Bob Smith

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I ask unanimous consent for 1 additional minute.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, the Senate now has acquired two documents which are very revealing in this debate, new information. I have a memorandum here which makes clear that neither the Department of Defense nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff were privy to the Department of Energy's lobbying effort vis-a-vis the White House to forgo all nuclear testing under the CTBT. This was never--in the words of a senior DOD official-- coordinated with the Defense Department or the military. These documents make it very clear that the Clinton administration ignored national security concerns expressed directly to the President of the United States in negotiating the CTBT and a further reason that the treaty should be rejected. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a memorandum, dated September 8, 1994, to the President of the United States from Hazel O'Leary.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. The second point in the O'Leary memo says: not technically essential to conduct hydronuclear experiments at this time. Hydronuclear experiments must be conducted while the stockpile is safe and reliable to acquire baseline data, otherwise HN, or hydronuclear, testing, as a diagnostic for stockpile problems, is of limited value. These are the experts saying this in response. Finally: Hydronuclear tests provide direct experimental testing of an unaltered real pit. No other technique provides that capability. This is what the experts in the Clinton administration believed. They were end run by the Secretary of Energy on a political decision, which basically said, don't worry about the science, just move forward with the policy. This is outrageous. It flies in the face of every single point the President has made in saying we should pass this treaty. Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, in the summary of the document to the President of the United States from Hazel O'Leary, the Energy Secretary, she said: After careful and extended debate within the executive agencies, you are to be presented with a decision memorandum on whether the United States should conduct hydronuclear experiments at the Nevada test site (NTS) under the moratorium on nuclear testing. Although the views of the Department of Energy on this matter are reflected in that decision memorandum, I want to take this opportunity to strongly urge you to decide that the U.S. should not conduct, nor prepare to conduct, hydronuclear experiments during the existing moratorium. In other words, the Secretary of Energy is asking the President of the United States to ignore the recommendations of the experts. She states further in this memorandum to the President: It is not technically essential to conduct hydronuclear experiments at this time. The Department of Energy has determined that the existing nuclear stockpile of the United States is safe and reliable and that technical means other than hydronuclear testing can maintain the stockpile in this robust condition for the near term. She concludes in the memo to the President: As a member of your cabinet with responsibility, with others, for carrying out your nonproliferation and national security agenda, I believe strongly that a decision to conduct, or to prepare to conduct, hydronuclear experiments under a nuclear testing moratorium is technically unwise and substantively unnecessary at this time. I urge you to decide not to authorize preparations for these experiments in the fiscal year 1996 . . . . That is a very interesting memorandum from the Secretary of Energy to the President of the United States. Now let us hear what the experts had to say. This is very interesting. In a memorandum from Dr. Harold Smith to John Deutch, Nuclear Weapons Council: Background, letter dated September 8 from Secretary O'Leary to the President was received in my office today by fax as a bootleg copy from the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Copies not distributed to OSD, DOD, Joint Staff, NSC or the Deputies, not distributed and not copied. Then the subject, and it begins to analyze the O'Leary memo. Let me quote a couple of items. In the memo from O'Leary to the President, she says: Strongly urge you to not conduct or prepare to conduct hydronuclear experiments. They say: This circumvents the IWG deputies forum established by the NSC to decide this issue in an interagency process.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. They work if you want to accept the fact that they violated it. We got lucky. That is the bottom line. As to the violations that President Reagan said trust but verify, in this particular case, I am not prepared to trust the North Koreans or the Libyans or the Iranians or the Iraqis or the Red Chinese, No. 1; and, No. 2, we cannot verify anything they are doing. That has been testified to over and over and over again. I rise in very strong opposition to this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and, in doing so, know full well that we have one of the greatest communicators and spinners in American history in the White House. The idea will be that this will become a political debate in that how could anyone not be in favor of or how could anybody be opposed to a comprehensive test ban where we would ban the testing of nuclear weapons. That is the way it will be spun. The answer is very simple. Because if you can't verify what the other side is doing, then you are at a disadvantage because we have the superiority of the arsenal. So if we don't verify that they are not testing, and we don't keep our stockpile up to speed because of that, and we don't know it is reliable and they do, then we are gradually losing that advantage. That is the issue. In spite of all the spin we will hear over the next day or two after this treaty is voted on, that is the crux of the issue. Let us separate the spin. Let us take the politics out of this. Let us take the spin out of it and go right to the heart of it. We can't verify what they do, and if our stockpile is not reliable because we don't test, they gain on us. The other point is, some of these nations, such as North Korea, might decide to test it on us and think nothing of it. Does anybody feel confident that the Iranians or the Iraqis would feel they had to test a nuclear weapon before they tried it on us? I don't feel that confident. I certainly don't think many in America do either. This treaty is wrong for our nuclear weapons program. It is wrong for America. It is wrong for the international community. It cannot be verified. It does not help us in maintaining our own stockpile. Time after time the past several weeks, I have heard members of the administration try to spin this issue and claim that every President since Eisenhower has sought a comprehensive test ban. Basically, that is an attempt to hide the truth, to fool the American people into thinking this treaty would have had unanimous support from all of those Presidents. It wouldn't have had the unanimous support of those Presidents. To make those of us who oppose this treaty look as if we are standing out on the fringes is simply wrong. Yet that is the way it is reported. That is the way it is written. That is the way it will be spun tonight, tomorrow, and the next day by members of the administration as they move out on to the talk shows--at taxpayers' expense, I might add--and criticize those of us in the Senate who in good conscience vote against this treaty. What they haven't told the American people about these Presidents is that not one single President--not Eisenhower, not Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, no one, not Reagan--no one until Bill Clinton ever proposed a test ban of zero yield and unlimited duration--zero yield, unlimited duration. In the past few days, the spin machines have been working overtime telling the American people this issue is far too critical to national security for the Senate to make such a rash decision on its ratification. The administration now wants to pull the treaty, saying we haven't had enough time to study it. For up until a week or two ago, they were pushing us for a vote on it. My colleague from Delaware mentioned the coup in Pakistan, did that bother me. No, frankly. I don't think it has a heck of a lot to do with this decision. I don't like to see coups anywhere. They contribute to the instability in the world. But it has nothing to do, in my view, with the issue before us. I would like to remind my colleagues, this treaty was signed by President Bill Clinton in 1996 and transmitted to the Senate in 1997. Over 2 years, we have had this treaty before us. One of the problems I have in the Senate is that it doesn't matter how much time you spend on something or how long something is before this body; the only time we try to get really involved in it is when we are about to vote on something. Then those who haven't done their homework want to come out here and say we need more time. We have had plenty of time. I have had 5 years of hearings on this issue. I chaired them myself and have listened to people testify for the past 5 years on this issue. I remind my colleagues, just a few months ago the minority threatened to hold up every single piece of legislation that came to the Senate floor until we agreed to have a vote on the test ban treaty. Now they are criticizing us because we are having one. It was President Clinton and the minority who demanded the treaty be brought before the Senate; it was President Clinton and the minority who urged consideration; and it was President Clinton and the minority who scolded the majority for failing to act on this issue. That was 2, 3 weeks ago. So when things go sour on the President, he has a unique way--and a very good way, frankly--of twisting things around to his benefit. We found that out here on the floor in a very important impeachment vote a few months ago. The President has been demanding a vote on this treaty for 2 years. Now he has it. But now it is our fault because he is not going to get the vote he wants. The President said in remarks on the 50th anniversary of the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in August, 1999--not too many months ago--``I ask the Senate to vote for ratification as soon as possible.'' That was 2 months ago. He asked the Senate, ``to give its advice and consent to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty this year.'' The problem with the President is, he wants us to give consent, but he doesn't like our advice. That is the problem. The Constitution requires both advice and consent. This President needs to learn that the Senate is here to advise, and if you want the consent, then you need to advise and discuss. That is part of the process. It is part of the process in treaties, and it is part of the process in judicial nominations, and it is part of the process in other appointments in his administration. After 7 years, almost, he still hasn't learned that. In his State of the Union, in 1998, President Clinton said, ``Approve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty this year.'' That was last year. The Vice President, Mr. Gore, said, ``The U.S. Congress should act now to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.'' That now was July 23, 1998. Now, because the votes are going against him, he is now saying we need more time, don't vote now. It is just spin at its best, and he is good at it; there is no question about it. That was pure partisan politics because when the majority leader finally consented and offered to bring the treaty to the floor, it was objected to. Let's remind the American people of that. You can bet the President is not going to remind them of that. This treaty was objected to when the majority leader asked to bring it to the floor. Then he offered a second time to bring the treaty to the floor and this body agreed by unanimous consent to a debate and a vote. Let me say again: Unanimously, we agreed to a debate and a vote. The minority party had ample opportunity at that time to object on the grounds that we haven't had enough time to study the treaty. Why didn't they say so then? Because the answer is, that is not the issue. We have had plenty of time to study the treaty. ``We haven't had enough time to have hearings,'' they said. The minority leader objected. Once the President sensed he was going to lose the vote, the spin machine began and he tried to figure out a way not to vote on what the President urged us so desperately to schedule in the first place--to avoid the vote he asked us to have. I agreed with the President then that this treaty deserved consideration by the Senate. I wish we had more chance to advise, but he didn't choose that. So he asked for our consent. As it turns out, we are not going to give it to him. That is our constitutional right. It should not be spun and changed. It should be truthfully debated. We are all accountable. Some have said they don't want to vote on this treaty. I am not one of those people. We are here to be held accountable; we are here to vote. That is why we are here. If we disagree, we can vote against it. If we agree, we can vote for it. My objection to this treaty is not based on partisan politics; it is based on careful, thoughtful study of the treaty and its implications both here in the United States and around the world. I believe the world will be more unstable--contrary to the feelings of my colleague from Delaware--not a more stable place, and America's nuclear deterrent capability will become more unreliable than at any time in the history of America if this treaty were to be ratified. There are three points that would support that argument: One, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not verifiable. Two, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not stop proliferation. Three--and perhaps most important--the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty puts our nuclear arsenal at risk. My job as chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee is to oversee that arsenal. I have been out to the labs, and I have had 5 or 6 years of hearings on these issues. Others will discuss the first two points in more depth than I will, and some have already. Let me focus on the third concern, which is that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not verifiable. Last week, we saw reports in the media that the CIA admitted they were unable to verify key tests that may even be taking place today. We can't base our national security on an ability --which arguably may not exist--to detect an adversary's covert activity, and that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not stop proliferation. We already have a treaty in place to do that, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This treaty has been violated repeatedly, over and over, year after year, by rogue nations that don't respect international law. Do you think, with this kind of treaty, that every nation is going to have this great respect for international law and they are going to allow us total access to their country to verify this? When are we ever going to learn? Some have mentioned how futile the treaty would be in asking rogue nations not to test the same nuclear weapons they promised not to develop in the first place under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And it is false hope that our adversaries will abide by international law if we just promise to do this treaty. As I mentioned, the safety and reliability of the nuclear arsenal is my most serious concern. Rather than relying solely on the good intentions of other countries--and they may be good or they may not be--or on our ability to detect violations by other countries, my concern is ensuring that we remain capable of providing the safeguard and nuclear deterrent that won the cold war. That is what won the cold war-- the fact that other nations knew what would happen. They knew what would happen if they messed with us; we had the arsenal. The linchpin of this treaty, as I see it, is whether or not you believe the United States can maintain a safe, credible, and reliable nuclear arsenal, given a zero-yield ban in perpetuity. The Stockpile Stewardship Program is really at the heart of this matter. If you think that we can have a reliable nuclear arsenal, with a zero-yield ban, in perpetuity, you should be for this treaty. Even the Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, has illustrated this point. This was 2 days ago. I want this to be listened to carefully. During testimony before the Armed Services Committee. Senator Snowe. Would you support ratification of this treaty without the Stockpile Stewardship Program? Secretary Cohen. No. Senator Snowe. No? So then, obviously, you are placing a great deal of confidence in this program. Secretary Cohen. I oppose a unilateral moratorium, without some method of testing for the safety and security and reliability of our nuclear force. The question right now is, does the Stockpile Stewardship Program give us that assurance? If there is doubt about it, then, obviously, you would say we cannot rely upon it and we should go back to testing. Let me repeat that last line: If there is doubt about it, then, obviously, you would say we cannot rely upon it and we should go back to testing. Well, that is a critical point. Which of us would knowingly ratify a treaty that was advertised to put the safety, reliability, and credibility of the United States nuclear deterrent stockpile at risk and place the lives of the American people at risk? None of us would do that. Certainly not us, not the Secretary, not anybody. But that is the linchpin. If you believe in the Stockpile Stewardship Program, a series of computer simulations and laser experiments--that is what the program is, that we don't need to test, and that we do these computer tests and laser experiments--if you think that can sufficiently guarantee the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons program, without testing of any kind forever--forever--then you should vote for the treaty because that is what this is about. As the Senator from Delaware said, you can get out of the treaty, but if you don't like what is going on, then it is too late. If, however, you do not believe that the Stockpile Stewardship Program can sufficiently guarantee the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons programs, then you should vote against the treaty. Well--as Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I have oversight of all three of the Nation's nuclear laboratories--Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia. I have been to the labs, I have seen the computer simulations, I have talked with the physicists and programmers. Just last February Senator Landrieu and I traveled to Lawrence Livermore Lab for a field hearing and a very productive set of tours and briefings. Based on my experience--based on what I've seen, I don't have the confidence that the Stockpile Stewardship Program can sufficiently guarantee the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons arsenal-- forever--without any testing of any kind. But don't just take my word for it--after all I'm not a physicist-- I'm not a nuclear lab director. To settle the question about whether this Stockpile Stewardship Program can guarantee the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons, we must turn to those lab directors, the men directly responsible for administering, executing, and overseeing the Stockpile Program. Those three gentlemen testified before the Armed Services Committee just last week, and I think it is absolutely critical to share that testimony with my colleagues as we debate this treaty. Dr. John Browne, Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, had this to say about the condition and reliability of the Stockpile Stewardship Program: Maintaining the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons without nuclear testing is an unprecedented technical challenge. The Stockpile Stewardship Program is working successfully toward this goal, but it is a work in progress. There are simply too many processes in a nuclear explosion involving too much physics detail to perform a complete calculation. At present, with the most powerful supercomputers on Earth, we know that we are not doing calculations with sufficient accuracy and with sufficient detail to provide maximum confidence in the stockpile. We know that we do not adequately understand instabilities that occur during the implosion process and we are concerned about the aging of high explosives and plutonium that could necessitate remanufacture of the stockpile. We do not know the details of how this complex, artificially produced metal (plutonium) ages, including whether pits fail gradually, giving us time to replace them with newly manufactured ones, or whether they fail catastrophically in a short time interval that would render many of our weapons unreliable at once. It is important to note that even with a complete set of tools we will not be able to confirm all aspects of weapons safety and performance. Nuclear explosions produce pressures and temperatures that cannot be duplicated in any current or anticipated laboratory facility. Some processes simply cannot be experimentally studied on a small scale because they depend on the specific configuration of material at the time of the explosion. On the basis of our experience in the last 4 years, we continue to be optimistic that we can maintain our nuclear weapons without testing. However, we have identified many issues that increase risk and lower our level of confidence. Dr. Bruce Tarter, Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory testified: We have not been able to meet the deadlines of the program as we thought we could. It (the stockpile stewardship program) hasn't been perfect--the challenge lies in the longer term. The stockpile stewardship program is an excellent bet--but it's not a sure thing. Dr. Paul Robinson, director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, which is responsible for the engineering of more than 90 percent of the component parts of all U.S. nuclear warheads, provided an even more ominous testimony. There is no question from a technical point of view, actual testing of designs to confirm their performance is the desired regimen for any high-technology device. For a device as highly consequential as a nuclear weapon, testing of the complete system both when it is first developed and periodically throughout its lifetime to ensure that aging effects do not invalidate its performance, is also the preferred methodology. I could not offer a proof, nor can anyone, that such an alternative means of certifying the adequacy of the U.S. stockpile will be successful. I believe then as I do now that it may be possible to develop the stockpile stewardship approach as a substitute for nuclear testing for keeping previously tested nuclear weapon designs safe and reliable. However, this undertaking is an enormous challenge which no one should underestimate, and will carry a higher level of risk than at any time in the past. The difficulty we face is that we cannot today guarantee that stockpile stewardship will be ultimately successful; nor can we guarantee that it will be possible to prove that it is successful. Confidence in the reliability and safety of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile will eventually decline without nuclear testing. The stockpile stewardship program--though essential for continual certification of the stockpile--does not provide a guarantee of perpetual certifiability. I have always said actual testing is preferred method--to do otherwise is acceptable risk. I cannot ensure the program will mature in time to ensure safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile in the future. I have always felt if you are betting your country--you better be conservative. I find this testimony absolutely chilling. I am not willing to ``Bet my country'' on the stockpile stewardship program. America's lab directors who are directly responsible for the execution of the stockpile stewardship program testified before Congress that this program cannot guarantee the future security or stability or our nuclear weapons. I am not willing to accept any risk. I will not risk the lies of the American people on a program who's director--empowered by the President with the responsibility for running that program--are so very uncertain about its reliability. On the basis of the expert testimony of these three lab Directors alone, if any Senators had any doubt about how they would vote on this treaty--it should now be gone! And I cannot for the life of me understand why the President would ask the Senate to ratify a treaty that lives or dies based on the stockpile stewardship program--a program that our lab Directors are telling us they cannot guarantee! If we ratify this treaty, there is a very high probability we will have to start looking for a way out of it within 10-15 years--maybe even sooner. I don't understand entering into a treaty you know full well you may have to pull out of almost as soon as it goes into effect. Now, supporters of the treaty will point out that if in fact the lab Directors, and the Secretary of Energy all agree in 10 years that the stockpile stewardship isn't working, the President, in consultation with Congress, can just pull us out of the treaty. Well, treaties tend to take on a life of their own, and I do not believe it would be that easy. Just look at the ABM Treaty of 1972. Our co-signer, the U.S.S.R. doesn't even exist anymore, and although there is overwhelming agreement between the defense and intelligence communities, and the American public, that our national interests are at stake, the President still opposes pulling out of the ABM Treaty! The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 are two more examples. These treaties have both been violated. But have we pulled out of either one despite the legal right to do so--absolutely not! My friends and colleagues, it makes no sense to ratify a treaty that our own nuclear experts tell us we may have to negotiate a way out of within a decade. This treaty is dangerous and ill-advised. It places our nuclear stockpile, and hence our nuclear deterrent capability, at considerable risk. This treaty is bad for America, and it is bad for the international community, and I will vote against it. That is if I'm given the opportunity to vote against it. While Senate Democrats and the White House are back pedaling furiously, some in the Senate are anxious to rescue them from their miscalculation and deliver them from a major legislative defeat. It might be tempting to view this as a ``win-win'' situation for those who oppose the treaty. The reasoning goes like this: If we effectively kill this flawed treaty without a vote, we will have forced the White House to back down, and have won without letting the White House accuse us of killing the treaty. This is superficially appealing. But it is a strategy for, at best, a half-victory, and at worst, a partial defeat. Postponing a vote on the CTBT will allow the White House to claim victory in saving the treaty, and will allow the White House to continue to spin the American people by blaming opponents for not ratifying the treaty. There is no conservative victory in that. Every single Senator knows today how he or she will vote on this treaty. More debate and more hearings won't change that. It's time to put partisan politics aside and stand firm on our beliefs. The die is cast, and Republicans and Democrats alike have staked out their positions. It's time for Senators to stand by those positions and vote their conscience. Mr. President, I oppose postponing the vote on this treaty, and I urge my colleagues to do the same. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Cline Crosier on my staff be granted the privilege of the floor for the remainder of the debate on this issue.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Madam President, it was interesting to hear my colleague from Delaware. He is correct. I remember those signs, ``One hydrogen bomb could ruin your day.'' I think the reason we are here today is a second hydrogen bomb that ruined their day. I think we need to make sure they understand we have the capability to respond in kind with weapons that will work. I think that is really the subject of the debate. It takes a very confident person to criticize Edward Teller a little bit.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Right. The Senator from Delaware also said that if you can't verify the reliability or certify the reliability, you can always get out of the treaty. That is true. But my concern is, will it be too late to catch up at that point? How much time will have elapsed? I wonder sometimes how the results of the cold war might have come out had we yielded to all of the arms control pressures and adopted every arms control agreement exactly as it was pushed upon us, not only in the Senate but also in the House over the years. I look at arms control agreements in the 1960s and 1970s and 1980s. In spite of the fact we had a full-scale Soviet expansion throughout the world and full-scale nuclear buildup and absolutely no verification for the most part and cheating year after year, time after time we still pushed hard for these arms control agreements.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. And the Soviets violated every one of them.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, this is a very simple, straightforward amendment that would prohibit enforcing Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirements in areas designated by the President as natural disaster areas. Section 6 of the Federal Davis-Bacon Act allows the President to suspend this act in the event of a national emergency. I think all of us would agree, especially those Senators in North Carolina and in Virginia as well, that we did have a national emergency with Hurricane Floyd. Pursuant to this authority, President Bush suspended Davis-Bacon in 1992 to help speed up and lower the cost of rebuilding the communities ravaged by Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki. So Hurricane Floyd has dealt this tremendous blow to the residents of the eastern seaboard, from Florida to North Carolina, even as far as New York. FEMA has called this one of the biggest multistate disasters in U.S. history. Many States believe cleanup costs from Hurricane Floyd will far exceed the costs of either Hurricanes Fran or Hugo. So relaxing the Davis-Bacon provisions in these hard-hit States will lower tremendously the cost of rebuilding these communities and help create job opportunities for those in need of work. Many people come to these communities and volunteer their time to help their friends and relatives and neighbors in need, and others cut their costs of services to help these unfortunate victims of the hurricanes. Davis-Bacon's prevailing wage requirements will increase the cost of construction, forcing the taxpayers to pay more and receive less in return. Not only that, it will cost the victims more. So that is why there is a provision, a waiver provision, the President may exercise to bring these costs down in times of disasters. Government estimates, economic studies, and those involved in the construction industry believe Davis-Bacon actually inflates the cost of a construction project by an estimated 5 to 38 percent. For people who are the victims of these hurricanes--where there is Federal help--to have to pay more in these construction projects and for it to cost the taxpayers that much more money is outrageous. CBO estimates that Davis- Bacon adds $9.6 billion over 10 years to the cost of all Federal construction projects. The historic floodwaters of Floyd have resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in property damage and created a huge swath of human misery that will last for months. The Davis-Bacon Act should be suspended to aid disaster relief in the areas designated as natural disasters. It is reasonable. That is why there is a provision for a waiver. It is unfortunate President Clinton has decided not to waive it, or at least has not waived it to this point. On September 21, 1999, the Wall Street Journal, in an editorial entitled ``Hurricane Davis-Bacon,'' stated: Folks whose electricity shorted out when floodwaters hit their circuit box or shopkeepers sweeping the mud and debris out from once-vibrant businesses need no reminders about the costs imposed by Hurricane Floyd. But as they go about their repairs they may find that the destructive powers of Mother Nature are nothing compared with those of Washington. Continuing to quote: Start with the Davis-Bacon Act, which effectively requires that workers on federally subsidized construction projects receive union wages--even though only about a quarter of the construction industry is unionized. Davis-Bacon looms large in the wake of Floyd because so much disaster relief comes from the federal government. It was for precisely this reason in 1992 that President George Bush ordered the relaxation of Davis-Bacon rules to hasten repairs in Florida, Louisiana and Hawaii after hurricanes devastated those states. Continuing to quote from the Wall Street Journal: The happy result was twofold: Not only did the work get done faster, between 5,000 and 11,000 new construction jobs, mostly to semi-skilled minority workers, were created. Alas, the jobs didn't last long. Within days of becoming President in 1993, Bill Clinton revoked the Bush waivers on Davis-Bacon as a payback for organized labor's support. Mr. Clinton's continued defense is particularly galling to many minority workers, conscious of the law's origins in the Jim Crow attitudes of the 1930s. ``People can't see the jobs and buildings that aren't created because of Davis-Bacon, but it is a major factor in the low-income housing crisis,'' says Elzie Higginbottom, a low-income housing builder from Chicago's South Side. Clearly the priority after any natural disaster must be getting help to the people who need it. But as we help the victims of Floyd pump water out of their basements and get their lives back on track, let's be careful not to contribute to the structural damage with . . . Davis-Bacon that only raise costs and make it that much harder to do the work that needs to be done. I think that editorial sums it up about as well as it can be summed up. The bottom line is, this act, which, ironically, discriminated against minorities--and that was the purpose of the act when it was first originated--will cost taxpayers millions of dollars and take advantage of an unfortunate situation where people have suffered through a disaster. I ask, what would be the problem of the President granting a waiver of Davis-Bacon? As I said before--and I think the Wall Street Journal said it better than I--the answer is, because the President owes a lot to organized labor, he is not about to do it. I think it is outrageous because the intent was clear. I will read from a letter from 80 organizations in support of my amendment. The list includes a number of outstanding national organizations. It also includes several State organizations representing some of the States that have been hit hardest by Hurricane Floyd and other disasters. It is the Coalition to Repeal the Davis- Bacon Act. It is unfair to further burden the local communities devastated by Hurricane Floyd and other disasters with the inflated costs of Davis-Bacon. Mr. President, I think Senators will recognize some of the organizations--I will not read them all; there are 80--the American Society of Civil Engineers, the American Trucking Association, Associated Builders and Contractors, Citizens Against Government Waste, Citizens for a Sound Economy, Free Enterprise Institute, National Association of Home Builders, National Association of Manufacturers, National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise, National Federation of Independent Business, National League of Cities, National School Boards Association, National Tax Limitation Committee, National Taxpayers Union, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to name a few of the 80. I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I am going to reserve the remainder of my time. It is my understanding that each side has 15 minutes on this debate; is that correct?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. How much do I have remaining?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 1844 and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, the Senate will begin consideration of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty at 9:30 a.m. on Friday. By previous consent, debate time is limited to 14 hours equally divided between the two leaders. Debate on the treaty is expected to take place throughout the day tomorrow and will resume at 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday. As a reminder, cloture was filed on the conference report to accompany the Agriculture appropriations bill today. By a previous consent, the Senate will proceed to the cloture vote Tuesday, October 12, at 5:30 p.m. It is hoped that the vote regarding the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty can be stacked to follow that 5:30 vote. Therefore, the next rollcall vote will occur at 5:30 p.m. on Tuesday, October 12.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn until the hour of 9:30 a.m. on Friday, October 8. I further ask unanimous consent that on Friday, immediately following the prayer, the Journal of the proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed to have expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate then proceed to executive session for consideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous consent that the deadline for amendments to be filed at the desk on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty be 9:45 a.m. on Tuesday, October 12.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that debate resume on the Agriculture appropriations conference report at 4:30 p.m. on Tuesday, October 12, and the time be equally divided between the two leaders.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the resolution be printed in the Record.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, on behalf of the majority leader, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 198, submitted earlier by Senator Snowe.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 179, designating October 15, 1999, as ``National Mammography Day.''

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution and preamble be agreed to, en bloc, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating thereto be printed in the Record.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous consent that the Agriculture Committee be discharged from further consideration of the following nomination; and further, the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration: Andrew Fish, to be Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. I further ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed, en bloc, to the following nominations on the calendar: Nos. 236, 250, 251, and 252. Finally, I ask unanimous consent that the nominations be confirmed, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, that any statements relating to the nominations be printed in the Record, and the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action.