Richard Shelby

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the resolution that I offered yesterday with Senator Sessions and many of my colleagues which recognizes the 30th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Lunar Landing. Mr. President, for thousands of years, men looked to the sky and were fascinated by the moon. To our forefathers it was a source of wonder, hope, curiosity and fear. Near enough to draw their attention, yet so far beyond their reach to remain a constant mystery, the moon was an unattainable destination for the people of earth. Undaunted by the significance of the task, President Kennedy called upon our nation ``to commit itself to achieving the goal . . . of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth.'' With this challenge, a goal that had previously exceeded the grasp of every generation, became the mission of the United States to achieve within ten years. Facing this great endeavor, the men and women of the American Space Program set to work with steadfast conviction. While their efforts produced steady results, there were tragic losses and technical setbacks that tested their resolve. Brave men gave their lives. Brilliant men and women spent countless hours trying to work through the numerous difficulties associated with such a complex undertaking. However, all remained dedicated to the goal of landing a man on the moon. On July 20, 1969, 30 years ago yesterday, that goal was achieved. On that day, Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin closed the timeless breach that had separated the earth from the moon and landed on the Sea of Tranquility. With Neil Armstrong's first step on the lunar surface, the American Space Program met the awesome challenge set by President Kennedy. This important event marks America's ascendance to the preeminent role that it occupies today as the world's leader in space exploration. While yesterday was an important anniversary for all the people of the world, it was especially important for the people of the United States. Landing men on the moon represents a great triumph of American endeavor. As the Spanish could be proud for having built the great ships that carried Columbus on his voyage of discovery, American scientists and engineers can feel equally proud for having built the Saturn V Rocket, the vehicle that carried the astronauts to the moon. That no other nation has produced a similar vehicle is a testament to the unparalleled achievement of our Space Program. This resolution celebrates the anniversary of the great achievement of landing men on the moon. It celebrates the efforts of the many men and women who defied the odds and helped to make what was once believed to be impossible, possible. Finally, it celebrates the courageous spirit of the American people.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I concur with Senator Kerrey. I commend Senators Levin, Kyl, Domenici, Murkowski, and others who brought about the progress on the bill. I urge adoption of the amendments en bloc.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it now be in order to offer a substitute amendment which consists of the committee- reported bill, S. 1009, a managers' package of amendments, and all previously agreed to amendments. The substitute is at the desk, and I ask for its consideration.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator from Nebraska. This is an agreed-on amendment. A lot of work has gone into it. I commend the Senator from Michigan, the Senator from Arizona, and also the Senator from New Mexico in fashioning this with their staff. I urge adoption of the amendment.

Mr. SHELBY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SHELBY. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. SHELBY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SHELBY. I urge adoption of the amendment, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to Mr. Jack Warner, a pillar of the Tuscaloosa business community and a man of deep passion both in his business and personal pursuits. The former Chairman and CEO of Gulf States Paper Corporation, I would like to recognize him for the work that he and his wife, Elizabeth, have contributed to Tuscaloosa in the form of time, expertise and money to many local causes. The pragmatic approach that he has brought to his life combines old- fashioned common sense with a flexible philosophy. This philosophy has evolved over time, through two world wars, numerous labor strikes, and tough financial circumstances. Through it all, Jack Warner has remained steadfast in his beliefs and a pioneer from which others might draw inspiration. He has made tough business decisions throughout the years, and through it all kept Gulf States Paper privately owned, when so many other companies have gone public. His gritty determination has led to financial success, which has helped him to pursue his personal interests and also allowed him to give back to the Tuscaloosa community. Jack Warner truly represents an era when a man presented his best effort to any obstacle in his path. As an officer in the Army's last horse-mounted unit, his cavalry unit was sent to India to pack supplies along the Burma trail during World War II. Once there, his unit was issued mules instead of horses, which would be enough to take the wind out of any proud soldier's sails. Jack Warner persevered however, and his regiment ended up making a significant contribution to the War effort when a traditional cavalry unit would have had little to offer. This story encapsulates the life of Jack Warner, demonstrating persistence through adversity, and a humble focus to get the job done right. Jack Warner has made a tremendous impact on Tuscaloosa and the surrounding area. In fact, he has recently completed the redecoration of the University of Alabama President's Mansion at his own expense. Perhaps almost as importantly, Jack followed through with the renovation to the last small detail, going so far as to choose the drapery as well as replacing a smaller chandelier with an immense late 18th century Waterford crystal chandelier. Again, this typifies the man which has been so integral to the Tuscaloosa community, not only providing the money for the project, but following through and making sure everything turned out right. His commitment to Tuscaloosa and the State of Alabama is greatly appreciated.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Forests & Public Land Management of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be granted permission to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, July 21, for purposes of conducting a subcommittee hearing which is scheduled to begin at 2:00 p.m. The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony on S. 1184, a bill to authorize the Secretary to dispose of land for recreation or other public purposes; S. 1129, a bill to facilitate the acquisition of inholdings in Federal land management units and the disposal of surplus public land, and for other purposes; and H.R. 150, a bill to amend the Act popularly known as the Recreation and Public Purposes Act to authorize disposal of certain public lands or national forest lands to local education agencies for use for elementary or secondary schools, including public charter schools, and for other purposes.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, July 21, 1999 at 4:30 p.m. to hold a hearing.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask consent that the Senate insist on its amendment, request a conference with the House, and the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees on the part of the Senate.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it now be in order to offer a substitute amendment which consists of the committee- reported bill, S. 1009; a managers' package of amendments; and all previously agreed to amendments.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SHELBY. What is the pending business?

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, on May 5 of this year the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence unanimously reported out of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. It subsequently referred to the Committee on Armed Services, where it was reported out on June 8. Senator Kerrey and I have once again worked very closely together to address our critical need for high-quality intelligence by allocating resources in a manner designed to ensure that this need is met. In preparing this legislation, the committee conducted a detailed review of the administration's three major intelligence budget requests for fiscal year 2000. They are the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities of the Military Services. The committee held briefings and hearings with senior intelligence officials, reviewed budget justification materials, and considered responses to specific questions posed by the committee. As in the past, the committee also impaneled a group of outside experts composed of distinguished scientists, industry leaders, and retired general and flag officers to review specific technical issues within the intelligence community. The panel is known as the Technical Advisory Group and is similar to the Defense Department's Defense Science Board in some ways. This group brings an invaluable level of expertise to the committee's work, and we owe them a debt of gratitude for their service. Many of their recommendations have been incorporated into this bill before the Senate this evening. Once again the committee has focused on what we refer to as the ``five C's''. They are: counterproliferation, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, covert action, and counterintelligence. The last of the five, counterintelligence, has received a great deal of congressional and media attention in recent months in light of revelations of espionage activities by the People's Republic of China. I am proud to say that the Intelligence Committee has been attempting to address the shortcomings of the Department of Energy's counterintelligence program for nearly 10 years, often to no avail. In fact, it was the Intelligence Committee that directed the study that finally led to the drafting and signing of Presidential Decision Directive 61. Before I turn to the legislative provisions in this bill, I feel compelled to share with our colleagues some comments about the current state of our defense and intelligence preparedness. In the immediate aftermath of the cold war, optimistic appraisals of our intelligence and security requirements generated calls for dramatic cuts in defense and intelligence spending. The first national security decision made by President Clinton on taking office in 1993 was to cut more than $120 billion from the defense budget. Substantial cuts were also made to classified intelligence programs. Unfortunately, such optimistic estimates have proved sadly wrong. Today we face a series of transnational threats spanning the spectrum of conflict from terrorist acts committed on U.S. territory to the development of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by Third World countries. I recently traveled to the Balkans and reviewed some of our intelligence activities in Europe. Military and civilian personnel were routinely working in excess of 80 hours a week, and that pace was nonstop throughout the Kosovo conflict. Regretfully, the problems the military and the intelligence community are experiencing are partly our fault. Congress accepted ``defense on the cheap,'' and we have gotten exactly what we paid for as we always do--an intelligence community and military force stretched to its limits. I believe the result is clear: We are not prepared to meet the challenges of a complex and dangerous world. National security cannot be had on the cheap, and we have attempted to address some of the shortfalls in this year's bill. The bill's classified schedule of authorizations and annex--I remind every Senator--are available for review just off the Senate floor. I repeat: The bill's classified schedule of authorizations and annex are available to every Senator in this body for review just off the Senate floor. I will now discuss the significant unclassified legislative provisions contained in the bill. First, section 304 directs the President to require an employee who requires access to classified information to provide written consent that permits an authorized investigative agency to access information stored in computers used in the performance of Government duties. This provision is intended to avoid the problems we have seen with the FBI's reluctance to access ``Government'' computers without a warrant in the course of an espionage investigation. There should be no question--yes, there should be no question--that investigative agencies may search the computer of an individual with access to classified information. This provision makes that perfectly clear. Second, sections 501 through 505 comprise the Department of Energy Sensitive Country Foreign Visitors Moratorium Act of 1999. What is that? Section 502 establishes a moratorium on foreign visitors to classified facilities at Department of Energy National Laboratories. The moratorium applies only to citizens of nations on the Department of Energy ``sensitive countries list.'' Section 502 also provides for a waiver of the moratorium on a case- by-case basis if the Secretary of Energy justifies the waiver and certifies that the visit is necessary for the national security of the United States. Section 503 requires that the Secretary of Energy perform background checks on all foreign visitors to the National Laboratories. The term ``background checks'' means the consultation of all available, appropriate, and relevant intelligence community and law enforcement databases. Section 504 requires an interim report to Congress on the counterintelligence activities at the National Laboratories and a net assessment of the Foreign Visitors Program at the National Laboratories to be produced by a panel of experts. Most importantly, the report must include a recommendation as to whether the moratorium should be continued or repealed. The Senate Intelligence Committee has been critical of the Department of Energy's counterintelligence program for nearly 10 years. Beginning in 1990, we identified serious shortfalls in funding and personnel dedicated to protecting our Nation's nuclear secrets. Yet year after year--and this year as well--the committee has provided funds and directed many reviews and studies in an effort to persuade the Department of Energy to take action. Unfortunately, this and prior administrations failed to heed our warnings. Consequently, a serious espionage threat at our National Labs has gone virtually unabated and it appears that our nuclear weapons program may have suffered extremely grave damage. I believe we must take steps to ensure the integrity of our National Labs. We understand that a moratorium on the Foreign Visitors Program may be perceived by some as a draconian measure, but until the Department of Energy fully implements a comprehensive and sustained counterintelligence program, we believe that we must err on the side of caution. The stakes are too high. The moratorium requires a net assessment to be conducted by a panel of experts; this is an integral part of a comprehensive report by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the FBI on the counterintelligence activities at the National Laboratories. Only then should we decide whether to lift the moratorium in favor of a comprehensive plan. I believe this is a very important point. During our preliminary look in the committee into the problems at the DOE labs, we were convinced that the FBI could and should be required to inform an agency or department that they are investigating an employee of that particular agency. Accordingly, section 602 of the bill requires the FBI to establish meaningful liaison with the relevant agency at the beginning stages of a counterintelligence investigation. This section also amends the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995 to make clear that the FBI's obligation to consult with departments and agencies concerned begins when the FBI has knowledge of espionage activities from other sources or as a result of its own information or investigation. In closing, I must remind the Members of this body, my colleagues, of an unfortunate fact. This is the last time that Senator Kerrey, the distinguished senior Senator from Nebraska, will bring an intelligence authorization bill to the floor of the Senate as the vice chairman of the committee. Senator Kerrey's tenure on the committee will conclude at the end of this year. This past March 14, as some of you will recall, marked the 30th anniversary of the day that Lieutenant, Junior Grade, Bob Kerrey, leading his SEAL team on an operation on an island in the bay of Nha Trang earned our Nation's highest award for valor, the Medal of Honor. No one who knows Bob Kerrey's military record would question his physical courage, but I would like to talk for just a few minutes about another type of courage he has, and that is moral courage. In a town like Washington that rewards neither, he is the rare man who has both, I believe. The wartime history of the United States Navy has documented his physical courage, but I want to recognize his moral courage. And I want to tell you why. Senator Kerrey has taken stands that many of us would consider politically unwise. He took a stand on entitlements reform here in the Senate long before it was politically wise to do so. It can be said he laid his bare hand on the ``third rail of American politics'' and took the heat--something few in this body were willing to attempt. As vice chairman of this committee, Senator Kerrey has often taken issue with his own administration when he believed it was in the national interest to do so. Indeed, he always puts the interests of the Nation ahead of politics. Also, Senator Kerrey's knowledge of our intelligence needs is unparalleled in the Senate. And I will miss his service, as others will, on the Intelligence Committee. Senator Kerrey has set a very high standard for his successor, and I thank him for his dedication and integrity, and also for his personal friendship. It has been a pleasure and an honor to work with Nebraska's senior Senator. I look forward to joining him on the floor one last time when the conference report for this bill reaches the floor later this year. Until that time, though, we will continue to work closely to conduct vigorous oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States in the nonpartisan spirit that created this important and unique committee. Mr. President, before I yield the floor, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the Congressional Budget Office cost estimate for S. 1009 be printed in the Record.

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I also support the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski amendment that is the pending business in the Senate. I take just a minute to commend the Senator from Arizona, Senator Kyl, and Senator Domenici and Senator Murkowski for working together on this very important amendment. It is important for the restructuring of our labs following the Rudman recommendation and others. Most Members know the horror stories that have been going on for years and years. This won't solve everything, but it will be a positive step in the right direction. I also note my colleague from Nebraska, the vice chairman of the committee, Senator Kerrey, and I both support this. That is unusual. We believe this is not a partisan issue. This is important for the Nation as far as national security is concerned. It is a step in the right direction. It is above politics, above party. I mention again, as I did yesterday, the Rudman report, which was requested by the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, concluded that purely administrative reorganizational changes at the Department of Energy labs are inadequate, totally inadequate to the challenge at hand. He said: To ensure its long-term success, this new agency must be established by statute. That is exactly what the amendment of Senators Kyl, Domenici, and Murkowski does. As an indication of how badly the Department of Energy is broken, I only have to remind my colleagues it took over 100 studies of counterintelligence, security and management practices by the FBI, other intelligence agencies, the General Accounting Office, the Department of Energy itself and others, plus one enormous espionage scandal to create the impetus for change that is before the Senate this evening. I think it is time for the Senate to act. I believe this is a good amendment. It is positive. It has been worked. I believe we will pass it. Mr. President, I support the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski amendment to restructure the Department of Energy. I am a cosponsor of that amendment, as is the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Kerrey. By now, my colleagues are familiar with the findings of the Rudman report, entitled ``Science at its Best; Security at its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy.'' But I think certain key conclusions are worth restating, because they underline the need for action. The Rudman report found that: At the birth of DOE, the brilliant scientific breakthroughs of the nuclear weapons laboratories came with a troubling record of security administration. Twenty years later, virtually every one of its original problems persists. . . . Multiple chains of command and standards of performance negated accountability, resulting in pervasive inefficiency, confusion, and mistrust. . . . In response to these problems, the Department has been the subject of a nearly unbroken history of dire warnings and attempted but aborted reforms. Building on the conclusions of the 1997 Institute for Defense Analyses report and the 1999 Chiles Commission, the Rudman panel concluded that: The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself. . . . Reorganization is clearly warranted to resolve the many specific problems . . . in the weapons laboratories, but also to address the lack of accountability that has become endemic throughout the entire Department. The panel is convinced that real and lasting security and counterintelligence reform at the weapons labs is simply unworkable within DOE's current structure and culture. . . . To achieve the kind of protection that these sensitive labs must have, they and their functions must have their own autonomous operational structure free of all the other obligations imposed by DOE management. To provide ``deep and lasting structural change that will give the weapons laboratories the accountability, clear lines of authority, and priority they deserve,'' the Rudman Report endorsed two possible solutions: Creation of a wholly independent agency such as NASA to perform weapons research and nuclear stockpile management functions; or Placing weapons research and nuclear stockpile management functions in a ``new semi-autonomous agency within DOE that has a clear mission, streamlined bureaucracy, and drastically simplified lines of authority and accountability.'' The latter option is the approach contained in the Kyl-Domenici- Murkowski amendment. The new semi-autonomous agency, the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship, will be a single agency, within the DOE, with responsibility for all activities of our nuclear weapons complex, including the National Laboratories--nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and disposition of fissile materials. This agency will be led by an Undersecretary. The Undersecretary will be in charge of and responsible for all aspects of the agency's work, will report--directly and solely--to the Secretary of Energy, and will be subject to the supervision and direction of the Secretary. The Secretary of Energy will retail full authority over all activities of this agency. Thus, for the first time, this critical function of our national government will have the clear chain of command that it requires. As recommended by the Rudman report, the new agency will have its own senior officials responsible for counterintelligence and security matters within the agency. These officials will carry out the counterintelligence and security policies established by the Secretary and will report to the Undersecretary and have direct access to the Secretary. The Agency will have a Senior official responsible for the analysis and assessment of intelligence, who will also report to the Undersecretary and have direct access to the Secretary. The Rudman report concluded that purely administrative re- organizational changes are inadequate to the challenge at hand: ``To ensure its long-term success, this new agency must be established by statute.'' For if the history of attempts to reform DOE underscores one thing, it is the ability of the DOE and the labs to hunker down and outwait and outlast Secretaries and other would-be agents of change--even Presidents. For example, as documented by Senator Rudman and his colleagues, ``even after President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 61 ordering that the Department make fundamental changes in security procedures, compliance by Department bureaucrats was grudging and belated.'' At the same time, we in the Senate should recognize that our work will not be done even after this amendment is adopted and enacted into law. As the Rudman report warned, DOE cannot be fixed by a single legislative act: management must follow mandate. . . . Thus, both Congress and the Executive branch . . . should be prepared to monitor the progress of the Department's reforms for years to come. Mr. President, it is an indication of how badly the Department of Energy is broken that it took over one hundred studies of counterintelligence, security and management practices--by the FBI and other intelligence agencies, the GAO, the DOE itself, and others, plus one enormous espionage scandal--to create the impetus for change. Now is the time for the Senate to act. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SHELBY

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I will take a minute this evening to thank Senator Coverdell and also Senator Feinstein for having the foresight and initiative to expand and to improve upon what is already a highly successful weapon in our Nation's fight against international narcotics trafficking. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act was expanded 4 years ago under Executive order to target specific drug trafficking kingpins operating from Colombia. Our colleagues' legislation expands upon that Executive order by allowing similar actions to be taken against additional kingpins worldwide. Any future designation of foreign narcotics traffickers under this act would still be made by the President, but recommendations to the President will now come from the entire U.S. counter-narcotics community, to include law enforcement, intelligence, and regulatory officials. Once designated, those foreign drug kingpins would soon see their access to the U.S. economy completely disappear. Without the ability to place illicitly derived proceeds into commerce and trade in the United States, these kingpins and their illicit organizations will wither and fade away. Denying these foreign traffickers the opportunity to participate in the vibrant and growing U.S. economy is truly a decisive weapon in the war on drugs. I again thank my colleagues for their fine work on this measure. I also state for the Record that I fully support and approve incorporating their measure into the Legislation Authorization Act which is before the Senate. I also state that my colleague, the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Kerrey, has asked I note for the Senate that he also concurs in this amendment and extends his congratulations. I urge adoption of this amendment.

Mr. SHELBY. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. SHELBY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.