Olympia Snowe

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, how much time is remaining on both sides?

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, ninety-nine percent of the ads that were run in that 60-day period mention Federal candidates. They tested the Snowe-Jeffords language. Guess what. Ninety-nine percent were ads that mentioned a Federal candidate. Only 1 percent were genuine issue advocacy ads. They can run all of the ads they want, but they have to disclose.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I want to conclude the debate on the motion to strike that has been offered by my colleague from Ohio by making several points on the Snowe-Jeffords provision. We will conclude the debate tomorrow before the vote. But I think it is critical for my colleagues to understand that the essence of this provision, as the Senator from North Carolina so eloquently stated, the legal rationale for the underpinnings of this amendment, was drafted with an abundance of caution. It was carefully crafted to specifically address the issues that were raised in the Buckley decision in 1976 with respect to the restrictions being either too vague or too broad, and so they in effect would not have a chilling effect on the public's right to free speech. Since that time, as I indicated earlier, in the 25 years or 26 years that have ensued, there has been no other major campaign finance law that has been passed by this Congress or that has come before the Supreme Court because we have not acted. We have not taken any action on campaign finance reform or changes in our campaign finance laws since that time. We have seen the evolution and the eruption of the so-called sham issue ads that supposedly were operating under the guise of being advocacy ads. But in reality, as we all well know, with the studies that have been done recently on the influence and impact they are having on the election because they mention the candidates by name, they come into that very narrow window of 60 days before an election. That is not just happenstance; it is because the election is occurring. They design these ads to mention a candidate and to avoid using those magic words ``for or against'' but knowing full well that it will have an effect on the intended audience on a candidate's election. We are very definitive. We are very specific in the Snowe-Jeffords provision in the McCain-Feingold legislation that is before us. It has to identify. It has to mention a candidate. The ad has to run 60 days before a general election and 30 days before a primary. The ad has to run in a candidate's State or district. Those criteria are very specific, and therefore anybody who has the intention of running those ads will know exactly whether or not they are treading constitutional grounds. That is why 70 constitutional scholars and experts signed a letter in support of these provisions, because they know they don't run afoul of constitutional limitations in the first amendment because it is very specifically drafted to address those issues. Fundamentally, it really comes down to whether or not we are truly interested in disclosure. The Supreme Court said we have a right to disclosure. It is in the public interest. It is a compelling public interest for disclosure. The Supreme Court has said clearly in a number of cases for constitutional purposes that electioneering is different from other speeches. That was handed down as one decision by the Supreme Court in 1986. Of course, in the Buckley case, it said Congress has the power to enact campaign financing laws that extend electioneering through a variety of ways, even though spending in other forms of political speech is entitled to absolute first amendment protection. It said, as an example, to ``vote for'' or ``vote against'' are the magic words but that it was not all-inclusive. The Supreme Court could not possibly have foreseen the evolution of the kinds of ads that are pervading the election process today. They are escaping. They are coming in under the radar of disclosure. We are saying those major donors of $1,000 or more--that is five times the requirement for disclosure that we have to provide as candidates under Federal election laws--but we are saying five times higher before the trigger for disclosure occurs to organizations that run ads in that 60-day window, in the 30-day window in the primary, that mention a candidate because it is clear that the intent is designed to influence the outcome of an election. In Buckley, it said Congress has broader latitude to require disclosure of election-related spending than it does to restrict such spending. Disclosure rules, according to the Court, are the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption. Congress banned corporate union contributions as upheld in United States v. UAW in 1957, reaffirmed, as I said earlier, in the Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce decision in 1990. It is all weighted in sound legal precedent. That is what the Snowe-Jeffords provision is all about. I really do think we have to come to grips with the realities of what is occurring in our elections when 99 percent --99 percent is almost as high as it gets--99 percent of all of the ads that are aired during that period of time before the election mention candidates. And their intent is clear, because all the focus groups that responded to the Snowe-Jeffords provision used that as an analysis and viewed these ads, and identified these ads as being the most influential, negative, and intended to effect an outcome. So that is essentially what we are talking about. I think the vote tomorrow to strike this provision is basically coming down to whether or not we want fundamental reform, if we are willing to take back the process, if we are willing to take back the process as candidates. I want to control my own campaign. As I said in my previous statement, in 1978 when I first ran for the House of Representatives, these phenomena were virtually unknown. It was rare to even have an independent expenditure--and that is another story--under Federal election laws. That is a different thing. But we did not even have that. These elections should be between and among the candidates themselves. Do we really think it is in our interest, in the public's interest, to have organizations of whom we know little, if anything, to influence, to impact, our elections--In fact, to spend more than the candidates themselves in some of these elections? Sometimes these organizations spend more than the candidates themselves who are involved in these elections. Are we saying that that is in our public interest? They hide behind the cloak of anonymity. We do not even know who they are. I have a list here. Some of them we would probably readily identify by name, at least in terms of their interests. But while you do not know most of them, this is a list of 100 organizations. And this is not all of them. This is not all inclusive. But you have the Americans for Hope, Growth & Opportunity, Americans for Job Security, Coalition to Protect Americans Now, Coalition to Protect America's Health Care, Committee for Good Common Sense. Those all sound very appropriate, meritorious, but who are they? Who are they? We are not saying they can't run ads. They can run ads all year long. They can do whatever they want in that sense. But what we are saying is, when they come into that narrow window, we have the right to know who are their major contributors who are financing these ads close to an election. There are no guaranteed rights to anonymity when it comes to campaigning. Even the Supreme Court has said it is in our public interest to have disclosure. In fact, the Court has said time and time again, disclosure is in the public's interest because it gives details as to the nature and source of the information they are getting. That is why 70 constitutional scholars have endorsed the Snowe-Jeffords provision. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this letter from the Brennan Center for Justice printed in the Record.

Ms. SNOWE. They illustrate exceptionally well the legal validity and rationale for this provision. It charts a very narrow course. That is why they have every confidence it will withstand constitutional scrutiny. You hear some who say: Oh, no, it will create a loophole. On the other hand, it creates too many restrictions. Well, which is it? I think we have reached the point in time where we have to stand up and be counted as to whether or not we want to hide behind the guise of anonymity, of organizational anonymity, to shape the direction and influence of these elections. I say that is the wrong direction. The Annenberg Center did a study. It showed, as I said earlier, $100 million was spent in the final weeks of the campaign. And guess what. They mentioned a candidate by name. They mentioned a candidate by name. That is no coincidence. It had nothing to do with influencing the issue agenda because, as I showed on a chart earlier, what was happening in Congress and what was happening out in the elections was not parallel. The ads run by these organizations tracked the ads run by candidates and had nothing to do, virtually speaking, with what Congress was addressing at that point in time. So that is why this legislation becomes so important. It is an integral part of the reform that is before us embodied in the McCain- Feingold legislation. It does represent a balanced approach. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have a statement by persons who have served the American Civil Liberties Union printed in the Record.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, every previous president of the ACLU has endorsed this legislation. They uphold it. As we know, they are an organization apt to take either side to preserve the freedom and the right to speak. But they believe this meets the constitutional soundness as crafted in previous decisions by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not say forever and a day you could never pass any other legislation to address what might develop. As I said, the Court could not possibly foresee 25 years later the emergence and the preponderance of the kind of ads that are clearly overtaking the process. The time has come, I say to my colleagues in the Senate, to recognize we have to stand up and be counted on this very significant issue. And it comes down to disclosure. It comes down to disclosure. I hope the Senate will stand four-square behind disclosure and sunlight and against the unchecked process of these electioneering ads that are certainly transforming the political landscape in ways that we could not possibly desire or embrace. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Connecticut for yielding me some time to address some of the issues that have been raised by the amendment and the motion to strike by our colleague from Ohio, Senator DeWine. I urge this body to oppose that motion to strike the provisions known as the Snowe-Jeffords provision. A vote to strike these provisions is essentially a vote against comprehensive reform. A vote against this provision is a vote against balanced reform. A vote against this provision is a statement that we are only willing to tackle part-- albeit a vital part--of the problem that is confronting the political system of today. The other part of the problem that we seek to address through these provisions is the glut of advertisements in elections--close to election time, close to election day--that seek to influence the outcome of Federal elections. So there is no disclosure. We have no disclosure. We do not know who is behind those advertisements. Yet they are very definitively influencing the outcome of Federal elections. To illustrate the amount of advertising, you only have to look at what has happened since 1995-1999, when $135 million to $150 million was spent on these types of commercials. Now in the election of 2000, over $500 million was spent. Is everybody saying it does not matter? That we should not know who is behind these types of commercials that are run 60 days before the election, 30 days before a primary, whose donors contribute more than $1,000? Are we saying it does not matter to the election process? Are we saying we do not care? I know the Senator from Ohio is saying these provisions are unconstitutional. I would like to make sure my colleagues understand that this provision was not developed in a vacuum. It was developed with more than 70 constitutional experts, along with Norm Ornstein, a reputable scholar associated with the American Enterprise Institute. They looked at the constitutional and judicial implications of the Buckley v. Valeo decision back in 1976. They crafted this type of approach, which carefully and deliberately avoids the constitutional questions that my colleague, the Senator from Ohio, suggests may be raised. First of all, we designed a provision to address the concerns that were raised in the 1976 Buckley decision about overbroad, vague types of restrictions on the first amendment. So what we said was that we have a right to know who is running these ads 60 days before a general election when the group has spent more than $10,000 in a year and whose donors have contributed more than $1,000 to finance these election ads--over $550 million of which were run in the election of 2000, more than three times the amount that was spent in the election of 1996. We also went on to say that unions and corporations would be banned from using their treasury money financing these ads when they mention a candidate 60 days before a general election or 30 days before a primary. Again, there is a basis in law extending back to 1907, when we had the Tillman Act passed by Congress that banned the participation of corporations in elections and, in 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act that prohibited unions from participating directly in Federal elections. This amendment and provision is building upon those decisions that were made by Congress that have been upheld by the Court. In fact, the most recent decision of 1990, Austin v. Chamber of Commerce, is again upholding those decisions in the prohibition of the use of corporations participating in Federal elections. That is what we have done. That is what we sought to do when designing this amendment. Are we saying these ads do not make a difference? We have seen and examined a number of studies over the last few years that talk about the influence of these ads on elections. What have we determined? No. 1, and I guess it is not going to come as a surprise to this audience which has participated in election after election and have seen these ads, but more than 95 percent of the ads that are run in the last 2 months, the last 60 days of the election, mention a candidate; 94 percent of those ads are seen as attempting to influence the outcome of an election. They mention a candidate's name. Virtually all the ads that are run in the last 60 days mention a candidate's name. Don't we have the right to know who is running those ads, who is supporting those ads, who is financing those ads? Yes. The Supreme Court has said it is permissible for Congress to have this requirement. It is in our interest. We have the right. It is not just the right to free speech. It is similar to other restrictions that have been incorporated in Federal election laws. Ninety-five percent of the ads that are run for the final 2 months of an election mention a candidate. The worst thing when organizations run these types of ads is that they mention a candidate by name 60 days before an election. We have the right to know who the $1,000 donors are. We are also saying that unions and corporations would be banned from running those types of ads using their treasury money when they are mentioning a Federal candidate the last 60 days because of preexisting law that has stood for almost a century and has been upheld by the Federal court. The next chart shows that, again, 94 percent have spots during the 2 months before the election making a case for a candidate. Again, we are entitled to know who is behind those types of advertisements. We have the right to know. The public has the right to know because they are playing a key role. We had a number of studies that examined the impact of these ads. First of all, it wouldn't come as a surprise to this audience once again that 84 percent of the ads that were aired in the last 2 months of a Federal election were attack ads. They were negative. And they mentioned a candidate's name. Again, we are saying we have the right to know. The Supreme Court will uphold our right to know and the public's right to know. This is sunlight; it is not censorship. In this next chart, only 1 percent of the ads were true issue advocacy ads. In the final 2 months of an election, 99 percent identified a candidate by name. They were attack ads. Only 1 percent would be construed as being legitimate issue advocacy ads. For example, on an ad that would say, ``Call your Senator on an issue that is before Congress,'' they would still have that right. If they identified a candidate by name, however, they would be required to disclose. On this chart we see the relationship between TV ads and the congressional agenda. We are trying to make distinctions between true issue advocacy ads and election ads. That is what this Snowe-Jeffords provision does. It is carefully crafted to make sure we have a narrow provision identifying the time period of 60 days and 30 days. We ban only union and corporation money. So the entities know which provisions affect them in the election. Then we also require disclosure of those donors who contribute more than $1,000 to organizations that run ads that mention a candidate in the 60-day window. Again, groups or individuals will know exactly what is permissible and what is not and whether or not they would be running afoul of the law. That is what the Supreme Court said--that it not result in an overly broad or vague provision to ultimately have a chilling effect on the constitutional right of freedom of speech. That is why this provision was so narrowly and carefully drawn, with constitutional experts examining each and every provision. Look at the relationship between TV ads and congressional agenda. In the last 60 days we do a lot here in Congress before an election. So you are going to affect organizations' abilities to talk about those issues in their ads. Guess what. All the ads, virtually speaking, run by these organizations that mention or identify a candidate in that 60- day window parallel the ads that are run by the candidates themselves. In the lower line at the bottom, which is the line that reflects the issues being debated in Congress, you can see that there is virtually no parallel between what we are discussing in Congress and the ads that are being run by organizations in that 60-day window. They parallel the ads with a candidate's ad, which again reflects one thing--that these ads are designed to influence the outcome of an election. There was a study of just 735 media markets in this last election. Guess what. One hundred million dollars was spent in the last 2 weeks of the election on advertisements that identified a Federal candidate by name in that 60-day period--in fact, in that 2-week period. I think the public deserves the right to know who is financing those ads and who is attempting to affect the outcome of an election given the amount of money that has been invested in these types of commercials. As I said, it was three times the amount in the last election compared to the 1996 election. They are ultimately engulfing the political process. In some cases, these organizations, whether they exist in the State in which they are running these ads or not, are having a greater impact than the ads the candidates run themselves. It may come as a surprise to you that in the focus group that examined the Snowe-Jeffords provision and looked at the ads that were run in that 60-day period--guess what--they didn't even see the candidate's ads being the ones that influenced the outcome of a Federal election. They saw these so-called sham ads as the ones that influenced the outcome of a Federal election. I think we need to take this step. It is a limited step; it is not a far-reaching step.

Ms. SNOWE. May I have an additional 2 minutes?

Ms. SNOWE. The time is controlled by whom?

Ms. SNOWE. I will yield to the Senator from Arizona. He needs 4 minutes. Can we have 10 minutes?

Ms. SNOWE. I yield to the Senator from Arizona.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I thank Senator McCain for his words regarding these provisions and for underscoring the importance and the significance and the meaning of the Snowe-Jeffords provision as outlined in the McCain-Feingold legislation. The preponderance of these ads in the political process has to be disturbing to each and every one of us, not to mention the American people. That is what it is all about and what we need to address. How can we say we are going to allow these so-called sham ads to go unchecked? How are we going to say to the American people that somehow they or we do not have a right to know who is financing these ads? As Senator McCain indicated, even candidates now, who already come under the Federal election laws, do not use the magic words ``vote for'' or ``against'' because what has become most effective is not using those magic words to get the point across. That is why all of these organizations have taken to running ads because they know what is more effective and more influential. In every focus group and study group that has been conducted over the last few months, to take the Snowe-Jeffords provisions and use them in a focus group, to see what the response was of the individuals included in that group--guess what--they were most influenced by those organizational ads that mention a candidate by name but do not use those magic words. The Supreme Court said there isn't one single permissible route to getting where we are going in terms of restrictions and changes in election laws. And the fact is, since 1976, Congress has not passed a law concerning campaign financing, has not sent any law to the Court because we have not passed anything in the last quarter of a century. So it has no guidepost. But the Court was addressing in 1976 what was happening in 1976. We well know what has changed and transpired in over a quarter century. We have seen the kind of development and evolution of these ads that has taken a very disturbing trend and change in the election process. I hope we defeat the motion to strike by my colleague, the Senator from Ohio, because truly we are getting at a very serious problem that has characterized the political process in a way that does not engender confidence in the American people. These ads are intended to affect an election. They are overwhelmingly negative. Ninety-nine percent mention a candidate in that 60-day window. Are we saying that we should allow them to go unchecked? I say no. I know the Supreme Court will uphold this provision because in analyzing every decision since and in analyzing what the Court had said even previously, this is not treading on the constitutional rights of those who are willing to express themselves. This is a monstrosity that has evolved in terms of the so-called sham ads that are having a true impact on our election process in a way that I do not think the Supreme Court could foresee back in 1976, and we, as candidates, could not possibly envision. I ran for Congress in 1978. No one heard of these ads. Independent expenditures were even rare at that moment in time. What has happened in the election process has taken place in the last few years. Those expenditures have tripled in these types of advertisements that are having a true impact on elections. That is what we are talking about. I have a chart that shows the degree to which the ads were intended to influence your vote. The candidates' ads are less influential than these ads to which we are referring in the Snowe-Jeffords amendment. They have more influence in the overall election than the candidates' ads. We do have a right to know. We are talking about disclosure. The Supreme Court will uphold that view that, yes, the public does have a right to know. These provisions are not chilling first amendment rights. People will have very defined guidance under these provisions that would inform any group, any individual who has an intention of running these types of advertisements. Norman Ornstein, who was instrumental in developing this provision, along with numerous constitutional experts, spoke in a column recently. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

Ms. SNOWE. He said: The court rejected as overly broad the 1974 Congressional decision to include in its regulatory net any communication ``for the purpose of influencing'' a federal election. Instead, the court drew a line between direct campaign activities, or ``express advocacy,'' and other political speech. The former could be regulated, at least in terms of limits on contributions; the latter had greater first amendment protection. How to define express advocacy? The High Court in a footnote gave some suggestions to fill the resulting vacuum and to define the difference between the two kinds of advocacy. Express advocacy, the justices said, would cover communications that included words such as ``vote for,'' ``vote against,'' ``elect'' or ``defeat.'' The residual category included ``issue'' advocacy. The court did not say that the only forms of express advocacy are those using the specific words above. Those were examples. Now we hear the only way we can have these ads covered is if they use those magic words. As Norman Ornstein is saying in his column, the Court was citing examples back in the Buckley v. Valeo decision in 1976. He went on to say, the fundamental reality is that Congress had been essentially silent on campaign finance reform since it spoke in 1974. Buckley v. Valeo is in effect law of the land because Congress has not superseded it by filling the vacuum in the quarter century that followed. If Congress acted, the Supreme Court would give its due deference. The lines Congress drew in 1974 were not within constitutional bounds. But other lines, different from Congress' in 1974 and the court's in Buckley, can be, especially if Congress makes clear its views are based on both careful deliberation and strong empirical evidence.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I hope my colleagues will vote against the motion to strike that has been offered by our colleague from Ohio. It would remove a fundamental provision in the legislation before us. We cannot have comprehensive reform without addressing this egregious development that has occurred in the election process.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today, together with Senator McCain, to introduce the Individual Fishing Quota Act of 2001 which will address one of the most complex policy questions in fisheries management, individual fishing quotas, IFQs. This bill will amend the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act to authorize the establishment of new individual quota systems after October 1, 2002. Last year, I introduced legislation to reauthorize the Magnuson- Stevens Act and extend the existing moratorium on new IFQ programs for three years. Congress ultimately extended the moratorium for two years through fiscal year 2002. The combination of the moratorium extension and the IFQ Act of 2001 will provide fishermen and fisheries managers time to prepare for the possibility of using IFQs as a management option. This legislation will in no way whatsoever force IFQs upon any regional management council. This is not a mandate to use IFQs. Rather, it is intended to provide the councils with an additional conservation and management tool after the existing moratorium expires. IFQ programs can drastically change the face of fishing communities and the fundamental principles of conservation and management. Therefore, this legislation needs to be developed in a careful and meaningful manner. Accordingly, introduction of this bill is intended to begin the dialogue on the possibility of new IFQ programs. I fully anticipate that we will hear from many stakeholders to help the Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries shape and re-shape this bill as necessary. I look forward to participation by all impacted groups as we move this bill through the legislative process. The IFQ Act of 2001 sets conditions under which fishery management plans, FMPs, or plan amendments may establish a new individual fishing quota system. The bill ensures that any council which establishes new IFQs will promote sustainable management of the fishery; require fair and equitable allocation of individual quotas; minimize negative social and economic impacts on local coastal communities; ensure adequate enforcement of the system; and take into account present participation and historical fishing practices of the relevant fishery. Additionally, the bill requires the Secretary of Commerce to conduct referenda to ensure that those most affected by IFQs will have the opportunity to formally approve both the initiation and adoption of any new individual fishing quota program. This bill authorizes the potential allocation of individual quotas to fishing vessel owners, fisherman and crew members who are citizens of the United States. The legislation does not allow, however, individual quotas to be sold, transferred or leased. In addition, participation in the fishery is required for a person to hold quota. Acknowledging the possibility that undue hardship may ensure, the bill allows for the suspension of the transferability requirements by the Secretary on an individual case-by-case basis. Moreover, this bill permits councils to allocate quota shares to entry-level fisherman, small vessel owners, or crew members who may not otherwise be eligible for individual quotas. In 1996, Congress reauthorized the Magnuson-Stevens Act through enactment of the Sustainable Fisheries Act, SFA. The SFA contained the most substantial improvements to fisheries conservation since the original passage of the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 1976. More specifically, the SFA included a five year moratorium on new IFQ programs and required the National Academy of Sciences, NAS, to study and report on the issue. As a result, the NAS issued a report which contained a number of recommendations to Congress addressing the social, economic, and biological aspects of IFQ programs. The first recommendation was for Congress to lift the existing moratorium on new IFQ programs and authorize the councils to design and implement new IFQs. The IFQ Act of 2001 specifically incorporates certain recommendations of the NAS report and provides councils with the flexibility to adopt additional NAS or other recommendations. Mr. President, as with other components of fisheries conservation and management, there is no ``one-size-fits- all'' solution to IFQ programs. Therefore, this bill sets certain conditions under which IFQs may be developed, but at the same time, it clearly provides the regional councils and the affected fishermen with the ability to shape any new IFQ program to fit the needs of the fishery, if such a program is desired. Over the past one and a half years, the Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries traveled across the country and held six hearings on the reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. We began the process in Washington, DC, and then visited fishing communities in Maine, Louisiana, Alaska, Washington, and Massachusetts. During the course of those hearings, we heard official testimony from over 70 witnesses and received statements from many more fishermen during open microphone sessions at each field hearing. The Subcommittee heard the comments, views and recommendations of federal and state officials, regional council chairmen and members, other fisheries managers, commercial and recreational fishermen, members of the conservation community, and many others interested in these important issues. Additionally, the 26th annual Maine Fishermen's Forum held a very informative all-day workshop on IFQs on March 1, 2001. The IFQ Act of 2001 incorporates many of the suggestions we heard from those men and women who fish for a living and those who are most affected by the law and its regulations. Unfortunately successful fisheries conservation and management seems to be the exception and not the rule. The decisions that fishermen, regional councils and the Department of Commerce make are complex and often depend on less than adequate information. It is incumbent upon the Congress to provide the many interested stakeholders with the ability to make practical and informed decisions. At a later date, I will introduce additional legislation to amend the Magnuson-Stevens Act to address the fundamental problems in fisheries management--a lack of funding, a lack of basic scientific information, and enhanced flexibility in the decision-making process. But today, I introduce the IFQ Act of 2001 to begin the dialogue on new individual fishing quota programs, the most significant policy question in fisheries management. Clearly, I do not presume to offer a perfect solution to a complex and emotional concept. However, it is my intent to resolve this issue after appropriate debate and consideration by the Commerce Committee and the U.S. Senate. I look forward to and expect the full participation of those Senators who have expressed interest in this issue in the past and those who may be new to the debate. I ask unanimous consent that the test of the bill be printed in the Record.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, today I am submitting a concurrent resolution, also sponsored by Senator Mikulski, which calls for a United States effort to end the restrictions on the freedoms and violations of the human rights of the enclaved people in the occupied portion of Cyprus. I have introduced this legislation in the past, and I regret that these concerns are still with us. In the 106th Congress, my resolution garnered 36 cosponsors, more than one-third of the U.S. Senate. I am aware that developments on Cyprus are not known to most Americans. Yet if I were to tell them that a small nation has had part of its land illegally occupied by a neighboring state for over a quarter of a century, I know they would share my outrage. The 26 years since the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus have seen the end of the cold war, the collapse of the USSR, free elections in South Africa and a reunited Germany. Yet while the line through the heart of Berlin is gone, the line through the heart of Cyprus remains. Over a quarter of a century ago, Turkey's brutal invasion drove more than 200,000 Cypriots from their homes. Turkey still controls about one-third of the island of Cyprus and maintains about 30,000 troops there. There remains, in northern Cyprus, a small remnant of 428 enclaved Greek-Cypriots and 165 Maronites. The reason they are referred to as the enclaved of Cyprus is that during the fighting in 1974 they mostly resided in remote enclaves and therefore were not able to flee the fighting and thus were not immediately expelled. I believe that this resolution is important in serving to bring to the attention of the American people and the world community, the hardships and restrictions endured by these enclaved individuals. In 1975, representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities agreed that the Greek-Cypriots in the northern part of the island were to be given every help to lead a normal life. Twenty-six years later this is still not the case. The presence of the Turkish-Cypriot police in the lives of the enclaved Greek-Cypriots is constant and represents an aggravated interference with their right to respect their private and family life and for their home. Human rights violations and deprivations include: restrictions and formalities on their freedom of movement; the impossibility of preserving their property rights upon their departure or death; the unavailability of access to Greek Cypriot press; an insufficient number of priests; and the difficulties in continuing their children's secondary education. What I just cited are the 1999 findings of the European Commission of Human Rights in the case of Cyprus against Turkey which is currently before the European Court of Human Rights. Overall, the Commission found that the enclaved ``have been subjected to discrimination amounting to degrading treatment.'' On January 22, 1990, Turkey recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and although there has been no ruling, these findings by the Commission illustrate the dire situation which exists. Going back to 1995, the situation was studied then too, with equally compelling findings. This report on the conditions of the enclaved by the UN Secretary General stated that, ``the Review confirmed that those communities were the objects of very severe restrictions, which curtailed the exercise of many basic freedoms and had the effect on ensuring that, inexorably with the passage of time, those communities would cease to exist in the northern part of the island.'' The UN expressed its concerns and made recommendations for remedial actions by the Turkish-Cypriot regime. As an example of the situation there, I will state what two of the recommendations were. The simplicity of them speaks volumes. They are: (1) ``All restrictions on land travel within the northern part of Cyprus should be lifted'', and (2) ``Restrictions on hand-carried mail and newspapers should be lifted'' These are basic rights to us, but something to be desired and wished for by the enclaved. In addition, the State Department's Human Rights Report for 2000 recently released states that the Turkish-Cypriot regime ``continued to restrict freedom of movement''. As a result of this review, very minor relaxation of restrictions on the freedom of movement of the enclaved were introduced in 1996, but all the other recommendations have not been implemented. Some new telephone lines were also installed in the Karpas and Kormakiti areas but the overseas charges imposed make it impossible to use for communication with relatives in the Government controlled area. The numbers of the enclaved continue to decrease and education is one reason. No Greek language educational facilities for the Greek-Cypriot and Maronite children exist beyond the elementary level. Parents are forced to choose between keeping their children with them or sending them to the south for further education. If a child is sent for further education they are no longer permitted to return permanently to their homes. I am aware that on May 4, 2000, the Turkish occupation regime announced measures to ease restrictions in order to improve the living conditions of the enclaved. For example, it was announced that Greek- Cypriots and Maronites who wish to visit their relatives in the occupied areas will be allowed to stay for a reasonable length of time after obtaining the necessary permit. What was instituted was that the relatives of the enclaved when visiting can stay in the occupied areas for three days and two nights instead of the two days and one night that was the case in the past. One restriction that was eased in may was that the enclaved may bring their spouses to reside with them and the Greek-Cypriot marriage certificates will be recognized as proof of marriage. Amazingly, this previously required special permission which was difficult to obtain. This situation calls out for justice. By bringing these human rights violations to the attention of the American people, it is my hope, that we can bring the plight of these people to the World's attention. My resolution urges the President to undertake efforts to end the restrictions on the freedoms and human rights of the enclaved people. I will remain actively involved in this issue until their rights and freedoms are restored. This is the least we can do for these people. While this resolution addresses the plight of the enclaved people of Cyprus, work must not cease on efforts to bring about a withdrawal of Turkish forces and a restoration of Cyprus' sovereignty over the entire island with the full respect of the rights of all Cypriots. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this legislation.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. I appreciate what the Senator is trying to do with respect to the language. I hope we can defer in terms of the impact and what effect it would have on the overall language in Snowe-Jeffords. We are concerned about being substantially too broad and too overreaching. The concern that I have is it may have a chilling effect. The idea is that people are designing ads, and they need to know with some certainty without inviting the constitutional question that we have been discussing today as to whether or not that language would affect them as to whether or not they air those ads. That is why we became cautious and prudent in the Senate language that we included and did not include the Furgatch for that reason because it invites ambiguity and vagueness as to whether or not these ads ultimately would be aired or whether somebody would be willing to air them because they are not sure how it would be viewed in terms of being unmistakable and unambiguous. That is the concern that I have. In terms of severability, again, I would like to know whether or not, in the Senator's view, the Court would consider that idea of having layers of criteria, and if you do and say it is severable, in the meantime there may have been an impact or a deterrent to individuals or groups airing ads that are considered to be legitimate, but weren't certain because of the ambiguity of the language that you are seeking to insert in McCain-Feingold.

Ms. SNOWE. Will the Senator yield?

Ms. SNOWE. Thank you. I thank the Senator from Tennessee and I will be glad to respond to the Senator from Delaware. In drafting this language, we attempted, obviously, to draw a very bright line, building upon the Buckley v Valeo decision back in 1976, that was issued by the Supreme Court. At that time, the Supreme Court was obviously responding to the law that was on the books that was passed by Congress in 1974. And it used as examples the words, ``vote for or against'' as ways in which to define express advocacy. Obviously that decision, nor their suggestions for examples, weren't limited and Congress since that time has not passed legislation with respect to campaign finance. So, therefore, there is nothing for the Supreme Court to react to. So we looked at the various Court decisions and decided that the way in which we can carefully calibrate legislation that would allow for disclosure and would require disclosure--and banning advertisements by unions and corporations within that 60-day period before a general election, 30-day period before the primary--would be a way of avoiding any constitutional questions. And that bright line is referring to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office, that this communication is done 60 days before the general, 30 days before the primary.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. I thank the Chair. I thank Senator Feingold for yielding me this time. I rise today in support of the McCain-Feingold legislation to reform our system of campaign financing in America. First, I applaud the sponsors of this legislation, Senators McCain and Feingold, for their courage and their remarkable commitment to the cause of campaign finance reform. Their determination on this issue has been nothing short of extraordinary, if not legendary, and it can truly be said that we would not be here today debating this issue if it were not for their leadership. Both have gone to the mat time and time again for this cause, and I commend them for bringing us to this day. We have certainly tried to start down the road to reform on a number of occasions during my 6-year tenure in the Senate. Unfortunately, those roads proved to be procedural dead-ends. I thank the leadership for scheduling this time and for committing to an open process by which we can have real debate and, at the end, I hope real reform. This could truly be our moment. This could be a tremendous time that people will point to in the future when we turned the corner on this issue and made substantive changes that will make a real and positive difference in the way campaigns in this country are funded. When one stops and thinks about it, it is remarkable that the last time there were major changes to Federal election law were amendments passed to the existing laws in 1979. In 1979, disco was in the nightclubs, President Carter was in the White House, and some of the staff we have working in our offices were not even born yet. It has been a long time in coming. There is little question that there is a strong sense that campaigns in this country have spiraled out of control. There is a strong sense that elections are no longer in the hands of individual Americans. As the old saying goes, perception becomes nine-tenths of reality, and the reality is we have a system in need of overhaul. Soft money totals doubled since the 1998 elections, with a total of over $1 billion in soft money for the 2000 elections. In fact, in 1980, when soft money really came into being, Republicans and Democrats combined raised an estimated $19 million, according to Colby College political science professor Anthony Corrado. Two decades later, that total had ballooned to more than $487 million. This is money that is skirting around the edges of Federal campaign finance law, and I support the soft money ban contained in the McCain-Feingold legislation. The fact is, this is money that was never intended to help Federal candidates for office. It was intended to help build the strength of parties, which is a goal I support. But what we have seen is a veritable flood of money being given without limits that is very much influencing our Federal elections. What the public sees is a system by which access and influence is gained through the size of a check, not the weight of an argument. At the same time we address the soft money issue, I also think it is critical that we address the ever burgeoning segment of electioneering popularly known as sham issue advertising. We do so in a way carefully constructed as to pass constitutional muster. I am speaking of advertisements influencing the Federal elections in this country but get off scot-free when it comes to any degree of disclosure or any degree of prohibitions normally associated with campaigning. Let there be no mistake. The record I intend to outline will show these advertisements constitute campaigning every bit as much as any advertisements run by candidates themselves or any ad currently considered to be express advocacy and therefore subject to Federal election laws. I thank my colleague from Vermont, Senator Jeffords, for his tireless work. It has been a privilege to work with him and champion the cause. I express my appreciation to the sponsors of this bill for including this provision in the McCain-Feingold ban of soft money. This is a critical component and critical element of the overall problems we are confronting in modern-day elections. I have spoken of the exploding phenomenon of the so-called issue advertising in elections. That phenomenon continues unchecked and will continue unchecked if we turn a blind eye to reality. I am talking about broadcast advertisements that are influencing our Federal election, in the overwhelming number of instances designed to influence our Federal elections, and yet no disclosure is required and there are none of the funding source prohibitions that for decades have been placed on other forms of campaigning. These are broadcast ads on television and on radio that masquerade as informational or educational but are really stealth advocacy ads for or against candidates. They must be doing a very good job because there are more and more of them all the time. That is the trend. According to a 2001 report from the Annenberg Public Policy Center, which has been studying this trend almost since its inception--particularly since the 1996 election cycle which is where we saw a dramatic change and transformation toward this trend in elections--in the past three cycles we have seen the spending on these issue ads go from $150 million in 1996 to $340 million in 1998 to $500 million in the year 2000 election. In a very short period of time the spending for these issue ads that go below the radar--in other words, they don't require the kind of disclosure, the kind of restrictions that other forms of expenditures on advertisements require--has gone from $135 million in 1996 upwards of $500 million, half a billion in the election of the year 2000. In a very short period of time we have seen a dramatic growth in the expenditures on these types of ads. As detailed by a 2001 report entitled ``Dictum Without Data: The Myth of Issue Advocacy and Party Building,'' written by David Magleby at the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy at Brigham Young University: The broadcast advertising, used by labor and then copied by business organizations in 1996, unleashed a new dimension of electioneering . . . Permitting electioneering through issue advocacy to continue is an open invitation to individuals and groups to avoid disclosure requirements and contribution limits. That is the essence of what we are talking about. We are talking about disclosure. We are talking about sunlight, not censorship. We are talking about the public's right to know. We are talking about citizens making informed decisions about the quality and sources of the information they receive from messages that are influencing their votes. How does the Snowe-Jeffords provision address this issue? It is simple and straightforward. First, we require disclosures on groups and individuals running broadcast ads within 30 days of a primary, 60 days before a general election that mention the name of a Federal candidate or show a likeness of a Federal candidate. The disclosure threshold is $1,000 for each individual donor for that organization that sponsors such an ad that runs in that window, 60 days before a general election, that mentions a Federal candidate. That $1,000 trigger is five times the contribution amount that candidates are required to disclose. We create a higher threshold, a $1,000 donation to any organization that engages in this kind of advertising 60 days before a general election and 30 days before primary. Second, it prohibits the use of union, of corporation treasury money, to pay for these ads, in keeping with longstanding provisions of law. As the next chart shows, corporations have been banned from directly participating in Federal elections since 1907. That is not a dramatic change in law. It has been that way for virtually a century. The same is true when it comes to labor unions' direct participation in making political contributions to elections. They have been prohibited since 1947. Both of these prohibitions have been in law for a very long period of time. The law said in 1947, when it came to the Taft-Hartley Act, when it came to unions, it is unlawful for any national bank or any corporation organized by the authority of any law of Congress to make contributions or expenditures in connection with any election to political office. That is what it comes down to. It is clear; it is common sense; it is constitutional; it is not speech rationing but informational, information that the public has the right to know. Indeed, there is nothing in this provision that bans any form of speech. We are saying if an organization or an individual spends more than $10,000 per year on broadcast ads, you cannot use union or corporation money. That is the only ban on anything in this amendment. If you do decide to engage in that kind of advertising, you have to disclose who is bank rolling the ads if you donate more than $1,000. You have to disclose the identity of the organization and the donor. We are not requiring every group to disclose entire membership lists, only the major sponsorships of these advertisers because it tells us something about the message being sent. We developed this approach in consultation with noted congressional scholars and reformers such as Norm Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute; Joshua Rosenkrantz, director of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU; and Daniel Ortiz, John Allan Love Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law. This provision is narrowly and carefully crafted and based on the precept that the Supreme Court has made clear that for constitutional purposes, campaigning--make no mistake about what these ads do; these are campaign ads; they are not issue advocacy ads--is different from other speech. It is built upon the bedrock of legal and constitutional principles extending current regulations cautiously and only in the areas in which the first amendment is at its lowest threshold. We will hear a lot of statements throughout the next 2 weeks about the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Buckley vs. Valeo, arguing if an ad is not what is known as express advocacy, if it does not include the so-called magic words such as ``vote for candidate X'' or ``vote against candidate X'' then we cannot impose disclosure requirements and we cannot place source restrictions on their spending. Period. End of story. I refute that mistaken notion. I want to say emphatically that such an interpretation of Buckley is not the end of the story--far from it. You do not have to take my word for it. As a Brennan Center report from the year 2000 said: We must recognize that, as a legal matter, Congress is not foreclosed from adopting a definition of ``electioneering'' or ``express advocacy'' that goes beyond the ``magic words'' test [for or against] . . . as long as vagueness and overbreadth concerns are met, Congress is presumably free to draft new legislation that is more effective in achieving its constitutionally valid goals. According to the Center's scholars' letter of this month: Congress has the power to enact a statute that defines electioneering in a more nuanced manner, as long as its definition adequately addresses the vagueness and overbreadth concerns expressed by the court. Certainly, this provision is not vague. We draw a bright line. Anyone will know that running ads more than $10,000 in a given year, mentioning a Federal candidate 30 days before a primary, 60 days before a general election, and seen by that candidate's electorate, being aired in that candidate's district or State, will be covered by this provision. Anyone not meeting any single one of those criteria will not be affected. As to the issue of broadness or overbreadth, again quoting the Brennan Center letter: A restriction that covers regulable speech can be struck if it sweeps too broadly and covers a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech as well. But under the overbreadth doctrine, the provision will be upheld unless its overbreadth is substantial. A challenger cannot topple a statute simply by conjuring up a handful of applications that would yield unconstitutional results. The empirical evidence demonstrates that this provision and the criteria included in this amendment are not ``substantially overbroad.'' The fact of the matter is, we have a body of evidence on these kinds of ads that never existed before, that there effectively is no line between the express advocacy and the sham issue ads in terms of voter perception. In other words, an ad that runs, that says, ``John Doe is dishonest and corrupt and un-American, call John Doe and tell him how you feel,'' is seen every bit as much to be an ad designed to influence a Federal election as an ad using the so-called magic words such as, ``Vote for John Doe.'' As a legislative body, we are allowed to devise a solution to this new problem, and the Court will give it a fresh look. The truth is that 25 years ago the Court issued a decision to try to cure a previous statute that was poorly and vaguely written, at a time that is now over a quarter of a century ago. The fact is, the Court has not had any new law from Congress to consider on campaign finance reform in the last 25 years in order to review the matters, in order to review the kinds of trends that have taken place that have reinterpreted law that was passed more than 26 years ago. So it is our prerogative, Madam President, and, I would say, our obligation as a legislature, to try to craft solutions to problems when it is in our public interest. That is why we have three branches of Government. We will hear it may have a constitutional question. We have never hesitated when we have deemed it to be in the public's interest, government's interest, our country's interest, to pass legislation--and in fact in some cases even testing the courts. We did that on the line- item veto. It did not deter Members of the Senate or Members of the House from voting for that legislation because there were some constitutional questions. The same is true for the flag-burning issue. Many of us are in support of that constitutional amendment. There have been some constitutional questions raised, but again that should not deter the legislative branch of Government from moving forward on what it deems and perceives to be in the Government's interests. Again, as we look at some of the analyses and interpretations that have been done in recent studies on election trends, let me again go back to how some of the experts are defining it. In the Magleby v. Brigham Young University study that was done this year, as they said as they defined the uses of political money in campaigns and elections: . . . neither the Supreme Court (back in their 1976 decision) nor the FEC had substantial data with which to create their rulings. Dictum was created without data. . . . If respondents see election issue advocacy in the same way as candidate or party communication-- Both of which are considered ``express advocacy'' by definition-- then the Buckley distinction is mistaken. This report, appropriately entitled ``Dictum without Data,'' bills itself as ``the first systemic test of the court's assumption that the magic words are a reasonable standard for what constitutes election-related activity.'' Again, what is most telling about the next chart is the statistics that are represented: The degree to which these ads are intended to influence the voters' vote. We hear issue advocacy. No one is denying that every group should have the right to issue their ads talking about their positions on a particular issue. But in this study--again, it is another interesting phenomenon of the current election trends-- respondents were asked the degree to which these ads influenced their votes: On a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 meaning that the ad was not at all intended to influence their vote--in this case it was in the Presidential election--and 7 meaning the ad was clearly intended to influence how they would vote in the Presidential election, how would they rank this ad? Guess what. The ads that they viewed to be the most influential of all the ads run were the ones that were run by interest groups that mentioned a candidate, that are supposedly issue ads, even more than the ads that were run by the candidates themselves. In other words, candidates who ran their ads that obviously very clearly were intended to speak for a candidate on behalf of their issues projecting an image, projecting their positions on certain issues--those were seen to be less influential than the ads run by these interest groups that identified a candidate 60 days before election. Furthermore, a remarkable 70 to 71 percent scored the election issue advocacy ads as a 7; 70 to 71 percent thought they were more influential, and 83 percent gave the ads a 6 or a 7. Remember that 7 was the highest point, meaning they had the greatest impact, reinforcing the fact that these ads are seen as an attempt to influence their vote in the days before a campaign. What is even more interesting if you look at this chart, the election issues ad, the ones that opponents would have us believe are strictly issue ads and are not influencing elections because they do not contain express advocacy--these election issue ads were seen as more clearly intended to be about the election or defeat of a particular candidate than the candidate's own ads. I think this is very illustrative of the problem we are now facing with these so-called issue ads but which really are ads intended and designed to influence the outcome of an election, and they come out from under the disclosures and restriction requirements under the Federal election laws. That is why they come beneath the radar, because they are not required to be disclosed. We do not know who finances these ads. We don't know the identity of these organizations. All we know is that somebody is spending a whole lot of money for these kinds of advertisements. So if you think about it, the ads that the candidates themselves were running, ads which were automatically classified as express advocacy because candidates were running them--they were obviously ads to run in favor of a candidate or against a candidate and to get one's votes-- those ads were perceived as less clearly intended to influence their votes than the so-called issue ads. So it is no wonder then that the candidates themselves have taken to running ads without mentioning the magic words ``vote for or against.'' Again, the Brennan Center, in their report on the 1998 elections, found that only 4 percent of candidate ads used the magic words--4 percent. In other words, 4 percent of the ads that were run by candidates, sponsored by candidates, did not use those magic words ``for'' or ``against.'' Keep in mind that there is a legal benefit for the candidates who run the so-called issue ad. So the only reason they would have chosen this route over ads saying ``vote for me'' or ``vote against'' is that they believed the nonmagic words--not using those words--were more effective in getting their campaign message across, which, of course, is what all these organizations found out themselves. Furthermore, the report concluded, as our experience demonstrates, that policy distinctions such as those drawn by the Court and the FEC can have no basis in actual experience. Much of what falls under the Buckley definition of issue advocacy is indistinguishable to respondents from party and candidate communication. Yet issue advocacy operates under very different rules, which, of course, is to say no rules, and has negatively affected our electoral process and candidate accountability. We now have established how effective these ads are in influencing our elections and how irrelevant the ``magic words'' that were mentioned back in the Buckley v. Valeo decision by the Supreme Court in 1996 have become. Let's see how the Snowe-Jeffords provision dovetails with these ads at the end of an election and further evidence as to what these ads are really doing and the role they are playing in our elections, and ever more so. The effectiveness of these kinds of ads is not lost on these sponsors. First of all, we know they have gone up from $135 million in the 1996 election to $500 million in the year 2000 election. But let's look at the final months of the election in the year 2000 and TV spots that mentioned candidates--all of the ads we are talking about in the final 2 months of the election. Ninety-five percent of the television spots that aired 2 months before the election mentioned the candidate's name. Why would you suppose that an average of 95 out of 100 ads were talking about candidates in the final months of an election? Is that just a remarkable coincidence? Obviously. As you see from this next chart, again, it talks about the final 2 months of the last election and that 94 percent of the televised issue spots made a case for or against a candidate. Again, there is further proof of the fact that all of those ads that were run 2 months before an election--the 60-day period that we address in this legislation--were ads that were run by issue organizations that mention a candidate--95 percent of them. Ninety-four percent of those ads were seen as making a case for or against the candidate. So obviously they understand that those ads do and will influence the outcome of an election because they identify candidates 60 days before an election. Ninety-five percent of those ads are mentioning a candidate by name. Let's get the content of these ads. I guess it won't come as a shock to all of us who are on the election cycle that 84 percent of these televised spots have an attack component. Eighty-four percent have an attack component. Obviously, they are also designed to influence the outcome of a campaign because they are negative advertisements, and, in fact, the interest groups in this last election cycle ran the most negative ads. They were informational ads; they weren't comparative ads. They weren't comparing records, but they were frontal attack ads. People have a right to do that. What they shouldn't have a right to do is to run these ads that are clearly campaign ads and yet they do not have to disclose a dime; they don't have to play by any of the campaign finance rules whatsoever. To argue otherwise, frankly, I think flies in the face of logic. This record clearly shows that the Snowe-Jeffords provision embodied in the McCain-Feingold legislation in fact is not overly broad. But if all of that isn't enough, let me tell you something further about a report that was issued just last week that not only confirmed what the track record already indicates but provided additional proof of the problems we are facing in this election cycle. The report that was issued last week entitled ``The Facts about Television Advertising and the McCain-Feingold Bill,'' written by Jonathan Krasno and Kenneth Goldstein, studied issue advertising in the 2000 election in the top 75 media markets. In it, they ask the question: ``Would the definition of electioneering created by McCain- Feingold inadvertently capture many of those commercials that might be considered pure issue advocacy?'' Because there is a concern when you look at the Constitution side of the question: What about a group that wants to advocate in behalf of their issue in that election cycle of 60 days? Guess what. When they ran those ads by various focus groups, and identified those ads, only 1 percent of those ads were true issue advocacy ads; 99 percent were not. Ninety-nine percent of those ads were not issue advocacy; they were electioneering. Just 1 percent of the total number of ads would be captured by the Snowe-Jeffords provision that would have been viewed to be issue advocacy. In other words, just 1 percent of what would be genuine issue ads appeared after Labor Day and mentioned the Federal candidate. The other 99 percent were electioneering ads. As I mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court would not knock down anything based on a few examples. We are talking about thousands and thousands of ads. We are not discussing a provision in this legislation that is overly broad or vague. We are not talking about ads that are purely designed to convey an issue. But what we are addressing here and what we are saying is we are trying to get at the disclosure of the 99 percent of those ads that have identified a candidate, that run in that 60-day period, that clearly are intended to influence the outcome of an election.

Mrs. SNOWE

Mrs. SNOWE. I ask the Senator from Wisconsin for an additional 10 minutes.

Mrs. SNOWE. I thank the Senator for yielding. In this final report that was issued, we now see an evaluation of the relationship between TV ads and the congressional agenda. I have been asked the question: Well, what about a group that wants to run an ad in that 60-day period and we happen to be in session? It could affect their ability to be able to communicate. Again, it wouldn't deny them that ability, but it would require disclosure when they mention a candidate 60 days before an election. But what is interesting about this chart, and what it illustrates, is it tracks the number of candidate ads that run as we get closer and closer to the election. And it compares to the number of issue ads that were run throughout the year in the top 75 media markets, and then the number of votes going on in Congress. Guess what. The ads that were run by those so-called issue organizations tracked the ads that were run by candidates. The bottom line shows the votes in Congress. As you can see from the chart, those ads run by those issue organizations were not done to track what was going on in Congress. What they were doing was running ads to track the candidate's ads. As you can see by these two lines on the chart: The ads of the issue organizations and the ads run by the candidates themselves during that period of time are almost identical. It had nothing to do with what we were doing in Congress. So, obviously, the intent of these ads, beyond the fact that they mention a candidate in that 60-day window before the general election, is designed to influence the outcome of the election, not concerned about what is taking place in Congress. So again, I think it is pretty clear in terms of their intent, in terms of what they are attempting to do, and what is the focal point of these ads. I will get into a lot of this later because I think this is an issue that bears repeating throughout the course of this debate over the next 2 weeks, to remind people we are not talking about those genuine issue ads that Buckley v. Valeo and the Supreme Court thought of 26 years ago. We are talking about a whole new phenomenon in America in modern day politics of which everybody is well aware. So let's talk about the difference between the two ads. We will call this the electioneering ad. It does not say ``vote for'' or ``vote against''--again, those magic words. Back in the 1976 Supreme Court decision, the Supreme Court said, as an example, you should use those words ``vote for'' or ``vote against'' to determine that these are truly political-type election ads. But look at new ads that have cropped up, particularly in the last three election cycles, to show you the difference. First, we have the electioneering ad. This is what would be covered by the Snowe-Jeffords provision in terms of disclosure. The announcer says: We try to teach our children that honesty matters. Unfortunately, though, Candidate X just doesn't get it. Candidate X urged her employer to buy politicians and judges with money and jobs for their relatives. Candidate X advertises corruption . . . Call candidate X. Tell her government shouldn't be for sale. Tell her we're better than that. Tell her honesty does matter. Now, can anyone say with a straight face that this ad isn't a clear attack ad on a candidate? Shouldn't we know who is paying for this ad running 60 days before an election with $1,000 donors, when an organization is spending more than $10,000 in a campaign period? Now, let's look at the genuine issue ad, which is the difference, if we are talking about a genuine issue ad, which this provision would not apply to. Again, let's read it: This time of the year, the average person's thoughts turn to the IRS. Now we all know one person can't fight 'em. But a bunch of average folks like us can eliminate the IRS with the new Fair Tax Plan, the only plan that's fair to everybody . . . Some things are worth a good fight. Call to join us. You could even say ``call your Senator, call your representative,'' or you could even provide your Representative's phone number in the ad. If you are not identifying the candidate, you will not come under the disclosure provisions in this 60-day period. That is the true distinction of the type of ad we are attempting to force disclosure on, the ones in which they identify a candidate by name 60 days before an election. I think the American people are entitled to know who is financing these ads. That is what this amendment gets to the heart of: whether or not we are prepared to do that at this moment in time, in this Congress, and seeing the extraordinary developments in our elections and what has transpired to see some of the monstrosities that have evolved through our election practices that have reached the point in time when we are seeing $500 million being spent on so-called issue ads, sponsored by organizations or individuals of which we do not know their identity. I think the time has come to develop the approach that requires disclosure that meets and will withstand constitutional scrutiny, so that all Americans will understand who is trying to influence these elections. We are not trying to get at those groups that genuinely want to be able to convey their message through television broadcasts or radio advertisements. What we are trying to do is to identify those groups of donors who are trying to influence the outcome of an election shortly before that election occurs. I think the time has come to pass this sweeping reform. Something along the way has certainly gone wrong. The McCain-Feingold legislation would certainly make that difference.

Mrs. SNOWE. Not even 10; probably about 5.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I am pleased to rise today to join Senator Harkin and Senator Mikulski as an original cosponsor of the Assure Access to Mammography Act of 2001. This bill addresses an emerging need in the fight for breast cancer--the need for adequate reimbursement for screening mammography in the Medicare Program and the need to preserve access to mammographies services for women across the country. Mr. President, we are clearly making small gains in fighting breast cancer, which is one of the most challenging and daunting health problems in America today. There is no question that a diagnosis of breast cancer is something that every woman dreads. But for an estimated 192,200 American women, this is the year their worst fears will be realized. One thousand new cases of breast cancer will be diagnosed among the women in Maine, and 200 women in my home state will die from this tragic disease. The fact is, one in nine women will develop breast cancer during their lifetime, and for women between the ages of 35 and 54, there is no other disease which will claim more lives. But the fact is that mammograms are the most powerful weapon we have in the fight against breast cancer. They enable us to detect and treat breast cancer at its earliest stage when the tumors are too tiny to be detected by a woman or her doctor, providing a better prognosis. An estimated 30 million mammograms were performed last year at a cost of over $2 billion--a valuable down-payment in our fight against an unmerciful killer. And due to the aging of the baby boom generation it is estimated that more than one million additional women each year will need regular mammograms. In 1990 we succeeded in making screening mammography the very first preventive benefit available under Part B of the Medicare Program, and we set the reimbursement level in statute. In 1998, the Medicare Program alone provided over 6 million mammography procedures. Unfortunately the Medicare payment, which was indexed to inflation under the statute, has not kept pace with the actual increase in health care costs. Last year the Medicare reimbursement for a screening mammogram was $69.23--well under the mean cost of $90 per procedure. There is evidence that radiology clinics are closing their doors, and that radiologists are no longer able to provide mammography services due to the simple fact that providers are not reimbursed enough for their work and cannot justify the losses they incur by providing mammography services. Over the past 18 months 243 facilities have closed their doors; close to 100 of them in just the past four months. This is a problem that must be addressed immediately. The legislation we introduce today would increase Medicare reimbursement for screening mammograms to $90 for 2002, insuring that radiologists across the country are appropriately reimbursed for the valuable service they provide. On March 7, 2001, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued a fascinating report evaluating the new technologies of mammography titled ``Mammography and Beyond: Developing Technologies for the Early Detection of Breast Cancer.'' At the same time, the IOM recommended analyzing current Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement rates for mammography to determine whether they adequately cover the total costs of providing the procedure. The report also recommends that the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) undertake or fund a study to analyze trends in speciality training for breast cancer screening among radiologists and radiologic technologists, and examine factors affecting the decision of practitioners to enter or remain in the field. We have taken these recommendations very seriously and by introducing this legislation today, we are acting to preserve access to mammography. The truth is we simply cannot risk slipping back in our fight against breast cancer. I urge my colleagues to join us in supporting this very important bill and work towards passing it this year.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I am pleased to rise today to join Senator Harkin and Senator Mikulski as an original cosponsor of the Assure Access to Mammography Act of 2001. This bill addresses an emerging need in the fight for breast cancer--the need for adequate reimbursement for screening mammography in the Medicare Program and the need to preserve access to mammographies services for women across the country. Mr. President, we are clearly making small gains in fighting breast cancer, which is one of the most challenging and daunting health problems in America today. There is no question that a diagnosis of breast cancer is something that every woman dreads. But for an estimated 192,200 American women, this is the year their worst fears will be realized. One thousand new cases of breast cancer will be diagnosed among the women in Maine, and 200 women in my home state will die from this tragic disease. The fact is, one in nine women will develop breast cancer during their lifetime, and for women between the ages of 35 and 54, there is no other disease which will claim more lives. But the fact is that mammograms are the most powerful weapon we have in the fight against breast cancer. They enable us to detect and treat breast cancer at its earliest stage when the tumors are too tiny to be detected by a woman or her doctor, providing a better prognosis. An estimated 30 million mammograms were performed last year at a cost of over $2 billion--a valuable down-payment in our fight against an unmerciful killer. And due to the aging of the baby boom generation it is estimated that more than one million additional women each year will need regular mammograms. In 1990 we succeeded in making screening mammography the very first preventive benefit available under Part B of the Medicare Program, and we set the reimbursement level in statute. In 1998, the Medicare Program alone provided over 6 million mammography procedures. Unfortunately the Medicare payment, which was indexed to inflation under the statute, has not kept pace with the actual increase in health care costs. Last year the Medicare reimbursement for a screening mammogram was $69.23--well under the mean cost of $90 per procedure. There is evidence that radiology clinics are closing their doors, and that radiologists are no longer able to provide mammography services due to the simple fact that providers are not reimbursed enough for their work and cannot justify the losses they incur by providing mammography services. Over the past 18 months 243 facilities have closed their doors; close to 100 of them in just the past four months. This is a problem that must be addressed immediately. The legislation we introduce today would increase Medicare reimbursement for screening mammograms to $90 for 2002, insuring that radiologists across the country are appropriately reimbursed for the valuable service they provide. On March 7, 2001, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued a fascinating report evaluating the new technologies of mammography titled ``Mammography and Beyond: Developing Technologies for the Early Detection of Breast Cancer.'' At the same time, the IOM recommended analyzing current Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement rates for mammography to determine whether they adequately cover the total costs of providing the procedure. The report also recommends that the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) undertake or fund a study to analyze trends in speciality training for breast cancer screening among radiologists and radiologic technologists, and examine factors affecting the decision of practitioners to enter or remain in the field. We have taken these recommendations very seriously and by introducing this legislation today, we are acting to preserve access to mammography. The truth is we simply cannot risk slipping back in our fight against breast cancer. I urge my colleagues to join us in supporting this very important bill and work towards passing it this year.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President I rise today to introduce the Child Protection/Alcohol and Drug Partnership Act, and I am pleased to be joined by my good friends, Senators Rockefeller, DeWine, Dodd, collins, and Lincoln. Mr. President this bill is an enormously important piece of legislation. It provides the means for states to support some of our most vulnerable families, families who are struggling with alcohol and drug abuse, and the children who are being raised in these homes. It is obvious, both anecdotally and statistically, that child welfare is significantly impacted by parental substance abuse. And it makes a lot of sense to fund state programs to address these two issues in tandem. The real question in designing and supporting child welfare programs is how can we, public policy makers, government officials, welfare agencies, honestly expect to improve child welfare without appropriately and adequately addressing the root problems affecting these children's lives? We know that substance abuse is the primary ingredient in child abuse and neglect. Most studies find that between one-third and two-thirds, and some say as high as 80 percent to 90 percent, of children in the child welfare system come from families where parental substance abuse is a contributing factor. The Child Protection/Alcohol and Drug Partnership Act creates a new five-year $1.9 billion state block grant program to address the connection between substance abuse and child welfare. Payments would be made to promote joint activities among federal, state, and local public child welfare and alcohol and drug prevention and treatment agencies. Our underlying belief, and the point of this bill, is to encourage existing agencies to work together to keep children safe. HHS will award grants to States and Indian tribes to encourage programs for families who are known to the child welfare system and have alcohol and drug abuse problems. These grants will forge new and necessary partnerships between the child protection agencies and the alcohol and drug prevention and treatment agencies so they can work together to provide services fort this population. The program is designed to increase the capacity of both the child welfare and alcohol and drug systems to comprehensively address the needs of these families to improve child safety, family stability, and permanence, and to promote recovery from alcohol and drug problems. Statistics paint an unhappy picture for children of substance abusing parents: a 1998 report by the National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse found that 36 states reported that parental substance abuse and poverty are the top two problems exhibited by families reported for child maltreatment. And a 1997 survey conducted by the Child Welfare League of America found that at least 52 percent of placements into out-of- home care were due in part to parental substance abuse. Children whose parents abuse alcohol and drugs are almost three times likelier to be abused and more than four times likelier to be neglected than children of parents who are not substance abusers. Children in alcohol-abusing families were nearly four times more likely to be maltreated overall, almost five times more likely to be physically neglected, and 10 times more likely to be emotionally neglected than children in families without alcohol problems. A 1994 study published in the American Journal of Public Health fund that children prenatally exposed to substances have been found to be two to three times more likely to be abused than non-exposed children. And as many as 80 percent of prenatally drug exposed infants will come to the attention of child welfare before their first birthday. Abused and neglected children under age six face the risk of more severe damage than older children because their brains and neurological systems are still developing. Unfortunately, child welfare agencies estimate that only a third of the 67 percent of the parents who need drug or alcohol prevention and treatment services actually get help today. This bill is about preventing problems. My colleagues and I know that what is most important here is the safety and well-being of America's children. We expect much of our youth because they are the future of our nation. In turn, we must be willing to give them the support they need to learn and grow, so that they can lead healthy and productive lives. In 1997 Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act, ASFA, authored by the late Senator John Chafee. ASFA promotes safety, stability, and permanence for all abused and neglected children and requires timely decision-making in all proceedings to determine whether children can safely return home, or whether they should be moved to permanent, adoptive homes. Specifically, the law requires a State to ensure that services are provided to the families of children who are at risk, so that children can remain safely with their families or return home after being in foster care. The bill we are introducing today identifies a very specific area in which families and children need services, substance abuse. And it will ensure that states have the funding necessary to provide services as required under the Adoption and Safe Families Act. On March 23, 2000, Kristine Ragaglia, Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Children and Families, testified before the House Subcommittee on Human Resources on this issue. She said simply that ``If substance abuse issues are left unaddressed, many of the system's efforts to protect children and to promote positive change in families will be wasted.'' This legislation aims to address this very gap in our nation's child protection system. I am pleased that this legislation has been endorsed by the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry; the American Academy of Pediatrics; the American Prosecutors Research Institute; the American Psychological Association; the American Public Human Services Association; the Child Welfare League of America; the Children's Defense Fund; Fight Crime: Invest in Kids; the Maine Association of Prevention Programs; the Maine Association of Substance Abuse Programs; the Maine Children's Trust; Mainely Parents; the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children; the National Conference of State Legislators; the New York State Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services; and Prevent Child Abuse America. I encourage my colleagues to take a look at our bill, to think seriously about the future for kids in their states, and to work with us in passing this very important piece of legislation. I ask unanimous consent that a fact sheet and section-by-section description of the bill be printed in the Record.