Chris Smith

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for her very strong statement. I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Solomon), who has been a leader on human rights in China for many, many years.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I urge every member of this body to support House Resolution 364. This strongly bipartisan resolution urges the introduction and passage of a resolution on human rights in the People's Republic of China at the 54th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission which began yesterday and runs to the 24th of next month. If any government deserves to be the subject of a U.N. Human Rights Commission resolution, the Beijing regime does. In its testimony before my subcommittee last month, Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck made it very clear that ``. . .the government of China continues to commit widespread and well-documented abuses in all areas of human rights.'' He also testified that there have not been any major improvements in that situation during the last year. As detailed in the State Department's country reports on human rights practices in China, those abuses included extrajudicial killings, the use of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced abortion and forced sterilization, the sale of organs from executed prisoners, and tight controls over religion, speech, and press. Persecution in some areas, such as the captive nations of Tibet and East Turkistan, even intensified during the past year. House Resolution 364 merely urges the administration to reconsider and to do what it promised to do when it delinked MFN for China from human rights considerations in 1994: ``. . . to insist that the U.N. Human Rights Commission pass a resolution dealing with the serious human rights abuses in China.'' However, this past weekend, the administration signaled that it is backing away from that promise, just as it backed away from its previous promise to link China's MFN status to respect for human rights. In both cases, the retreat has not been justified by any improvement in the Chinese government's human rights record. As a matter of fact, it has gone backwards. In explaining its decision not to seek a China resolution in Geneva, the administration has highlighted the PRC's recent announcement that it intended to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, that rationale does not justify the President's latest deference to the Beijing dictatorship for three basic reasons. First, the Beijing regime regularly ignores its legal promises, especially where human rights are concerned. The Constitution of the PRC already guarantees freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of demonstration, as well as the freedom of religious belief and the freedom of ethnic minorities such as the Tibetans and Uyghurs from discrimination and oppression. According to the administration's own reporting, the Beijing regime routinely and systematically violates those freedoms. In a further example, China signed the U.N. Convention Against Torture over a decade ago; but according to the State Department, and other sources in human rights organizations, the Chinese government continues to use torture against prisoners each and every day. Thus, in return for its silence, the United States must demand real improvements, not paper promises. Second, experience demonstrates that ratification of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights does not guarantee genuine respect for human rights. Many of the most abusive countries on the planet, including Iraq, North Korea, Nigeria, to name a few, are parties to that convention. Third and most important, by using convention ratification as an excuse for the United States' inaction in Geneva, the administration has set up an explicit double standard benefitting the Beijing regime. Yet, last year alone, the administration supported seven U.N. Human Rights Commission resolutions concerning other countries that have signed the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights: Nigeria, Iran, Sudan, Iraq, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Yugoslavia, and Equatorial Guinea. The unprecedented favors shown to the Beijing dictatorship suggest that, in reality, the President's latest decision has little to do with the convention and everything to do with dollars and cents. Wei Jingsheng, Mr. Speaker, the great Chinese democracy advocate and former prisoner of conscience, testified before my subcommittee just a few weeks ago. He said that a U.N. Human Rights Commission resolution at this time is a ``matter of life or death'' for the democratic reform in China. Last week, in an open letter urging the U.S. to support a China resolution in Geneva, he explained that ``the success of the Chinese government to silence the world community has serious consequences. It is a massive blow to the Chinese people's determination to struggle for human rights and democracy. They are left with the feeling that they are being betrayed.'' Mr. Speaker, the President's decision this past weekend was, indeed, a betrayal, a betrayal of the countless Chinese, Tibetans, and others who suffer under the current regime, and a betrayal of our own democratic and humanitarian ideals. The United States' support for a U.N. human rights resolution is the very least that we can do for the Chinese and the Tibetan peoples. If the U.S. will not raise human rights violations in a forum dedicated exclusively to human rights concerns, then where will we raise those issues and how can we expect tyrants to heed our admonitions in private when they know we will lack the will to speak about them in public? Notwithstanding his announcement this weekend, Mr. Speaker, I urge the President, we urge collectively the President to honor his previous pledge to support a China resolution at the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva. In the meantime, I urge my colleagues to support passage of the resolution. I. Summary China appears to be on the verge of ensuring that no attempt is made ever again to censure its human rights practices at the United Nations. It is an extraordinary feat of diplomacy and an equally extraordinary capitulation on the part of governments, particularly the United States and the countries of the European Union, that claim to favor multilateral initiatives as a way of exerting human rights pressure. One of the few remaining international fora to exert such pressure is the annual meeting of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva--in session this year from March 10 to April 18--where countries with particularly egregious human rights records can become the subject of resolutions. Every year save one since 1990, the U.S. and the E.U. have taken the lead, with support from Japan and other governments, in sponsoring a resolution on China, and every year save one, China has successfully blocked even debate on the subject. The threat of a resolution, however, has itself been an effective form of pressure, as illustrated by the time and resources China has spent in trying to counter it. This report is an analysis of China's diplomatic efforts with respect to key members of the commission over the last three years. It describes a pattern of aggressive lobbying by Chinese officials, using economic and political blandishments, that has worked to undermine the political will in both developed and developing countries to hold Beijing accountable in Geneva, coupled with procrastination and passivity on the part of China's critics, the same governments that have been such vocal proponents of multilateralism. The report suggests that countries concerned about human rights in China should put more, not less effort into a carefully constructed resolution at the U.N. Human Rights Commission; that the process of fashioning a resolution and lobbying for its passage is important, whether it ultimately reaches the floor of the commission for debate or not; and that ending all efforts on China at the U.N. Human Rights Commission, as the U.S. and Europe seem to be considering, will be seen in China as a triumph over the West's dominance of international institutions and one that it may want to follow up in fields other than human rights. As this report went to press, the U.S. and the E.U. were involved in diplomatic negotiations with China on a possible package of limited steps or promises in exchange for dropping a resolution this year and in subsequent years. The U.S. in particular, seemed poised to accept any last-minute gestures that China might make during Vice President Albert Gore's trip to China in late March, midway through the commission's deliberations. But the prospect of obtaining truly meaningful improvements from Beijing on human rights would have been far higher had there been a real threat of a coordinated, high- level lobbying effort behind a resolution in Geneva, the work on which would have had to have begun in September or October 1996. For the U.S. and E.U. to suggest at this late date that a resolution cannot pass is a prophecy they have done their utmost to make self-fulfilling. background A resolution on China at the commission is a curiously potent tool for raising human rights issues, given that it is an unenforceable statement that carries no penalties or obligations. But as the product of the U.N., it has major implications for a country's international image, and even to table a resolution for discussion is considered by many countries, China among them, as a major loss of face. But China considers the U.N. Human Rights Commission an important forum for other reasons as well, including as a vehicle for countering Western ``hegemonism,'' particularly through alliances with governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America. During the 1996 session of the commission, Chinese diplomats made clear that they saw an attempt to seek a resolution on China as an example of this hegemonism, arguing that the North used the commission as a one-way forum through which to confront, judge, and interfere in the internal affairs of developing countries while ignoring abuses in the U.S. and Europe, and that the commission paid too much attention to political and civil rights while neglecting economic, social, and cultural rights and the right to development.\1\ In addition to its value to China as a forum to challenge the West, the commission has also become a useful vehicle to play the U.S. off against its erstwhile European allies. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Footnotes appear at end of report. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Interest in using the U.N. Human Rights Commission as a forum for criticizing China only emerged after the crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Beginning in 1990, the annual Geneva meetings were marked by efforts to table mildly worded resolutions urging China to improve its human rights practices and criticizing ongoing violations of international standards. These efforts were defeated before the resolutions could come up for debate by ``no-action'' motions brought by one of China's friends on the commission--Pakistan could be counted on in this regard. A ``no-action'' motion, if passed, meant that the resolution died a quick death before ever coming to debate and vote. In March 1995, however, the ``no-action'' motion failed for the first time. China's human rights record was debated, and a resolution sponsored by the U.S. and the European Union lost by only one vote when Russia unexpectedly cast its vote in opposition. It was the closest China had ever come to defeat. In April 1996, by contrast, China again successfully blocked a resolution through the ``no-action'' procedure, by a vote of twenty-seven to twenty with six abstentions. In the year that elapsed between the two meetings, China's human rights record had worsened, but its lobbying had improved and the political will of its critics had weakened. Visits between China and commission members between April 1996 and March 1997 resulted in more aid packages, new and expanded trade contracts including foreign investment and joint ventures, and promises of improved bilateral cooperation on projects ranging from agriculture to nuclear technology. While it is impossible to definitively document the direct relationship between each visit or aid package and the votes of individual commission members, an overall pattern emerged that may help to explain China's success at muzzling the commission. Clearly, in many countries, much more was at stake than a Geneva vote, as Beijing sought to boost its long-term political and economic relationships and to weaken Taiwan's ties with some capitals. But a major objective during this period was also to defeat the annual Geneva effort. In 1995 and in 1996, the importance of the outcome in Geneva was clearly reflected in official statements. At the conclusion of the 1995 voting, a foreign ministry spokesman speaking on state radio ``expressed its [the Chinese government's] admiration and gratitude to those countries that supported China,'' and China's ambassador to the U.N. in Geneva said the resolution was ``entirely a product of political confrontation practiced by the West with ulterior motives.'' \2\ After the 1996 vote, an article by the official Chinese news agency Xinhau, entitled ``Failure of Human Rights Resolution Hailed,'' gloated that the commission ``has again shot down a draft resolution against China, marking another failure by the West to use human rights to interfere in China's internal affairs. . . .'' \3\ From China's perspective, there were two relatively balanced voting blocs on the commission, and a number of crucial swing votes.\4\ One bloc consisted of Asian and African states. The second was composed of western Europe and North and Central America. The swing votes were to be found among some of the new democracies of central Europe, the former Soviet republics, large Latin American countries and a handful of African and Asian nations. China courted them all and pursued its efforts to divide Europe and the United States. II. The European Union and the United States In 1995, the year the resolution lost by one vote, the U.S. and E.U., which together with Japan were the resolution's co- sponsors, began efforts to get other countries on board as early as December 1994, when then U.S. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake went to Zimbabwe, Gabon and Ethiopia. The Geneva resolution was one of the issues on his agenda. Geraldine Ferraro, then head of the U.S. delegation to the commission, made calls to Latin American capitals. After that close call, Chinese diplomats and government officials seemed to intensify their efforts to underscore that good economic relations with the world's largest country would be fostered by decreasing pressure on human rights. Overt Chinese pressure, of course, was not always needed: European leaders were well aware that the competitive edge with the Americans could be widened if human rights criticism was left to the latter, especially when the U.S. was already preoccupied with a struggle with China over intellectual property rights and the annual debate over Most Favored Nation status. The first attempts to derail a resolution on China at the 1996 U.N. Human Rights Commission session took place in Bangkok on March 1 and 2, 1996 when Chinese Premier Li Peng met with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Jacques Chirac at the E.U.-Asia summit. With a US$2.1 billion Airbus contract hanging in the balance and a visit to France by Li Peng set for April, France took the lead in trying to work out a deal whereby in exchange for a few concessions from China, the E.U. and the U.S. would agree to drop the resolution. The nature of the proposed concessions was never made public but was rumored to include an agreement by China to sign and ratify the two major international human rights treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: the release of some political prisoners; and an invitation to U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Jose Ayala Lasso, to visit China. Ratification without reservations would indeed have been a useful step, but when pressed to give a timetable for ratification, Beijing reportedly backed off, and the deal fell through. Italy--then in the presidency of the E.U.--was said to be leaning to the French deal, as was Germany, which with bilateral trade of $18 billion, was China's largest trading partner in Europe and one of Europe's top investors in China. The Europeans did not come on board until ten days after the commission session opened, and then only reluctantly. The resolution was doomed by a failure of will on the American side as well. The United States was no more eager than its European counterparts to earn China's opprobrium by sponsoring a resolution, and, according to one source, a deliberate decision was made within the Clinton administration sometime in December 1995 to give the resolution less attention that the year before, with the result that lobbying was late, desultory and ultimately unsuccessful. Despite appeals on human rights in China and Tibet signed by over 200 French legislators and scattered protests, Li Peng's visit to Paris from April 9-13, just before the commission vote, was hailed by Beijing as marking a ``watershed'' in its ties with France. Li Peng took the opportunity to finalize the Airbus sale in what appeared to be a deliberate slight to the U.S. government and the American company Boeing, hitherto the largest supplier of aircraft to China. In one reporter's words. China preferred to deal with countries that ``don't lecture China about human rights, don't threaten sanctions for the piracy of music, videos and software and don't send their warships patrolling the Taiwan Straits.'' \5\ Li Peng's trip to Europe was followed in July 1996 by a six-nation swing by President Jiang Zemin through Europe and Asia, aimed at closing business deals and enhancing Jiang Zemin's international standing. An important side-effect, if not a deliberate objective of these visits, was to erode the willingness of some European countries to confront Beijing in Geneva. The trip came on the heels of a Chinese threat to impose economic sanctions on Germany in retaliation for a conference on Tibet. The conference was sponsored by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, closely linked to Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's Free Democratic Party, and was to be held in Germany in June in cooperation with the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile. The row started over the German government' proposal to provide a subsidy for the conference. Under pressure, government funding was withdrawn, but the conference went ahead with the support of German politicians from all parties. The Chinese government then forced the closure of the foundation's Beijing office. In retaliation, German politicians introduced a motion in the Bundestag criticizing China's human rights record. China then withdrew an invitation to German Foreign Minister Kinkel to visit Beijing. When Beijing further warned that German business interests in China could suffer, Bonn quickly scrambled to restore good relations. In September the invitation was renewed, and Kinkel went the following month. He did raise the cases of political prisoners Wang Dan and Wei Jingsheng, but the real story was that commercial relations with Germany were back on track, for in November in Beijing, President Jiang and German President Roman Herzog signed four agreements on financial and technological cooperation. The last quarter of 1996 saw multimillion dollar deals signed between China and Germany companies, including a joint venture by Mercedes Benz in Jiangsu province to produce buses; a joint venture by Kogel Trailer to produce specialized auto vehicles; a joint venture by Bayer AC and Shanghai Coating Company to produce iron oxide pigments; and a US$6 billion investment in a petrochemical plant by German chemical company BASF. China also wooed other European countries. In June, Chen Jinhua, head of China's State Planning Commission, visited Italy. In Milan, he held meeting with leading Italian financial and business interests, discussing how China's ninth five-year plan would lead to the continued open up of the economy to the outside world. Stressing the growth of bilateral trade, which stood at a record US$ 5.18 billion in 1995, he noted China's potential as a huge market with possibilities for increased Sino-Italian cooperation. In September, Li Peng went to the Hague, just as the Netherlands was poised to take over leadership of the E.U.; in October Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini led a group of Italian businessmen to Beijing on a ``good will'' visit; and in November, Li Peng was back in Europe on a visit to Rome, where he and his Italian counterpart pledged to encourage Sino-Italian economic and trade ties. Britian also worked to bolster its trade with China. When Trade and Industry Secretary Ian Lang met with Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Development Wu Yi in Beijing in September 1996, they agreed to set up working groups in the chemical industry, aeronautics, and energy. In October, Li Lanqing, a vice-premier and vice-chair of the State Council (the equivalent of China's cabinet), traveled to London to meet with Deputy Prime Minister Michael Heseltine, and in November, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on forming a Sino-U.K. Aerospace Equipment Working Group to promote commercial and technical cooperation in civil aviation. III. Latin America Latin America was clearly a priority region for China if it was to defeat a resolution at the 1996 commission session. Next to Europe and North America, it was most likely to vote against China. In some cases, this was due to history of susceptibility to U.S. influence, in others to a democratic transition from an abusive authoritarian past that made the new democracies important allies in efforts to censure grave abuses wherever they occurred. Many Latin American countries, including Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Peru and Venezuela, also had serious strains in their bilateral relations with China because of textile and garment ``dumping'' by the latter. Of all the countries in the region, only Cuba and Peru consistently voted with China in 1995 and 1996, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela abstained in both years. Top Chinese government and Party officials increased the exchange of visits with Latin America leaders after the near success of the 1995 resolution. In October 1995, Premier Li Peng went to Mexico and Peru, signing trade and cooperation agreements with both governments. Peru had abstained from all China votes at the commission until 1995 when it voted in favor of the no-action motion. As if to reinforce the relationship, Luo Gan, secretary-general of the State Council, went to Peru in March 1996 with the commission already in session and pledged US$350,000 in aid and a loan of US$70 million to be used toward China-Peru trade. The sums were small, but the symbolism of South-South aid was important. Peru again voted with China at the commission in 1996. That August, the speaker of the Peruvian parliament, visiting Beijing, said pointedly in the context of a discussion on human rights that his country did not interfere with China's internal affairs. High- level exchanges also took place in 1995 with Brazil, Chile, and Cuba.\6\ In June 1996, following the April vote in the Human Rights Commission, Wu Yi went on a month-long tour of seven Latin American countries, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Chile, all but Peru to be members of the commission for the coming year. In November 1996, Li Peng went back to Latin America, visiting two members of the commission whose voting records had been inconsistent, Brazil and Chile. Brazil was key. Until 1996, it had abstained on all votes on China, in April 1996, it voted against China's efforts to stop action on a resolution. Li Peng's delegation specifically raised the issue during the visit expressing unhappiness with the Brazilian vote, and officials at the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations reportedly discussed the possibility of abstaining on a no-action motion in 1997. The Chinese premier's visit produced agreement on a consulate in Hong Kong after July 1, 1997, on peaceful use of space technology and on sustainable development initiatives. Trade issues were also on the agenda. Chile had voted with China in 1992, then abstained on all votes until 1996 when it joined Brazil to vote against China's efforts to stop debate. During his November visit, Li Peng announced tariff reductions of more than 10 percent on Chilean agricultural goods and signed agreements on scientific and technological cooperation in agricultural and aerospace. As with Peru, the substance of the agreements between Chile and China was less important than the political symbolism of Li Peng's visit, and as with Brazil, the Geneva vote was almost certainly on the agenda. The presidents of Ecuador and Mexico and the foreign minister of Uruguay all visited Beijing between May and December 1996.\7\ Closer ties between China and Latin America, as indicated by high-level exchanges, underscored the fact that sponsors of a resolution critical of China could not take the votes of Latin American members of the commission for granted. They would have to undertake some sustained lobbying, and apparently they did not. IV. Africa If the U.S. and Europe and other sponsors of a resolution were serious about a multilateral initiative to exert pressure on China, it was essential that they bring some African members of the commission on board. Admittedly, it would not have been an easy task, given Chinese diplomatic initiatives and interests in the region, but save for some modest measures in 1994 like U.S. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake's discussions (see above), the sponsors put little energy into finding support from African governments. China, on the other hand, was energetic. Since the end of the Cold War, it has seen African countries as critically important allies, particularly in the United Nations, in the struggle against American ``hegemonism.''\8\ With its history of colonialism and the fact that for the North, it had become the ``forgotten continent,'' Africa has been viewed as a desirable partner in China's efforts to ``bypass'' the United States.\9\ In addition, China had a strong interest in stepping up its diplomacy in the region to counter Taiwan's aggressive campaign to expand ties with some African states. China embarked on a concerted diplomatic campaign in Africa in mid-1995. Although the main objective may have been to blunt Taiwan's influence, it may not be coincidental that the campaign began after China lost a no-action motion and nearly lost the resolution in Geneva in March 1995, or that the countries singled out in this campaign were also for the most part members of the commission. In October-November 1995, well before the 1996 session of the commission convened, Li Lanqing traveled to six central and western African countries: Mali, Guinea, Senegal, Gabon, Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire. Of these, all but Senegal were members of the commission. In November, Quao Shi, a leading member of the Central Committee and chairman of Standing Committee of China's National people's Congress (China's parliament), went to Egypt, another key member of the commission. All the countries included in these two visits voted with China in the April 1996 ``no-action'' motion. By contrast, from September 1995 to March 1996 there were few high-level exchanges between the U.S. and African members of the commission, and when they took place, China was not on the agenda. Angolan president Dos Santos made a state visit to Washington, D.C. on December 8, 1995, for example, but amid the many issues on the U.S.-Angolan agenda, support for a critical position in the U.N. toward China's human rights practices was reportedly not one Madeleine Albright, then U.S. ambassador to the U.N. visited Angola in January 1996, but apparently made no effort to press for Angola's support at the Human Rights Commission. Angola ranks fourth among China's African trading partners and has consistently voted with China at the Human Rights Commission. If the U.S. was serious about generating international pressure on China through the U.N., its officials would have seen the visits by its officials as an opportunity to put multilateralism into practice and raise the issue of a resolution in Geneva. Ethiopia, a key member of the commission, exchanged visits with European and American officials, with development assistance and security the main issues at stake. German President Herzog visited Ethiopia in January 1996, during which he signed an aid agreement for the purchase and transport of fertilizers, and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi spent two days in Paris, meeting with the French prime minister and with President Chirac. In neither case was there any indication that the China vote was on the agenda, and a source close to the U.S. delegation to Geneva told Human Rights Watch that no attempt was made to lobby Ethiopia for its vote. China appeared to have stepped up its efforts to ensure a similar victory in the 1997 session. Following the end of the 1996 commission meeting in April, all fifteen African members of the commission sent or received high-ranking visitors from China. In May 1996, according to Chinese reports, President Jiang himself ``crossed a thousand mountains and rivers to enhance friendship, deepen unity, and learn from the African people.'' visiting a total of six countries as he covered the continent ``from North to South, from east to West.'' Of the six countries, four, Ethiopia, Egypt, Mali an Zimbabwe, were members or about to become members of the commission. At a meeting of the Organization of African States, Jiang stressed that China would be an ally in Africa's drive to develop; and, in fact, over twenty-three agreements and protocols on Sino-African cooperation were signed in May alone. They primarily provided for basic construction projects in transport and energy.\10\ During meetings in Beijing in May 1996, two days before he left for his African tour, President Jiang pledged economic and military support for Mozambique, which rotated on to the commission in time for the 1997 session, at the same time, Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian discussed details of the bilateral ties between the two nations' militaries and provided Mozambique with quantities of new weapons. Sino- Mozambiquan relations went into a tailspin in 1996 when China abruptly pulled out of an agreement to build a new parliament building. The visit in May was an effort to repair relations but it could also help produce a pro- China vote in the commission this March. Jiang Zemin was present in Zimbabwe in May 1996 when Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Wu Yi signed agreements for US$10 million in grants and an additional US$10 million in loans, as well as other agreements on trade, reciprocal protection of investment and technological and economic cooperation. Earlier an agricultural group from China studied the possibilities of importing cotton and tobacco from Zimbabwe. In 1995, the first time Zimbabwe voted on a China resolution in Geneva, it voted for the no-action motion and against the China resolution; in 1996 it again voted in favor of no action on China. Following Jiang Zemin's May 1996 visit to Mali, China signed agreements on economic and technological cooperation during meetings in Beijing between Premier Li Peng and Mali's president, and the Chinese vice-minister of agriculture signed an agreement to assist Mali in building a number of factories. In 1996, when Mali voted on the China question for the first time, it voted in favor of the no-action motion. Jiang Zemin also traveled to Ethiopia in May on a good will visit during which four cooperation agreements were signed. China-Ethiopian economic relations have been minimal compared with China's relationships with other African countries. Before Jiang's visit, Chinese journalists made much of an Ethiopian irrigation project completed with help from thirty- eight Chinese experts. In 1990, Ethiopia voted for a no- action motion and then went off the commission until 1995, when it voted in favor of the no-action motion but abstained when the resolution itself was voted on. In 1996 it again voted in favor of no action. Algeria was already considered in the China camp. Jiang Zemin and the president of Algeria met in Beijing in October to discuss bilateral relations and to sign six documents including one protecting and encouraging reciprocal investment. Algeria has had a strong and continuous relationship with China which helped with a heavy water research reactor, and has been involved in irrigation, agricultural, and research projects including a three-star hotel in Algiers. In January 1997, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen paid a quick visit to Algeria, meeting with the foreign minister to discuss strengthening bilateral cooperation. Uganda became a member of the commission in time to vote with China on the 1996 no-action motion. While the commission was still meeting in April 1996, Li Zhaoxin, China's vice- minister of foreign affairs, agreed to provide US$3.6 million to cover the costs of a national stadium. In January 1997, at the request of the Ugandan government, China agreed to send technical personnel for two years to provide guidance in connection with the stadium project. Li Peng and the president of Gabon, meeting in Beijing in August 1996, stressed the importance of their relationship and their support for the rights of developing nations. Gabon abstained in 1992 on a no-action motion but has since voted solidly in the Chinese camp. When Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei met with the Guinean Foreign Affairs Minister in Guinea in April while the commission meeting was still in session, he thanked him for Guinea's support on the human rights issue. Guinea, a new member of the commission as of the 1996 session, voted for no action on the China resolution. During a visit to South Africa, China's largest trading partner in Africa, in May 1996, Wu Yi negotiated promises of expanded trade ties and reciprocal ``most favored nation trading status.'' The importance of China to South Africa's economy was underscored in December 1996 when President Nelson Mandela abruptly abandoned diplomatic support for Taiwan and recognized Beijing as the sole representative of China. Buhe, the vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress paid a goodwill visit to Benin in December 1996. Although Benin had voted with China in 1996, it abstained on both the no-action motion and the resolution itself in 1995. Both the timing and the high-profile nature of most of these exchanges highlight the likely difficulties of getting African countries to abstain on a China resolution, let alone vote in favor, in 1997. If the U.S. and Europe had been committed to seeing a resolution pass, both would have had to have engaged in intensive lobbying beginning in late 1996. V. Central and Eastern Europe After March 1995, high-level Chinese officials logged considerate mileage traveling to the Russian Federation and to two former Soviet republics, Belarus and the Ukraine. All three countries were to be 1996 commission members. Belarus for the first time, and the Ukraine for the first time since 1990. In 1995, after Russia helped to defeat a no-action motion, its delegates switched their vote and the resolution itself failed as a result. It seemed logical in 1996, that if China were to avoid another near embarrassment, it would have to guarantee Russia's vote on the no-action motion itself. Not since 1990 had Russia voted to send a resolution to the floor. Furthermore, it was generally agreed that the Belarussian president, anxious for reunification with Russia, would vote with Russia. Of course China had other political and economic stakes in its relations with Central and Eastern Europe that may have been the driving force behind much of the activity outlined below; but with the Geneva vote so important to Beijing, lining up commission members was a likely factor. In June 1995, Li Peng visited all three states. During his visit to Belarus, there was agreement on bilateral cooperation in trade, science, technology, manufacturing, and agriculture. In the Ukraine, he signed a note worth 8.5 million renminbi (approximately US$1.7 million) in economic assistance. In August, as a follow-up to the June visits, the vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) led a trade delegation to the region. The direction of the visits reversed in September when the vice-prime minister of Russia went to Beijing, followed in November by a vice-minister from the Belarussian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and in December by the Ukrainian president. During a meeting with Jiang Zemin, the two signed a joint communique furthering bilateral economic and political cooperation. In April 1996 while the Human Rights Commission was in session, Qiao Shi, chairman of Standing Committee on China's National People's Congress (parliament), traveled to Moscow to meet with top Russian officials in preparation for meetings later in the month with three central Asian republics. That same month, China exchanged ministerial visits with both Belarus and the Ukraine. At the invitation of Qian Qichen, the Belarussian foreign minister traveled to Beijing. During a meeting with Li Peng, he thanked him for China's support of Belarus on international issues and described as ``encouraging'' the 60 percent growth in bilateral trade in 1995. Qiao Shi traveled to the Ukraine for a four-day visit aimed at expanding cooperation between the two countries. Shipbuilding, aircraft manufacturing and instrument products were cited as industries for cooperation. In the wake of all this activity, Russia abstained and Belarus and Ukraine voted with China in favor of no action on the resolution at the 1996 commission session. Two days after the vote, President Boris Yeltsin was warmly welcomed in Beijing by Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Qiao Shi. The major accomplishments of the meetings included an agreement signed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan strengthening border confidence, a Sino-Russian joint communique to serve as ``the principled basis for the two countries' constructive partnership during the 21st century'' \11\ and a dozen cooperation agreements, including ones on intellectual property rights, cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and development for mutual prosperity. In addition, representatives from both countries discussed cooperation on military technologies. By December 1996, when Li Peng visited Moscow, plans were being laid for an April 1997 summit on security. At the same time, Russia agreed to lend China US$2.5 billion for nuclear power plant construction and to sell arms to Beijing. And Li and Viktor Chernomyrdin discussed raising bilateral trade volume and cooperation on large-scale projects. In November, the Belarussian president told Li Lanqing during his visit to Minsk that improving Belarus-Chinese relations was of strategic importance to Belarus, adding that he attached great importance to developing bilateral trade and that he welcomed Chinese entrepreneurs willing to invest in Belarus. The following month, the acting prime minister of Belarus attended a signing ceremony in Beijing for agreements on educational cooperation and on ensuring the quality of exported and imported goods. A well-documented effort by the Chinese government to gain support in the commission from central European countries began before the 1994 vote. Poland, to the surprise of delegation members themselves, members of Parliament, and local human rights groups, abstained from voting on the no- action resolution instead of voting against it as it had the year before. Instructions from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had arrived just before the actual vote took place. China had reportedly agreed to support Poland's effort to gain a seat in the Security Council in exchange for the abstention. A representative of the ministry later explained to the Polish parliament that the vote had come about as a result of a ``mistake'' by a junior official. In 1995, Li Peng wrote to Polish Prime Minister Pawlak to thank him for his support in Geneva in 1994 and asked for ``even more substantial support in 1995.'' The offer to promote a Security Council seat was reiterated. After the main Warsaw newspaper publicized the ``vote trade'' and media pressure mounted, Poland's vote against the no-action resolution helped to defeat it. Two other Central European countries on the 1997 commission have received more attention from the U.S. and Europe than from China, and the commission votes may reflect this. With the exception of 1992 when it abstained, Bulgaria has voted against China in the no-action motion, and the Czech Republic, back on the commission after a hiatus of three years, would be unlikely to succumb to Chinese pressure. VI. Asia Most Asian countries were already voting solidly with China. In 1995 and 1996, the only countries that did not were the three Asian democracies, Japan, the Philippines and Korea. Japan has consistently voted in favor of a resolution; the Republic of Korea has consistently abstained; and the Philippines, which voted with China in 1992 before going off the commission for two years, voted against China in 1995 after a territorial dispute with China flared up in the South China Sea. In 1996, Korea and the Philippines abstained; both were considered swing votes for 1997. Korea, which resumed diplomatic relations with China in 1992, has heavy economic stakes in China. The chaebol or conglomerate Goldstar is expected to invest US$10 billion in China by the year 2005, and Daewoo is planning to contribute 960 million renminbi (approximately US$120 million) to the building of an expressway. Daewoo will participate in the operation of the road for thirty years, after which it will belong to Huangshan City, its Chinese partner. During Jiang Zemin's visit to the Philippines in November 1996, China promised to build two power plants and pledged bilateral cooperation. Other important efforts in Asia included Jiang Zemin's November-December 1996 goodwill tour South Asia with stops in India, Pakistan, and Nepal. India has consistently voted with China, a reflection perhaps of its own rejection of external human rights pressure, especially on the sensitive issue of Kashmir. Sino- Indian relations, however, have also steadily improved since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen accompanied President Jiang to India in November 1996 to promote bilateral relations in politics, trade, economy, and culture. The primary issue among the two regional powers was security, and an agreement was reached on military zones on the Sino-Indian border. While in Nepal in early December 1996 to mark the twenty- fifth anniversary of King Birendra's ascension to the throne of Nepal, Jiang Zemin witnessed the signing of a grant of economic and technical assistance. In his December swing through Pakistan, a traditional ally and leader of the efforts in the commission to prevent a resolution on China from coming up for debate, Jiang Zemin oversaw the signing of agreements on construction of a hydroelectric power plan, environmental protection, drug trafficking, and establishment of consulates, including maintenance of Pakistan's consulate in Hong Kong. Pakistani President Farooq Leghari noted that there was no difference between Pakistan and China on Tibet, and Pakistan ``completely supports China.'' He also stated how happy he was that China would resume sovereignty over Hong Kong ``and hoped for a peaceful joining of Taiwan with China as soon as possible.'' \12\ VII. Waffling in 1997 It was clear by November 1996 that sponsorship of a resolution on China at the 1997 U.N. Human Rights Commission was in for a rough ride. On November 24, at a debriefing following President Clinton's meeting with Jiang Zemin at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Manila, a senior administration official said that ``the president said that we want to maintain dialogue and cooperate on [human rights], but on the present record we could not forgo presenting [. . .] a resolution.'' The implication was clear: any nominal gesture or open-ended promise on China's part that could be interpreted as progress on human rights might be enough to derail a resolution. The European Union played a similar game of delaying a decision on the resolution by bouncing consideration of the question from one E.U. body to another. When the E.U. Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) could not reach a decision on what to do about a resolution at its meeting on December 13, 1996, further consideration was delayed almost a month until January 10 when the Political Affairs Working Group, with representatives from all fifteen E.U. capitals, met in Brussels. The meeting decided to refer the issue back to the HRWG despite the fact that a straw poll of political directors had found an overwhelming majority in favor of a resolution and the HRWG had recommended that the E.U. move quickly. Rather than taking a firm decision to exert pressure through a resolution, the political affairs meeting discussed a variety of ways of avoiding confrontation at the commission, including pushing for consensus rather than majority vote on resolutions and substitution of investigations by the U.N. thematic mechanisms for commission resolutions.\13\ Just as the HRWG was about to meet on January 23, China suddenly proposed a human rights discussion on February 14 around the edges of the Asia-Europe (ASEM) foreign ministers' meeting in Singapore, providing some E.U. countries with a pretext for delaying a decision once more. (For months, the E.U. had been unsuccessful in trying to schedule a formal E.U.-China human rights dialogue, originally scheduled for October 1996). But China offered no human rights concessions or gestures during the meeting, according to diplomatic sources. The U.S. also refused to commit itself to the one multilateral initiative that might have exerted real pressure on China, with officials reiterating that Sino-U.S. relations could not be ``held hostage'' to human rights concerns and that a decision about sponsorship would be made ``when the time came.'' During the U.S. Senate hearing on January 8, 1997 to confirm Madeleine Albright as secretary of state, Albright went so far as to imply that China's previous record was of no import, what counted was ``in the remaining weeks'' how China ``approach[ed] that situation'' and whether any changes took place. Different administration officials gave the same message: the U.S. position would be determined based on China's actions between ``now''--and ``now'' became later and later--and the time of the commission vote. A week after Albright's confirmation hearing, the Chinese government warned of complications in the bilateral relationship if the U.S. pressed on rights issues.\14\ No concrete promises or assurances resulted from a visit to Beijing on January 30-31 by a low-level delegation from the National Security Council and the State Department, aimed at exploring the possibilities for a human rights breakthrough. On January 21, the Clinton administration moved to ensure consistency in the U.S.-E.U. position. A diplomatic demarche circulated to E.U. members in Brussels stated that ``we are continuing to talk with the Chinese about what meaningful concrete steps they might take to avoid confrontation in Geneva,'' and it suggested that to make compliance easier, the E.U. ask China for the same minimal concessions: releases of prisoners with medical problems, resumption of discussions on prison visits, and signing and submitting to the National People's Congress for ratification the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The U.S. did state its willingness to cosponsor a resolution if China's performance did not improve but did not set a time frame or deadline for making a formal decision. President Clinton himself went further, stating at his January 24 press conference that there was no need to press China on human rights because the current government would, like the Berlin Wall, eventually fall.\15\ Six days later, the Clinton administration was back to justify no decision in terms of seeking improvements. On January 30, Secretary Albright relayed that message when she met in Washington with Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Micrlo and Sir Leon Britian, vice-president of the European Commission and a strong supporter of commercial diplomacy.\16\ Given the deterioration of human rights in China across the board over the past year, however, trying to seek ``improvements'' in the few months before the commission meetings began was disingenuous at best. Secretary Albright's visit to Beijing on February 24--just prior to Deng Xiaoping's funeral--provided another opportunity to avoid a resolution, pending the outcome of her high-level discussions with Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and other senior officials. A report in the New York Times, published the day she arrived in Beijing, outlined the possible elements of a deal, although the administration vehemently denied the story's suggestion that a bargain was imminent, it did not dispute the other details.\17\ Albright left Beijing, empty-handed but noting that breakthroughs before had not come during high-level visits but often several weeks or months afterwards, so as not to give the impression that foreign pressure had been involved. Three days after her visit, however, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that China was giving ``positive consideration'' to signing the two major international human rights agreements, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. However, he went on to say, ``as to when we would join, that is entirely our own affair.'' It is worth noting that in November 1993, China had announced that it was giving ``positive consideration'' to access to its prisons by the International Committee of the Red Cross, not long afterwards, negotiations with the ICRC came to a standstill. But two days after the February 27 statement on the covenants, China announced that it had agreed to ``resume our contact [with the ICRC] after a two-year hiatus.'' \18\ An ICRC spokesman noted that these were ``talks about talks to begin talks.'' The only element of a deal that had not been announced by China by the end of February, then, was the release of key dissidents. It was left to Vice President Gore to try to close any deal during his late March visit. Meanwhile the E.U. had met in Brussels on February 24 and decided to put off any decision on a resolution, waiting instead for the outcome of Albright's trip. Immediately following Gore's visit, Australian Prime Minister John Howard is due in Beijing, as are Canada's foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy (in April), and French President Jacque Chirac (in May). While the E.U. and the U.S. were procrastinating, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Jose Ayala Lasso announced on February 10, before the sudden announcement of his resignation, that he had received and accepted in principle an invitation from China to visit. The timing of the invitation was clearly an effort to try to undermine the already dim prospects for a successful resolution by demonstrating China's openness to cooperation on human rights with the U.N. VIII. Conclusion For the last two years, the diplomacy surrounding a China resolution at the U.N. Human Rights Commission has been marked by a sorry lack of will and outright hypocrisy on the part of those countries that purport to defend human rights. The U.S. and E.U. member governments in particular have watched in near-silence as penalties for dissent in China steadily increased. The one tool that even U.S. and European critics of a vocal human rights policy were willing to support was a resolution in Geneva because it was by definition multilateral and less damaging, it was thought, to bilateral relations. But by 1997, American and European leaders appeared ready to take any promise the Chinese government was willing to make as evidence of progress on human rights and as a pretext for backing out of a resolution. At the same time, it had ensured that no such resolution could ever pass by holding off so long on the lobbying needed to build support at the commission even as China was engaged in steady and effective lobbying of its own. The U.S. and Europe have sent a clear message that powerful countries will be allowed to abuse international standards with impunity. That signal is a disservice to the United Nations and to the cause of human rights. footnotes \1\ See, for example, the statements of Chinese diplomats in press releases issued by the U.N. Commission for Human Rights during its 1996 session: Wu Jianmin in Press Release HR/CN/ 96/03, March 19, 1996, p. 4 and Zhang Jun in Press Release HR/CN/96/13, March 26, 1996, p. 4. \2\ Washington Post, ``U.N. Rights Panel Votes Down Measure Censuring China,'' March 9, 1995. \3\ ``Failure of UN Human Rights Resolution Hailed,'' Xinhua, April 24, 1996, in FBIS, CHI-96-081. \4\ Commission members serve for three-year terms, but may serve more than one term. \5\ David Sanger, ``Two Roads to China: Nice and Not So Nice--Boeing's Strategy is Appeasement; Microsoft Growls,'' New York Times, June 9, 1996. \6\ Li Ruihuan, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and often suggested as a possible successor to Li Peng, went to Cuba in June 1995, followed by a nine-day trip by Fidel Castro to China in December, his first visit ever. \7\ Li Peng met with the president of Ecuador in May and with the foreign minister of new commission member Uruguay in October. (In June, Uruguay had hosted Wu Yi and a trade delegation. In its previous three years on the commission, 1992-94, Uruguay had abstained on the China no-action votes.) Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon met with Jiang Zemin in November 1996. \8\ ``Profit and Prejudice: China in Africa,'' China News Analysis, No. 1574, December 15, 1996, p. 6. \9\ ``Profit and Prejudice: China in Africa,'' China News Analysis, No. 1574, December 15, 1996, p. 6. \10\ ``Profit and Prejudice: China in Africa,'' China News Analysis, No. 1574, December 15, 1996, p. 3. \11\ ``Yelstin Adviser Stresses Importance of Upcoming Visit,'' Xinhua, April 22, 1996; in FBIS-CHI-96-080, April 24, 1996. \12\ ``Spokesman on Jiang Zemin Visit,'' The News (Islamabad), December 2, 1996, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-CHI-96-232. \13\ The U.N. thematic mechanisms include, among others, the Special Rapporteurs on Torture; Summary and Arbitrary Execution; Religious Intolerance; Freedom of Expression; Independence of the Judiciary; Violence Against Women; and Sale of Children, as well as Working Groups on Disappearances and Arbitrary Detention. At China's invitation, the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance visited in November 1994. Not only have none of his recommendations been implemented, but religious repression in China has intensified in the two years since the visit. Negotiations for a visit by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention are ongoing. \14\ ``Mutual Respect Needed,'' China Daily (English language version), January 15, 1997, p. 4. \15\ ``I don't think there is any way that anyone who disagrees with that in China can hold back that [liberty], just as eventually the Berlin Wall fell. I just think it's inevitable.'' Quoted from his press conference in Jim Mann, ``Clinton's `Berlin Wall' Theory on China Steeped in Paradoxes,'' Washington Post, February 12, 1997. \16\ South China Morning Post, ``Rights Action Urged to Avoid Censure,'' January 30, 1997. \17\ Patrick E. Tyler, ``U.S. and Chinese Seen Near a Deal on Human Rights,'' New York Times, February 24, 1997. \18\ Patrick E. Tyler, ``China and Red Cross Agree to New Talks on Jail Visits,'' New York Times, March 1, 1997.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the resolution (H. Res. 364) urging the introduction and passage of a resolution on the human rights situation in the People's Republic of China at the 54th session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, as amended.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the chairman of the full Committee on International Relations. (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds, before yielding to the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific to make one additional point. I think it is very important to point out that the Chinese Government, and Human Rights Watch Asia has done a very fine job in chronicling this, country by country, went out and sought members of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva and provided favors to those governments, money, building supplies, all kinds of materiel in order to buy out those countries from supporting the human rights resolution last year. I would ask at the appropriate time that that be made a part of the Record so that Members can see how the Chinese Government methodically was able to silence its critics. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the very distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to thank my good friend from Nebraska, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. He is very much involved on a day-to-day basis with what is going on in China. We have worked cooperatively on this resolution. He had some very useful text changes, and we thank him for that. I wanted to thank the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), who is always a great friend of human rights; the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi); and I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), my ranking member of the subcommittee, and all the Members who have helped forge this legislation.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I agree fully with the MacBride Principles, which are patterned after the Sullivan Principles, which were instrumental in eliminating, or very important in the process of eliminating, discrimination in South Africa. They are contained, as we know, in the State Department Conference Report, which will be up tomorrow as part of the fund for Africa. So I would hope Members would be put on notice that tomorrow, when we do vote on the State Department Conference Report authored by Mr. Helms, my good friend, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), and myself, that that contains the MacBride Principles, which advance the cause of religious freedom in the north of Ireland. So I thank the gentleman for asking that question.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman). (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, first of all, let me thank my friend, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez), for his kind remarks. We are in solidarity on this. I think this is again one of those issues that unites this Chamber. Let me just close by noting that House Concurrent Resolution 152 puts Congress on record as supporting not just the peace process, which we all want hostilities to end, but also to put human rights at the core, at the center of those negotiations. It is timely and needed and will help ensure that human rights concerns are in no way overlooked when the final document is produced. Mr. Speaker, the history of the ``Troubles'' of Northern Ireland are marked by violent crimes of parliamentary groups and at times by agents of the British government. The failure of the British government to protect the human rights of its citizens, especially Catholics in the north of Ireland, have helped to fuel the violence. Notwithstanding the abuses perpetrated by partisan paramilitary forces or by the police, for that matter, we must remember that the essential responsibility for protecting rights and maintaining the rule of law belongs to the government which, in this case, at this particular time, is the British government. When governments resort to methods that are illegal, unjust or inhumane, even when these methods are seemingly directed against the guilty or the dangerous, the effect is not to preserve law and order, but to seriously undermine it. It is particularly saddening that the British government, America's trusted ally, is the object of serious and credible charges of disrespect for the rule of law in the north of Ireland. All of the major human rights organizations, from Amnesty International to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, have been particularly critical of pervasive restrictions on the due process of law in Northern Ireland; and they have testified that law enforcement officials of the UK, members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, tolerate and even perpetrate some of the gross abuses that have taken place in the north of Ireland. Under so-called emergency legislation applicable only in Northern Ireland, police have expansive powers to arrest and detain suspects and to search premises without a warrant. In addition, the government can suspend the right to trial by jury, the much-maligned Diploic Courts Systems, and the universally recognized right to be preserved from self-incrimination in like manner has been abridged. It seems to me that the power to arbitrarily arrest, detain, intimidate, the power to deny timely and appropriate legal counsel, and the power to compel self-incrimination is an abuse of power normally associated with some of our adversaries, not our allies. Thus, the resolution is a wake-up call to our friends. Friends do not let friends abuse human rights. Witness after witness, Mr. Speaker, who came into our two hearings expressed a fear that as the political issues are addressed, universal human rights such as the right to silence, the right to jury trial, the right to attorneys, the right to work free of discrimination will be neglected. House Concurrent Resolution 152 puts on notice those who are negotiating and says, in a very friendly way but in a very firm way, that the U.S. Congress believes that there must be reform on human rights issues if genuine peace is to be achieved. It also points out that there are many human rights reforms that could be enacted today without waiting for a final peace negotiation. Among the immediate changes are those proposed by Britain's own standing advisory committee or commission, I should say, on human rights, SACHR, to eliminate religious discrimination against Catholics in the workplace. Other reforms suggested by human rights groups, such as repealing the emergency legislation, conducting independent inquiries into the deaths of Pat Finucane, Robert Hamill and other human rights abuses, and banning plastic bullets, are all doable. If enacted immediately, these changes could help pave the way for further reconciliation, further confidence-building and, hopefully, for a lasting and sustainable peace. Mr. Speaker, House Concurrent Resolution 152 has been reviewed and has been endorsed by all of the major human rights organizations. It does put us on record as standing four-square. Let me just say one final point, Mr. Speaker. In the upcoming weeks we hope to have an additional hearing in our subcommittee that would deal with an issue of very grave concern. That is the issue of defense attorneys in the north of Ireland. We have found, much to my shock and dismay, an ongoing intimidation campaign against those who would defend those who have been accused of wrongdoing in Northern Ireland. It seems to me that defense attorneys are not unlike those that we stood up for time and time again during the heydays of the Cold War, the Helsinki monitors, people who have stood up and said that due process must be protected. I may not like my client, I may not like what you say they are alleged to have done, but you are not going to intimidate the attorney that is there to defend them, because that would be a breach of due process and of basic human rights. We are going to be looking at that in the coming weeks in the subcommittee, and hopefully by then this process will be that much further along, and this resolution that is under consideration in Belfast will have a happy conclusion. I urge Members to support this resolution. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, last week the Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary heard testimony in support of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe's Fiscal Year 1999 budget request. In my written submission for the committee, I shared portions of a poignant letter I recently received from the National Director of the Union of Councils of Soviet Jews, Micah Natfalin. Mr. Naftalin's words and observations are well said and heartfelt, and frankly, he reflects observations about the Commission and its work that many NGOs and public policy analysts have shared with me over the years. The Commission is aggressive in pursuing its mandate to monitor and encourage compliance with the Helsinki Accords. Through its hearings, public briefings, bilateral communications and encouraging strong statements by the U.S. delegation at OSCE meeting, the Commission encourages compliance through public diplomacy and suasion. The Commission's work is significantly enhanced by the diligent work of non-governmental organizations both here in the United States and in the field. The commitment and effectiveness of the Commission and the staff which are expressed in this letter from the Union of Councils speaks for themselves. Mr. Speaker, these complimentary words about the work of the Commission and particularly the expertise of the staff are not uncommon. For the record, I would like to share excerpts from the March 10 letter. The Union of Councils for Soviet Jews has been a close observer of the Commission's work since its inception. . . . In the vast desert of policy and think tank meetings, largely concerned with questions of economics, military defense, and environmental protection, the Helsinki Commission stands as the single oasis where those concerned with human rights, and especially the grassroots efforts to support common citizens in their quest to hold their national and local governments accountable to the standards of democracy, rule of law and a civil society, can invariably receive a responsive and understanding hearing. The power and moral influence of the Helsinki Commission lies in the commitment of its entirely bi-partisan membership in the House and Senate. Its strength and the quality of its assessments derive from one of the most dedicated and professionally expert staffs I have encountered since I was a Congressional staff member in the early 1960s. . . . The Helsinki Commission's high standard of quality tends to obscure the limitations in its scope and reach. While it is difficult to measure quantifiably the opportunities thus lost, those of us in the human rights community can attest that the success of your work demands greater resources. No other institution can match the Helsinki Commission. It would seem incumbent on the Congress to strengthen your ability to expand the staff, which is your most precious resource.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on the concurrent resolution just considered.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I--along with my colleagues Reps. Gilman, Wolf, Porter, Hoyer and Markey--rise today to introduce a resolution voicing concern about serious limitations on human rights in Belarus, a country of 10 million people located in eastern Europe. Belarus has an old and rich--and often tragic--history. This century, the people of Belarus suffered the horror of both Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism. More recently, they were ravaged by the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the legacy of which profoundly haunts Belarus to this day. Today, the rights and liberties of the Belarusian people are being eroded by their own authorities. As a participating State of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Belarus has pledged to abide by its commitments under the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent agreements of the OSCE. Yet since the election of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in 1994, basic rights and freedoms have come under increasing assault in clear violation of Belarus' freely undertaken commitments under the OSCE. In an illegitimate November 1996 referendum to amend the 1994 Constitution, President Lukashenka amassed sweeping powers over parliament and the judiciary. In his quest for more power, Lukashenka has ignored the constitutionally established system of separation of powers. Virtually all power rests in the hands of Lukashenka, who has resorted to rule by decree. Following the 1996 referendum, Lukashenka disbanded the Supreme Soviet (parliament) and created a new legislature, which is largely subordinate to his authoritarian rule. The resolution I am introducing today urges President Lukashenka to restore the rights of the pre-November 1996 parliament, which, having been duly elected on the basis of democratic elections in 1995, is the only legitimate parliament in Belarus. Similarly, Lukashenka has also undermined the judicial branch. The previously independent Constitutional Court has been brought entirely under his control, and independence of the judiciary in Belarus is no longer guaranteed. Belarus has been rife with violations of human rights over the last few years, bringing to mind the bygone Soviet era. Freedoms of expression, and association and assembly are severely restricted. The state controls almost all media outlets. The few genuinely independent newspapers and radio stations have been harassed or shut down. Journalists critical of the regime have been denied accreditation; some have been jailed. Opposition leaders and other individuals who criticize the president or government have been intimidated, beaten, or detained. Non-governmental organizations face obstacles and have been subjected to harassment. The Belarusian Soros Foundation, for instance, which had donated some $13 million to educational, humanitarian, cultural and media projects in Belarus, was forced to close its office there last September as a result of the Belarusian Government's orchestrated campaign of harassment. Demonstrations during the last few years have resulted in short-term detentions--with detainees held incommunicado--fines and police violence against demonstrators and even bystanders. Mr. Speaker, one can provide a litany of specific instances, but allow me to highlight just two recent cases. Last August, police in the Belarusian town of Stolptsy detained 19-year-old Alexei Shidlauski and 16-year-old Vadim Labkovich--both members of the youth branch of the opposition Belarusian National Front. They were charged for ``malicious hooliganism'' for allegedly writing on walls appeals for freedom in Belarus and for replacing on several buildings the official red-green Belarusian flag with the red-white-red ``independent'' Belarusian flag, which President Lukashenka banned in 1995. The young men spent six months in pre-trial detention under very difficult conditions. Just last week, a Miensk court sentenced Vadim Labkovich to a one-and-a- half-year suspended prison term and Alexei Shidlauski to one-and-a- half-year prison term in a strict regime colony. Human Rights Watch, whose representatives were present at the trial, condemned the proceedings as a ``show trial and a mockery of justice.'' In late December, Yuri Khashchevatsky, an internationally renowned film director and a member of the Belarusian Helsinki Committee was beaten unconscious by two unidentified men, in what human rights observers strongly believe to be a politically-motivated assault. Khashchevatsky had directed a documentary film called ``An Ordinary President'', which is critical of President Lukashenka. The film won several international prizes, but has been effectively banned in Belarus. Mr. Speaker, I can cite numerous other instances of specific violations of human rights and civil liberties and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), which I Co- Chair, has detailed information concerning such violations. We have and we will continue to make our views about these matters known to the Belarusian government. Mr. Speaker, all of the post-communist countries in the region face formidable obstacles in their transition to democratic states based on the rule of law. We recognize that the oppressive legacy of communism and of Soviet rule cannot be overcome overnight. Some of the post- communist countries have made greater progress towards reform; in others, progress has been more erratic, but in virtually all, there has been progress. Belarus, however, appears to be the only country in the region which has witnessed serious backsliding and a turn to the Soviet past. Immediately following its 1991 independence, Belarus appeared to be off to a good start in establishing its democratic credentials, but even those limited reforms have been reversed as Lukashenka has steadily tightened his grip. Belarusian officials, including President Lukashenka, have complained about Belarus' isolation from the international community, as more and more countries and international bodies have taken Belarus to task over the curtailment of human rights and civil liberties there. The OSCE, for instance, has repeatedly called upon the Government of Belarus to respect human rights and democratic principles, to enter into dialogue with the opposition and to ensure freedom of the media. Lukashenka fails to realize the consequences of his actions and his government's failure to abide by international commitments. The international community has not isolated Belarus--President Lukashenka is isolating Belarus. After nearly a year of difficult negotiations and several false starts, Belarus and the OSCE agreed to an OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group, which will assist the Belarusian authorities in promoting democratic institutions and in complying with other OSCE commitments. This Group, which is now commencing its work and which will be located in the Belarusian capital of Minsk, can play a truly constructive role in helping Belarus improve its human rights situation. Let me assure you that I will watch closely the willingness of the Belarusian Government to cooperate with the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group. Mr. Speaker, If the Belarusian Government abides by its commitments under the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE agreements, its isolation from the international community will disappear and its relations, not only with the United States, but with its neighbors in the region, will improve dramatically.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, recently I visited Moscow with my colleagues Mr. Hall of Ohio and Mr. Wolf of Virginia, along with the distinguished Librarian of Congress and specialist on Russia, Dr. James Billington. We were there as part of an international delegation invited to discuss with Russian officials the new Russian law on freedom of conscience and religious organizations. This trip was very fruitful and I believe will have played a role in having some of the most pernicious elements of that regrettable legislation removed or alleviated. During our stay in Moscow, the U.S. Embassy kindly arranged a meeting for us with Alexander Ogorodnikov, a former Soviet political prisoner whom I first met in 1988. Until recently, he had operated a soup kitchen and shelter for endangered young women in Moscow. I say ``recently'' because just before our arrival, the soup kitchen was closed down by order of city officials. The shelter is still open, although it has been subjected to periodic police raids since its opening. Mr. Ogorodnikov opened his soup kitchen on Khoroshevskoe Shosse in February 1991, the first such privately funded charitable institution in the former Soviet Union. Among the financial contributors were religious organizations in the United States, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. The soup kitchen fed pensioners, homeless persons, former incarcerees, refugees, people from other neighborhoods, basically most anyone who needed a meal. According to Mr. Ogorodnikov, an average of 450 to 550 persons visited the soup kitchen every day as of 1997. Unfortunately, as the saying goes, no good deed goes unpunished-- especially in today's Russia. Neighborhood officials and the Moscow city property authorities have been leveling (in Mr. Ogorodnikov's words) ``unjustified financial claims'' against the soup kitchen. The case has gone to court and has still not been resolved. Nevertheless, on the night of November 13, 1997, a group of unknown persons showed up when none of the soup kitchen personnel were present and seized the premises. On the next day, when soup kitchen personnel arrived for work, they were not permitted to enter. The new occupants announced that ``repairs had been initiated.'' Mr. Ogorodnikov was not even allowed to retrieve his equipment or the foodstuffs that had been stored at the soup kitchen. On January 15, I visited the soup kitchen, or rather what was left of it, with Mr. Ogorodnikov. Repair work on the building was being done, but it appeared as if the soup kitchen had never existed. All Mr. Ogorodnikov's kitchen equipment and his foodstuffs had disappeared. We asked for the foreman of the operation and, after a while, he showed up. I don't think he was glad to see us. The foreman informed Mr. Ogorodnikov that his equipment had been removed and stored elsewhere in the city, but he refused to say where. Mr. Ogorodnikov was shown a back room where someone had stashed two of the icons that had been on the soup kitchen wall, and Mr. Ogorodnikov was required to sign for the icons before he could remove them for safe keeping, ``so there won't be any claims.'' Of course, no one worried about claims when the food, refrigerators, freezers, tables, and other equipment were hauled away. The foreman did indicate that he would arrange to have the equipment delivered wherever Mr. Ogorodnikov instructed, a rather difficult condition, since Mr. Ogorodnikov has no other place to store his equipment. In the meantime, Mr. Ogorodnikov could win his case against his tormentors, and the court might order his foodstuffs and equipment returned to him. By that time, who knows what will remain? Mr. Speaker, ironically, the United States Government has spent significant amounts of taxpayers' money to assist Russia with macroeconomic programs, small business assistance, and humanitarian aid. Yet here is a Russian man who, like many of his contemporaries, could have gone into business for his own financial gain. Instead, he has devoted himself to helping the many poor and destitute among his countrymen. In return, local officials harass him, shut down his operation, and deprive many others of the chance to have a decent meal. It is a sad commentary on human nature, and bespeaks badly on the political leadership of a city with such great potential.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, on our very first day back in session, I joined with my colleague, Rep. Jim Saxton, in introducing legislation to block the implementation of the Health Care Finance Administration's (HCFA's) new Medicare reimbursement program for home health care. This new Medicare reimbursement program, known as the ``Interim Payment System'' (IPS), is based on an incomplete and inequitable funding formula which directly jeopardizes home health care agencies and the elderly they serve in my state. The value of home health care is obvious. All of us intuitively know that enabling our seniors to receive quality, skilled nursing care in their own homes is preferable to other, more costly, sometimes isolated, settings. Senior citizens receive the peace of mind from familiar settings and their loved ones close at hand. And the cost savings to Medicare from proper use of home health care are considerable. The legislation we have introduced (HR 3108) corrects several flaws contained in the IPS formula and assures fair and reasonable Medicare reimbursement for quality home health care. If left unchanged, the IPS will cut Medicare reimbursement for home health care in New Jersey by $25 million in fiscal year 1998 alone. Several agencies in New Jersey could lose $2 million or more in anticipated reimbursement for homebound Medicare patients. One of the most unfair aspects of the IPS is that it seeks to treat efficient and inefficient home health agencies alike, despite the fact that average utilization rates in New Jersey's agencies--43 visits per beneficiary served in 1996--are far lower than the national average of 74 visits that year. Because the IPS reimbursement rates for each home health care agency are linked to earlier utilization rates and costs, agencies that were efficient and honest all along still find themselves struggling to squeeze another 12 to 15 percent reduction in aggregate reimbursement rates from already lean operations--a very tall order indeed. Meanwhile, agencies in other parts of the country with abnormally high home health costs and utilization rates are permitted to use base year utilization rates that were badly inflated in the first place. Thus, they will continue to receive high reimbursement rates because they had inflated costs in the past. The IPS, therefore, effectively punishes efficient operations and does not comprehensively address the problem in areas with inordinately high home health utilization statistics. For example, home health agencies serving senior citizens in NJ will only receive enough funding to provide as few as 30 to 35 visits per patient. Meanwhile, agencies in other parts of the country--such as Tennessee and Louisiana--may continue providing their patients with almost triple that number of visits at twice the cost per visit. Disparities of this magnitude are inherently unreasonable and unfair, and must be corrected. Mr. Speaker, it is a simple fact of life that the home health care industry is very time and labor intensive. There are ways to restructure an agency's operations to make care-giving more efficient, but at a certain point, one cannot go any further without impacting the quality of care the patient receives. In Ocean County, New Jersey--which is home to the greatest concentration of senior citizens in New Jersey--home health care agencies may only receive enough resources to provide as few as 30 visits per patient. The situation in Mercer, Burlington, and Monmouth counties is much the same: all will see an arbitrary capping of reimbursement for home care visits no matter the patient's condition. If New Jersey patients require, on average, more visits per patient than Medicare will reimburse, the quality of the care they receive could be jeopardized and an agency that is forced to continue providing uncompensated care will eventually risk bankruptcy. The IPS is troubling for another reason: as initially implemented, the IPS gives providers a perverse incentive to avoid treating critically ill, chronic, or more expensive patients. Unlike a fully implemented prospective payment system (PPS), the Interim Payment System (IPS) makes no attempt to distinguish between agencies that are simply inefficient and agencies that are treating a disproportionately sicker patient population. Our bill mitigates the damage set in motion by the IPS and will restore at least 60% of the reimbursement cuts announced January 1, 1998. To preserve the quality of medically necessary care for our seniors, our legislation mandates two changes to the IPS. First, our bill will allow home health care agencies to use calendar year 1994--rather than fiscal year 1994--cost data as the base year upon which visits and reimbursement rates are derived. This distinction may seem technical but it is extremely important for states like New Jersey which do not run on the same fiscal year as the federal government. The practical result of the IPS fiscal year requirement is that it forces NJ home health agencies to use earlier base year data (1993) when complying with the IPS. The older the data, the greater the gap between the IPS settings and the actual needs in 1998. Older data also glosses over the growing trend to move patients out of acute care settings and into home health care programs. The IPS program should be based on the most recent, practical, data. The second provision contained in our bill will protect home health agencies from a hidden cut in the Medicare home health reimbursement. Under the guise of ``freezing'' certain costs and prohibiting adjustments for inflation, the IPS actually goes beyond merely capping or ``freezing'' home health cost limits--it reduces total per-patient payments, too. If left unchanged, this ``so-called'' freeze provision will not only cut the anticipated inflation costs, but go below current per-patient reimbursements as well. To address this, HR 3108 requires HCFA to factor in medical inflation in IPS calculations. Mr. Speaker, when HCFA first announced its changes to the Medicare coverage of home health care I sent a letter signed by the entire NJ Congressional Delegation to Nancy-Ann Min DeParle, the Director of HFCA, outlining three major problems with the IPS and asking that the agency not implement its proposal until the formula was corrected. While one of our concerns has been addressed, the remaining inequities have not. I urge my colleagues to act swiftly on this legislation and move to protect homebound Medicare patients who are now at risk.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, this authority was necessary for longtime reeducation camp victims who had been persecuted in Vietnam for their pro-U.S. associations to bring their unmarried children with them to the United States if these children have reached the age of 21 during their incarceration or the long wait for an exit visa from the Communist authorities. A member of these former prisoners of conscience have refused to leave Vietnam unless they can bring their children with them. These families are trapped in Vietnam until the provision is reauthorized. I would just like to point out to the Members that extension of this authority has been endorsed by the administration, on the other side of the building Senators McCain, Abraham, and Kennedy, and it has the bipartisan support of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], and the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman], and I appreciate their cosponsorship of this legislation, and Mr. Berman and Mr. Davis, as a matter of fact, are additional cosponsors as well.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, I just want to say very briefly in response to my good friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman], we were engaged in a very difficult negotiation with the White House over the last several days, and in the end we gave half a loaf on the Mexico City policy which separates abortion from family planning. We said that foreign nongovernmental organizations would be precluded, those that are subsidized by the U.S. Government, would no longer be able to lobby in foreign capitals to topple their pro-life laws. It seems to me this was a very modest proposal. This was rejected. The good news for the pro-life said that the Speaker of the House and the majority leader have given their solemn word that the IMF issue and arrearages payments, and those arrearages payments are in dispute, there are all different, conflicting numbers as to what they should be, that those three issues are intertwined and they will move forward together or they will not move forward at all. We have offered the White House a true compromise; they have rejected it at this point. My hope is that in the spirit of comity, I would hope that we could move to a real compromise on this, and then we could work in partnership on all three of these issues.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, as everyone is aware, the British and Irish Governments face an unprecedented opportunity to achieve real peace in Northern Ireland. For the first time since the partition of Ireland in 1922, all parties are participating in peace talks while a cease-fire is in effect. The Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, which I chair, has held two hearings on human rights abuses in Northern Ireland and on the prospects for improved human rights conditions as part of the current peace talks. At our hearings, international and American human rights experts, as well as victims and relatives of victims, provided compelling and eye-opening testimony about human rights abuses, the disregard for the rule of law, and the personal tragedies people in Northern Ireland have endured. All of our witnesses welcomed the interest and support of the U.S. Government and affirmed that American standards and ideals are critical to the success of the process. After the first hearing, I led a human rights, peace mission to the north of Ireland. I met with leaders from political parties on all sides of the conflict and with key officials in the Government, including Secretary of State Mo Mowlam. I was pleased by Secretary Mowlam's intimate understanding of the human rights concerns and remain hopeful that human rights protections will be afforded to members of all communities in Northern Ireland. While optimistic, I remain cautiously optimistic. Unfortunately, not even the best of intentions guarantee that the final agreement will genuinely protect human rights. In peace processes around the world, most recently in Bosnia, and Guatemala, we have seen that the atmosphere at these negotiations, the pressure to get an agreement, and the reluctance to reopen old wounds can have the unfortunate side effect of making human rights an after-thought rather than a central element to the agreement. I submit for the Record today, Mr. Speaker, my bill as amended, House Concurrent Resolution 152 which condemns violence and urges the participants of the multiparty talks in Northern Ireland to fully integrate internationally recognized human rights standards as part of the peace process. This resolution, which has broad bipartisan support and has been approved by the full International Relations Committee, puts Congress on record supporting human rights reforms in Northern Ireland. The text of the resolution is a culmination of information gathered on the trip and at the hearings. It identifies abuses and pronounces concrete recommendations for advancing human rights and building a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. In addition to condemning the violent crimes of paramilitary groups on both sides of the conflict, House Concurrent Resolution 152 addresses the failures of the British Government. Notwithstanding the abuses perpetrated by partisan paramilitary forces, or by the police for that matter, we must remember that the central responsibility for protecting rights and maintaining the rule of law belongs to the Government--which in this case, at this particular time, is the British Government. When governments resort to methods that are illegal, unjust, or inhumane, even when these methods are seemingly directed against the guilty or the dangerous, the effect is not to preserve law and order but to undermine it. It is particularly saddening that the British Government, America's trusted ally, is the object of serious and credible charges of disrespect for the rule of law in the north of Ireland. All of the major human rights organizations, Amnesty International, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch have been particularly critical of pervasive restrictions on the due process of law in Northern Ireland and they have testified that law enforcement officials of the United Kingdom, members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, tolerate, and even perpetrate some of the gross abuses that have taken place in the north of Ireland. Under emergency legislation applicable only to Northern Ireland, police have expansive powers to arrest and detain suspects and to search premises without a warrant. In addition, the Government can suspend the right to trial by jury--the much maligned Diplock Courts System--and the universally recognized right to be preserved from self- incrimination has been abridged. It seems to me that the power to arbitrarily arrest, detain, intimidate; the power to deny timely and appropriate legal counsel; and the power to compel self-incrimination is an abuse of power normally associated with our adversaries, Mr. Speaker, not our allies. Thus the resolution is a wake up call to our friends. Friends don't let friends abuse human rights. Witness after witness at our hearings expressed a fear that as political issues are addressed, universal human rights such as the right to silence, the right to jury trial, the right to attorneys, and the right to work free of discrimination, just to name a few, will be neglected. My resolution, which has broad bipartisan support, notifies negotiators in Belfast that the U.S. Congress believes that there must be reform on human rights issues if genuine peace is to be achieved. The resolution condemns political violence and recommends: The establishment of a bill of rights for all citizens of the North; A ``Truth Commission'', with international input, to investigate outstanding human rights abuses; The repeal of the so-called ``emergency legislation'' which has limited human rights in Northern Ireland for over 25 years; The establishment of a truly independent complaints mechanism for citizen inquiries regarding the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and other security forces; and A ban on plastic bullets. Mr. Speaker, House Concurrent Resolution 152 has been reviewed and endorsed by the major human rights groups, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, British Irish Rights Watch, the Committee on the Administration of Justice, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. In addition, the Irish National Caucus, the Ancient Order of Hibernians, and the Hibernian Civil Rights Coalition have all urged swift passage of this Northern Ireland Human Rights Resolutions. We have an obligation to do all that we can to ensure that this historic opportunity for the promotion and establishment of human rights for everyone in Northern Ireland is not squandered. I have been advised by leadership staff that when Congress reconvenes in January, we will look to move House Concurrent Resolution 152. In the meantime, it is my sincerest hope that negotiators at the current talks will need our call for addressing outstanding human rights violations and fully integrating human rights standards as part of the peace process. Without a strong human rights foundation, it is unlikely that any proposed peace settlement will be just or lasting. I ask that House Concurrent Resolution 152, as amended, a list of current cosponsors, and a fact sheet of comments made by human rights groups about the resolution be made part of the Record. Human Rights Groups Endorse H. Con. Res. 152 Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, British Irish Rights Watch, Committee on the Administration of Justice, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and others urge passage of Northern Ireland Human Rights Resolution. ``Human Rights Watch fully supports the resolution now being considered for passage by the Congress regarding human rights in the Northern Ireland peace process. The resolution rightly recognizes the gravity of past violations and the role that such abuses have played in perpetuating the conflict . . . the resolution is a signal that Congress is eager to prevent the same lack of attention to human rights issues which has doomed other peace processes and may threaten the success of the Northern Ireland peace process if action is not taken now . . . We heartily endorse the resolution.''--Human Rights Watch ``Amnesty International welcomes the resolution proposed by the Congress which situates the centrality of human rights within the peace process and raises a number of key concerns which are in line with many of our own concerns. The recommendations [in the resolution], if acted upon, would make a significant contribution to developing a lasting peace in Northern Ireland.''--Amnesty International ``We very much welcome this resolution. It's the first document of its kind that we have seen that does acknowledge the role that human rights must play in the Northern Ireland peace process. The individual issues that it raises are all matters of burning concern to the people of Northern Ireland.''--British Irish Rights Watch ``Any effort by Congress to raise these [human rights] issues is particularly welcome and deserves widespread support. In that regard, the initiative taken by Chairman Smith and supported by other members in relation to the resolution on these issues and others is particularly welcome . . . it would be helpful if the concerns of Congress on these and other human rights could be raised with the British and Irish governments, Senator Mitchell, and with the U.S. administration . . . We look to the resolution receiving widespread support and are grateful for the efforts of Congress and hope they will continue.''--Committee on the Administration of Justice ``We join in your call expressed in the concurrent resolution for repeal of emergency laws and the establishment of a mechanism for independent investigations of threats and intimidation of solicitors. We urge Congress to . . . continue to press its concerns about human rights in Northern Ireland . . . ''--Lawyers Committee for Human Rights

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, when most of us think about the Food and Drug Administration [FDA], we envision an agency that works diligently to expand the universe of safe and effective medications. So when I discovered that the FDA was actually proposing to reduce the number of proven medicines available to treat asthma and cystic fibrosis patients, I knew Congress had to act on behalf of patients. As a legislator representing thousands of asthma patients, and as a father of two daughters with asthma, I am appalled that FDA might ban proven medicines patients need to survive. As a result of these efforts by the FDA, today I am introducing legislation that will preserve access to metered dose inhalers [MDIs] for those patients suffering from respiratory conditions--particularly children suffering from asthma and cystic fibrosis. This bill will ensure that those who rely upon MDI's to breathe, will not be denied access to their lifeline by an overzealous FDA. Joining me in this effort is my good friend Florida, Representative Cliff Stearns. Together, Mr. Stearns--who is the author of H.R. 2221--and I have worked together in an effort to change the FDA's misguided policy. On March 6, 1997, the FDA initiated the first stage of a plan to phase-out the use of chlorofluorocarbons [CFC's] metered-dose inhalers [MDI's], which are used by asthma and cystic fibrosis patients to breathe. This action was taken ostensibly to protect the ozone layer, despite the fact that less than 1 percent of all ozone-depleting substances in the atmosphere are caused by metered-dose inhalers. In fact, the amount of CFC's that the EPA allows to be released from automobile air conditioners over 1 year is about the same as 14 years of metered-dose inhaler emissions. If you combined all sources of CFC's allowed by the EPA in 1 year, it would equal 64 years of MDI emissions. And yet the only CFC products targeted for elimination this year are inhalers. It is also interesting to note that while the FDA and EPA are rushing to eliminate CFC inhalers, they continue to allow the use of a variety of CFC products, including bear-repellent pepper sprays, document preservation sprays, and certain fire extinguishers. This is clearly a case of misplaced priorities--how can historical document sprays be considered more essential than products that protect our children's lives? And while American children and senior citizens will have their treatment regimens disrupted by the FDA's plan, nations like China and Indonesia will be pumping tons of CFC's into the atmosphere from hair sprays and air conditioners until the year 2010. Not surprisingly, the FDA's plan has generated a firestorm of opposition from patients, respiratory therapists, and physicians: nearly 10,000 letters in opposition have been received to date by the FDA. A coalition of stakeholder organizations reviewed the FDA proposal in May and concluded that the FDA's approach banning therapeutic classes was flawed and must be re-evaluated. The patient and provider organizations also stated that the FDA plan ``has the potential to disrupt therapeutic regimens * * * and limit physician treatment options.'' It is important to institute a transition strategy that will eventually eliminate the use of CFC's. However, the FDA's proposal is deeply flawed and should be scrapped in favor of a plan that puts patients--not international bureaucrats--first. To ensure that the interests of patients are upheld throughout the formation of our country's MDI transition strategy, this legislation will temporarily suspend the FDA's proposed framework until a new proposal can be crafted. In addition, this bill would require the FDA to consult with patients, physicians, manufacturers of MDI's and other stakeholders prior to issuing any subsequent proposal. In addition, my legislation requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to certify to Congress that any alternatives to existing MDI's will be available to all populations of users of such inhalers, are comparable in terms of safety and effectiveness, therapeutic indications, dosage strength, cost, and retail availability. Mr. Speaker, this past week we held a press conference in an effort to educate the public and media about the dangers of the FDA's proposal. Participating in this press conference was Tommy Farese, who is 9 years old, and lives in Spring Lake, NJ, and has had asthma since the age of 2. One of the asthma inhalers Tommy uses to breathe-- Proventil--would be eliminated under the FDA plan in favor of a non-CFC version that has not been approved by the FDA for use by children. Unless the FDA's proposal is changed, Tommy could lose access to the medicine he needs to breathe and live. Why should Tommy, and 5 million children like him have to face this dilemma? In my view, any plan to remove safe and effective medications from the marketplace needs to place the interests of children like Tommy Farese first and foremost. Sadly, the FDA plan fails in this regard. Indeed, the FDA plan presumes that CFC-free inhalers serve all patient subpopulations--such as children and the elderly--equally well, despite the fact that children have special needs and many drug therapies are not interchangeable. Therefore, I call upon the FDA to stop their proposed ban of asthma inhalers. If the FDA insists on moving forward with their antipatient plan, I call upon my colleagues to support and pass the Smith-Stearns bill to allow asthma patients like Tommy Farese retain access to their medicine.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, when most of us think about the Food and Drug Administration [FDA], we envision an agency that works diligently to expand the universe of safe and effective medications. So when I discovered that the FDA was actually proposing to reduce the number of proven medicines available to treat asthma and cystic fibrosis patients, I knew Congress had to act on behalf of patients. As a legislator representing thousands of asthma patients, and as a father of two daughters with asthma, I am appalled that FDA might ban medicines patients need to survive. On March 6, 1997, the FDA initiated the first stage of a plan to phase-out the use of chlorofluorocarbons [CFC's] in metered-dose inhalers [MDI's], which are used by asthma and cystic fibrosis patients to breathe. This action was taken ostensibly to protect the ozone layer, despite the fact that less than 1 percent of all ozone-depleting substances in the atmosphere are caused by metered-dose inhalers. In fact, the amount of CFC's that the EPA allows to be released from automobile air conditions over 1 year is about the same as 14 years of metered-dose inhaler emissions. If you combined all sources of CFCs allowed by the EPA in 1 year, it would equal 64 years of MDI emissions. And yet the only CFC products targeted for elimination this year are inhalers. It is also interesting to note, Mr. Speaker, that while the FDA and EPA are rushing to eliminate CFC inhalers, they continue to allow the use of variety of CFC products, including bear-repellent pepper sprays, document preservation sprays, and certain fir extinguishers. This is clearly a case of misplaced priorities--how can historical document sprays be considered more essential than products that protect our children's lives? And while American children and senior citizens will have their treatment regimens disrupted by the FDA's plan, nations like China and Indonesia will be pumping tons of CFC's into the atmosphere from hair sprays and air conditioners until the year 2010. Not surprisingly, the FDA's plan has generated a fire storm of opposition from patients, respiratory therapists, and physicians: nearly 10,000 letters in opposition have been received to date by the FDA. A coalition of stakeholder organizations reviewed the FDA proposal in May and concluded that the FDA's approach banning therapeutic classes was ``flawed and must be re-evaluated.'' The patient and provider organizations also stated that the FDA plan ``has the potential to disrupt therapeutic regimens * * * and limit physician treatment options.'' It is important to institute a transition strategy that will eventually eliminate the use of CFC's. However, the FDA's proposal is deeply flawed and should be scrapped in favor of a plan that puts patients--not international bureaucrats--first. To ensure that the interests of patients are upheld throughout the formation of our country's MDI transition strategy, my colleague and friend from Florida, Congressman Cliff Stearns and I introduced legislation--H.R. 2221--that will temporarily suspend the FDA's proposed framework until a new proposal can be crafted. We have also urged the conferees working on the FDA reform bill--H.R. 1411--to include legislative language protecting the rights of 30 million respiratory patients to maintain access to the medications they need to survive. Earlier today, I was honored to meet Tommy Farese. Tommy, who is 9 years old, and lives in Spring Lake, NJ., has had asthma since the age of 2. One of the asthma inhalers Tommy uses to breathe--Proventil-- would be eliminated under the FDA plan in favor of a non-CFC version that has not been approved by the FDA for use by children. Unless the FDA's proposal is changed, Tommy could lose access to the medicine he needs to breathe and live. Why should Tommy, and 5 million kids like him, have to face this dilemma? In my view, any plan to remove safe and effective medications from the marketplace needs to place the interests of children like Tommy Farese first and foremost. Sadly, the FDA plan fails in this regard. Indeed, the FDA plan presumes that CFC-free inhalers serve all patient subpopulations--such as children and the elderly--equally well, despite the fact that children have special needs and many drug therapies are not interchangeable. Mr. Speaker, I call upon the FDA to stop their proposed ban of asthma inhalers and put forward a new proposed rule only after Congress reconvenes. In addition, I urge the conferees to H.R. 1411 to include legislative language that will stop the FDA from implementing this terribly flawed and environmentally marginal proposal. If the FDA insists on moving forward with their antipatient plan anyway, Congress should debate and pass the Sterans-Smith bill--HR 221--to allow asthma patients like Tommy Farese retain access to their medicine.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf].

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, we have two other speakers that are not here. They have been detained. I believe they are working on some committee work. So I would be the last speaker. So if the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Davis] would like to close on his side, then I will close on our side.