Olympia Snowe

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, today I introduce the Early Hearing Loss Detection, Diagnosis and Intervention Act of 1998, which will serve as a companion bill to H.R. 2923, introduced in the House by Representative Jim Walsh. I am pleased to have, as the lead cosponsor, my colleague from Iowa, Senator Harkin, who has long been a champion of the hearing impaired. We have a tendency to associate hearing problems with the aging process, and it is true that the largest group of Americans suffering from hearing impairment are those in the 65 to 75 year age range. At the other end of the spectrum, however, approximately 1.5 to 3 out of every 1000 children--or as many as 33 children per day--are born with significant hearing problems. According to the National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders, as many as 12,000 infants are born each year in the U.S. with some form of hearing impairment. In the last several years, scientists have begun to tell us that the first years of a child's life are crucial to their future development. This makes early detection and intervention of hearing loss a necessity if we are to ensure that all our children get the strong start they deserve. Currently, the average age of diagnosis of hearing loss is close to three years of age. Yet it is believed that speech and oral language development can begin as early as 6 months of age. Without early diagnosis and intervention, these children are behind the learning curve--literally--before they have even started. They should not be denied a strong start in life simply for the lack of a simple screening test. There are many causes of hearing loss, and in many states a newborn child is screened only if the physician is aware of some factor that puts that baby in a risk category. Our four states--Rhode Island, Hawaii, Colorado, and Mississippi--currently require the screening of all newborns. in 16 other states, babies are screened only if they are believed to be a risk. This screening process, while important, detects only 50 percent--or half--of the hearing problems in young children. Universal screening is not a new idea. As early as 1965, the Advisory Committee on Education of the Deaf, in a report of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, recommended the development and nationwide implementation of ``universally applied procedures for early identification.'' In 1989, former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop used this year 2000 as a goal for identifying 90 percent of children with significant hearing loss before they are one year old. And just last year, the National Institutes of Health convened an expert panel at the National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders, and the panel made a recommendation that the first hearing screening be carried out before three months of age to ensure that treatment can begin before six months of age. It is time to move beyond the recommendations and achieve the goal of universal screening. In addition to the four states that require screening, the Bureau of Maternal and Child Health, in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control, is helping 17 states commit to achieving universal hearing screening by the year 2000. This plan will lead to the screening of more than 1 million newborns a year, but it still leaves more than half the states without universal screening programs. The purpose of the bill I am introducing today is to provide the additional assistance necessary to help all the states in implementing programs to ensure that all our newborns are tested and to ensure that those identified with a hearing impairment get help. Specifically, the bill: (1) Authorizes $5 million for the Secretary of Health and Human Services to work with the states to develop early detection, diagnosis and intervention networks; (2) Authorizes $5 million for the Centers for Disease Control to provide technical assistance to State agencies and to conduct applied research related to infant hearing detection, diagnosis and treatment/ intervention; and (3) Authorizes $3 million for the National Institutes of Health to carry out research on the efficacy of new screening techniques and technology. A baby born today will be part of this coutnry's future in the 21st century. Surely we owe it to that child to give them a strong start on that future by ensuring that if they do have a hearing impairment it is diagnosed and treatment started well before their first year of life is completed. I urge my colleagues to join me and Senator Harkin in supporting the Early Hearing Loss Detection, Diagnosis and Intervention Act of 1998.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. I need 15 minutes.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, the approach in this amendment is a straightforward, two tiered one that only applies to advertisements that constitute the most blatant form of electioneering. It only applies to ads run on radio or television, 30 days before a primary and 60 days before a general election, that identify a federal candidate. And only if over $10,000 is spent on such ads in a year. What is required is disclosure of the ads' sponsor and major donors, and a prohibition on the use of union dues or corporate treasury funds to finance the ads. We called this new category ``electioneering ads''. They are the only communications addressed, and we define them very narrowly and carefully. If the ad is not run on television or radio; if the ad is not aired within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election, if the ad doesn't mention a candidate's name or otherwise identify him clearly, if it isn't targeted at the candidate's electorate, or if a group hasn't spent more than $10,000 in that year on these ads, then it is not an electioneering ad. If is an item appearing in a news story, commentary, voter guides or editorial distributed through a broadcast station, it is also not an electioneering ad. Plain and simple. If one does run an electioneering ad, two things happen. First, the sponsor must disclose the amount spent and the identity of contributors who donated more than $500 to the group since January 1st of the previous year. Right now, candidates have to disclose campaign contributions over $200--so the threshold contained in McCain-Feingold is much higher. Second, the ad cannot be paid for by funds from a business corporation or labor union--only voluntary contributions. The clear, narrow wording of the amendment is important because it passes two critical first amendment doctrines that were at the heart of the Supreme Court's landmark Buckley versus Valeo decision: vagueness and overbreadth. The rules of this provision are clear. And the requirements are strictly limited to ads run near an election that identify a candidate--ads plainly intended to convince voters to vote for or against a particular candidate. Nothing in this provision restricts the right of any group to engage in issue advocacy. Nothing prohibits groups from running electioneering ads, either. Let me be clear on this: if this bill becomes law, any group running issues ads today can still run issue ads in the future, with no restrictions on content. And any group running electioneering ads can still run those ads in the future, again with absolutely zero restrictions on content. So to those who will argue, as they did in February, that this measure runs afoul of the first amendment, I say that that is simply a red herring, Mr. President. And you don't have to take my word for it. Constitutional scholars from Stanford Law to Georgia Law to Loyola Law to Vanderbilt Law have endorsed the approach that is now part of this legislation. If anything, Mr. President, this provision underscores first amendment rights for union members and shareholders by protecting them from having their money used for electioneering ads they may not agree with, while maintaining the right of labor and corporate management to speak through PACs. This is a sensible, reasonable approach to addressing a burgeoning segment of electioneering that is making a mockery of our campaign finance system. How can anyone not be for disclosure? How can anyone say that less information for the public leads to better elections? Don't the American people have the right to know who is paying for these stealth advocacy ads, and how much? This problem is not going to go away, Mr. President. The year 1996 marked a turning point in American elections--make no mistake about it. The Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania published a report this year on so-called issue advertising during the 1996 elections, and if any member of the Senate hasn't read it I recommend you get hold of a copy. As this first chart demonstrates, the report finds that, during the 1996 elections, anywhere from $135 million to $150 million was spent by third-party organizations in the 1996 election on radio and TV ads. This totals almost one-third of the amount of money that was spent in the election; $400 million was spent by all candidates for President, U.S. Senate, and the House, but other organizations spent a third of all of the money that was spent in the last election. Then chart two, if there is any doubt about the intent of these ads, indicates, according to the Annenberg Report, that in a study of 109 ads that were supported by 29 different organizations, almost 87 percent of those so-called issue ads referred to a candidate, and 41 percent of those issue ads were identified by the public as being ``attack ads''--41 percent. Almost 87 percent of these so-called issue ads identified a candidate. That is the highest percentage recorded among a group that also included Presidential ads, debates, free-time segments, and news program organizations. Clearly, these ads were overtly aimed at electing or defeating targeted candidates, but under current law they aren't even subject to disclosure requirements. We are only talking about those individuals who provide $500 or more to an organization that runs ads identifying a candidate 30 days before a primary and 60 days before a general election. But let's look at the ads that I am talking about. Again, we are talking about stealth advocacy ads. First, you get the ``True Issue Ad,'' according to the Annenberg Public Policy Center, which says that ``McCain-Feingold would have no impact on True Issue Ads.'' It says here that it is ``A True Issue Ad.'' It says: This election year, America's children need your vote. Our public schools are our children's ticket to the future. But education has become just another target for attack by politicians who want huge cuts in education programs. They're making the wrong choices. Our children deserve leaders who will strengthen public education, not attack it. They deserve the best education we can give them. So this year, vote as if your children's future depends on it. It does. That is a true issue ad. Look at chart four. This is what I call a ``Stealth Advocacy Ad.'' This is what McCain-Feingold would define as ``Electioneering Communications.'' That is totally permissible under any of the rulings that have been made and rendered by the Supreme Court, because those distinctions can be made between electioneering and between constitutionally permitted freedom of speech. This is a stealth advocacy ad: Mr. X promised he'd be different. But he's just another Washington politician. Why, during the last year alone he has taken over $260,000 from corporate special interest groups. . . . But is he listening to us anymore? That identifies a candidate. I defy anyone to tell me with a straight face that the intent of this stealth advocacy ad is anything other than to advocate for the defeat of candidate X. That is the kind of ad that is covered by the McCain- Feingold measure. Let me tell you something. This ad could still run. Any group in America can run any ad that they want before the election identifying a candidate. But the fact is it would require disclosure of those donors who provide more than $500 to that organization, if these ads run 30 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election. And the money could not be funded by unions or corporations through their treasuries. If they want to finance these ads, by unions or corporations, they will have to do so by a PAC, if these ads run 30 days before a primary and 60 days before a general election. So what are we talking about? Disclosure. That is what we are talking about. And 87 percent of these issue ads, these so-called issue ads, are what I would call stealth advocacy ads, because they identify a candidate but we don't know who finances these ads. This, on the other hand, is a true issue ad. It doesn't identify a candidate. Groups can run ads saying: ``Call your Senator. Call your Member of Congress.'' They don't have to identify the candidate. But if they do, it requires disclosure of their major donors. Mr. President, we are accountable to the people. We are required as candidates for office to file disclosure forms as candidates. PACs are required to disclose. But hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on these ads without one dime being reported--not one dime. And I remind you that one-third of the money that was spent in the last election, in 1996, was spent by organizations that did not have to disclose one dime. And there is no reason to think it will not get worse. You do not need a crystal ball. Just look at some of the special elections this year. For example, it has been widely reported that just one group spent $200,000 on special election TV commercials. We don't have the total of exactly how much was spent overall, because there is currently no accountability, no disclosure. That is what the McCain- Feingold legislation is addressing. And think about this. Overall, national party committees raised over $115 million in soft money during the first 18 months of the 1997-1998 election cycle, the most money ever on a nonpresidential election cycle. Total soft money contributions to both Democrats and Republicans have more than doubled during the past 4 years. In fact, soft money contributions to national party committees have grown by 131 percent from the first 18 months of the 1993-1994 election cycle compared to the same period in this 1997-1998 election cycle--grown 131 percent. Enough is enough. I have said before that it is the duty of leaders to lead, and that means making some difficult choices. I know this is not an easy vote. It requires looking at ourselves and asking what is important, protecting the status quo, or is it protecting the integrity of our system of elections? How we choose our elected officials goes to the heart of who we are as a nation. It defines us as a country and it defines whether or not we will continue to maintain the integrity of this process. But there is a very great danger that if we do nothing, if we shroud ourselves in the rhetoric of absolutism, if we turn our backs on a monumental opportunity that we now have, then our mantle of greatness will decay from the inside, because if the American people lose faith in the system that elects our public officials, they have lost faith in the integrity of Government itself, and we cannot allow this to happen. We cannot preside over this disintegration of public trust. Eight votes stand between us and a reform bill. Eight votes stand between us and the passage of the McCain-Feingold legislation. After two tries in the Senate, the labyrinthian parliamentary procedure, hundreds of amendments, and a ``Queen of the Hill'' contest in the House, all that is holding back a reform bill this year is eight Senators. This is our chance, my friends, and I implore my colleagues to seize this historic opportunity. After this vote, there will be no doubt who stands four square behind fair, sensible, meaningful reform and who does not. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Wisconsin for yielding me the time and for his leadership and his commitment. I yield the floor. Exhibit 1 Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, New York, NY, February 20, 1998. Re NRLC objections to the Snowe-Jeffords amendment. Dear Senator: We write to rebut letters from the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC), dated February 17 and February 20, 1998, in opposition to the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment to the McCain-Feingold Bill. NRLC mischaracterizes what the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment would achieve and misrepresents constitutional doctrine. The Amendment would not restrict the ability of advocacy groups such as NRLC to engage in either issue advocacy or electioneering. But it would prevent them from (1) hiding from the public the amounts they spend on the most blatant form of electioneering; (2) keeping secret the identities of those who bankroll their electioneering messages with large contributions; and (3) funneling funds from business corporations and labor unions into electioneering. These goals, and the means used to achieve them, are constitutionally permissible. What the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment Would Do The Snowe-Jeffords Amendment applies only to advertisements that constitute the most blatant form of electioneering. If an ad does not satisfy every one of the following criteria, none of the restrictions or disclosure rules of the Snowe- Jeffords Amendment would be triggered: Medium: The ad must be broadcast on radio or television. Timing: The ad must be aired shortly before an election--within 60 days before a general election (or special election) or 30 days before a primary. Candidate-Specific: The ad must mention a candidate's name or identify the candidate clearly. Targeting: The ad must be targeted at voters in the candidate's state. Threshold: The sponsor of the ad must spend more than $10,000 on such electioneering ads in the calendar year. If, and only if, an electioneering ad meets all of the foregoing criteria, do the following rules apply: Restriction: The electioneering ad cannot be paid for directly or indirectly by funds from a business corporation or labor union. Individuals, PACs, and most nonprofits can engage in unlimited advocacy or the sort covered by the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment. The Amendment would prohibit these advocacy groups from financing their electioneering ads with funds from business corporations or labor unions. Since it is already illegal for business corporations and labor unions to engage in electioneering, these limitations are intended to prevent evasion of otherwise valid federal restrictions. Disclosure: The sponsor of an electioneering ad must disclose the amount spent and the identity of contributors who donated more than $500 toward the ad. This requirement is necessary to prevent contributors from evading federal reporting requirements by funneling contributions intended to influence the outcome of an election through advocacy groups. the nrlc's misrepresentations about the snowe-jeffords amendment The NRLC has so completely distorted the effect of the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment with false and misleading allegations that it is important at the outset to set the record straight. The Amendment would not prohibit groups such as NRLC from disseminating electioneering communications. Instead, it would merely require the NRLC to disclose how much it is spending on electioneering broadcasts and who is bankrolling them. The Amendment would not prohibit NRLC and others from accepting corporate or labor funds. If it wished to accept corporate or labor funds, it would simply have to take steps to ensure that those funds could not be spent on blatant electioneering messages. NRLC and similar organizations would not have to create a PAC or other separate entity in order to engage in the types of electioneering covered by the Amendment. Rather, they would simply have to deposit the money they receive from corporations and unions (or other restricted sources) into separate bank accounts. The Amendment would not bar or require disclosure of communications by print media, direct mail, or other non- broadcast modes of communication. NRLC and similar advocacy groups would be able to organize their members or communicate with the public at large through mass communications such as newspaper advertisements, mass mailings, voter guides, or billboards, to the same extent currently permitted by law. There is no provision in the current version of the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment that changes any of the rules regarding those non- broadcast forms of communication. The Amendment would not affect the ability of any organization to ``urge grassroots contacts with lawmakers regarding an upcoming vote in Congress.'' The Amendment has no effect on a broadcast directing the public, for example, to ``Urge your congressman and senator to vote against [`or in favor of'] the McCain-Feingold bill.'' The sponsor could even give the telephone number for the audience to call. And the ad would be free fom all the Amendment's new disclosure rules and source rules--even if the ad is run the day before the election. By simply declining to name ``Congressman X'' or ``Senator Y,'' whose election is imminent and the outcome of which NRLC presumably does not intend to affect, NRLC could run its issue ad free from both the minimal disclosure rules and the prohibition on use of business and union funds. The Amendment's disclosure rules do not require invasive disclosure of all donors. They require disclosure only of those donors who pay more than $500 to the account that funds the ad. The Amendment would not require advance disclosure of the contents of an ad. It would require disclosure only of the amount spent, the sources of the money, and the identity of the candidate whose election is targeted. Basic Constitutional Principles NRLC is simply mistaken in suggesting that the minimal disclosure rules and the restrictions on corporate and union electioneering contained in the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment are unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has made clear that, for constitutional purposes, electioneering is different from other speech. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986). Congress has the power to enact campaign finance laws that constrain the spending of money on electioneering in a variety of ways, even though spending on other forms of political speech is entitled to absolute First Amendment protection. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Congress is permitted to demand that the sponsor of an electioneering message disclose the amount spent on the message and the sources of the funds. And Congress may prohibit corporations and labor unions from spending money on electioneering. This is black letter constitutional law about which there can be no serious dispute. There are, of course, limits to Congress's power to regulate election-related spending. But there are two contexts in which the Supreme Court has granted Congress freer reign to regulate. First, Congress has broader latitude to require disclosure of election-related spending than it does to restrict such spending. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67- 68. In Buckley, the Court declared that the governmental interests that justify disclosure of election-related spending are considerably broader and more powerful than those justifying prohibitions or restrictions on election- related spending. Disclosure rules, the Court opined, in contrast to spending restrictions or contribution limits, enhance the information available to the voting public. Plus, the burdens on free speech rights are far less significant when Congress requires disclosure of a particular type of spending than when it prohibits the spending outright or limits the funds that support the speech. Disclosure rules, according to the Court, are ``the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption.'' Thus, even if certain political advertisement cannot be prohibited or otherwise regulated, the speaker might still be required to disclose the funding sources for those ads if the governmental justification is sufficiently strong. Second, Congress has a long record, which has been sustained by the Supreme Court, of imposing more onerous spending restrictions on corporations and labor unions than on individuals, political action committees, and associations. Since 1907, federal law has banned corporations from engaging in electioneering. See 2 U.S.C. Sec. 441b(a). In 1947, that ban was extended to prohibit unions from electioneering as well. Id. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, Congress banned corporate and union contributions in order ``to avoid the deleterious influences on federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital.'' United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957). As recently as 1990, the Court reaffirmed this rationale. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 491 U.S. 652 (1990); FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982). The Court emphasized that it is perfectly constitutional for the state to limit the electoral participation of corporations because ``[s]tate law grants [them] special advantages--such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation of and distribution of assets,'' Austin, 491 U.S. at 658-59. Having provided these advantages to corporations, particularly business corporations, the state has no obligation to ``permit them to use `resources amassed in the economic marketplace' to obtain `an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.'' (quoting, MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257). The Snowe-Jeffords Amendment builds upon these bedrock principles, extending current regulation cautiously and only in the areas in which the First Amendment protection is at its lowest ebb. Congress Is Not Stuck with ``Magic Words'' The Supreme Court has never held that there is only a single constitutionally permissible route a legislature may take when it defines ``electioneering'' to be regulated or reported. The Court has not prescribed certain ``magic words'' that are regulable and placed all other electioneering beyond the reach of any campaign finance regulation. NRLC's argument to the contrary is based on a fundamental misreading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Buckley v. Valeo. In Buckley, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). One section of FECA imposed a $1,000 limit on expenditures ``relative to a clearly identified candidate,'' and another section imposed reporting requirements for independent expenditures of over $100 ``for the purpose of influencing'' a federal election. The Court concluded that these regulations ran afoul of two constitutional doctrines-- vagueness and overbreadth--that pervade First Amendment jurisprudence. The vagueness doctrine demands precise definitions. Before the government punishes someone--especially for speech--it must articulate with sufficient precision what conduct is legal and what is illegal. A vague or imprecise definition of electioneering might ``chill'' some political speakers who, although they desire to engage in discussions of political issues, may fear that their speech could be punished. Even if a regulation is articulated with great clarity, it may still be struck as overbroad. A restriction that covers regulable speech (and does so clearly) can be struck if it sweeps too broadly and covers a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech as well. But under the overbreadth doctrine, the provision will be upheld unless its overbreadth is substantial. A challenger cannot topple a statute simply by conjuring up a handful of applications that would yield unconstitutional results. Given these two doctrines, it is plain why FECA's clumsy provisions troubled the Court. Any communication that so much as mentions a candidate--any time and in any context--could be said to be ``relative to'' the candidate. And it is difficult to predict what might ``influence'' a federal election. The Supreme Court could have simply struck FECA, leaving it to Congress to develop a narrower and more precise definition of electioneering. Instead, the Court intervened by essentially rewriting Congress's handiwork itself. In order to avoid the vagueness and overbreadth problems, the Court interpreted FECA to reach only funds used for communications that ``expressly advocate'' the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. In an important footnote, the Court provided some guidance on how to decide whether a communication meets that description. The Court stated that its revision of FECA would limit the reach of the statute ``to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as `vote for,' `elect,' `support,' `cast your ballot for,' `Smith for Congress,' `vote against,' `defeat,' `reject.' '' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. But the Court emphatically did not declare that all legislatures were stuck with these magic words, or words like them, for all time. To the contrary, Congress has the power to enact a statute that defines electioneering in a more nuanced manner, as long as its definition adequately addresses the vagueness and overbreadth concerns expressed by the Court. Any more restrictive reading of the Supreme Court's opinion would be fundamentally at odds with the rest of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. Countless other contexts--including libel, obscenity, fighting words, and labor elections--call for delicate line drawing between protected speech and speech that may be regulated. In none of these cases has the Court adopted a simplistic bright-line approach. For example, in libel cases, an area of core First Amendment concern, the Court has rejected the simple bright- line approach of imposing liability based on the truth or falsity of the statement published. Instead the Court has prescribed an analysis that examines, among other things, whether the speaker acted with reckless disregard for the truth of falsity of the statement and whether a reasonable reader would perceive the statement as stating actual facts or merely rhetorical hyperbole. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1990). Similarly, in the context of union representation elections, employers are permitted to make ``predictions'' about the consequences of unionizing but they may not issue ``threats.'' The courts have developed an extensive jurisprudence to distinguish between the two categories, yet the fact remains that an employer could harbor considerable uncertainty as to whether or not the words he is about to utter are sanctionable. The courts are comfortable with the uncertainty of these tests because they have provided certain concrete guidelines. In no area of First Amendment jurisprudence has the Court mandated a mechanical test that ignores either the context of the speech at issue or the purpose underlying the regulatory scheme. In no area of First Amendment jurisprudence has the Court held that the only constitutionally permissible test is one that would render the underlying regulatory scheme unenforceable. It is doubtful, therefore, that the Supreme Court in Buckley intended to single out election regulations as requiring a mechanical, formulaic, and utterly unworkable test. The Snowe-Jeffords Amendment's Prohibition is Precise and Narrow The Snowe-Jeffords Amendment presents a definition of electioneering carefully crafted to address the Supreme Court's dual concerns regarding vagueness and overbreadth. Because the test for prohibited electioneering is defined with great clarity, it satisfies the Supreme Court's vagueness concerns. Any sponsor of a broadcast will know, with absolute certainty, whether the ad depicts or names a candidate, how many days before an election it is being broadcast, and what audience is targeted. There is little danger that a sponsor would mistakenly censor its own protected speech out of fear of prosecution under such a clear standard. The prohibition is also so narrow that it easily satisfies the Supreme Court's overbreadth concerns. Any speech encompassed by the prohibition is plainly intended to convince voters to vote for or against a particular candidate. A sponsor who wishes simply to inform the public at large about an issue immediately before an election could readily do so without mentioning a specific candidate and without targeting the message to the specific voters who happen to be eligible to vote for that candidate. It is virtually impossible to imagine an example of a broadcast that satisfies this definition even though it was not intended to influence the election in a direct and substantial way. Though a fertile image might conjure up a few counter-examples, the would not make the law substantially overbroad. The careful crafting of the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment stands in stark contrast to the clumsy and sweeping prohibition that Congress originally drafted in FECA. Unlike the FECA definition of electioneering, the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment would withstand constitutional challenge without having to resort to the device of narrowing the statute with magic words. Congress could, if it wished, apply the basic rules that currently govern electioneering to all spending that falls within this more realistic definition of electioneering. Congress could, for example, declare that only individuals and PACs (and the most grassroots of nonprofit corporations) could engage in electioneering that falls within this broadened definition. It could impose fundraising restrictions, prohibiting individuals from pooling large contributions toward such electioneering. But, of course, the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment does not go that far. The flat prohibition applies not to advocacy groups like NRLC, but only to business corporations and labor unions--and to the sorts of nonprofits that are already severely limited in their ability to lobby. The expansion in the definition of electioneering will not constrain NRLC from engaging in grassroots advocacy or spending the money it raises from its members for electioneering purposes. An individual, any other group of individuals, an association, and most nonprofit corporations can spend unlimited funds on electioneering that falls within the expanded definition and can raise funds in unlimited amounts, so long as they take care to insulate the funds they use on electioneering from funds they collect from business corporations, labor unions, or business activities. Since all corporations and labor unions receive reduced First Amendment protection in the electioneering context--remember. they can be flatly barred from electioneering at all--the application of the new prohibition only to labor unions and certain types of corporation is certainly constitutional. the extended disclosure requirement NRLC incorrectly argues that the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment's disclosure requirements infringe on the public's First Amendment right to engage in secret electioneering. In short, there is not such right. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995), the Court was careful to distinguish the anonymous pamphleteering against a referendum at issue in that case from the disclosure rules governing electioneering for or against a particular candidate for office that were permitted in Buckley. Similarly, NRLC improperly relies on NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), which recognizes a limited right of anonymity for groups that have a legitimate fear of reprisal if their membership lists or donors are publicly disclosed. NRLC, like any other group, may be entitled to an exemption from electioneering disclosure laws if it can demonstrate a reasonable probability that compelled disclosure will subject its members to threats, harassment, or reprisals. See McIntyre, 112 S. Ct. at 1524 n.21. But the need for these kinds of limited exceptions certainly do not make the general disclosure rules contained in Snowe-Jeffords unconstitutional. Since the new prohibition in the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment does not apply to the funds of individuals, associations, or most nonprofit corporations, the First Amendment implications for them are diminished. They will simply be required to report their spending on speech that falls within the broadened definition of electioneering, just as they currently must report the sources and amounts of their independent expenditures. They would be required to disclose the cost of the advertisement, a description of how the money was spent, and the names of individuals who contributed more than $500 towards the ad. Contrary to the NRLC's claim, they will never be required to disclose in advance any ad copy that they intend to air. The overbreadth and vagueness rules are particularly strict when applied to rules that restrict speech--such as the aspect of the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment that bars business corporations and labor unions from spending any funds on electioneering. But, as the Supreme Court has observed, disclosure rules do not restrict speech significantly. Disclosure rules do not limit the information that is conveyed to the electorate. To the contrary, they increase the flow of information. For that reason, the Supreme Court has made clear that rules requiring disclosure are subject to less exacting constitutional strictures than direct prohibitions on spending. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68. There is no constitutional bar to expanding the disclosure rules to provide accurate information to voters about the sponsors of ads indisputably designed to influence their vote. conclusion The Snowe-Jeffords Amendment is a sensitive and sensible approach to regulating spending that has made a mockery of federal campaign finance laws. It regulates in the two contexts--corporate and union spending and disclosure rules-- in which the Supreme Court has been most tolerant of regulation. The provisions are sufficiently clear to oversome claims of unconstitutional vagueness and sufficiently narrow to allay overbreadth concerns. The Amendment will not restrict the ability of advocacy groups such as NRLC to engage in either issue advocacy or electioneering, but it will subject their electioneering spending to federal disclosure requirements, which is constitutionally permissible. Respectfully submitted, Burt Neuborne, John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law, NYU School of Law. Norman Ornstein, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute. Daniel R. Ortiz, John Allan Love Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Executive Director, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law. Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the McCain- Feingold campaign finance amendment before us. It is often said that when it comes to the important things in life, we don't get a second chance. Well, today, we are presented with such a second chance this year to pass comprehensive, meaningful campaign finance reform. We have a third chance this Congress, for which I thank Senators McCain and Feingold for their unflagging determination. I also want to thank the majority leader for allowing us an opportunity to have another vote on this issue on the Interior appropriations bill. Indeed, it seems, to paraphrase Mark Twain, that reports of campaign finance reform's demise have been greatly exaggerated. I hail authors of the House bill for their tenacity and the Members of the House who defied conventional wisdom and passed a comprehensive reform bill along the lines of McCain-Feingold. We are back here to attach this legislation to this appropriations bill because the House of Representatives courageously chose to do their part to dispel the cynicism that hung over the Capitol like a cloud. They have brought this issue out into the light of day, and it is long past time that we here in the Senate do likewise. When you consider the veritable mountain, indeed, the sheer cliff wall of legislative obstacles the Shays-Meehan bill had to overcome, it is unthinkable that we cannot overcome our hurdles in this Chamber. It was truly a ``long and winding road'' for the Shays-Meehan bill which, at first, wasn't even going to be considered. Finally, when the drumbeat for the Shays-Meehan bill would not die, a process was devised that would allow for the consideration of 11 different plans and more than 250 amendments. The so-called ``Queen of the Hill'' contest played itself out from May 21 through August 6. But in the end, when the smoke finally cleared, the Shays-Meehan bill remained standing in what has to be one of the most remarkable legislative victories in recent memory. By a vote of 252-179--including 61 Republicans--Shays-Meehan was passed in the House in the face of overwhelming odds and, thus, our mandate was handed to us here in the Senate. Like the House, we, too, have a majority who are already on record in favor of reform--52 Senators--thanks to the leadership of Senators McCain and Feingold in bringing this legislation to the floor earlier this year. Unlike the House, we have twice failed to pass a bill. We have twice failed to reach the 60 votes necessary to defeat a filibuster. But for the very first time, as a result of the McCain- Feingold vote we had earlier this year, we received a majority in support of that legislation--the very first campaign finance reform bill to receive a majority vote here in the U.S. Senate. Mr. President, I cannot believe there aren't eight other Senators in this body who understand the fundamental issue we are faced with: the very integrity of this institution, as well as the process that brings us here. When the House of Representatives can get a bipartisan majority of 252 Members to understand the implications, people might wonder why it is so hard to find eight more Senators to do the same. I have asked the same question myself. Last week, Senator Lieberman, during a widely and deservedly praised speech, stood in this Chamber and appealed to a higher principle than partisanship or the politics of self-preservation. He wasn't speaking of election reform, but his appeal to our more noble instincts is relevant to this debate. In fact, it is integral. Reforming our broken campaign system is not a Republican thing, not a Democrat thing, but the right thing. It is something we owe to ourselves as leaders, it is something we owe to this institution, and it is something we owe to the American people as participants in the world's greatest democracy. I know that some have said that the American people actually aren't very concerned about this issue. They point to studies, such as a poll conducted this year by the Pew Research Center, which ranked campaign reform 13th on a list of 14 major issues. But let's look at the reason: The report also said that public confidence in Congress to write an effective and fair campaign law had declined. In other words, the American people have given up on us. They are betting we won't do it. That is a sad commentary. I say, let's surprise them and do the right thing. I say, we have a solemn obligation not to justify their cynicism. And to those who argue that now is not the time to take up this issue, my response is: What better time than now? This is the most optimum time to change the political dynamic today. After an election in which the most corruptive elements were brought to bear, after we learn of illegal donations from the Chinese in an attempt to gain influence, after we learn of more than 45 fundraising calls from the White House, after we learn that the President may have controlled advertising paid for by the DNC but aimed at reelecting the President, after the Attorney General launched three separate preliminary investigations in the last 2 weeks into these allegations, after we learn of the explosion of soft money and electioneering ads-- after all of these things, now is the time to clean up the system. Mr. President, I come to this debate as a veteran supporter of campaign finance reform. As someone who has served on Capitol Hill for almost 20 years, I understand the realities and I know there are concerns on both sides of the aisle that whatever measure we may ultimately pass, it must be fair, it must treat everyone as equitably as possible. In fact, I agree with those concerns. That is the challenge that brought Senator Jeffords and me to the table last October when we first attempted to consider this issue. It is what brought us back in February, and it is the reason I am here again today. I said last year that we should be putting our heads together, not building walls between us with intractable rhetoric and all-or-nothing propositions. Senator Jeffords and I attempted to bridge the gulf between two sides and expand support for McCain-Feingold by making sensible incremental changes. We were joined in this bipartisan effort by both Senators McCain and Feingold, as well as Senators Levin, Chafee, Lieberman, Thompson, Collins, Breaux, and Specter. I thank them again for their tremendous help and support. Together we not only won adoption of the amendment, but we helped bring this body to the first real vote on campaign finance reform and moved the debate forward by actually having the debate, and we solidified majority support for McCain-Feingold. I would like to take a few moments to speak about the provisions of the Snowe-Jeffords measure and why I think this measure is now considered worthy of the support of my Republican colleagues. The McCain-Feingold measure we are now considering takes a tremendous step forward by putting an end to soft money, tightening coordination definitions, and working to level the playing field for candidates facing opponents with vast personal wealth spent on their own campaigns. It also addresses the issues concerning the use of unregulated and undisclosed advertising that affects Federal elections, and the concerns that the original bill's attempt at addressing this issue would not withstand court scrutiny. This is important because if the courts had ruled the bill's efforts to address the distinction between true advocacy ads that influence Federal elections to be unconstitutional, then essentially all that would remain would be a ban on soft money. If that were to happen, we would be left with only one- half of the equation, and I share the concerns of those who want to see balanced reform--and a level playing field, not throw it even further off kilter. The Snowe-Jeffords approach would be much more likely to pass court muster. It was developed in consultation with noted constitutional scholars and reformers such as Norm Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute and Josh Rosenkrantz, Director of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU, as well as others. And it goes to the heart of the ``stealth advocacy ads'' which purport to be only about issues but are really designed to influence the outcome of federal elections. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the document from the Brennan Center for Justice be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Texas.

Ms. SNOWE. So I would urge my colleagues to adopt this conference report that allows the States of Texas and Vermont and Maine to do what 41 other States, including the State of Minnesota, have been able to do in the past.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, let me make a final comment. I think we have had very extensive debate. I believe that the facts have been emphasized and clarified with respect to this issue. The fact of the matter is, this compact adheres to all of the standards that have been applied to previous compacts ratified by the Congress, nine such instances as mandated by the U.S. Congress. The fact is, 82 Senators in this body represent States that have compacts, but the Senator from Minnesota is saying that somehow the States of Texas and Vermont and Maine should be discriminated against, that they should not be allowed to enter into a compact to safely dispose of low-level radioactive waste--waste, yes, that is generated by universities, by medical centers, by defense facilities, by power plants. The Senator from Minnesota is saying that somehow we should be treated differently from his own State of Minnesota and all of the other 40 States that are included in these compacts. The State of Texas has procedures, has a public process, has a political process to determine where the site should be located. The Senator from Minnesota is somehow suggesting that the State of Texas does not have the trust and the confidence of the people that it serves to make a judgment in adherence to their State environmental and public and health and safety laws as well as the Federal Government, all of which, I might add, have to be adhered to, all of which have been outlined in this process throughout. This has not been something that somehow has materialized out of thin air, overriding and breaching all of the environmental and safety laws in America.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I was informed earlier that I had 9 minutes remaining. I ask unanimous consent for 1 additional minute and the Senator from Minnesota to have an additional minute.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Texas have 2 additional minutes.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I am very pleased to be able to yield 4 minutes to my colleague from the State of Texas, Senator Hutchison.

Ms. SNOWE. The fact of the matter is that there has been a public process. There has been very careful evaluation and concern about the views of the constituents in the local area of Hudspeth County, of Sierra Blanca, of the State of Texas. The fact is, the Senator from Minnesota wants to treat the States of Texas, Vermont, and Maine differently from 41 other States, including the Senator's own State of Minnesota. The States of Texas, Vermont, and Maine are doing just what the Congress required them to do--enter into a compact. The failure of this Congress to approve this conference report and ratify this compact would mean that the State of Texas could not create one safe permanent disposal for low-level radioactive waste; that they would have to maintain 684 temporary storage facilities that do not meet the strict Federal, State and local requirements that this permanent facility would be required to meet. So, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to adopt this conference report. I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. SNOWE. The fact of the matter is that there has been extensive public participation, and it has not been completed. In fact, there were local elections in Hudspeth County, and all of the candidates who were in support of this facility were elected or reelected. I think that speaks volumes. This was an issue in those campaigns. I will also submit for the Record the list of supporters of the compact and the following letters; a letter from nine Texas Members of the House of Representatives; the Governors of Maine, Texas and Vermont; a letter from the National Governors' Association; the National Conference of State Legislatures; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; a ``Dear Colleague'' by two members of the Texas House of Representatives. All of them are in support of the Texas Compact before us here today. I ask unanimous consent that the list and these letters be printed in the Record.

Ms. SNOWE. I want to read this open letter that was placed as an advertisement in a local newspaper: We support the approval of the license for the proposed radioactive waste disposal facility near our town. It offers hope for a better future and tangible, real-life advances that will make Sierra Blanca and Hudspeth County more livable. The overwhelming majority of residents support this project near our town for the following reasons: A halt to exporting our children to other areas for employment; a larger job market for all residents of Sierra Blanca and Hudspeth County; the ripple effect seen from additional businesses and services to support the facility; improved medical care; increased property values; a broader tax base; enhanced infrastructure; disposal fees paid to the county; upward mobility, and an improved standard of living; a better perception of our community by ourselves and others. The critics--almost all of whom live outside the community--say the proposed site is not a reasonable road to economic development for Sierra Blanca. We say that these people do not speak for us and that this is our only road in sight. I believe the people of Hudspeth County have spoken. I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I think it is important this morning to review some of the facts regarding this conference report before the Senate that creates this Texas Compact, because I do think that some of the facts have been lightly regarded during the course of this debate. This is nothing that hasn't been done before. This conference report will ratify a compact between the States of Texas, Maine and Vermont for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste, as has been done on nine previous occasions by the U.S. Congress in response to a mandate by the Congress in both 1980 and 1985 that required the States to accept responsibility for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste. Mr. President, 41 States--including the State of Minnesota, the State which the Senator represents and who opposes this compact--have entered into a compact over the last 20 years in response to the mandate that was issued by the U.S. Congress. There are nine such compacts. This compact in this conference report does not deviate from the previous compacts. The fact of the matter is this compact gives greater control to the State of Texas in terms of the determination of the siting and all of the other factors to repeatedly and safely dispose of low-level radioactive waste. This compact allows the State of Texas, the State of Vermont and the State of Maine to do what 41 other States, including Senator Wellstone's own State of Minnesota, do--to dispose of this low-level radioactive waste. The States are responsible for making this determination, whether it is in their State or out of their State, for the waste that is generated within their borders. There are other factors that have to be clarified here today. The Senator from Minnesota said no other States in these compacts have determined or designated other sites--which is incorrect--at the time of the ratification. In fact, three other compacts--the Northwest, the Rocky Mountain and the Southeast, which passed by the Congress in 1985--had operating facilities that were intentionally designated as the compact's regional facility. As has been said, the failure of this Congress to ratify this conference report to create this compact will result in no facility being built in Texas. As this chart illustrates, there are 684 such storage sites in the State of Texas. They are temporary. They are interim storage facilities. What does that mean? It means that they don't have to meet all the same strict requirements that a permanent storage facility will have to meet. So if this conference report is ratified by the Congress, that means the State of Texas can consolidate into one permanent facility to meet all of the State, local and Federal requirements. It is not, as the Senator from Minnesota has suggested, that we are running roughshod, we are going to override all of the strict Federal, State and local regulatory requirements with respect to safety and health regulations, and of course environmental regulations. This issue isn't going to go away. The waste has already been generated. In fact, even the administrative law judge wants the commission to go back to review essential factors to indicate that the process is working so that all of the requirements under Federal, State and local law are examined very carefully, in terms of the site, so that it is environmentally and geologically safe and sound. But even the administrative law judge determined on July 7 that, indeed, the State of Texas is in need of a low-level waste disposal site. Congress did not put conditions on the nine other compacts that were ratified by Congress on previous occasions. So this compact should not be dealt with any differently. We are going to adhere to all of the safe requirements that have been established in law. So the siting in Texas is not being done in a vacuum. To the contrary. Just to name a few of the regulatory requirements that have to be reviewed and have to be satisfied and have to be adhered to and are being done, as included in this book right here that goes through the entirety of the process that has been implemented in the State of Texas for a siting of a facility, there is the Civil Rights Act, which has to be adhered to; title VI of the Civil Rights Act has to be regarded; the Clean Water Act; the Clean Air Act; the Toxic Substances Control Act; the Atomic Energy Act; the 1980 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act; the 1985 Amendments; the Texas Radiation Control Act, and the Texas Health and Safety Code. They all must be adhered to. So there is a process. The Senator from Minnesota suggests that there has not been a process, or public participation. To the contrary, there has been extensive public participation, and the process is not over. This compact is site neutral. That doesn't mean to say that the State of Texas hasn't been examining the site in Sierra Blanca, but the process has not been completed. It is being examined very carefully. There has been public participation. There have been numerous hearings within Hudspeth County and Sierra Blanca specifically about this issue. The Texas Legislature overwhelmingly has supported it in both the house and senate, as have the Governors, Governor Richards and Governor Bush; the State of Vermont, both legislatures, and the State of Maine, on a bipartisan basis. In fact, 24 of the 30 members of the Texas congressional delegation are all in support of this conference report. So it has been regarded. I want to read to my colleagues an open letter to the people of the State of Texas from 100 residents of Sierra Blanca and Hudspeth County. I ask unanimous consent to have a letter from Judge Peace, the county judge, printed in the Record.

Ms. SNOWE. May I be informed when I have consumed 10 minutes?

Ms. SNOWE. How much time do I have remaining?

Ms. SNOWE. I agree with that.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I am now pleased to yield to my colleague from Maine, Senator Collins.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. That's correct.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in recess until 9:15 a.m on Wednesday, September 2. I further ask that when the Senate reconvenes on Wednesday, immediately following the prayer, Senator Bennett be recognized to speak for up to 15 minutes in morning business.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 269 submitted earlier today by Senators Lott and Daschle.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess under the previous order.

Ms. SNOWE

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, when the Senate reconvenes on Wednesday at 9:15 a.m., Senator Bennett will be recognized for 15 minutes of morning business. Following the Senator's statement, the Senate will resume consideration of the Texas Compact conference report with 40 minutes of debate remaining. At the conclusion of that debate, the Senate will proceed to a vote on adoption of the conference report. Following that vote, the Senate will resume consideration of the foreign operations appropriations bill. Rollcall votes are expected throughout Wednesday's session as the Senate attempts to complete action on the Texas Compact, the foreign operations appropriations bill, and any other legislative or executive items cleared for action.