Arlen Specter

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. The concern I have, having gotten an understanding on the applicability of the statute, which the Senator and I are in agreement with, is, how is it going to work? I characterized it, while the Senator was off the floor, as a procedural quagmire. If you have a case--and I cited a couple of them--where a child is born, and the mother has an HMO which encourages release from the hospital within 12 hours, and the child, unfortunately, dies--and I cited a specific case--and then you have a series of claims which were brought by the plaintiff and one of the claims involves interpretation of the contract, is that care covered by the contract? Then if there are other claims for negligence on the part of the doctor or hospital, that would then fall under the amendment of the Senator from North Carolina under State court jurisdiction. I cited another case where you had a woman who was suicidal, she was released from the hospital, the doctor wanted to put her back in, and the HMO wouldn't let him do that. She committed suicide. A suit was brought and the HMO defended it on the ground that it wasn't covered. That went from the Federal court. They dealt with the exclusive preemption under 502. But the aspect of ``quality of care'' is a State court action. You have perpetuated that. It is very difficult, obviously, to move totally away from Federal jurisdiction under ERISA on the interpretation of the contract because there is so much law on the subject. I know my colleague will agree with me on that generalization. What happens when you have the suicide? The mother of the infant is released from the hospital within 24 hours, and the claims are made. They are essentially the same claims. They are claiming that they are covered under the contract. They are claiming personal injuries, loss of earning potential, or for the woman who has committed suicide, loss of earnings, loss of consortium, the whole range. Having litigated some of these cases, you more recently than I. But the essential claims are going to be the same: Personal injuries for both the claim for coverage and ``quantity of care" as opposed to the claim for ``quality of care'' or malpractice. So how is it going to be resolved with two separate courts, Federal court having jurisdiction over ``quantity,'' and State court having jurisdiction over ``quality?''

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I agree with the Senator from North Carolina. There has been erosion on the preemption of 514 where the courts have really seen the inequities of denying injured parties relief, and instead of being under 502 with ``quantity'', they have tried to move the cases into ``quality'' with the broader interpretation where some relief has been granted. I am a cosponsor of the amendment. As I said earlier, one of the concerns that I candidly expressed a decade ago was my surprise over the reach of the preemption of ERISA. It seemed to me to be unfair to deny injured plaintiffs redress in the courts because of the preemptions which were really designed originally under other kinds of benefit plans and not under health maintenance organization plans. When the HMOs came into being, they took the benefit of the same kind of preemption. But in this legislation you have the dichotomy where some cases are heard in the Federal courts as they relate to ``quantity care'' or interpretation of the contract, and other cases or the same case may be heard in the State court as it relates to a medical malpractice or the ``quality of care.'' My question to the Senator is, isn't that an accurate statement?

Mr. SPECTER. I would be glad to repeat the question. As the Senator and I were talking this morning, isn't it accurate that the courts have made a distinction in ERISA, section 502, on what is contract coverage or ``quantity'' with complete preemption under existing law?

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I agree with the general delineation that it was a medically reviewable decision. That is called ``quality of care,'' as I have said before, and is a malpractice issue. But the question which I have directed to the Senator from Massachusetts is a much narrower question. To repeat, is this not a question on the interpretation of the contracts, specifically where an item of service is covered under the terms and conditions of the plan for coverage? That is my question. The interpretation of ``an item of service is covered under the terms and conditions of the plan for coverage'' is a matter for the Federal court. I believe it is plain from the language on 139 to 141 that it is a Federal matter. But if you move to an interpretation of what is medical malpractice or a breach of duty by a doctor on what is a medically reviewable decision, then that is a matter which goes to the State courts. And this legislation does not continue the preemption of existing law. If I might have the attention of the Senator from North Carolina, Madam President, this is an issue which my distinguished colleague from North Carolina and I have been discussing for several days. And this morning in my hideaway we discussed the complications, at least as I saw them, on having the provisions of the pending bill which deal with this complex dichotomy of an interpretation of contract coverage, which is set forth at line 24, 25 on page 140 over to lines 1 and 2 on 141, which comment regarding an item of service covered under the terms and conditions of the plan for coverage which comes under the category of availability for Federal civil remedies. Then if you move over to a medically reviewable decision on medical malpractice, there is the difference. Is my interpretation correct that the legislation provides for cause of action in different courts, No. 1? It is the coverage of the contract, or what the courts have called ``quantity'' malpractice and what the courts have called ``quality.''

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, if the Senator cares to read the next paragraph, where he makes a claim of being taken out of context, I would be interested in hearing him read any such paragraph.

Mr. SPECTER. I do want a response, but not in the middle of my sentence or the middle of my question. But to go forward here on the availability of Federal civil remedies in cases not involving medically reviewable decisions, this covers, line 24-25: regarding whether an item of service is covered under the terms and conditions of the plan or coverage,[.] My question to the Senator from Massachusetts: Isn't that an explicit conclusive statement that, if it is a matter of interpreting a contract as to what service is covered under the terms and conditions of the plan or coverage, that is a Federal remedy? That is what it says in black and white, doesn't it? I ask Senator Kennedy.

Mr. SPECTER. If I may be permitted to finish my sentence, since I do have the floor----

Mr. SPECTER. Going on to 140.

Mr. SPECTER. If I might have the attention of the Senator from Massachusetts, on the preceding page, 139, section 302 talks about the ``availability of civil remedies.'' (a) Availability of Federal Civil Remedies In Cases Not Involving Medically Reviewable Decisions.

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I suggest that is at variance with the provisions of the Senator's bill. I will cite the exact citation here. At page 140, if I might call it to the attention of the Senator from Massachusetts, section 502 of ERISA, which is brought in the Federal court, and at the bottom, line 24: (I) regarding whether an item of service is covered under the terms and conditions of the plan or coverage, So that is a section where you have Federal court jurisdiction, and that would be the issue, as to interpretation of a contract to determine coverage. I ask the Senator from Massachusetts if that is not an accurate citation of the Senator's bill?

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I would press the question as to the interpretation of the insurance contract, which defined the rights of the parties under the contract. Isn't it plain, under your bill, I say to Senator Kennedy, that this is a matter which goes to the Federal court?

Mr. SPECTER. I do not intend to litigate a case on the Senate floor. So without referring to a specific case, I ask the Senator from Massachusetts, is it true that under his bill a claim which calls for interpretation of coverage of the insurance contract for so-called ``quality of care'' would be brought in the Federal court, and a claim which might--which would arise out of the same occurrence, which involved malpractice, or a ``quality'' case--would that not, under his bill, be brought under the State court?

Mr. SPECTER. Did the Senator from Massachusetts suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I declined to enter into a time agreement because this is an amendment which deals with the complex subject of jurisdiction. I have long been a cosponsor for a Patients' Bill of Rights, and I was surprised to learn many years ago of the Federal preemption which precluded an injured patient--for example, where a family doctor recommended a specialist and the HMO refused to provide the specialist to the person and the person was injured, or perhaps died, and had no redress in the Federal courts because of the so-called preemption under ERISA. It has seemed to me for many years that that was one of the problems that ought to be addressed. I compliment Senator McCain, Senator Kennedy, and Senator Edwards for the work they have done, and also Senator Frist, Senator Breaux, and Senator Jeffords for their companion bill, and what the managers have done here. This amendment addresses what I believe, from my experience as a litigator in the civil courts, to be a very fundamental question of concern as to what courts these cases are going to be tried in. The very brief history of ERISA is that cases which have been brought under section 502 of ERISA are governed by what is called the doctrine of complete preemption, and that is where the cases involve contract interpretation, or so-called quantity of medical care. Under ERISA, section 514, a plaintiff's case has been barred where it relates to an employee benefit plan, and that has been decided by the case law, and has been referred to as quality of care or medical malpractice. For many years, under ERISA, which was enacted in the 1970s, that barred any action at all. But as the courts saw the difficulty of this matter, there gradually came to be a loosening of the interpretation and noted succinctly in a Fifth Circuit opinion, Corporate Health Insurance v. The State Department of Texas, where Circuit Judge Higginbotham noted that the court had ``repeatedly struggled with the open-ended character of preemption provisions of ERISA and also the Federal Employers Health Benefits Act.'' The court noted that there had been a faithful following of the Supreme Court's broad reading of ``relate to'' in its opinions decided during the first twenty years after ERISA's enactment. Since then in a trilogy of cases, DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Services Fund, 117 S.Ct. 1747 (1997); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 117 S.Ct. 832 (1997); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins., Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671 (1995), the Court has confronted the reality and had limited the application of that preemption so the cases were brought for medical malpractice in the State courts. The provisions of the McCain-Edwards-Kennedy bill provide that where you have an action brought on contract interpretation or ``quantity of medical care,'' those cases will go to the Federal court, but where you have a claim which is brought for the ``quality of medical care,'' or so-called malpractice, those cases will go to the State court. I suggest to my colleagues that to have the two courts handle the matters in that way will result in procedural quagmire because if you have a case such as the following where a child is born to a mother who has a plan under an HMO which seeks to limit the hospital stay to 24 hours. The patient is then discharged and an unfortunate result happens to the child. There will be both claims under the so-called quantity interpretation of the contract and quality on medical malpractice. That is illustrated in the case of Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare, 1 F. Supp. 2d 420, a case which was heard in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in 1998. In that case, and this illustrates the kind of an issue I am referring to, the HMO plan had policies which encouraged the discharge of a mother and a newborn within 24 hours after birth. Mrs. Bauman was discharged after that time elapsed, and the next day the Baumans' daughter fell ill. The Baumans contacted the HMO and requested a home visit by a nurse. The HMO refused to send a nurse, and the daughter died of meningitis the same day. The Baumans brought an action against the HMO, the doctor, and the hospital, and they went into State court. The HMO removed the case to Federal court as they had a right to under ERISA. The district court made a determination that counts under the complaint relating to the discharge decision were ``quality-of-care'' decisions, and the counts would be remanded to the State court. The district court said that the failure to provide the nurse was a ``quantity'' decision and, therefore, was preempted totally. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a case captioned In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, reversed the district court holding that the claim was a quality decision. The Bauman case illustrates the point about how hard it is to decide whether a claim is a ``quantity'' claim or a ``quality'' claim. Under the McCain bill, the claim that the Baumans would bring if the McCain bill were enacted, would be in the Federal court on the issue of plan coverage because that is a determination of the ``quantity'' of medical care, but that the other claims would be brought in the State court. I suggest obviously that is a procedural quagmire. The point is further illustrated by an opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in a case called Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 237 F.3d 242, decided just last year, where the underlying facts show the plaintiff's wife was hospitalized for attempted suicide. She was released but continued to have thoughts of suicide. Her doctor refused to readmit her to a hospital, and thereafter, regrettably and unfortunately, she killed herself. In the State court, the plaintiff sued the HMO. The case was removed to the Federal court where the counts on direct liability against the HMO were dismissed. The case was then remanded to the State court and then removed again by the HMO to the Federal court. The Federal court dismissed some of the counts against the HMO but remanded the case to the State court because of the various vicarious liability claims which the plaintiff had against the HMO. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the district court on one liability count and remanded the case to the district court. That is legalese, obviously, and very hard to present in the course of a floor statement in a Senate debate on this subject, but it is illustrative of a point that where you have a situation where an HMO covers certain kinds of treatments for medical illness and you have a question as to the coverage, under the McCain bill that claim would go to the Federal court, but if there is a claim on malpractice, failure of the doctor to exercise ordinary care, that case would go to the State court. There is no doubt that with the long history which the Federal courts have had on interpreting ERISA that there is going to be the first line of jurisdiction, and appropriately so, in the Federal court. My amendment would provide that the Federal court would have exclusive jurisdiction over all of the claims. In a situation where the HMO would have its case heard in the Federal court, the Federal courts frequently will retain jurisdiction over the doctors, the nurses, and the hospital, and the other parties where the matter would ordinarily go to State court on what is called pendent or supplemental jurisdiction. Again, it is very complicated. It does not lend itself to a short time agreement, but the upshot of it is that if you have the provisions of the McCain bill which give jurisdiction to the Federal court on contract interpretation or ``quantity of care" and jurisdictions in the State court on malpractice or ``quality of care'', a plaintiff is going to have to go to two courts to get both of the claims adjudicated which is, as I say, a procedural quagmire. The amendment which I have proposed would give appropriate deference to State law by providing that it would be the law of the State where the incident occurred which would govern the lawsuit. That is to say that the damages would be determined by State law and damages do vary among the 50 States. Also, if the State had a cap or a limit on the amount which could be collected, that would be determinative when the case is brought in the Federal court. This is very much like the diversity cases where jurisdiction resides in the Federal court, where the plaintiff is a resident of one State and the defendant is a resident of another State. A simple illustration would be if a patient from Camden, NJ, is treated in a Philadelphia, PA, hospital by a Philadelphia physician and there is an allegation of malpractice, negligence on the part of the physician and the hospital, then the resident of the State of New Jersey could sue in the Federal court with requisite jurisdictional amount, but it would be the law of Pennsylvania which would govern, or the plaintiff could sue in the State court of Pennsylvania. State courts would have jurisdiction. Once you bring the HMO into the picture and you have what is traditionally under ERISA, it has to start out in the Federal court at least as the contract interpretation and ``quantity of care.'' That is why it is my view, my legal judgment, that it is necessary to avoid the procedural quagmire to have the Federal court have jurisdiction over the entire matter. The question has been raised as to choice of law and venue, the question raised by my distinguished colleague from Tennessee, and I specified in the legislation that it would be the place of the incident which would determine the applicable law. Again, liability varies from State to State and venue has an important place. We want to avoid the potential of judge shopping so that the choice of law and the determination of venue would be where the incident occurred. There is another important aspect to the litigation in the Federal court because of a feeling of a greater confidence in the Federal judicial system than in some State court judicial system. This is a touchy point, but it is one which the Judiciary Committee examined in some detail last year in considering the question of amending diversity jurisdiction in class action cases. Class action is when plaintiffs join to sue a defendant. There had been, for illustrative purposes, a case which had been denied class action status by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and the plaintiffs then went to Louisiana, to a favored county, and instituted the class action case and had the class action certified. Diversity jurisdiction is easily defeated in a class action matter because if you have many plaintiffs, as you do in a class action, and a single defendant, all you have to do to avoid diversity jurisdiction is to have one of the plaintiffs a resident of the same State as the defendant. In order to have a diversity jurisdiction in the Federal court, all the plaintiffs have to be from a State other than the residence of a defendant. In the Judiciary Committee report on this subject, the following facts of findings were made: Some State court judges are less careful than their Federal court counterparts about applying the procedural requirements that govern class actions. That appears on page 16 of the report of the Judiciary Committee reporting this bill out at a 10-8 vote. On the next page, page 17, appears the following statement: A second abuse that is common in State court class actions is the use of the class device as ``judicial blackmail.'' That is a fairly strong condemnation in citing that criticism of the State courts. I do not suggest the impugning of all State court judges everywhere. But there is a considerable difference in many States in the quality of the courts where you have electoral process in many States, contrasted with the Federal system of life tenure, where I believe it is fair to say it is generally accepted that the caliber of the Federal courts is better, at least as a generalization. There has been a great deal of concern expressed by some about the unlimited potential that would be present in a Patients' Bill of Rights in exposing defendants, HMOs, and employers to very high verdicts which would increase the cost of health care. So there is some assurance, I think fairly stated, by having the cases brought in the Federal courts. I think it is useful to cite a couple of other illustrations abut the underlying concern which I have about the procedural quagmire which occurs. One of the two cases I intend to cite additionally--but I shall not cite many of the other cases, and there are many illustrative of this proposition--is the case of Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, decided by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit earlier this year. The plaintiff had back problems, sought surgical treatment, the HMO delayed a decision for months, the plaintiff went to State court, suing the HMO for medical complications occasioned by the delay. The HMO removed the case to the Federal court where the Federal court dismissed the claims against the HMO, finding that they were ``quantity determinations'' and therefore preempted under ERISA section 502. The district court also found that claims against the primary care provider were expressly preempted by section 514 and dismissed those claims, as well. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the findings and remanded the case to district court to make further findings. The appellate court noted that the claims against the primary care provider raised both ``quality'' and ``quantity'' issues and, on the record before it, the court could not decide which applied in this case. So not only do you have the provisions of the pending bill, which would send a plaintiff to two different courts on what is essentially the same situation, but even have the courts unable to draw a bright line between what is ``quantity'' and ``quality.'' Another case which is illustrative of the problem is Corcoran v. United Health Care Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 1992, where a patient was pregnant, and her doctor recommended complete bed rest and hospitalization so that he could monitor the fetus. The patient's doctor sought precertification from the HMO for a hospital stay. The HMO denied the request and authorized only 10 hours per day of health nurse services at home. Subsequently, the fetus regrettably went into distress and died at a time when the home health nurse was not on duty. The Corcorans, parents of the deceased child, brought suit in the State court which then had it removed to the Federal court, with the HMO arguing that they had not made a medical decision on ``quality'' but only a decision as to what benefits were covered under the health plan which was preempted by ERISA. The court concluded that the HMO gave medical advice, but in the context of making a determination about the availability of benefits under the plan, and as such the court found the Corcorans' claim was preempted by ERISA. So there you have a curious situation of what is viewed as a medical decision but again, preemption, because it was held to relate to a determination of benefits under the plan. The amendment would give jurisdiction to the Federal court on both of the claims so that when any one of these plaintiffs, such as a mother who is delivering a baby and has a limitation of 24 hours in the hospital and has a claim both as to coverage and as to malpractice, she could bring the case into Federal court, where State law would apply as to damages, and if there was a cap on damages in that State, that cap would apply. I am a cosponsor of the bill and I, too, intend to support the bill. But I do believe that this sort of a jurisdictional clarification is indispensable if we are to avoid having a plaintiff compelled to litigate in two courts with that kind of multiplicity of action. I ask the manager of the bill to engage in a discussion, if the distinguished manager would be willing to do so, or if a co-manager would be more appropriate to talk about the operation of the plan, if I may have Senator Kennedy's attention. I direct a question to my colleague from Massachusetts and raise the issue as to whether it would be more appropriate to discuss the matter with the Senator from North Carolina on this issue, but the question I have relates to the McCain- Kennedy-Edwards bill where you have a case, taking the illustration of the underlying facts that I gave in the Lazorko case. Where you have an HMO, which covers medical care, and a woman being in a hospital for attempted suicide being released and the HMO refusing to readmit her, and thereafter she killed herself--isn't it true that the claims which were brought, say in Lazorko, which raised questions of interpretation of the plan, would be brought in the Federal court and the cases on malpractice would be brought in the State court under your bill?

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am prepared to start the debate and to make it as expeditious as possible. But I am not prepared to negotiate time to an hour and 20 minutes total. I object.

Mr. SPECTER. That is not satisfactory. I am being importuned over here about what a good deal it is. This amendment, Mr. President, involves a question of whether there will be both Federal jurisdiction and State jurisdiction. It is a matter I have discussed with the managers of the bill again this morning and with Senator Edwards. I believe there is going to have to be some discussion. There are going to have to be some issues raised and some questions answered. It simply does not lend itself to that kind of time constraint.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I do object to that. I was asked how long I thought it would take, and I said 2 hours. Then I was asked if I thought I could do it in an hour, and I said I would do my best. This is a complicated amendment. This is a complicated bill. I am not prepared to enter into a unanimous consent request which limits my presentation to 20 minutes.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I entered the Chamber and I heard my name mentioned. I would ask that the unanimous consent be repeated.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition at this time to comment briefly on legislation that I am introducing today to increase educational benefits paid to veterans under the Montgomery GI bill, MGIB. This bill is the same as a bill, H.R. 1291, that was passed by the House, under the leadership of the chairman of the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Representative Chris Smith, on June 19, 2001, by a vote of 416-0. I introduce the same legislation here in the Senate, and I urge my colleagues to join with me to complete the task of increasing veterans' Montgomery GI bill benefits. This legislation, once it is fully phased in over a three year period, would increase the basic monthly benefit paid to veterans with at least three years of service who have returned to school from $650 to $1,100. With this 85 percent increase in MGIB benefits, the largest percentage increase in the history of the Montgomery GI bill, a veteran with three years of service would be able to afford the average cost of tuition, fees, books, and room and board at a four-year public college or university, and still have money left over for transportation expenses or other personal expenses. The legislation would provide greater educational freedom for veterans who are constrained by the current benefit amount; it would open up the possibility of attendance at more expensive universities. And it would promote the national security interests of the United States by providing a substantial inducement for young men and women to serve in the military. When I became chairman of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs at the start of the 105th Congress in 1997, I committed to increasing MGIB benefits which, due to budget constraints, had been woefully inadequate. I am pleased to report that that picture has changed; the basic MGIB benefit has increased by 52 percent from $427 to 650 per month, and in addition, service members now have the opportunity to ``buy-up'' an additional $150 in monthly benefits, bringing the total level of available benefits to $800 per month, an increase of 87 percent since 1997. Despite this significant progress, however, I remain concerned that the benefit usage rate among young veterans is too low, and that it may not yet be a sufficient inducement to assist the Department of Defense in recruiting high quality young men and women to serve in the military. Of the young veterans eligible for MGIB benefits, only 57 percent choose to avail themselves of this extraordinary opportunity. According to a recent report by the Department of Veterans Affairs, VA, a significant reason for this relatively low usage rate is the inadequacy of the benefit amount. MGIB benefits have simply not kept pace with rising education costs. As a consequence, veterans who use the benefit must compromise on the educational programs they select; a low percentage of MGIB users, only 12 percent, attend private institutions, and a relatively high percentage of MGIB users, 27 percent, enroll in two-year college programs. Now I do not undervalue the role, contributions, or quality of our two-year colleges. The fact is, however, that many veterans who would choose to attend four-year institutions, even public institutions, cannot afford to do so with the current level of benefits. My legislation would move us closer to the day when the only limitation on veterans' educational choice would be their own interests and aspirations. One of the primary purposes of the MGIB is to assist the Department of Defense, DOD with service member recruitment. When DOD asked new recruits in 1997 to list the reasons they joined the military, money for college ranked second only to ``a chance to better myself in life'' among the answers given. Even so, tight labor market and the availability of other Federal education aid have resulted in DOD difficulty in meeting recruiting goals. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy reports that a benefit level ``of approximately $1,000 per month . . . would increase high-quality accessions without having a negative impact on reenlistments. . . .'' Thus, my proposed legislation, which would, in phases, increase the monthly benefit to $1,100, is consistent with DOD's position that increased MGIB benefits are necessary for it to attract high-quality recruits. Attracting high-quality young men and women into the military is not only in the interest of the Department of Defense, it is in the national interest of all of our citizens. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, chaired by our former colleagues, Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, recently called on Congress to enhance national security by ``significantly enhanc[ing] the Montgomery GI Bill'' by providing a benefit that would pay for the average education costs of four-year U.S. colleges. The Commission emphasized that the ``GI bill is both a strong recruitment tool and, more importantly, a valuable institutional reward for service to the nation in uniform.'' I thank the Commission for recognizing the important role the GI bill has played, and will continue to play, in ensuring the security of our country. I commend the chairman of the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Representative Chris Smith, who has taken the lead on this issue in the House during this first year of his chairmanship. Under Mr. Smith's leadership, the House did its part on June 19, 2001, by passing H.R. 1291 by a resounding vote of 416-0. I urge my Senate colleagues to join with me to complete the task here in the Senate. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition at this time to comment on legislation that I have introduced today to increase the special pension that is available to Medal of Honor recipients, and to provide for automatic adjustments in that special pension to reflect annual increases in the cost of living. When the Congress enacted the Medal of Honor pension, it stated, in the 1916 Senate Report, Report No. 240, 64th Congress, accompanying enactment, that the special pension was then necessary to serve as a ``recognition of superior claims on the gratitude of the country,'' and to ``reward . . . in a modest way startling deeds of individual daring and audacious heroism in the face of mortal danger when war is on.'' The legislation that I have introduced today has the same two purposes: to recognize, and to reward, the ``startling deeds of individual daring and audacious heroism'' to which every Medal of Honor recipient can lay claim. No one can question that Medal of Honor recipients deserve the Nation's respect and gratitude. And no one could question a limited government pension is a proper sign of that respect and gratitude. I am concerned that some of the 149 surviving Medal of Honor recipients, there are only 149 such people among us, may struggle to make financial ends meet, notwithstanding the availability of the pension. The current $600 monthly amount is simply too small, in my estimation, to afford a minimum standard of living for our Nation's heroes given their expenses. In 1997, the Congressional Medal of Honor Society suggested that the Medal of Honor pension level be set at $1,000 per month and that the level of the pension be adjusted thereafter on an annual basis to reflect increases in the annual cost of living. At that time, the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, which I then had the privilege of chairing, succeeded in securing an increase in the pension from $400 to $600 per month, but we were not successful in persuading the House to approve an ``indexation'' feature. I believe a compelling argument could be made then, and still can be made now, to grant the entire increase suggested by the Congressional Medal of Honor Society and to approve the indexing of the benefit. I am pleased to offer legislation to that effect today. Many Medal of Honor recipients, out of a sense of duty and patriotism, make frequent trips to provide accounts of their act of valor and, more importantly, to speak of the lessons learned in battle and the vigilance that freedom requires to this day. Countless young Americans have benefitted by the example of these most distinguished role models. Often, the expenses associated with these excursions are borne by the medal of Honor recipients themselves, men who, we must remember, emerged from, and, in most cases, returned to, the ordinary citizenry from whom America has always drawn her warriors. Testimony offered by AMVETS at a Veterans' Affairs Committee hearing on July 25, 1997, confirmed that the majority of Medal of Honor recipients live only on their social security benefits, supplemented by the Medal of Honor pension, giving them an average monthly income of only $1,600. It is unconscionable to think that we, as a country, can allow them to live so close to the poverty line. I ask my colleagues to join with me, once again, to show our gratitude to the recipients of our Nation's highest honor. Let us show them--in this minor way--how grateful America truly is for their wonderful example. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition at this time to comment briefly on legislation that I am introducing today to increase educational benefits paid to veterans under the Montgomery GI bill, MGIB. This bill is the same as a bill, H.R. 1291, that was passed by the House, under the leadership of the chairman of the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Representative Chris Smith, on June 19, 2001, by a vote of 416-0. I introduce the same legislation here in the Senate, and I urge my colleagues to join with me to complete the task of increasing veterans' Montgomery GI bill benefits. This legislation, once it is fully phased in over a three year period, would increase the basic monthly benefit paid to veterans with at least three years of service who have returned to school from $650 to $1,100. With this 85 percent increase in MGIB benefits, the largest percentage increase in the history of the Montgomery GI bill, a veteran with three years of service would be able to afford the average cost of tuition, fees, books, and room and board at a four-year public college or university, and still have money left over for transportation expenses or other personal expenses. The legislation would provide greater educational freedom for veterans who are constrained by the current benefit amount; it would open up the possibility of attendance at more expensive universities. And it would promote the national security interests of the United States by providing a substantial inducement for young men and women to serve in the military. When I became chairman of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs at the start of the 105th Congress in 1997, I committed to increasing MGIB benefits which, due to budget constraints, had been woefully inadequate. I am pleased to report that that picture has changed; the basic MGIB benefit has increased by 52 percent from $427 to 650 per month, and in addition, service members now have the opportunity to ``buy-up'' an additional $150 in monthly benefits, bringing the total level of available benefits to $800 per month, an increase of 87 percent since 1997. Despite this significant progress, however, I remain concerned that the benefit usage rate among young veterans is too low, and that it may not yet be a sufficient inducement to assist the Department of Defense in recruiting high quality young men and women to serve in the military. Of the young veterans eligible for MGIB benefits, only 57 percent choose to avail themselves of this extraordinary opportunity. According to a recent report by the Department of Veterans Affairs, VA, a significant reason for this relatively low usage rate is the inadequacy of the benefit amount. MGIB benefits have simply not kept pace with rising education costs. As a consequence, veterans who use the benefit must compromise on the educational programs they select; a low percentage of MGIB users, only 12 percent, attend private institutions, and a relatively high percentage of MGIB users, 27 percent, enroll in two-year college programs. Now I do not undervalue the role, contributions, or quality of our two-year colleges. The fact is, however, that many veterans who would choose to attend four-year institutions, even public institutions, cannot afford to do so with the current level of benefits. My legislation would move us closer to the day when the only limitation on veterans' educational choice would be their own interests and aspirations. One of the primary purposes of the MGIB is to assist the Department of Defense, DOD with service member recruitment. When DOD asked new recruits in 1997 to list the reasons they joined the military, money for college ranked second only to ``a chance to better myself in life'' among the answers given. Even so, tight labor market and the availability of other Federal education aid have resulted in DOD difficulty in meeting recruiting goals. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy reports that a benefit level ``of approximately $1,000 per month . . . would increase high-quality accessions without having a negative impact on reenlistments. . . .'' Thus, my proposed legislation, which would, in phases, increase the monthly benefit to $1,100, is consistent with DOD's position that increased MGIB benefits are necessary for it to attract high-quality recruits. Attracting high-quality young men and women into the military is not only in the interest of the Department of Defense, it is in the national interest of all of our citizens. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, chaired by our former colleagues, Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, recently called on Congress to enhance national security by ``significantly enhanc[ing] the Montgomery GI Bill'' by providing a benefit that would pay for the average education costs of four-year U.S. colleges. The Commission emphasized that the ``GI bill is both a strong recruitment tool and, more importantly, a valuable institutional reward for service to the nation in uniform.'' I thank the Commission for recognizing the important role the GI bill has played, and will continue to play, in ensuring the security of our country. I commend the chairman of the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Representative Chris Smith, who has taken the lead on this issue in the House during this first year of his chairmanship. Under Mr. Smith's leadership, the House did its part on June 19, 2001, by passing H.R. 1291 by a resounding vote of 416-0. I urge my Senate colleagues to join with me to complete the task here in the Senate. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition at this time to comment on legislation that I have introduced today to increase the special pension that is available to Medal of Honor recipients, and to provide for automatic adjustments in that special pension to reflect annual increases in the cost of living. When the Congress enacted the Medal of Honor pension, it stated, in the 1916 Senate Report, Report No. 240, 64th Congress, accompanying enactment, that the special pension was then necessary to serve as a ``recognition of superior claims on the gratitude of the country,'' and to ``reward . . . in a modest way startling deeds of individual daring and audacious heroism in the face of mortal danger when war is on.'' The legislation that I have introduced today has the same two purposes: to recognize, and to reward, the ``startling deeds of individual daring and audacious heroism'' to which every Medal of Honor recipient can lay claim. No one can question that Medal of Honor recipients deserve the Nation's respect and gratitude. And no one could question a limited government pension is a proper sign of that respect and gratitude. I am concerned that some of the 149 surviving Medal of Honor recipients, there are only 149 such people among us, may struggle to make financial ends meet, notwithstanding the availability of the pension. The current $600 monthly amount is simply too small, in my estimation, to afford a minimum standard of living for our Nation's heroes given their expenses. In 1997, the Congressional Medal of Honor Society suggested that the Medal of Honor pension level be set at $1,000 per month and that the level of the pension be adjusted thereafter on an annual basis to reflect increases in the annual cost of living. At that time, the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, which I then had the privilege of chairing, succeeded in securing an increase in the pension from $400 to $600 per month, but we were not successful in persuading the House to approve an ``indexation'' feature. I believe a compelling argument could be made then, and still can be made now, to grant the entire increase suggested by the Congressional Medal of Honor Society and to approve the indexing of the benefit. I am pleased to offer legislation to that effect today. Many Medal of Honor recipients, out of a sense of duty and patriotism, make frequent trips to provide accounts of their act of valor and, more importantly, to speak of the lessons learned in battle and the vigilance that freedom requires to this day. Countless young Americans have benefitted by the example of these most distinguished role models. Often, the expenses associated with these excursions are borne by the medal of Honor recipients themselves, men who, we must remember, emerged from, and, in most cases, returned to, the ordinary citizenry from whom America has always drawn her warriors. Testimony offered by AMVETS at a Veterans' Affairs Committee hearing on July 25, 1997, confirmed that the majority of Medal of Honor recipients live only on their social security benefits, supplemented by the Medal of Honor pension, giving them an average monthly income of only $1,600. It is unconscionable to think that we, as a country, can allow them to live so close to the poverty line. I ask my colleagues to join with me, once again, to show our gratitude to the recipients of our Nation's highest honor. Let us show them--in this minor way--how grateful America truly is for their wonderful example. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to pay tribute to Reverend Leon Sullivan who was not only a great American but a great citizen of the world. He was called the ``Lion of Zion,'' a reference to the Zion Baptist Church where he was a fixture at the pulpit for 38 years. His accomplishments carried him beyond the city of Philadelphia to nationwide acclaim and then to worldwide leadership. From founding the Opportunities Industrialization Center, OIC, to America's most prestigious corporate boards where he brought recognition for minority employment to initiatives on education and health care in Africa, Dr. Sullivan was a global leader in successfully striving to improve the quality of life for those in need of assistance. I first met Dr. Sullivan in the late 1950s when I was an Assistant District Attorney prosecuting cases in a magistrate's court at 19th and Oxford Streets in the heart of the city's African American community. Dr. Sullivan reclaimed that shambled police court and made it into OIC's first job training school. From that modest start, Dr. Sullivan went on to establish 56 centers nationally and another 46 centers internationally. Standing 6 feet 5 inches, Dr. Sullivan was a powerful orator in the Zion Baptist Church on Sundays and an even more powerful social innovator the other 6 days of the week. His towering strength gained national recognition when he was asked to serve on the board of directors of General Motors, Mellon Bank, Boy Scouts of America, and the Southern African Development Fund. With unparalleled accomplishments in the United States, Dr. Sullivan then turned his attention to Africa, where he initiated the Sullivan Principles. The Sullivan Principles are a code of conduct for businesses operating in South Africa which is acknowledged to be one of the most effective efforts in combating discrimination in the workplace. On April 12, 2000, I introduced a resolution along with Senator Feingold that called on companies large and small in every part of the world to support and adhere to the Global Sullivan Principles of Corporate Social Responsibility wherever they have operations. Dr. Sullivan also founded the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help, IFESH. IFESH was established to train people around the world in various disciplines including farming, teaching, healthcare, banking and economics. As an Assistant District Attorney in Philadelphia in the early 1960s and as District Attorney through the mid-1970s, I worked with Dr. Sullivan on a wide variety of projects to combat juvenile delinquency, reform prison abuses and provide for realistic rehabilitation for many convicted in Philadelphia's courts. For two decades in the U.S. Senate, I continued to work with Dr. Sullivan. As a member of the Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, I worked with the Subcommittee to secure a total of $38 million in funding since 1984 to support the work of Opportunities Industrialization Centers, OIC, International. Since its founding in 1970, OIC International has trained and provided jobs for thousands of poverty stricken people in Africa, Europe, and Asia. Also, I have worked with the Department of Housing and Urban Development to assist Reverend Sullivan build Opportunities Towers, which provides affordable housing for seniors and retirees in Philadelphia and other major cities. When Dr. Sullivan passed away on Tuesday, April 24, 2001, the United States and the world had lost a great humanitarian, an acclaimed theologian, an extraordinary social activist and a great world leader.