Olympia Snowe

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleague, Senator Kerry, to submit a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the policy of the United States at the 17th Regular Meeting of the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, ICCAT. We are submitting this resolution today as our delegates prepare for the upcoming ICCAT meeting in Murcia, Spain which begins on November 12, 2001. At this meeting the ICCAT will set international quotas for highly migratory species and recommend conservation and sustainable management measures. The ICCAT is an international body and only has the authority to make recommendations to its member nations. As such, the effective management of highly migratory species, such as bluefin tuna, requires the cooperation of the member nations in this voluntary regime. The sustainable harvest and longterm viability of U.S. bluefin tuna fisheries depends on the compliance with management measures by all member nations. Unfortunately, several member nations routinely take actions that undermine the convention. In some cases, the conservation efforts of other countries do not directly affect the United States and its fishing industry. That is not the case with highly migratory species, such as the ones managed through ICCAT. Recent scientific studies conducted cooperatively with U.S. fishermen have shown that bluefin tuna caught off the coast of the United States migrate to and from the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. This means that the traditional notion of the Eastern Atlantic stock being separate and independent from the Western Atlantic stock is not accurate and the data indicate it is one mixed stock of fish. Therefore, overharvesting of bluefin tuna in the Eastern Atlantic has a direct effect on United States fisheries. This resolution expresses the Senate's belief that the United States needs to push for improved monitoring, reporting, and compliance with all ICCAT management plans. This will help all nations to identify those that have routinely acted counter to the recommendations of the ICCAT and aid enforcement efforts. It is important for the international community to understand which nations are undermining the recovery efforts of the ICCAT and take action to correct this problem. The United States should push for the necessary changes to create transparency in the conservation and management efforts of all members of the ICCAT. We need to know who is a dedicated partner in these efforts to conserve and sustainably manage highly migratory species. As chair and ranking member of the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries, Senator Kerry and I have been dedicated to improving fisheries management. This resolution is a critical step in ensuring that the international management plan approved by the ICCAT in 1998 meets the sustainable harvest goals that we all fought for. I urge my colleagues to join us and support this resolution.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Madam President, I rise today with Senator Murray and our other colleagues to introduce the Sales Tax Holiday Act of 2001. Since last Wednesday, when Senators Murray, Lieberman and I first publically raised the idea of a national sales tax holiday, this exciting and innovative concept has truly taken root. Indeed, the idea of a sales tax holiday has been supported by economists and editorial writers alike and from all across the political spectrum--from Alan Blinder, former Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank to Grover Norquist, President of Americans for Tax Reform. So we are talking about a bipartisan bill with support as wide as it is deep. And one thing everyone agrees on is that our National Sales Tax Holiday legislation offers the ultimate economic stimulus, literally feeding Federal stimulus dollars directly into the economy. We believe that this direct approach is perhaps the most immediate, fair, and responsible approach that will have the most stimulative effect on the economy. With December fast approaching, we need to give a ``shot in the arm'' to our economy and help restore the confidence of consumers, because we have seen a dramatic and negative reaction to the events of September 11. In fact, the Conference Board's first report on consumer confidence since the attacks showed the steepest two-month drop since the 1980 recession--and confidence has plummeted to the lowest level in 7 years, since 1994, even as consumer spending dropped 1.8 percent in September, the first decline in 2\1/2\ years and the biggest spending drop since 1987. According to a survey released yesterday by the Credit Union National Association and the Consumer Federation of America, almost one-third, 28 percent, of those surveyed plan to spend less this year than last. With the economy already on the brink of a recession following the attacks--including economic growth actually declining 0.4 percent in the third quarter--a one-third decline in spending this season could be detrimental. Clearly, we need to take action to restore this confidence in the economy, and tell consumers that ``Help is on the way.'' As Lynn Franco, director of The Conference Board Consumer Research Center said recently, ``Widespread layoffs and rising unemployment do not signal a rebound in confidence anytime soon. With the holiday season quickly approaching, there is little positive stimuli on the horizon.'' Indeed, the signs are ominous. According to the National Governors Association, dollar Christmas sales may actually fall below last year-- which would be the first decline since Christmas of 1953, in the wake of the Korean War. Our Sales Tax Holiday Act of 2001 will provide that positive stimuli at a critical time when consumers need the help most. Holiday sales make up one-fifth, 22.8 percent, of annual consumer spending, so we will target our bill directly toward these sales. States that opt to participate by rolling back their sales tax will be ``held harmless'' for their decisions, with reimbursement made by the Federal Government for lost sales tax revenue. This revenue will be replaced on a timely basis so that States' cash flows are not affected, with States opting to be reimbursed for lost revenue based on a formula which is based on historical December sales tax revenue, or opting to receive dollar for dollar reimbursement based on actual sales. States will have to choose which method of reimbursement they would like to receive prior to implementation of the sales tax holiday. Forty-five States, and the District of Columbia will be eligible to participate in our plan, with an estimated overall economic impact of about $6.5 billion for the 10-day sales tax holiday. Needless to say, no State would be required to take action, but we think they deserve to have the option. This is a proven approach that can dramatically boost sales. When Maryland and the District of Columbia tried sales tax holidays last August, for example, monthly sales jumped by 10 percent. One retailer even saw sales jump 35 percent over the same period a year ago. And the Wall Street Journal in 1997 reported that a survey of 102 stores in the New York City metropolitan area averaged 125 percent increases in sales during the region's January sales tax holiday on most clothing and footwear. The fact is, this is an approach that fulfills every one of the principles for a stimulus that the Centrist Coalition I cochair laid out earlier this month. And as the Los Angeles Times reported on October 12, ``in the view of many economists--conservative as well as liberal--most plans fall short of the key criteria for stimulus proposals: they should take effect quickly, promote new spending or investment that otherwise would not occur, and do no long-term damage.'' Our plan fits the bill and makes perfect sense--and will pay off for consumers with more dollars and cents in their pockets. What better signal of holiday cheer and confidence than to include a savings on every purchase, enticing consumers back into the stores and giving a much-needed boost to our economy? As we approach this holiday season, rather than being ``a day late and a dollar short'' in helping consumers and stimulating the economy, we should pass this legislation and give America the gift of an immediate boost to our economic strength and well-being. I thank the Chair.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I'm pleased to join with Senators Feinstein and Kyl in introducing the Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001. Both of these leaders have worked feverishly to bring this bipartisan bill to fruition and I have very much appreciated the opportunity to work with them in assembling a strong and meaningful package to help secure our homeland. The bottom line is, at this extraordinary time, in the wake of horrific attacks from without against innocent lives within our borders, we must take every conceivable step with regard to those variables we can control in securing our Nation. How can we do anything less when it has become so abundantly and tragically apparent that admittance into this country cannot and must not be the ``X-Factor'' in protecting our homeland? Entry into this country is a privilege, not a right, and it's a privilege that's clearly been violated by evildoers who were well aware of inherent weaknesses in the system. Just look at the story of Mohamed Atta, coming into Miami, he told the INS that he was returning to the U.S. to continue flight training, despite the fact that he presented them with a tourist visa, not the student required visa for his purposes, and they let him in. INS has since said that Atta had filed months earlier to change his status from tourist to student so they let him in, despite long-standing policy that once you leave the country, you're considered to have abandoned your change of status request. What this bill is about is stopping dangerous aliens from entering our country at their point-of-origin and their point of entry by giving those Federal agencies charged with that responsibility the tools necessary to do the job. Now, some say the tools we need are better technologies, some say better information, some say better coordination. The beauty of this bill is that it stands on all three legs, because I can tell you if there's one thing I learned from my experience in working on these issues on the House Foreign Affairs International Operations Subcommittee it's that we're only going to get to the root of the problem with a comprehensive approach. This was clear from the aftermath of our investigation of the comings and goings of the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the radical Egyptian cleric Sheikh Rahman. We found that the Sheikh had entered and exited the country five times totally unimpeded, even after the State Department formally revoked his visa and even after the INS granted him permanent resident status. In fact, in March of 1992, the INS rescinded that status which was granted in Newark, New Jersey about a year before. But then, unbelievably, the Sheikh requested asylum in a hearing before an immigration judge in the very same city, got a second hearing, and continued to remain in the country even after the bombing, with the Justice Department rejecting holding Rahman in custody pending the outcome of deportation proceedings and the asylum application, stating that ``in the absence of concrete evidence that Rahman is participating in or involved in planning acts of terrorism, the assumption of that burden, upon the U.S. Government, is considered unwarranted.'' To address the trail of errors, I introduced legislation to modernize the State Department's antiquated microfiche lookout system, but as we've painfully learned in the interim, such a system is only as good as the information they can access. That's why we fought tooth and nail to require information sharing between the FBI and the State Department, but even then it was only a watered-down provision that eventually passed into law in 1994, with even that sunsetting in 1997 with a brief extension lapsing in 1998. So I'm pleased that the terrorism bill we just passed does require information sharing between the State Department and the FBI, but we can and must do more, we must also require information sharing among all agencies like the CIA, DEA, INS, and Customs. And that's what this bill does, along with my measure that's included to establish ``Terrorist Lookout Committees'' at every embassy, which are required to meet on a monthly basis and report on their knowledge or lack of knowledge of anyone who should be excluded from the U.S. Ultimately, each Deputy Chief of Mission would be responsible for this information, because to paraphrase Admiral Rickover, unless you can identify the person who's responsible when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible. We should also know who and what is in our waters and be pro-active in preventing potential threats from reaching our shores. As I mentioned at a recent Oceans and Fisheries Subcommittee hearing, a terrorist act involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons at one of our seaports could result in the extensive loss of lives. In that light, I'm pleased this bill also includes a measure I developed that requires incoming vessels to submit to the Coast Guard crew and passenger manifests as background on the vessel 96 hours before arrival. And finally, we ought to ensure that the person standing in front of the INS agent at the border is the same person who applied for that visa. It does no good to do every background check in the world overseas, only to have someone else actually show up at our doorstep. The fact is, we have the so-called ``biometric technology'' available to close this gap, and I'm pleased that my measure requiring fingerprinting for visa applicants both abroad and at the border has been included. As the President said just the other day, ``We're going to start asking a lot of questions that heretofore have not been asked.'' By giving the Director of Homeland Security the responsibility of developing a centralized ``lookout'' database for all of this information, along with instituting tighter application and screening procedures and increased oversight for student visas, we will close the loopholes and help bring all our Nation's resources to bear in securing our nation. This is a crucial bill in our war on terrorism and I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I'm pleased to join with Senators Feinstein and Kyl in introducing the Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001. Both of these leaders have worked feverishly to bring this bipartisan bill to fruition and I have very much appreciated the opportunity to work with them in assembling a strong and meaningful package to help secure our homeland. The bottom line is, at this extraordinary time, in the wake of horrific attacks from without against innocent lives within our borders, we must take every conceivable step with regard to those variables we can control in securing our Nation. How can we do anything less when it has become so abundantly and tragically apparent that admittance into this country cannot and must not be the ``X-Factor'' in protecting our homeland? Entry into this country is a privilege, not a right, and it's a privilege that's clearly been violated by evildoers who were well aware of inherent weaknesses in the system. Just look at the story of Mohamed Atta, coming into Miami, he told the INS that he was returning to the U.S. to continue flight training, despite the fact that he presented them with a tourist visa, not the student required visa for his purposes, and they let him in. INS has since said that Atta had filed months earlier to change his status from tourist to student so they let him in, despite long-standing policy that once you leave the country, you're considered to have abandoned your change of status request. What this bill is about is stopping dangerous aliens from entering our country at their point-of-origin and their point of entry by giving those Federal agencies charged with that responsibility the tools necessary to do the job. Now, some say the tools we need are better technologies, some say better information, some say better coordination. The beauty of this bill is that it stands on all three legs, because I can tell you if there's one thing I learned from my experience in working on these issues on the House Foreign Affairs International Operations Subcommittee it's that we're only going to get to the root of the problem with a comprehensive approach. This was clear from the aftermath of our investigation of the comings and goings of the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the radical Egyptian cleric Sheikh Rahman. We found that the Sheikh had entered and exited the country five times totally unimpeded, even after the State Department formally revoked his visa and even after the INS granted him permanent resident status. In fact, in March of 1992, the INS rescinded that status which was granted in Newark, New Jersey about a year before. But then, unbelievably, the Sheikh requested asylum in a hearing before an immigration judge in the very same city, got a second hearing, and continued to remain in the country even after the bombing, with the Justice Department rejecting holding Rahman in custody pending the outcome of deportation proceedings and the asylum application, stating that ``in the absence of concrete evidence that Rahman is participating in or involved in planning acts of terrorism, the assumption of that burden, upon the U.S. Government, is considered unwarranted.'' To address the trail of errors, I introduced legislation to modernize the State Department's antiquated microfiche lookout system, but as we've painfully learned in the interim, such a system is only as good as the information they can access. That's why we fought tooth and nail to require information sharing between the FBI and the State Department, but even then it was only a watered-down provision that eventually passed into law in 1994, with even that sunsetting in 1997 with a brief extension lapsing in 1998. So I'm pleased that the terrorism bill we just passed does require information sharing between the State Department and the FBI, but we can and must do more, we must also require information sharing among all agencies like the CIA, DEA, INS, and Customs. And that's what this bill does, along with my measure that's included to establish ``Terrorist Lookout Committees'' at every embassy, which are required to meet on a monthly basis and report on their knowledge or lack of knowledge of anyone who should be excluded from the U.S. Ultimately, each Deputy Chief of Mission would be responsible for this information, because to paraphrase Admiral Rickover, unless you can identify the person who's responsible when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible. We should also know who and what is in our waters and be pro-active in preventing potential threats from reaching our shores. As I mentioned at a recent Oceans and Fisheries Subcommittee hearing, a terrorist act involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons at one of our seaports could result in the extensive loss of lives. In that light, I'm pleased this bill also includes a measure I developed that requires incoming vessels to submit to the Coast Guard crew and passenger manifests as background on the vessel 96 hours before arrival. And finally, we ought to ensure that the person standing in front of the INS agent at the border is the same person who applied for that visa. It does no good to do every background check in the world overseas, only to have someone else actually show up at our doorstep. The fact is, we have the so-called ``biometric technology'' available to close this gap, and I'm pleased that my measure requiring fingerprinting for visa applicants both abroad and at the border has been included. As the President said just the other day, ``We're going to start asking a lot of questions that heretofore have not been asked.'' By giving the Director of Homeland Security the responsibility of developing a centralized ``lookout'' database for all of this information, along with instituting tighter application and screening procedures and increased oversight for student visas, we will close the loopholes and help bring all our Nation's resources to bear in securing our nation. This is a crucial bill in our war on terrorism and I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Madam President, today I am joining with Senator Rockefeller in introducing the Medicare Remote Monitoring Service Coverage Act of 2001. This bill is designed to place Medicare on the cutting edge of technology and ensure that our Nation's seniors have access to the best treatment options available. Ever since the first stethoscope was developed in Paris in 1816, medical technology has had a dramatic impact on health care. Over the past twenty-five years, the technology of medical devices has improved dramatically. The resulting changes in the practice of medicine and the improvements in the quality of patient care of have been dramatic and this trend will continue as we move into the future. Once such important improvement is in the ability of new cutting-edge medical devices to electronically monitor a patient's response to treatment. The new devices will collect, analyze and transmit clinical health information to the patient's physician. As a result, the physician will have access to better information on the patient's condition, which will improve patient care. These innovative devices will also monitor their own internal performance and transmit this information in real-time to the physician's office. Physicians can use this data to assess a patient's response to treatment and determine if new interventions are required. One such device that is under development is an advanced version of the internal cardiac defibrillator or ICD similar to the one used by Vice President Cheney. These devices monitor the heart and respond automatically when indicated. When the heart's rhythm triggers certain interventions, the patient is required to immediately contact their physician and must travel to the emergency room to determine if a more serious problem has developed. It is also crucial at these times to determine that the device is working properly. Access to care in these circumstances is imperative. With these new devices, this important information can be transmitted electronically to the physician. The physician can then analyze this clinical data and determine if further intervention is required. As a result of this innovation, costly emergency room visits are avoided and patients can receive their physician's assessment more quickly. This reduces the cost of the health care intervention by avoiding the emergency room visit and provides piece of mind to the patient that the life-saving device is working properly. One can easily see that this is of greatest value to patients in rural areas who would otherwise have to travel great distances to the emergency room for evaluation, many times in the middle of the night. While these new technologies hold great promise, Medicare reimbursement policies are an unfortunate barrier to their use. Under current Medicare payment policy, most physician billing codes are limited to face-to-face interactions between physician and patient. The physician payment system does not provide reimbursement for time spent on a clinical evaluation when a face-to-face encounter is not needed. As a result, Medicare payment rules will inhibit the adoption of this promising technology. This is unfortunate when one considers that, in many cases, costly emergency room visits can be avoided while the identical clinical analysis and interpretation takes place using data that is transmitted electronically to the physician. This legislation, which we are introducing today, would create reimbursement parity between physician visits on a face-to-face basis and equivalent interventions resulting from remote patient management made possible by these devices. The legislation would provide the same Medicare coverage and level of reimbursement for remote monitoring services that are found to be comparable to face-to-face, encounter- based, services specifically for data collection and analysis. This new reimbursement policy will be implemented in a budget-neutral manner and simply designed to pay for remote monitoring when a face-to-face physician encounter would be reimbursed for the same services under the same set of circumstances. This proposal will improve patient care and promote the adoption of this innovative new technology. Moreover, it will provide better access and improved quality of care for patients who rely on these devices, particularly in rural areas. This is especially true in cases when an immediate evaluation is required. We believe this is a sensible proposal that will reduce costs in the long-run and will ensure that seniors have access to cutting edge, life-saving technologies. We are hopeful that this legislation can be adopted quickly to assure that Medicare beneficiaries are not prevented from accessing this technology.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of a bill sponsored by Senators Hutchison and Mikulski that would authorize the use of Federal resources to increase the education, health and living standards for women and children in living in Afghanistan, and as refugees in neighboring countries. Importantly, it also specifies that this assistance is provided in a way that protects and promotes the human rights of all people in Afghanistan. Allow me to begin by praising the work and leadership of my colleague from Texas, Senator Hutchison, on behalf of women both at home and abroad. This legislation is entirely consistent with her strong beliefs and leadership to extend opportunities to women throughout the world, and I am proud to join her in support of this effort. It is simply unconscionable that we should even have to consider such a measure in this day and age. But there should be no mistake, the facts show that Congressional support for women in Afghanistan is nothing short of a moral imperative. This issue is not simply a matter of cultural differences, of imposing a particular viewpoint on another country or people. This is a core human rights issue, and to ignore the plight of Afghan women is to turn our backs on a terrible wrong that we have the power and I would say the obligation as fellow human beings to help right. This is a matter of basic justice, and it's basic justice denied under the current Taliban regime. Prior to the Taliban's assent to power, Afghani women enjoyed both stature and freedom. In fact, many Americans may be unaware that Afghani women were not only well educated, they constituted 70 percent of the nation's school teachers, half of the government's civilian workers, and 40 percent of the doctors in its capital. But that all changed, or, more accurately, came to a crashing and tragic halt, with the seizure of the Afghanistan capital in September of 1996, when the Taliban began a regime of gender-based apartheid. It's a regime, I'm sad to say, that's been enforced with the most extreme brutality. Talk about going backwards, what's happened in Afghanistan hasn't just turned back the clock, it's turned back the centuries. While the calendars tell us it's a new millennium, you'd never know it from the graphic and disturbing footage we see from the Taliban-occupied regions of Afghanistan, which paint a very different picture of Afghanistan than even five years ago. Today, women have been banished from the work force, flat out not allowed to work . . . to earn a living . . . or to support themselves or their family. And let's not forget that, according to an October 23 article in the Chicago Tribune, and I quote, ``Tens of thousands of women were said to be widowed by Afghanistan's long-running battle against Soviet occupation in the 1980's. Many have had to turn to begging and prostitution.'' Under the Taliban, girls aren't allowed to go to school. And women have been expelled from the universities. In fact, incredibly, women are prohibited from leaving their homes at all unless accompanied by a close male relative, even in the event of a medical emergency for themselves or their children. These women are under house arrest, they are prisoners of their own homes. And if that's not bad enough, they are prisoners within themselves, with the Taliban going to great and inhumane lengths to strip Afghani women's sense of self and personhood. As the world has seen over and over again in the past five years and even more so since the start of the military campaign on October 7th, Afghani women are forced to wear a burqa, leaving only a mesh hole from which they can view the world in which they cannot participate. And heaven help those who dare to tread upon or flout these laws. Penalties for violations of Taliban laws range from beatings to public floggings to killings, all state sanctioned. While these tragedies are not new, with the world's focus on the plight of the Afghani women, it is time for us to stand up and be counted. For myself, I have continually supported efforts to improve the lot of women in Afghanistan, cosponsoring a resolution in the last Congress to condemn the systemic human rights abuses that are being committed against women and girls in Afghanistan, and supported a similar resolution this year that passed unanimously. We've been a leader in assisting the people of Afghanistan, in fact, the U.S. is the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan people, and we should continue our leadership, now more than ever, as the Taliban has brought even greater woe upon the Afghan people. It is imperative that we distinguish between the Afghan people and the oppressive ruling Taliban that harbors terrorists within their borders. This bill highlights the ongoing plight of the Afghani women. By authorizing the President to provide educational and health care assistance to women and children living in Afghanistan, and as refugees in neighboring countries, we recognize that women must have a future in Afghanistan. This potential for prosperity can only be realized if, as in the United States, both men and women have an opportunity to participate and contribute. That's what this bill is all about, and I hope that my colleagues will join us in supporting it.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the anti- terrorism legislation we have before us, the USA PATRIOT Act. I supported the Senate bill when it passed 2 weeks ago, and this bill-- which was overwhelmingly passed by the House yesterday--retains key provisions that give our Government the tools it needs to combat terrorism. One of the key issues during the House-Senate negotiations was that of the so-called ``sunset.'' While the Senate-passed bill ensured these provisions would remain in effect as long as necessary, the House voted to suspend the bill's provisions in 5 years. Ultimately, the bill before us today includes a four year sunset. While I believe the provisions of this bill will be needed to combat terrorism beyond 4 years, it is fair to say Congress should review the provisions and make an assessment of their effectiveness in 4 years. Let me also say I am pleased to have worked in conjunction with Senator Bond and Senator Conrad in supporting the Visa Integrity and Security Act. This bill addresses many of the concerns we raised, such as the importance of information sharing among government law enforcement and intelligence agencies with the State Department and tightening tracking controls on those entering the U.S. on student visas, including those attending flight schools. These are critical issues, and I commend both Senators for their efforts, and I am pleased the bill before us contains provisions from this bill on information sharing and the use of biometric technology for the entry and exit of aliens. With this legislation, we take reasonable, constitutional steps to enhance electronic and other forms of surveillance, without trampling on the rights of Americans. We will also institute critical measures to increase information sharing by mandating access to the FBI's National Crime Information Center, or NCIC, by the State Department and INS. Incredibly, while intelligence is frequently exchanged, no law requires agencies like the FBI and CIA to share information on dangerous aliens with the State Department or INS. While I am pleased the bill before us ensures information sharing between the FBI, State Department and INS, I believe it does not go far enough as other crucial agencies, such as the DEA, CIA, or DoD, that may have information the State Department and INS need, but are still not required to share information. In short, by only providing access to the FBI's NCIC system, we are not summoning the sum total of U.S. Government information on individual aliens which is now needed in our war on terrorism. I saw firsthand the consequences of serious inadequacies in coordination and communication during my 12 years as ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs International Operations Subcommittee and chair of the subcommittee's Senate counterpart. Access to the FBI's NCIC system by the State Department is a first step, and one that I advocated in 1993, after the Justice Department ruled that because the State Department was not a ``law enforcement agency,'' it no longer had free access to the NCIC. Tellingly, after ruling, the visa denial rate for past criminal activities plunged a remarkable 45 percent--stark evidence that we can't afford to tie the hands of America's overseas line of defense against terrorism. Although my legislation designated the State Department a ``law enforcement agency'' for purposes of accessing the NCIC when processing any visa application, whether immigrant or non-immigrant, a revised provision enacted in 1994 only provided the State Department with free access for purposes of processing immigrant visas--dropping my requirement for non-immigrant visas eventually used by all 19 suspected hijackers. Even that limited law was sunsetted in 1997 with a brief 6- month extension to 1998. Currently, U.S. posts check the lookout database called the Consular Lookout and Support System--Enhanced, or CLASS-E, prior to issuing any visa. CLASS-E contains approximately 5.7 million records, most of which originate with U.S. embassies and consulates abroad through the visa application process. The INS, DEA, Department of Justice, and other federal agencies also contribute lookouts to the system, however, this is voluntary. To further fortify our front-line defenses against terrorism--to turn back terrorists at their point of origin--information sharing should be mandatory, not voluntary. That is why I introduced a bill that would require that law enforcement and the intelligence community share information with the State Department and INS for the purpose of issuing visas and permitting entry into the U.S. And while my bill would have gone farther than the legislation before us, by including the DEA, CIA, Customs and the Department of Defense in the mandated information-sharing network, I am pleased that this bill we are considering at least mandates access to the NCIC by INS and the State Department. The bottom line is, if knowledge is power, we are only as strong as the weakest link in our information network. Therefore, we must ensure that the only ``turf war'' will be the one to protect American turf. Another important issue is that of verifying the identity of a visa holder. Once a visa is issued at the point of origin, we should be ensuring that it is the same person who shows up at the point of entry. The fact is, we don't know how many, if any, of the 19 terrorists implicated in the September 11 attacks entered the U.S. on visas that were actually issued to someone else. Currently, once a visa is issued by the State Department, it then falls to INS officials at a port-of-entry to determine whether to grant entry. The problem is, no automated system is utilized to ensure that the person holding the visa is actually the person who was issued the visa. In other words, the INS official has to rely solely on the identification documents the person seeking entry is carrying--making that official's job that much more difficult. There is a better way, and legislation I introduced would require the establishment of a fingerprint-based check system to be used by State and INS to verify that the person who received the visa is the same person at the border crossing station trying to enter the country. Simply put, it requires the State Department and INS to jointly create an electronic database which stores fingerprints, and that other agencies may use as well. When a foreign national receives a visa, a fingerprint is taken, which then is matched against the fingerprint taken by INS upon entry to the U.S. This is a common sense approach that would take us one step closer to minimizing the threat and maximizing our national security. The fact of the matter is fingerprint technology, one part of the larger category of biological factors that can be used for identification known as biometrics, is not new. In fact, the U.S. Government has already employed biometrics to verify identities at military and secret facilities, at ports-of-entry, and for airport security, among many others. The bill before us includes a provision that requires the Attorney General to report on the feasibility of enhancing the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) or other identification systems to identify visa holders who may be wanted in a criminal investigation in the U.S. or abroad before they are issued a visa or permitted entry or exit to the U.S. This surely doesn't sound all that much different than the legislation I have proposed. I am pleased this bill at least starts us down the road toward implementing biometric technologies, and I hope this can be achieved as soon as possible. Although I would prefer an even stronger bill and indeed worked toward the inclusion of measures that would have accomplished this goal, this legislation negotiated by the House and Senate is vital to our national security, and I am proud to support it. The war on terrorism is a war on many fronts. Some of the battles will be great in scale, many will be notable by what is not seen and by what doesn't happen, namely, that individuals who pose a serious threat to this nation never see these shores and never set foot on our soil. Many of our greatest victories will be measured by the attacks that never happen, in battles we win before they ever have a name, in conflicts we prevent before they ever claim one American life. I hope we will pass and enact legislation that will help make that possible, and urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an op-ed from The Bangor Daily News.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Transparent Sea Act of 2001. The Coast Guard is a multi-mission agency charged with maintaining our national defense and the safety of our citizens. This is an extraordinary time in our Nation's history and we need to act now and provide the Coast Guard with all of the tools and information necessary to protect our Nation's waterways. This bill allows the Coast Guard to gather vital information about incoming vessels before they reach our ports. This allows them to be pro-active and prevent potential threats from reaching our shores. The sum total of all of our available resources and knowledge must be brought to bear in the defense of our country. Specifically, my bill would authorize the Coast Guard to obtain the information needed to achieve a greater awareness of possible maritime threats. The bill requires vessels to submit to the Coast Guard prearrival messages not later than 96 hours prior to entering U.S. waters, or such time as deemed necessary by the Secretary of Transportation. This will provide the Coast Guard time to thoroughly examine the information, including the name and flag-country of the vessel, a detailed crew and passenger list, the vessel's cargo, and the port the vessel last departed from. Such a database allows the Coast Guard to track patterns and identify potential problems. The Coast Guard could then deny entry to any vessel that does not meet the notification or listing requirements and intercept any vessels that may pose a threat. The American people place very high expectations on the Coast Guard. It is incumbent upon us to provide them with the information they need to fulfill those expectations. The Transparent Sea Act of 2001 has the support of the Coast Guard and I look forward to moving the bill to the Senate floor at the earliest opportunity. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Transparent Sea Act of 2001. The Coast Guard is a multi-mission agency charged with maintaining our national defense and the safety of our citizens. This is an extraordinary time in our Nation's history and we need to act now and provide the Coast Guard with all of the tools and information necessary to protect our Nation's waterways. This bill allows the Coast Guard to gather vital information about incoming vessels before they reach our ports. This allows them to be pro-active and prevent potential threats from reaching our shores. The sum total of all of our available resources and knowledge must be brought to bear in the defense of our country. Specifically, my bill would authorize the Coast Guard to obtain the information needed to achieve a greater awareness of possible maritime threats. The bill requires vessels to submit to the Coast Guard prearrival messages not later than 96 hours prior to entering U.S. waters, or such time as deemed necessary by the Secretary of Transportation. This will provide the Coast Guard time to thoroughly examine the information, including the name and flag-country of the vessel, a detailed crew and passenger list, the vessel's cargo, and the port the vessel last departed from. Such a database allows the Coast Guard to track patterns and identify potential problems. The Coast Guard could then deny entry to any vessel that does not meet the notification or listing requirements and intercept any vessels that may pose a threat. The American people place very high expectations on the Coast Guard. It is incumbent upon us to provide them with the information they need to fulfill those expectations. The Transparent Sea Act of 2001 has the support of the Coast Guard and I look forward to moving the bill to the Senate floor at the earliest opportunity. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the legislation before the Senate which is designed to overhaul aviation security in this Nation. This is an issue of vital national importance during these dark days in America's history, and as a member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, I believe it is critical that we pass the strongest possible enhancements to our existing system and do so as soon as possible. The fact of the matter is, the images of the unspeakable horrors of September 11, 2001, will be etched in our minds forever. When the ``devil incarnate'' hit the United States, he attacked not only America, but freedom-loving nations everywhere. We are going to need the resources of the United States coupled with the cooperation of our global neighbors in order to wage this fight against terrorism. For it is a fight we must win, and will win. But there should be no mistake, victory will not come overnight. We are here today debating this bill because, as we mourn the tremendous loss of life both of those in the air and on the ground, we also know that our transportation system must endure and must be secure if we are to move the Nation forward. We must leave no stone unturned in the effort to preserve this Nation's transportation infrastructure, so that we might both carry on the business of the Nation and ensure our continued economic viability, and also ensure that we are in a position of strength to be able to wage the kind of war necessary to eradicate terrorism. And, we cannot remain strong if we cannot remain mobile. Specifically, we are here today to improve our aviation security infrastructure and policies, to instill the kind of confidence that is vital to the health of our country's commercial airline industry. Clearly, our way of life, our freedom to travel and do so with relatively minimal encroachment, was used against us in the most horrific way imaginable. And it is vital that we take the necessary steps now to prevent such catastrophes from recurring. The debate on this legislation is so critical because aviation security will only be addressed with a comprehensive, exhaustive approach that recognizes we are dealing with interlocking rings of issues, from perimeter security to on-site airport security to on-board aircraft security to a range of other issues, and that the entire aviation security system is only as strong as the weakest ring. That is why I have cosponsored Senator Hollings's comprehensive legislation to improve aviation security. This bipartisan legislation takes critical steps to safeguard the security of our airports and aircraft. It includes provisions to strengthen cockpit doors, increase the number of sky marshals, which is a critical issue also addressed in Senator Hutchison's bill, S. 1421, of which I am a cosponsor, to increase the number of sky marshals, federalize security, and improve training and testing for screening personnel. Federalizing security, in particular, is an issue I feel very strongly about. The fact of the matter is, if the flying public does not have confidence in airport security, they will remain reluctant to fly, and this will have severe long-term repercussions in the aviation sector and in our economy. Imposing stringent Federal control and oversight over airport security will go a long way to helping instill confidence in the flying public, and will enable the government to exercise much greater control over the quality of screening. This is a problem that was identified long ago. In September 1996, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommended that FAA was, in fact, poised, at the time of the terrorist attacks, to issue a final rule, as directed by Congress last year in the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000, establishing training requirements for screeners and requiring screening companies to be certified. And in its January 18, 2001, Top DOT Management Challenges Report, the Department of Transportation Inspector General noted that, to close this critical gap in security, the Government ``. . . needs to have a means to measure screener performance, and methods of providing initial and recurrent screener training as well as ensuring that the screeners maintain their proficiency through actual experience with the machines in the airport environment.'' The IG also concluded that the ``. . . FAA must complete deployment of equipment that will help in the testing and training of screeners.'' Quite frankly, I am not convinced that we can ever have full confidence in our airport security without stringent Federal controls, which is why it is vital we resolve the issue of federalization once and for all. In addition to addressing the issue of airport security, the Hollings legislation: Establishes a Deputy Administrator within the U.S. DOT for Transportation Security, Establishes an Aviation Security Council, comprised of representatives from FAA, DOJ, DOD, and the CIA to coordinate national security, intelligence, and aviation security information and make recommendations; Stipulates hijack training for flight crews; Requires background checks on students at flight schools; and Increases perimeter security. I would note I am particularly pleased that the legislation before us includes my amendment directing a new Deputy Secretary for Transportation Security within U.S. DOT, which is established in the underlying bill, to focus on the critical mission of better coordinating all modes of transportation nationwide during a national emergency, such as the tragic events that unfolded on September 11. And I thank Senators Hollings and McCain, in particular, for working with me and for their support on this important issue. I am also very pleased that the Hollings bill addresses the issue of background checks on students at flight schools. On September 21, I introduced legislation, S. 1455, to regulate the training of aliens to operate certain aircraft. Under S. 1455, background checks would be required before any alien would be permitted to receive jet flight training. I also commend the President for his leadership. The President's proposal addresses many of the same core issues. His air travel security plan would expand the sky marshal program. It urges Governors to deploy the National Guard at Federal expense at all commercial airports. It would provide oversight and control of airport screening by the Federal Government. And it would provide $500 million to help airlines fortify cockpit doors, install surveillance cameras and install aircraft tracking devices that cannot be turned off. Under the President's plan, contractors would continue to perform screening. The Federal Government would set standards, supervise operations, conduct background checks and training, purchase and maintain equipment, and oversee airport access control. I believe the administration's proposal would be a major step in the right direction. And I understand that some have concerns that federalizing the screener workforce could make it difficult to remove employees who are not performing their important duties. It is my hope and my expectation that we will find common ground on this point while coming together to ensure that Americans have complete confidence in the men and women who form the last line of defense when it comes to preventing weapons from getting on our aircraft. And I am very pleased that S. 1447 includes provisions to exert federal control over security screening once and for all. One way or the other, this issue must be worked out so there is no doubt about the quality of this critical workforce, this has got to happen if we are to restore the American public's confidence in flying and, by extension, the health of America's commercial airline industry. At the end of the day, we must have a screening system with stringent Federal controls and oversight, so that the government will control hiring standards, compensation, training, and re-training. We need a reliable, professional force of screeners. We must move heaven and earth to make flying safe. That is our mission here today. One national poll, CNN/USA Today/Gallup, found that 43 percent of Americans are less willing to fly, with the majority of their concerns centering on the adequacy of airport security. They are also willing to sacrifice convenience for safety, with the same poll finding widespread support for new measures, even if it means checking in two to three hours before a flight, or paying more to cover the increased security costs. The failure to correct the existing deficiencies in the aviation security system has already cost us dearly, and we no longer have the luxury to postpone action. Accordingly, we must pass this bill now. It is critical that we come together, as we did on a resolution supporting the use of force to combat terrorism, as we did on legislation providing emergency funding for the recovery and relief effort after the tragic attacks of September 11, as we did on a financial relief package for the airline industry, and pass legislation promptly to address the gaps in aviation security and restore the confidence of the American people in our aviation system.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the antiterrorism legislation we have before us. First, let me say I am pleased to have also worked in conjunction with Senator Bond and Senator Conrad in supporting their legislation entitled ``The Visa Integrity and Security Act.'' This bill addresses many of the concerns I have, such as the importance of information sharing among Government law enforcement and intelligence agencies with the State Department and tightening tracking controls on those entering the United States on student visas, including those attending flight schools. These are critical issues, and I commend both Senators for their efforts. Today, our men and women in uniform are on the frontlines in the war against terrorism. We salute their willingness to put themselves in harm's way in defense of freedom, and we pray for their safety and well-being. Here at home, we are working to secure our nation, and that is why I am pleased that we will pass this legislation in the Senate that will take strong measures to help prevent further terrorist attacks on American soil. With this legislation, we will take reasonable, constitutional steps to enhance electronic and other forms of surveillance, without trampling on the rights of Americans. We will also institute critical measures to increase information sharing by mandating access to the FBI's National Crime Information Center, or NCIC, by the State Department and INS. In our war against terrorism, Americans stand as one behind our President. It is equally critical that, in the all-out effort to protect our homeland, Federal agencies be united in securing American soil. In that light, President Bush made exactly the right decision when he created the Office of Homeland Security, a national imperative in the wake of the horrific tragedies of September 11, and I commend him for appointing my former colleague, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge, as its Director. With a seat at the Cabinet table, Governor Ridge will literally be at the President's side, giving him the standing that will be required to remove jurisdictional hurdles among the 40-plus agencies he will be responsible for coordinating. Now, we will assist in that coordination by allowing INS and the State Department access to the information they need to make informed decisions about who we will grant entrance into this country. I saw firsthand the consequences of serious inadequacies in coordination and communication during my 12 years as ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs International Operations Subcommittee and Chair of the subcommittee's Senate counterpart. In fact, I recently wrote an op-ed piece concerning my findings during that time and I would like to submit the entire text of that piece for the Record. In conducting oversight of Embassy security as well as visa and consular operations, I became extensively involved with the issue of terrorism, co-drafting antiterrorism legislation with former Representative Dan Mica in the wake of 1983 and 1984 terrorist attacks against the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon--traveling to Belgrade, Warsaw, and East Berlin to press government officials into helping stem the flow of money to the terrorist Abu Nidal and his organization--and investigating entry into the United States by radical Egyptian cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. As far back as our hearings on the 1985 Inman Report, commissioned by then-Secretary of State George Shultz in response to the attacks in Lebanon, it was abundantly clear that improved coordination and consolidation of information from agencies such as the FBI, CIA, DEA, Customs, INS and the State Department would be an essential step toward removing a vulnerability in our national security. That point was tragically underscored by our discovery that, astoundingly, in the period since 1987 when Sheikh Rahman was placed on the State Department lookout list, the Sheikh entered and exited the United States five times totally unimpeded. But it got even worse. Even after the State Department formally issued a certification of visa revocation, he was granted permanent residence status by the INS. When he was finally caught on July 31, 1991, reentering the United States, he was immediately released back into U.S. society to allow him to pursue a multi-year appeal process. As unbelievable as that may sound, just as unfathomable is the fact that, even after the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, membership in a terrorist organization in and of itself--with the exception of the PLO--was not sufficient grounds for visa denial. Rather, the Immigration Act of 1990 required the Government to prove that an individual either was personally involved in a terrorist act, or planning one. This absurd threshold made it almost impossible to block individuals, such as Sheikh Rahman, from entering the country legally. Legislation I introduced in 1993 removed that bureaucratic and legal obstacle--yet it took nearly 3 more years to enact it as part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. However, provisions from my bill were enacted in 1994 to respond to the trail of errors we uncovered requiring modernization in the State Department's antiquated microfiche ``lookout'' system to keep dangerous aliens from entering the United States. This system required manual searches, was difficult to use, and was subject to error. The language I crafted required the State Department to replace the old systems with one of two forms of state-of-the-art computerized systems. Visa fees were even increased for non-immigrants to pay for the upgrades. Recognizing the need to mate these new technologies with the need for the most comprehensive, current and reliable information, we also attempted to address the issue of access. This was all the more pressing because, in 1990, the Justice Department had ruled that because the State Department was not a ``law enforcement agency,'' it no longer had free access to the FBI's National Crime Information Center, NCIC. This system, which maintains arrest and criminal information from a wide variety of Federal, State, and local sources as well as from Canada, was used by the State Department to deny visas. Tellingly, after it lost access to the NCIC, the visa denial rate for past criminal activities plunged a remarkable 45 percent--stark evidence that we can't afford to tie the hands of America's overseas line of defense against terrorism. Incredibly, while intelligence is frequently exchanged, no law requires agencies like the FBI and CIA to share information on dangerous aliens with the State Department. To address this, my 1993 bill also designated the State Department a ``law enforcement agency'' for purposes of accessing the NCIC as well as other FBI criminal records when processing any visa application, whether immigrant or non- immigrant. Unfortunately, a revised provision also enacted in 1994 only provided the State Department with free access to these FBI resources for purposes of processing immigrant visas--dropping my requirement for non-immigrant visas eventually used by all 19 suspected hijackers. Also of note, we discovered later in trying to understand some of what's gone wrong that even that limited law was sunsetted in 1997 due to a provision added by the House-Senate conference on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1994-1995--a conference of which I was not a member. Subsequently, that law was extended to 1998 in the Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations bill for fiscal year 1998, and then was allowed to expire. This happened despite my legislation enacted in 1996 repealing the requirement that visa applicants be informed of the reason for a denial--a provision that law enforcement agencies legitimately believed could impede ongoing investigations, or reveal sources and methods. Thus, today, information sharing remains optional and ad hoc. Currently, U.S. posts check the lookout database called the ``Consular Lookout and Support System--Enhanced,'' or CLASS-E, prior to issuing any visa. CLASS-E contains approximately 5.7 million records, most of which originate with U.S. Embassies and consulates abroad through the visa application process. The INS, DEA, Department of Justice, and other Federal agencies also contribute lookouts to the system, however, this is voluntary. To further fortify our front-line defenses against terrorism--to turn back terrorists at their point of origin--information sharing should be mandatory, not voluntary. That is why I introduced a bill that would require that law enforcement and the intelligence community share information with the State Department and INS for the purpose of issuing visas and permitting entry into the United States. And while my bill would have gone farther than the legislation before us--by including the DEA, CIA, Customs and the Department of Defense in the mandated information-sharing network--I am pleased that this bill we are considering does mandate access to the NCIC by INS and the State Department. Clearly, the catastrophic events of September 11 have catapulted us into a different era, and everything is forever changed. We must move heaven and earth to remove the impediments that keep us from maximizing our defense against terrorism. The bottom line is, if knowledge is power, we are only as strong as the weakest link in our information network--therefore, we must ensure that the only ``turf war'' will be the one to protect American turf. That is why we need a singular, Cabinet-level authority that can help change the prevailing system and culture, and why we need legislation to help them do it. Ironically, the most compelling reason for an Office of Homeland Security is also its greatest challenge--the need to focus on the ``three C's'' of coordination, communication and cooperation so that all our resources are brought to bear in securing our Nation. Winston Churchill, in a 1941 radio broadcast, sent a message to President Roosevelt saying, ``Give us the tools and we will finish the job.'' I have no doubt that, given the tools, the men and women of our Embassies throughout the world will get the job done and help us build a more secure American homeland. Finally, once a visa is issued at the point of origin, we should be ensuring that it's the same person who shows up at the point of entry. The fact is, we don't know how many--if any--of the 19 terrorists implicated in the September 11 attacks entered the United States on visas that were actually issued to someone else. Currently, once a visa is issued by the State Department, it then falls to INS officials at a port-of-entry to determine whether to grant entry. The problem is, no automated system is utilized to ensure that the person holding the visa is actually the person who was issued the visa. In other words, the INS official has to rely solely on the identification documents the person seeking entry is carrying--making that officials job that much more difficult. There is a better way, and legislation I introduced would require the establishment of a fingerprint-based check system to be used by State and INS to verify that the person who received the visa is the same person at the border crossing station trying to enter the country. Simply put, it requires the State Department and INS to jointly create an electronic database which stores fingerprints--and that other agencies may use as well. When a foreign national receives a visa, a fingerprint is taken, which then is matched against the fingerprint taken by INS upon entry to the United States. This is a common sense approach that would take us one step closer to minimizing the threat and maximizing our national security. The fact of the matter is, fingerprint technology--one part of the larger category of biological factors that can be used for identification known as biometrics--is not new. In fact, the U.S. Government has already employed biometrics to verify identities at military and secret facilities, at ports-of-entry, and for airport security, among many others. The INS has already announced it was beginning to implement the new biometric Mexican border crossing cards as required by 1996 Illegal Immigrations Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. These cards have the individual's fingerprint encoded on them and are matched to the fingerprint of the person possessing the card at a U.S. port-of-entry. This surely does not sound all that much different than the legislation I have proposed. I am pleased the bill before us at least starts us down the road toward implementing biometric technologies by requiring a review of the feasibility of instituting such technologies, and I hope this can be achieved as soon as possible. Despite areas where I might have wished to strengthen this bill even further, this legislation is vital to our national security, and I will be proud to support it. The war on terrorism is a war on myriad fronts. Some of the battles will be great in scale, many will be notable by what is not seen and by what doesn't happen--namely, that individuals who pose a serious threat to this Nation never see these shores and never set foot on our soil. Many of our greatest victories will be measured by the attacks that never happen--in battles we win before they ever have a name--in conflicts we prevent before they ever claim one American life. I hope we will pass and enact legislation that will help make that possible. I thank the Chair.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, in the war against terrorism, Americans stand as one behind our President. Now, in the all-out effort to protect our homeland, Federal agencies must be united in securing American soil. In that light, President Bush made exactly the right decision when he created the Office of Homeland Security--a national imperative in the wake of the horrific tragedies of September 11--and I commend him for appointing my former colleague, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge, as its director. With a seat at the Cabinet table, Governor Ridge will literally be at the President's side, giving him the standing that will be required to remove jurisdictional hurdles among the forty-plus agencies he will be responsible for coordinating. I saw firsthand the consequences of serious inadequacies in coordination and communication during my twelve years as ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs International Operations Subcommittee and Chair of the subcommittee's Senate counterpart. In conducting oversight of embassy security as well as visa and consular operations, I became extensively involved with the issue of terrorism, co-drafting anti- terrorism legislation with former Representative Dan Mica, Florida, in the wake of 1983 and 1984 terrorist attacks against the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon; traveling to Belgrade, Warsaw, and East Berlin to press government officials into helping stem the flow of money to the terrorist Abu Nidal and his organization; and investigating entry into the United States by radical Egyptian cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. As far back as our hearings on the 1985 Inman Report, commissioned in response to the attacks in Lebanon, it was abundantly clear that improved coordination and consolidation of information from agencies such as the FBI, CIA, DEA, Customs, INS and the State Department would be an essential step toward removing a vulnerability in our national security. That point was tragically underscored by our discovery that, astoundingly, in the period since 1987 when Sheikh Rahman was placed on the State Department lookout list, the Sheikh entered and exited the U.S. five times totally unimpeded. Even after the State Department formally issued a certification of visa revocation, he was granted permanent residence status by the INS. When he was finally caught on July 31, 1991, reentering the United States, he was immediately released back into U.S. society to allow him to pursue a multi-year appeal process. Just as unbelievable is the fact that, even after the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, membership in a terrorist organization in and of itself--with the exception of the PLO--was not sufficient grounds for visa denial. Rather, the Immigration Act of 1990 required the Government to prove that an individual either was personally involved in a terrorist act, or planning one. This absurd threshold made it almost impossible to block individuals, such as Sheikh Rahman, from entering the country legally. Legislation I introduced in 1993 removed that bureaucratic and legal obstacle--yet it took nearly 3 more years to enact it as part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Further, to respond to the trail of errors we uncovered, provisions from my bill were enacted in 1994 requiring modernization in the State Department's antiquated microfiche ``lookout'' system to keep dangerous aliens from entering the United States. This system required manual searches, was difficult to use, and was subject to error. The language I crafted required State to replace the old systems with one of two forms of state-of-the-art computerized systems. Visa fees were even increased for non-immigrants to pay for the upgrades. Recognizing the need to mate these new technologies with the need for the most comprehensive, current and reliable information, we also attempted to address the issue of access. This was all the more pressing because, in 1990, the Justice Department had ruled that because the State Department was not a ``law enforcement agency'', it no longer had free access to the FBI's National Crime Information Center. This system, which maintains arrest and criminal information from a wide variety of federal, state, and local sources as well as from Canada, is used by the State Department to deny visas. Tellingly, after it lost access to the NCIC, the visa denial rate for past criminal activities plunged a remarkable 45 percent--stark evidence that we can't afford to tie the hands of America's overseas line of defense against terrorism. Incredibly, while intelligence is frequently exchanged, no law requires agencies like the FBI and CIA to share information on dangerous aliens with the State Department. To address this, my 1993 bill also designated the State Department a ``law enforcement agency'' for purposes of accessing the NCIC as well as other FBI criminal records when processing any visa application, whether immigrant or non- immigrant. Unfortunately, a revised provision also enacted in 1994 only provided the State Department with free access to these FBI resources for purposes of processing immigrant visas--dropping my requirement for non-immigrant visas eventually used by at least 16 of the 19 suspected hijackers. Even that limited law was allowed to expire, despite my legislation enacted in 1996 repealing the requirement that visa applicants be informed of the reason for a denial--a provision that law enforcement agencies legitimately believed could impede ongoing investigations, or reveal sources and methods. Thus, today, information sharing remains optional and ad hoc. To further fortify our front-line defenses against terrorism, I also propose to assist our embassies in turning-back terrorists at their point of origin by establishing Terrorist Lookout Committees, comprised of the head of the political section of each embassy and senior representatives of all U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The committees would be required to meet on a monthly basis to review and submit names to the State Department for inclusion in the visa lookout system. Clearly, the catastrophic events of September 11 have catapulted us into a different era, and everything is forever changed. We must move heaven and earth to remove the impediments that keep us from maximizing our defense against terrorism, and that is why we need a singular, Cabinet-level authority that can change the prevailing system and culture. Ironically, the most compelling reason for an Office of Homeland Security is also its greatest challenge: the need to focus on the ``three C's'' of coordination, communication and cooperation so that all our resources are brought to bear in securing our nation. The bottom line is, if knowledge is power, we are only as strong as the weakest link in our information network therefore, we must ensure that the only ``turf war'' will be the one to protect American turf. In our fight against terrorism, we can do no less.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Madam President, I rise today to introduce three bills that will provide our first line of defense, our Consular Officers at our embassies and INS Inspectors at our ports-of-entry, with the resources and information they need to determine whether to grant a foreign national a visa or permit them entry to the United States. They are: The Terrorist Lookout Committee Act, the Visa Fingerprinting Act, and the Information Sharing to Strengthen America's Security Act. I saw firsthand the consequences of serious inadequacies in coordination and communication during my twelve years as ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs International Operations Subcommittee and chair of the International Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was this lack of coordination that permitted the radical Egyptian Sheik Rahman, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, to enter and exit the U.S. five times unimpeded even after he was put on the State Department's Lookout List in 1987, and allowed him to get permanent residence status by the INS even after the State Department issued a certification of visa revocation. These bills are an essential step toward removing a vulnerability in our national security that has continued through the years. For example, the Inman report of 1984, which was commissioned by Secretary Shultz after three terrorist attacks against the U.S. Embassy and marines in Lebanon in 1983 and 1984, found that coordination between agencies must be improved. After the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Accountability Review Board, a board which is required by law to make findings and recommendations upon the loss of life or property, made a recommendation that the FBI and State Department should improve their information sharing on terrorism. The 2000 National Commission on Terrorism also recommended that the FBI should establish a cadre of reports officers to distill and disseminate terrorism-related information once it is collected. While intelligence is frequently exchanged, no law requires law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share information on dangerous aliens with the State Department. The information sharing that does occur among agencies is done on a voluntary basis. Accordingly, the first bill I am introducing, the Information Sharing to Strengthen America's Security Act, requires all U.S. law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community to share information on foreign nationals with the State Department so that visas can be granted with the assurance that the sum total of the U.S. government has no knowledge why an alien should not be granted a visa to travel to the U.S. This bill increases the information sharing among our law enforcement agencies, our intelligence community, and the State Department, so that foreign nationals who are known by any entity of the U.S. Government to be associated with, or members of, terrorist organizations are denied a visa. This includes the FBI, DEA, INS, Customs, CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, all vital agencies in the war on terrorism. The second bill I am introducing--the Terrorist Lookout Committee Act, builds on the Information Sharing to Strengthen America's Security Act by requiring a Terrorist Lookout Committee to be established in every one of our embassies. This committee, which would be chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission, will be comprised of the senior representatives of all law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community. The purpose of the mandated monthly meeting is to provide a forum for these officials to add names to the State Department's Consular Lookout and Support System, CLASS, of those who are considered dangerous aliens and, if they applied for a visa, should undergo a thorough review and possible denial of the visa. If no names are submitted to the list then the chair is required to certify, subject to an Accountability Review Board, that no member had knowledge of any name that should be included. This requirement will elevate awareness of, and focus constant attention on, the necessity of maintaining the most accurate and current information possible. Finally, quarterly reports by the Secretary of State are to be submitted to the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. To ensure that the foreign national who received the visa from our Embassy is the same person using it to enter the United States, I have introduced the Visa Fingerprinting Act. This bill requires the Secretary of State and the INS Commissioner to jointly establish and implement a fingerprint-backed check system. Foreign nationals would be fingerprinted before a visa could be issued, with information catalogued in a database accessible to Immigration officials. INS authorities at port-of-entry would then be required to match fingerprint data with that of the foreign nationals seeking entry into the U.S., with the INS certifying to the match before permitting entry. My bill authorizes a one-time congressional expenditure to establish and implement the system, but the cost of operating the system would be funded through an increase in the visa service charge required for each visa. The use of biometric technology such as fingerprint imaging, retinal and iris scans, and voice recognition, is no longer just a part of our science-fiction movies, but has become a widely used means of identity verification. The U.S. Government uses it at military and secret installations for access to both information and the installations themselves. Airports, such as Charlotte-Douglas International which utilizes iris scanning technology, have incorporated biometric technology to limit access to particular areas of the airport to authorized personnel only. Interestingly, the INS already started down this road when, in 1998, it began to issue biometric crossing cards to Mexicans who cross the border frequently. These cards have a digital fingerprint image which, upon crossing, is matched to the fingerprint of the person possessing the card. The bottom line is, we must stop terrorists not only at their points of entry, but more critically, at their point of origin. In America's war on terrorism, we can do no less.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Madam President, I rise today to introduce three bills that will provide our first line of defense, our Consular Officers at our embassies and INS Inspectors at our ports-of-entry, with the resources and information they need to determine whether to grant a foreign national a visa or permit them entry to the United States. They are: The Terrorist Lookout Committee Act, the Visa Fingerprinting Act, and the Information Sharing to Strengthen America's Security Act. I saw firsthand the consequences of serious inadequacies in coordination and communication during my twelve years as ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs International Operations Subcommittee and chair of the International Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was this lack of coordination that permitted the radical Egyptian Sheik Rahman, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, to enter and exit the U.S. five times unimpeded even after he was put on the State Department's Lookout List in 1987, and allowed him to get permanent residence status by the INS even after the State Department issued a certification of visa revocation. These bills are an essential step toward removing a vulnerability in our national security that has continued through the years. For example, the Inman report of 1984, which was commissioned by Secretary Shultz after three terrorist attacks against the U.S. Embassy and marines in Lebanon in 1983 and 1984, found that coordination between agencies must be improved. After the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Accountability Review Board, a board which is required by law to make findings and recommendations upon the loss of life or property, made a recommendation that the FBI and State Department should improve their information sharing on terrorism. The 2000 National Commission on Terrorism also recommended that the FBI should establish a cadre of reports officers to distill and disseminate terrorism-related information once it is collected. While intelligence is frequently exchanged, no law requires law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share information on dangerous aliens with the State Department. The information sharing that does occur among agencies is done on a voluntary basis. Accordingly, the first bill I am introducing, the Information Sharing to Strengthen America's Security Act, requires all U.S. law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community to share information on foreign nationals with the State Department so that visas can be granted with the assurance that the sum total of the U.S. government has no knowledge why an alien should not be granted a visa to travel to the U.S. This bill increases the information sharing among our law enforcement agencies, our intelligence community, and the State Department, so that foreign nationals who are known by any entity of the U.S. Government to be associated with, or members of, terrorist organizations are denied a visa. This includes the FBI, DEA, INS, Customs, CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, all vital agencies in the war on terrorism. The second bill I am introducing--the Terrorist Lookout Committee Act, builds on the Information Sharing to Strengthen America's Security Act by requiring a Terrorist Lookout Committee to be established in every one of our embassies. This committee, which would be chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission, will be comprised of the senior representatives of all law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community. The purpose of the mandated monthly meeting is to provide a forum for these officials to add names to the State Department's Consular Lookout and Support System, CLASS, of those who are considered dangerous aliens and, if they applied for a visa, should undergo a thorough review and possible denial of the visa. If no names are submitted to the list then the chair is required to certify, subject to an Accountability Review Board, that no member had knowledge of any name that should be included. This requirement will elevate awareness of, and focus constant attention on, the necessity of maintaining the most accurate and current information possible. Finally, quarterly reports by the Secretary of State are to be submitted to the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. To ensure that the foreign national who received the visa from our Embassy is the same person using it to enter the United States, I have introduced the Visa Fingerprinting Act. This bill requires the Secretary of State and the INS Commissioner to jointly establish and implement a fingerprint-backed check system. Foreign nationals would be fingerprinted before a visa could be issued, with information catalogued in a database accessible to Immigration officials. INS authorities at port-of-entry would then be required to match fingerprint data with that of the foreign nationals seeking entry into the U.S., with the INS certifying to the match before permitting entry. My bill authorizes a one-time congressional expenditure to establish and implement the system, but the cost of operating the system would be funded through an increase in the visa service charge required for each visa. The use of biometric technology such as fingerprint imaging, retinal and iris scans, and voice recognition, is no longer just a part of our science-fiction movies, but has become a widely used means of identity verification. The U.S. Government uses it at military and secret installations for access to both information and the installations themselves. Airports, such as Charlotte-Douglas International which utilizes iris scanning technology, have incorporated biometric technology to limit access to particular areas of the airport to authorized personnel only. Interestingly, the INS already started down this road when, in 1998, it began to issue biometric crossing cards to Mexicans who cross the border frequently. These cards have a digital fingerprint image which, upon crossing, is matched to the fingerprint of the person possessing the card. The bottom line is, we must stop terrorists not only at their points of entry, but more critically, at their point of origin. In America's war on terrorism, we can do no less.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Madam President, I rise today to introduce legislation, the National Emergency Transportation Coordination Act of 2001, to address a serious concern I have in the wake of last week's tragic events. Last week, I met with local transportation officials in my home State of Maine to review the enhanced security measures implemented since the September 11 attacks. During my meetings, these officials expressed serious concerns about security coordination among different modes of transportation. Apparently, drastically differing standards of safety and security were used by Federal officials in different cities during the attacks. For obvious reasons, this lack of coordination could be of significant concern in the future. The fact of the matter is, we did not know last Tuesday's attacks were coming. We certainly didn't know where, or in what form. In the future, my hope is that our intelligence will be enhanced so that we may thwart terrorist attacks before they occur. Nonetheless, I believe it is critical that we be prepared for any contingency. To this end, the legislation I am introducing today gives the U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. DOT, the authority and tools necessary to safeguard our national transportation infrastructure in the event of a national emergency. Specifically, my legislation will enhance coordination within the U.S. DOT and with other federal agencies to safeguard our transportation infrastructure in the event of an emergency. It will centralize within U.S. DOT the authority to: 1. coordinate national transportation and transportation-related activities of all federal agencies during a national emergency; 2. disseminate critical transportation-related information during an emergency; and 3. develop and notify appropriate federal, state and local authorities of uniform emergency transportation security standards to be followed during an emergency and to ensure those standards are followed. It will establish within the U.S. DOT a Federal Emergency Transportation Administration, FETA. FETA would be responsible for coordinating domestic transportation during a national emergency, including aviation, maritime and port security, and surface transportation, including rail. FETA would coordinate transportation- related responsibilities of other agencies during an emergency as well. FETA could serve as a point of contact within U.S. DOT for the Office of Homeland Security laid out by the President last Thursday. In addition, FETA would be responsible for establishing uniform national transportation ``emergency'' standards, and notifying appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies and governments about transportation-related security threats in the event of an emergency. It would also develop appropriate standard operating procedures for agencies and municipalities to follow during an emergency and disseminate critical transportation-related information during. As a member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, I know that steps are already being taken to safeguard our airports and our skies. However, there is no guarantee that, should there be another terrorist attack on our soil in the future, that aviation will be the only mode of transportation targeted. We must not take that chance. We must take steps to ensure that all our modes of transportation are coordinated in the event of such an attack. I strongly urge my colleagues to join me in a strong show of support for this legislation.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Madam President, I rise today to introduce legislation, the National Emergency Transportation Coordination Act of 2001, to address a serious concern I have in the wake of last week's tragic events. Last week, I met with local transportation officials in my home State of Maine to review the enhanced security measures implemented since the September 11 attacks. During my meetings, these officials expressed serious concerns about security coordination among different modes of transportation. Apparently, drastically differing standards of safety and security were used by Federal officials in different cities during the attacks. For obvious reasons, this lack of coordination could be of significant concern in the future. The fact of the matter is, we did not know last Tuesday's attacks were coming. We certainly didn't know where, or in what form. In the future, my hope is that our intelligence will be enhanced so that we may thwart terrorist attacks before they occur. Nonetheless, I believe it is critical that we be prepared for any contingency. To this end, the legislation I am introducing today gives the U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. DOT, the authority and tools necessary to safeguard our national transportation infrastructure in the event of a national emergency. Specifically, my legislation will enhance coordination within the U.S. DOT and with other federal agencies to safeguard our transportation infrastructure in the event of an emergency. It will centralize within U.S. DOT the authority to: 1. coordinate national transportation and transportation-related activities of all federal agencies during a national emergency; 2. disseminate critical transportation-related information during an emergency; and 3. develop and notify appropriate federal, state and local authorities of uniform emergency transportation security standards to be followed during an emergency and to ensure those standards are followed. It will establish within the U.S. DOT a Federal Emergency Transportation Administration, FETA. FETA would be responsible for coordinating domestic transportation during a national emergency, including aviation, maritime and port security, and surface transportation, including rail. FETA would coordinate transportation- related responsibilities of other agencies during an emergency as well. FETA could serve as a point of contact within U.S. DOT for the Office of Homeland Security laid out by the President last Thursday. In addition, FETA would be responsible for establishing uniform national transportation ``emergency'' standards, and notifying appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies and governments about transportation-related security threats in the event of an emergency. It would also develop appropriate standard operating procedures for agencies and municipalities to follow during an emergency and disseminate critical transportation-related information during. As a member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, I know that steps are already being taken to safeguard our airports and our skies. However, there is no guarantee that, should there be another terrorist attack on our soil in the future, that aviation will be the only mode of transportation targeted. We must not take that chance. We must take steps to ensure that all our modes of transportation are coordinated in the event of such an attack. I strongly urge my colleagues to join me in a strong show of support for this legislation.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Thank you, Madam President. I rise today in strong support of the amendment that has been offered by the Senator from Kentucky to strike the base closing provisions within the DOD authorization bill. We all recognize that this is not business as usual. We also recognize how we will have to reevaluate many of the considerations that are included in the Defense authorization bill, many of the ways in which we viewed our military and our force structure prior to September 11. Even before the horrific attacks of September 11, I, along with many of my colleagues, had serious questions about the integrity of the base closing process itself, as well as the actual benefits realized. Now, with acts of war committed against the United States, with the President addressing a joint session of Congress that justice will be done, with our Reservists being called up and our troops being deployed and the unpredictability of the mission ahead, of the asymmetric threats, I do not believe this is the time to be considering the closure of additional bases. Indeed, now more than at any other time in recent history, I believe it is absolutely critical that this Nation not sacrifice valuable defense infrastructure when we have just committed ourselves to a new war on terrorism. This challenge will require a new overarching military doctrine, one, indeed, that has yet to be developed. One of the central goals of this administration has been to overhaul the military doctrine which has been in place since the cold war, requiring that the United States must be able to be engaged in and to win two major theater wars at the same time. Until a new doctrine has been determined, we cannot decide what the military infrastructure should be. Now with the announcement by the President of a Cabinet-level position responsible for homeland defense, we certainly do not know essentially what our requirements at home will be to provide for our national security interests. Until there is an assessment and cataloging of those needs, we simply cannot afford to determine what additional bases should be closed. I look at the Northeast, and in all the four previous rounds the Northeast has lost 49 bases, roughly 50 percent of what we had prior to the BRAC process; 73 of those bases, or just under 35 percent of the installations on the east coast, were closed during the previous four rounds. Although the Office of Homeland Security will not take the place of the Department of Defense, it obviously will be coordinating many of the law enforcement responsibilities of the myriad agencies across the Federal Government, and all of our military installations will no doubt play a critical and prominent role in our homeland security. Moreover, the war on terrorism will be a long-term challenge, as the President has said repeatedly. This will require a sustained resolve and effort on the part of the United States. It will employ U.S. military, intelligence, and law enforcement personnel and resources. These forces will require the support of our domestic and overseas installations. This is all in addition to our existing force deployments and peacekeeping operations that we have in Bosnia and Kosovo and, of course, our logistical support in Macedonia. Instead of chasing elusive savings, I believe the Department of Defense needs to provide to the Congress a comprehensive plan that identifies the operational and maintenance infrastructure required to support the services' national security requirements. We all know that once the property is relinquished and remediated, it is permanently lost as a military asset for all practical purposes. Proponents of additional base closure rounds are quick to point out that reducing infrastructure has not kept pace with post-cold-war military force reductions. They say bases must be downsized proportionate to the reduction in total force strength. However, the fact of the matter is, there is no straight-line corollary between the size of our forces and the infrastructure required to support them. Belief that there is disturbs me. I heard it repeatedly when I served on the Senate Armed Services Committee and chaired the Seapower Subcommittee. I was in the House when this whole process began. I think about it in terms of the 1997 QDR, the Quadrennial Defense Review process. Since the end of the cold war, we have reduced the military force structure by 36 percent and have reduced the Defense budget by 40 percent, but now I ask you: How much are we employing that force? Although the size of our armed service has decreased, the number of contingency operations that our service members, our men and women who are in the military, have been called upon to respond to in recent years has dramatically increased. As I said, I chaired the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee in the last Congress. Guess what. The Navy and Marine Corps team alone responded to 58 contingent missions between 1980 and 1989--58 between 1980 and 1989--and between 1990 and 1999 they responded to 192, a remarkable threefold increase. Between 1980 and 1989, they responded to 58 contingencies. But from 1990 to 1999, in that entire decade, it was 192, and that is just for the Navy and Marine Corps alone. During the cold war, the U.N. Security Council rarely approved the creation of peace operations. In fact, it was a relatively rare event. I served on the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives, and I was the ranking member on the Subcommittee on International Operations. We rarely had such contingency operations. In fact, the U.N. implemented only 13 peace operations between 1948 and 1978 and none--none--from 1979 to 1987. However, from 1988 through last year, by contrast, there were 38 peace operations, nearly 3 times as many during the previous 40 years. Madam President, as a former member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and chair of the Seapower Subcommittee, I can attest that the Armed Services Committee has listened to our leaders in uniform testify that our current military forces have been stretched too thin, and that estimates predicted in the fiscal year 1997 QDR underestimated how much the United States would be using its military. Clearly, the benefits of the peace dividend were never truly realized. So, we are seeing first hand that the 1997 QDR force levels underestimated how much our military force was intended to be used, that our military force is beign called upon now more than what military strategies estimated, and that are forces are being stretched to cover a wide range of operations. Keep in mind, Mr. President, that force levels may have to be revisited once again in light of the new anti-terror mission our military faces, and may well require an increase. So would we then go and buy back property that we have given up in future base closure rounds to build new bases--I think not. Madam President, the Department of Defense contends there is 20 to 25 percent excess infrastructure today. Before we legislate defense-wide policy that will reduce the size and number of training areas critical to our force readiness, the Department of Defense ought to be able to tell us, through a comprehensive plan, the level of operational and maintenance infrastructure required to support our shifting national security requirements. Congress, instead, is being pressed to authorized base closures essentially in the dark, without the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review or Future Years Defense Plan. We will have a preliminary QDR in the near future, but it will have to be revised in light of the new threat facing this nation. How can we make fundamental decisions about our infrastructure needs before we even have any guidance from the QDR? In the full committee hearings and the subcommittee hearings that the Armed Services Committee held during the 106th Congress--while I sat on the committee, and chaired the Seapower Subcommittee--the Chief of Naval Operations and fleet commanders testified that the QDR- established force levels were not sufficient to support their operational requirements. A report by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the submarine force levels needed to be raised from the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and I anticipate that the next QDR will support an increase in the Navy force as well. We simply must not take the risk of losing critical infrastructure at this time. Not only have arbitrary comparisons of personnel and infrastructure levels never been the basis for military force structure changes . . . Not only has a direct correlation between force and facility level yet to be established . . . but the Department of Defense has said that the primary criteria for base closure will be military value tied to the forthcomong QDR. But this begs the question as to the validity of the QDR numbers--the 1997 QDR has been heavily criticized for getting the numbers wrong, particularly with regard to Naval fleet size. It could be premature and costly to predicate base closure decsions even on the 2001 QDR, until we knwo for certain what our needs will be as we confront the new terrorist threat. Critical assets such as waterfront property, airspace, and bombing ranges would be far more difficult and expensive to replace then troops, ships, and tanks. Proponents argue that the administration's approach will be based upon military value and removes parochial and political factors from the process, but in reality, the administration's Efficient Facilities Initiative is more similar to past BRAC rounds than one might think. Much has been made of the de-politicization of the process by including ``military value'' and the other criteria in the legislation. However, review of the last process reveals that these criteria are nearly identical to those used in the 1995 round. This is very disturbing, because in my view, the past BRAC rounds were not fair or equitable, and were not based solely on military value. I have been through BRAC before. And I have to say, I know how the criteria can be twisted to the advantage or disadvantage of a given facility. In fact we had not one but two Air Force generals defending the former Loring Air Force Base before a past BRAC commission; yet the Air Force claimed its facilities were ``well below average''--and this despite the fact that $300 million had been spent there over a ten year period to replace our upgrade nearly everything on the base and it ended up being closed on so-called ``quality of life'' issues even though that was never supposed to be part of the criteria. I strongly believe Congress must also consider the economic impact of base closures on communities in light of the uncertainty regarding the nation's economy in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Prior to that date, it was clear that the economy was slowing, perhaps even entering a recession. Today, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the state of the economy in the quarters to come. In August 2001, GAO issued an overview of the status of economic recovery, land transfers, and environmental cleanup in communities that have lost bases during previous BRAC rounds. GAO found that the short term impact of a base closure was traumatic for the surrounding community and that economic recovery was dependent on several factors including the strength of the national economy, federal assistance programs totaling more than $1.2 billion, and an area's natural resources and economic diversity. Keep in mind, Mr. President, this assessment was done during a time of unprecedented economic growth and as GAO stated, the health of the national economy was critical to the ability of communities to adjust: ``Local officials have cited the strong national or regional economy as one explanation of why their communities have avoided economic harm and found new areas for growth.'' GAO also noted: ``Local officials from BRAC communities have stressed the importance of having a strong national economy and local industries that could soften the impact of job losses from a base closure.'' With the slow-down of the economy, and the uncertainty brought about by the recent tragedy, it is doubtful that communities will be able to rebound even to the extent they have in previous years. Indeed, it is vital to note that not every community affected by base closures has fared so well in the past--those in rural areas still experienced above average unemployment and below average per capita incomes. In this vein, I would like to discuss for a moment the issue of the up-front costs involved in the base closure process. This appears to be noticeably absent from the debate. The facts reveal that there are, in fact, billions of dollars in costs incurred to close a base. These costs include over $1.2 billion in federal financial assistance provided to each affected community--a cost paid by the federal government, not through base closure budget accounts, and therefore not counted in the estimates. And more significantly, there is at least a $7 billion environmental cleanup bill so far as a result of the first four BRAC rounds--a conservative figure that will continue to grow, according to a December 1998 GAO report. Indeed, the Department of Defense has admitted that savings would not be immediate; that approximately $10 billion would be needed for up- front environmental and other costs. The Department of Defense also projects that savings from 2003 closures would not materialize until 2007. Advocates of base closure allege that billions of dollars will be saved, despite the fact that there is no consensus on the numbers among different sources. These estimates vary because, as the Congressional Budget Office explains, BRAC savings are really ``avoided costs.'' Because these avoided costs are not actual expenditures and cannot be recorded and tracked by the Defense Department accounting systems, they cannot be validated, which has led to inaccurate and overinflated estimates. The General Accounting Office found that land sales from the first base closure round in 1988 were estimated by Pentagon officials to produce $2.4 billion in revenue; however, as of 1995, the actual revenue generated was only $65.7 million. That's about 25 percent of the expected value. This type of overly optimistic accounting establishes a very poor foundation for initiating a policy that will have a permanent impact on both the military and the civilian communities surrounding these bases. And the GAO has found that, in reality, the majority of land designated as excess in previous BRAC rounds is still in DOD possession. Moreover, GAO reports that environmental cleanup costs have been underestimated. So far, as I mentioned, $7 billion or 32 percent of BRAC-associated costs have been attributed to environmental cleanups. This figure is estimated to increase over $3.4 billion after FY01, $1 billion more than the $2.4 billion originally projected in 1999. Lastly, when and if cost savings materialize, the Department of Defense intends to allow the services to retain savings and use the funding at their discretion. This does not guarantee that any freed up funding will go toward comprehensive modernization or quality of life improvements--one of the arguments employed in favor of the BRAC process. I believe that the Department of Defense has other long term alternatives to base closures that provide savings for important military programs. The 1997 Defense Reform Initiative included actions such as streamlining, paperless contracting, and reduction in staff personnel. These reforms were estimated to lead to approximately $3 billion in savings. The new administration has proposed similar initiatives and efficiency improvements that could generate substantial savings. Madam President, I want to protect the military's critical readiness and operational assets. I want to protect the home port berthing for our ships and submarines, the airspace that our aircraft fly in and the training areas and ranges that our armed forces require to support and defend our Nation and its interests. I want to protect the economic viability of communities in every state. And I want to make absolutely sure that this Nation maintains the military infrastructure it will need in the years to come to support the war on terrorism. We must not degrade the readiness of our armed forces by closing more bases, certainly not at this time. Certainly not without information on our future defense needs that we do not have. Madam President, we say that we are going to have a Quadrennial Defense Review, and at least the preliminary report is expected to be forthcoming this month. Supposedly we predicate our infrastructure and our national security requirements on that report, and I know, having been a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, we listened to our leaders in uniform testify that our current military forces have been stretched too thin and that the estimates in that 1997 QDR, in fact, underestimated how much the United States would be using its military, how much our men and women would be called upon to be involved in contingency operations abroad. They have multiplied. So now we are seeing firsthand, even before September 11, that the forces established in the 1997 QDR underestimated how much our military force was intended to be used, that our military force is being called upon now more than what the military strategies estimated, and that our forces are being stretched to cover a wide range of operations. We know our force levels obviously may have to be revisited once again in light of the new antiterrorism our military faces. The threat that is represented to the United States and our security interests may well require an increase. How do we know exactly what infrastructure we need and where we need it? In hearing after hearing, I implored the Pentagon and the previous administration: Give us your plan, tell us what you think our infrastructure requirements will be, and based on what threats, that we will need to have so many installations and so many locations around the country. That is something we have never received. Now they say they base it on the 1997 QDR report. Well, we know that underestimated the utilization of our military forces. So now why would we want to put in place another base commission closing process, set it on an automatic path, when we have yet to receive the new Quadrennial Defense Review and how that will have to be reevaluated in light of the threat we now face with terrorism? It really does not make any sense. I know the Department of Defense has indicated there is a 20- to 25- percent excess of infrastructure, but I do not know how we have arrived at that excess of this 20 to 25 percent because we have never had a plan. I know this is a new administration, and it is beginning to evaluate it, and obviously an enormous burden has been placed upon it as a result of September 11. Those of us who have been through the four previous rounds, who have been through the experience of this last decade with contingency operation upon contingency operation that has stretched our forces to the maximum--that has had a tremendous impact on their abilities, and they have performed in such a professional and skilled way, even in spite of all of the pressures as a result of doing so much more with less. So I say we have to really draw back. We cannot afford to put this process in an automatic motion for some course in the year 2003 because we have to go back and reexamine exactly what we need and why we need it. What message does it send to those who are deployed or those who are about to deploy, that somehow we are going to be downsizing at home? We might need those bases. I know the Senator from New York mentioned Plattsburgh, that it was a state-of-the-art facility. So too was Loring Air Force Base. It was on the base closing list and was closed in 1991, and we spent a total of $300 million providing every upgrade in that facility. It happened to be a base that was the closest base to Europe, to the Middle East, to Africa, to Russia, but we were told we are in a new era where it is no longer required. How do we really know, when we see the threat that occurred and the tragedy and the enormity of the impact of that attack on September 11? No one could have fully anticipated what has affected the United States and the civilized world. So I think it would be prudent on our part to recede from this predicate that somehow we have excess infrastructure because we really do not know. It is an uncertainty. It is as uncertain as the asymmetric threats that are now prevalent in the world today. So I hope the Senate will support this amendment to strike these provisions because we really do have to reexamine many of the issues that are now prevailing in our world of today. We do not know the validity of what numbers, from which report, will now be applicable in today's world with this threat of terrorism. I know from my own experience, not only with the four previous rounds and the base closing process, but also in terms of underestimating the number of times our men and women would be deployed in other parts of the world, and I know firsthand from the testimony that was provided to my subcommittee when I chaired the Seapower Subcommittee, that our forces were stretched too thin, that we could no longer absorb the demands being placed on us because we were being asked to do so much in so many places around the world. So now, in view of September 11, it is all the more prudent that we begin to examine what we need in America today to provide for our security, an acknowledgment that we have now had an attack on domestic soil that we heretofore did not anticipate in the manner in which this happened. I think we really do have to look very carefully at what our requirements will be in the future, because once these bases are lost, once you lose the waterfront property, once you lose the land, once you lose the access, it is very difficult to retrieve. It is very difficult to be able to create an installation in the manner in which it was established before. Also, we hear about the savings, and there is no doubt we ought to do everything we can to find savings within the Defense Department, as is true with all other budgets, but I have yet to see the methodology that is the rationale for the savings the Defense Department has indicated have been created as a result of the four previous base closing rounds. I know the Defense Department claims there are $15.5 billion in net savings through fiscal year 2001 due to prior base closing rounds, but even in the July 2001 GAO report it indicated there were flaws with that estimate. And I quote: The savings estimates have been infrequently updated, and, unlike for estimated costs, no method or system has been established to track savings on a routine basis. Over time, this contributes to imprecision as the execution of closures or realignments may vary from original plans. That is true. It has been my experience, in examining what potential savings would be derived from these base closings, that they have traditionally underestimated the costs of closing such a base. They overestimated the savings and the benefits that would be yielded as a result of land sales. In fact, they were far below what they had originally estimated. The environmental cleanup costs have been underestimated. So far, $7 billion, or 32 percent, of the BRAC-associated costs have been attributed to environmental cleanups, and this figure is estimated to increase over $3.4 billion after fiscal year 2001. These figures are for base closures already in progress. If another 20 to 25 percent of installations are closed, environmental costs can be expected to skyrocket. Increased costs in environmental cleanup have led to delays in the cleanup process and deferment of land transfer for reuse. This further cripples local communities already hurt by the base closures. There are a number of other issues regarding those savings, and I draw my colleagues' attention to the GAO report ``Military Base Closures, DOD's Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains Substantial'' dated July, 2001. In conclusion, this is not the time to ask this of our communities that would be directly affected by potential closures, the men and women who work at these installations. They have to use their energy, attention, and focus to begin to prepare for the arduous, complex, and burdensome process that we ask of those who are trying to defend these installations. It costs millions of dollars for communities across this country, with the installations at stake. In Maine, for example, a community in Brunswick has already established a committee to begin to reevaluate. Now, in light of September 11, that is not what we should be asking of anyone. We have to absolutely make sure this Nation maintains the military infrastructure it will require in the years to come to support all of our challenges, and certainly this new one, which is the war on terrorism. I hope we will not embark on this process that ultimately could lead to a degradation in terms of the readiness of our Armed Forces, certainly not at this time, not without information on our future defense requirements that we certainly do not have at our disposal at this point. I hope my colleagues will support the Senator from Kentucky in his effort to strike the language that creates this additional process. I thank Senator Lott, our leader, for all of his efforts. I know he has been supportive in making sure this can happen.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Madam President, I am sure I am not alone in finding that one of the more disturbing revelations of the investigation into the September 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon is that over half of the hijackers received flight instruction at American facilities. Investigators have named ten separate flying schools across the United States, from California to Oklahoma to Florida, where the hijacking suspects may have engaged in flight training in one form or another. In addition, it is believed that one of these suspects was able to gain legal entry into the United States through the assistance of a flight school that provided immigration documentation. I know that this ironic turn of events, the schools dedicated to the safety of the airline industry were unwittingly utilized to facilitate the worst airline disaster in history, has school administrators and instructors asking themselves, ``What if . . .'' as they look in the mirror every morning. We need to take action now to remove the doubts of the instructors as well as restore confidence in student pilots engaged in valid training. That is why I am introducing legislation to require thorough background checks on foreign nationals seeking advanced flight or jet aircraft training in American flight schools. At present the Federal Aviation Administration FAA, regulates course content at these schools and does it well, the U.S. has the best training program in the world and pilot certification from the FAA is considered the industry ``gold standard.'' That is why a large number of foreign students are attracted to American schools. And we want to continue to encourage foreign participation at our schools, it assures aviation safety world wide. However, the FAA does not regulate who can participate in pilot training, be it glider plane basics or 757 advanced training. More specifically, the requirement for foreign students is limited to demonstrated English proficiency and proper immigration documentation. Given the events of September 11, it is imperative that the screening process for pilot trainees be improved. As such, the legislation I am introducing today mandates the completion of security checks before foreign nationals may commence advanced jet training. Specifically, by requiring that the Attorney General carry out background investigations on individuals seeking such training, the legislation ensures a comprehensive review against records held by such agencies as the FBI, INS, and DEA will be carried out prior to starting training on any simulator or jet powered aircraft. Also, given the recent tragedies in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania, all foreign nationals currently in training would be required to stop until a satisfactory background check is completed. I want to urge my colleagues to join me in taking this small but critical step to prevent a repeat of unintentionally training those who would terrorize our cities and skies and ask for their support in increasing security requirements for flight training.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Madam President, I am sure I am not alone in finding that one of the more disturbing revelations of the investigation into the September 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon is that over half of the hijackers received flight instruction at American facilities. Investigators have named ten separate flying schools across the United States, from California to Oklahoma to Florida, where the hijacking suspects may have engaged in flight training in one form or another. In addition, it is believed that one of these suspects was able to gain legal entry into the United States through the assistance of a flight school that provided immigration documentation. I know that this ironic turn of events, the schools dedicated to the safety of the airline industry were unwittingly utilized to facilitate the worst airline disaster in history, has school administrators and instructors asking themselves, ``What if . . .'' as they look in the mirror every morning. We need to take action now to remove the doubts of the instructors as well as restore confidence in student pilots engaged in valid training. That is why I am introducing legislation to require thorough background checks on foreign nationals seeking advanced flight or jet aircraft training in American flight schools. At present the Federal Aviation Administration FAA, regulates course content at these schools and does it well, the U.S. has the best training program in the world and pilot certification from the FAA is considered the industry ``gold standard.'' That is why a large number of foreign students are attracted to American schools. And we want to continue to encourage foreign participation at our schools, it assures aviation safety world wide. However, the FAA does not regulate who can participate in pilot training, be it glider plane basics or 757 advanced training. More specifically, the requirement for foreign students is limited to demonstrated English proficiency and proper immigration documentation. Given the events of September 11, it is imperative that the screening process for pilot trainees be improved. As such, the legislation I am introducing today mandates the completion of security checks before foreign nationals may commence advanced jet training. Specifically, by requiring that the Attorney General carry out background investigations on individuals seeking such training, the legislation ensures a comprehensive review against records held by such agencies as the FBI, INS, and DEA will be carried out prior to starting training on any simulator or jet powered aircraft. Also, given the recent tragedies in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania, all foreign nationals currently in training would be required to stop until a satisfactory background check is completed. I want to urge my colleagues to join me in taking this small but critical step to prevent a repeat of unintentionally training those who would terrorize our cities and skies and ask for their support in increasing security requirements for flight training.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of contraceptive coverage for almost 9 million Federal employees and their dependents who receive their health care coverage through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. At a negligible cost, this coverage has been included in the past three Treasury-Postal appropriations bills and is in the House passed bill and as well as the legislation before us today. This provision enjoys broad bipartisan support among members of the Senate as demonstrated by a letter sent by over half of the Members of the Senate to the chairman and the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service and General Government. This contraceptive coverage provision was adapted from legislation I originally authored back in 1997, the bipartisan Equity in Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Act, or EPICC, which currently has 42 cosponsors, and which was the subject of a hearing in the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee on September 10. Throughout this effort, I have had the good fortune of being joined by Senator Reid who has been a partner with me in this effort, and I thank him for his ongoing leadership on this issue. We both agree this is commonsense public policy whose time has long since come. The facts are not in dispute, contraceptives are an essential part of not only a woman's health, but that of her children and her future children. The lack of equitable coverage of prescription contraceptives has a very real impact on the lives of America's women and, therefore, our society as a whole. We took a strong first step towards ending this inequity when, in 1998, we guaranteed access to prescription contraceptive coverage for federal employees. The inclusion of this coverage in FEHBP has saved female enrollees over $1,000 over the past three years, according to the Alan Guttmacher Institute. Not only has the inclusion of this coverage saved our female employees about $350 a year, it has not cost the Federal government anything either. A January 2001 OPM statement on the cost of this coverage for federal employees under the FEHBP found no effect on premiums whatsoever since implementation in 1998. Since it's not often that we can say that, let me repeat it, it has had no effect on costs of health care. In fact, some, like the Alan Guttmacher Institute, argue that improved access to and use of contraception nationwide saves insurers and society money by preventing unintended pregnancies, as insurers generally pay pregnancy-related medical costs, which can range anywhere from $5,000 to almost $9,000. Improved access to contraception would eliminate these costs and would reduce the costs to both employers and insurers. Whenever we talk about contraceptive coverage, the issue of a ``conscience clause'' has continually been raised. I would remind my colleagues that this is a concern we effectively addressed in 1998 and that standard has remained unchanged ever since. I agree that this is a legitimate concern, which is why we found a compromise in order to assuage the concerns of our colleagues who felt that there needed to be a ``conscience clause'' to allow religious plans to opt out of this coverage if their beliefs and tenets are not consistent with this coverage. Originally, we specifically named five health plans that were excluded from having to provide this coverage and allowed ``any other existing or future religious based plans whose religious tenets are in conflict with the requirements'' of this coverage. Three years later, there are only two plans remaining in the FEHB program which do not provide this coverage. That's two out of over 245 participating health plans. While many of my colleagues and I would prefer to have this coverage expanded for all women nationwide, it is essential that we do not rescind this critical health care benefit for women in the FEHB program. And the proponents of the larger legislation, EPICC, are not alone. As recently as June, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington ruled in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Company that an employer's failure to cover prescription contraceptives in its otherwise comprehensive prescription drug plan constitutes gender discrimination, in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This case was the first of its kind, setting a legal precedent as well as bolstering the case for our broader legislation. In turn, the foundation for the district court decision was a ruling by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, or EEOC, last December that an employer's decision to exclude coverage of contraceptives in a health plan that covered other prescription drugs, devices and preventive health care services violated title VII of the Civil Rights Act regarding gender discrimination. Together, these two decisions form a ``one-two'' punch in favor of the approach we advocate today, an approach that's already been endorsed by a total of 16 States, including my home State of Maine-- that have passed similar laws since 1998. Today, another twenty States have contraceptive coverage legislation pending. That's a start, but it's not enough. Not only are these laws limited to state regulated plans, but this piecemeal approach to fairness leaves many American women at the mercy of geography when it comes to the coverage they deserve. Unfortunately, until we can get EPICC passed on its own, you either have to be a member of Congress, a Senator, a Federal employee, or living in one of these states to receive this guaranteed benefit. We believe that contraceptive coverage not only makes sense in terms of the cost of contraceptives for women, but also as a means bridging, at least in some small way, the pro-choice pro-life chasm by helping prevent unintended pregnancies and thereby also prevent abortions. The fact of the matter is, we know that there are three million unintended pregnancies every year in the United States. We also know that almost half of those pregnancies result from just three million women who do not use contraceptives, while 39 million contraceptive users account for the other 53 percent of unintended pregnancies, most of which resulted from inconsistent or incorrect use. In other words, when used properly, contraceptives work. We know that they prevent unintended pregnancies and when we have fewer unintended pregnancies, we will have a reduced need for abortions, and that is a goal each of us can support. I ask my colleagues to continue to support the inclusion of this provision in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program as contained in the Fiscal Year 2002 Treasury-Postal appropriations bill. It is an important benefit and it is in the best interests of women's overall health, their children and their future children's health. Mr. Conrad. Mr. President, I rise to offer for the Record the Budget Committee's official scoring for S. 1398, the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2002. The Senate bill provides $17.118 billion in discretionary budget authority, which will result in new outlays in 2002 of $12.528 billion. When outlays from prior-year budget authority are taken into account, discretionary outlays for the Senate bill total $16.183 billion in 2002. The Senate bill is within its Section 302(b) allocation for budget authority and outlays. Once again, the committee has met its target without the use of any emergency designations. I again commend Chairman Byrd and Senator Stevens, as well as Senators Dorgan and Campbell, for their bipartisan effort in moving this and other appropriations bills quickly to make up for the late start in this year's appropriations process. The tragic events of September 11 demand that this bipartisanship continue and that the Congress expeditiously complete work on the 13 regular appropriation bills for 2002. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table displaying the budget committee scoring of this bill be printed in the Record.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise in support of the joint resolution authorizing the use of U.S. Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent act of war against this Nation, to deter future attacks, and to disable the machinery of terror. With the end of the cold war came the hope of even greater prosperity and freedom for people the world over. That promise has been threatened and attacked in the most vicious and monstrous assault on American soil ever. But make no mistake, it has not been squelched. The forces of evil have had their day. Now, we will have ours. It is no exaggeration to say that this is a defining moment not only for the United States, but for the principles and ideals for which it stands. It comes down to this: Either you stand with those principles and ideals, or you stand against them. Unlike almost any other issue we debate on this floor, this matter is that simple. Either we move to crush those who disregard human life on a massive scale, or we surrender humanity to the hands of madmen. Either we send the message that the world will not be a hostage to terror, or we submit to an infinite cycle of hopeless victimization. That is our choice. It is that simple. But just because the choice is simple does not mean the decision is easy. To the contrary, there is nothing more difficult than committing our troops to a dangerous mission. While we do not yet know what form that mission will be, we know it will require tremendous sacrifice. This is the one vote that not a single one of us ever wants to make, but now we must make. I well remember being in the White House in January of 1991, at a meeting in the Cabinet room to discuss the use of force in the Persian Gulf. During the meeting, the President excused himself to take a call from the Secretary of State on the progress of the talks with the Iraqi foreign minister. When he returned, the look on his face told me the talks had failed. Force would have to be used. I will never forget that moment. I will never forget this moment--none of us will. Winston Churchill, in preparing his nation for the full onslaught of the Axis blitzkrieg, told his fellow countrymen, ``Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duty.'' All of us--here in Washington and throughout the country--must brace ourselves for the duty before us. There will be days of triumph, and days of tears. But in the end, we know that our cause is just, and we know we will prevail. Whoever is responsible for this heinous act against humanity must know the full force of our fury. How tragic it is that we must return suffering for suffering, but we know from the history of human experience that it is a price we must be prepared to pay in defense of liberty. Sadly, from all we know of these faceless cowards, it is the only dialogue they and others like them understand. For them, the language of violence is the only language they speak. For them, the taking of life is the apex of human expression. That is not the world I want for us. That is not the world I want for our children. Terrorism is quite literally a cancer in the body politick, elusive by its nature, insidious in its stealth, and requiring the most early detection and eradication possible. And that is what we intend to do. Either that, or terrorism will destroy the rule of law from the inside out, along with the basic tenets by which we are able to live together and thrive and enjoy ``life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness'' in a civilized society. We must remember that this unprovoked attack was on soil that is American, against ideals that are global. Indeed, two of the very targets themselves, the twin towers of the World Trade Center, were international buildings rooted in U.S. ground. The lives that were lost--American, Australian, British, and countless others--are in a way symbolic of the freedom that was lost not only in the United States, but in countless nations across every hemisphere of the globe. So while we may lead the charge, we do not stand alone. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization to which we have pledged our unyielding support, as well as many other nations beyond those we might consider our traditional and closest allies, will now be there in support of our mission, a mission that ultimately is larger than any one Republic, any one people. In this particular instance, right now, we know not against whom we aim. For that reason, it is all the more important we give the President broad latitude to take whatever action is necessary to punish the perpetrators and help ensure that such a catastrophe never reoccurs. This Joint Resolution grants the President discretion in destroying the soul of whatever organization has jabbed at the heart of democracy. It is a resolution born of necessity, and rooted in precedent. In 1962, when Cuba posed the threat of spreading communism and endangering the security of the United States, Congress approved a joint resolution stating that the United States will use force if necessary to halt the spread of communism in this hemisphere. The resolution declared that the United States was determined to prevent, by whatever means necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States. On January 12, 1991, in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, both houses of Congress passed the ``Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution'', which I supported. The resolution authorized the President to use the U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 to achieve implementation of the earlier Security Council resolutions calling for the repulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. On January 16, former President Bush made the determination required by the Resolution that diplomatic means had not and would not compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. On January 18, he reported to Congress ``consistent with the War Powers Resolution'' that he had directed U.S. forces to commence combat operations. Now, we are faced with the bloodiest attack ever on American soil, the first of this magnitude in this history of the continental United States. This resolution states that the President is ``authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, or harbored such organization or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.'' This resolution, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, is precisely the right course for the Congress to take at this momentous juncture in American history. Our thoughts and prayers are with all the men and women of our Armed Services, who will be at the vanguard of our struggle against whatever evil force has darkened the world. We cannot allow these forces of darkness to take root in the fertile soil of this new century. Rather, the time has come to eradicate terror at its roots. We have no choice if we are to remain the authors of our own destiny, a destiny that has no room for those who would shackle freedom with the twin specters of fear and violence. It is time to unleash the full resources and force and determination of this great nation against this unimaginable evil. This atrocity cannot stand, and let history one day record that it did not stand.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, as did all of my colleagues and all Americans, I woke up this morning with a broken heart but not a broken spirit. The unimaginable and horrific attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was an attack on all Americans and against every freedom- loving nation of the world. Today, our prayers and our deepest sympathies are with the families of those innocent victims who lost their lives, as well as those who were injured in these monstrous tragedies. We can scarcely comprehend the images that have flashed before our eyes over the past 24 hours, but we know that so many of our fellow Americans are grieving for lives cut short and possibilities ended. And so today we grieve as one nation, under God, indivisible. Our hearts are heavy but our resolve is strong. This outrageous attack has reverberated through every level of our society. But let there be no mistake, and let the word go forth from the Halls of Congress and from the White House and from every house across our indomitable Nation that we will find who is responsible, we will hold them accountable, and we will persevere. The soul of this country and the ideals upon which it was built cannot be torn asunder neither by war, nor by assassination, nor by the blunt and bloody instruments of faceless cowards. The forces of darkness have challenged our country's determination before. As we rose to the challenge then, so will we rise at this most solemn of times. Clearly, the attacks on our Nation were coordinated, and they were calculated. Yet clouded by their own twisted fanaticism--whatever brand of fanaticism that may prove to be --the perpetrators of this crime against humanity and the American people failed to understand that ours is a nation in which the principle of individual freedom is exceeded only by our commitment to protect our freedom. The American spirit is stronger than stone and water, tougher than steel and glass, and more enduring than any pain or suffering that can be inflicted on our national conscience. It cannot be collapsed by fire and terror. To the contrary, today we stand united behind our President and the entire leadership of the Congress. Today, solidarity eclipsed politics and partisanship. And this will remain so for every minute of every hour of every day that it takes to right this injustice. We must remain always vigilant but never fearful. We must relentlessly seek justice, and we must do all that is within our power as a free nation to prevent such catastrophic terrorist attacks both at home and abroad. There are events in our lives that will be forever etched on the landscape of our consciousness. We all know where we were and what we were doing at the precise time they happened. As we remember the assassination of President Kennedy and, for many of my colleagues, Pearl Harbor, our children will remember this day. We are angry as a nation, and we have every right to be angry. But now it is time to focus our energies on responsible actions and swift responses when the masterminds are found. Now is also the time to heal and to tend to our neighbors and families and friends. In typical American fashion, heroes rushed to the aid of those in peril, even as the sounds of blasts still echoed across Manhattan and our Nation's Capital. For the unthinkable numbers of people in New York, Virginia, Pennsylvania, military personnel at the Pentagon, passengers on planes from across America, policemen, firefighters, and emergency personnel who gave their lives, their memory will live on with the memory of this tragedy. To the families, our Nation shares in your unspeakable loss. America will never be the same, just as we were forever changed by two World Wars and numerous other conflicts throughout the world. Now terrorism has come to American soil on a scale most dared not imagine. We are changed, but we are far from broken. Ours is a nation born of adversity, forged by perseverance, and defined by our ability to unite against those who would tear us down. We must never forget that some of America's finest hours have followed our darkest days. To whomever is responsible for this tragedy, hear this loud and clear because America speaks with one voice: You will be found. You will be held accountable, and this injustice will not stand. Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today to express my disappointment that funding in the Committee-passed bill that is important to Maine is no longer a reality. While the emergency agriculture assistance bill the Senate passed today provides $2 million for Maine, including $850,000 for a State grant for specialty crops, gone is the possibility of conferees making any decision to reauthorize or extend the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact. Gone is the $5 million for Maine for incentive-based voluntary agriculture conservation programs. Gone is the $270 million for CCC commodity purchases for Northeast specialty crops for the federal nutrition programs, such as wild blueberries, cranberries, and potatoes. Gone is $150 million in Apple Market Loss Assistance, of which $1.6 million would have gone to apple growers in Maine. Gone is the $25 million for disaster payments for the recent devastation from armyworms, some of which would have gone to Maine hay farmers. Gone is the $20 million for fiscal year 2002 for the Senior Nutrition Program, called Senior Farm Share in Maine. This is a program for low income elderly that allows them to obtain shares with which to purchase locally produced produce throughout the growing season. Out of a $5.5 billion package passed by the Senate today, the State of Maine will receive approximately $2 million. I am deeply troubled by the unbalanced and unfair emergency agriculture bills Congress continues to pass that almost totally ignore the farmers in my State of Maine and throughout the Northeast. My votes on this emergency agriculture funding bill reflect my true disappointment that once, again, funding for farmers and rural communities in Maine and the Northeast was left out. As we begin to work on the 2002 farm bill, I hope my colleagues are willing to work with the Northeast Senators to rectify this unbalance and this unfairness. I am also disappointed that the legislation does not include the Dairy Consumers and Producers Protection amendment, which as a free- standing bill is sponsored by 37 of my colleagues from New England and throughout the Mid-Atlantic states and the Southeast. This legislation reauthorizes the very successful Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact. As my colleagues are, by now, no doubt aware, the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact will expire on September 30 of this year if it is not reauthorized by Congress. The compact has unquestionably been of great benefit to preserving our dairy farms, while also assuring consumers a continuous, adequate supply of quality local milk at a stable price . . . saving consumers money overall by helping to stabilize milk prices . . . and generally helping regional economies. In my home State of Maine alone, our 463 dairy farms produce products valued at $100 million, and provide employment for approximately 2,100 Mainers. The compact grew out of the need to address a fundamental problem in the New England dairy farming community--the loss of family dairy farms, which was largely the result of increased production costs, coupled with price volatility in the milk market. Farm milk prices have fallen more than five percent in real dollars since 1985, and New England dairy farmers have struggled with this decline. However, 5 years ago, New England dairy farmers were able to stabilize the effects of this decline when Congress passed the Compact as part of the Freedom to Farm Act, and it was implemented by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Since then, the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact has provided a reliable safety net for small family farmers throughout New England by helping to maintain a stable price for fresh fluid milk on supermarket shelves. Now, I know that one of the chief arguments made by detractors is that the compact is harmful to consumers. The facts, however, tell a different story. For consumers, the compact translates to the addition of a small increment in the price of milk--a recent University of Connecticut study put the cost at 2.5 cents per gallon. Indeed, rather than overcharging New England milk drinkers, the compact has instead resulted in milk prices ranking among the lowest and most stable in the country. And it's no small point that Federal nutrition programs, such as the Women, Infants, and Children Program, or WIC, are held entirely harmless under the Compact. In fact, the advocates of these federal nutrition programs support the compact and serve on its commission. In return, the compact has paid off with lower, more stable dairy prices in New England that more fairly reflect farmers' costs. As testimony proved at the July 25 Judiciary Committee hearing held by Senator Leahy of Vermont, the existence of the Northeast Dairy Compact has had a tremendous, positive impact--without threatening or otherwise financially harming any other dairy farmer in the country. In response to my recent request, the Departments of Agriculture throughout New England sent me data that clearly shows that the compact has slowed the rate of dairy farm reductions in the New England Dairy Compact area. These letters show that in the 3 years prior to the compact's establishment, New England lost 572 dairy farms, compared to 408 farms in the 3 years since its implementation. Even during this period of historic lows in milk prices, 164 fewer farms left the business. How has this worked? Under the compact, whenever the Federal Government's minimum price falls below that of the Northeast Dairy Commission, which administers the compact, dairy processors are required to pay the difference to farmers. Moreover, the compact has given dairy farmers a measure of confidence in the near term for the price of their milk so they have been willing to reinvest in their operations by upgrading and modernizing facilities, acquiring more efficient equipment, purchasing additional cropland and improving the genetic base of their herds. Without the compact, farmers would have been far more hesitant to do these things--if at all--and their lenders would have been much less willing to meet their capital needs. And the compact has protected future generations of dairy farmers by helping local milk remain in the region and preventing dependence on a single source of milk--from outside the region--that can lead to higher milk prices through increased transportation costs, as well as increased vulnerability to natural catastrophes. All this has been accomplished without threatening or otherwise financially harming any other dairy farmer in the country. In fact, more than 97 percent of the fluid milk market in New England is self- contained within the area with strong markets for local milk because of the demand for freshness and high transportation costs to ship milk in from other areas. In short, the compact provides a fairer value for dairy farmers, and protects a way of life important to New England--a win-win situation for everyone involved, at no cost to the Federal Government. Let me repeat--the costs of operating the compact are borne entirely by the farmers and processors of the compact region, at absolutely no expense to the federal government. Moreover, the compact provides environmental benefits through preservation of dwindling agricultural land and open spaces that help to combat the growing problem of urban sprawl, particularly near large cities. As a July 29, 2001 Boston Globe editorial pointed out, ``A wide range of environmental organizations back the compact, seeing it as a defense against the sprawl that often occurs when beleaguered farmers sell out to developers.'' The amendment offered by Senator Specter of Pennsylvania would have permanently authorized the Northeast Compact, as well as giving approval for states contiguous to the participating New England states to join, in this case, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. It would also have granted Congressional approval for a new Southern Dairy Compact, comprised of 14 states--Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. Why did the amendment include all of these States--half the country? The answer is that dairy compacting is really a States rights issue more than anything else, as the only action the Senate needs to take is to give its congressional consent under the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 10, clause 3, to allow the 25 states to proceed with their two independent compacts. Consider 24 other States with Maine's and you have a reflection of all of the Northeast and Southern Compact legislators--and all of their Governors--who have requested nothing more than congressional approval to ``compact''. All of the legislatures in these 25 States, including Maine, have ratified legislation that allows their individual States to join a Compact, and the governor of every State has signed a compact bill into law. Half of the States in this country await our congressional approval to address farm insecurity by stabilizing the price of fresh fluid milk on grocery shelves and to protect consumers against volatile price swings. Altogether, these 25 States make up about 28 percent of the Nation's fluid milk market--New England production is only about three and a half percent of this. This is somewhat comparable to two States of Minnesota and Wisconsin which together make up to 24 percent of the fluid milk market. California makes up another 20 percent. Detractors have also claimed that compacts encourage the over- production of milk, but again, the facts say otherwise. In the nearly four years that the compact has been in effect, milk production in the Compact region has risen by just 2.2 percent or 100 million pounds of milk. In Wisconsin alone, milk production increased by almost 900 million pounds, or 4 percent. Nationally during this identical period, milk production rose 7.4 percent. And finally, those who oppose this compact assert that it discourages trade between compact and non-compact states. To the contrary, dairy compacts require farmers from inside and outside the compact region to receive the compact price. An OMB study found that trade in milk in the compact region actually increased by 8 percent 1 year after the compact was implemented--further, 30 percent of milk sold in the compact region was produced outside the compact region in the State of New York. As we work on the fiscal year 2002 Agriculture appropriations, and the 2002 farm bill, I hope that my colleagues realize that should the Compact Commission be shut down even temporarily while Congress grapples with its extension, it cannot magically be brought back to life again. It would take many months if not a year to restore the successful process that is now in place. I do not want to gamble with this process in such as manner that endangers the livelihoods of the dairy farmers of Maine. During debate on this bill, according to the chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, Mr. Harkin, the compact amendment offered was not germaine to this particular bill. According to the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Kohl, an extensive debate is needed on the compact reauthorization. Since the farm bill is an appropriate vehicle for this debate, I would hope these Senators will work with me to extend the Northeast Compact until such time as the 2002 Farm bill is completed. The bottom line is, the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact has provided the very safety net that we had hoped for when the compact passed as part of the omnibus farm bill of 1996. Mr. President, the Dairy Compact has helped farmers maintain a stable price for fluid milk during times of volatile swings in farm milk prices . . . the consumers in the Northeast Compact area, and now in the Mid-Atlantic area and the Southeast area, have shown their willingness to pay a few pennies more for their milk, none of it at government expense, if the additional money is going directly to the dairy farmer and environmental organizations have supported dairy compacting as a means to help to preserve dwindling agricultural land and open spaces. I urge my colleague not to look success in the face and turn the other way, but to support us for a vote on the compacts that half of our states support. Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that the following material be printed in the Record.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Madam President, I rise today to introduce legislation the Commercial Truck Safety Pilot Program Act to create a safety pilot program for commercial trucks. The Commercial Truck Safety Pilot Program Act would authorize a safety demonstration program in my home state of Maine that could be a model for other states. I have been working closely with the Maine Department of Transportation, communities in my State, and others to address statewide concerns about the existing Federal Interstate truck weight limit of 80,000 pounds. I believe that safety must be the number one priority on our roads and highways, and I am very concerned that the existing Interstate weight limit has the perverse impact of forcing commercial trucks onto State and local secondary roads that were never designed to handle heavy commercial trucks safely. We are talking about narrow roads, lanes, and rotaries, with frequent pedestrian crossings and school zones. I have been working to address this concern for many years. During the 105th Congress, for example, I authored a provision providing a waiver from federal weight limits on the Maine Turnpike the 100-mile section of Maine's Interstate in the southern portion of the State and it was signed into law as part of TEA-21. I have also corresponded with the Department of Transportation and the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee to make them aware of my serious concerns and to urge them to work with me in an effort to address this challenge. In addition, the Maine Department of Transportation is in the process of conducting a study of the truck weight limit waiver on the Maine Turnpike, and I have been working closely with the State in the hopes of expanding this study, which will focus on the safety impact of higher limits, infrastructure issues, air quality issues and economic issues as well, in order to secure the data necessary to ensure that commercial trucks are required to operate in the safest possible manner. Federal law attempts to provide uniform truck weight limits, 80,000 pounds, on the Interstate system, but the fact is there are a myriad of exemptions and grandfathering provisions. The legislation I am submitting today would simply direct the Secretary of Transportation to establish a three-year pilot program to improve commercial motor vehicle safety in the State of Maine. Specifically, the measure would direct the Secretary, during this period, to waive federal vehicle weight limitations on certain commercial vehicles weighing over 80,000 pounds using the Interstate System within Maine, permitting the State to set the limit. In addition, it would provide for the waiver to become permanent unless the Secretary determines it has resulted in an adverse impact on highway safety. I believe this is a measured, responsible approach to a very serious public safety issue. I hope to work with all of those with a stake in this issue, safety advocates, truckers, states, and communities, to address this matter in the most effective possible way, and I hope that my colleagues will join me in this effort.

Mrs. SNOWE

Mrs. SNOWE. Once again, I would like to thank the Subcommittee for its strong support and its willingness to make an effort to address issues of concern to rural states like Maine. Thank you both very much.