Arlen Specter

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. I yield.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this is an amendment which adds $700 million to increase the health function in this resolution to assure that the funding for the National Institutes of Health be doubled by the year 2003 as provided for in a resolution of the Senate which goes back to 1997, a 98-0 resolution that we double the funding for the National Institutes of Health. The offset for the $700 million comes from the 920 account, I am advised, which is allowances on administrative costs across the board. The funding for the National Institutes of Health is a priority second to none. There is nothing more important than health. The National Institutes of Health have made extraordinary progress in their efforts to combat the most serious maladies which confront Americans, and for that matter, people around the world. Among those diseases, including, but not necessarily limited to, are Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's, epilepsy, cancer of the prostate, breast cancer, cervical cancer, leukemia, melanoma, hearing research, heart disease, stroke, AIDS, and diabetes. I could go on and on and on. Our effort to secure this funding has been a rather bumpy road. We have managed to persevere. In 1998, Senator Harkin and I led the attack with a resolution to add $1.1 billion to the health function and the amendment was defeated 63-37. We came back the next year, having sustained that loss for $1 billion and doubled the request to $2 billion. Again the amendment was defeated, but this time by a lesser vote of 57-41. In those 2 years, notwithstanding the failure of our efforts to get an increase in the budget resolution, we took out our sharp pencils and as a matter of priorities allocated the extra billion in fiscal year 1998 and the $2 billion extra in fiscal year 1999. In fiscal year 2000 we, again, offered an amendment to the budget resolution, this time of $1.4 billion to the health function over and above the $600 million which had been provided by the Budget Committee. This time we lost again by a narrowing vote of 47-52. Again, we found the extra funds as a matter of priority by allocating funds within the overall budget for the subcommittee which has jurisdiction over labor, health, human services, and education. In fiscal year 2001, we offered an amendment to the budget resolution to add $1.6 billion to the health function. This time, for the first time, the budget resolution was passed 55-45. Our efforts were rewarded with increases over that 4-year period of affirmative votes: 37, to 41, to 47, and finally to 55. This year, on February 13, Senator Harkin and I had as additional cosponsors Senators Breaux, Cochran, Collins, DeWine, Frist, Hutchinson, Mikulski, Murray, Santorum, Sarbanes, Schumer, and Snowe on S. Res. 19, the Biomedical Revitalization Resolution of 2001. This year the administration has come forward with $2.750 billion, so it was necessary only to increase by $700 million. We could not do a figure in less than $100 million amounts under the resolution rules which would enable us to come to the $3.4 billion target which is necessary to keep us on the path to doubling the NIH budget within the 5-year period as called for in the resolution from 1997 which, as I say, passed 98-0. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, like the incident with the Navy plane, no apology is in order. I have worked with the distinguished Senator from West Virginia for many years when he was the Democratic leader and then majority leader, President pro tempore, and chairman of the Appropriations Committee. I greatly admire what he has done. I sat and listened to the whole proceeding, but I thought it was worth just a minute of the Senate's time to note I yielded for a question and 45 minutes later I got the floor. Amendment No. 186

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, at the outset, let me say to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, who holds an extraordinary record in this body, and asked me 45 minutes ago if I would mind yielding for a question, I want the Record to show that I agreed to yield for a question. I had no idea that the answer would be so long, Mr. President. I thought it worthy of note.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, it is my view that a $1.6 trillion tax cut is an appropriate figure considering the projected surplus of $5.6 trillion. But I am concerned that projections over a 10-year period are risky. If there is a change of 1 percent in the inflation rate or a change of 1 percent in the unemployment rate, the figures are very different. I recall the projections in 1981, when we considered the Kemp-Roth tax bill, that surpluses were expected and deficits turned out to be the fact. It is my view that there ought to be the condition that these surpluses do materialize for the $1.6 trillion tax cut to take effect. I personally do not like the concept of a trigger, which means some recall action or some responsive action. It is my view that conceptually the proper approach is that we are to have the tax cut if the surplus holds up, and it is the event of the tax cut about which we are talking. I have discussed the matter with the distinguished chairman of the Budget Committee and with other Senators. Senator Domenici has assured me he is working on language that will satisfy the concerns many of us have expressed. My soundings in Pennsylvania, and really around the country, are that there is enormous concern that we not add to the national debt. When I have polled my constituents--repeatedly in the course of the past many years, up to a decade--I have found that more people are concerned that the national debt be paid down--in fact, paid off--than are concerned about a tax cut. But as President Bush has projected a $5.6 trillion surplus, to repeat, there is adequate room for a $1.6 trillion tax cut, and there is adequate room to be sure that Social Security is sound, that Medicare is reformed, and that we are able to have the appropriations on the domestic discretionary accounts which are appropriate for the important needs of health, education, and other discretionary domestic programs, and defense as well. I have also expressed my concern in conversations with the leadership of the Senate, and with the administration in discussions with Vice President Cheney and Secretary of the Treasury O'Neill, that at least as I view it, the tax cut ought to be a little more heavily weighted for middle and lower income Americans. I realize that in the budget resolution we are not going to delineate all of the parameters of these considerations. What we are looking at technically in the budget resolution is the $1.6 trillion without a specification as to conditionality, without a specification as to how the tax cut will be apportioned. But I think it is important for Senators, such as myself, to express themselves so there will be notice to those on the Finance Committee and the Republican leadership and the White House as to where, at least, this Senator stands when the bills are presented. With the 50-50 Senate, it is important to be looking to take into account the condition of all Senators. It is my hope and expectation to be able to support our new President. I think he is off to an outstanding start. I had the opportunity to travel with him to Beaver County, PA, several weeks ago when he was talking about his tax plan. I believe we are on the right track. But this is a body which is not a rubber stamp. Under the separation of powers--the Framers of the Constitution drafted the most impressive document in the history of the world, second to the Bible, and they made the Congress article I, they made the President article II, and they made the judiciary article III. If someone were to rewrite the Constitution, it would appear that the Supreme Court has rewritten the Constitution really to make the judiciary article I. But we are not supposed to be a rubber stamp. But counsel and collaboration is appropriate. That is why I take this occasion to express my views. With respect to the domestic spending, the 4-percent allocation, candidly, is tight. But I expect this body to work its will on a number of appropriations and on a number of matters which we will offer for amendments on education and health--and agriculture being discussed this morning. Last year, when the appropriations bill came to the floor for the subcommittee which I chair on Labor, Health, Human Services, and Education, we had established a mark of $106 billion. That was then- President Clinton's figure. After a lot of discussion with him, the Republican caucus, both in the Senate and the House--the Republican leadership--agreed to a figure of $106 billion--somewhat reluctantly, I might say. But my experience had been, in preceding years--without going into details--that if we tried to undercut the President's budget, we ended up paying a lot more. We then reallocated some of the priorities on the bill presented on the Senate floor. Then, during the course of the amendment process, very substantial funds were added to education and health care. Being a principal author of the budget presented along with my distinguished colleague, Senator Harkin, I defended the budget. As I said on the Senate floor, I cast more bad votes in 3 days voting against education and health care measures than I had cast in my preceding 19 years in the Senate. But that was my job, to defend the budget, and I did. Some 13 Republicans joined the Democrats in the add-ons, which I would not be surprised takes place at least to some extent on this budget resolution today. When the $106 billion budget for Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education was not submitted to the White House, because the Republican leadership never saw fit to do that, the figure then ballooned to $114 billion. At which point, I refused to sign the conference report. Then the figure was ultimately lowered to $107.9 billion. As we consider this budget resolution, the lesson from that is, if we don't adopt a realistic figure at the outset, we are going to end up spending more. Last year when we took up the budget, there were some on the Budget Committee who wanted $596 billion for discretionary accounts. Finally, the figure arrived at was $600 billion. The result then was a lot of mirrors and smoke on deferred expenditures. The figure which was needed was $616 billion. Had that figure been present, we could have gotten agreement in this body and in the House and then gotten the bill signed. Ultimately, the figure was $640 billion. We spent at least $24 billion more than we should have because of the last minute rush and add-ons became the order of the day. It is different this year. We have a Republican President. Last year we had a President who was a Democrat. There was pressure from the White House for add-ons. This year it is my expectation that, while there may be some flexibility from the White House, the pressure will be reversed. The President still has the veto pen. It is my hope that, as we move forward with the budget resolution, we will adopt realistic figures with which those of us on the Appropriations Committee can live and structure bills that can be enacted. I compliment Senator Domenici for the extraordinary work he has done on this budget and budgets in prior years. He has served as chairman or ranking on the Budget Committee since 1981. It is an extraordinarily difficult job. He also sits on the Appropriations Committee where he is caught between a rock and a hard place as he tries to maneuver through the requirements and the wishes, sometimes the demands, of the Budget Committee to try to structure a bill which will pass in Appropriations. He has done just an extraordinary job, as has the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Senator Stevens, who has the unenviable job of trying to make ends meet with 13 subcommittees. I also compliment my colleague, Senator Conrad, for the work he has done, for his having come to see me on a couple of occasions to go through the budget, as he sees it, in an effort to try to find common ground for a budget which can be approached on a bipartisan basis. It is regrettable that we have not been able to work through a budget resolution which could be accomplished on a bipartisan basis. It is my thought that if we work at it harder, that is something we can still do. Senator Harkin and I have had a very close relationship; he earlier as chairman and I as ranking on our subcommittee and I now as chairman and Senator Harkin as ranking. I learned a long time ago if you want to get something done in Washington and in this body, there has to be bipartisan cooperation. I also compliment the ranking member of the Appropriations Committee, Senator Byrd, who has performed in that capacity with great distinction, as he has as President pro tempore and majority leader and also, in prior years, as chairman of the Appropriations Committee. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I would like to make a few comments on the pending budget resolution. Amendments Nos. 174 and 176

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have been asked on behalf of the distinguished majority leader to announce that today the Senate will immediately resume consideration of the budget resolution with the time between now and 10:30 a.m. equally divided for debate on the Grassley and Johnson amendments regarding agriculture. At 10:30 a.m. there will be two back-to-back votes on these amendments. Senator Harkin will be recognized to offer the next amendment on education. Further amendments will be offered with votes to occur throughout the day. Senators will be notified as votes are scheduled. I thank my colleagues for their attention.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I concur with the statement of supporters of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, with respect to the discussion of the intent of the Specter amendment.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this legislation follows consideration by the Judiciary Committee of the pardons issued by former President Clinton on January 20, the last day of his administration, and seeks to reform and correct a couple of major gaps which are present in existing procedures in two respects; stated succinctly, to require that lobbyists, such as Jack Quinn, be required to register and that contributions to Presidential libraries be subject to public disclosure. I offer this legislation on behalf of myself, Senators Leahy, Hatch, Kohl, Biden, Feinstein, Sessions, Grassley, and Clinton. The public record is filled with the details as to what happened with the notorious pardon of Marc Rich, who was a fugitive for some 17 years, where a pardon was granted at the very last minute without the pardon attorney at the Department of Justice being informed of the situation until 1 a.m. on January 20. When the pardon attorney called the White House to try to get some information about Marc Rich and Pincus Green, he was told that they were ``traveling abroad.'' When the pardon attorney testified at the Judiciary Committee hearing under my questioning, and testified that they were ``traveling abroad,'' he about broke up the hearing room, for that characterization to be made of someone who had been a fugitive for 17 years. In granting the pardon, former President Clinton notified Ms. Beth Dozoretz, who was very active in lobbying for the pardon, at 11 o'clock on January 19, some 2 hours in advance of telling the pardon attorney, and there had been extensive lobbying by Ms. Denise Rich, the former wife of Marc Rich. The legislation we are introducing will require that someone such as Jack Quinn be registered as a lobbyist. Without going into the details--and they are set forth in the Judiciary Committee hearing--there were major efforts made to keep this activity under the so-called radar screen so that nobody would know about it. This legislation would require someone in Jack Quinn's position to register and be known publicly, and then with the kind of public pressure which would be brought, I think it highly likely that a pardon such as that granted to Marc Rich would never have been granted. The second provision deals with contributions for pledges or commitments to raise money for Presidential libraries. This legislation provides that there should be public disclosure of those contributions, pledges, or commitments to raise money, where those pledges or commitments are made during the term of office. A pledge to contribute money to a Presidential library has a great many of the same characteristics as a campaign contribution. The question is raised about whether or not there is favoritism or influence sought from that kind of a monetary contribution. By having the public disclosure, then it would be within public view. That is the essence of the legislation. Mr. President, the Senate Judiciary Committee inquiry into the pardons and commutations issued by former President Clinton on January 20, 2001, has disclosed major gaps which can be addressed through legislation. Today I am introducing a bill to address two of these subjects. My bill requires individuals who urge officials in the White House to grant clemency to register as lobbyists. There is currently no requirement for them to do so. This bill will also require the disclosure of donations or pledges of $5,000 or more, or commitments to raise $5,000 or more for presidential libraries while the President is still in office. Such donations, pledges or commitments are not currently subject to disclosure, creating a situation where individuals could make large contributions to the President's library foundation in the hope of influencing favorable action by the President. The Senate investigation of the pardons matter has been forward- looking from the beginning. The objective of the inquiry was to get the facts out in the open. Once the facts were known, the question was whether legislative remedies were appropriate. This legislation does not deal with the President's power to grant executive clemency since any changes in that power would require a constitutional amendment. Former President Jimmy Carter called the pardon of fugitive commodities trader Marc Rich ``disgraceful,'' and Democratic Representative Henry Waxman said that ``the failures in the pardon process should embarrass every Democrat and every American.'' The outrage over former President Clinton's last minute pardons is bi- partisan, and I expect there will be bi-partisan support for this legislation to fix the problems disclosed by the Senate Judiciary Committee inquiry. The pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green have sparked the most public outrage, and rightly so. The actions of Hugh Rodham, who took more than $400,000 for his limited work on the clemency requests for Almon Glenn Braswell and Carlos Vignali, Jr., and Roger Clinton, who is reportedly under investigation for trying to peddle access to the White House in relation to pardons, are similarly outrageous. There are undoubtedly others who made money from the pardons process, or at least tried to do so. But let us at least identify them as what they are--lobbyists. When you get paid money, in some of these cases, lots of money, to argue for a pardon because you know the President of the United States, or someone like a relative who is close to the President, what you are doing is lobbying. Shining sunlight on the activities of these pardon lobbyists will further the cause of good government. In a February 18, 2001 op-ed in the New York Times, former President Clinton said that he had decided to grant Rich and Green clemency for a number of legal and foreign policy reasons, but it's hard to see how the facts of the case add up to a pardon. Rich fled to Switzerland in 1983, shortly before he was indicted on 65 counts of racketeering, tax evasion, mail fraud, wire fraud, violation of Department of Energy regulations, and trading with the enemy. Then he tried to renounce his citizenship. Although he could afford the best lawyers in the business, Rich refused to return to the United States to plead his case in court. At the time of his pardon, he was still listed on the Justice Department's list of top international fugitives. Over the course of seventeen years and three administrations, Rich repeatedly tried to get the Justice Department to offer him a deal on favorable terms. When that failed, he orchestrated a plan last year to get a grant of executive clemency to wipe out the charges against him so he would never even have to stand trial. In the end, Mr. Rich got his pardon, but the way he got it shows the need for requiring pardon lobbyists to register. In late 2000, after failing to get the Southern District of New York to make a deal that didn't involve any jail time for Rich and Green, the Rich legal team began seriously pursuing a pardon strategy. There is some disagreement on the timing of the decision to seek a pardon, but the important point is that, once the decision was made to take the case to the White House, the Rich legal team wanted to keep their activities out of public view so the Southern District of New York, or someone else who would oppose the pardon, wouldn't weigh in and scotch the deal. There is some evidence that the Rich legal team was considering seeking a pardon as early as March, 1999. A log from the law firm of Arnold and Porter cites a March 12, 1999, memorandum from Carol Fischer to Robert Fink, one of Mr. Rich's lawyers. The document is titled ``Legal Research re: Pardon Power.'' Clearly there was some consideration of seeking a pardon, or there wouldn't have been a need to do research on the pardon power. On February 10, 2000, Robert Fink wrote an e-mail to Avner Azulay, who works for Mr. Rich in Israel. Fink told Azulay that the latest efforts to make a deal with the Southern District of New York had failed because the Department of Justice would not negotiate unless Mr. Rich returned to the United States to face the charges. Azulay replied the same day, saying that ``The present impasse leaves us with only one other option: the unconventional approach which has not yet been tried and which I have been proposing all along.'' There is also a March 20, 2000 e-mail from Azulay to Fink. In this e- mail, Azulay tells Fink that ``We are reverting to the idea discussed with Abe which is to send DR [Denise Rich] on a ``personal'' mission to NO1. [undoubtedly President Clinton] with a well prepared script.'' Mr. Quinn has testified that the idea of a pardon did not receive serious consideration until late in the year, but these e-mails raise questions about that assertion. Under ordinary circumstances, it would be of no interest when the Rich team made a decision to seek a pardon, but it is important in this case because there are other e-mails showing that they tried very hard to keep their efforts secret. For example, in a December 26, 2000 e-mail, Fink told Quinn that ``Frankly, I think we benefit from not having the existence of the petition known, and do not want to contact people who are unlikely to really make a difference but who could create press or other exposure.'' Later, in a January 9, 2001, e-mail, Quinn told Fink, ``I think we've benefitted from being under the press radar. Podesta said as much.'' How did they benefit? They benefitted by not having the U.S. Attorney from the Southern District of New York weigh in with the White House, by not having the kind of scrutiny from the press that the case has had since January. Does anyone seriously believe that former President Clinton would have granted this pardon if the story had broken, with all the details out in the open, in early January instead of after the pardon was already a done deal? Of course not. Jack Quinn counted on being under the radar, and it worked. This legislation will make it harder for the Jack Quinn's of the future to stay under the radar. When pardon lobbyists are required to register, they won't be able to hide their actions until it is too late for anyone to act. If Jack Quinn had been required to register as a lobbyist when he started urging officials at the White House to grant clemency to Rich and Green, the chances are good that this story would have had a different ending. This legislation would also cover the activities of Hugh Rodham, who made more than $400,000 working to get clemency for Almon Glenn Braswell and Carlos Vignali, Jr. Mr. Braswell is the subject of an ongoing investigation related to allegations of tax evasion, and clearly should not have been granted a pardon. Mr. Vignali was one of the top members of a drug smuggling organization that shipped more than 800 pounds of cocaine from the Los Angeles area to Minnesota. He was not a likely candidate to have his sentence commuted, and the Pardon Attorney reportedly recommended that the request be denied. Several of the members of the drug ring who had smaller roles that Vignali did are still sitting in jail. But Carlos Vignali got a pardon. Hugh Rodham's role should have been subject to public disclosure since he had close family ties to the White House, reportedly lived at the White House for the last several weeks of the Clinton Administration and had documents shipped to himself there. Roger Clinton was also reportedly involved in several attempts to get paid for getting pardons for his friends. This matter, like several others, is reportedly being investigated by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. It remains to be seen what she will find, but we don't have to wait for the end of her investigation to know that if an individual trades on his access to the White House to make money, that's lobbying, and he or she should be required to register as a lobbyist. The second part of this bill requires the public disclosure of donations or pledges of $5,000 or more, or commitments to raise $5,000 or more for presidential libraries while the president is still in office. There are presently no requirements to make such donations public, and the Clinton library foundation has resisted efforts to review it's donor list. Presidential libraries are a relatively new phenomenon, with only ten of them in existence. Under current law, presidential libraries are built with private funds, then turned over to the National Archivist for operation. Amendments to the Presidential Libraries Act have mandated the establishment of an endowment to cover some of the costs of operating the library. These goals are usually met through the establishment of a charitable organization, a 501(c)(3) corporation. Former Presidents Carter and Bush did not raise any money for their libraries while they were in office because they were concentrating on getting re-elected. Because both of these Presidents lost their re- election bids, they never faced a situation of having to raise money for a library while they were still in office. Former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, as two term Presidents, began raising money for their libraries during their second terms. Officials from the Reagan library have said that the library fund received several large contributions from corporate donors while former President Reagan was still in office, but the big corporate donations tailed off rapidly when the President left office. It is not necessary to suggest that there was any wrongdoing on the part of former President Reagan or of former President Clinton to realize that a donor could make a large donations to a presidential library in the hope of receiving a favorable action from the President in exchange for the donation. The fact that these donations can be made without public disclosure makes them a matter of even greater concern. The Rich case highlights the need for public disclosure of donations while the President is still in office. Denise Rich, Marc Rich's former wife, was deeply involved in trying to get a pardon for Rich. She also gave at least $450,000 to former President Clinton's library foundation. Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair of the Democratic National Committee who pledged to raise $1 million for the Clinton library, also worked on the Rich pardon. Ms. Dozoretz's involvement in the Rich case is remarkable in that the former President spent far more time talking to her about it than he did talking to the prosecutors in the Southern district of New York. Ms. Dozoretz had at least three conversations with former President Clinton about the Rich pardon, including one at 11 p.m. on January 19, 2001, the night before the pardon was actually issued. Ms. Dozoretz had been scheduled to meet with my staff, but she changed attorneys and declined to be interviewed. But we found out that she had called the President on the night of January 19, at about 11 P.M. to thank him for granting the pardon for Marc Rich. If Ms. Dozoretz knew of the Rich pardon in time to call the President at 11 P.M. on the evening of January 19, she found out about the decision at least two hours before Pardon Attorney Roger Adams, the official who was charged with actually writing up the pardon warrant. Mr. Adams testified that he had not heard that Rich and Green were being considered for clemency until almost 1 A.M. on the morning of January 20. Mr. Adams was told by the White House counsel's office that there probably wouldn't be much information available on Rich and Green because they had been ``living abroad'' for several years. That was a strange way of saying they were fugitives, but Mr. Adams was later able to figure that out himself. He had his staff research the Internet to see what he could learn about these two men, and he learned that they were on the Justice Department's list of most wanted international fugitives. When he relayed his concerns to the White House, he was told to prepare the pardon documents anyway. Ms. Dozoretz has refused to say from whom she learned that the President had decided to grant Rich's clemency request, but she apparently knew before the official who was charged with overseeing the pardon process. Ms. Dozoretz has asserted her privelege against self- incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, so we have no way of knowing exactly how she learned that the decision had already been made on January 19. But we do have other relevant information. First, Beth Dozoretz pledged to raise $1 million for the Clinton library. Former President Clinton spoke to Ms. Dozoretz on January 10, 2001, when she was with Ms. Rich in Aspen. According to a January 10, 2001, e-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn, Ms. Dozoretz received a phone call from POTUS, the President, on January 10. Mr. Fink went on to quote former President Clinton as saying ``that he wants to do it and is doing all possible to turn around the WH counsels.'' Ms. Dozoretz has denied saying that the President was trying to turn around the WH [White House] counsels, but she has not offered any explanation for what happened. It has been asserted that the message was garbled, but that explanation is inconsistent with the facts. All of former President Clinton's top advisers in the White House--including his Chief of Staff, John Podesta; his White House Counsel, Beth Nolan; and Bruce Lindsey, one of his closest political advisers who held the title of Assistant to the President--looked at the facts and recommended against a pardon. That is consistent with the former President having to turn around his White House counsels. Former President Clinton was unable to turn around his counsels, but in the end it didn't matter. He issued the pardons anyway, and created a firestorm. When a President ignores the advice of his closest advisors, there isn't much we can do since the power of executive clemency is in the hands of the President alone. But the Congress can and should ensure that bad judgement on the part of a President does not undermine the public's confidence in government. The two provisions in this legislation will help to restore public confidence in the pardon process. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the further modification has been made to satisfy some concerns about drafting. I believe the language had been definitive, but it was faster to make some changes than it was to debate that proposition. And where we are now--if I may have the attention of the Senator from Michigan--where we are now is to satisfy all the parties that what we are accomplishing on this amendment is that if the Snowe-Jeffords test is held to be unconstitutional by a final judicial decision, then the modified Furgatch test will be applied to define an advocacy advertisement which will satisfy Buckley v. Valeo that the advertisement ``is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.'' The additional sentence has been made: ``Further, nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect the interpretation or application of 11 CFR, 100.22(b),'' which is the current FEC regulation on an electioneering communication which follows Furgatch. Then the further modified amendment strikes the findings, and they will be supplemented at a later time because to call through and satisfy all the parties as to the findings would take longer than we can accomplish it simply by full striking, which this further modification does. I believe at this juncture that we have satisfied all the concerns of the varieties of cooks who have been added to the stew. I yield the floor. Mr. GRAMM addressed the Chair.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I send to the desk a further modification of amendment No. 140.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SPECTER. I do.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this amendment, as modified, seeks to accomplish two objectives. One objective is to set forth findings to provide a factual basis to uphold the constitutionality of the statute, and the second objective is to insert a definition so that the bill will survive constitutional challenge under the Buckley v. Valeo decision, which has language that required specifically saying ``vote for,'' ``support,'' with ads being deemed to be issue advertisements where the obvious intent is to extol the virtues of one candidate and to comment extensively on the deficiencies of another candidate; and notwithstanding the clear purpose of these ads in the 1996 Presidential election and the Presidential election of 2000, those ads were deemed to be issue ads and, therefore, could be paid for with soft money. The bill as presently written endeavors to provide a bright-line test with the provision of identifying a specific candidate. The reason I am able to abbreviate the argument this evening, or the contentions this evening, is that we had about 2 hours of debate last Thursday. The critical language in the bill is the reference to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office. Now this may or may not be a sufficiently bright line to satisfy the requirements of Buckley v. Valeo, or in fact it may not be because it does not deal with the kind of specific urging of a candidate to ``vote for'' or ``support,'' which Buckley has talked about. In Buckley, in a very lengthy opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States said that in order to avoid the constitutional challenge for vagueness, those specific words of support--``vote for'' or ``vote against''--had to be used in order to avoid the vagueness standard of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. What this amendment seeks to do is to provide an alternative test, which is derived from the decision of the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the Furgatch case, and this definition is really Furgatch streamlined. The original amendment that was offered provided that the context of the advertisement was ``unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.'' In our debate last Thursday, there were arguments made that the language of ``unmistakable'' and ``unambiguous'' left latitude for a challenge. In the amendment which has been modified, it is deemed to be sufficient to have the language be ``suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.'' This really sharpens up Furgatch, really streamlines Furgatch in order to pass constitutional muster. The findings which have been set forth in the modified amendment seek to characterize events which have occurred in the intervening 25 years since the decision of Buckley v. Valeo, reciting how much money has been paid, the very heavy impact of funding, the ads really, in effect, urging the election of one candidate and the defeat of another so that, by any logical definition, they would be deemed advocacy ads and not issue ads, but they do not meet the magic words test of Buckley v. Valeo. The expanded test of having ``no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate'' would make it plain that the kinds of ads which have been viewed as being issue ads are really advocacy ads. We had an extended debate last Thursday about the impact of this language on the balance of what is in the bill at the present time on a clearly identified candidate. This modified amendment has been very carefully crafted to meet the concerns that if the Supreme Court of the United States determines that the language in the underlying bill is sufficient, and the language added in this modified amendment is insufficient, that one or the other will be stricken so that there is a severability clause within this amendment as modified. We have already legislated, we have already adopted an amendment to provide for severability. So it may be this is surplusage or it may be that it is necessary, but it does not do any harm to have this language. I believe that most, if not all, of the objections which were raised last Thursday have been satisfied in this modified amendment. I urge my colleagues to adopt it. I am not yet asking for the yeas and nays to see if the arguments which may be presented here are suggestive of some further modification which would require consent after asking for the yeas and nays, but it is my intention, as I have notified the managers, to seek a rollcall vote. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, it is my hope to be able to do it within a brief period of time--perhaps as little as 15 minutes, in that range.

Mr. SPECTER. I send an amendment to the desk.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair, and I thank my distinguished colleague from Iowa for yielding to me.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of an extensive statement be printed in the Record and that the Record reflect--sometimes the Record does not reflect the actual language; there is a cutoff. The statement is printed, and there is repetition and redundancy. But I ask that the Record show that there is a unanimous consent request made that the text be printed in the Record, even though there is some redundancy with what has been summarized orally.

Mr. SPECTER. My request was to proceed for up to 10 minutes as in morning business for the introduction of a bill.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for up to 10 minutes for the introduction of a bill as in morning business.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, my distinguished colleague from Iowa has consented to let me take just a few minutes at this point to introduce a bill. I have checked with the distinguished manager, Senator McConnell, and it is agreeable.