Ike Skelton

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Whitfield] spoke about us clouding an issue. This issue is not clouded. It is as clear as day. The purpose of our military in this country is to protect our freedoms and to protect American interests. Today I speak for the veterans, I speak for those in uniform, I speak for the military who fought for America against Saddam Hussein and against Iraq. Some of those Americans died. Some were injured. Some came home very, very sick and still suffer as a result of toxics obtained in that area and from that war. What kind of a message are we sending the troops that now stand guard in Macedonia, in Korea, Ft. Leonard Wood, anywhere else around the world, if we do not adopt this resolution unanimously? That is what I call upon us to do. We should not put business interests ahead of those who fought for and sacrificed for our country, whether those business interests be tobacco or otherwise. Our American military should come first. It is up to the Congress under the Constitution to raise and maintain the military. I stand by them. Let us work with them. Let us support them. This is an opportunity to do just that. Mr. Speaker, I heard in testimony in our committee some of these young soldiers who were suffering from what is known as gulf war syndrome. Not just fatigue. Some had deformed limbs, some had scars on their bodies, very difficult anxiety that they are going through. I say this, Mr. Speaker, let us look at those veterans and listen to those veterans and then cast our vote in favor of them. They deserve no less.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, today, it is my pleasure to share with my colleagues a good news story, one about our Nation's military and, in particular, our Army. It involves a materiel acquisition program first developed in the 1980's for Army soldiers. It is called MANPRINT, which stands for manpower and personnel integration. The MANPRINT program objective is to improve the performance of Army weapons and equipment through a man-machine total systems approach. That is, MANPRINT focuses on the interrelationship of the soldier and his or her weapon or equipment and the human requirements for maximizing system performance. In a nutshell, it does not make any difference if there is a tank that is capable of firing 10 rounds per minute if its crew can only operate it at three rounds per minute. Regardless of its technical capabilities, the tank is a three-round- per-minute tank due to the human factors that limit its output. This is the kind of problem MANPRINT addresses. MANPRINT is an umbrella term that refers to seven disciplines that are critical to optimizing the man-machine, total-system approach. They are manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, system safety, health hazards, and soldier survivability. The central idea is to integrate considerations of these domains continuously into the acquisition process. Thanks to MANPRINT the Army now has a vastly increased confidence that its new systems will perform as expected in the hands of its soldiers-and, at the same time, save lives and dollars. As I will explain later, MANPRINT has, in fact, already saved hundreds of soldiers' lives and billions of dollars. It has returned thousands of percent on a trickle of investment dollars. It is, or should be, a governmental downsizer's dream come true. Moreover, in this day of increased reliance on technology, we are only beginning to explore the ramifications the Army's concept could have for our entire society. There is an element of urgency associated with this Army program, however, and the very real danger that we could repeat mistakes of the past--the type where U.S. inventors or progressive thinkers create great ideas which we fail to appreciate and implement. Instead, other countries capitalize on them. You will recall the Dr. W. Edward Deming's ideas on quality were ignored in this country in the 1950's and then successfully adopted by the Japanese. We may be on the verge of committing such a mistake with the Army's MANPRINT program. The Army resources devoted to MANPRINT have been continually slashed during the drawdown. At the same time, the United Kingdom has picked up on the U.S. Army's idea and is already in the process of implementing it throughout all services in the royal force. Moreover, as the Japanese recognized, Deming's quality ideas applied to all technology, not just defense. Not surprisingly, the British are starting MANPRINT programs in the Departments of Trade and Industry as well. In order to reduce the likelihood of our making the same error with MANPRINT as we did with Deming's quality management, I want to make sure my colleagues are familiar with this highly successful soldier- oriented concept for the design, development, manufacturing, and fielding of the Army's newest weapon's systems. army acquisition programs led to adoption of manprint I am sure that many of you recall the manpower and readiness problems that plagued the Army force modernization program in the early 1980's. It seemed that whenever a new system was put into the hands of the soldier, actual field performance often failed to match the standards predicted during its development. The Stinger anti-aircraft missile, for example, was designed to hit incoming aircraft better than 6 percent of the time. But if it had been placed in service as originally designed, it would actually have achieved hits only 30 percent of the time when operated by soldiers in combat units. The Stinger's problems were eventually corrected. But the problems of soldier utilization were so great in the Division Air Defense Gun, known as the DIVAD or Sergeant York, that the program had to be canceled. In the case of the Dragon anti-tank missile, that soldier's nightmare is still in the Army's inventory. In addition to unacceptable performance from new systems, the Army experienced problems in crew performance. When the Army replaced an existing system with a newer, more technologically complex system, the newer system often generated requirements for soldiers of a higher level of skill and for more soldiers per system. The Army personnel system simply could not provide enough soldiers of the caliber required to operate and maintain such sophisticated systems. The Army's first study on what to do about the disappointing performance and unaffordable manpower costs of new weapons systems and equipment was conducted by retired Generals Walter T. Kerwin and George S. Blanchard in 1980. In examining the Army's concerns about the mobilization, readiness and sustainability of new systems, the report concluded that it was primarily a lack of consideration of the human in the system that was causing the problem. Human performance assessments either were not done or were too late to influence weapons design. Supporting the Kerwin and Blanchard findings, the General Accounting Office [GAO] published reports in 1981 and 1985 attributing 50 percent of equipment failures to human error. GAO, too, stressed the need for integrating into the acquisition process human disciplines, such as, in particular, manpower, personnel and training needs. The recommendations for a new soldier-oriented approach to systems acquisition were taken very seriously in the mid-1980's. With the full support of the entire Army leadership, military and civilian, Gen. Maxwell Thurman, as the Vice Chief of Staff, directed that an entirely new approach to systems acquisition be adopted by the Army, one which required that systems fit the soldiers rather than that the soldier-- through selection or training--fit the systems. This new concept also affected industry because, as we all know, defense contractors actually design and develop Army systems. In the mid-eighties, the concept required a radical change in the way contractors did business. To successfully compete in the new Army acquisition process, industry had to focus on the human element and design systems that fit soldier's needs and capabilities. In the MANPRINT process, human parameters are specified in the same manner as any other component of the system. System performance is measured with the humans quantitative performance included as an inherent part of the total system performance. No longer could performance in the laboratory be extrapolated as satisfying the requirements of performance in the field. The MANPRINT philosophy and examples of the array of concepts inherent in MANPRINT are documented in a book, ``MANPRINT: An Approach to Systems Integration'' (Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1990), edited by Dr. Harold R. Booher, who was the first senior Army civilian official appointed to direct the Army's MANPRINT program. comanche and manprint Nowhere has the new soldier-oriented partnership between Government and industry been more visible than on the Army's Light Helicopter Experimental [LHX] program. Better known to us today as the Comanche, the LHX in 1986 was the Army's true experimental program, testing where it was possible to introduce cutting-edge technology into its inventory without running headlong into the problems of unsatisfactory performance and runaway personnel costs. Even opponents of Comanche cannot ignore the great advances achieved in this program beyond the standard of normal acquisition practices. Perhaps the first indication that MANPRINT was not only viable but could revolutionize the military's procurement process was the successful development of the Comanche's T-800 engine. The MANPRINT approach fostered hundreds of design improvements affecting both maintenance and reliability. In one striking example, the tool kit for the organization mechanic was reduced from 134 tools to only 6. The trunk-sized caster tool kit used on other helicopters was reduced to a canvass pouch half the size of a rolled-up newspaper. Furthermore, this reduction cost Government and industry nothing and will save taxpayer dollars. For the Comanche itself, MANPRINT resulted in more than 500 design improvements in system performance and logistics. The cockpit was designed outward, from the pilot seat, using simulations and modeling, lessons learned from previous aircraft programs, and user inputs. In addition, when fielded, the Comanche would allow the aircrew to select what information is needed during missions. The result is an anticipated system with a much improved pilot-crew workload. A typical performance benefit is illustrated in the reduced number of steps it takes for the pilot to acquire a target. The OH-58D Kiowa Warrior required 34; the Comanche, 5. Incorporation of MANPRINT considerations during Comanche development also introduced entirely new concepts to the acquisition process. The source selection competition included MANPRINT in all evaluation areas. It became impossible for a company to win the contract without a plan to integrate MANPRINT in the design, development, and manufacture of Comanche. In addition, seasoned maintenance personnel and other soldiers with field experience in operational units were assigned to the contractor's plant as representatives of the users in the operating commands. These soldiers were invaluable in fitting the machine to the operator. For example, they completed a rotor design change in 30 days that would otherwise have taken 12 months to achieve contractor- Government approval. MANPRINT was also responsible for technological advances. To provide for easy maintenance to aircraft components, Comanche was built around a box-like, load-bearing keel. In most helicopters, the load is carried by the external skin. In Comanche, the load-bearing keel made it possible to locate easy-access panels almost anywhere on the aircraft. Consequently, maintenance personnel can easily reach all of the internal components. In this case, a maintenance requirement drove the technological design, which in turn resulted in an aerodynamic improvement. In another instance MANPRINT and transport considerations suggested the need for an improved rotor blade removal capability. The contractor design team already had a rotor blade design which met Government specifications and was concerned about the added expense. Nevertheless, because of soldier concerns, MANPRINT prevailed. A new blade was designed at a cost of approximately $60,000. Life cycle cost calculations have indicated that the new blade will remain easier to manufacture and should save approximately $150 million in personnel, maintenance, and transport costs from the original design. From the outset soldier safety has been a major design objective. Safety experts studied more than two decades of helicopters accident reports to determine how the designers could make Comanche a safer aircraft. As a result of their efforts, the Comanche's safety-related design features are projected--when compared to other helicopters such as the OH-58 Kiowa and AH-1F Cobra--to save 91 soldiers lives and avoid at least 116 disabling injuries. A 1995 report by the Analytic Sciences Corp.--Minninger, et al.-- documents the performance improvements and savings on Comanche attributable to MANPRINT. The report found Comanche cost avoidance in manpower, personnel, training, and safety to be a whopping $3.29 billion. This return resulted from a design investment of approximately 4 percent of the Comanche R&D budget. Calculated as a return on design investment, MANPRINT in the Comanche program yielded over an 8,000- percent return. Moreover, if the costs of the remaining MANPRINT disciplines--health hazards and soldiers survivability--are included in the calculation, the return on investment for the entire program remains well over 4000 percent. manprint applied to other army systems MANPRINT is not only limited to new or major acquisition systems. It works with systems already in the inventory as well. In 1994, McDonnell Douglas conducted a study covering 4 years of MANPRINT design improvements on Longbow Apache. More than 80 MANPRINT problems, issues, and concerns were identified and resolved. Each of them yielded an improvement either for the operator or the maintainer of the aircraft. Once again, improved human performance proved cost effective. From a $2.7 million investment, a return in manpower and safety costs reached $268 million, approximately a 2,000-percent return on investment. The Fox vehicle modification is an illustrative example of MANPRINT's contribution to smaller, less visible acquisition programs. The Army uses the Fox--a mobile sensing module built into an eight-wheeled armored vehicle--as a nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance system for identifying contaminated areas. In a recent system improvement project, the Army wanted to reduce the crew from four soldiers to three. But operational evaluators labeled the vehicle, when operated by three soldiers, ``unsuitable and ineffective.'' The program appeared doomed because it was out of money and time. But MANPRINT experts, using two different types of integration models, redesigned the Fox and it was subsequently shown to be fully effective in its projected missions. The MANPRINT effort cost $60,000 and was completed in a short time; additional operational testing was avoided and the Army saved $2 to $4 million from projected program costs while removing on crew member requirement from each vehicle. manprint viability today A recent Army Audit Agency [AAA] report evaluated how the Army, after its radical downsizing, is ``incorporating MANPRINT into weapon systems development.'' The good news is that nine Army weapons systems were evaluated and all but one were considered to have incorporated MANPRINT adequately. Based on the AAA's audit assessment, the Army can expect positive MANPRINT results in such current programs as Land Warrior, Javelin, and Extended Range Multiple Launch Rocket System. The Command and Control Vehicle program and several nondevelopmental programs examined by AAA, including the Embedded Global Positioning System/ Inertial Navigation System, also include good MANPRINT initiatives. Because of MANPRINT, the Army can have increased confidence in many of the systems it will be fielding in the not-too-distant future. The Army cannot rest on its laurels, however. Several developments cloud the future of MANPRINT. First, the AAA report noted that not all systems under development have incorporated MANPRINT. The now-canceled Armored Gun System is an example in the recent past of a program in which MANPRINT considerations were purposely rejected. It is not a coincidence that the Army canceled the program. Second, the new DOD acquisition system may make it easier to omit MANPRINT from programs. The new system rightly attempts to give program managers more latitude by removing regulations that previously proved too restrictive. But this new-found freedom in itself may make it more difficult in the future to ensure an appropriate incorporation of MANPRINT. It would be very unfortunate if an unintended consequence of streamlining the acquisition process proved to be a reduced emphasis on MANPRINT. That need not be the case, as the AAA report points out. The new acquisition system, if approached correctly, affords the opportunity for greater integration of people-oriented concerns into the acquisition process. If the ``unbound'' program managers appreciate the value of optimizing the man-machine interface, they are free under the new system to tailor their programs to incorporate people-oriented considerations. Consequently, a major effort is needed to adapt MANPRINT to the new acquisition process. A third concern is the erosion of the MANPRINT program in recent years as the Army has experienced the drawdown. The Army made a commitment to understand and incorporate the features that optimize man-machine performance in the mid-1980's but until recently has been in danger of returning to old ways. MANPRINT personnel have been reduced 55 percent while the active Army has come down approximately 37 percent. The AAA audit report concluded that the Army's training process, which started out so well in 1986, is now inadequate. Career paths no longer identify MANPRINT as important. Nor does MANPRINT always play as prominent a role in source selection as in some programs, such as Comanche. Finally, the technology resources devoted to the research and development needed to advance the state of the art for quantitative tradeoffs of manpower, personnel skills, and training have shrunk significantly. Fortunately, thanks to the AAA audit report, Army leadership has been reminded that MANPRINT is a golden nugget and seems determined that it must be revitalized. A panel of senior officers has been working for several months to ensure that the wounds inflicted on the program by the drawdown are not fatal and that MANPRINT recovers its health. In closing I want to congratulate the Army for developing MANPRINT and for continuing to support the program in a time of very scarce resources. I also want to suggest that the Army's approach to systems integration is relevant to the other military departments, to the entire Department of Defense, and probably to the remainder of the Government. Acquisition reform seeks to advance technology while holding down procurement costs. Downsizing seeks to ensure essential Government functions are accomplished with a minimum of staff. MANPRINT can be an essential ingredient in both initiatives. With respect to the military, it ensures that the weapons and equipment supporting a reduced force structure will perform as expected on the battlefield. But the possible applications for MANPRINT go far beyond the military in our constantly evolving technological-based society. Our regulatory agencies like the Federal Aviation Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Food and Drug Administration should push this concept to the forefront with the systems and equipment they regulate. Also it would seem our medical and educational systems could benefit from a technological development and management process which focuses on the end user. One may wonder what a difference it would make it these systems were made to operate primarily for the doctor and the patient or the teacher and the learner rather than fitting these individuals to the system as an afterthought. We have not been in such an enviable position to take advantage of a technological cultural change since Deming's total quality management. Let's not miss our opportunity this time around.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, today I wish to congratulate and pay tribute to Gen. J.H. Binford Peay III who will retire from the U.S. Army on October 1, 1997. General Peay's career spans more than 35 years, during which he has offered selfless and distinguished service as a soldier, teacher, leader, military statesman, and visionary adviser to America's most senior national leaders. Gen. Binnie Peay grew up in Virginia. He graduated with honors from the Virginia Military Institute, and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the field artillery. He served two tours in Vietnam, with the 4th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, and was decorated for valor. Following the war, General Peay served a succession of high profile and influential staff and command positions, including Executive to the Chief of Staff of the Army, commandant of the command and general staff college at Fort Leavenworth, and assistant division commander of the 101st Airborne Division. During these years, General Peay was one of a number of officers and enlisted personnel who helped restore integrity, morale, and spirit to the Army in the wake of the Vietnam war. In 1989, General Peay took command of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, KY. The division deployed to the Arabian Gulf in August 1990 as part of Operation Desert Shield. During Operation Desert Storm, the 101st made the longest, most rapid heliborne assault in the history of warfare, deploying more than 150 miles behind enemy lines to block Iraqi reinforcements and lines of communications. During the period 1991 to 1994, General Peay served as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and then as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. In 1994, the President named him to his current assignment, Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command. During this 3-year tour, General Peay set the stage for preserving regional peace and stability over the long term, while enhancing our Nation's ability to respond to any contingency. Mr. Speaker, Gen. J.H. Binford Peay III is a preeminent military thinker, a master of tactics and strategy, and an expert on the intricacies of senior level military management and command. I know the Members of the House will join me in offering our heartfelt gratitude to General Peay and his family--his wife, Pamela, and sons, Jim and Ryan--for their service to our Nation, and wish them all the best in the years ahead.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, it is with great regret that I rise to inform the Members of the House of the passing away of Buford E. Thurmon, former mayor of Higginsville, MO, on September 10, 1997. Mr. Thurmon was a decorated veteran of World War II, having served in the U.S. Marine Corps from November 1940 to April 1946. In May, 1942, Mr. Thurmon was captured and taken prisoner of war during the battle of Corregidor. In recognition for Mr. Thurmon's valor, he received various ribbons and medals, including the Asiatic Pacific Service Ribbon, Purple Heart Medal, U.S. Presidential Unit Citation with two stars, Philippine Defense Medal with one battle star, Philippine Presidential Citation, Bronze Star Medal, China Defense Medal, Prisoner of War Medal, and U.S. Marine Corps Good Conduct Medal. Buford Thurmon was also an important governmental leader in Higginsville, MO. He twice served as mayor of the community from 1968 to 1972 and again from 1982 to 1985, and was also elected city collector, city treasurer, and city councilman. While serving the people of Higginsville, Mr. Thurmon also devoted his time to various civic and veterans organizations. He was commander of the American Legion Post, treasurer of the C-1 School District, president of Higginsville Country Club, lifetime member of the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Blinded Veterans Association, American Ex- Prisoners of War, and American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor Am Vets. Buford E. Thurmon served the United States of America as few men have. His great contributions to our country deserve our praise and admiration, and he will long be remembered for his patriotic life and commitment to public service. He truly is a role model to young civic leaders. Mr. Thurmon was preceded in death by his wife, and is survived by three sons, two sisters, and seven grandchildren. I am certain that the Members of the House will join me in honoring this American who will be missed by all who knew him.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, it has come to my attention that a distinguished career in the health care industry is coming to an end in Missouri. Charles L. ``Charlie'' Bowman, president of the Missouri Hospital Association, Hospital Industry Data Institute, and MHA Management Services Corp., is retiring after having served Missouri's health care community for 22 years. Bowman's distinguished career in health care began in October 1975 when he was named senior vice president of the Missouri Hospital Association. He was selected president of that organization in 1986. Mr. Bowman also proudly served his country in the U.S. Army National Guard from 1962-1990, retiring as a Colonel. During his decades of service to Missouri's hospitals, Bowman has witnessed encouraging changes in the State's health care system. Recent challenges include the emergence of managed care, increasing competition among health care providers, rapid advances in technology, and increasing oversight by government agencies. Throughout the new challenges of today's health care environment, Bowman has led the association to promote the health and welfare of the citizens of Missouri through education and legislative advocacy. Additionally, Charlie Bowman is active in service and professional organizations, including Rotary International, the American Hospital Association, the American Society of Association Executives, the Missouri Society of Association Executives, the Missouri Association of Army Officers, and the Boy Scouts of America. As he prepares for quieter times with his wife, Sue, and his four children, I know the Members of the House will join me in paying tribute to Charlie Bowman and in wishing him the best in the days ahead.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, today, I pay tribute to a dedicated Missouri religious leader, the Most Reverend Michael F. McAuliffe, S.T.D. the bishop of Jefferson City. Bishop McAuliffe is retiring on August 27, 1997 after serving as bishop for 28 years. Bishop McAuliffe grew up in Kansas City, and studies at the St. Louis Preparatory Seminary and the Theological College of the Catholic University. He was ordained to the priesthood on May 31, 1945. He was the pastor at three parishes in the Diocese of Kansas City-St. Joseph, and also served in a number of diocesan positions, including diocesan superintendent of schools. He was also active in community affairs as a member of the Human Relations Commission of the city of Kansas City. Bishop McAuliffe was ordained as bishop and appointed to lead the Diocese of Jefferson City in 1969. During his tenure, he has been an active religious and community leader. He served as executive chairman of the Missouri Catholic Conference, as chairperson of the Steering Committee of the Missouri Christian Leadership Forum, and as a member of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops of the United States, in addition to membership on other boards and committees. Bishop McAuliffe's dedication to the people of the Diocese of Jefferson City, and his leadership, will be missed. I know the Members of the House will join me and all Missourians in thanking him for his service, and in wishing him a happy and healthy retirement.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell often described the men and women he led as an exquisite military force. I do not believe he was overstating the situation. Soldier for soldier, sailor for sailor, airman for airman, marine for marine, the U.S. military today is as fine a fighting force as has ever been assembled, perhaps the best ever. It is a force that is well trained and well led. It is equipped with modern weapons. It has worked hard to devise and implement a body of military doctrine that multiplies its effectiveness. The military services are more and more able to work jointly to carry out their missions. It is, above all, a high quality force made up of well-educated, carefully selected, disciplined volunteers. When called upon, the members of this force have served with as much bravery and distinction as American soldiers ever have. A large part of the reason for this exquisite character of this force is that it is comprised of professionals. As virtually all senior military officers now acknowledge, the all volunteer force, or AVF, that was instituted in 1973 has been a remarkable success. The all volunteer force, to be sure, took some time to fulfill its promise. In its early years the all volunteer force was plagued by a host of difficulties. Like the country as the whole, the military had to recover from the fissures of the Vietnam era, and adjust to sweeping cultural changes as the baby boom generation grew up. Both the country and the volunteer force got through it. Nurtured by a cadre of military leaders that matured after the war in Vietnam, the all volunteer force today has shown, first, that a high-quality personal military force can be recruited and sustained by a democratic Nation, and second, that a professional force can exploit modern technology and carry out an extraordinarily broad range of military missions with great loyalty and dedication. One of the concerns that people had when the all volunteer force was instituted, however, seems to me to deserve some additional attention today, especially as the country makes a transition from the Cold War era to a new period in world affairs. This is the issue of civil- military relations, by which I mean the relationship between the professional military force and the broader society from which it is drawn and which it serves. Let me be clear at the outset that I am not worried about a loss of civilian control over the military. On the contrary, it is built into the very fabric of the U.S. military to be dedicated to the defense of democratic institutions. I am only slightly more concerned about the supposed politicization of the military, a situation in which many members of the Armed Forces feel themselves at odds with their elected and appointed leaders in the executive branch. Though this could become a problem, it is incumbent on senior officials in the executive branch and on senior officers in the military to prevent a serious rift from growing. What I am mainly concerned about is that the professional military may be becoming more and more isolated from the rest of society, to the detriment of popular understanding of the needs of defense. The result will not be the evolution of a rogue military force, but rather, the loss of public support for necessary military preparedness. Indeed, for most Americans, the military is an institution, as a rule, simply off the screen, unless an international crisis develops, or some military scandal gets on the front pages. Because the military is off the screen for most Americans, it is also increasingly off the screen for Congress. The solution to this problem, it seems to me, has to be addressed mainly by the military itself. Above all, the military has to try harder to establish and maintain better ties to the communities in which it works. Mr. Speaker, the reasons for a gap between the professional military and the rest of society are deep-rooted. For most of American history the peacetime standing army was very small, and sometimes quite isolated. After World War II and the Korean conflict, that changed. For the first time in peacetime, the United States maintained a large standing army, with the bulk of its personnel provided through conscription. As a result, a large part of the male population had direct experience in the military, and, in almost every American family, someone had served. Moreover, millions of Americans continued their direct involvement with the military after active duty by serving in the National Guard and Reserves. At least until the war in Vietnam, the large standing force and the draft enjoyed widespread public support. Indeed following World War II, our sense of identity as a Nation involved pride in the global role that our military played in preserving peace. Service in the military was accordingly also a matter of pride. It was a way of serving the Nation as a whole. Pride in the military was a fundamental element of our social and political makeup. Moreover, a key result of the draft was that the service in the military cut across cultural, socioeconomic and regional lines. It was, therefore, an important source of national unity. Perhaps the most lasting damage caused by the war in Vietnam was that it reversed the unifying effects of military service and aggravated social divisions. The children of the economically and educationally better off often avoided service in the military during the Vietnam War while the children of less privileged families were called up and sent to fight. This left a social and cultural gash across the country which has never completely healed. The decision to abandon conscription after Vietnam was necessary and ultimately good for the military. The all-volunteer force has been a success, but it has come at a price in civil-military relations. Now the number of people with military service has declined steadily over the time. Many, both within and outside the military, regard the professional military force as something different from the rest of society. As a Nation, we have slowly lost our sense of the military's global role and of service in the military as a key part of our national identity. In the meantime, public attitudes toward the military have evolved over the years, largely for the better but also in a way that is more difficult to discern, partly for the worst. After Vietnam many Americans looked on the military in a negative way, even many who supported a strong defense were disdainful, wrongly, I think, of the military's performance in the war while others distrusted anyone in uniform. During the 1970's, military leaders, to their ever lasting great credit, resolved to fix what was broken and to make the new all-volunteer force work. But it was a task made all the more difficult by budget constraints and by hurdles to recruiting top- notch people. A turning point in public attitudes, I think, came in 1980, with the failure of the Iran hostage rescue mission in Desert One. After that many Americans resolved never again to allow the Nation to be in such a position of apparent weakness. Public support for the military grew dramatically stronger and with public support a rejuvenated officer corps was able to bring to fruition the developments in doctrine, education and training, weapons technology and jointness that had been initiated in the darkest days after Vietnam. The result was a string of military successes, though not without some shortfalls along the way, culminating in the American led victory of coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War. The outpouring of popular enthusiasm following the war was heartening, especially to those who had worked to rebuild the military after Vietnam. General Schwartzkopf said for him that the public reaction to the Persian Gulf War finally healed the psychic wounds he had suffered with ever since Vietnam. It was a moment of national unity that recalled for me the closeness between the military and the public that those of us in the post-World War II generation grew up with. But it is not quite the same. The difference, I think, lies in the lack of deeper understanding between the professionals who serve in the military and the public that admires the military but does not fully identify with it. The danger is not that any significant part of the public distrusts or disdains the military, as was the case after Vietnam, but that the public does not really know what it is like to serve in the military and therefore neglects things that are necessary to keep the military focused and strong and effective. Many symptoms of the civil-military gap are apparent. Recently Tom Ricks, an outstanding military affairs reporter for the Wall Street Journal, wrote an excellent article in the Atlantic Monthly entitled The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society. He began by relating interviews with young men and women who had recently begun military service. Overwhelmingly their reaction on returning home for visits was a sense that the military was in many ways different from and, most importantly, better than the civilian world that they had left behind. Repeatedly his respondents cited public disorder, lack of discipline, drug and alcohol use, sloppy appearance, a lack of direction among former peers and a score of other flaws in civilian society. Ricks acknowledged that the results were due in part to the fact that the military services trained new recruits to have a sense of uniqueness as an aspect of pride in their service. He sees something deeper in the sentiments of these military recruits, and I agree with his conclusion, that the military increasingly sees itself as apart from and in many respects better than the society it protects. For my part, however, I have been concerned less with the implications of military perceptions of civilian society than with the implications for civilian perceptions of military society. One implication is this, in the long run a military that sees itself as a cultural elite will at best foster misunderstanding and at worst create public resentment. At the very least, the public will begin to regard unique features of military life as somehow peculiar. Consider the recent public reaction to cases of adultery in the military. From the military's perspective, rules against adultery are not simply a puritanical anachronism. Rather, they follow from the critical requirement that members of the services refrain from activities that undermine good order and discipline. Good order and discipline are essential to a system of command that must be effective when matters of life and death are at stake. That rules against adultery are enforced in some cases and not in others is not necessarily a result of preferential treatment. Rather, the rules are enforced when good order and discipline are threatened. To many civilians however, these notions are entirely alien. The military for its part has not done a good job of diffusing the sensationalism of much reporting about the issue in part, I believe, because it has not thought it necessary to explain why and how its rules must be unique. For many in the military, it was sufficient to say simply that we have a higher and better standard. Another symptom of the civil-military gap lies in the sense of grievance that some members of the military services harbor about various issues that affect them. As those who served in the military in the past always knew, it is a deep rooted and innate feature of military life to gripe about almost everything. The old comedy series Mash is as much about the apparent arbitrariness of life in the military and constant griping about it as anything else. Today, however, there is often something deeper in the complaints in the ranks. Often people in the military today feel that they are being made objects of social experimentation because of sexual integration, rules against sexual and racial harassment or even changes in health care for military dependents and other measures. In fact, the military has done an excellent job over the years in responding to changes in social norms. Witness the relatively successful racial integration of the military compared to the rest of society. For good or ill, the military is never going to be insulated from battles over changes in social relations, including relations between the sexes. These changes will necessarily create frictions. But if the military feels itself as somehow unique, as if it should be insulated from these social changes, then the battles themselves will be unnecessarily destructive both within the military and between civilians and the military. To be sure, there is much for service members to feel aggravated, if not aggrieved about. For my part, I believe the current pace of military operation is putting too much of a strain on military families. I think the solution is to be more selective in committing forces abroad and to maintain an adequate force structure. But legitimate complaints from within the ranks will be unnecessarily divisive if the civil-military gap does not narrow. Solutions to some of these problems cannot be found solely within the military. For their part senior civilian officials in the executive branch must constantly be aware of the need to prevent the gap from growing wider. For its part, the Clinton administration deserves some credit for working so hard at this when its relations with the military could easily have soured. Early in the administration, the conflict over gays in the military, apparent disrespect for military officers among some younger White House staff members and I believe, most importantly, a failure to be clear on the military role in Somalia, all created a potentially disastrous lack of trust to develop within the military. Secretary of Defense Perry, especially, did much to reduce the tension, above all with his focus on the quality of life of people in the service. Moreover the administration has learned that the use of military force abroad must be thought through carefully. In Haiti, in Bosnia, whether one agrees with the mission or not, it is clear that the administration worked to define the goals of the military actions carefully. I am still concerned that the administration is asking too much of people in uniform but at least it is not lightly taking risks with the lives of military service members. Congress also has a role to play in keeping the civil-military gap in check. Perhaps most importantly it is incumbent upon Members of Congress to seek consensus on social and political issues that might otherwise have a polarizing effect within the military. I think we have done a good job of that in recent years. For the most part, however, I do not believe the military can look elsewhere to narrow the civil-military gap. Instead it is incumbent on the military leadership to work at reducing this civil-military gap as assiduously as it has worked at leadership development, recruit training, doctrinal improvements, jointness or other key aspects of organizational management. The public is not going to become more understanding of military concerns and the military requirements on its own, rather, the military itself must reach out to the public to create better understanding, even among those who have never served in the military. In carrying out this responsibility, there are several things the military should continue doing and some things it should do much better. One thing it must continue doing is to educate its own leadership in civilian affairs. One thing that is especially striking to me is the growing portion of the military, both officer and civilian, that comes from military families. According to Professor Eliot Cohen of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, roughly 25 percent of the current force comes from families of service members. This is a startling figure which suggests that the professional military could in time become almost a separate caste unless measures are taken to broaden the experience of military service members to include educational, cultural and social contacts within the civilian community. I am also struck by the fact that an increasing proportion of the officer corps is being drawn from the military service academies relative to the proportion from ROTC or officer candidate schools. According to a recent Congressional Research Service report, if we exclude officers serving in the health care professions, chaplains and some other categories, about 22 percent of the officer corps in 1995, was comprised of graduates of the military academies, a dramatically higher portion than in the past, when ROTC and OCS sources were relatively greater sources of officers. Among general and flag officers the proportion from the service academies is even greater, about 36 percent in 1995. I would not suggest because of this that we close or significantly reduce the size of the academies. I do think, however, that it becomes more and more imperative that as a military officer advances, he or she receive education in nonmilitary institutions and that military training institutions make it a point of broadening the intellectual and cultural perspectives of their students. Most importantly of all, I believe that the military must take steps to ensure that the military commanders are held accountable for building much better relations with the civilian community. In my own experience representing a congressional district with large military bases, I know that some military officers are excellent at community relations and others are not. Increasingly there is no substitute for having commanders who are good at it. Even the most mundane community activities are profoundly effective in building public identification with an understanding of the military. Participation in Lion's Clubs, sponsorship of Little Leagues, and of Boy and Girl Scout Troops, involvement on school and other similar affairs are essential. Community relations should be made a prominent factor in officer efficiency report ratings that determine whether an officer will be promoted. Military leaders should also vastly expand programs to educate civilians about the military. There should be many more opportunities for civilian community leaders to visit military facilities and interact with military personnel. One final step is also critically important, and that is for the active duty Army and the National Guard relations to improve. National Guard and Reserve troops are truly a national treasure for the simple reason that they remain true citizen soldiers. Relations between the active duty force and the National Guard and the Army, however, are laden with distrust. This rift must be healed. The active Army leadership must work on ways to integrate the Guard forces into military plans, and must genuinely rely on the Guard as a key element of the force. Mr. Speaker, the professional U.S. military force of today is by every measure the best in the world and perhaps the best in history. It is, however, a difficult matter for democracy to maintain a large professional military establishment. To make it work requires that military leaders pay serious attention to the social and political issues that arise. Both the military and the society as a whole will greatly benefit from the military leadership if the military leadership works more assiduously to prevent a widening rift from developing between civilian and military societies.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, today I pay tribute to a distinguished Missourian. Col. Fred Mills, a 30-year veteran of the highway patrol, is retiring on September 1, 1997. Colonel Mills has been the superintendent of the Missouri State Highway Patrol since September 1993. The focus of his administration as superintendent was ``Working Together.'' He worked to forge partnerships between the highway patrol and other law enforcement agencies as well as between the highway patrol and the citizens of Missouri. Colonel Mills was a driving force behind the partnership formed between highway patrol and the Kansas City and St. Louis Police Departments which put highway patrol officers on the streets with city officers in 1994 and 1995. The joint operation lowered the violent crime rate in both cities. Colonel Mills also encouraged a process which moved uniformed officers from office jobs back into field positions by training civilian personnel to perform office functions. Nearly 70 officers were put back on the highways during Colonel Mills' tenure. Colonel Mills' dedication to the highway patrol and the citizens of Missouri exemplify the highest tradition of service. His experience will be sorely missed. I know that the other Members of this body join me in expressing our deepest gratitude to Colonel Mills and our best wishes for his retirement.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, a few years ago, I discovered a speech made in 1923 by then Army Maj. George C. Marshall, that warned against a troubling pattern of failure in American history--a pattern which I fear we may be repeating today. Marshall, of course, later became one of the most distinguished American leaders of the century, serving as Chief of Staff of the Army in World War II, Secretary of State in the early years of the cold war, and Secretary of Defense during the war in Korea. ``[F]rom the earliest days of this country,'' said Marshall in 1923, ``[the Regular Army] was materially increased in strength and drastically reduced with somewhat monotonous regularity.'' Immediately following a war, he said, ``every American's thoughts were centered on the tragedies involved in the lessons just learned,'' and the size of the standing Army was increased in an effort to prepare for future conflicts. But within a few months, Marshall lamented, ``the public mind ran away from the tragedies of the War . . . and became obsessed with the magnitude of the public debt. . . . Forgetting almost immediately the bitter lesson of unpreparedness, [the public] demanded and secured the reduction of the Army.'' The bitter lesson of unpreparedness, unfortunately, had to be relearned repeatedly through much of the rest of the 20th century. Each time the price was paid in the lives of young Americans ill-prepared for the missions thrust upon them--at Kasserine Pass in North Africa, where United States forces were decimated in their first large tank battle of World War II; at the start of the Korean war, where a poorly equipped United States holding force, called Task Force Smith, was almost destroyed; and at Desert One in Iran, where equipment failures and poor coordination doomed the hostage rescue mission. Today, in contrast, America has built a military force that sets the standard for the rest of the world. It is equipped with modern weapons. It is well led and well trained. The military services are more able than ever to work cooperatively. It is, above all, a high quality force, made up of well-educated, carefully selected, disciplined volunteers. They have carried out an extraordinarily broad range of responsibilities in recent years in a fashion that has demonstrated their professionalism and their dedication to duty. The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell, often characterized the troops he led as an exquisite force--he was not exaggerating. I am afraid, however, that we may once again be forgetting the costs of unpreparedness. A return to the unfortunate pattern of the past is reflected in several ways. First, now that the cold war is over, the rationale for maintaining U.S. military strength is being questioned even by many who ought to know better. Second, because of budget pressures, defense spending appears unlikely to rise in the foreseeable future, but budgets must grow modestly over time to maintain a capable force. Third, the quality of our Armed Forces depends on keeping quality people in the services, but the extraordinarily high pace of operations is putting too much pressure on military families and may lead many good people to leave. Consider each of these issues in turn. Why we should remain strong: Today, a number of my congressional colleagues challenge me with a question that surely echoed through the halls of Congress in 1923 or in 1946--``What is the enemy?'' I am asked. And with that question, there are many others. Why continue to support more spending for defense when the cold war is over? Why continue to pursue expensive, new, advanced weapons when U.S. technology was so dominant in Operation Desert Storm, and when no other nation is spending nearly what we do on military hardware? If we look to the past, however, we have never been able to predict what military threats would arise in the future. In 1903, no one envisioned World War I. In 1923 we did not foresee World War II. In 1946, we did not anticipate the Korean war. In 1989, we did not expect the Persian gulf war. So a major reason for maintaining military strength is to hedge against the appearance of unexpected regional or global threats in the future. But that is not the only reason. Today, our military strength is the foundation of a relatively secure international order in which small conflicts, though endemic and inevitable, will not decisively erode global stability. And as such our military strength is also a means of discouraging the growth of a new power that could, in time, constitute a threat to peace and evolve into the enemy we do not now foresee. Because of this, the very limited investment required to maintain our military strength--though somewhat larger than we are making right now--is disproportionately small compared to the benefits we, and the rest of the world, derive from it. My fellow Missourian, Harry S. Truman, stated the issue clearly: ``We must be prepared to pay the price for peace, or assuredly we will pay the price of war.'' Defense spending: As so often in the past, the United States again appears unwilling to pay the price of peace. Since the mid-1980's, the Department of Defense budget has declined by 40 percent in real, inflation-adjusted dollars, and the size of the force has been reduced by a third. Funding for weapons procurement has fallen even further-- today we are spending just one-third as much on new weapons as we did in the mid-1980's. I do not believe that these levels of spending can be tolerated without critically weakening our military capabilities. And yet, there is all too little support for restoring even modest rates of growth in military spending. On the contrary, for long-term planning purposes, the Pentagon assumes that Defense budgets will be frozen at about $250 billion per year, in constant prices, as far as the eye can see. We cannot, however, maintain a force of a stable size without at least modest growth in spending. For one thing, in order to keep quality people in the force, the quality of life in the military has to keep pace with the quality of life in the civilian sector. So pay, housing expenditures, facility maintenance accounts, and other related activities have to increase with the overall growth of the economy. Second, modern, advanced weapons grow in cost from one generation to the next, so budgets must grow to take advantage of evolving technology. Finally, sophisticated new weapons are more expensive to maintain, and they allow a higher, more costly pace of operations. Flat defense budgets, therefore, will entail further, strategically unwarranted cuts in the size of the force, declining military readiness, and a failure to exploit the rapid evolution of military technology. This is a prescription for the slow, steady, debilitating erosion of our military capabilities. Pressures on people: Perhaps most importantly, even as the size of the force has declined in recent years, the pace of military operations--from Somalia, to Haiti, to Bosnia, to the Persian Gulf--has accelerated dramatically. Senior officers in all of the services worry that the pace of operations will sooner or later drive good people out of the military. To operate the modern U.S. military requires professional personnel with advanced skills that take years to learn. As a result, the services have to retain quality people after their initial enlistment run out. Older, skilled service members will get married, have children, struggle to make ends meet, worry about education, just like other citizens. Military personnel managers, therefore, often say that they enlist soldiers,but they retain families. By its very nature, military life puts pressure on families. Service members are away from home for extended periods. Moves are frequent. Jobs are often very demanding, and job pressures grow as careers advance. Military personnel, of course, understand and accept these pressures, including regular deployments abroad, as part of the job. The pressures on military families have been greatly aggravated in recent years, however, by force reductions and by unplanned, irregular, temporary assignments to support military operations. If we are to keep skilled people in the service, we cannot afford to keep asking them to do more and more with less and less. Were he here today, Major Marshall, I am afraid, would recognize all of this--a failure to appreciate the need for military strength, reluctance to pay the price of peace, asking too much of those who serve in the military--as familiar symptoms of our Nation's traditional attitude toward national defense. If we are to avoid the mistakes of the past, we need to reconsider sooner, rather than later, how to protect the exquisite military force that we have inherited.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to this amendment and in favor of the market access program that is being so very important to exports in America. The Market Access Program is a $90 million USDA cost-share program aimed at helping maintain, develop, and expand U.S. agriculture export markets. The program was substantially reformed in the 1996 farm bill: Participants contribute up to 50 percent or more toward program cost. MAP is targeted toward small businesses, farmer cooperatives, and trade associations. Requires funds to be used only to promote American grown and produced commodities and related products. MAP is a key part of the new 7-year farm bill, which gradually reduces direct income support to farmers. Expanding exports is extremely important--exports now account for as much as one-third of domestic production. Export markets are extremely competitive, especially since other nations and the European Union greatly outspend U.S. promotion efforts. In 1996, Missouri exported approximately 1.3 billion dollars' worth of agricultural products--soybeans, feedgrains, wheat, cotton, poultry, animals/meats--which sustained more than 22,000 jobs. MAP has helped the agriculture sector become the largest positive contributor to the U.S. trade balance. Promoting Missouri Exports and Protecting Jobs usda's market access program [map] USDA's Market Access Program (MAP) has been a tremendous success in helping promote U.S. and Missouri agriculture. It has also helped protect jobs, counter subsidized foreign competition, and contribute to economic growth and an expanding tax base. As a cost-share program providing assistance to farmers and ranchers through their associations and cooperatives, and to related small businesses, MAP continues to be of critical importance. map is important to missouri agriculture, economy and jobs Number of jobs: Nearly 1 in 6 Missouri Jobs Depend on Agriculture. Number of farms: 105,000. Value of agriculture production: Over $4.5 billion. Value of agriculture exports: More than $1.2 billion. Export-related jobs: Approximately 20,000. map is important to u.s. agriculture, economy and jobs Agriculture largest single U.S. industry: Accounts for 16 percent gross domestic product. Exports key to continued economic growth. Value of U.S. agriculture exports: Record $60 billion in 1996. U.S. agriculture trade surplus: Record $30 billion in 1996. U.S. agriculture export-related jobs: Over 1 million American jobs. map helps meet subsidized foreign competition The global marketplace is still characterized by subsidized foreign competition. The European Union (EU) maintains a 10 to 1 advantage over the U.S. in terms of export subsidies. Many other countries and the EU also support industry market development and promotion efforts to encourage exports. MAP is one of the few programs allowed under the Uruguay Round Agreement to help U.S. agriculture and American workers meet such foreign competition. map is a successful partnership with broad public support Serves as ``Buy American'' Program by promoting only American-grown and produced agricultural commodities and related products. Strongly supported by 75 percent of American public based on 1996 national election day exit poll conducted by Penn & Schoen Associates, Inc.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, today I pay tribute to a distinguished gentleman from the Fourth Congressional District of Missouri, Virgil Koechner. He recently retired after more than 44 years of dedicated service for the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company. Mr. Koechner, from California, MO, served for 5 years in the United States Navy before beginning work for Southwestern Bell in 1952. He was not only an employee of Southwestern Bell, but was also elected local president of the Communications Workers of America for 32 consecutive years. In retirement, Mr. Koechner plans to stay active in the labor movement. Mr. Koechner and his wife Mary Jane have been long time friends of mine. It is dedicated people like Virgil Koechner who are the heart and soul of what makes this country great. I know that other Members of this body join me in congratulating Virgil Koechner on his retirement and wish him the very best in the days ahead.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, in these days with the cold war behind us, Berlin Wall having come down, we find ourselves in a comparable era, as we did in the 1920's and the early 1930's where there was no known adversary on the horizon. I support the bill as it is, and I oppose the amendment to reduce the authorization. Serving on the Committee on National Security, and there are a few of us on this Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that do, also as a member of this committee, I know the value of timely and accurate intelligence to military commanders as well as to the administration and the State Department. In these days where the predictability of the future is so cloudy, that is when, Mr. Chairman, it is all the more important for us to have the best, the finest intelligence network we can. More than that, it is more than just being able to collect intelligence. We need the analysts who can give us that predictive analysis as to where we think problems may arise. Successful military operations, successful diplomatic operations which minimize the risk of problems and lives of American service men and women cannot, simply cannot be conducted without excellent intelligence and excellent analysis. As a member of both of the committees that deal with this I pay particular attention to the needs of the military as well as the other. I believe this bill responds to those needs, I support it. A cut, I think, would be doing a disservice to our diplomats, it would be doing a disservice to those who serve in uniform, a disservice to those who want to keep our country free and our interests keen in the days and years ahead.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, let me take just a moment to associate myself with the gentleman's remarks and compliment him as the subcommittee chairman on the authorizing committee, to compliment the gentleman from California [Mr. Packard], the chairman, and the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Hefner], the ranking member who has labored so long and so well in his previous chairmanship on this. This is an excellent bill, and I think it should pass, as the gentleman says, overwhelmingly. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, on July 1, 1997, Maj. Gen. David A. Richwine, U.S. Marine Corps, will retire after 32 years of faithful and dedicated service to his country. It is only fitting that his distinguished service record be brought to the attention of the House of Representatives and the American public. In June of 1965, Maj. Gen. Richwine was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps. He then attended the Basic School at Quantico, Virginia following which, he joined the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines in Vietnam in January of 1966. There he served as platoon commander, company executive officer, commanding officer, and the battalion S-4 officer. Following Vietnam, and duty as the officer selection officer in Indianapolis, IN, Captain Richwine reported to Williams Air Force Base in Chandler, Arizona to begin his pilot training. He was designated as Naval Aviator in April of 1971. After tours with FMFAT-201. VT-4. graduation from Amphibious Warfare School, and further tours with FMFA-531, VMFA-232, and VMFA-212, Major Richwine was assigned as Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General at Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. In 1978 he attended Air Command and Staff College in Montgomery, AL, graduated, and was assigned to MAG-31, in Beaufort, SC. Beaufort provided a number of assignments for Maj. Gen. Richwine. He served as the assistant group S-4 officer of MAG-31, the executive officer of Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron-31 and the commanding officer of FMFA-251. He then joined MAG-15 in Iwakuni, Japan as the group operations officer and then became the Group Executive Officer. In Washington, DC, Maj. Gen. Richwine served as the assistant for Special Analyses to the Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Resources and then attended the National War College. He was assigned as commanding officer of MCAS Beaufort in 1986. Returning to Washington, DC, Major General Richwine was assistant head and then head, Aviation Plans, Programs, Doctrine, Joint Matters and Budget Branch. He then was the special assistant, Marine Corps Aide to the Secretary of the Navy. He then was selected as Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Eastern Area, MCAS Cherry Point, NC. Major General Richwine served his final tour in Washington, DC as the Deputy for Expeditionary Forces Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, and his final position of Assistant Chief of Staff, Command Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence (C41), director of Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC. Major General Richwine has earned all of the decorations he wears, among which are a Silver Star, Legion of Merit with a gold star, Purple Heart and a Defense Meritorious Service Medal. He has served his country well, and will continue to do so in the future. He is a fine marine.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, June 16, 1997, the State of Missouri lost a distinguished citizen. William Lester ``Les'' Simpson of Odessa, MO, passed away in Lexington, MO at the age of 88. In 1926, Mr. Simpson started a lifelong career in the news business at his father's Rolla (MO) Times. In 1944, he and his wife Madeline bought the Holden Progress, where he became publisher. In 1990, they moved to Odessa, where he resided until his death. Mr. Simpson was a member of the Missouri Press Association, serving as president in 1957, and the Central Missouri Press Association, of which he was president in 1950. He was inducted into the MPA Hall of Fame in 1992. He was also the recipient of distinguished service awards from Northeast, Northwest, and Central Missouri press associations and received the Merril Chilcote Award in 1995 from the Northwest Missouri Press Association. Mr. Simpson also served on the board of regents at Central Missouri State University in Warrensburg, MO from 1959-77, serving as board vice president from 1961-65, and president from 1965- 71. He received the CMSU Distinguished Service Award in 1995. Mr. Simpson was a 50-year member of the Holden Masonic Lodge and Order of Eastern Star. He was past president and member of the Holden Chamber of Commerce and a member of the Ararat Shrine of Kansas City. He was preceded in death by his wife Madeline in 1992, as well as three brothers and one sister. He is survived by a daughter, Betty Spaar of Odessa, who continues in her father's footsteps as the publisher of the newspaper, The Odessan. Also surviving are three sisters, five grandchildren, and a great-grandson. I know that this body joins me in expressing sympathy to the family of this outstanding Missourian.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, we have a very interesting and telling decision before us, the three choices that may be made in all of this Bosnia business today. The first is to adopt an amendment, which I oppose, to take our troops out by the end of December of this year. That would be wrong. No. 1, that is rushing to judgment. No. 2, that would be in violation of what our President has openly stated. The other is to leave the commitment open. To do so raises the issue as to whether our European allies will be ready, will take up of gauntlet and perform the duties we have been urging them and wanting them to do and take care of the European problems themselves now that we have shown them the way and given them the leadership. The other problem with the open-ended commitment is the operational tempo of our young troops, and I am immensely, immensely proud of them. But with the downsizing that we have already had of particularly the U.S. Army, the young soldiers will be meeting themselves going and coming. The middle ground, I believe, is to accept the word of our President and to adopt the date that he suggested. Mr. Chairman, over the past few years I have addressed this body no less than seven times regarding U.S. involvement in the region in southeast Europe. In March 1993, warning of the 1,000-year-old nature of tension in the region, I advocated American involvement in the form of organizing and leading a concert of nations for a regional peace. I called for a diplomatically focused coalition-building effort and advocated U.S. military involvement, involvement limited to the peripheral but essential roles of logistical support, intelligence, command and control, and communications; in the air and on the sea. In December 1995, with the impending deployment of 20,000 American grounds troops to that region, I appealed to this body to remember the importance of impartiality. I quoted the U.S. Army Field Manual: ``Peacekeeping requires an impartial, even-handed approach.'' I voiced my angst that, as American peacekeepers, our sons and daughters posited themselves inside a centuries-old, three-sided conflict, just as America pledged to assist, train and equip one faction. During the spring and summer campaigns of 1995, parity was reached between the armor-heavy Serbs and the infantry-heavy Croat-Muslim Federation. The combined forces of the Federation pushed the enemy from the Bihac region back towards the Sava and the Drina Rivers. We have been fortunate. In 1997, we can be proud of our military personnel for their efforts and accomplishments. They have been professional and dedicated in their military duties. We have overseen a separation of the warring parties and a cessation of hostilities. We have allowed political reform to begin and refugee settlement to occur. We have led as no other Nation than America can. Keeping our troops there until the end of June 1998 will be the best and correct thing.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Hilleary amendment. To do so, to adopt that I think would be a travesty in this House and a travesty for our country. We have deployed our troops. And I might say I am immensely proud of what they have done in Bosnia. But we have been fortunate. We should be proud that our military personnel and their efforts have been successful in their accomplishments. They have overseen a separation of warring parties. They have been professional. They have caused the hostilities to cease. We have allowed political reform to begin. Refugee resettlement is occurring, and we have led as no other nation can. We have relished support among Europeans and throughout other nations of the world to follow our deeds. Today I ask my colleagues to help our uniformed personnel complete their mission in a timely, efficient, and professional manner. In doing so, we must follow in honor of the word of the President of our Nation. He said some time ago that we should be out of there by June 1998. To cut if off at this time would be improper for our troops, to rush them out and not give them sufficient time to make plans to leave, to cause us to break our word as a nation, and to not give the former warring parties the time to complete their reconciliation, which the end of June 1998 will do. We should honor the commitments of our Nation. We should honor the commitment of our President. We should honor the commitment of his word when he said June 1998. We must stick to that. We, as this Congress, should back him up and allow our troops to remain until that time. I oppose the Hilleary amendment. It would be wrong for this body. It would be wrong for our Nation.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak against the resolution to disapprove. It boils down to whether my colleagues want China inside the tent or outside the tent. Now all of this China business, there is one segment of trade that has not been discussed as thoroughly as it should, and that segment is agricultural exports. So today I speak for the American farmer, I speak for the rural Missourians who sell products abroad. United States should again extend normal trade status to China. Failure to do so will jeopardize American agricultural sales to that country that last year topped $3 billion. Overall, our country enjoys a substantial agricultural trade surplus with China of $2\1/2\ billion. Moreover, agricultural exports to China stand to gross significantly in the coming years as income growth in China leads to continuing dietary improvement. Let us look at some of the sales statistics that we have. Nineteen hundred ninety-six corn sales to China topped 90 million bushels; fertilizer, $1.1 billion; wheat, $426 million; cotton, $736 million; soy beans, $414 million; soybean meal, $116 million; soybean oil, $104 million, and poultry, $408 million. China is already a major market for American agricultural exports and has the potential to become an even bigger customer as the economy continues to grow. So for the American farmer, for the Americans and those who live in rural Missouri and rural America, I say let us continue to sell agricultural products to that country.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, it is an honor for me to bring to the attention of the House of Representatives and the American public the distinguished record of service to our Nation by a fellow Missourian, Lt. Gen. John E. Miller. He is retired from the U.S. Army today after serving this great Nation for over 34 years. Entering the U.S. Army in 1963 as an infantry officer, Lieutenant General Miller started his career by serving two tours in Vietnam, first as the commander of B Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and then as a district senior advisor. Advisory Team 68, Delta Regional Assistance Command. During his service in Vietnam, he earned a Silver Star, a Bronze Star with the ``V'' device, an Air Medal with the ``V'' device, a Purple Heart, and the Combat Infantryman Badge. Lieutenant General Miller has served in many diverse assignments, including commanding general, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth; deputy commanding general for combined arms, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; and commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Other key assignments include: commander of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Fort Campbell; deputy commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; assistant division commander (Maneuver), 8th Infantry Division; assistant deputy chief of staff for combat developments, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA, commander, 1st Brigade, and later chief of staff, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), Fort Lewis, WA. In culmination of his long and illustrious career, Lieutenant General Miller served as deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA. In this capacity, he has been the driving force as the architect of the future for the Army, developing and integrating future concepts and requirements for doctrine, training, and combat developments for Army XXI to operate with joint, combined, multinational, and interagency organizations. Lieutenant General Miller provided vision and guidance in the development of the Army After Next Program and has been instrumental in integrating Army models and simulations into a dynamic, efficient, and effective program. He has led the effort in developing investment strategies which lay the foundation for the Army to grow into the early 21st century. In addition to his combat decorations, Lieutenant General Miller has earned the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Soldiers Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Army Commendation Medal, and the Army Achievement Medal. He has also earned the Parachutist Badge, the Air Assault Badge, and the Army Staff Identification Badge. Mr. Speaker, there is not enough time in the day to thoroughly highlight the many contributions that this outstanding Missourian has made to our Army. He has dedicated his life to our soldiers and our Nation. He is truly a leader of leaders.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I offer the amendment at this time, which changes the law as it relates to veterans and veterans' burials. It is like the amendment that was passed in the Senate at the behest of Senator Torricelli, the gentleman from New Jersey. As my colleagues know, the statute of our law state that certain veterans are prohibited from being buried in national cemeteries as a result of certain acts and convictions under the criminal law. The statute includes a good number of crimes that prohibit some veterans from being so interned. However, the crimes of which Timothy McVeigh was convicted in Denver, CO, just a few days ago, the destruction of property and the killing of innocent people by mass destruction, and also the intentional killing of Federal law enforcement officers, is not included in that list. And that is the purpose of my amendment. It has come to my attention, however, Mr. Chairman, that subsequent to my offering this amendment and putting it in line to be taken up at this time, there are some veterans organizations that are concerned. And the gentleman who is the chairman of the Committee on Veteran' Affairs, Mr. Stump, and I have conferred about this; and as my colleagues know, this particular amendment is outside the immediate scope of the Department of Defense bill, however, would be and has been authorized by the Committee on Rules to be taken up today. However, in deference to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Stump], because there are to be hearings on this in an attempt to make sure that the door is battened down fully and correctly on this issue, I will in a moment ask unanimous consent to withdraw this amendment. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, at this time, realizing that we all seem to be singing from the same sheet of music and unanimous in our attempt to make this law clear and understandable, I do ask unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I was sorry to hear a few moments ago the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Foley] say this is not about the defense of our country. It is about the defense of the young men and young women in uniform, those who are on the firing line, those who are nearing battle, those who may be called upon unless we have a weapons system that slows down or stops the enemy. The question is asked by my friend from California, who wants it? The young men and young women on the ground want it. Talk to the young soldiers who saw the bombardment and what the F-117's did to help them win in the Persian Gulf war. Mr. Chairman, this is an important decision. It is not something we should take lightly. We should also be very careful in what we do this evening and not do something against the interest of America. Often, historically, this Congress has done that. We should not step into that hole once begin. It is rather interesting that the replay of something back in 1925, a courageous Brigadier General by the name of Billy Mitchell spoke openly and forcefully for a bomber force. And here we are again, in 1997, saying the same thing, only with a more sophisticated bomber force that has stealth, that has long range, that can save American lives. It is interesting that the second part of this amendment has not been alluded to, the $331 million that goes elsewhere. I say to my colleagues that the Senate in conference I think will invade this budget for $331 million for their programs because not one helicopter, not one truck, not one artillery piece is singled out for these dollars. This Stealth B-2 bomber has a mission, it has an important mission to fulfill the strategy set forth in the recent quadrennial defense review of shaping, responding and preparing. Insofar as shaping the battlefield, the F-117, the Stealth, did work. It had short range. We had several air bases nearby. And as time goes by, as already has been mentioned, those will be fewer and fewer. This allows us to respond within hours rather than the days and the weeks it takes to get fighter bombers, to get aircraft carriers into position. We cannot count on local host airfields. Mr. Chairman, long-range air power will be more important than ever in the decades ahead. Consequently, we do not believe that a mere force of 21 B-2's will satisfy foreseeable U.S. military requirements. The changing shape, the security environment makes long-range stealthy precision strike power ideally suited to the protection of American security interest in the decades ahead and that the Nation's long-range air power capabilities will be more important in the future than they have been in the past. The B-2's ability to strike independently within hours anywhere in the globe from bases in the United States leaves it uniquely well- suited among all U.S. force elements for dealing with unexpected challenges. And we have had those in our history: Pearl Harbor, Kuwait. They are there. The only realistic option for maintaining the viability of the long- range stealthy precision strike force over the long-term is to continue production of the B-2. The B-2 is there for a critical national asset which is uniquely capable of performing these vital missions. That is reality. That is reality, Mr. Chairman. Being able to strike the enemy promptly and accurately from a distance is the best choice in many scenarios, particularly since it is more effective and less costly than other options when all costs are considered. Mr. Chairman, I urge a no vote on this amendment.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I at this time wish to discuss very briefly amendments 32, 32 and 33. The first: In an effort to collect, evaluate, and assess the efforts of the U.S. Government to combat international terrorism, the amendment requires the director of the Office of Management and Budget to submit to Congress an appropriate report regarding the programs and funding levels throughout the Federal system. The full report, due no later than 120 days from the date of enactment, should assess the amount of duplication or gaps in the overall effort. The amendment would also establish an annual reporting requirement. Regarding the second amendment, it is aimed at ensuring the safety and security of our personnel. It directs the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress about achievements and findings to date regarding our effort to protect our forces abroad and our anti-terrorism initiatives therefor. My third amendment deals with the authority of granting degrees to individuals participating in the programs of the community college of the Air Force. With this language, all participants can receive an associate degree.