Arlen Specter

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, today I renew my efforts that began on September 29, 1998, to authorize the creation of the Valley Forge National Cemetery. I am introducing this bill to coincide with a news conference that Congressman Joseph Hoeffel is holding today in Montgomery County, PA, and I join with the entire Pennsylvania delegation in the House, in announcing our joint intention to see this matter resolved this year. Congressman Hoeffel will introduce a companion bill, and I am pleased to join him in this effort. I had hoped to be with Congressman Hoeffel at Valley Forge today, but was not able to join him due to a prior commitment. I nevertheless commend him, and the entire Pennsylvania delegation in the House, for their leadership in advancing this legislation. I am anxious to begin the fight for this worthy endeavor. A national cemetery located at Valley forge would not only be a fitting final resting place for the Nation's veterans because of the area's historical significance, it would also provide the veterans of southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey with their only national cemetery burial option within a reasonable distance from the homes of their loved ones. This legislation would designate 200 acres of land within the Valley Forge National Historic Park for use by the Department of Veterans Affairs, VA, to create a national cemetery. The cemetery would fall under the jurisdiction of VA's National Cemetery Administration, the agency charged with administering 119 national cemeteries nationwide. The need for a national cemetery at or near Valley Forge first gained my attention in 1998. Back then, I joined with then-Congressman Jon Fox, and the entire Pennsylvania delegation in the House, in introducing legislation, S. 2530, to create the Valley Forge National Cemetery. Unfortunately, that measure was not acted on after its referral to the Senate Energy and Natural Resource Committee. It is my understanding that opposition to the legislation arouse due to concerns, misplaced concerns, in my estimation, that the presence of a veterans' cemetery might somehow be inconsistent with the historic nature of the Valley Forge Park site. I am advised that the National Park Service, NPS, the agency charged with administering over 3,000 acres of federally owned land at the Valley Forge National Historic Park, has expressed reservations about giving up Valley Forge land for cemetery use. I am told that NPS is concerned that a cemetery would denigrate the historical significance of the Park. While these concerns may be held in good faith, I believe the presence of national cemeteries at other historical sites proves that the historical significance of an event or area is heightened not degraded, by the presence of a cemetery honoring those who served in the military. Two NPS-administered cemeteries, Gettysburg National Cemetery and Andersonville National Cemetery, prove my point. Although Gettysburg is not closed for new burials, it is the final resting place of veterans from all of the country's major wars; Andersonville is still open to new burials. Does the presence of deceased veterans at these Civil War sites detract from their solemnity? I think not. In any case, the acreage that would be transferred to VA under my bill is not the site of the original 1777 encampment of General Washington and his men. The need for a national cemetery in the Philadelphia area is particularly acute. The three closest national cemeteries for Philadelphians--the Philadelphia, Beverly, and Finns Point national cemeteries--have been closed to new burials since the 1960s. The closest open national cemetery at Indiantown Gap, PA, is over 2 hours away and, at best, will only remain open for new burials until 2030. Pennsylvania has the fifth largest 65-and-older veteran population in the United States. Estimates from the VA indicate that WWII veterans are passing away at a rate of 1,000 a day, and that the number of annual veteran deaths will reach its peak in 2008. Since national cemeteries take, on average, 7 years to build, we must move quickly to provide an appropriate burial option for Philadelphia-area veterans. Our Nation's national cemeteries provide a lasting, dignified memorial to the service so many veterans have given to our country. I have received many letters from widows and family members of veterans explaining how much having their loved ones; service honored by an appropriate burial can mean. Providing lasting tributes to this country's heroes sends several messages to all our citizens. It reminds them that we uphold the virtues of serving in the military; we honor the sacrifices veterans have made; and we will never forget that our freedoms are linked with their sacrifices. It is time to move expeditiously to provide Philadelphia area veterans with the opportunity to be so remembered and honored by authorizing a national cemetery at Valley Forge. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, today I renew my efforts that began on September 29, 1998, to authorize the creation of the Valley Forge National Cemetery. I am introducing this bill to coincide with a news conference that Congressman Joseph Hoeffel is holding today in Montgomery County, PA, and I join with the entire Pennsylvania delegation in the House, in announcing our joint intention to see this matter resolved this year. Congressman Hoeffel will introduce a companion bill, and I am pleased to join him in this effort. I had hoped to be with Congressman Hoeffel at Valley Forge today, but was not able to join him due to a prior commitment. I nevertheless commend him, and the entire Pennsylvania delegation in the House, for their leadership in advancing this legislation. I am anxious to begin the fight for this worthy endeavor. A national cemetery located at Valley forge would not only be a fitting final resting place for the Nation's veterans because of the area's historical significance, it would also provide the veterans of southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey with their only national cemetery burial option within a reasonable distance from the homes of their loved ones. This legislation would designate 200 acres of land within the Valley Forge National Historic Park for use by the Department of Veterans Affairs, VA, to create a national cemetery. The cemetery would fall under the jurisdiction of VA's National Cemetery Administration, the agency charged with administering 119 national cemeteries nationwide. The need for a national cemetery at or near Valley Forge first gained my attention in 1998. Back then, I joined with then-Congressman Jon Fox, and the entire Pennsylvania delegation in the House, in introducing legislation, S. 2530, to create the Valley Forge National Cemetery. Unfortunately, that measure was not acted on after its referral to the Senate Energy and Natural Resource Committee. It is my understanding that opposition to the legislation arouse due to concerns, misplaced concerns, in my estimation, that the presence of a veterans' cemetery might somehow be inconsistent with the historic nature of the Valley Forge Park site. I am advised that the National Park Service, NPS, the agency charged with administering over 3,000 acres of federally owned land at the Valley Forge National Historic Park, has expressed reservations about giving up Valley Forge land for cemetery use. I am told that NPS is concerned that a cemetery would denigrate the historical significance of the Park. While these concerns may be held in good faith, I believe the presence of national cemeteries at other historical sites proves that the historical significance of an event or area is heightened not degraded, by the presence of a cemetery honoring those who served in the military. Two NPS-administered cemeteries, Gettysburg National Cemetery and Andersonville National Cemetery, prove my point. Although Gettysburg is not closed for new burials, it is the final resting place of veterans from all of the country's major wars; Andersonville is still open to new burials. Does the presence of deceased veterans at these Civil War sites detract from their solemnity? I think not. In any case, the acreage that would be transferred to VA under my bill is not the site of the original 1777 encampment of General Washington and his men. The need for a national cemetery in the Philadelphia area is particularly acute. The three closest national cemeteries for Philadelphians--the Philadelphia, Beverly, and Finns Point national cemeteries--have been closed to new burials since the 1960s. The closest open national cemetery at Indiantown Gap, PA, is over 2 hours away and, at best, will only remain open for new burials until 2030. Pennsylvania has the fifth largest 65-and-older veteran population in the United States. Estimates from the VA indicate that WWII veterans are passing away at a rate of 1,000 a day, and that the number of annual veteran deaths will reach its peak in 2008. Since national cemeteries take, on average, 7 years to build, we must move quickly to provide an appropriate burial option for Philadelphia-area veterans. Our Nation's national cemeteries provide a lasting, dignified memorial to the service so many veterans have given to our country. I have received many letters from widows and family members of veterans explaining how much having their loved ones; service honored by an appropriate burial can mean. Providing lasting tributes to this country's heroes sends several messages to all our citizens. It reminds them that we uphold the virtues of serving in the military; we honor the sacrifices veterans have made; and we will never forget that our freedoms are linked with their sacrifices. It is time to move expeditiously to provide Philadelphia area veterans with the opportunity to be so remembered and honored by authorizing a national cemetery at Valley Forge. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. There is no doubt that the public is concerned about the appearance of corruption. It is my hope that there will be a close look at this issue by those who are interested in campaign finance reform. If someone is not interested in campaign finance reform, then I can understand a vote against this constitutional amendment. Let's not clear the underbrush of Buckley v. Valeo if someone does not want to have campaign finance reform, but if someone wants to have campaign finance reform--and there are many people who oppose this constitutional amendment on the ground that it is a change of the first amendment--they are simply wrong. There is no change in the first amendment. There is a change in a majority of the nine people on the Supreme Court who have interpreted the first amendment. I thank the Chair. I thank my distinguished colleague from South Carolina, and I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, again, I join my distinguished colleague from South Carolina, Senator Hollings, in offering a constitutional amendment which, simply stated, would allow the Federal Government, through its Congress, signed by the President, or overriding the Presidential veto, and the State legislatures, in due form according to State law, to enact legislation to limit expenditures and contributions on campaign matters. In so doing, I would not in any way suggest changing the language of the first amendment, which I consider sacrosanct and have personal reverence for. But in moving for a constitutional amendment on this issue to overturn Buckley v. Valeo, there is no reference here to changing any language of the first amendment, but only to changing the interpretation of the Supreme Court of the United States in Buckley v. Valeo. That decision was extraordinarily complicated. The main portion, which I hold in my hand, runs 145 pages. That is not considering the dissents which were brought. Chief Justice Burger concurred in part and dissented in part, and Justice White concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Marshall dissented in part. Justice Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part. By the time you finish reading the opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, what you find is a constitutional quagmire--a constitutional quagmire which, in the past 25 years, has led to extraordinary litigation and some of the most absurd results in constitutional history. For example, the controversy has arisen as to what is an advocacy ad and what is an issue ad. The Supreme Court of the United States, in one small paragraph in this lengthy opinion, said that in order to uphold the statute so that it would not be considered vague and therefore violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment, unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness, that the statute would require specific language, such as ``vote for'' or ``vote against,'' ``support,'' or ``defeat.'' That has brought about the dichotomy on what is an advocacy ad, which the Supreme Court designed as ``vote for,'' or ``vote against,'' et cetera, or what is an issue ad. Look at what has happened. In the 1996 campaign, President Clinton put on the following ad, which was deemed to be an issue ad, not an advocacy ad. What I am about to read to you has been interpreted to be just on issues and not urging the election of President Clinton or the defeat of Senator Dole. This is the ad: America's values: Head Start, student loans, toxic cleanup, extra police, protected in the budget agreement. The President stood firm. Dole-Gingrich's latest plan includes tax hikes on working families, up to 18 million children facing health care cuts, Medicare slashed $167 billion. Then Dole resigns, leaving behind him the gridlock he and Gingrich created. The President's plan: Politics must wait. Balance the budget. Reform welfare. Protect our values. It would be hard to conceive an advertisement which was any more emphatic to reelect President Clinton and to defeat Senator Dole. But the exact same pattern was followed by the other side, the Republican National Committee. Listen to the following ad: Three years ago, Bill Clinton gave us the largest tax increase in history, including a four-cents-a-gallon increase on gasoline. Bill Clinton said he felt bad about it. Then there is a videotape of Clinton saying, ``People in this room still get mad at me over the budget process because you think I raised your taxes too much. It might surprise you to know that I think I raised them too much.'' Then President Clinton's face fades out and the announcer comes back on and says, ``OK, Mr. President, we are surprised. So now surprise us again. Support Senator Dole's plan to repeal your gasoline tax and learn that actions do speak louder than words.'' Now how that ad could possibly be interpreted as dealing only with issues and not with the advocacy of Senator Dole's election and the defeat of President Clinton's bid for reelection--I don't like the expression ``boggles the mind,'' but it boggles the mind. But that is the consequence of Buckley v. Valeo. And, then, referring to a single ad in the election for the year 2000 Presidential--this is a brief statement because of limited time. We could go into many advertisements that are the same, advocating the election of one candidate and the defeat of the other, but because of Buckley v. Valeo are held to be issue ads. This is an unusual one, even in the context of issue ads. This is in the election for the year 2000. This is an advertisement paid for by the Democratic National Committee: George W. Bush chose Dick Cheney to help lead the Republican Party. What does Cheney's record say about their plans? Cheney was only one of eight Members of Congress to oppose the Clean Water Act, one of few to vote against Head Start, and he voted against the school lunch program and against health insurance for people who lost their jobs. Cheney, an oil company CEO, said it was good for OPEC to cut production of oil and gas so prices can rise. What are their plans for working families? It is obvious that the language just read urges defeat of the candidate, Vice President Cheney. But how ludicrous is it to say that this could remotely be considered an issue ad when it takes up the Clean Water Act? There has been no debate about the Clean Water Act. It could not possibly be an issue on the American political scene. It talks about the Head Start Program, which has been accepted in America for more than a decade--hardly a matter that relates to an issue--or the school lunch program. Again, it is absolutely ludicrous to say that those matters relate to issue advertisements. All of this has happened because of the progeny of Buckley v. Valeo. The decision in Buckley is inordinately complicated. As I say, there are 145 pages in the main text before coming to the dissents and concurrences by Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Rehnquist. And then within the doctrines of their concurring and dissenting opinions, Mr. Justice White concurred in part and dissented in part. This is the start of his opinion: I concur in the Court's answers to certified questions 1, 2, 3(b), 3(c), 3(e), 3(f), 3(h), 6, 7, 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d), 8, 8(a), 8(b), 8(c), 8(d), 8(f). I dissent from the answers to certify questions 3(a), 3(d), 4(a), and I also join in part three of the court's opinion adding much of parts 1/B II and IV. It takes a complicated crossword puzzle analysis to go through the opinions and to figure out who agrees with what and who dissents from what and what is the conclusion. If there ever was a constitutional quagmire, this is it. Regrettably, Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision in Buckley v. Valeo. Justice Stevens has since participated in the decisions on the issue and has articulated the view that the Supreme Court was wrong in Buckley in equating money and speech. It seems to me to be a non sequitur on its face, to be diplomatic and not to call it absurd, ridiculous, or preposterous, that money equals speech. Yet in a society which comprises democratic rule, one person one vote, where do you end up with the ability of people to spend unlimited sums of money to carry their political point of view? Freedom of speech means that someone can advocate, state, articulate, argue, but it hardly means, in my opinion, that somebody should be weightier in speech because his bank account is weightier. I come to this issue with a little bit of a personal bias, if I may state briefly my own personal experience with Buckley v. Valeo. In January of 1976, when Buckley v. Valeo was decided, I was in a primary contest with Congressman John Heinz for the Republican nomination for the U.S. Senate. In late January 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States said that Congressman Heinz could spend millions, which he did, and that my brother, Morton Specter--he could not have met the highest financing, but he could have done quite well--was limited to $1,000. I petitioned for leave to intervene in Buckley v. Valeo and to file a brief in Buckley v. Valeo. So I am no Johnny-come- lately to this issue. When Senator Hollings said to me years ago: Arlen, why don't we take on Buckley v. Valeo, I understood Fritz, barely, and we have been fighting this constitutional amendment for years. Senator Hollings, if he were understood totally, would have carried the day a long time ago when he ran for President in 1984. I am pretty sure I have the year right. When the campaign was over, Senator Hollings approached me in the steam room one day and said: My Presidential campaign went nowhere. Everybody thought Fritz Hollings was a German moving company. Fritz Hollings. We have been at this for a long time, and we have not gotten very far. We have not gotten very far because there is a coalition of people who articulate the sanctity of freedom of speech, and there are the people who would like to keep the current finance system in effect to benefit those who can raise the most money or those who have the most money. While I do not like to repeat myself, it is worth repeating that I would not dream of changing the language of the first amendment, but I would actively argue that because a majority of Supreme Court Justices have interpreted the first amendment as they have in Buckley v. Valeo, their interpretations are not sacrosanct. There are many, many, many Supreme Court decisions which are 5-4. One vote decides some of the most important questions touching the lives of Americans every day. Those are interpretations of the Constitution. They are not holy writ. They do not come from Mount Olympus. They do not come from Mount Sinai. While their opinions may be better than mine, they are not better than Senator Hollings, a very distinguished lawyer and constitutional scholar. I think we have standing to say: Let's take another look at Buckley v. Valeo. Let's see where it leaves us. We have had very extended debate during the course of the past week, and now we are starting the second week on campaign finance reform. Continually the issue is raised: What you are proposing is unconstitutional. No matter what it is, which side, the argument is raised that it is unconstitutional. On Thursday afternoon we had an extensive debate with the Senator from Kentucky, Mr. McConnell, the Senator from Delaware, Mr. Biden, the Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Thompson, and I, and we were pontificating--I was pontificating; they were giving legal arguments-- about what was constitutional and what was not constitutional; what is a bright line to satisfy Buckley v. Valeo. We could all be right or we could all be wrong because the reality is you cannot figure out what Buckley v. Valeo means. There have been a plethora of decisions I have gone through preparing for these discussions, and this is only a small part of it. It is beyond peradventure a constitutional quagmire. The Supreme Court of the United States has said the obvious in Buckley, that there is the authority to regulate speech where you have corruption or the appearance of corruption. The appearance of corruption is rank in America today. We passed a bankruptcy bill the week before last. I thought it was a good bill, and I voted for it. I voted for it because there are many people who are avoiding their debts who can afford to pay their debts. The bankruptcy law has sufficient flexibility so the bankruptcy judge can schedule payments that somebody can afford. The Senate took a shellacking in the media because of contributions and what was characterized as the appearance of corruption, that Senators votes were bought. A series of books are cited in the amendment which I offered last week: ``The Best Congress Money Can Buy,'' ``Party Finance and Political Corruption.'' I ask unanimous consent that this list be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have just arrived from Pennsylvania. I am going to take about 3 minutes to prepare a statement. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. I prefer to have it set aside. It has a certain status value. I will not object to any request to set it aside to offer other amendments.

Mr. SPECTER. I ask unanimous consent that this amendment be laid aside until the vote has occurred on the severability amendment, and that at that time the motion recur for debate. Should we set a time limit at that time?

Mr. SPECTER. I thank my friend from Connecticut. Mr. President, I am prepared to accede to the suggestion made by the Senate from Tennessee.

Mr. SPECTER. Let me respond very briefly. The thrust of Buckley is to require that there be a strong statement for or against. You may have a sufficient standard when you have identified a candidate within a given period of time. Or you may not because that may not be sufficiently forceful to meet what Buckley is looking for as not being vague on ``for or against,'' for somebody or against somebody. Then you pick up an alternative standard, which Furgatch had, where the circuit court thought that was a sufficient statement: That you are for a candidate or against a candidate. Then I think you have both lines. When the Senator from Tennessee suggests deferring the vote, I am agreeable to that. It may lend more weight to having severability adopted if it has been to some specific reason in the statute. I yield to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. SPECTER. I do.

Mr. SPECTER. I am willing to do that.

Mr. SPECTER. If I may respond, I believe that is exactly what severability means. That is when the Congress tries to figure out what the Court is going to do. It is pretty hard to do. We really can't tell. We just had an extensive debate as to whether Snowe-Jeffords language is constitutional, and whether Furgatch is constitutional. If we put both of them in, and we make a legislative record that we are looking for one or the other to be satisfactory, I believe that the language of severability means just that. If you have a long statute, and the Court strikes down one part of it saying it is wrong, it leaves the rest of it. If the rest of it passes constitutional muster, then it is constitutional. The severability issue really turns on constitutional doctrine as to whether the legislation makes sense if it is severed. The Court will strike it down if by striking down a certain clause the rest of it doesn't carry out congressional intent. Congress tries to avoid that by the severability clause. But putting in a severability clause isn't an absolute guarantee that the Court might not say it is non-severable, notwithstanding the severability clause, because a part was stricken leaving the rest of it as unintelligible, or insufficient, or not really meaningful. But in this context if we say in this legislation we have Snowe- Jeffords, or Furgatch, and if one of them measures up, then the statute survives.

Mr. SPECTER. I do.

Mr. SPECTER. If I may respond, if you have an ``or'', and you have severability, then, if the Senator from Tennessee is correct, the statute would be upheld under the Snowe-Jeffords language. If the Senator from Pennsylvania is correct, and either is possible, if Snowe-Jeffords were stricken as being insufficient under a Buckley case, but Furgatch and ``or'' was sufficient, and they are severable, and one was satisfactory to pass constitutional muster, we would be able to have the one which survived constitutional challenge.

Mr. SPECTER. But in any event, Mr. President, I can modify the amendment--we haven't asked for the yeas and nays yet--to put in the ``or'', the disjunctive instead of ``and'', the conjunctive so that there is severability. And where one is decided to be inefficient to satisfy the vagueness standards of Buckley, the other might be sufficient--picking up on what the Senator from Delaware said, having the safeguard. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. SPECTER. I don't know if the Senator from Tennessee made that point.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I wonder if I can direct a question to the Senator from Wisconsin. We were discussing this issue. Is it the intent of this amendment to make it easier to identify an advocacy ad, and to see to it that what has been seen as an issue ad, which clearly urges the election of a candidate and the defeat of an opponent, is classified as an advocacy ad? I believe the language of Snowe-Jeffords would be consistent, and this language would supplement. But if there is any doubt, the thought occurs to me that we might turn to page 15 where we find electioneering communications. It is i.ii.iii put into the disjunctive ``or'', and pick up Furgatch, so that if you satisfy either standard you have an advocacy ad.

Mr. SPECTER. How much time would the Senator from Delaware like?

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, that draws the issue. My own view is that it is conclusive that Snowe-Jeffords would not satisfy Buckley, that we are looking for an avoidance of a vagueness standard, that simply having a clearly identified candidate for Federal office and a time parameter would not meet the requirement of Buckley which talks about ``vote for'' or ``vote against,'' that in the long history of many cases since 1976, over a 25-year-period, the best language which has come forward is the Furgatch language. I believe that, on its face, it passes constitutional muster. There are a lot of decisions by the courts throwing out legislation on the ground that the legislation is vague and, if legislation is vague, it doesn't satisfy requirements of due process of law. Many courts have struggled mightily for 25 years, and the only court which has come up with language is the Supreme Court of the United States. And as I say that, I know the Hornbook rule is you are supposed to not be able to tell anybody if the Supreme Court denies cert. But it is always mentioned the Supreme Court did not cert, and it is mentioned the Supreme Court does not cert because of the impossible inference, because if the Supreme Court did not like Furgatch, it would have taken cert. I know there is a contrary doctrine that says the Supreme Court is so busy one cannot draw an inference, but I think in a practical sense you can. So in 25 years of litigation and a lot of cases, the best that has evolved is this language which I submit to my colleagues is not vague when it says ``no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.'' That is not vague. But if we stand pat and pass this bill, there is a big risk of unconstitutionality. And if somebody has a way to eliminate vagueness more precisely, I am open. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. If I may further pinpoint the question, does the Senator say if Snowe-Jeffords had been in the Act, that the advertisement extolling Clinton and defaming Dole would have been held an advocacy ad in 1996?

Mr. SPECTER. If I may refocus to the Senator from Tennessee: Put aside the language of Furgatch, assume you are right about the language of Furgatch--and maybe we need some other language--how does Snowe- Jeffords or language of a clearly identified candidate for Federal office satisfy Buckley when the ads extolling Clinton and defaming Dole, where there was a clearly identified candidate and you were within the time-frame and they were issue ads--would Snowe-Jeffords cover the Clinton ads in 1996?

Mr. SPECTER. If I may reclaim the floor for the argument, if it refers to a clearly identified candidate, it does not advance the issue beyond the face of McCain-Feingold, which has ``refer to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office.'' You have all of these ads which extol Clinton and defame Dole or vice versa, or extol Gore and defame Bush, which are held to be issue ads. But you have a clearly identified candidate. So I ask my friend, the Senator from Tennessee, how does that meet the Buckley test, which was not met by these horrendous ads on both sides which, in any event, advocated the election of Clinton and the defeat of Dole? How does this language of Snowe-Jeffords, with a clearly identified candidate--which is the same as McCain-Feingold--advance to any extent the ads in the 1996 or 2000 election which were viewed as issue ads?

Mr. SPECTER. If I may direct this question to my colleague from Tennessee, if the Clinton ads don't have the likeness but simply talk about Gore, then would that satisfy the Snowe-Jeffords test?