Arlen Specter

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. I yield it back and ask for an appropriate credit. Thank you.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, how much time of my 10 minutes remains?

Mr. SPECTER. I was then pleased to see my distinguished colleagues, Senator DeWine and Senator Kohl, introduce what is now S. 555, the No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act of 2005, which was accepted by voice vote yesterday. What this bill does essentially is to codify the ability of the Government to proceed against OPEC under the antitrust laws. It is my legal opinion, as set forth in the detailed letters to both President Clinton and President Bush, that the United States has that authority now, that it is not governmental activity when OPEC gets together and conspires, it is commercial activity. They do business in the United States. They are subject to our antitrust laws. And we should have moved on them a very long time ago. It is my hope the DeWine-Kohl bill, which I cosponsored, which has come out of the Judiciary Committee and the Antitrust Subcommittee, will be retained in conference. It is always a touchy matter to have a voice vote as opposed to a rollcall vote where if the numbers are very substantial it may be that the amendment will be taken more seriously in conference than if it is a voice vote. But I urge the managers to take the DeWine-Kohl amendment very seriously, which I have cosponsored. We ought to be moving against OPEC because of their cartel activity. To that end, I voted earlier today for the Schumer Sense of the Senate amendment calling on the President to confront OPEC to increase oil production and vigorously oversee oil markets to protect the U.S. from price gouging. I supported the amendment even though I disagreed with another section calling for the release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. While I recognize that the Sense of the Senate amendment is not binding, I believe the strong vote sends a signal to the Administration that there is support for action against OPEC. I know the floor is going to be very crowded a little later, so I am going to take this opportunity to speak very briefly on the amendment which is offered by Senator Bingaman--cosponsored by Bingaman-Byrd- Specter. And I think Senator Domenici is going to join it as well. I commend Senator Bingaman for his initiatives on the issue of our energy policy to try to cut down on emissions and to try to cut down on the problems of global warming. We have just had a vote on the amendment offered by Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman. We had a vote on it in the year 2003. It has always been a very attractive amendment. I opposed it because I believe that it puts the United States at a very substantial economic disadvantage with other countries that are not compelled to comply. As a Senator from Pennsylvania, I have a duty to be specially concerned about what is happening in coal, what is happening in steel, but I think the thrust of it is something. The objectives need to be obtained. The National Commission on Energy Policy published a report last year which deals with the problems of emissions reductions and the cap on emissions in trade so that one company may utilize the emission limit of another company. I have been in discussions with Senator Bingaman on that, and I am glad to see his amendment is moving forward at this time. I am pleased to be a cosponsor of his amendment. I believe this will take a significant step forward on the issue of global warming. It would always be desirable to move farther ahead in a more dramatic fashion, but I think this is a significant step forward. I have been pleased to work with Senator Domenici. I compliment the chairman. And Senator Bingaman, the ranking member, I compliment him on a number of amendments which I think will strengthen the energy policy of the United States. Exhibit 1 U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, April 11, 2000. President William Jefferson Clinton, The White House, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. President: In light of the very serious problems caused by the recent increase in oil prices, we know you will share our view that we should explore every possible alternative to stop OPEC and other oil- producing states from entering into agreements to restrict oil production in order to drive up the price of oil. This conduct is nothing more than an old-fashioned conspiracy in restraint of trade which has long been condemned under U.S. law, and which should be condemned under international law. After some considerable research, we suggest that serious consideration be given to two potential lawsuits against OPEC and the nations conspiring with it: (1) A suit in Federal district court under U.S. antitrust law. (2) A suit in the International Court of Justice at the Hague based, perhaps, upon an advisory opinion under ``the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,'' which includes prohibiting oil cartels from conspiring to limit production and raise prices. (1) A suit in Federal district court under U.S. antitrust law. A case can be made that your Administration can sue OPEC in Federal district court under U.S. antitrust law. OPEC is clearly engaging in a ``conspiracy in restraint of trade'' in violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1). The Administration has the power to sue under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 4 for injunctive relief to prevent such collusion. In addition, the Administration should consider suing OPEC for treble damages under the ``Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 15a), since OPEC's behavior has caused an ``injury'' to U.S. ``property.'' After all, the U.S. government is a major consumer of petroleum products and must I now pay higher prices for these products. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 30 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the consumers who were direct purchasers of certain hearing aides who alleged that collusion among manufacturers had led to an increase in prices had standing to sue those manufacturers under the Clayton Act since ``a consumer, deprived of money by reason of allegedly anticompetitive conduct is injured in `property' within the meaning of [the Clayton Act].'' Indirect purchasers would appear to be precluded from suit, even in a class action, under Illinois Brick v. Illinois 431 U.S. 720 (1977), but this would not bar the United States Government, as a direct purchaser, from having the requisite standing. One potential obstacle to such a suit is whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (``FSIA'') provides OPEC, a group of sovereign foreign nations, with immunity from suit in U.S. courts. To date, there has been a ruling on this issue in only on case. In International Association of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (1979), the District Court for the Central District of California held that the nations which comprise OPEC were immune from suit in the United States under the FSIA. We believe that this opinion was wrongly decided and that other district courts, including the D.C. District, can and should revisit the issue. This decision in Int. Assoc. of Machinists turned on the technical issue of whether or not the nations which comprise OPEC are engaging in ``commercial activity'' or ``governmental activity'' when they cooperate to sell their oil. If they are engaging in ``governmental activity,'' then the FSIA shields them from suit in U.S. courts. If, however, these nations are engaging in ``commercial activity,'' then they are subject to suit in the U.S. The California District Court held that OPEC activity is ``governmental activity.'' We disagree. It is certainly a governmental activity for a nation to regulate the extraction of petroleum from its territory by ensuring compliance with zoning, environmental and 'other regulatory regimes. It is clearly a commercial activity, however, for these nations to sit together and collude to limit their oil production for the sole purpose of increasing prices. The 9th Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling in Int. Assoc. of Machinists in 1981 (649 F.2d 1354), but on the basis of an entirely different legal principle. The 9th Circuit held that the Court could not hear this case because of the ``act of state'' doctrine, which holds that a U.S. court will not adjudicate a politically sensitive dispute which would require the court to judge the legality of the sovereign act of a foreign state. The 9th Circuit itself acknowledged in its Int. Assoc. of Machinists opinion that ``The [act of state] doctrine does not suggest a rigid rule of application,'' but rather application of the rule will depend on the circumstances of each case. The Court also noted that, ``A further consideration is the availability of internationally-accepted legal principles which would render the issues appropriate for judicial disposition.'' The Court then quotes from the Supreme Court's opinion in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964): It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international justice. Since the 9th Circuit issued its opinion in 1981, there have been major developments in international law that impact directly on the subject matter at issue. As we discuss in greater detail below, the 1990's have witnessed a significant increase in efforts to seek compliance with basic international norms of behavior through international courts and tribunals. In addition, there is strong evidence of an emerging consensus in international law that price fixing by cartels violates such international norms. Accordingly, a court choosing to apply the act of state doctrine to a dispute with OPEC today may very well reach a different conclusion than the 9th Circuit reached almost twenty years ago. You should also examine whether the anticompetitive conduct of the international oil cartel is being effectuated, by private companies who are subject to the enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws (for example, former state oil companies that have now been privatized) rather than sovereign foreign states. If such private oil companies are determined to in fact be participating in the anticompetitive conduct of the oil cartel, then we would urge that these companies be mulled as defendants in an antitrust lawsuit in addition to the OPEC members. (2) A suit in the International Court of Justice at the Hague based upon ``the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.'' which includes prohibiting oil cartels from conspiring to limit production and raise prices. In addition to such domestic antitrust actions, we believe you should give serious consideration to bringing a case against OPEC before the International Court of Justice (the ``ICJ') at the Hague. You should consider both a direct suit against the conspiring nations as well as a request for an advisory opinion from the Court through the auspices of the U.N. Security Council. The actions of OPEC in restraint of trade violate ``the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.'' Under Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, the Court is required to apply these ``general principles'' when deciding cases before it. This would clearly be a cutting-edge lawsuit, making new law at the international level. But there have been exciting developments in recent years which suggest that the ICJ would be willing to move in this direction. In a number of contexts, we have seen a greater respect for and adherence to fundamental international principles and norms by the world community. For example, we have seen the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993. Each of these bodies has been active, handing down numerous indictments and convictions against individuals who have violated fundamental principles of human rights. For example, as of December 1, 1999 the Yugoslavia tribunal alone had handed down 91 public indictments. Today, adherence to international principles has spread from the tribunals in the Hague to individual nations around the world. Recently, the exiled former dictator of Chad, Hissene Habre, was indicted in Senegal on charges of torture and barbarity stemming from his reign, where he allegedly killed and tortured thousands. This case is similar to the case brought against former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet by Spain on the basis of his alleged atrocities in Chile. At the request of the Spanish government, Pinochet was detained in London for months until an English court determined that he was too ill to stand trial. The emerging scope of international law was demonstrated in an advisory opinion sought by the U.N. General Assembly in 1996 to declare illegal the use or threat to use nuclear weapons. Such an issue would ordinarily be thought beyond the scope of a judicial determination given the doctrines of national sovereignty and the importance of nuclear weapons to the defense of many nations. The ICJ ultimately ruled eight to seven, however, that the use or threat to use nuclear weapons ``would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.'' The fact that this issue was subject to a decision by the ICJ, shows the rapidly expanding horizons of international law. While these emerging norms of international behavior have tended to focus more on human rights than on economic principles, there is one economic issue on which an international consensus has emerged in recent years--the illegitimacy of price fixing by cartels. For example, on April 27, 1998, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development issued an official ``Recommendation'' that all twenty-nine member nations ``ensure that their competition laws effectively halt and deter hard core cartels.'' The recommendation defines ``hard core cartels'' as those which, among other things, fix prices or establish output restriction quotas. The Recommendation further instructs member countries ``to cooperate with each other in enforcing their laws against such cartels.'' On October 9, 1998, eleven Western Hemisphere countries held the first ``Antitrust Summit of the Americas'' in Panama City, Panama. At the close of the summit, all eleven participants issued a joint communique in which they express their intention ``to affirm their commitment to effective enforcement of sound competition laws, particularly in combating illegal price-fixing, bid-rigging, and market allocation.'' The communique further expresses the intention of these countries to ``cooperate with one another . . . to maximize the efficacy and efficiency of the enforcement of each country's competition laws.'' One of the countries participating in this communique, Venezuela, is a member of OPEC. The behavior of OPEC and other oil-producing nations in restraint of trade violates U.S. antitrust law and basic international norms, and it is injuring the United States and its citizens in a very real way. Consideration of such legal action could provide an inducement to OPEC and other oil- producing countries to raise production to head off such litigation. We hope that you will seriously consider judicial action to put an end to such behavior. Arlen Specter. Herb Kohl. Charles Schumer. Mike DeWine. Strom Thurmond. Joe Biden.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for the time. I appreciate the 10 minutes. I will try to reduce that time because I see the congested calendar here today. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to comment, first, about the very serious situation with oil prices--approximating $60 a barrel now--and the average cost of gasoline across the country at $2.13. This is a problem which has beset the United States and the world for decades now. I remember with clarity the long gas lines in about 1973. I have believed for a long time that we ought to be moving against OPEC under the laws which prohibit conspiracies and restraint of trade. I set forth, in a fairly detailed letter to President Clinton, on April 11, 2000, my recommendations for litigation by the Federal Government against OPEC, and I repeated it in a letter to President Bush dated April 25, 2001. I ask unanimous consent that both of these letters be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my statement.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, along with my colleague, Senator Lautenberg, I am introducing the Justice for Marine Corps Families-- Victims of Terrorism Act. I am submitting this legislation on behalf of the families of the brave servicemen who died when terrorists--with the support of the Government of Iran--sent a suicide bomber into the Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, on October 23, 1983, killing 241 U.S. servicemen--18 sailors, 3 soldiers, and 220 marines. This legislation clarifies a private right of action, in Federal courts, for U.S. citizens against state sponsors of terrorism and will ultimately make it easier for victims of such acts to collect court- ordered damages against state-sponsors of terrorism. The specific provisions of the legislation have been drafted to harmonize existing statutory law with the recent decision by the District of Columbia circuit in Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, D.C. Cir. 2004, which held that ``neither 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. . . ., nor the two considered in tandem, creates a private right of action against a foreign government.'' 353 F.3d 1024, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 2004). This bill will permit the families of the brave servicemen who died at the Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, to collect court- ordered damages against state-sponsors of terrorism such as Iran. The initial section of the bill clarifies that victims of a state- sponsored terrorist attack are permitted to bring a private suit against the sponsoring foreign terrorist government. Congress first allowed U.S. citizen victims of state sponsored terrorism to pursue private actions against a foreign terrorist government when we passed the Flatow Amendment in 1996. Now, some 9 years and over 50 successful cases later, the Federal Appellate Court for the District of Columbia Circuit in Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 D.C., 2004, has held that the Flatow amendment did not create a private right of action against a foreign terrorist government. Accordingly, the initial section of this bill will correct Cicippio-Puleo by explicitly inserting language into the Flatow amendment enabling U.S. citizens to once again bring private suits against foreign terrorist governments who have murdered or maimed their loved ones. The second section of the bill eliminating many of the barriers which have prevented U.S. citizens from collecting on court ordered damages against state sponsors of terrorism. The bill does this by changing the legal standard of the Bancec doctrine from day to day-managerial control to those under the beneficial ownership of the state. The Supreme Court enunciated the so-called Bancec doctrine in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para EI Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626-27, 1983. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court created a presumption against a party that seeks to satisfy an outstanding judgment against a foreign government by seizing the foreign government's assets. This section of the bill will ease the burden on the families of victims of terrorism by permitting them to attach the hidden assets of terrorist states held within the United States. Finally, the remaining portions of the bill would create a mechanism whereby a lien could be filed in any jurisdiction in the United States where a state sponsor of terrorism directly or indirectly owns assets. This would prevent foreign state sponsors of terrorism from removing these assets from the country after the passage of this legislation. On October 23, 2004, in Philadelphia, I was privileged to take part in a memorial service held in honor of the servicemen killed in the 1983 Beirut attack. Some of the family members of those killed attended the event. Their moving comments about how they had been denied the ability to seek legal redress, despite clear findings implicating Iran in the attacks, were both poignant and persuasive. It is vitally important to victims' families that they have a private right of action against the state sponsor itself, not just against its officials, employees, or agents acting in their official capacity. These victims and their families deserve not only a day in court but also the ability to recover damages from these terrorist states that commit, direct, or materially support terrorist acts against American citizens or nationals. This bill reaffirms that the United States will not tolerate state-sponsored terrorism. Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to join us in support of this bill. I yield the floor. I ask unaminous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, along with my colleague, Senator Lautenberg, I am introducing the Justice for Marine Corps Families-- Victims of Terrorism Act. I am submitting this legislation on behalf of the families of the brave servicemen who died when terrorists--with the support of the Government of Iran--sent a suicide bomber into the Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, on October 23, 1983, killing 241 U.S. servicemen--18 sailors, 3 soldiers, and 220 marines. This legislation clarifies a private right of action, in Federal courts, for U.S. citizens against state sponsors of terrorism and will ultimately make it easier for victims of such acts to collect court- ordered damages against state-sponsors of terrorism. The specific provisions of the legislation have been drafted to harmonize existing statutory law with the recent decision by the District of Columbia circuit in Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, D.C. Cir. 2004, which held that ``neither 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. . . ., nor the two considered in tandem, creates a private right of action against a foreign government.'' 353 F.3d 1024, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 2004). This bill will permit the families of the brave servicemen who died at the Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, to collect court- ordered damages against state-sponsors of terrorism such as Iran. The initial section of the bill clarifies that victims of a state- sponsored terrorist attack are permitted to bring a private suit against the sponsoring foreign terrorist government. Congress first allowed U.S. citizen victims of state sponsored terrorism to pursue private actions against a foreign terrorist government when we passed the Flatow Amendment in 1996. Now, some 9 years and over 50 successful cases later, the Federal Appellate Court for the District of Columbia Circuit in Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 D.C., 2004, has held that the Flatow amendment did not create a private right of action against a foreign terrorist government. Accordingly, the initial section of this bill will correct Cicippio-Puleo by explicitly inserting language into the Flatow amendment enabling U.S. citizens to once again bring private suits against foreign terrorist governments who have murdered or maimed their loved ones. The second section of the bill eliminating many of the barriers which have prevented U.S. citizens from collecting on court ordered damages against state sponsors of terrorism. The bill does this by changing the legal standard of the Bancec doctrine from day to day-managerial control to those under the beneficial ownership of the state. The Supreme Court enunciated the so-called Bancec doctrine in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para EI Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626-27, 1983. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court created a presumption against a party that seeks to satisfy an outstanding judgment against a foreign government by seizing the foreign government's assets. This section of the bill will ease the burden on the families of victims of terrorism by permitting them to attach the hidden assets of terrorist states held within the United States. Finally, the remaining portions of the bill would create a mechanism whereby a lien could be filed in any jurisdiction in the United States where a state sponsor of terrorism directly or indirectly owns assets. This would prevent foreign state sponsors of terrorism from removing these assets from the country after the passage of this legislation. On October 23, 2004, in Philadelphia, I was privileged to take part in a memorial service held in honor of the servicemen killed in the 1983 Beirut attack. Some of the family members of those killed attended the event. Their moving comments about how they had been denied the ability to seek legal redress, despite clear findings implicating Iran in the attacks, were both poignant and persuasive. It is vitally important to victims' families that they have a private right of action against the state sponsor itself, not just against its officials, employees, or agents acting in their official capacity. These victims and their families deserve not only a day in court but also the ability to recover damages from these terrorist states that commit, direct, or materially support terrorist acts against American citizens or nationals. This bill reaffirms that the United States will not tolerate state-sponsored terrorism. Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to join us in support of this bill. I yield the floor. I ask unaminous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I rise to speak on behalf of Mr. Thomas B. Griffith for confirmation to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. I could not be here in my capacity as chairman of the Judiciary Committee to open the debate this afternoon because we had a field hearing on juvenile crime in Philadelphia. But I am here now because I want to express my views as to why I believe Mr. Griffith is preeminently well qualified to take on the important job of circuit judge in the District of Columbia. Mr. Griffith has an extraordinary academic background. He graduated from Brigham Young University with his bachelor's degree in 1978, with a summa cum laude rating and high honors. He also was valedictorian of his college. He earned his law degree from the University of Virginia. During law school, Mr. Griffith was a member of the Editorial and Articles Review Board of the Virginia Law Review, which is a very high position at a prestigious law school. Following law school, Mr. Griffith worked at the Charleston, NC, law firm of Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson. He then continued his very distinguished professional career as a partner at Wiley, Rein & Fielding. In 1995, by unanimous resolution, the Senate, sponsored by the Republican and Democratic leaders, appointed him to the nonpartisan position of Senate legal counsel. During his tenure as Senate legal counsel, Mr. Griffith tackled a very tough issue relating to the impeachment of President Clinton. He did an outstanding job. He also argued, on behalf of the Senate, two very important matters involving committee investigations and the line item veto litigation, which resulted in two landmark decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States, At the conclusion of his tenure, Mr. Griffith was unanimously endorsed by a bipartisan resolution, cosponsored by Senator Daschle, Senator Lott, Senator Dodd, and Senator McConnell, expressing the Senate's gratitude for his services as Senate legal counsel. There were especially complimentary remarks made by Senator Dodd, who said, ``Mark Twain once suggested, `Always do right. This will gratify some people and astonish the rest.' During his tenure as legal counsel, Tom exemplified this philosophy, impressing all who knew him with his knowledge of the law and never succumbing to the temptation to bend the law to partisan ends. All of us who serve here in the Senate know the importance of the rule of law; but let us never forget that it is individuals like Mr. Thomas Griffith whose calling it is to put that ideal into practice.'' Senator Thurmond also expressed high praise for Mr. Griffith, as did Senator Lott. Beyond his work in the profession, Mr. Griffith has found time to give back to the community. He serves as an advisory board member to the ABA Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative. Furthermore, while in private practice, Mr. Griffith took on a significant pro bono representation of a death row inmate, which led to the commutation of the inmate's sentence by the Governor of Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Congressional Record, statements of support on behalf of Mr. Griffith.

Mr. SPECTER. There has been a challenge against Mr. Griffith, with respect to his Utah bar membership. Because he serves as general counsel to Brigham Young University, there were some questions raised as to whether he should have been a member of the Utah bar. I think that issue has been clarified, although some are still contesting it. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a full explanation of the Utah bar membership issue.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SPECTER. Similarly, there had been an issue regarding Mr. Griffith's lapsed membership in the District of Columbia bar, which occurred because of an administrative oversight. Excuse me; nothing is as troublesome as a pesky summer cold. Without this cold, my speech would be considerably longer, Mr. President, so there are some advantages, at least, for anyone who may be watching on C-SPAN--if anyone watches C-SPAN during these late afternoon proceedings of the Senate. I ask unanimous consent that a full explanation of the DC Bar membership issue also be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER. We had a second hearing for Mr. Griffith this year, after I became chairman, because his original hearing was not well attended. It was held at the end of the last session. At the hearing this year, I think we explored in considerable detail the issue of his D.C. bar membership. It is always a difficult matter when a lawyer is a member of one bar and seeks to become a member of another. I know I went through a similar issue when I took the New Jersey bar, 23 years after I attended law school. It is an experience, but I went through it. However, I think this by no means disqualifies Mr. Griffith, and I think the issue has been adequately explained on the record. Tom Griffith is well known in the Senate, perhaps better known than virtually any other judicial nominee who comes here, because he had been legal counsel to the Senate. I think many people who know Mr. Griffith on a personal, intimate basis know of his high ethical standards, his scholarship, and his legal ability. He is soft spoken. He is mature. He is knowledgeable. I think he will make a fine circuit judge. Mr. Griffith comes with an especially strong recommendation from the former chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Hatch, who has known Mr. Griffith personally for many years, and speaks very highly of him. Regrettably, I cannot be here tomorrow to speak again, as is the practice for the chairman to speak immediately before leadership, because I will be traveling in Pennsylvania with President Bush. Tom Griffith is an outstanding candidate, and I urge my colleagues to vote to confirm him. Mr. President, in the absence of any Senator seeking recognition, in fact, in the absence of any other Senator on the floor, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, President George W. Bush first nominated Judge Richard Allen Griffin to the Sixth Circuit on June 26, 2002. During the 108th Congress, on June 16, 2004, the committee held a hearing on the nomination of Judge Griffin. He was successfully voted out of committee on July 20, 2004. Judge Griffin is a judge of the Michigan Court of Appeals currently serving his 16th year on the court. Judge Griffin is an outstanding and highly qualified candidate. After graduating magna cum laude from Western Michigan University Honors College, Judge Griffin received his juris doctor from the University of Michigan Law School in 1977. Upon graduating from law school, Judge Griffin clerked for the Honorable Washtenaw Circuit Judge Ross W. Campbell. He then became an associate and eventual partner at Coulter Cunningham, Davison & Read. In 1985, Judge Griffin started his own firm, Read & Griffin, where he practiced a broad range of litigation, including automobile negligence, premises liability, products liability, and employment law. Judge Griffin engaged in both plaintiff and defense personal injury litigation. During this time, Judge Griffin also provided pro bono legal services as a volunteer counselor and attorney with the Third Level Crisis Clinic. In 1989, Judge Griffin successfully ran for the Michigan Court of Appeals. He was reelected to retain his seat in 1996, and again in 2002. The American Bar Association rated Judge Griffin ``Well-Qualified'' for appointment to the Sixth Circuit. Judge Griffin has engaged in numerous noteworthy activities. In addition to his duties on the Michigan Court of Appeals, Judge Griffin also devotes a significant amount of time to volunteer activities. Judge Griffin has served as president of the Grant Traverse Zoological Society since 1987. He also has served as chief judge of the YMCA Youth in Government Mock Trial Program since 1997. Judge Griffin has widespread support. Gerald Ford, 38th President of the United States, said: I can say with conviction that Judge Griffin is a person of the highest quality character. As the record shows, he has been a very excellent Judge with unquestioned integrity. Maura D. Corrigan, chief justice, Michigan Supreme Court, said: Judge Griffin brings a depth of practical experience and a grasp of real life problems to the decisions of cases . . . Richard Allen Griffin is a man of integrity and probity who is fully capable of discharging the duty of protecting our Constitution and laws. He is deserving of the public trust as he has already proven himself worthy of that trust during his years of service to the State of Michigan. William C. Whitbeck, chief judge, Michigan Court of Appeals, said: [T]here is no question that the United States Senate should promptly confirm Judge Griffin for the position on the Sixth Circuit . . . He is a decisive, scholarly judge with an instinct for the core issues and with a flair for authoring crisp, understandable opinions. Stephen L. Borrello, judge, Michigan Court of Appeals, said: Judge Griffin possesses a rare trait amongst my colleagues: an intrinsic sense of justice. His innate fairness is combined with a rigorous work ethic and a thorough grasp of legal issues. Judge Griffin is one of the finest jurists in this State. Mr. President, Judge David McKeague was originally nominated by President George W. Bush on November 8, 2001, and was renominated by the President on February 14, 2005. He received a hearing on June 16, 2004, and was voted out of the Judiciary Committee on July 20, 2004. Judge McKeague is extremely well qualified to sit on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Judge McKeague has a B.A. from the University of Michigan and a J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School. Upon his graduation from law school, he joined the law firm of Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C., in Lansing, MI, and was elected a shareholder and director of the firm. Judge McKeague served on the firm's Executive Committee in various offices, and was chairman of the firm's Government and Commerce Department, for many years before his confirmation to the Federal bench in 1992. Since February 1992, Judge McKeague has served as a judge on the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. Judge McKeague has regularly participated by designation on, and authorized appellate opinions for, panels of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The American Bar Association has rated Judge McKeague as unanimously ``well-qualified'' for appointment to the Sixth Circuit. Judge McKeague is an active member of the community and several professional associations. Judge McKeague has been active as a member of several community, local, and professional organizations, including the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Federal Judicial Center, the Michigan State and Ingham County bar associations. Both while in private practice and while on the Federal bench, Judge McKeague has directed and participated in numerous seminars, moot court competitions, and trial advocacy programs at high schools, universities and law schools throughout Michigan. Prior to his confirmation to the Federal bench, he served 6 years in the U.S. Army Reserve. Since 1998, he has also served as an adjunct professor of law at Michigan State University's Detroit College of Law, where he teaches Federal Jurisdiction and Trial Advocacy. Judge McKeague has the support of many attorneys and peers in Michigan, including several Democrats. John H. Logie, attorney and Mayor of Grand Rapids, said: What emerged from our mutual experiences was a deep admiration for Judge McKeague's concerns both with the processes of the court and with their impact on people. If these are matters that we want out appellate judges to have in equal measure, then I can and do assure you that he will be an excellent choice. Paul D. Borman, U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, said: I have known Judge McKeague for seven years and I can vouch for his intelligence, hard work, and commitment to equal protection under the law. Randall S. Levine, attorney and life-long Democrat, said: Judge McKeague is extremely intelligence, possesses a sharp wit and keen intellect . . . His integrity is beyond reproach.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I know our colleagues are anxious to vote. I have put into the Record statements in support of the nominations of Richard Allen Griffin to be a judge on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and David W. McKeague to be, similarly, a judge on the Sixth Circuit. It would have been gratifying a couple of years ago to have had this confirmation at that time, but it is good to have it now rather than at some time in the future. It would not serve any useful purpose to go through the litany of reasons these nominees have been held up. Suffice it to say, they are very well qualified, and the Sixth Circuit is in a state of crisis, and it will help the administration of justice to have these nominees confirmed. Mr. President, I believe we are ready to vote. vote on nomination of richard a. griffin

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. In conclusion, it is a very healthy situation in that we are now proceeding to take up these nominees individually. That is something which I had sought to do since taking over the chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee. We have moved ahead now with three controversial nominees. It is my hope we will continue to take up these nominees, one at a time, and evaluate them on their merits. As I have said in a number of floor statements, we have reached the current confrontation because of a practice which goes back almost 20 years, starting with the last 2 years of the Reagan administration and continuing with 4 years of President Bush, and when the Democrats took control of the Senate and the Judiciary Committee, they stopped the processing of judges and slowed it down. Then when we Republicans won the election in 1994, for the last 6 years of the Clinton administration we slowed down the process and tied up some 70 judges in committee, a practice that I objected to at the time, and supported Judge Paez and Judge Berzon and others. Then the controversy was ratcheted up with the unprecedented systematic filibustering of judges, and then the unprecedented move by President Bush in the interim appointment, after the Senate rejected a judge, albeit by the route of not getting cloture. My time has expired, and I note the presence of the distinguished Democratic leader, so I yield the floor in midsentence, Mr. President. Exhibit 1 Senator Specter. The Chairman has asked about whether you have made some comments which you now consider intemperate, and I regret, that I could not be here earlier today, but as you know, we have many conflicting schedules. But I note the comment you made after Planned Parenthood v. Casey, where you were quoted as saying--first I would ask you if this quote is accurate. I have seen a quote or two not accurate. ``In the 1992 case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey the Court preserved the worst abomination of constitutional law in our history,'' close quote. Is that an accurate quotation of yours? Mr. Pryor. Yes. Senator Specter. Is that one which would fall into the category that Senator Hatch has commented on, you wish you had not made? Mr. Pryor. No, I stand by that comment. Senator Specter. Why do you consider it an abomination, Attorney General Pryor? Mr. Pryor. Well, I believe that not only is the case unsupported by the text and structure of the Constitution, but it had led to a morally wrong result. It has led to the slaughter of millions of innocent unborn children. That's my personal belief. Senator Specter. With that personal belief, Attorney General Pryor, what assurances can you give to the many who are raising a question as to whether when you characterized it an abomination and slaughter, that you can follow a decision of the United States Supreme Court, which you consider an abomination and having led to slaughter? Mr. Pryor. I would invite anyone to look at my record as Attorney General, where I've done just that. We had a partial birth abortion law in our State that was challenged by abortion clinics in Alabama in 1997. It could have been interpreted broadly or it could have been interpreted narrowly. I ordered the district attorneys of Alabama to give it its narrowest construction because that was based on my reading of Roe and Casey. I ordered the district attorneys to apply that law only to post-viable fetuses. I could have read it easily more broadly. The governor who appointed me was governor at the time and a party to the lawsuit, disagreed with me and openly criticized me. A pro-life activist in Alabama criticized me. But I did it because I thought that was the right legal decision. I still had an obligation to defend Alabama law. This was a recently-passed Alabama law. When the Supreme Court of the United States later of course struck down this kind of partial birth abortion law, we conceded immediately in district court that the decision was binding, but until then I was making the narrowest argument I could make, trying to be faithful to the Supreme Court's precedent, while also being faithful to my role as Attorney General and my oath of office to defend a law recently passed by the legislature. Senator Specter. When you talk about post-viability and you have the categorization of partial birth or late-term abortion, is not that statute necessarily directed toward post-viability? Mr. Pryor. That was one of the main arguments I made in construing it, but if you look at the actual language-- Senator Specter. Well, I asked you that question as to whether there was a basis for construing it to the contrary. When you talk about partial birth abortion, we are talking about an event in the birth canal which is definitely post- viability. When you talk about late-term abortion, we are also talking about post-viability. So aside from having some people who will raise a question about anything, whether there is a question to be raised or not, was it not reasonably plain on the face of the statute that they were talking about post-viability? Mr. Pryor. No, I don't think anyone would contend life. I believe that abortion is morally wrong. I've never wavered from that, and in representing the people of Alabama, I have been a candid, engaged Attorney General, who has been involved in the type of-- Chairman Hatch. What does that mean with regard to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals? If you get on that court, how are you going to treat Roe v. Wade? Mr. Pryor. Well, my record as Attorney General shows that I am able to put aside my personal beliefs and follow the law, even when I strongly disagree with it, to look carefully at precedents and to do my duty. That is the same duty that I would have as a judge. Now, as an advocate for the State of Alabama of course I have an obligation to make a reasonable argument in defense of the law, but as a judge I would have to do my best to determine from the precedents what the law actually at the end of the day requires. My record demonstrates that I can do that. Chairman Hatch. So even though you disagree with Roe v. Wade you would act in, accordance with Roe v. Wade on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals? Mr. Pryor. Even though I strongly disagree with Roe v. Wade I have acted in accordance with this as Attorney General and would continue to do so as a Court of Appeals Judge. Chairman Hatch. Can we rely on that? Mr. Pryor. You can take it to the bank, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SPECTER. Shortly after becoming chairman of the Judiciary Committee, within a week, by memorandum dated January 12 of this year, I sent to all members of the Judiciary Committee a memorandum including summaries of some of Judge Pryor's statements which I thought merited analysis and reconsideration by those who had opposed him in the past. Those opinions included the decision in DIRECTV v. Treworgy, where Judge Pryor ruled against a major satellite transmission corporation, instead siding with a private citizen to shield him from liability. Also, a case on Judge Pryor's decision protecting religious liberty, Benning v. Georgia, also decided in the year 2004. A case illustrating Judge Pryor's protection of civil rights in the case of Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Incorporated. A case which involved a district court's dismissal of a female employee's gender discrimination claims. Judge Pryor reinstated her claim of bias as to promotion and remanded back to the district court. By way of amplification of the case I referred to on Benning v. Georgia, that involved a situation when the Georgia prison system refused an inmate's request to practice his Jewish faith. Judge Pryor enabled the prisoner to continue to worship in his preferred manner. The case involving Sarmiento-Cisneros, where Judge Pryor ruled protecting immigrants' rights, involved a Mexican immigrant who desired to remain in the United States with his family. Judge Pryor vacated the deportation order, enabling the family to remain together, and brought a commonsense interpretation to a harsh ruling by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The case of Brown v. Johnson is an illustration of Judge Pryor's judgment and decision in protecting prisoners' rights. Judge Pryor recognized the need for improvement in the treatment of an inmate afflicted with HIV and concluded that prison officials were not sufficiently concerned about the serious medical needs under the Eighth and 14th Amendments. Judge Pryor also stood by the petitioner, permitting him to proceed in forma pauperis. Judge Pryor has faced, in his capacity as Attorney General of Alabama, quite a number of situations where he took positions which were very unpopular politically and contrary to his own views, but did so because of his determination and his recognition that he was supposed to uphold the law of the land. In a very highly celebrated case nationally and internationally, as Attorney General for Alabama he proceeded against Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore for refusing to remove the large depiction of the Ten Commandments on display in the Alabama Supreme Court after the Federal courts ruled the display was unconstitutional. In that case, Judge Pryor commented that his personal beliefs were contrary to what he was ruling. He took a lot of criticism from his Alabama constituency and when asked about his decision to enforce the law against Alabama Chief Justice Moore, Judge Pryor stated: This was not a tough call. I believe that our freedom depends on the rule of law. The reason the American experiment has been successful is because we are a nation of laws and not of men. No person is above the law. We have to abide by the law even when we disagree with it. That is the guiding principle of my public service. Hard to structure a response better than that. Cannot do any better than that, when you say you disagree with something and you disagree strongly, but you recognize your obligation to enforce the law. On other occasions, then-Attorney General Pryor set aside personal beliefs and instructed State law enforcement officials to enforce the Supreme Court rulings. Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling in Lawrence v. Texas, he released a press statement through the Web site of the Office of Attorney General saying that in light of the Supreme Court ruling in Lawrence: the law of Alabama . . . which prohibits consensual sodomy between unmarried persons, is now unenforceable. Similarly, after the Supreme Court ruled in Stenberg v. Carhart, which struck down a Nebraska law prohibiting partial-birth abortion, then-Attorney General Pryor issued a statement to State officials saying State officials ``are obligated to obey the Stenberg ruling until it is overruled or otherwise set aside.'' Judge Pryor's record shows commitment to improving race relations and protecting racial equality. As attorney general, Judge Pryor worked with President Clinton's U.S. attorney Doug Jones to prosecute former klansmen who bombed Birmingham's 16th Street Baptist Church in the 1960s which resulted in the death of four young girls. He helped to start a drive to rid the Alabama Constitution of its racist prohibition on interracial marriage and then stepped up to head the effort to end the ban, ultimately to its victory in November of 2000. He dedicated much of his career to protecting the interests and the safety of women. As Attorney General, he supported and lobbied for legislation that created a State crime of domestic violence. I ask unanimous consent the summaries of the cases which I referred to previously be printed in the Record, with a pertinent letter, at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to support the nomination of Judge William H. Pryor, Jr., to be a judge for the Eleventh Circuit. It has been divided. Judge Pryor comes to this position with a very distinguished record. He graduated from Northeast Louisiana University in 1984, magna cum laude; from the Tulane University School of Law in 1987, again magna cum laude; was editor-chief of the Law Review of the Tulane University School of Law, which is no minor achievement. There are not too many editors-in-chief around. That is quite an accomplishment. So the academic career is really extraordinary. Following graduation from law school, he was law clerk to Judge John Minor Wisdom for the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, a very distinguished jurist. A I speak on this subject, the Presiding Officer is Senator Lamar Alexander, who, as I recollect, was also a law clerk to Judge John Minor Wisdom and, on the recommendation of Senator Alexander, he spoke very highly of William Pryor, the people who knew him in a very distinguished clerkship, one of America's great, historical jurists. Bill Pryor was his law clerk. He then had a distinguished record in the practice of law, working for the firm of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal; was an adjunct professor at the Samford University, Cumberland School of Law; and came back into the practice of law for 4 more years with Walston, Stabler, Wells, Anderson & Bains. Then, from 1995 to 2004, he was Deputy Attorney General and also Attorney General of the State of Alabama and has been on the U.S. Circuit Court for the Eleventh Circuit now for a year, having obtained an interim appointment from President Bush. Judge Pryor has been criticized for his views, expressed very forcefully, in opposition to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Roe v. Wade. The quotation attributed to him was that it was the ``worst abomination of constitutional law in our history,'' which is pretty strong language. That is about as strong as you can get. The issue is not what is his personal view of Roe v. Wade. The issue is what would he do as a circuit court of appeals judge when faced with the responsibility to uphold the law of the land, of the Supreme Court. This subject came up during the confirmation hearing of Judge Pryor before the Judiciary Committee on June 11, 2003. I propounded the following question to Judge Pryor: The Chairman [Senator Hatch at the time] has asked about whether you have made some comments which you consider intemperate, and I regret I could not be here earlier today, but as you know, we have many conflicting schedules. But I note the comment you made after Planned Parenthood v. Casey, where you were quoted as saying--first I would ask you if this is accurate. I have seen a quote or two not accurate. ``In the 1992 case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey the Court preserved the worst abomination of constitutional law in our history,'' . . . is that an accurate quotation of yours? Mr. Pryor. Yes. It is pretty hard to get a simple answer of a witness anywhere and I appreciated that kind of brevity. I continued: Senator Specter. Is that one which would fall into the category that Senator Hatch has commented on, you wish you had not made? Mr. Pryor: No, I stand by the comment. Then I asked: Why do you consider it an abomination, Attorney General Pryor? And he responded: Well, I believe that not only is the case unsupported by the text and structure of the Constitution. But it has led to a morally wrong result. And he goes on to give his reasons for his conclusion. He was very candid, very steadfast, and stood up to what he had said and was not running from it. Later, he made it plain he would abide by the law of the land, that his personal views of Roe v. Wade were not determinative. The record shows my own view has been to uphold the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, a subject I will not discuss as to my own views, but I respect a difference of opinion. In looking for the confirmation of a Federal judge, the issue is, will he follow the law of the land. He said he would and said so very emphatically on the record. On March 3 of this year, I wrote to Senator Reid because this question had come up. I cited the applicable page of the Record June 11, page 45 of the transcript where the following exchange occurred: Chairman Hatch. So even when you disagree with Roe v. Wade you would act in accordance with Roe v. Wade on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals? Mr. Pryor. Even though I strongly disagree with Roe v. Wade I have acted in accordance with it as Attorney General and would continue to do so as a Court of Appeals judge. Chairman Hatch. Can we rely on that? Mr. Pryor. You can take it to the bank, Mr. Chairman. Again, that is about as emphatic as you can be on that subject. During the course of Judge Pryor's tenure on the Court of Appeals, he has handed down quite a number of opinions which show maturity, which show growth, and which undercut many of the objections of his critics. I ask unanimous consent the relevant portions of the transcript I have just referred to from the Judiciary Committee hearing and the letter which I sent to Senator Reid dated March 3, 2005, be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my statement.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, as the debate winds down on the nomination of California State Supreme Court Justice Janice Rogers Brown, I suggest to my colleagues that this debate is really not about Justice Brown at all, but it is about the escalating battle which has been going on between the two parties since the last 2 years of President Reagan's administration and continuing up to the present time. I was on the Judiciary Committee in the last 2 years of the Reagan administration, having served since I was elected in 1980 on that committee, and there was a limited list to be confirmed after the Democrats took control of the Senate in the 1986 election, for 1987 and 1988. Then the policy was continued during the 4 years of President George Herbert Walker Bush. I recall pending Third Circuit nominees who were not going to be considered because we were not going to confirm any more of the President's nominees. Then the situation was exacerbated to a new level during the years of President Clinton, when some 60 judges were bottled up. I opposed that practice at the time as a Republican on the Judiciary Committee and supported Judge Berzon, Judge Paez, and others, and urged that we not have party payback. Then the matter was exacerbated to new levels with the unprecedented use of systematic filibusters, the first time in the history of the country that has been done. Then the President responded with an interim appointment, the first interim appointment in the history of the Senate on a Senate rejection, albeit by the filibuster route. Then we came to the critical issue of how we were going to handle the future with the heavy debate on the so-called constitutional or nuclear option. And finally, we worked our way through on individual judges, without reviewing all of that history. What this nomination is all about is party payback time. That is what it is. In the 25 years I have been on the Judiciary Committee, I have seen the committee routinely confirm circuit judges who were no better qualified and, in many cases, not as well qualified as Justice Brown. We had two very celebrated cases where two nominees for circuit court went through with relative ease, and then their records were subjected to very intense scrutiny during nomination hearings for the Supreme Court of the United States. But the practice has been to confirm the circuit judges. The argument is made that circuit judges play a critical role, and will make law because their cases will not be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which grants certiorari in so few cases. But the fact is that no one judge can do that on the circuit. The judges sit in panels of three. So if one judge is way out of line, does something egregious, there has to be a second judge concurring. And if there is concurrence on something that is out of line, the circuit courts have the court en banc to correct it. And then there is always the appeal or petition to the Supreme Court of the United States. One thing that has troubled me is the unwillingness of Senators to concede that both sides have been wrong--to make the explicit concession that their side has been wrong at least in part. I have scoured the Record and noted a comment made by the leader of the Democrats, Senator Reid, who said this on May 19: Let's not dwell on what went on in the 4 years of President Bush's administration. I am sure there is plenty of blame to go around. As we look back, I am not sure--and it is difficult to say this and I say it--I am not sure either was handled properly. I have known it wasn't right to simply bury 69 nominations. And in hindsight, maybe we could have done these 10 a little differently. It seems to me that we really ought to be able to admit the wrongs on both sides--to have a clean slate, to start over and try to have Senators vote their individual consciences on matters such as filibusters. In talking to my colleagues who are Democrats, I heard many say they did not like the systematic filibusters; it was not the right thing to do. But there is a party straitjacket on, so it is done. Similarly, in the Republican cloakroom and Republican caucus, many of my colleagues voiced objections to the so-called constitutional or nuclear option. But there again, party loyalty has come into play. We have admitted our mistakes in the past, historical mistakes, egregious mistakes on race, women's suffrage and women's rights, the rights of criminal defendants, and many, many things. It would not be too much for both sides to say we have both been wrong and let's move ahead. But there has been payback and payback, and the American people are sick and tired of the rankling. When you put aside those factors, I suggest that State Supreme Court Justice Janice Rogers Brown stacks up fine against the long litany of circuit judges who have been confirmed by the Senate. We know the details. I spoke at length on this nomination on Monday of this week, before the floor became congested with many Senators who wanted to speak, and spoke at that time in my capacity as chairman of the committee. Now I have been allotted 10 minutes to speak as we wind down this debate. Her record is really exemplary. She was born in Alabama in 1949 to sharecroppers. She had an excellent record in college and in law school. She went back to get a master's degree from the University of Virginia after she was on the State supreme court in California. She has been pilloried for statements that have been made in speeches. As is well known, not to be unduly repetitious--I made a comment about this on Monday--if everybody in public life, including Senators, were held to everything they have said, none of us would be elected, confirmed, appointed, or asked to do anything in the public sphere. If somebody put a microscope on the countless tracks of statements I have made in the Congressional Record--a court reporter is taking this down, and it will be in the Congressional Record forever-- if I were to be suggested for some important job, it is not hard to find something someone has said at some time that would be a disqualifier. The proof is in the pudding on her cases. She has handled a lot of cases, and I went through those cases in great detail. It is true that she has made undiplomatic statements, but she is not in the State Department. In speeches, she has talked about limiting Government, but when her cases were reviewed and analyzed, she has upheld the authority of the Government in many lines which I detailed in a speech the day before yesterday. Similarly, she has upheld individual rights. On the merits, this is a nominee who, in my view, is worthy of confirmation to the Court of Appeals. On Monday, I made a brief reference to an opinion by Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes about 80 years ago where he talks about the importance of individualization, free thinking, and free speech, and has one of the most poignant phrases in any Supreme Court opinion: that ``time has upset many fighting faiths.'' Time has upset many fighting faiths, and in the free interplay of ideas, we come to the best values and the best ideas in the marketplace. If you have a nominee who exercises some independence and individuality in her speeches but has solid judicial opinions and a solid professional record, solid work in the State government, that is the test as to whether she ought to be confirmed. If it were not party payback time, this ferocious debate would not be undertaken. That is why I am going to vote to confirm State supreme court justice Janice Rogers Brown. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to support the proceeding to invoke cloture, cut off debate, on California State Supreme Court Justice Janice Rogers Brown, and to bring her to a vote for confirmation to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Justice Brown comes to this body with a truly outstanding academic and professional record. She is a graduate of the California State University-Sacramento in 1974. She received her law degree from the University of California at Los Angeles in 1977 and then has had an illustrious career in government in the practice of law and on the bench. She has served in very important legislative roles with the California Legislative Counsel Bureau where she was deputy legislative counsel. She was deputy attorney general for some 8 years; deputy secretary and general counsel for the State of California Business, Transportation and Housing Agency for 3 years, and then came to the court of appeals, which is an intermediate appellate court in California, for 3 years before becoming a justice on the Supreme Court of California, where she has sat since 1996 until the present time. During the midst of her career, she has gone on to get a master's degree at the University of Virginia School of Law in the year 2004 which, I would say, is quite an achievement for someone who has been in the California court to take on that kind of academic endeavor and to earn a master's degree. Beyond her professional work, she has been very active in the community, working with the Youth for Citizenship which serves young people, high school students, teaching them history, civics, reasoning, and debating skills. She is a participant in a program called ``Playing by the Rules'' sponsored by a local baseball team, which brings together lawyers, judges, baseball, and elementary and junior high school students to explore life lessons, good citizenship, and the rule of law. She is a founding board member of Rio Americano High School's Academy Civitas, a 3-year program which specializes in history and political philosophy and seeks to encourage civic virtue by having students participate in internships with Government agencies. She is the first African-American woman to serve on California's highest court. She is the daughter of sharecroppers, having been born in Greenville, AL, in 1949, 5 years before Brown v. Board of Education. She attended segregated schools and came of age in the midst of Jim Crow policies in the South, which is not easy to do. With all of that, she has had an extraordinary and really illustrious career. I suggest to my colleagues in the Senate that the confirmation process of Justice Janice Rogers Brown would not be nearly so complicated if it were not set in a timeframe where, for the past two decades, virtually, there has been an exacerbation of the issue of confirmation of judges when one party held the White House and the other political party held the Senate and the Judiciary Committee. I have served on the Judiciary Committee since my election in 1980. I personally observed, in the last 2 years of President Reagan's administration, after Democrats won control of the Senate in the 1986 election, that the process was slowed down, and the process was further slowed down during the full 4 years of the administration of President George Herbert Walker Bush. I have detailed these in previous floor statements and will not now reiterate them. Then, in the last 6 years of President Clinton's administration, nearly 70 nominees by President Clinton were held up in committee, and that was payback, in effect, for what had happened for the last 2 years of President Reagan's administration and the 4 years of the administration of the first President Bush. When the Republicans won control of the Senate, the Democrats then resorted to the filibuster, which was the first systematic use of the filibuster against judicial nominees in the history of this country. That was followed by President Bush's use of the interim appointment power, the first time in history that the interim appointment power had been used for a judicial nominee after a rejection by the Senate, albeit by the filibuster route. That stopped when there was a commitment made not to use it any more, and the nomination process went forward. Let us take a look at the record of Justice Janice Rogers Brown and take a look at the record of Justice Owen, now Judge Owen confirmed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, or Judge Pryor, whose nomination will be before the Senate hopefully in the next several days. We have confirmed many circuit judges during my tenure since my election in 1980, all which I have spent in the service of the Judiciary Committee, who had records not as good as those of Justice Brown or Justice Owen or Judge Pryor. Had we had not been in this situation of holding up judges when one party controlled the White House and the other controlled the Senate and the exacerbation of this situation, we would not have reached the critical stage in which the Senate has been in the immediate past. We have seen a situation where the filibuster went on and, in my own personal opinion--and I have expressed this at some length in prior floor statements--Democrats were not really pleased with this systematic filibuster. That led to the potential retaliation of the Constitution or nuclear option. I do not think many, if not most, of the Republicans were pleased with that sort of an alternative. But the whole situation had spiraled out of control. As Senators, we do have a fundamental constitutional obligation to consent, if we choose to do so, to the President's nominees to the bench. This is an advice and consent function under the United States Constitution. That does specify--I think it is more than implication, I think it is really specification--that there be independent judgment used by Senators in coming to that decision. Just as there is a requirement of independence, if there is to be separation of power, then the party which controls the White House ought not to be an automatic rubberstamp for the President. Similarly, the party out of power ought not to be an automatic filibustering machine; there ought to be independent judgment. And that is why I had urged the leaders, again in extended floor statements which I shall not now repeat, to liberate their Members from the straight party-line, straitjacket vote and allow them to exercise their independence. I think if the 100 Senators were left to our own judgments as to what kind of a nominee ought to be filibustered, Justice Janice Rogers Brown would never have been filibustered. Similarly, if we Senators--Republicans on the situation of the constitutional or nuclear option--had been left to our own judgment, we would have rejected the idea of having the constitutional or nuclear option. So we have come to a situation now where at least we have moved to confirm Justice Owen, and we are on the brink of the confirmation process of Justice Brown with, as we all know, the agreement of some 14 Senators that there would not be a filibuster as to Justice Brown. It is true that if you take a look at some of Justice Brown's statements in a context of diplomacy, they might have been left better unsaid, but if everybody in public life--and that would even include Senators--were held to every last syllable that each of us uttered, it would not be a very difficult matter to go through the tracks of speeches each of us has made and find some items on which to be highly critical. Justice Brown has been criticized for a comment which she made criticizing Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner, where she referred to the ``triumph of our own socialist revolution'' in 1937. But if we take a look at Justice Brown's decisions, we find her decisions are not in line with that kind of a loose condemnatory statement. In Lochyer v. Shamrock Foods, Justice Brown joined the court's opinion upholding California's stringent standards, which exceeded Federal standards, for identifying and labeling milk and milk products. That is hardly an inactive government. In the case of Lungren v. Superior Court, she joined the court's opinion, broadly construing the phrase ``source of drinking water'' in the State's clean water statute so that plaintiffs could proceed with their case. Again, not exactly denial of governmental authority. In the case of Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., she joined the court in upholding State regulations regarding overtime pay that applied greater protection to workers than Federal law. Here, again, that is active State regulation. In Pearl v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board, she joined the court's opinion, upholding the Worker's Compensation Board's stringent standards for ensuring the safety of workers, awarding the plaintiff, an injured police officer, higher benefits; again, sound judicial thinking and not exactly denial of the authority of the State to legislate and look after the common welfare. She made a statement with respect to discrimination saying it is not ``. . . based on age is not . . . like race and sex discrimination. It does not mark its victim with a `stigma of inferiority and second class citizenship'; it is the unavoidable consequence of that universal leveler: time.'' That is perhaps an effort to be scholarly, perhaps to be poetic, but hardly disqualifying. If we take a look at her opinions on the bench, they demonstrate a very distinctive regard for civil rights. In People v. McKay, hers was the lone dissent, arguing for the exclusion of evidence of drug possession that was discovered after the defendant was arrested for riding his bicycle the wrong way on a residential street. Her dissent pointedly suggested that the defendant was the victim of racial profiling and included an impassioned critique of that practice. In Kasky v. Nike, the court held that Nike's statements denying mistreatment of overseas workers constituted commercial speech subject to the State truth in advertising laws. Justice Brown dissented saying that Nike's speech constituted noncommercial speech worthy of more strict first amendment protection. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, but in opinions issued by Justices Breyer and Stevens, there were strong suggestions that if the Court had taken the appeal, Justice Brown's position might well have been upheld, in a very difficult case, where it is hard to draw the line as to what constitutes commercial speech or what is noncommercial speech entitled to more stringent protections under the first amendment. In this case, as in so many others, Justice Brown demonstrated a real concern for constitutional protections. In re Brown, she wrote the court's opinion reversing a verdict and death sentence on grounds that the prosecutor deprived the defendant of a fair trial by failing to discover and disclose an arguably exculpatory blood test. In Visciotti, she dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that a defendant's death sentence should be set aside on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. In the interest of time, I am not going to delineate any more of Justice Brown's opinions, but I would like to put into the Record some summaries of criticism of Justice Brown where she has been criticized for her attitude toward big Government, where she has been criticized for some rulings on civil rights, where she has been criticized for rulings on the first amendment, and where she has been criticized for rulings on criminal law. I ask unanimous consent that these summaries be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER. I ask unanimous consent that quotations from certain of Justice Brown's supporters be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER. One of the cases which I studied in law school was the famous dissent by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who argued for dissent and for freedom of speech, saying what I think is, if not the most famous quotation in Supreme Court history--that is pretty hard to categorize--certainly one of the most famous where he said that ``time has upset many fighting faiths.'' That is why we encourage independent thought. That is why we encourage dissent. There are many dissents which have become the law of the land. Dred Scott was overturned. Plessy v. Ferguson on segregation was overturned. Brown v. Mississippi established the rule of due process of law for State court criminal proceedings, and dissenting opinions of Brandeis and Holmes and Cardozo have become the law of the land. So when one sees someone who might not conform exactly to the kind of thought or might be a little more colorful in phraseology, it is not necessarily something to be discouraged. If one takes a close reading as to what Justice Brown has had to say, she is worthy of confirmation by this Senate. As we analyze nominees for the Federal court, as we analyze nominees for any important position, we ought not to discourage individualism, independence, and free thought. The phrase that ``time has upset many fighting faiths,'' encouraging independence and free thought has been a great bulwark for the progress of this country. I yield the floor, and in the absence of any other Senators seeking recognition, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition today to introduce The Gynecological Cancer Education and Awareness Act of 2005 also known as Johanna's Law. Every year, over 80,000 women in the United States are newly diagnosed with some form of gynecologic cancer such as ovarian, uterine, or cervical cancer. In 2005, 29,000 American women are expected to die from these cancers. Early detection of these cancers must be improved to decrease this tragic loss of life. Unfortunately, thousands of women in the U.S. each year aren't diagnosed until their cancers have progressed to more advanced and far less treatable stages. In the case of ovarian cancer, which kills more women in the U.S. than all other gynecologic cancers combined, 70 percent of all new diagnoses take place after this cancer has progressed beyond its earliest and most survivable stage. Women are often diagnosed many months, sometimes more than a year after they first experience symptoms due to a lack of knowledge of early warning signs of gynecological cancers. Adding to the challenge of a prompt and accurate diagnosis is the similarity of gynecological cancer symptoms to those of more common gastrointestinal conditions and benign gynecologic conditions such as perimenopause and menopause. Women too often receive diagnoses reflecting these benign conditions without their physicians having first considered gynecologic cancers as a possible cause of the symptoms. The Gynecological Cancer Education and Awareness Act will improve early detection of gynecologic cancers by creating a national awareness and an education outreach campaign to inform physicians and individuals of the risk factors and symptoms of these diseases. When gynecological cancer is detected in its earliest stage, patients 5-year survival rates are greater than 90 percent and many go on to live normal, healthy lives. The national awareness campaign will be carried out by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to increase women's awareness and knowledge of gynecologic cancers. The campaign will maintain and distribute a supply of written materials that provide information to the public about gynecologic cancers. Further, the program will develop public service announcements encouraging women to discuss their risks for gynecologic cancers with their physicians, and inform the public about the availability of written materials and how to obtain them. The projected cost of the awareness campaign is $5 million per year from 2006-2008, totaling $15 million. The educational outreach campaign will be carried out through demonstration grants through HHS. These demonstration grants will go to local and national non-profits to test different outreach and education strategies, including those directed at providers, women, and their families. Groups with demonstrated expertise in gynecologic cancer education, treatment, or in working with groups of women who are at especially high risk will be given priority. Grant funding recipients will also be asked to work in cooperation with health providers, hospitals, and state health departments. The projected cost of the educational outreach campaign is $10 million per year from 2006-2008, totaling $30 million. This legislation was brought to my attention by my friend Fran Drescher, who was diagnosed with uterine cancer in 2000 and whose diagnosis was also delayed due to her lack of knowledge about symptoms of this disease. She has recovered from uterine cancer and is advocating on behalf of gynecological cancer awareness. She also brought to my attention one of the many victims of gynecological cancers Johanna Silver Gordon, after whom this bill is named, who was diagnosed at an advanced stage of ovarian cancer. Johanna, the daughter and sister of physicians, was extremely health conscious taking the appropriate measures to maintain a healthy lifestyle including exercising regularly, eating nutritiously, and receiving annual Pap smears and pelvic exams. Johanna however did not have the information to know that the gastric symptoms she experienced in the fall of 1996 were common symptoms of ovarian cancer. She didn't learn these crucial facts until after she was diagnosed at an advanced stage of this cancer. Despite aggressive treatment that included four surgeries, various types of chemotherapy, and participation in two clinical trials, Johanna died from ovarian cancer 3\1/2\ years after being diagnosed. Johanna is survived by her sister Sheryl Silver who has tirelessly worked to increase the information available regarding gynecological cancers. As Chairman of the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Subcommittee, I led, along with Senator Harkin, the effort to double funding for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) over five years. Funding for the NIH has increased from $11.3 billion in fiscal year 1995 to $28.5 billion in fiscal year 2005. In 2004, the NIH, through the National Cancer Institute provided $212.5 million for gynecological cancer research. Further, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program (NBCCEDP) provided $209 million in fiscal year 2005 for breast and gynecological cancer screening and diagnostic services, including: pap tests, surgical consultation, and diagnostic testing for women whose screening outcome is abnormal. To date, the Program has screened more than 2.1 million women, provided more than 5 million screening exams, and diagnosed 66,295 pre-cancerous cervical lesions and 1,262 invasive cervical cancers. We must continue these efforts to do more to provide information about gynecological cancer to physicians and those most at risk. I believe this bill can provide desperately needed information to physicians and individuals so that women can be diagnosed faster and more effectively. I urge my colleagues to work with Senator Harkin and me to move this legislation forward promptly. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to honor George W. Mullen of Pennsylvania, who will step down as State Adjutant of the Pennsylvania Department of Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States this June. George's retirement will mark the end of a distinguished 59 year career of service to our military, our veterans community, and our Nation. George W. Mullen joined the United States Navy in 1943 at the age of 17 and served during World War II aboard the merchant ship SS Ben Holt and the destroyer USS Cotton in both the Atlantic and Pacific Theatres. While on active duty aboard the Holt, his ship arrived 2 days after the invasion of Normandy, France, to help supply Allied forces in the battle against Germany. His duty on the Cotton included helping rescue a downed American pilot and supporting the invasion of Okinawa. George worked at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Coatesville for 35 years before becoming the Pennsylvania Veterans of Foreign Wars State Adjutant in 1983. As a member of the Pennsylvania War Veterans Council and the Pennsylvania State Veterans Commission, he has been a familiar face to governors and many State and Federal legislators who have sought his guidance. Mr. Mullen, who lives in Parkesburg, has touched many lives and that has not gone unnoticed. He has been honored at the local, State and national level for his many contributions. While humble in service to others, George has always stood for what is right and remains a staunch supporter of our troops. His will be hard shoes to fill, and he will be missed. We wish George and his wife Dawn well in future endeavors, and thank him for his dedication to duty, hard work, and professionalism.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to offer legislation to halt Saudi Arabia's support for institutions that fund, train, incite or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, and to secure full Saudi cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents and organizations. Despite the Saudi government's attempts to show otherwise, a growing amount of evidence indicates that Saudi Arabia has provided only lackluster support for U.S. investigations into terrorist networks, such as al Qaeda. Mounting documentation and reports have revealed that since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Saudi citizens have provided significant amounts of financial support to al Qaeda, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations. The Saudi government continues to use direct and indirect means to support organizations that propagate hate and incite terror around the world. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted in 2001, mandates that all states ``refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts . . . take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts . . . deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts . . . ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice'' and that member countries ``afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts.'' I would like to share some findings with my colleagues that I believe paint a clear picture that Saudi Arabia has failed to comply with this U.N. standard. Saudi Arabia's lack of cooperation with the United States is not a post 9/11 phenomenon. At the time of the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996, I chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee. I visited Dhahran and had the opportunity to inspect the results of the car bomb which killed nineteen of our airmen and injured 400 others. In that situation, U.S. investigators were denied the opportunity to interview the suspects. I personally met with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and requested that the FBI be permitted to speak with suspects in custody. Crown Prince Abdullah denied my request and informed me that the United States should not meddle in Saudi internal affairs. The murder of nineteen U.S. airmen and the wounding of 400 more hardly qualifies as a Saudi internal affair. A joint committee of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives issued a report on July 24, 2003, which found ``a number of U.S. Government officials complained to the Joint Inquiry about a lack of Saudi cooperation in terrorism investigations both before and after the September 11 attacks.'' With regard to dealing with Saudi officials, General Counsel of the Treasury Department, David Aufhauser, testified on July 23, 2002, that ``there is an almost intuitive sense, however, that things are not being volunteered. So I want to fully inform you about it, that we have to ask and we have to seek and we have to strive.'' The Saudi Government has asserted its right to question Saudi nationals captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, yet according to a September 15, 2003 issue of Time Magazine, the Saudi Government denied ``U.S. officials access to several suspects in custody, including a Saudi in detention for months who had knowledge of extensive plans to inject poison gas in the New York City subway system.'' In a June 2004 report entitled ``Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing'', the Council on Foreign Relations reported that ``we find it regrettable and unacceptable that since September 11, 2001, we know of not a single Saudi donor of funds to terrorist groups who have been publicly punished.'' Additionally, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also referred to as the 9/11 Commission, interviewed numerous military officers and government officials who repeatedly listed Saudi Arabia as a prime place for terrorists to set up bases. ``In talking with American and foreign government officials and military officers on the front lines fighting terrorists today, we [9/11 Commission] asked them: If you were a terrorist leader today, where would you locate your base? Some of the same places come up again and again on their lists . . . the Arabian Peninsula, especially Saudi Arabia.'' The U.S. should not be in the position of begging for information and expending time and energy pleading for assistance from Saudi Arabia on matters of such great importance to our national security. In the case of funneling funds to terrorist organizations, Saudi Arabia cannot be permitted to turn a blind eye to the millions of dollars its citizens funnel to radical organizations. It sends a message to the U.S. that they are not serious about stemming the flow of support for terror and it sends a message to their own people that this type of behavior is tolerated. The New York Times reported on September 17, 2003, that ``at least fifty percent of Hamas's current operating budget of about $10 million a year comes from people in Saudi Arabia.'' In a July 3, 2003 report, The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) reported that various Saudi organizations have funneled over four billion dollars to finance the Palestinian intifada that began in September 2000. The 9/11 Commission also clearly stated that ``Saudi Arabia's society was a place where al Qaeda raised money directly from individuals through charities.'' In testimony presented to the Senate Judiciary Committee in July 2003, David Aufhauser, General Counsel of the Treasury Department, was asked if the trail of money funding terrorists led back to Saudi Arabia. He indicated that ``in many cases it is the epicenter.'' Not only has the government failed to halt the hemorrhaging of terrorist funds from its citizens, but its own leadership has reportedly provided significant support for terrorist organizations. Saudi Arabia must begin by getting its own house in order which includes rooting out those of its leaders and those in its government who are fanning the fire of hate. According to the aforementioned MEMRI report, ``for decades the royal family of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been the main financial supporter of Palestinian groups fighting Israel.'' In addition to financial support, Saudi Arabia, through its various domestic and foreign institutions, has supported the spread of radical ideology. A report released on January 28, 2005 by Freedom House's Center for Religious Freedom found that Saudi Arabia is the state most responsible for the propagation of material promoting hatred, intolerance, and violence within United States mosques and Islamic centers, and that these publications are often official publications of a Saudi ministry or distributed by the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC. Freedom House also found that ``while the government of Saudi Arabia claims to be `updating' or reforming its textbooks and study materials within the Kingdom, its publications propagating an ideology of hatred remain plentiful in some prominent American mosques and Islamic centers, and continue to be a principal resource available to students of Islam within the United States.'' One such document Freedom House collected from a Herndon, Virginia mosque, distributed by the Cultural Department of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, was found to contain ``virulent denunciations of Christians and of the infidelity of their beliefs and practices. It offers intricate guidelines concerning the proper relations Muslims should have with non-Muslims while they reside in the latter's `lands of shirk and kufr' (i.e. lands of idolatry and infidelity).'' The report also found a fatwa in a Saudi Embassy publication condemning tolerant Muslims and ``is followed by selective Koranic verses that spell out the infidelity of Jews and Christians and condemn them to the eternal fires of hell.'' In a May 2003 report on Saudi Arabia, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom found ``some Saudi government-funded textbooks used both in Saudi Arabia and also in North American Islamic schools and mosques have been found to encourage incitement to violence against non-Muslims.'' The Commission further found ``offensive and discriminatory language in Saudi government-sponsored school textbooks, sermons in mosques, and articles and commentary in the media about Jews, Christians, and non-Wahhabi streams of Islam.'' The September 13, 2003 issue of Time Magazine reported eighth and ninth grade Saudi textbooks which read ``that Allah cursed Jews and Christians and turned some of them into apes and pigs . . . and that Judgment Day will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them.'' Time also, found that ``many of the Taliban, who went on to rule much of Afghanistan, were educated in Saudi-financed madaris in Pakistan.'' In the September 2003 issue of Time Magazine, a former Saudi diplomat, Mohammed al-Khilewi, stated that ``the Saudi government spends billions of dollars to establish cultural centers in the U.S. and all over the world'' and that they ``use these centers to recruit individuals and to establish extreme organizations.'' It is no surprise that it is from these fertile grounds that fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were born and radicalized. To be successful in the global war on terrorism we need the proactive and full cooperation of all nations--especially those who consider themselves allies of the United States. The Saudi Government must provide complete, unrestricted and unobstructed cooperation to the United States in the investigation of terrorist organizations and individuals. This bill directs the President to certify to Congress that the Government of Saudi Arabia is fully cooperating with the United States in investigating and preventing terrorist attacks, has closed permanently all Saudi-based terror organizations, has ended funding for any offshore terrorist organization, and has made all efforts to block funding from private Saudi citizens and entities to offshore terrorist organizations. If Saudi Arabia fails to take such steps, this legislation will require the President to prohibit certain exports to Saudi Arabia and restrict the travel of Saudi diplomats. This legislation permits the President to waive such sanctions if he determines it is in the national security interest of the United States. Two major objectives in the Global War on Terrorism are to deny terrorists safe haven and to eradicate the sources of terrorist financing. We cannot be successful in this war by ignoring the problem Saudi Arabia presents to our security. The government of Saudi Arabia can no longer remain idle while its citizenry continues to provide the wherewithal for terrorist groups with global reach nor can it continue to directly facilitate and support institutions that incite violence. President Bush has stated that the United States ``will challenge the enemies of reform, confront the allies of terror, and expect a higher standard from our friends.'' The 108th Congress passed, and the President signed, the Syrian Accountability Act. I believe the Saudis are a much greater threat to U.S. interests than the Syrians and there ought to be a very firm approach to our relationship with the Saudi Government. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the problems in our bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia must be confronted openly-- this legislation takes a step in that direction.