Olympia Snowe

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, today I am submitting a resolution concerning the fate of the Eastern Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate and the important of protecting its ability to carry on its vitally important religious mission. I am please to be joined in submitting this important resolution by three distinguished colleagues on both sides of the aisle, Senators Moseley-Braun, D'Amato, and Sarbanes. With over 250 million faithful worldwide, the Orthodox Church deserves attention and respect as one of the world's major religious. Its nonpolitical Patriarchate in Istanbul, however, has often been hampered in its mission due to a misunderstanding or hostility toward its religious role. This resolution is intended to raise awareness of the role of the Orthodox Patriarchate, and the importance of its receiving the protection necessary for it to remain a viable and respected world religious institution. Mr. President, the protection of the Ecumenical Patriarchate is an issue of vital international interest. The Patriarchate, which is the epicenter of Christian Orthodoxy, is severely hampered in its ability to function as the preeminent Orthodox religious institution it was intended to be. This has come about due to the neglect and often outright hostility the institution is afforded in modern-day Turkey, particularly among Turkish fundamentalists. Although the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Turkey is small, attempts have been made on the life of the Ecumenical Patriarch. The most recent incident occurred on March 30, 1994, when three bombs were discovered in the attic of the Patriarch's residence. On a separate occasion, the patriarchal complex was attacked with a Molotov cocktail, threatening the safety of all who worked there. There have also been incidents of desecration and vandalism of the Christian Orthodox Cemetery outside Istanbul. While there is no indication that the Turkish Government, or most Turkish people supported these acts of violence, such acts should make clear to the Government the need to take steps to ensure the safety of this holy institution and the small Christian minority that still resides in Istanbul. But the Turkish Government has taken some steps that do directly undermine the institution of the Patriarchate. One was Turkey's 1971 closing of the Patriarchate's Theological School, which this year would have celebrated its 150-year anniversary. This action was in violation of a variety of treaties and human rights accords that Turkey has signed before and after this action. The most important of these is the Treaty of Lausanne, which lays out the reciprocal duties of both Greece and Turkey to protect the rights of the Christian and Moslem minorities in each others country. Until its abolition, hundreds of priests had been trained in the academy for religious service worldwide. The closing of the academy is a particularly serious matter for the long-term survival of the institution of the Patriarchate. Turkish law requires that the Patriarch and all other clergy in Turkey be Turkish citizens. The closing of the Patriarchate's Theological School now requires all candidates for the priesthood to be trained overseas, and many do not return to Turkey. As a result, there are fewer and fewer clergy in Turkey eligible to serve in the future as Orthodox Patriarch. The resolution calls for the United States to use its influence to: encourage the proper protection for the Patriarch and all Orthodox faithful residing in Turkey; work toward the reopening of the Patriarchal School of Theology; encourage conditions that would prevent recurrence of past acts of violence against the institution and personnel of the Ecumenical Patriarchate; and help ensure that the Patriarchate is free to carry out its religious mission. This resolution is a simple statement of the importance of religious freedom and human rights not only in Turkey, but for all of the world Christian Orthodox faithful. I am confident that the principles contained in the resolution are overwhelmingly supported by the American people, and they deserve similarly overwhelming support from the U.S. Senate.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. I thank the Senator for yielding and appreciate her efforts here today because I think it is critically important to the issue that we are debating and will determine the Senate position. I hope that we do not adopt the House position. I believe it is regrettable that we have even reached this point because, in effect, what we would be doing by accepting the House position is to further subjugate women's lives and the health of Federal employees to a new standard--a lower standard. I agree with Senator Specter, who has said that it is about one ban after another, after another ban, in attempts to do legislatively what the courts have failed to do judiciously--to roll back, gut, water down, strip away a woman's right to choose. Now, we will talk about the issue at hand today. It is about changing the status quo of health care for female Federal employees in America. It would not take them a step forward. It would take a giant step backward. It would prohibit Federal employee health benefit plans from covering termination of pregnancies in all instances, even in cases of rape and incest. So a Federal employee could not make that determination, even in the cases of rape and incest. It does not allow a female Federal employee to make that decision on her own--a personal, moral decision, and, yes, a very difficult one at that. What we are saying here today is that the power of the purse of Congress ought to penalize a large number of women who work in the Federal Government from making their health care choices. It is going to provide a serious financial handicap to a lot of families if they have to make that decision, because there are a number of Federal employees who are at or below the poverty level. Mr. President, 25 percent of the Federal employees earn less than $25,000, and 18,000 Federal employees are at or below the Federal poverty level. Now we are saying, ``We are sorry, you cannot make the choices about your health insurance.'' We are telling 1.2 million women who work for the Federal Government that you cannot have the same access to health care choices as your counterparts in the private sector. There are 78 million women in the private sector who have those choices. The fact is, two-thirds of the private sector fee-for-service plans offer coverage for an array of reproductive choices; 70 percent of health maintenance organization plans provide reproductive choice coverage. Mr. President, 178 of the 345 health care plans that are offered to the Federal employees offer this choice. Four of the five major plans do so. But now we are saying we are going to distinguish a woman's right to choice by virtue of whether they work in the private sector or for the Federal Government, and that is what is wrong. We are denying the women who work in the Federal Government their constitutionally protected right, that has been affirmed and reaffirmed by the highest court in the land. It is discriminatory, it is unfair, it is inequitable. Federal health insurance is one form of compensation to Federal workers. They have earned that. They get their salary, they get their health care, and they get their pension coverage. It is not a Federal allowance. It is not a handout. It is something that they have earned and has been decided upon through an employment agreement. What is to distinguish from the fact that we say, ``Well, Federal salaries are supported by taxpayers, therefore we are going to say that you cannot use your Federal salary to make your choices with respect to reproductive health care?'' What is the difference? There is none. Should we not allow Federal workers to make the decision about what kind of health insurance they have? I think so. I think they ought to be able to make that decision. Congress should not make that decision. The Federal Government should not make that decision for them. It is a personal decision. It is a constitutionally protected right decision. So I hope we will not accept the House language, because it is regressive. It is penalizing to the 1.2 million women who work for the Federal Government. It is singling them out and denying them the same rights of freedom of choice as those women who work in the private sector. I hope we reject the House position. We cannot underestimate the consequences of this decision. There is a lot at stake here. It is about the rights of Federal employees, not to mention the reproductive freedom of women who work for the Federal Government.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. I thank the Senator for yielding. Mr. President, I am pleased to join in cosponsorship with Senator Harkin and Senator Abraham, from Michigan, on this very important amendment. I think Senator Harkin certainly explained the framework of this amendment and the reason for having such an important amendment to this defense authorization. It is a very simple, straightforward amendment. The question is why can our allies not pay more for their own defense? In response it has been argued in the past and rightfully so that the threat against NATO was compelling and that our allies were spending their fair share by what they invested in their own forces. Moreover, we recognized the ominous threat the allies were facing from the Warsaw Pact nations as well as the threat from the Soviet Union. So, obviously it was not an appropriate time to discuss that we will fairly apportion the cost of our troops in Europe. Certainly it was in our mutual security interests. It certainly was not a time that we should say we are going to withdraw our forces from Europe unless they pay more for the support. That certainly could have, potentially, split the alliance at the time when unity was needed to face down the Soviets. NATO has been a very successful alliance, the most successful military alliance in the history of the Western World. It was designed with a single purpose, to confront and deter the Soviet military threat to Western Europe. We all recognize now that level of threat has been dramatically diminished with the collapse of the Soviet empire and the collapse of the Berlin wall. We now have to decide, and NATO is deciding, its future mission. But in the meantime we have a right to expect more from our allies, in terms of providing for the support of our troops in Europe. What we are talking about in this amendment is the aggregate of the incremental costs in the foreign labor costs associated with having American troops in Europe. The total cost is estimated, in 1997 to be $9.8 billion. If, as has been estimated, the incremental costs are to be anywhere from 10 to 20 percent we are talking about $1.5 billion. We are asking our allies by the year 1998 to pay 75 percent of those incremental costs. So that is about $1.1 billion for each year thereafter. Then of course the foreign labor costs. There are tremendous disparities in terms of how much Japan pays for the costs of our troops to be stationed in that country, compared to our European allies. In 1990, we reached an agreement with Japan that they now pay 77 percent of the costs of our troops there. They have stepped up their contributions dramatically. They are assuming the burden. We had the same arguments then that we are going to, I am sure, have now with respect to opposition to this amendment. But Japan currently pays 77 percent, approximately $4.2 billion of the United States military nonpersonnel costs incurred by the stationing of our troops in Japan. In contrast our European allies collectively contribute 24 percent of the military costs. To put it another way, Japan pays the Department of Defense in direct contributions, $3.466 billion for 45,938 American personnel stationed in Japan, or an average of $75,450 per American soldier. On the other hand, Europe pays the Department of Defense only $60 million direct contributions for the 116,190 American military personnel stationed in European NATO nations, an average of just $516 per soldier. So now we are asking the allies to assume a greater share of the cost, 37.5 percent by fiscal year 1997 and 75 percent for every year thereafter. I think it is an important issue in a year in which we passed a budget resolution that establishes a framework for a balanced budget by the year 2002. It becomes all the more important to achieve those savings, and in a year in which we are going to be considering a Base Closing Commission's report in which many communities will be seriously impacted by the closure of bases all across this country, in which these savings could help to ease that economic impact, in a year in which we are bringing down the cost of our own defense, we think it is important to be able to even provide some of these savings towards the operation and maintenance accounts of our Armed Forces. There are many uses that we could provide with the savings that would be [[Page S 11406]] offered by this requirement if our allies were to have more of our fair share. Frankly, I think this amendment would give strength to the negotiations between the United States and our allies with respect to increasing their contribution to the support of our troops abroad. I think this is only in the interest of the American taxpayer. The end of the cold war certainly should really result in savings for us as we have drawn down and will continue. But it does provide for a threshold of troops abroad. It also provides a waiver authority for the President in the event of an emergency. But the fact of the matter is, I think we are talking about responsibility. This amendment is not about isolationism. It is not about withdrawing our troops from Europe. What it is about is shared responsibility. And, frankly, I think our European allies have been avoiding that responsibility. So at a time when we are supposed to be tightening our belt because of the cuts we will have to make, in a time when community and local and State governments are going to face reduced contributions from the Federal Government, I think is only fair and reasonable to ask our European allies to do the same. So, Mr. President, I urge all of my colleagues to support this amendment.

Ms. SNOWE. Will the Senator yield?

Ms. SNOWE. The amendment is designed to allow other countries to participate in payment of those costs, for example to assist Germany. There is nothing complicated about this amendment. The Department of Defense issues a report on host nation support. I bet they could figure it out. It is not that complicated. We are asking them to pay a fair share. They know what they pay; we know what they pay; and it is not enough. We are asking them just to pay more. It costs us $9.8 billion. The U.S.-European Command determines that incremental costs are 10 to 20 percent higher. We are saying we want you to pay eventually 75 percent of that 10 to 20 percent incremental cost. And it can be determined. It was laid out in last year's DOD bill. I think there are tremendous disparities. We are looking at Japan that pays 77 percent. Korea pays 62 percent. We cannot ask our allies because somehow it becomes a complicated formula to pay more than 24 percent collectively? Yes, it is for the alliance, but they have an obligation to contribute to the alliance as well. That is what this is all about.

Ms. SNOWE. If the Senator will further yield.

Ms. SNOWE. Look at the foreign national labor costs that are also included in this amendment, the aggregate and incremental amount of foreign national labor costs: Germany 6 percent; Great Britain 9 percent, and Japan pays 94 percent toward those additional costs. It is obvious we have been able to figure it out with Japan and Korea for that matter. But we are now saying in this amendment--it is very clear--the Secretary of Defense would calculate the aggregate amount of the incremental costs to the United States of permanently stationing U.S. forces ashore in European member nations of NATO, and the foreign labor costs also attributed to those forces. I think it is only fair, and I just want to congratulate the Senator for offering this amendment because I do think it is important and I think, frankly, it is a post-cold-war amendment.

Ms. SNOWE. I would like to make another point with respect to who spends what on defense. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger testified before the Foreign Relations Committee recently and happened to indicate that Japan has the third largest defense budget--Japan. They certainly have made a great effort toward spending on defense. Our European allies spent 2.5 percent of GDP whereas the United States spent 4.4 percent of GDP. So they are not making as great an effort, obviously. We make 2\1/2\ to 3 times greater effort toward defense than our European allies do collectively. So I do not think that there is any excuse in this regard. We are only talking, if you just analyze what we are talking about--as a result, the bottom line of this amendment is $1.1 billion per year, depending on those incremental costs. If you assume 15 percent as an average--$9.8 billion--you are talking about $1.1 billion a year. That is not asking too much, given what we are asking everybody else in America to do with respect the Federal cutbacks.

Ms. SNOWE. Would the Senator yield?

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Bone Mass Measurement Standardization Act of 1995. A companion bill is being introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives by Representative Connie Morella. Millions of women in their post-menopausal years face a silent killer * * * a stalker disease we know as osteoporosis. This unforgiving bone disease afflicts 25 million Americans; causes 50,000 deaths each year; 1.5 million bone fractures annually; and the direct medical costs of osteoporosis fracture patients are $10 billion each year, or $27 million every single day. This cost is projected to reach $60 billion by the year 2020 and $240 billion by the year 2040 if medical research has not discovered an effective treatment. The facts also show that one out of every two women have a lifetime risk of bone fractures due to osteoporosis, and that it affects half of all women over the age of 50 and an astounding 90 percent of all women over 75. Perhaps the most tragic consequences of osteoporosis occur with the 250,000 individuals annually who suffer a hip fracture. Twelve to 13 percent of these persons will die within 6 months following a hip fracture, and of those who survive, a 20 percent will never walk again, and 20 percent will require nursing home care--often for the rest of their lives. We all know that osteoporosis cannot be cured, although with a continued commitment to research in this area I remain hopeful that we will find one. We also know that once bone mass is lost, it cannot be replaced. Therefore, early detection is our best weapon because it is through early detection, that we can thwart the progress of the disease and initiate preventative efforts to stop further loss of bone mass. Bone mass measurement can be used to determine the status of a person's bone health and to predict the risk of future fractures. These tests are safe, painless, accurate and quick. Our expanding technology is adding new methods to determine bone mass and we need to keep up with this technology. The most commonly used test currently is DXA dual energy x ray absorptiometry. In order to ensure that we detect bone loss early, we need to ensure that older women have coverage for bone mass tests. According to the National Osteoporosis Foundation, only about one half of private insurance policies cover these tests for diagnostic purposes, and the Federal Medicare coverage is inconsistent in its coverage depending on where an individual resides. For example, Medicare currently covers the DXA test in 42 States--including my home State of Maine. But it is not covered in 4 States and the District of Columbia, and it is covered only in parts of 4 additional States, some of which are our most populous, including New York. This patchwork coverage means that on older women who lives in Florida will be covered, but if she moves to Pennsylvania, she will not be. And a Medicare beneficiary living in Baltimore will be covered, but if she moves to Rockville, Medicare will not cover the test. Mr. President, a woman shouldn't have to change zip codes to obtain coverage for a preventive test, especially when early intervention is the only action we can take right now to slow the [[Page S 11329]] loss of bone mass. Once it is lost, it cannot be replaced. The Medicare Bone Mass Measurement Standardization Act will clarify the Medicare coverage policy for DXA testing to make it uniform in all States. It also will provide an expanded definition of the types of tests covered for bone mass measurement in order to keep up with the expanding technology in this area. We all know that ``an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure''. This bill will ensure that older women, regardless of where they live, will have access to bone mass measurement technology that will help detect bone loss and allow preventive steps to be taken. It is our only weapon right now in the fight against osteoporosis. I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting this bill.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding. On July 10, I cosigned a letter to the chairman and vice chairman of the Ethics Committee urging that they hold public hearings at the concluding stages of the case currently before the committee. Signing that letter was not an easy step to take. But I believe it was the right step to take. It was not an issue of politics; it was an issue of principle. The fact is, instances of misconduct know no partisan lines. Allegations of impropriety know no political boundaries. My singular goal and overriding goal in this matter has been to preserve the integrity and reputation of this institution, and I believe we do so by opening up the final stage of an ethics process for public view. Let me say from the outset, though, that I have the utmost respect for the hard work, dedication and integrity of the Chairman, Senator McConnell, Senators, and staff of the Ethics Committee have done in this case to date. Indeed, they have been assigned the most difficult and thankless of tasks in this institution. Without question, this is a painful and difficult matter. It is tough for the institution of the Senate. It is difficult for each and every Senator in this Chamber and everybody involved. But the time has come, Mr. President, the time has come for a decision to be made about the ethics process. On Monday, the Ethics Committee opted not to hold public, open hearings in the case pending before them. That is a decision with which I respectfully disagree. I recognize that this is a very complex and delicate process, and I understand why some Senators look upon this amendment with concern. But, Mr. President, this Chamber at the top of a hill in the Nation's Capital is not a museum. It is not an institution that should be removed from the people. And it must never be above the ideals of our country or its people. It must represent America at its very best. This is a place where nominations to the U.S. Supreme Court are decided. It is the place where members of the President's inner circle--the Cabinet--are confirmed. And it is the part of Congress where the hope for peace is hatched through our unique role of crafting treaties. The U.S. Senate is not immune to some of the problems and challenges of our society. Throughout the history of the Senate, Members have been cited and reprimanded for those flaws. In this case, since December 1992, the Senate Ethics Committee has conducted a thorough investigation into accusations of misconduct against a Member of this institution. Clearly, the Senators of this committee and their staff have not taken this case lightly. Their analysis--released in mid-May--concluded that there exists ``substantial credible evidence'' that the Senator has engaged in clear misconduct over a period of 25 years. The committee then voted unanimously to proceed to the third and final investigative stage. These are very difficult, very sensitive, and very disturbing allegations. For perhaps the first time since its creation 31 years ago, the Ethics Committee has had to investigate charges that are not simply numbers on paper. They are not a series of accountant's slips or ledgers. It is about a tough subject--we all know that--and it is about never tolerating that kind of misconduct, no matter when it occurs, no matter who the perpetrator, no matter what the context. But the real issue that has come before this Chamber is whether to continue this matter behind closed doors or to conclude this last--and most serious--phase of the investigation in full, public view by way of open hearings. Some have claimed that this will embarrass us as an institution. Embarrass us as an institution? It is by our lack of action, Mr. President, by our failure to hold open hearings and by our embrace of the institutional sanctuary of closed doors that we would embarrass this institution. To do otherwise would threaten those bonds of trust and faith with the American people. Does this policy mean that, simply because the issue at hand is in the form of sexual misconduct, even less openness is in order? Does that mean that financial misconduct deserves open, public hearings, but sexual misconduct should be a closed door policy? I think not. The point is, if we are ever to turn back the tide of sexual misconduct--which has taken years to even get into the realm of public debate and dialog--open hearings must be held in this and othe cases. In words attributed to Lord Acton, this point is made: ``Everything secret degenerates, even the administration of justice; nothing is safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and publicity.'' These are thoughts to bear in mind as we make our decision on this amendment today. Mr. President, this amendment takes the simple and honest step of shining light into the process of the U.S. Senate. In the end, the issue at hand drives us to cross a new threshold for this revered institution. Its significance cannot be underestimated, not just in terms of fairness and justice, but in terms of what we are as an institution, and who we are as servants of the American people. It is my hope that we will make the right decision. Thank you, and I yield the floor.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Thank you Mr. President. I think the chairman has accurately stated the dilemma that faces members here in terms of making decisions about whether or not to move forward with a specific consolidation proposal. The real question is whether or not there is support--bipartisan support--for a consolidation proposal. We heard from Senator Kerry this morning, who said that he supports consolidation, the idea of consolidation. He basically said the same thing in committee. The problem is, there has been no specific proposal forthcoming to achieve the goals of consolidation. That is the problem. Everybody talks about consolidation, eliminating duplicating functions and responsibilities, but there is no specific plan that has been put forward by the minority, on the committee or here on the floor, that achieves the goals that are necessary and indeed mandated by the budget resolution. Even the Vice President said, back on January 27, that he would come forward with a plan for reinventing Government and these agencies in the State Department that would achieve a savings of $5 billion. We have no such plan. The only recommendation the Vice President has made is eliminating 6 missions and streamlining the contracting services within the agencies. That is it. That will not achieve $5 billion. Even our savings are less than $5 billion. The fact is the budget resolution requires us to achieve $3.6 billion. Now, somebody can say how we do it differently. I cannot understand, frankly, why the minority could not accept the principles that are embodied in the amendment that is before the Senate. It says, and it is a sense of Congress, that the President should consolidate and eliminate duplicative, overlapping or superfluous goals, activities, offices, and programs that the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Agency for International Development have in common with the Department of State, in order to realize budgetary savings to the American taxpayers. That leaves $3 billion during fiscal years 1996 through 1999. That is the essence of the amendment now pending before the Senate. It incorporates the principles of consolidation. It is obvious that there is not an interest in working together in a bipartisan way to come up with a consolidation plan that can get a majority of support here. Now, the President--and I can understand, there is a dilemma here for those on the minority side--the President proposed in his budget to increase the 150 account by $1 billion. The budget resolution that passed this Congress requires us to cut by $3.6 billion. That is what we have to do. The President does not want to cut the foreign affairs account. He is asking for a $1 billion increase. That is why I think we are meeting the resistance from the other side with respect to consolidation, because they do not want to consolidate. They do not want to eliminate. They do not want to do anything to change the status quo. That is what last year's election was all about--to change the status quo on how we conduct our business. That is what we have to do. That is our mandate here. It surprises me in a lot of ways to suggest that there are not ways in which we can do that. I happen to think that consolidation is necessary because I think it will reinvigorate the departments and the agencies. I think it will reinvigorate the State Department in the way it conducts its foreign policy decisionmaking. I think it is necessary. Does anyone here suggest that we should not look at the exchange programs? I am a strong advocate of the exchange programs. But, believe it or not, the exchange programs have doubled. They have actually doubled since 1990. They have doubled in the 1980's. So they doubled in the 1980's and they have doubled since 1990. We are proposing that we cut $400 million in the exchange programs that are duplicative. They are spread out all over the U.S. Government. We are saying we should consolidate and manage them because we do think they are important, especially in this post-cold-war period. It is important for our young people to have a chance to understand the cultures of governments of other countries. But does anybody think that we should not do it a little bit differently, given the proliferation of those exchange programs? I say not. What about the Agency for International Development? As I said, the Director has done an outstanding job since he has been in that position. But there is much more to be done. Even he said, several years ago before he took that position, that the agency was a disaster. We have spent on development assistance since the agency was created $144 billion, and we still provide countries with assistance. Countries have received development assistance from 35 to 51 years consecutively. We have not made any headway. The point is, we have to do things somewhat differently. We should tie development assistance to our foreign policy goals. There is nothing wrong with that. Indeed, I think we will maximize the benefits for our taxpayers, but also for our specific goal. Sixty percent of the employees of the Agency for International Development work here in Washington, DC. There are 9,000 employees in the Agency for International Development--9,000. Just the administrative costs alone represent 25 cents on every development dollar we spend, but that does not take into account the grants. That is where the other 4,000 employees come in. We have 5,000 under the traditional administrative costs and overhead, and then we have another 4,000 employees that are paid through the grants that we issue through development assistance in the Agency for International Development. Is anyone suggesting that we should not cut or reform those programs to maximize the benefits for the American taxpayers and, indeed, the program? No one is saying that the essence of development assistance and helping countries for sustainable development for the future to become independent economically is not essential. It absolutely is. The question is how we achieve those goals. That is what we are attempting to do with this legislation: To consolidate and to improve the way in which we deliver these programs. Public diplomacy--I have been a very strong proponent of the broadcasting functions under the USIA. Again, the question is whether or not we can move those functions within the State Department. I had concerns about maintaining the independence and integrity of the broadcasting functions of radio, for example. But we maintain that critical firewall in this legislation because we have a broadcasting board of governors. So we will maintain the independence and integrity of radio. But there is not anything to say that we cannot do things differently in bringing them into the State Department hierarchy. Edward R. Morrow, who was once the USIA Director, said that oftentimes the agency was always brought in when a policy crash landed, but was never there when there was a takeoff. I think they will correct that longstanding problem. I think it is our responsibility to reform the public diplomacy structure. We create an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy. We create a fifth person so that preserves the Foreign Service officers and their skills, because I have a great deal of respect for their professionalism and their dedication to their job. There is no greater demonstration of the way in which they perform than at the various embassies around the world. In fact, they are integrated fully into the process within the embassy. That is exactly the same kind of procedure we want to duplicate here in Washington, DC. Everybody works together. Today, in a more democratic world than ever before, the foreign policy in those countries is very, very essential to the formation of policy in this country. That is what public diplomacy has become, an essential responsibility. I think we can emphasize that even more by taking the USIA and putting it into the State Department. We are not here to deemphasize it or say it is a lesser priority; absolutely not. We are saying it is very much a priority, and we are going to protect the integrity and the independence of broadcasting. In fact, we had the nomination hearing for the eight individuals who serve on that board, a very distinguished group of individuals that will bring a broad array of experience into the public and private sector to manage this board in this transition. I have a great deal of confidence in their ability to manage a very crucial change in the broadcasting function. I hope, as generally can be the case, that we just do not have this natural visceral reaction in opposition to any kind of change. I am certainly willing to consider any proposal and any ideas to reform the consolidation that we have before us. I think we have to make a decision that consolidation is very, very essential. But we are not getting any specific or concrete ideas from the other side as to how to achieve it. We keep hearing, well, we support consolidation. But we have been hearing that for 6 months, and nothing has come forward that would suggest that they have a plan or indeed actually support any kind of plan for consolidation. We will hopefully go through this legislation and hopefully we will have a vote, which I am going to ask for in a moment on the pending amendment, because I think it is important that we find out where everybody stands on the principle of consolidation of the State Department and its related agencies. We are here today because we need to change the way in which we handle the organizational structure of the State Department and other agencies. But we certainly want to do everything we can to make it right. Senator Kerry mentioned the fact that we have increased responsibilities on the embassies and our diplomatic corps. That is certainly true. In fact, this last year, I attempted to mandate a cost sharing so we apportion the costs within each embassy among a variety of agencies, because the State Department is not the only one that creates costs within our embassies. We have the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, and other agencies that have responsibilities for those embassies, and yet they do not pay their fair share of cost. Unfortunately, I was not successful. I am not saying that we just should cut. I am saying that we should cut in a responsible way through consolidation. I do not think anybody can disagree on the purpose of consolidation. So as we move forward in this debate, perhaps there will be some interest on the other side, and most specifically the administration, which obviously is governing the course and the direction of this legislation, with respect to accepting the idea of consolidation or not. opposition to abolishing aid

Ms. SNOWE. I certainly want to speak to this amendment and to the issue of consolidation, because I think it is more. As I said yesterday in my opening statement, I thought it was essential that there should be bipartisanship on this consolidation. This is not a new issue. In fact, Secretary of State Christopher had recommended this originally, only to be rejected in the inner-agency process. The Vice President has said through the process of reinventing Government he recommended and, in fact, said they would submit a proposal to the Congress that would yield $5 billion in savings through the consolidation, through the merging and streamlining within the State Department and its related agencies. We have yet to see that proposal. There has been no proposal forthcoming from the administration to achieve the goals that are outlined in the authorization in this amendment before us today, or as mandated by the budget resolution that passed the Congress. We have a certain mandate to meet specific funding levels for the 150 account, and the consolidation helps us to reach that goal. So the administration, for the last 5 or 6 months, has not worked with the committee on this consolidation proposal in any fashion. They have not been proactive; they have not made recommendations. They simply rejected the idea of any consolidation. This is not a new issue. Five former Secretaries of State did support this proposal. The fact is, they were not reticent in their support for this proposal. Former Secretary of State Eagleburger said that this consolidation was necessary in order to change the focus at the top within the State Department. This would be the impetus for creating the change that is necessary for this consolidation to work and that it was vital because the State Department was going to have to approach its own agenda differently in advancing foreign policy goals. After rejecting the Secretary of State's plan within the administration, the only proposal the administration made with respect to consolidation and merging were two small elements within the department. One was consolidating the State Department and the USIA Office of Inspector General and a merger of the State Department Office of Foreign Missions and the Bureau for Diplomatic Security. That was it. So we are now saying that we are going to move forward with the proposal. But that still could include the administration's proposal because the mechanism that is included in this legislation allows the President to propose alternatives or refinements to this plan and is required to submit a reorganization plan for each agency that would be considered by Congress by a resolution of approval under expedited procedures. So we give the President the opportunity to address this particular consolidation plan. But today they have been silent. So I think that we have an obligation to move forward on this issue because five former Secretaries of State said this is the direction we should take in order to reintegrate these policy functions, but also to make sure that we revitalize these agencies and these functions. That is what is important. We have provided a detailed way in which to streamline and consolidate the funding and personnel of foreign affairs agencies. We need to take that approach. The administration, and I know that no one thinks that we should dictate to the administration as to how we should consolidate, but the President has a right to offer a plan. It is not just going to be this President who will be affected by this consolidation. It is not aimed at a Democratic President by a Republican Congress, because future Presidents--certainly I hope there will be future Republican Presidents--will also have to live under this consolidation proposal. I said yesterday it is not a Republican plan, it is not a Democratic plan. It is an American plan as to how to make the State Department more efficient and function more effectively in administering our foreign policy goals. I hope we can support this consolidation. I think it is worthwhile for the future. We have had a number of people who testified before the subcommittee, suggesting this would be the appropriate approach to take. We have to look differently at the way in which we handle our goals within the State Department. It is the end of the cold war. We have to make a transition to a balanced budget. We have to consider new approaches. This requires us to look at the kind of consolidation and integration in our foreign affairs infrastructure that will be more flexible and cost effective. I think that is what is so important. We need a more flexible foreign policy structure. That is why it requires us to integrate our program decisions with changing, and frequently changing, policy goals. It was less of a problem before the cold war ended. We had a single particular focus. Today, that is not the case. What was the rule is now the exception. What was the exception is now the rule. That is why this consolidation is so essential. I hope that rather than engaging and saying this is a partisan approach, we want it to be a bipartisan approach. Unfortunately, the administration was unwilling to be forthcoming in any suggestions, other than to say they were opposed to it. I yield the floor. Privilege of the Floor

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. I yield the floor. Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I would now like to ask for the yeas and nays on amendment 2042, the amendment that is pending before the Senate.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Harry Wu is an American citizen. So, therefore, we have an obligation or responsibility to make those determinations as a country. I agree that is important, too.

Ms. SNOWE. May I finish my statement? It is important for the United States to make that decision. I think it is that important, frankly, to say something about human rights. To hold a conference in a country which has violated in the worst way the human rights of an American citizen, I think that we have to stand up and be counted. It is not easy because there are many important issues on that agenda which are very important to women throughout the country. I have been a leader on those issues on international human rights for women. I put a number of provisions in the State Department authorizing bill last year on this very subject. I feel very strongly about it. I feel very strongly about it. But I also feel very strongly about what China has done to Harry Wu.

Ms. SNOWE. Yes.

Ms. SNOWE. I say to the Senator that I happen to think we have different opinions on the subject, but I happen to think that this will enhance China's credibility in the international community to hold this conference. Frankly, I think China would find it very difficult if the conference was not held in Beijing. I think that happens to be a stronger statement, in my opinion, than holding the conference--and certainly China would view it and interpret it as suggesting that in spite of what they have done, they are still holding this conference in this country. Mind you, Beijing was on the list as the next country in line to hold the conference. There was reluctance even at that point at the United Nations to hold that conference in Beijing for the reasons that we all know. Now, this has happened. I just frankly do not feel that it would be appropriate for this country to send our delegation there talking [[Page S 10942]] about the very important issues but at the same time sending the message that we are still going to talk about these issues in spite of the fact that Harry Wu is in prison.

Ms. SNOWE. They have an agenda. I have a letter here.

Ms. SNOWE. I think Harry Wu would want the United States to stand up for him, and I happen to think--again, I cannot say what Harry Wu would think, but I think that China would feel very much slighted as well as insulted in the international community if the American delegation did not go to this conference; in fact, if the conference was not held at all. I think the international community should make that decision.

Ms. SNOWE. Harry Wu has given his life to expose the unspeakable crimes that not only he endured in China's prisons but what others are enduring. I think it is a slap in the face what China has done to the United States. But it is more than that. It is what they have done to an individual. And I think that we have to stand up. I would like the international community to stand up and say, no, we will hold the conference someplace else. It is inconvenient to change the location of this conference, but we are going to do it. What kind of message would that send to China? It is obvious they want to have it both ways. Look what they did, what they released recently in a tape with Harry Wu.

Ms. SNOWE. They want to be able to show that they are evenhanded and fair. I would be glad to yield to the chairman.

Ms. SNOWE. Yes, I do, as a matter of fact.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I am very pleased today that we are able to bring before us the State Department authorization. It is revolutionary, refreshing. It is restructuring. It is an historic bill that, for the first time in decades, looks upon an entire component of our Government in a very different fashion. As chair of the International Operations Subcommittee, which has jurisdiction over these issues, I am very pleased to play a role in the creation and bringing of this legislation before the floor. Before I describe some of the issues and the features of this legislation, I certainly want to express my commendations and appreciation for the cooperation and the leadership provided to me and to others on the committee, to Chairman Helms, who has brought this legislation to the floor. It is because of his hard work and initiative we are considering it here today. I also want to say I am very pleased to have worked with Senator Pell, because of his contributions to the committee in the foreign policy arena over the years, and with Senator Kerry, who is the ranking member of the subcommittee. I am not new to these issues. I have worked on these issues in the House as ranking member of the counterpart subcommittee for more than 10 years. So many of these issues are very familiar to me. But we have now reached a point where we have to decide how we are going to reform our foreign policy apparatus and policymaking bureaucracy. This bill has two main themes: Agency consolidation and deficit reduction. It terminates three independent agencies: The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Information Agency. It consolidates arms control, development, and public diplomacy within the hierarchy of the State Department. But it is far more than just moving bureaucratic boxes around. It integrates important aspects of American foreign policy into our basic policy formulation process. The purpose of this is to improve our overall foreign policy, not to diminish the importance of any of these functions. For example, currently the independent Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is primarily responsible for the nonproliferation policy. But concerns about nuclear proliferation frames our relations with a range of countries around the world, from North Korea to India to Iran. This bill will integrate these issues into the policy formulation process at the Department of State. They are too important to be considered as an afterthought in the interagency process. And by better coordinating public diplomacy with policy, we will also directly benefit from the conduct of our Nation's foreign policy and foreign relations. Public relations plays an increasingly important role in a world that is increasingly democratic. Currently, our public diplomacy expertise rests in the independent U.S. Information Agency. This bill integrates these fields into our basic foreign policymaking institutions. The world has changed dramatically in the last decade and, with it, the demands on our foreign policy structure. Gone is the cold war and the certainty of a single opposing force in our foreign relations. Gone, too, is the highly focused foreign policy we once waged against an expansionist and authoritarian Soviet Union and its satellites. In the 1990's we face a new imperative: To maintain a strong, aggressive foreign policy, but to streamline our operations, achieve cost savings, and meet the new criteria of a changing world. State Department consolidation is an idea whose time has come. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reigniting of ethnic strife that has been kept bottled up by the cold war, we live in a new world. But it is not necessarily a safer world, as a multitude of crises across the world have proven in the last few years. Our legislation offers a fast, flexible foreign affairs structure that [[Page S 10934]] we require and it also offers the promise of significant long-term cost savings. This leads me to the second characteristic of this legislation and that is, of course, deficit reduction. Not only does this bill restructure Government within our foreign policy institutions to make it smaller, more efficient, but it also does so at a lesser cost. These two themes are very closely related and I believe will improve our Nation's ability to conduct a truly coordinated and consistent foreign policy. But, without agency consolidation, we simply cannot meet our deficit reduction requirements without much deeper program cuts in the international affairs account. The Congressional Budget Office has indicated that the consolidation plan would save $3 billion over the next 4 years. And, frankly, Secretary of State Christopher had originally proposed this consolidation plan last fall, even though the interagency process did not permit the proposal to go forward with the administration, and that is regrettable, because I think it did prevent a bipartisan discussion of this restructuring proposal. Even Vice President Gore had recommended, and said, in fact, the administration would come forward with a reinventing Government initiative for the State Department and its foreign affairs related agencies, with a planned savings of $5 billion over the next 5 years. We have yet to see that plan, let alone the administration's legislative proposal for the reauthorization of the State Department. In all my years having managed this bill for the Republicans in the House of Representatives, we have always had an authorization proposal from the administration--whether or not they agreed with subsequently what the committee might or might not do. So I regret this bill is coming forward without bipartisan support. We have tried to be receptive to ideas, to incorporate those ideas into this restructuring. But we have yet to hear those ideas. The fact is, I think this is the kind of legislation that demands bipartisan support. We received the unanimous support of the Republicans on the committee. It certainly is not too late to be engaged in a bipartisan process, but it is important that we understand that consolidation is necessary, and it is not because we are saying we are going to deemphasize these areas within the State Department. In fact, I say we are reemphasizing them in a different fashion as we move forward to integrate these functions more efficiently. I am also disappointed by the administration's apparent unwillingness and its specific policy of not engaging us in the field of ideas with respect to this major restructuring of the State Department. Rather, their strategy seems to be embodied in the explicit words of an internal AID memorandum that was leaked to the press recently. The strategy is to delay, postpone, obfuscate, derail--if we derail, we can kill the merger. So I think that is an unfortunate approach to one of the most significant consolidation issues in recent years. But I would like to describe the features of this legislation because I do think it is important for the Members of this body to fully understand and comprehend what we are attempting to do through this consolidation proposal. As I said, we are abolishing three agencies and transferring their functions within the State Department. I believe the State Department itself will be enhanced as well as reorganized in a way that will significantly improve the way in which we can develop our foreign policy agenda. The operations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the USIA, although streamlined, will be directly merged into the State Department's policymaking structure. If you have any doubt as to whether or not we should have a restructuring consolidation of these three agencies within the State Department, only look at this graph, at the current structure of our foreign affairs agency. You can see it is rather complicated, convoluted. There is duplication. It is much more complex, in terms of trying to make decisions; certainly less efficient. In today's world, whether it is the public or private sector, everyone is looking toward more efficiency for less money and making it more effective. What we are trying to do through this reoganization is streamlining the process so the Secretary of State is better equipped to make those decisions more efficiently. It is not to say that arms control is not important, or public diplomacy is not important, or development assistance is not important. What it is saying is, it is necessary to efficiently incorporate it into the structure that gets the Secretary's attention. As many have said in the past, and before the committee, you do not have to have a separate independent agency to make it a priority. I think that is important. As you can see here, something has to be done. Just looking at this chart, it is clear that we have to revise and consolidate and make it more efficient in today's post-cold-war world. I want to compare it to what we are proposing in this legislation. And you can see that we have far fewer boxes, far fewer areas. We are making it far more efficient to make those decisions. I think that these charts certainly illustrate what we are attempting to accomplish through this legislation. It is an idea whose time has come. Even Secretary Christopher indicated in a speech before State Department employees back in March when they were doing the strategic management initiative that this was the 90th report since 1946 aimed at a restructuring and improving the State Department. And I am quoting now. He said, ``It is there gathering dust in the file cabinets.'' So a lot of these ideas have been around. But I think that what has happened in the post-cold-war period has given us the impetus to begin the approach to consolidate. And that is why I think it is also essential to have bipartisan input. That is why I regret today that has not occurred. As the Agency for International Development, this bill will more closely tie our foreign assistance programs to policy goals intended to directly advance our national interests. This will be accomplished by integrating regional foreign aid decisions into the State Department's regional policy bureaus. Former Under Secretary Bill Schneider--who was responsible for coordinating the entire international affairs budget for the Reagan administration--testified before my subcommittee. He noted that AID's structure, autonomy, and management precludes a sharp focus on using our aid resources to support foreign policy functions. By its very nature, he argued, AID programs have little behavioral impact on the recipient in terms of advancing U.S. foreign policy interests. Former Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger confirmed this argument, by arguing for consolidating AID into State in order that bilateral foreign assistance be more closely related to specific, identifiable U.S. foreign policy interests. Today's AID will be transformed into a leaner State Department mechanism for delivering foreign assistance. Today, vast amounts of our humanitarian and developmental aid is consumed by AID's huge administrative cost structure and field apparatus. For instance, there are 690 AID employees stationed at our Embassy in Cairo alone. Out of a $2.3 billion developmental aid account, AID spends $600 million on its formal operating expenses account. This is 25 cents for every developmental dollar. But in reality, AID's administrative costs are much higher because AID's formal operating expenses only count 5,000 out of its 9,000 employees worldwide. The remaining 4,000 are AID contract employees who are paid out of program funds, not operating expenses. In looking at the Arms Control Development Agency, we certainly should take very seriously the concerns that have been expressed by arms control advocates in the administration. We should also, however, consider the observations of former ACDA Director Fred Ikle who testified before my subcommittee that moving forward with a proposal as innovative and necessary as this is opposed because it: ``hurts the pride and prestige of the affected officials, jeopardizes job security and mobilizes throngs of contractors, captive professional organizations, and other beneficiaries.'' [[Page S 10935]] Director Ikle also noted that people who want to preserve an institution long after they have served their purpose believe they do so for the noblest of reasons, but at the core of their argument is inevitably: ``the tendency of bureaucracies to become more vigorous and grow in size as their initial purpose is overtaken by events.'' Director Ikle noted that ACDA was formed 34 years ago out of the need to maintain a tightly focused agency dedicated to continuity and competence in negotiations with a single adversary, the Soviet Union. Now, he noted, there is no more need for an independent agency working only on arms control issues than there would be for a separate U.S. agency for counterterrorism, global communications, or international crime. I guess I could argue that there should be separate agencies even for those categories. Former NSC Adviser Brent Scowcroft noted at the same hearing, that this changed focus of arms control argues against an independent ACDA. He observed that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the single most important arms control issue today. The full range of policy tools needed to addressing proliferation issues simply cannot be accomplished out of an isolated, insular ACDA. This, he argued can only be pursued through the broader institutions of State and DOD. usia The most logical fit of all is the consolidation of the U.S. Information Agency into the State Department. At our overseas posts, State Department and USIA operations work together in an almost seamless fashion. The top USIA officer at post is the public affairs officer, who operates as the Ambassador's close media adviser and the Embassy's press officer. The USIA operation at post conducts outreach into the grassroots organizations and maintains contacts with all those who help shape public opinion in the country. The purpose of this consolidation would be to bring this same level of coordination to Washington. A better understanding of and appreciation for the impact of international public opinion can only help us to formulate better overall foreign policy. Former NSC Adviser Scowcroft and former Secretary Eagleburger made this same observation, when they noted that public diplomacy is a function with continuing and growing needs. They noted that in the world today, individuals, groups, and publics have an increasing affect on how the United States is viewed and how our foreign policy is received. We need to incorporate this capacity, they said, into our core foreign policy institution. The logic of combining these two agencies is even recognized by the inspector general offices of the State Department and USIA. Over the past few years, they have adopted the practice of jointly conducting their periodic inspections of diplomatic posts. They do this together, because the State Department and USIA functions at post are so closely integrated. This legislation sets up a 2-year transition period. The three agencies would be merged into the State Department by March 1, 1997. During this transition period, the bill sets up a mechanism for the President to transmit to Congress his own consolidation plan. The President would be guaranteed quick action by Congress under expedited procedures. So the President could in response to this plan offer his own very specific plan that would require a resolution of approval. But the fact is that this legislation gives the President the opportunity, as well as the flexibility, to submit his own plan, or modifications to this plan, and it would require a resolution of approval by Congress. There are other issues in this legislation that I will not get into here today. Some of the issues that I have included, and others have included, are very essential to the overall bill. I know there is a great deal of anxiety about this legislation among the dedicated and hard-working employees of our foreign affairs agencies. And I understand that concern. I have worked with them over the years, and they have done an admirable, commendable job in implementing their responsibilities. But I think we are dealing in a different world today. We have to come to recognize that we have to do things somewhat differently. That is why I certainly would prefer the administration working in conjunction with the chairman and myself and other members of committee to develop a plan that has a bipartisan consensus because the scope of this legislation calls for a more proactive role on the part of this administration. In fact, they have an obligation as well as a responsibility to do so. But to maintain silence on this issue is unacceptable, let alone understandable, given the magnitude of this consolidation and given the fact that it is affecting our foreign policymaking apparatus. I hope that during this process we will hear from them, not simply to stonewall, as the chairman said, this process, but to help expedite this process of consolidation and integration of our foreign affairs agencies. This approach should be bipartisan. There is nothing Republican or Democratic about this approach. This should be an approach that everybody can endorse, and, in fact, Secretary Christopher had even recommended this approach last fall only to be rejected by others within the administration. As the chairman has indicated, five former Secretaries of State have supported this initiative. I think that is significant. The time has come for this kind of consolidation, and it is not gutting it because the issue of restructuring, as even Secretary Christopher indicated, has been done over the years, but the changes as a result of the end of the cold war has compelled us to look at these issues very realistically. We are not saying that this is a perfect plan. But it is very difficult to work with the other side when they are unwilling to work to make the revisions that they think are necessary to do this legislation. During one of our subcommittee hearings on this plan, former Bush administration official Bob Kimmit, who was Under Secretary of State, said that when he was asked to testify, he gave his proposal very careful and serious review. The standard he used in deciding his position on this was whether he would be as enthusiastic in support if it had been proposed by the Clinton administration rather than by the Republican Congress, or if it had been advanced by a Democratic Congress during a second Bush administration. Mr. Kimmit, together with a great number of our witnesses, made a common observation: To place a priority on the issue does not require a separate agency. No one questions the importance of arms control, public diplomacy or international development. Imagine if the principle of maintaining a separate agency for every important policy issue were applied throughout our Federal Government. There would be no end to organizational proliferation. I think we get some idea just based on the current chart with respect to the State Department and its related agencies and the bureaucratic confusion that has been created as a result of the multitude of agencies that exist within these agencies. This is not a Republican plan against a Democratic administration. This is an American plan that would benefit all future American administrations, both Republican and Democratic. So I urge my colleagues to consider it on its own merits, devoid of partisan considerations. If considered on this basis, I believe we will receive overwhelming support on both sides of the aisle. The bill before us is breathtaking, not just in its scope but in the quality of the recommendations and gives credit to our chairman, to our committee, and to all the Senators who have been involved in its creation. In the final analysis, whether you are Republican or Democrat, what we are doing here today would be arguing for fundamental, positive change in our Government. This is a chance to cast a vote for exactly the kind of change that the American people want. This is a vote for cost savings and efficiencies we will need to advance and if we are certainly going to meet our deficit reduction goals required by the budget resolution that passed the Congress. But also more importantly it is to advance our foreign policy goals. I think in the final analysis this is exactly what this legislation would do. On a final note, I should say that not only do I commend the employees within these various agencies but also [[Page S 10936]] the directors and the administrators because without a doubt they have been hard-working, dedicated individuals who are committed to their goals. And although we may disagree on this consolidation, I want to make sure I give credit to those individuals who currently head these agencies because clearly they have worked very hard to try to do what they can with the kind of mandates received within current law and with the structures that they have had to live with. And I understand their commitment to maintaining the current structure. But I think they also hopefully understand we have to meet the goals that are required of us through not only the budget resolution but also because the climate and the circumstances have now changed. So, Mr. President, I hope that as we go through this process in the final analysis we will be able to get a reorganization of State Department agencies necessary to meet the future commitments of this country. I yield the floor. Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.