Bob Smith

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I think that if we were to look at the resolve of Mr. Milosevic, he has done pretty well for himself, considering after 60-some days of bombing he has cleared out Kosovo of just about every ethnic Albanian he can clear out, with the exception of those who can serve him as human shields to protect his army and tanks. That is despicable. I am not going to stand on the floor of the Senate and defend Slobodan Milosevic. I am concerned about the long- range situation and what our objective is. We can bomb and bomb and bomb. We have been doing that. How long that goes on, I do not know. The bottom line is: he has achieved what he wanted to achieve, which is to get the ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo. He has accomplished what he wanted to accomplish in spite of the bombing--and maybe because of the bombing. I do not know what we are gaining by continuing. But I do think that, as a minimum, the President must get Congressional authorization to continue the war.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Responding to the leader on his time, I lost that vote earlier, regrettably. I lost that vote on the floor. What I am trying to do now is to not authorize any funds for operations in Yugoslavia beyond the October 1, the beginning of the next fiscal year, unless we again authorize those operations.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I certainly will add that to the list. I referred to that a few moments ago. But it is a point well taken. Mr. President, great powers use discretion. They do not allow themselves to be bogged down in places where their interests are not at stake. They use their power judiciously. When do we use force? When do we use diplomacy? We have made commitments around the world in places like Korea and the Middle East. The United States has shown resolve. We place American lives at risk when our vital interests are the stake. We have done it all over the world. Americans have died in places all over the world that some cannot pronounce and never heard of. It has been happening for decades. There is no question about it. But our vital interests are not threatened in Yugoslavia. We have troops in warships across the world. Every year we send billions of Americans' tax dollars overseas in foreign aid. The American people are the most generous in the world. Private citizens, corporations, and charitable organizations send hundreds of millions of dollars every year to help needy people throughout the world. If we have a flood, or an earthquake, or a tornado in America, how many times do you hear about all of these other countries pouring in money to help the people in Des Moines, or to help the people someplace else where a tornado or a flood occurs? To somehow say now that we have to get into this conflict when we have countries in Europe who can, and should, deal with it--how much more blood do we need to shed in Europe for Europe? It is about time Europe stepped up to the plate. The United States does not need to resort to airstrikes to show we are not isolationist, and we certainly should not put our troops at risk. And we do not need somebody who has never been a strong military leader--indeed, who has never been in the military--to be the macho man who drags us into a war where we do not belong in. With this legislation, I am just trying to keep the administration from throwing money and forces at Kosovo without regular accountability. If Congress wants operations after 1 October, all we have to do is authorize them. This vote tonight will not be the mission. We have made that vote. This vote is going to be on whether or not we want to have another opportunity fund this operation after October 1. I respect my colleagues on both sides of this question. I respect immensely the thought that they put into it. I respect their convictions. Again, the only instrument I have as a Member of Congress, blunt as it may be, if I disapprove of this policy, is to cut off the funding. That is the reason I offer this amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Starting at 7:00.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, just reserving the right to object, I do have six or seven cosponsors. I did not realize this was going to come at this point. I would just like to be able to protect their rights to speak. My intention would be not to go beyond the 40 minutes, if they did not show up. I ask you to amend the UC to 60 minutes. If we do not need it, I would be more than happy to yield it back.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. That is correct. I will be happy to offer that amendment.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments the Senator has made. I think clearly it would be in the best interests of the Senate, and certainly of the Indianapolis, to not have the amendment tabled. I believe you bring up some very valid points. There may be some Senators who have not had a chance to digest this. I did send out a significant amount of information over the past several days, but we have been busy. So in deference to the chairman, as long as my rights are protected--I would like to complete 5 or 6 minutes to just finish the statement I was making, to finish the story, if you will, as to what happened--I will, with the chairman's commitment to a hearing, withdraw the amendment. We will have the hearing at some point, whenever is appropriate, where we can both convene it. Then perhaps we can bring it back after that hearing to the floor as a separate piece of freestanding legislation, which I have on the calendar, as is, anyway.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield to the chairman.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I spoke in morning business on this issue a couple of days ago, to call it to the attention of my colleagues, because I believe it is one that is very important and very relevant to this bill. I wanted my colleagues to be aware that I would probably be bringing it up at some point in the near future. I did not expect it to be quite this soon. A lot of individuals who have expressed an interest in my bringing it up earlier rather than later, are not only my colleagues but many aboard the U.S.S. Indianapolis who survived this great tragedy at sea. In deference to them, I felt it would be appropriate to try to get a vote on this. I want to emphasize to my colleagues, I hope my colleagues are paying attention out there, watching on TV. Because if there is any doubt or concern about whether or not this should be supported, I urge Senators to listen to me for a few minutes as I try to explain why I believe this amendment should be agreed to. First of all, I have a number of cosponsors who came in as original cosponsors. Not only myself, but Senator Frist, Senator Bond, Senator Landrieu, Senator Robb, Senator Hagel, Senator Breaux, Senator Torricelli, Senator Helms, Senator Inhofe, Senator Durbin and Senator Edwards. It is a joint resolution. I also, subsequent to that, received cosponsorship from Senator Boxer and from Senator Inouye. We can see it represents all regions of the country and both sides of the political spectrum. It is not in any way, shape, or form a political issue. It simply expresses the sense of Congress with respect to the court-martial conviction of the late Rear Adm. Charles Butler McVay, III. It calls upon the President to award a Presidential Unit Citation to the final crew of the U.S.S. Indianapolis. This is an incredible story of incredible bravery and at the same time it is a story of incredible prejudice to an individual with a great, distinguished record as a captain, as an officer in the U.S. Navy. I want to share with my colleagues this brief story from the closing days of World War II, the war in the Pacific. I know as we debate the issues of the day, and believe me I have been involved in them all week, and there are some huge issues--the China issue and so many others. But I think it is important to understand. I just spoke a few moments ago to new flag officers who were just getting their stars. It was quite an honor to do that. But I think it is important, if we are going to ask people such as these new flag officers to come on board to serve and continue to serve in the military, not to leave after their enlistment is up, but to become those flag officers, they need to understand if there is some type of inequity or something that has happened that causes an injustice, we need to look at it in a way so we can make a wrong right. I think they need to know that. If something was wrong and the military did something wrong, we need to be big enough to admit it and to correct it. That is what this story is about. This is a harrowing story. It has a lot of bad elements--It has bad timing; it has bad weather. It has heroism and fortitude, but it also has negligence and shame. It has good luck and bad luck. And above all, it is a story of some very special men whose will to survive shines like a beacon even today, many decades later. We have the opportunity, right now, perhaps as soon as an hour, to redeem the reputation of a fine man--a wronged man, in my view--and salute the indomitable will of a very fine crew of the U.S.S. Indianapolis. I had the privilege of hosting two--actually more than two, several survivors of the U.S.S. Indianapolis, a couple here yesterday or the day before that, and several before that at a meeting. The bill I offer today will honor all these men and their shipmates of the U.S.S. Indianapolis and redeem their captain, in my view--Capt. Charles McVay. Captain McVay graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1920. He was a career naval officer. He had an exemplary record in the military that included participation in the landings in North Africa, award of a Silver Star for courage under fire earned during the Solomon Islands campaign. Before taking command of the Indianapolis in November of 1944, Captain McVay chaired the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. That is the highest intelligence unit of the Allies during the war. McVay led the ship through the invasion of Iwo Jima, then bombardment of Okinawa in the spring of 1945, during which Indianapolis antiaircraft guns shot down seven enemy planes before the ship was severely damaged. Captain McVay returned his ship safely to Mare Island in California for much-needed repairs. Another great story about the Indianapolis which is not well known. In 1945, the Indianapolis delivered to the island of Tinian the world's first operational atomic bomb, which would later be dropped on Hiroshima by the Enola Gay on August 6. After delivering her fateful cargo, she then reported to the naval station at Guam for further orders. She was ordered to join the U.S.S. Idaho in the Philippines to prepare for the invasion of Japan. It was at Guam that the series of events ultimately leading to the sinking of the Indianapolis began to unfold. It is quite a story. There were hostilities in this part of the Pacific, but they had long since ceased. This is 1945. The war is almost over. The Japanese surface fleet is no longer considered a threat and attention instead had turned 1,000 miles to the north where preparations were underway for the invasion of the Japanese mainland. So we have a picture here of very little Japanese activity in the Pacific. These conditions led to a relaxed state of alert on the part of those who decided to send the Indianapolis across the Philippine Sea unescorted, and consequently Captain McVay was randomly told, just zigzag at your discretion. So the higher-ups were in a relaxed state. We were going into the Japanese homeland. There was little presence, Captain McVay was told. So we will send you out across the Philippine Sea unescorted. The Indianapolis, unescorted, departed Guam for the Philippines on July 28, 1945. Think about how close we are now to the end of the war. Just after midnight, on 30 July 1945, midway between Guam and the Leyte Gulf, the U.S.S. Indianapolis was hit by two torpedoes fired by the ``I-58'', the Japanese submarine that was not supposed to be there according to the higher-ups. The first torpedo blew the bow off the ship. The second hit the Indianapolis at midship on the starboard side adjacent to a fuel tank and a powder magazine. You cannot imagine--no one could--the resulting explosion, but it split the ship completely in two. There were 1,196 men aboard the U.S.S. Indianapolis on that fateful night. Mr. President, 900 escaped the ship before it sunk in 12 minutes. In 12 minutes, the naval ship went to the bottom and 900 men were able to get off that ship before it sank. Few liferafts were released, and at sunrise on the first day of those 900 men being in the water, they were attacked by sharks. The attacks continued until the remaining men were physically removed from the water almost 5 days later. If you can imagine in the middle of the night aboard ship: It is hit by two torpedoes and sinks in 12 minutes, very few liferafts; you are in the water. The men were in the water for 5 days and the sharks began immediately to circle and attack and pick these men off, literally, one by one, as wolves might pick off a weakened antelope or some other animal they were pursuing. Shortly after 11 a.m. on the fourth day, the survivors were accidentally discovered by an American bomber on a routine antisubmarine patrol. This is important for my colleagues to understand this--accidentally discovered. A patrolling seaplane was dispatched to lend assistance and report. En route to the scene, it overflew the destroyer Cecil Doyle DD-368, and alerted her captain to this emergency. The captain of the Cecil Doyle, on his own authority--no orders--decided to divert from his mission and go to the scene of the Indianapolis sinking. Arriving there hours ahead of the Cecil Doyle, the seaplane's crew-- the seaplane's crew had called the Cecil Doyle; the Cecil Doyle is en route and the seaplane, in the meantime, began dropping rubber rafts and supplies to these men who had been in the water for 5 days. While doing so, they observed the shark attacks. They literally saw men who were moments from rescue dragged under by attacking sharks. These men were so overcome by this that, disregarding standing orders not to land at sea, the plane landed and taxied to the stragglers and lone swimmers who were at greatest risk of shark attacks, as the sharks would pick off those who were not able to stay up with the rest of the group. It was an act of extreme bravery on the part of the seaplane crew. As darkness fell, the crew of the seaplane waited for help, all the while continuing to seek out and pull nearly dead men from the water. When the fuselage of the plane was full, the survivors were tied to the wing with a parachute cord. That plane rescued 56 men from the water on that particular day, just literally sitting in the water allowing these men to cling to that plane. Then came the Cecil Doyle. This was the first vessel on the scene, and it began taking survivors aboard. Again, disregarding the safety of his own vessel, the Doyle's captain pointed his largest searchlight into the night sky to serve as a beacon so other rescue vessels might catch it. This was the first indication to the survivors that their prayers had been answered. Help at last had arrived.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to do just the opposite and to support a motion that I am going to make in a moment to table, out of respect for those of us who believe deeply in the sanctity of life and who also understand and are compassionate about young women who are in need of an abortion, or feel that they are in need of an abortion in some way, and who hope we could save that life, that innocent life, and to show compassion for the unborn, which I think is really the issue. At this point, I move to table the Murray amendment and ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I thank my colleague from Michigan for his comments. Just finishing the story briefly, in 5 or 6 minutes, so we can go ahead to the next issue, there were 900 men who made it into the water and only 317 remained alive at the end of those 5 days. If you can imagine 5 days of shark attacks, starvation, thirst with only salt water, suffering from exposure. The men from the U.S.S. Indianapolis were finally rescued. Curiously enough, the Navy withheld the news of the sunken ship from the American people for 2 weeks until the day the Japanese surrendered, on August 15, 1945. So the press coverage was minimal. Also, it was somewhat suspicious that they started the proceedings without having all the available data that was necessary. And less than 2 weeks after the sinking of the Indianapolis, before the sinking of the ship had even been announced to the public, the Navy opened an official board of inquiry to investigate Captain McVay, the captain of the ship, and his actions. The board, strangely enough, recommended a general court-martial for Captain McVay 2 weeks after the incident before it had even been made public. Indeed, many of the survivors' families were not even made aware that the ship had gone down. Admiral Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Command, didn't agree. He wrote the Navy's judge advocate general that at worst, McVay was guilty of an error in judgment, but not gross negligence worthy of a court-martial. Nimitz later recommended a reprimand. Nimitz and Admiral Spruance later were overridden by the Fifth Fleet, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and Adm. Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations. They directed that the court-martial would go on and proceed. It is pretty difficult to understand why the Navy brought the charge in the first place. Explosions from torpedoes, as I said before, had knocked out the ship completely, knocked out its communication system so he was unable to give an abandon ship order except by word of mouth, which all of the crew said McVay had done. So he was ultimately found not guilty on that count. Then the second count was not zigzagging, and it goes on to talk about that. The bottom line, Captain McVay was ultimately found guilty on the charge of failing to zigzag and was discharged from the Navy with a ruined career. And in 1946, at the request of Admiral Nimitz, who had now become the CNO, Chief of Naval Operations, in a partial admission of injustice, Secretary Forrestal remitted McVay's sentence and restored him to duty. But Captain McVay's court-martial and personal culpability for the sinking of the Indianapolis continued to stain his Navy records. The stigma of this conviction remained with him always. And as sometimes happens in these kind of tragedies, in 1968, he took his own life. To this day, Captain McVay is recorded in naval history as negligent in the deaths of 870 sailors. Not one sailor said that he was negligent, yet it still continues to be on the record. This is an injustice. I look forward to having the hearing and hearing from these sailors who will tell us publicly how they feel about this. We need to restore the reputation of an honorable officer. In the decade since World War II, the crew of the Indianapolis, to their everlasting credit, has worked tirelessly in defending their captain. Captain McVay could be and would be, if he were here, very proud of his men who are trying to see that his memory is properly honored. We can do that. We can help the crew do just that right here in the Senate. It is at the request of the survivors that I introduce this resolution. Since McVay's court-martial, a number of other things have come up. I will not get into those now because of time, but we will get into them in the hearing. Let me conclude on this point: Many of the survivors of the Indianapolis believe that a decision to convict Captain McVay was made before the court-martial. That is a very serious charge. They are convinced that McVay was made a scapegoat to hide the mistakes of others higher up. McVay was court-martialed and convicted of hazarding his ship by failing to zigzag despite overwhelming evidence that the Navy itself had placed the ship in harm's way, not Captain McVay, despite testimony from the Japanese submarine commander that zigzagging would have made no difference, despite the fact that although 700 Navy ships were lost in combat in World War II, McVay was the only Navy captain, ship captain, to be court-martialed, and despite the fact that the Navy did not notice when the Indianapolis failed to arrive on schedule. In spite of that, he was court-martialed, thus costing hundreds of lives unnecessarily and creating the greatest sea disaster in the history of the United States. Amendment No. 405, Withdrawn

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, at Chairman Warner's request, I will withdraw my amendment at this time and look forward to the hearing. The amendment (No. 405) was withdrawn. Amendment No. 406 (Purpose: To prohibit, effective October 1, 1999, the use of funds for military operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) unless Congress enacts specific authorization in law for the conduct of those operations)

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I will now proceed to the next issue at hand, my amendment on Kosovo, which I send to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. If I may respond to the Senator from Virginia, how much time would the Senator like to have?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I say to the Senator, I understand that the Senator opposes it. I ask if the Senator would allow considering an up-or-down vote. But the Senator is the chairman, and I respect that. I prefer an up-or-down vote because I think it is an issue that is deserving of that one way or the other, no matter how we feel. It seems to me more appropriate to have a yes-or-no vote, but obviously I defer to my chairman.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, this is an amendment I regret very much that I have to offer. I cannot express in words how strongly I am opposed to the war in Yugoslavia and the conduct of that war. I have to say that the only weapon in the arsenal of a Congressman or a Senator is funding. Cutting off funding is the only way you can stop an administration policy that you do not approve of. It is the only instrument we have at our disposal under the Constitution. And I will be the first to admit that it is a blunt instrument, but it is the only weapon I have in my arsenal to stop a policy that I think is very dangerous, one which is going to cost us dearly if we continue. So with great reluctance, I am offering this amendment, not because I want to but because I have to. As we deliberate funding the Department of Defense for the next fiscal year, I think the Senate of the United States should go on record as to whether or not we ought to be expected to vote on funding this operation in Kosovo. We have been warned many times against interventions like the one in Yugoslavia. Our Founding Fathers themselves implored us in written statement after written statement, in speech after speech--George Washington comes to mind in his Farewell Address--not to meddle in the affairs of sovereign nations. He took care to warn us against the mischiefs of foreign intrigue. We would do well to heed his words. But we did not heed his words when we attacked Yugoslavia. It is not the first time in American history, but we did not heed those words. We started the war in Yugoslavia. We attacked a sovereign nation in the midst of a civil war. The Founding Fathers explicitly gave the responsibility to Congress to approve or disapprove acts of war, and we cannot and we must not abdicate that. We have already authorized airstrikes. We did that, regrettably, in a vote that I lost earlier this spring. But the issue here is: Are we going to have an operation of possible ground forces and a possible continuation of airstrikes in a sovereign nation in the midst of a civil war, without any statement from Congress other than one that was to fund an air war, which kept the ground troops out, which allowed Milosevic to take over Kosovo? This policy has not worked. We are being dragged into a ground war. Believe me, there are plans on the table, and everybody in America should know it, right now as we speak, to put ground forces into Kosovo. When a superpower uses military force against another nation, it has to do it with an intensity and ferocity that shows purpose and decisiveness. I do not want any more Vietnams. I served in Vietnam. I watched the politicians debate the war, and the people in the streets protest the war while the rest of us fought the war, and then were not treated very well when we came home. I have had enough of that. It has been said many times: ``No more Vietnams.'' Well, to do anything less than to go in with absolute purpose and absolute decisiveness and end the war that you began--to do less than that is another Vietnam. Somalia comes to mind. People lost their lives. We did not have a clear purpose there either. We just went in. And here, in Kosovo, we just went in. Yes, Milosevic is a terrible person and he has done terrible things to innocent people. The question is, though: Was bombing Milosevic the way to end it? Well, apparently not, since there were 2,000 people dead and 50,000 refugees when we went in, and now there are 150,000 dead and a million refugees. Apparently, the policy that 58 senators supported in here two months ago is not working. I have been on this floor repeatedly arguing against this war. I do not like doing so. But we are attacking a sovereign nation, and our national interests are not at stake. Humanitarian problems in Yugoslavia are serious problems, but are they national security interests of the United States of America? Every single person out there who has a son or daughter old enough to serve in the military should ask themselves: Is it worth my son's or daughter's life to die in Yugoslavia for a humanitarian crisis that does not involve the national security of the United States? If the answer is yes, then you ought to tell all your Senators to vote against me. Call them up tonight and tell them that. I, for one, have two sons and a daughter, and I do not want any of them in Yugoslavia. As the sole remaining superpower, we have a special obligation and responsibility. We have to be committed to democracy, we have to keep our markets open, and we have to have the finest military in the world. And we do. But most importantly, we have to act clearly, decisively, and within our explicit national interests. We have not done that here in Yugoslavia. Some people have said: Let's go win the war. Maybe somebody can explain to me what ``win'' means. Does it mean that we occupy Yugoslavia for the next hundred years? That we put a partition up between Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia, or barbed wire, and keep 50,000, or 60,000, or 200,000 troops there for a hundred years? Perhaps we should just bomb every bridge, every building, every oil refinery, every railroad, flatten it to the ground, kill every Serb. Maybe that is how we win. Somebody tell me. I have been waiting. I have offered this challenge on broadcast after broadcast, in interview after interview, in conversation after conversation with administration officials, Senators, Congressmen, people on the street, people in the military. Nobody has given me the answer yet. How do we win? I have not heard the answer. Our military is stretched to the breaking point. Recruiting is down. There are chronic spare part shortages. Deployments continue to increase. And now we are hearing reports about shortages of cruise missiles and other smart weapons. Over 30,000 reservists are being called up. Let me ask my colleagues to reflect on something. God forbid, but what if North Korea were to attack the South tomorrow morning; or Iraq decided to invade Kuwait; or the Iranians, or the Libyans, or anybody else caused some problems somewhere in their part of the world? Are we ready to meet those threats? Could we meet those threats all at once, or any of them, and keep all of the commitments--including that in Kosovo--that we have now? If you have a son or daughter in the military, ask them. They will tell you that they cannot. Ask a general or an admiral in private, I say to my colleagues, and they will tell you that we cannot. If we cannot, then we ought not to be doing this. Let me tell you something. If we get into a ground war in Yugoslavia, we are going to be there for a long, long time. I do not want that to happen. I do not want to be proven right. But we are at a turning point. If we continue to increase our intervention in Yugoslavia--which ground forces will certainly do--we are in fact committing ourselves to the Balkans, not for a day, not for a week, not for a month, not for a year, but for decades. Mark my words: we will be in the Balkans for decades. We went into Vietnam in 1965. Thirteen years later and after 58,000 Americans were dead, when we tried to defeat and conquer an indigenous people who were dug in in their country, in their homeland, we still had not gotten it done. These people are going to fight for their homeland, and we are going to have to be prepared to take heavy casualties to move them out. Again, I will be blunt about it. If you think it acceptable to put your son or your daughter into Kosovo, then you ought to vote against me. But you ought to be prepared to put your son or daughter in there at the same time you put somebody else's son or daughter in there. This region of the Balkans has been inflamed for centuries. If they attacked the United States, or if they threatened the national security of the United States anywhere in the world, I would lead the charge here in the Senate for a declaration of war. But they have not done that. I am hearing a lot of pious arguments about this humanitarian crisis. But the question we have to ask: ``Will our grandchildren be patrolling the streets of Kosovo?'' Think about it--not you, not your son, but your grandson, and maybe his grandson. Are they going to be patrolling the streets of Kosovo to keep the Serbians from coming across their border and killing more ethnic Albanians? That is what you had better ask yourself. There are those who say that the integrity of NATO is at stake. I hear that all the time--if we do not go to war in Kosovo, NATO will fall apart. Look-- NATO survived the Soviet Union. It survived Joseph Stalin. It survived Khrushchev and Brezhnev. But it is not going to survive Slobodan Milosevic? For goodness' sake. This alliance has stood for decades for all of these great powers, and has stood well. I supported NATO in those years. The administration would almost laughingly tell us that Slobodan Milosevic has the power to do what Stalin, Khrushchev, and Andropov could not do--destroy the NATO alliance. If the alliance is that fragile, maybe it is time to shut the door on NATO. Surely it is not that fragile. The key for NATO's success has been that it is a defensive alliance. But it must stay true to its core mission--which it is not doing now; we are seeing tremendous broadening of the scope of NATO here, under this President--the collective defense of its members. If we use this as the overriding principle of NATO, that it should be there for the collective defense of its members, not only will the cohesion of the alliance not be in question, but we would never have gotten involved in the swamp in the Balkans. That is exactly what it is. It is a swamp. And we are going to get stuck in it. Let me assure you of one thing. If this war against Yugoslavia continues to escalate, then NATO truly is finished, because NATO will disgrace itself. Even today on the news we have our commander, General Clark, saying we need to hit more targets, we need to hit more specific targets in Belgrade, we have to come closer to those embassies, closer to those populations, take more risks, take out more facilities, risk more collateral damage, because, if we do not, we will never win--or, if we do not, we are going to have to put in ground troops. Should ground troops be introduced? Should we be forced to attack and occupy Yugoslavia? This will certainly be the end of NATO. This alliance is not an offensive force. It never has been. The greatness of NATO is the fact that it is defensive--that is what allows it to function by consensus. Already our allies have tried to find a way to end the airstrikes. Anybody who tells you that there are no cracks in NATO and that NATO is solidly behind this is not telling you the truth. Who can blame those in NATO who are taking a different position now? They joined NATO to prevent a European war. Now they find that the U.S. has led them into one--in the Balkans, of all places. One of the main reasons I do not support this war is because I want to preserve our standing in the world. It is because I believe our relationship with Russia is on the line. It is because I believe that we should not draw precious military resources from our overseas commitments. It is because I care about the stability in Bosnia. It is because I believe in the sovereignty of other nations that I am against the escalation of this conflict. Some call that isolationism. It is not isolationism, and I resent that reference. It is actually realism.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Yes, I yield to my friend from Oklahoma.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. My concern is the tabling motion. As the Senator knows, this issue is on the calendar now as a separate issue. My purpose in bringing it up on this bill: There are a lot of Senators on both sides of the aisle who support it. My assumption is there may be enough, but I haven't done a whip count. My inclination would be, if the chairman is going to move to table it, to not bring it up at this time, because I do have the option of bringing it up as a separate resolution because it is on the calendar. I hoped to have an up-or-down vote. I put it to the chairman this way: If the chairman will allow an up-or-down vote, I am happy to have a time limit, say, of 30 minutes, depending on what the other side desires. I don't need any more than 15 minutes. If the chairman is going to table, I think at this point I will not offer the amendment.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. All right.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.