Brad Sherman

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, in the ideologically perfect world of Ayn Rand novels, there is no Ex-Im Bank for the United States or any other country. In the real world, Germany has an export credit agency. China has one. Canada has one. They are all much bigger than ours. When I gave 100 speeches for George McGovern, they accused us of favoring unilateral military disarmament. Now, we see some who are in favor of unilateral economic disarmament. Our products face tough competition, and sometimes the order goes to whomever has the best financing. Ninety percent of Ex-Im Bank's loans go to small business and the other 10 percent help Big Business buy from American suppliers. Two hundred and fifty Members of this Congress support Ex-Im Bank, with particular courage among the 40-something Republicans who signed the discharge petition. As co-chair of the CPA Caucus, let me tell you, the Ex-Im Bank makes a substantial profit under generally accepted accounting principles. That is why they have been able to transfer $7 billion to the Treasury. Ronald Reagan said: The Export-Import Bank contributes in a significant way to our Nation's export sales.

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, tomorrow the Select Committee on Benghazi will hold hearings certain to drive congressional approval ratings to new lows. The majority leader, the leader of the Republicans, and the New York Republican, Mr. Hanna, and former Republican Committee staffers have all confessed that the purpose of this committee is no governmental purpose, but the political purpose of driving down Secretary Clinton's approval ratings and political prospects. And for that, we have spent 4.5 million taxpayer dollars. Even before those admissions, it was apparent that that was the purpose of this committee. They have held four hearings in 17 months and developed nothing of significance. They have abandoned plans to have hearings with top intelligence and defense officials. They have done nothing up until now. Yet, tomorrow, they are set to spend 8 hours grilling one woman. Nothing about the tragedy in Benghazi has been revealed by this committee, and nothing will be revealed tomorrow. All this committee has done is focus on what has been referred to as Secretary Clinton's damn emails. Look at the rules that bind Congress on emails. We are free to use any server. We are free to keep and delete or to take the emails with us. We have got an 8 percent approval rating. It is going down tomorrow as a result of what the Benghazi Committee plans to do.

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. I do want to quote out of it. The CFPB recognizes that ``the mortgage industry has needed to make significant systems and operational changes to adjust to the requirements of the Rule.'' It goes on to set forward why we need this grace period; and we need to make sure the grace period applies to both private and public enforcement.

Mr. SHERMAN. He has responded to my question and said of this grace period, so it will ``be diagnostic and corrective, not punitive, and there will be time for them to work to get it right.''

Mr. SHERMAN. Will the gentleman yield? You said you would yield to a Democrat who could quote Mr. Cordray.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, back in the old days, this bill would have just passed on suspension. It is bipartisan, it is small, and it is temporary. Both sides have praised the CFPB's efforts in coming out with this rule. Both sides believe in a grace period, and the question before us is whether we should codify that grace period and apply it to trial lawyer enforcement, or whether we should have it be more vague than the chairman would want, and whether this grace period should apply to private enforcement or only government enforcement. Mr. Speaker, 91 Democrats called for this grace period. Half the Democrats on the committee voted for the bill. The bill applies only until the end of January. It is small, it is temporary, and it applies only to lenders who operate in good faith. I said until the end of January. Some would say it applies until February 1. Either way, it is a temporary bill. I know the pressure the Democrats are under. Anybody who shows up at Democratic club meetings, they are thinking that any bill, no matter how small, temporary, or practical, that is favored by the financial services industry must be a complete sellout to banks. Well, as one of the leaders against the $700 billion TARP bill, I can go to any Democratic club holding my head up high even if I vote for bills that are practical and yet may clash with some ideology. The CFPB recognized the importance of this grace period, saying in the letter of October 1: We recognize that the industry needs to make significant systems and operational changes. They document all those changes and review them. That is why they provide for a grace period which they have indicated may last longer than 4 months. So why are smaller participants in the industry, small escrow companies and small lenders, backing away, abandoning consumers to only the biggest who know how to comply with this complicated 1,888- page regulation without worrying about a period of a shakedown cruise to get organized? Why? Because although they have got the restrained administrative enforcement that has been praised, they don't have the restrained trial lawyer enforcement. This bill effectuates what the CFPB is trying to do: let people go, do a shakedown cruise, make sure that things operate correctly, and do so knowing that if they act in good faith, they won't face retribution. But the CFPB can do that only with regard to governmental enforcement. It is up to this Congress to make sure that it applies to private enforcement. That is the purpose of this bill. Let us achieve the purpose that the CFPB had when they issued their letter of October 1. Let us make sure that those who act in good faith will not face retribution. Let us make sure that the smaller mortgage lenders and smaller escrow companies can continue to operate if they try to do so in good faith. Let us not hand a huge competitive advantage to those players in the industry that have the most lawyers and the most sophisticated computer programmers. If we are going to have a grace period, it needs to apply to both private enforcement through lawsuits as well as public enforcement through the CFPB. That is why I hope that Members will vote for this bill. Madam Speaker, I enter into the Record this letter of October 1. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Washington, DC, October 1, 2015. Re Your inquiry regarding supervisory practices. Frank Keating, President and CEO, American Bankers Association, Washington,

Mr. SHERMAN. I am so close to that, you should yield to me.

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I voted against H.R. 3460. I regret that this bill was brought to the floor without even a discussion, let alone a markup, in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Had it been marked up in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, I would have offered an amendment to strike the date so that the President's authority to waive sanctions was either eliminated entirely or eliminated for three years or five years. Unfortunately the text of the bill implies that the next president will be more capable of making decisions regarding Iran than the current president. I have disagreed with President Obama on Iran policy, but I think it is absurd to assume that the next president will make better policy, especially when we have no idea who that individual will be.

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, when I came to this House in 1997, a few months after I started serving on the Foreign Affairs Committee, I said back then that the Iran nuclear program was the greatest single threat to the security of Americans. It was true then. It is true now. On July 14, a few hours after the deal was published, I came to this floor and said that what this House ought to do is consider a Resolution of Approval of the nuclear deal and to vote it down by a large vote. That is exactly what we will do tomorrow morning. Let me go through a number of points that proponents and opponents of this deal can both agree on. The first is this resolution is quite a bit different than the one we have been thinking about for the last month. This is a Resolution of Approval. And even if we vote it down, the President can and will carry out this agreement. That is very different from the Resolution of Disapproval that we have all talked about and made commitments about. We don't have any commitments on this resolution. It is a totally new resolution. This resolution will express the feelings of Congress, but will not prevent the President from carrying out the deal. Second, we can agree this deal is better during the next year and a half than it is the next decade. The controls on Iran's nuclear program are much stronger for the first 10 years than they are thereafter. Whether you like the deal or hate the deal, you have got to agree that it is better up front than it is in the out-years. The third thing we can agree on is that the President only promised Iran that he would sign the deal and that he would carry out the deal and that he would use his veto, as he has threatened to do and has successfully done, in effect--that he would carry out the deal using his powers to do so. That is already settled. Mr. Speaker, the President never told Iran that Congress would approve this deal. Why should we give Iran more than they bargained for? They bargained for the President's signature together with his freedom to carry out the deal. That is already settled. Why should we give Iran something extra in return for nothing? We should not vote to approve this deal. The next thing we can all agree on is that this deal is not a binding agreement as a matter of U.S. Constitutional law or international law. The Constitution defines a treaty. This is not a treaty and certainly wouldn't get a two-thirds vote confirmation in the Senate. If you look at the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, this is not a ratified treaty, it is not an unratified treaty, it is not a legislative executive agreement. It is simply an agreement between the executives of the respective governments. Mr. Speaker, the next thing we can agree on is that we don't know what the best policy for America is in the next decade. Let's keep our options open. Iran is not legally bound by this agreement. Even if they were, they would conveniently ignore that any day of the week. We cannot feel that we are legally bound. Now, as a legal matter, we are not. But appearances matter. And if this agreement that has been signed by the President gets a positive vote of approval in this House, there will be those around the world who believe that it is binding on the United States, even while, as a legal matter, it is not binding on Iran and, oh, by the way, their legislature hasn't voted to approve it. So we need freedom of action. What form will that action take? Will we demand that Iran continue to limit its nuclear program beyond year 10, beyond year 15? After all, we are continuing the sanctions relief all through the next decade. I don't know if that will be the right policy or not. Mr. Speaker, the current President's hands are untied. He gets to carry out his policy for the remainder of the term. Vote no on this resolution. Because if we vote yes, we are tying the hands of future Presidents in a decade to come.

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor the life of Lou Lenart, a hero to both the United States and Israel, who passed away July 20, 2015 at the age of 94. Today we remember Lou for his service in the Marines during World War II as well as in the Israel Air Force in 1948 when he was dubbed ``The Man Who Saved Tel Aviv.'' Lou Lenart was born in 1921 to Jewish farmers in a small village in Hungary. When Lenart was 10, his family moved to the United States to escape widespread anti-Semitism. Sadly, he and his family were subjected to anti-Semitic taunting in his new home of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. At 17, Lenart enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps where he fought in World War II and won the Gold Star flying in Okinawa. In 1948 Lenart became one of the first members of Israel's budding Air Force, which at that time had just four Czech-built German Messerschmitt fighter planes. On May 29, 1948, Egyptian forces of about 500 vehicles were closing in on Tel Aviv, threatening the very existence of the two-week old state of Israel. Israeli commanders decided to risk all four planes to attack the advance. As the most experienced pilot in the group (and in fact the only pilot with combat experience), Lenart led the attack, with future President Ezer Weizman as his wingman. Stunned by the sight of bona fide Israeli fighter planes, the Egyptians stopped their advance and were forced to retreat. Lenart's key role in this mission earned him the title, in many news reports, as ``The Man Who Saved Tel Aviv.'' Lenart later told the IAF journal, ``It was the most important event in my life . . . I survived World War II so I could lead this mission.'' Following the war, Lenart helped in airlifting Iraqi Jews to Israel in Operation Ezra and Nehemiah. He also became a pilot for El Al Airlines and spent time living in Southern California, where he produced six feature films including Iron Eagle and Iron Eagle II. Lou Lenart's legacy will live on in both Israel and the United States. He fought in our armed services to protect our freedom, and then risked his life again for Israel in its vulnerable and early stages. His life and story are an inspiration for those seeking hope and strength in the face of persecution. I send my sincerest condolences to his family.

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by praising Mr. Garamendi, the gentleman from California, for this excellent presentation on why we should make it in America. But I am here today to talk about something that was made in Vienna, namely, the Iran nuclear deal. I am going to start with a few observations and then get to the heart of my remarks. The first observation is that we ought to set the record straight. The sanctions that brought Iran to the table were imposed by Congress over the objection of the executive branch of government. For 30 years, Congress had it right, and for 30 years, the executive branch had it wrong. For 30 years, every time we passed sanctions acts, they would be argued against and thwarted and watered down due to the efforts of several administrations. The only time Congress got it wrong is when the House of Representatives got it right and passed tough sanctions legislation that went over to the Senate where, unfortunately, some in the senior body listened to the administrations at the time and failed to pass our legislation. The second observation I would like to make is that the deal in Vienna lifts a number of sanctions which were not imposed as a result of Iran's nuclear activity. It provides greater sanctions relief than that which was supposed to be provided. I, in particular, note that the arms embargo against Iran, an Iran that has created so much mischief in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere, will be phased out and the Iran Sanctions Act will be waived. The Iran Sanctions Act was passed by the Congress in the early 1990s. A review of that bill indicates that only one of three reasons it was passed was Iran's work with WMDs. And, of course, weapons of mass destruction come in three forms, not only the nuclear, but also the chemical and the biological. So I would reckon that only one-ninth of the reason Congress passed that bill was Iran's nuclear program, and yet those sanctions are being waived. And finally, we see that the sanctions relief is so complete that not only are we waiving our secondary sanctions and allowing Iran to do business with the rest of the world, we are even allowing Iran to export to the United States. We won't buy their oil, but we will buy the things that we don't need and they couldn't sell anywhere else. The next observation I would like to make is that there are those who say this deal may only work for about 10 years, but the Iranian Government will get better over the next 10 years. Do not hold your breath. The whole purpose of sanctions is to put pressure on the government, which either causes it to change its policy or creates a change in regime. That is what you do when you are trying to force a change in government. Showering this government with economic benefits is not going to lead to its destruction or its eclipse. Look at Tehran. What you see is what you get. Another observation is about missiles. It is unfortunate that this deal will allow Iran, in 8 years, to get more missile technology. There is only one reason for them to be working on intercontinental ballistic missiles, and that is to deliver a nuclear payload to a different continent than their own--namely, ours; namely, Europe. There is no other reason. Iran is not trying to fly to the Moon. They are trying to get a nuclear device to North America or Europe. But let us not be sanguine one way or the other about missiles. A nuclear weapon--they vary in size, but they are about the size of a person, and you can smuggle one into the United States inside a bale of marijuana. So while we should be doing everything possible to stop Iran's missile program, the heart of our effort has got to be to stop their nuclear weapons program. The heart of my speech is to focus on the deal from a nuclear weapons perspective. Now, the political pundits outside this Capitol are all trying to make this an ``evaluate the President'': Are you for him or are you against him? Is this a good deal? Did the President do a good job? Those questions may be relevant to those seeking ratings on this or that cable television channel, but we in Congress have got to deal with a completely different question: What should Congress do at this time under these circumstances in the real world as it exists today where the President has agreed to sign this deal, not as it existed 2 days ago, not as it existed a decade ago when we should have been enforcing sanctions laws, but what should Congress do today? Now, in order to reach that conclusion, we need to look at the overall deal and realize that it has different phases. It is a different deal over time. So let us look at the deal from the good, the bad, and the ugly. In the first year, the most important good parts occur. Iran must ship 90 percent of its uranium stockpiles out of country and mothball two-thirds of the centrifuges. As we craft our policy, we should be loathe to give up those two advantages. We must, whenever we focus on anything, say, yes, there are some bad parts of this deal, but two- thirds of the centrifuges, 90 percent of the stockpiles, that is something we need to be focused on. So that is the good. The bad also occurs in the first year. Iran will get its hands on $120 billion-plus of their own money that we have under the sanctions been able to freeze in various money centers around the world. What will they use this $120 billion for? Part of it will go to help their own people because they have raised expectations. A good chunk of it will go to graft and corruption in the Iranian regime because it is, after all, the Iranian regime. A large portion of that money will go to kill Sunni Muslims. Some of them deserve it, most do not. And what is left over will be used to kill Americans and Israelis. So there is bad in the first year and good in the first year. But what is truly ugly occurs after 10 years. After year 10, Iran can have an unlimited number of centrifuges of unlimited quality. As the President himself says, at that point, their breakout time, the amount of time from the day they kick out the inspectors to the day when they have enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, shrinks to virtually zero days for the first bomb, a few more days for the second bomb. Why is this? Because after 10 years, Iran will be allowed to create a huge industrial facility capable of supporting several electric generation nuclear plants. It is counterintuitive, but true, that it takes an awful lot more enrichment to power a nuclear plant than to create a nuclear bomb. In effect, we will be in a situation where it is as if Iran has an industrial-sized giant bakery capable of feeding many of their cities, and all they need for a nuclear bomb is a bag full of breadcrumbs. Obviously, once they go big, once they go industrial, once we get to the ugly part of this deal, Iran is a nuclear power--perhaps not an admitted nuclear power, but a nuclear power nevertheless. So we are faced with the good, the bad, and the ugly. But the question is: What should Congress do? One choice before us, and it is, I hope, the choice we will take, is to consider a resolution of approval of this deal and to vote it down by an overwhelming majority. What will this do? It will demonstrate for the world that the American people, the American Congress, and future administrations are not morally or legally bound by this agreement. It will set the stage for a subsequent administration to demand that the limits on uranium centrifuges are continued well past year 10 of this agreement. So the current administration will take advantage of the good, we will suffer the bad, but in the future we will not have to deal with the ugly. The second approach we can take is to consider a resolution of disapproval. Unlike a resolution of approval, a resolution of disapproval, if adopted, would have immediate legal effects under U.S. law. It would blow a hole in the deal. But as I will get to it, possibly the wrong hole and perhaps no hole at all. Because if we were to consider a resolution of disapproval, I think it would pass this House. I think it might get 60 votes in the other body. The President has already announced he will veto it. And then, as far as I can tell, we would not override the veto. Now, this would have a similar legal effect to us voting down a resolution of approval. Overall, the majority of the House and the majority of the Senate would have voted to disapprove. But that last picture will be a picture of the proponents of this agreement winning by not losing more than two-thirds of the vote. That conveys in the most confused way the fact that this agreement will not be binding on future administrations and future Congresses. There is, of course, the possibility that we somehow override a Presidential veto. That does not put us back where we were yesterday. That does not reinstitute sanctions. That does not create a good platform for creating a better deal, because by then many UN sanctions will be lifted. Our trading partners in Europe will already be doing business. The President will have told the world that Iran is acting reasonably and Congress is acting unreasonably. Under such circumstance, Iran would get the lion's share of sanctions relief. They would be denied some sanctions relief because U.S. law would remain in effect. But Iran would have every excuse not to deliver the important good parts of this deal, not to ship their uranium stockpiles out of the country, not to decommission two-thirds of their centrifuges. So if we pass over a Presidential veto, a resolution of disapproval, we have not blown up the deal and taken us back to where we had the deal. Rather, we have created a circumstance where Iran has literally split the U.S. Government, with Congress pushing in one direction, the President pushing in another direction, and every nation in the world taking its cue from the President. Instead, I suggest that we would be in a stronger position if we demonstrate to the world that Congress does not accept this agreement, it is not binding on the American people, the President may not be legally constrained for the remainder of his term in implementing this deal, getting us the good, suffering the bad, but knowing that the ugly is something that needs to be confronted by another administration. It is another administration that needs to prevent Iran from claiming that it will have the right to unlimited centrifuges 10 years from now but, instead, demanding a renegotiation of this deal. Finally, the sanctions relief promised in Vienna is relief only from those sanctions due to Iran's nuclear program. It is not a get-out-of- jail-free card. It is not a protection and a grant of authority to Tehran to engage in all kinds of evil activity in the Middle East and elsewhere. If Iran continues to support Assad, we need to impose additional sanctions for that reason. If they continue to destabilize Yemen, we need to impose sanctions for that reason. And we cannot give Iran a free pass just because they have entered into this particular deal. This is not rapprochement with Iran. This is a deal that has, in its first year, the good and the bad and, in its 10th year, is so ugly that we have to demand additional negotiations. When we make that demand, we need to make that demand in the voice of a President in a future administration who is determined to say that Iran can never have an unlimited number of centrifuges, Iran can never have an unlimited quality of centrifuges, Iran can never be a few days from a nuclear weapon, and that, in order to prevent that, we have the legal right to put all options on the table. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, we may be hours away from a deal with Iran. The question before us is not is it a good deal or is it a bad deal or what should the executive branch of government do. The question before us is what should Congress do if we have a President who has signed the deal. We don't know precisely what is in the deal. But we do know that it has advantages and disadvantages in the first year because it causes the vast majority of Iranian stockpile of enriched uranium and the majority of their centrifuges to be taken off the table. The disadvantage is it provides the Iranian Government with access to $120 billion plus of its own money. We do know that, in the next decade, the deal will be unacceptable because next decade Iran will be able to have massive enrichment facilities. So the question before Congress is, first, how do we prevent this deal from being morally binding on the American people next decade with that administration and that Congress. And then the tougher issue is whether we want to forfeit the advantages, knowing there are disadvantages, of what the deal does in its first year. It is this kind of analysis, not partisans screaming about is it a good deal, is it a bad deal, that should guide us in the future.

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 423, had I been present, I would have voted ``no.''

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 422, had I been present, I would have voted ``yes.''

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the House bring up H.R. 1031--a bill to protect hundreds of thousands of American jobs by preventing the shutdown of the Ex-Im Bank.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. As he points out, we are 1 legislative day away from the end of the authorization of the Ex-Im Bank. American businesses are already losing contracts as foreign companies must decide whether to structure themselves around American equipment or whether to buy equipment from another source. That foreign source offers stable export promotion authority financing provided by the governments of Germany, Japan, China, et cetera; whereas, we dawdle here. The purpose of a rule is to decide how the House will devote its time here on the floor. The most pressing matter before us is the Export- Import Bank. That is why we should defeat the rule and focus the House on the most pressing matter, and we should allow the House to work its will. A majority of this body wants to reauthorize the Ex-Im Bank, but instead, we are being held hostage by a group inside only one of the two caucuses. I gave 100 speeches for George McGovern. I am proud of that. We were accused of unilateral disarmament being our platform. This is a platform for unilateral disarmament because this is a platform that says Germany, Japan, and China will provide concessionary financing to push their exports, and we will be disarmed in the world of business. The Export-Import Bank makes money. The CBO concludes that; generally accepted accounting principles conclude that. The enemies of the Bank have concocted a fantasy accounting system, and only under that system, used nowhere else, is there any argument that the Export-Import Bank does not make money. We have hundreds of thousands of American jobs at stake. They should not be sacrificed on the alter of a new religion. Ayn Rand is not a deity; ``Fountainhead'' is not Holy Scripture, and we need to make practical decisions in the real world where we face real competition from real competitors. That is why we need to focus the attention of this House on today's most pressing issue, the reauthorization of Ex-Im Bank.

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, if you vote for this bill, you get fast track without Trade Adjustment Assistance. There is no assurance Trade Adjustment Assistance will come to this floor or that it will come to this floor in a form that either Republicans or Democrats will support. The supporters of this deal can't make their case without repeating demonstrably false statistics. The fact is we won a $177 billion trade deficit in goods with the countries with which we have free trade agreements. The $75 billion surplus in services brings the net to over a $100 billion deficit. How have so many Members been misled by charlatan lobbyists into coming to this floor and giving false statistics? They are given this slippery phrase: Go down to the floor and talk about what has happened since NAFTA. Now, ``since NAFTA'' usually sounds like, well, since the early 1990s. What they mean is excluding NAFTA. Excluding NAFTA when we review free trade agreements is like excluding LeBron James when you evaluate the Cavaliers. This bill is catastrophic for our national security. It hollows out our manufacturing base, and it is the greatest gift to China that we could possibly make because it enshrines the sacrosanct nature of currency manipulation. It says, in the future, countries can manipulate their currency all they want and there will be no accounting for it. In addition, the rules of origin provisions allow goods that are admitted to be 50 or 60 percent made in China--that are actually 70 or 80 percent made in China--to get fast-tracked into the United States. So China gets 80 percent of the benefit of this agreement without having to admit a single American export. As for Vietnam, our workers are going to have to compete against 56- cent-an-hour labor.

Mr. SHERMAN. We are told that we will get free access to the Vietnamese markets. Vietnam doesn't have freedom. Vietnam doesn't have markets. They are not going to buy our exports any more than their Communist Party decides to do so. The chairman points out that with trade comes influence. That is right. There will be Nike lobbyists here, financed by this bill and its effects, lobbying against going after Vietnam for its oppression of religion and its oppression of unions. So they will have influence here in Washington. They will continue not to have freedom, and we will continue to lose jobs.

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Speaker, if we vote for trade promotion authority, fast track, without Trade Adjustment Assistance, if that is how we vote today, that is what we will get. The Republican chair of the Rules Committee has made it clear. He has already used his precious time to start blaming Democratic leadership for the fact that Trade Adjustment Assistance will not become law. The fact is that if Trade Adjustment Assistance ever comes before this House, it will, no doubt, be loaded up by the Republican leadership with a host of poison pills, making sure that Democrats cannot vote for it. I can't vote for Trade Adjustment Assistance if you terminate the Affordable Care Act as part of the bill, for example. Now the proponents of trade promotion authority have had to misstate the actual economic facts, the figures on our trade surpluses and deficits, in order to make their case. They have come again and again and said, we have a trade surplus with our free trade agreement partners. Completely false. I will put into the Record the chart listing each of our free trade agreement partners, and we are running a $177 billion deficit in goods. Including services, you are now down to a little over a $100 billion deficit. Now, how is it that Member after Member has come here and said something demonstrably false? They have been fooled by slippery charlatans who feed them the following line: Since NAFTA, we have a surplus with those countries that have a free trade agreement. ``Since NAFTA'' implies since the early 1990s. No, they mean those agreements we entered into after NAFTA. So they look at our free trade agreements while ignoring NAFTA. That is like looking at the Cavs and ignoring LeBron. You can't do that. Mr. Speaker, if you look at the success and failure of our free trade agreements, number one is NAFTA. If you include all of our free trade agreements, including NAFTA, we have a $177 billion goods deficit. And then if you look at MFN for China, most favored nation status for China, well, then you are talking $400 billion of deficit. That was not a free trade agreement. That was an even worse agreement. This TPP is a gift to China. First, it enshrines the idea that currency manipulation will be allowed, even encouraged. It sets Chinese rules for trade in Asia, preserving for them their number one tactic in running such a huge trade surplus with the United States. It hollows out American manufacturing, thus endangering our national security. And the rules of origin provision available for review in the basement will show you that goods that are 50 and 60 percent made in China, admitted to be made in China, which means actually 70 or 80 percent really made in China, come fast-tracked into the United States. China gets the benefit and doesn't have to make a single concession. Vote ``no.''

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, it is unacceptable that we have not debated in committee and on the floor of this House an AUMF and a foreign policy designed to fit current circumstances, designed to fit an Assad regime that has killed nearly 200,000 of his own people, designed to fit ISIS, which either is or isn't a part or a former part of al Qaeda. Instead, we operate under a resolution passed in the wake of the attacks in 2001. The resolution before us I do not think is the answer to the fact that Congress has not debated a new AUMF. The reason I rise to oppose it is because I urge Members to read it. It says that all forces must be withdrawn in 30 days unless there is some threat to their security. It says that it ends all deployment, but it is not clear how it applies to Air Force operations or Naval air operations. Presumably, we would stop all bombing under all circumstances. How does it apply to the rights of the President under current law to deploy our forces for 60 to 90 days if there would be some further outrage from the Assad regime? We need a new resolution that does Congress' best job to deal with the current circumstances. What we don't need is the idea that blaming Obama for everything constitutes a foreign policy strategy. The fact is that it was the Bush administration that installed and left al-Maliki in power. It is al-Maliki that expelled all our forces and would not allow a residual force. Would we have gone to war with the Iraqi Army under al-Maliki if he expelled our forces? I have yet to hear that suggested by the blame Obama side. The fact is that we cannot leave our forces in a country that will not sign a status of forces agreement with us. The great problem with Iraq today is what al-Maliki did to that country, and the person who installed al-Maliki was the former President of the United States, President George W. Bush. So I look forward, first, to the defeat of this resolution but, second, to consideration of a new AUMF that focuses on whether we will do anything about Assad or only go after ISIS, whether we will use ground forces, which I oppose, or just use our Air Forces. That debate needs to start in our committee, but this resolution is not an answer.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I don't want to characterize the resolution. I want to read it. It requires the President of the United States to remove all of our forces, except those needed to protect our diplomatic facilities--and here are the words--``by no later than the end of the period of 30 days beginning on the day on which this concurrent resolution is adopted.'' Now, that certainly applies to all our naval forces and all our air forces. But then it goes on to say, if the President determines that it is not safe to remove forces, he can have an additional period up to the end of the year. That assumes that our ground forces cannot be withdrawn within a 30-day period. Our forces are mobile. They are capable. They are currently behind the front lines. And they can, indeed, leave within 30 days. So clause 2 is applicable only to a military that is engaged in combat or is immobile. Our military is neither. Clause 1: ``30 days beginning on the day on which this concurrent resolution is adopted.''

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, intelligence is critical to our national security. It should not be besmirched by a controversial and unrelated procedural shenanigan, unprecedented in the annals of the House of Representatives. In the words of the President of the United States, It is time to play it straight. TAA and TPA, that package was voted on. It was defeated. We are done. Play it straight. Write new legislation. Put together a new package. Bring it to the floor of the House. See if it has a majority. That is playing it straight. Instead, in an unprecedented move, a vote we took last week is being held in never-never land to be revoted on as late as the end of July. That is right. Early June votes tabulated in late July. If you are against unprecedented shenanigans, vote ``no'' on the rule. If you are for playing it straight, vote ``no'' on the rule. If you are against TAA, vote ``no'' on the rule. If you are against TPA, if you are against fast track, vote ``no'' on the rule. If you vote for an unprecedented procedural shenanigan, an unprecedented procedural mutation today, you can be sure it will be used against you and your district and your beliefs tomorrow. And if you are not against fast track, you should be because it gives an enormous gift to China, and we get nothing in return. China's number one tactic for running up the largest trade surplus against us in history is currency manipulation. This deal that is put on the fast track enshrines the view that currency manipulation is just fine. Go to it. A giant gift to China. In addition, the rules of origin provisions say that goods that the manufacturer admits are 50 or 60 percent made in China--which means actually 70 or 80 percent made in China--get fast-tracked into the United States. Vote ``no'' on this procedural mutation.

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, the proponents of this bill have not played it straight as far as legislative procedure. They took a Senate bill that should be a ``yes'' or ``no'' vote on this floor and split it up into two or three pieces. It is one package. If you are against fast track, vote ``no'' on TAA. It is not the opponents who came up with this crazy procedure. If they had played it straight, we could play it straight. But now we are in a position to use the legislative tactics afforded by this House, pursuant to a rule that is complicated beyond belief, to sink this whole package by voting ``no'' on TAA. Vote ``no'' on Trade Adjustment Assistance because, if that happens, Republican leadership has said we go home. What is the good of having a little bit of trade adjustment assistance if we lose millions of jobs because we put them on a fast track to Asia? Take Nancy Reagan seriously; when it comes to all three votes today, just vote ``no.''

Mr. SHERMAN

Mr. SHERMAN. I insert in the Record a chart showing that we have a $100 billion trade deficit with our FTA countries. Those are the official statistics of the U.S. International Trade Commission. Public Citizen, Washington, DC, February 2015. Job-Killing Trade Deficits Surge Under FTAs: U.S. Trade Deficits Grow More Than 425% With FTA Countries, but Decline 11% With Non-FTA Countries The aggregate U.S. goods trade deficit with Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partners is more than five times as high as before the deals went into effect, while the aggregate trade deficit with non-FTA countries has actually fallen. The key differences are soaring imports into the United States from FTA partners and lower growth in U.S. exports to those nations than to non-FTA nations. Growth of U.S. exports to FTA partners has been 20 percent lower than U.S. export growth to the rest of the world over the last decade (annual average growth of 5.3 percent to non-FTA nations vs. 4.3 percent to FTA nations from 2004 to 2014). The aggregate U.S. trade deficit with FTA partners has increased by about $144 billion, or 427 percent, since the FTAs were implemented. In contrast, the aggregate trade deficit with all non-FTA countries has decreased by about $95 billion, or 11 percent, since 2006 (the median entry date of existing FTAs). Using the Obama administration's net exports- to-jobs ratio, the FTA trade deficit surge implies the loss of about 780,000 U.S. jobs. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contributed the most to the widening FTA deficit--under NAFTA, the U.S. trade deficit with Canada has ballooned and a U.S. trade surplus with Mexico has turned into a nearly $100 billion deficit. More recent deals have produced similar results. Under the 2012 Korea FTA, the U.S. template for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the U.S. trade deficit with Korea has already surged 72 percent. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Pre-FTA trade Change in balance FTA partner Entry date balance 2014 Balance since FTA ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Israel *............................ 1985 ($1.0) ($15.2) ($14.2) Canada.............................. 1989 (23.9) (82.4) (58.5) Mexico.............................. 1994 2.6 (99.8) (102.3) Jordan.............................. 2001 0.3 0.6 0.3 Chile............................... 2004 (2.0) 5.8 7.8 Singapore........................... 2004 0.8 10.2 9.4 Australia........................... 2005 7.4 13.6 6.2 Bahrain............................. 2006 (0.1) 0.1 0.2 El Salvador......................... 2006 (0.2) 0.7 0.9 Guatemala........................... 2006 (0.6) 1.5 2.1 Honduras............................ 2006 (0.7) 1.2 1.9 Morocco............................. 2006 0.1 1.0 1.0 Nicaragua........................... 2006 (0.7) (2.2) (1.5) Dominican Republic.................. 2007 0.6 2.8 2.2 Costa Rica.......................... 2009 1.2 (3.2) (4.4) Oman................................ 2009 0.6 0.9 0.4 Peru................................ 2009 (0.2) 2.9 3.0 Korea............................... 2012 (15.4) (26.6) (11.2) Colombia............................ 2012 (10.0) (1.2) 11.2 Panama.............................. 2012 7.8 9.4 1.6