Arlen Specter

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Then, Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent I may be recognized to comment on the intelligence authorization report.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, at the outset of my comments, I asked unanimous consent that I might proceed on the 1997 intelligence authorization bill. I had not intended to comment on this subject when coming to the floor, but when I arrived here, I was advised that this issue is ripe for consideration, and I was asked by the staff if I would handle it in a leadership capacity, since I am the only Senator in the Chamber. I would like to proceed to do that at this point. From the script prepared by the staff, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 543, S. 1718, which is entitled the Intelligence authorization bill.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, today the Senate takes up S. 1718, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997. In addition to containing the annual authorization for appropriations for elements of the U.S. intelligence community, this bill includes a number of important provisions intended to ensure that our intelligence agencies operate more effectively and more efficiently in the post-cold-war world. The end of the cold war did not solve America's national security concerns. As evidenced by the bombing in June of the Khobar Towers facility in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and the possible complicity of international terrorists in the downing of TWA flight 800 in July, the focus of those concerns can shift with the speed and force of an explosion. The need for a national security apparatus that is equally dynamic is clear. Title VII of S. 1718--the Intelligence Activities Renewal and Reform Act of 1996--contains measures designed to improve our Nation's intelligence capabilities in order to meet the rapidly changing threats to our national security. Title VII takes significant steps toward this objective in two ways: First, it improves an institutional framework for ensuring that the decisionmakers who rely on intelligence can provide prompt, clear guidance to the intelligence community on what their needs are and what the priorities are. Second, it improves the Director of Central Intelligence's authority and improves the structure he needs to respond quickly in an effective, efficient, and responsible manner. S. 1718, as originally reported out by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, reflected the conclusions this committee had reached after 6 years of focused examination of the missions, functions, and organizational arrangements for the intelligence community. Triggered by the end of the cold war, this examination had gained momentum in 1994 in the wake of the Ames espionage case and the revelation that the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO] had built an expensive new building without adequately informing Congress. I do not need to remind my colleagues that just 2 years ago members of this body from both parties--angered by what appeared to be a lack of direction and accountability in the intelligence community, and particularly in the CIA--stood in this Chamber to call for a massive overhaul of our intelligence apparatus. In order to avoid precipitous action, the Senate adopted a proposal offered by Senators Warner, Graham, and others to create a bipartisan Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community to conduct a credible, independent, and objective review of U.S. intelligence. The Commission was given a deadline of March 1, 1996, with the expectation that its report would inform a legislative debate resulting in enactment of needed changes during the 104th Congress. The Commission was chaired by former Congressman and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin until his untimely death and later by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. The 17-member Commission included two of our distinguished colleagues, John Warner and Jim Exon, and two of our former colleagues, Warren Rudman, who served as vice chairman, and Wyche Fowler. While the Aspin-Brown Commission was conducting its review, our committee and its staff also held a number of hearings, received briefings, and conducted interviews regarding the appropriate missions and organizational structure of the intelligence community. During the course of these efforts, two additional incidents--the failure of CIA officials to inform Congress of the possible involvement of CIA assets in human rights abuses in Guatemala and the failure of NRO officials to tell either the DCI or Congress that the NRO had accumulated over $1 billion in unused funds--further convinced our Committee that the intelligence community needed greater central direction and accountability. Based on the Aspin-Brown Commission's recommendations and on the results of our own review, the committee reported out S. 1718 on April 24, 1996. The bill was subsequently taken on sequential referral by the Armed Services Committee, which informed the Intelligence Committee that it did not want to consider any intelligence reform this year. The Intelligence Committee did not believe that intelligence reforms could be put off for another year. The rapidly changing world, the recent incidents that have undermined public confidence in our intelligence agencies, and the work already done by the Aspin-Brown Commission and other groups--all of these factors led us to believe that the time was ripe for intelligence reform. We marked up our bill in April in order to ensure that the Armed Services Committee would have plenty of time to consider it. The Department of Defense, from the outset, opposed anything in the bill that enhanced the authority of the DCI at the expense of the Secretary of Defense. In an April 29 letter to the Armed Services Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense John White stated that ``clear and unambiguous lines of authority from the Secretary of Defense to the Defense intelligence agencies and the embedded Service intelligence elements are crucial'' to ensuring ``that those who depend on intelligence--especially our nation's military forces--receive the timely and responsive intelligence they require.'' Deputy Secretary White argued that enhancing the DCI's authorities over NSA, NRO, and CIO would ``unnecessarily complicate those lines of command and control.'' I agree completely that intelligence consumers, especially military consumers whose lives may be at risk, must have timely and responsive intelligence. I do not agree, however, that this objective can be accomplished through exclusive management by the Secretary of Defense of NSA, NRO, and CIO. The fact is that in the course of running an over $240 billion department the Secretary of Defense simply does not have time to exercise any degree of command and control over Defense intelligence agencies. The consequences of continuing the fiction of Secretary of Defense management of these intelligence agencies at the expense of real management by the DCI is significant. The country needs to vest the authority in the DCI so that intelligence, such as that produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency in mid-June warning of threats to United States troops at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, is certain to receive the kind of attention it is warranted. We need a DCI who can rattle the cages when necessary, so that consumers of intelligence cannot attribute policy failures to intelligence shortcomings. Both the Downing Commission and the staff report of the SSCI concluded that the tragedy at Khobar Towers was not attributable to an intelligence failure. It is deeply regrettable that, as a result of changes insisted upon by the Armed Services Committee, the country will have to wait for another Congress and perhaps additional bitter experiences before the needed changes can be made. Testifying before our committee on April 24, 1996, Director Deutch provided some interesting insights on the ability of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to exercise the authorities DOD fought so desperately to retain. When asked whether we should hold the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the DCI accountable for problems at the NRO, a key national intelligence agency within the Department of Defense, he responded: The Deputy Secretary of Defense has got a tremendous set of issues covering a much larger range of resources--10 times-- managing ten times the resources we're talking about for the whole intelligence community. So to say that you are going to go to the deputy--and I am not talking about personalities--and say to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, why didn't you catch this, he's going to say, well, I count on the DCI to keep track of this and to let the Secretary of Defense know. So in some sense, if we are going to say that the Director of Central Intelligence does not view himself or herself as being responsible for the NRO, fundamentally nobody will be. In light of these realities, this committee sought to give the DCI greater authority and responsibility to manage the intelligence community. The Armed Services Committee, asserting their jurisdiction over the Defense Department, insisted on a number of changes to keep provisions that affected the intelligence agencies within DOD. The Armed Services Committee and the Defense Department were most concerned about those provisions that would have given the DCI greater authority to manage the intelligence community, including those elements of the community that are part of the Department of Defense such as the National Security Agency [NSA], the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO], and the Central Imagery Office. These provisions would have given the DCI, as head of the intelligence community, authority to execute the budgets for NSA, NRO, and CIO as well as shared responsibility, together with the Secretary of Defense and for ensuring that these agencies perform their national missions. The DCI would also have been given authority to reprogram funds from one program to another within the National Foreign Intelligence Program--which is the portion of the overall U.S. intelligence budget the DCI is responsible for developing each year--even if the affected department or agency head objected to that transfer. Finally, the Intelligence Committee had voted for a provision to require DCI concurrence on the decision as to who should head the major collection agencies: NSA, NRO, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. This was watered down by Armed Services to a qualified concurrence, allowing the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense to be forwarded to the President over the DCI's objection so long as that objection is noted. Given the length of time the Armed Services Committee and, then, the Government Affairs Committee held this bill, and in light of the abbreviated legislative schedule, we were unable to bring these important issues to the floor of the Senate for debate and a vote. Nevertheless, despite the Defense Department's initial refusal to relinquish any significant authority to ensure more efficient and effective management of intelligence, we were able to get a bill out of the Armed Services Committee that contains important new statutory assurances of DCI authority and should enhance the prospects that future DCI's will not have to rely merely on the good will of the Secretary of Defense in order to effectively manage intelligence. The bill before you today contains much of what the Intelligence Committee initially proposed, but not as much as the country needs. That greater objective will require continued efforts. In addition to the amendments made to our bill by the Armed Services Committee, the Government Affairs Committees took the bill for 53 days. At the end of that time, they reported it out with minor modifications to the provision providing for a Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Finally, the Rules Committee also originally requested sequential referral of our bill in order to review a provision that would have amended Senate Resolution 400, the charter for our committee, to eliminate the 8-year term limit on committee membership. After consultations between our two committees and in response to concerns expressed by the majority leader, we agree to delete this provision and the Rules Committee withdrew its request for sequential referral of our bill. We remain convinced that extending the terms for membership of the oversight committee is an essential step in improving congressional oversight of intelligence, and I note that elimination of term limits was recommended by the Aspin-Brown Commission, on which Senator Warner served. But in order to ensure consideration of S. 1718 in this shortened legislative year, we have agreed to put off this issue for now. Now let me summarize the provisions in our bill. I will begin with the reform provisions in title VII. The key provisions enhance the ability of the DCI to manage the intelligence community by providing him with new statutory authority and an improved management structure. Specifically, section 707 of the bill gives the DCI new statutory authority to participate in the development of the budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for tactical intelligence and related activities; to approve all collection requirements and priorities and to resolve conflicts among priorities; and the right to be consulted by the Secretary of Defense before the Secretary reprograms funds within joint military intelligence programs. Section 707 would also require the DCI and the Secretary of Defense to develop a database of all intelligence programs and activities, including resource and budget execution information. The Office of Science and Technology Policy within the White House has recently developed a database of all research and development activities within the Federal Government, and this database has been invaluable for identifying duplication among Federal R&D programs. The committee believes that the DCI has been hampered in his ability to manage the intelligence community by a lack of accurate and comprehensive information about all intelligence community activities. Development of a database for intelligence activities should give the DCI one of the key tools he needs to provide greater direction and control of U.S. intelligence programs. In addition, section 716 of the bill would require the DCI to concur in recommendations by the Secretary of Defense to the President of individuals to be directors of NSA, NRO, or the newly created National Imagery and Mapping Agency, or to have his lack of concurrence noted. The DCI would also have to be consulted by the appropriate department head when appointing the heads of the major elements of the National Foreign Intelligence Program, including the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, the Assistant Director in charge of the FBI's National Security Division, the Director of DIA, and the Director of the Department of Energy's Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. This new authority will help to remedy a situation in which DCI's--despite their statutory role as head of the intelligence community--have had little or no say in the appointments of the heads of major intelligence community elements. The Armed Services Committee also agreed to include in the DOD authorization bill a requirement that the DCI provide to the Secretary of Defense an annual performance evaluation of the heads of NSA, NRO, and NIMA. The bill would also establish three new Senate-confirmed Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence to assist the DCI in managing the intelligence community. One would focus on managing the intelligence community's collection activities; the second would coordinate community-wide intelligence analysis and production; and the third would coordinate community administrative programs. The committee believes that one reason that successive DCI's have been unable to exercise stronger management over the intelligence community is that they have lacked an adequate management structure. We believe these new positions will help the DCI fulfill his community role. In addition to strengthening the authorities of the DCI, the bill also creates two new committees of the National Security Council--a Committee on Foreign Intelligence and a Committee on Transnational Threats--to provide better policy guidance for the intelligence community and for departments and agencies involving in fighting international terrorism and crime. The creation of both committees were recommended by the Aspin-Brown Commission. Section 715 clarifies that intelligence collection agencies may accept tasking from law enforcement agencies to collect intelligence about non-U.S. persons outside the United States. This provision is necessary because CIA and NSA read their legal authorities as preventing them accepting tasking from law enforcement agencies lest they be considered to be exercising law enforcement powers. The provision is narrowly tailored to apply only to collection outside the United States about non-U.S. persons. Section 717 of the bill calls for disclosure of the intelligence budget top line--that is, the aggregate of NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA. This number has been in the public domain for some time, without carrying us down the so-called slippery slope of more detailed disclosures. The DCI supports disclosure, the Aspin-Brown Commission supports disclosure, and the administration supports disclosure. Disclosure of the top line provides no new information to our enemies. In fact, I believe this disclosure will actually strengthen our ability to protect vital national secrets by bolstering the credibility of our classification decisions--officially revealing the budget total tells the American public is that we are using classification to protect vital national secrets, not to conceal information that might be inconvenient to defend. And I think it would not be difficult to defend the size of the intelligence budget, given the complex world we live in today. These are the principal reform provisions contained in the Intelligence Authorization Act. The bill contains a number of additional important provisions. Title V of the bill criminalizes theft of economic proprietary information by a person acting on behalf of a foreign government or its agent. This provision is the result of nearly 4 years of hearing and study by our committee. We held hearings on this provision earlier this year, and we are convinced by both the classified and unclassified testimony that economic espionage is a problem that needs to be remedied immediately in the interests of our national economy and thus our national security. Title VI would create a Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The eight members of the Commission are to be appointed by the President and the congressional leadership. The Commission is required to conduct a study of the organization of the Federal Government, including the intelligence community, for combating weapons proliferation. Finally, title VIII of the bill, as amended by the Armed Services Committee, codifies the national mission and tasking authorities of the DCI for the new National Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA]. NIMA is a new agency within the Department of Defense formed from the current Central Imagery Office, the Defense Mapping Agency, CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center, and certain other imagery related elements. As originally reported by our committee, title VIII included provisions that would have established NIMA. The DOD authorization bill, which was reported by the Armed Services Committee later than our bill, included a more comprehensive statutory framework governing NIMA, and we agreed to the removal of the provisions establishing NIMA in our bill and their replacement with provisions in the National Security Act defining the new agency's national mission and the DCI's tasking authorities. The DCI's tasking authorities are especially important. For the first time in statute, the DCI now has the specific authority to approve collection requirements, determine collection priorities, and resolve conflicts in priorities levied on our national imagery satellites and other imagery assets. I also want to mention that the Armed Services Committee attempted to establish NIMA as a combat support agency of the Department of Defense. We strongly opposed this formulation because it slighted the critical imagery needs of the National Security Council, the Department of State, and other non-DOD consumers. Our committee was unwilling to have NIMA cater to the exclusive needs of the Defense Department. Accordingly, we modified the language in the DOD authorization bill, which we took on sequential referral, to provide that NIMA is not only a combat support agency but also has significant national missions. I also want to note that although NIMA has been added to the list of combat support agencies in 10 U.S.C. 193(f), subsection (d) of section 193, as amended by the DOD authorization bill, specifically provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chief's oversight over NIMA shall apply ``only with respect to combat support functions [the Agency] performs for the Department of Defense.'' This language makes clear that NIMA has important noncombat support functions that are not subject to the control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. This concludes my summary of this year's intelligence authorization bill, including the reform provisions in title VII. Congress has been considering legislation to reform the intelligence community to meet the challenges of the post-cold-war world since at least 1990. Today, despite continuing bureaucratic resistance, the Senate is taking significant steps toward finally achieving that objective. I want to thank the distinguished vice chairman, Senator Kerrey, for his unflagging and nonpartisan commitment to the work of the committee. Senator Kerrey brings to this committee a unique understanding of the business of intelligence and a willingness and ability to master even the most complex technical issues. His insights and efforts were absolutely essential to the passage of this bill and to the committee's work overall. In addition, I would like to take this opportunity to recognize the excellent work of the committee staff, particularly Charlie Battaglia, Chris Straub, Suzanne Spaulding, John Bellinger, and Ed Levine.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendments be agreed to; further, that an amendment offered by the managers and an amendment offered by Senator Thurmond which are at the desk be considered and agreed to en bloc.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill then be read a third time and the Senate then proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 420, H.R. 3259, the House companion measure; further, that all after the enacting clause be stricken and the text of S. 1718, as amended, be inserted in lieu thereof, H.R. 3259 then be deemed read a third time and passed, with the motion to reconsider laid upon the table.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, as I understand the procedure, that now concludes the intelligence authorization bill, but since I am here and it has just been acted upon, I would like to make a few comments to supplement my more extended statement.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I believe that this legislation is a very, very significant step forward in reform of the U.S. intelligence community--candidly, not as far as we should have gone, not as far as I would like to have gone, but a considerable distance, a significant distance in improving the intelligence community in the United States. The intelligence community has been under considerable attack with disclosures of Aldrich Ames, with the problems in Guatemala, with many problems around the globe. And last year, at the initiative of our distinguished colleague, Senator John Warner, a commission was appointed to make recommendations on what should be done to reform the U.S. intelligence community. The commission--first headed by former Secretary of Defense Aspin, whose untimely death caused a vacancy and the need to appoint a subsequent chairman, another former Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown--came up with a comprehensive list of recommendations, and the Intelligence Committee then held extensive hearings on a subject that goes back many years. The Intelligence Committee then submitted a program which we thought would make very major changes in the U.S. intelligence community. There was very considerable objection then raised from a number of quarters, principally by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Finally, after very extensive negotiations, not only with the Armed Services Committee but also with the Governmental Affairs Committee and, to a lesser extent, with the Rules Committee, we have hammered out the agreement which has been presented here and has been agreed to and will now go to conference. It had been my desire that there should have been more authority in the Director of Central Intelligence on reprogramming, more authority on concurrence on the appointment of key officials because of the general responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, but that was not to be. We filed our report at an early stage, but there was a reference under the rules of referral to the Armed Services Committee which took considerable time and considerable time by the Governmental Affairs Committee, and I thank Senator Warner for not taking time in the Rules Committee. We find ourselves, as we frequently do in the legislative process, very close to the end of the session, not with sufficient time to bring the matter to the floor and to debate the issues of reprogramming or concurrence or appointments or many other issues, so we have had to make an accommodation to have the bill handled by unanimous consent in the course of a few minutes as we have already done earlier today. Senator Kerrey, my distinguished vice chairman, and I have agreed to this because, as I say, this is a significant step forward. We want to go to conference. We want to get these provisions accepted and placed into law even though a great deal more should have been done. This bill contains very significant provisions on economic espionage, contains a very significant provision on a commission to be established to streamline the Federal Government on our handling of weapons of mass destruction. Some 96 different agencies now touch that issue. There is not centralized command. And those are very, very important matters. An interest which I had pursued, to try to give greater authority to the Director of Central Intelligence, has come into the spotlight with the terrorist attack on Khobar Towers on June 25 of this year, and the allegation by the Secretary of Defense, in a July 9 hearing in the Senate Armed Services Committee, that there was intelligence failure, which I think was an incorrect assertion. The staff of the Intelligence Committee--and I emphasize ``the staff'' and not the full Intelligence Committee--but the staff prepared a report which was released last Thursday with my conclusions in my capacity as chairman of the Intelligence Committee, but again not the full committee, but my individual conclusions that there was not an intelligence failure. Then yesterday we had the report of the Downing task force which took to task the Pentagon as well as the local field commanders. I personally visited Khobar Towers last month, and on viewing Khobar Towers and seeing a fence only 60 feet from these high-rise apartments, which house thousands of our airmen, 19 of whom were killed and hundreds of whom were injured, it was apparent to me, in the face of the many intelligence reports which had been received, that there was not an intelligence failure and that there was in fact a failure by the military, going to the Pentagon and the highest levels of the Pentagon, on failing to act to protect our airmen. The conclusions yesterday of the Downing task force, as featured in the Associated Press reports, faulted the Pentagon, as well as the local commanders, for what had been done. I make comment of this at this time because I believe this ties into the reform of the intelligence community to have a Director of Central Intelligence who collects all of the information and could, in effect, rattle the cages, where necessary, to call attention to the top Pentagon officials, including the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the need for greater protection of our forces. We have not gone that far, and we have not accomplished that. I make these comments in the context of what had occurred on June 25 and what happened just yesterday with the filing of the Downing committee report. But I have talked to my colleagues about where we stand now, and the sentiments have been expressed that we will have a chance to further improve the intelligence community at a later date. But that remains, to some substantial extent, unfinished business, as we have unfinished business as to how we handle not only intelligence but force protection around the United States. But this is a significant step forward. This is the very best we could do. Those who do not know the interworkings of the Senate might be interested to know that any one Senator can tie up this bill. A number of Senators interposed objections, which we had to work through laboriously to get this bill to the stage where it is now where it has been passed. I thank my distinguished colleague, Senator Kerrey from Nebraska, who has done an extraordinary job in many things over many years, but especially on the Senate Intelligence Committee. As we have worked together, we have had some tough times, especially as the election grows nearer. We have kept the Intelligence Committee working on a bipartisan, nonpartisan basis. I think it is indispensable on a committee of this sort that the chairman and the vice chairman and really members on both sides of the aisle work very closely to keep partisan politics out of it. Senator Kerrey and I have worked laboriously at that and I think we have succeeded, notwithstanding the fact that we face some very, very difficult issues and continue to face difficult issues as we work to complete quite a number of projects which yet remain undone. I would like to single out for special praise--this is always a delicate matter--some key staffers, Charles Battaglia, who is the staff director, and Chris Straub, who is the staff director for the Democrats, the minority staff director, for the extraordinary work which they have done on the nights, Saturdays, Sundays, you name it; and for general counsel, Suzanne Spaulding, and for Ed Levine, who has been a powerhouse in drafting very complex reports. I thank the Chair, and I note the presence of my colleague, Senator Pell. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate insist on its amendment to H.R. 3259 and request a conference with the House, the Chair be authorized to appoint conferees on the part of the Senate, and, finally, S. 1718 be placed back on the calendar.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that the Record remain open for the insertion of any additional statements as any member of the committee or other Senator may wish to add.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my distinguished colleague, Senator Stevens, in praising Howard Greene. During the 16 years that I have had the privilege of serving in the Senate, I have come to know Howard Greene and have great admiration and respect for him. Senator Stevens talked about the Republican majority leaders Dirksen and Baker and Dole and what great service they received from Howard Greene. In a sense, Howard Greene was a leader's leader because he would always provide information and insights of enormous value to the leadership. We are blessed, in the Senate, to have personnel who serve in the capacity of--you might call them clerks, or you might call them directors, or you might call them, in effect, assistant leaders. When Howard Greene was here, I would frequently go to him, as would most of my colleagues, and want a prediction about what was going to happen. People who may watch the Senate intermittently on C-SPAN do not know that our schedules are very unpredictable. Some times people ask, ``When will the Senate adjourn?'' I customarily say, ``When the last Senator stops speaking.'' Howard Greene customarily had a good idea as to when the last Senator would stop speaking. When he was promoted to the Sergeant at Arms, a very important and prestigious position in the Senate, I was, in a sense, sorry to see it happen, because no longer would Howard Greene patrol the floor. That familiar sight when he would come out of those double doors, straighten his tie and adjust his coat and walk down that step. Even Elizabeth Greene laughs at the recapture of Howard Greene entering the Senate Chamber. He was always busy. Howard Greene was really a great aid and comfort to all the Senators. When the going got rough, I would call him in the evening or call him on weekends, and he was always available to help over the rough administrative hurdles. I know my colleague Senator Roth has come to the floor, and he intends to talk about Howard Greene as well. But I think Howard Greene was a tremendous asset to the U.S. Senate. I, for one, am very sorry to see him terminate his service here. But I wish him the very best in the years ahead, and I know we will all continue to work with him and admire him and respect him for his contribution to this body. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I met recently with County Commissioners Larry Dunn and Bob Cranmer, who are very interested in the economic development that could be generated from privatizing Allegheny County Airport, a general aviation airport which has not had commercial passenger service since 1956. During my visit to the airport on September 9, 1996, I again heard of the strong local interest in privatization, which the county has estimated could generate as much as $20 million in business growth in the Monongahela River Valley, an area hurt in recent years by severe unemployment. I am advised that Federal law and regulations are the principal obstacles to privatization of airports. The House FAA reauthorization bill contains a provision allowing for the sale or long-term lease, with the approval of the FAA, of up to six airports, of which one must be a general aviation airport or similar airport not in commercial service, such as Allegheny County Airport. The Senate bill we are considering today does not contain language authorizing such a pilot program, but does provide for a report to the Secretary by an independent task force that will consider innovative financing mechanisms. Upon this state of the record, and as a member of the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee, I believe that for Allegheny County Airport to realize its fullest potential, private investment is crucial. I would ask my distinguished colleagues, the chairmen of the Aviation Subcommittee and the full Commerce Committee, whether the Allegheny County Airport is the type of airport in which privatization should be facilitated by Congress?

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair. I note the change from Senator Frist to you, Madam President, and so I address you properly as Madam President.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition to report briefly on a trip which I made from August 16 through August 31 of this year. Madam President, the trip focused on a number of key items in my travels which took me to Korea, Japan, and China, then to the Gulf States of Oman, Saudi Arabia, then to Israel and Syria, with a brief stop in Paris, and back to the United States. One of the themes of concern to me, Madam President, was the issue of the enormous U.S. military expenditure, and the need to have burdensharing from our allies where we are maintaining so much of the cost of defense. The Japanese are paying 70 percent of the cost. But it seems to me realistic that with their enormous gross national product, and their ability to pay their own defenses, that even 70 percent is not sufficient in the context of spending so little of their own money on national defense. The 70-percent figure is much larger than the moneys paid by the Saudis, where we have recently seen plans to move our base from Dhahran to the desert with a 50-percent sharing by the Saudis. But even there, when we are there to protect their interests and they are a very affluent nation, it seems to me that more ought to be undertaken by the Saudis. In South Korea, we have 37,000 American troops, and there have long been suggestions that some of those troops ought to be withdrawn. South Korea, again, is a very prosperous nation. Some of their defense planning is long range, not on the immediate potential threat from North Korea. And there again, it would be reasonable to have more cost sharing by the South Koreans. I suggest that our defense policy ought to undertake a look globally beyond NATO as to burdensharing with the specific reference to Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia. During the course of travels, we also had a considerable focus on the nuclear threat, and, potentially, real problems in North Korea, where they have the wherewithal to have nuclear weapons, and where they have ballistic missiles which are reported to have sufficient thrust to reach Japan or Alaska, and far beyond. The situation in North Korea is very unstable. I had hoped to visit North Korea personally, and had some preliminary indications, up to the start of the trip, that we could do so, but at the last minute we were told we could not visit North Korea. The situation there is unstable because of the shortage of food, and I think that we have to engage the North Koreans. We have to do what we can to see that there is a stable government there. Assistance on food is elementary. Japan and South Korea are aiding. We are to some extent, but we have to keep a close watch on the volatility, and the potential instability in North Korea. When we traveled to China, a key focus of attention was the trade issue, and we were told that trade is not calculated properly because of certain statistics coming from Hong Kong. But we made the point as emphatically as we could that there needed to be more reciprocity and more openness of the Chinese markets. We visited the city of Harbin in Manchuria and saw really great potential for American growth, the growth of American trade, meeting with United States businessmen in that community. While in China, we also took up the issue of freedom of religion, noting the fact that Christians were not permitted to practice religion, and recent activities by the Chinese Government inhibited freedom of religion by Christians, and by Jews, and those with different religious views. We were assured, but I think vacuously, in their statements that there was freedom of religion, but the facts are very much to the contrary. And we asserted that point with some forcefulness. We also took up the issue of the sale of M-11 missiles from China to Pakistan. We protested that very strongly. We were told by the Chinese that they had not violated international accords, and there again a stalemate in our discussions. There is a real question as to how we deal with the Chinese, whether by sanctions or totally by diplomacy. My sense is we have to consider sanctions. With the Chinese destabilizing the subcontinent of Taiwan, firing their own ballistic missiles close to Taiwan, it seems to me that we have to be forceful and really consider the imposition of sanctions there. Moving on to Saudi Arabia, we had an opportunity to view the Khobar Towers site at Dhahran, a subject I reported on briefly in a floor statement yesterday--an enormous tragedy, 19 Americans killed, hundreds wounded. Seeing the perimeter fence less than 60 feet from Khobar Towers, it was apparent, on a cursory inspection, that it was an open invitation to terrorism. As noted in my floor statement yesterday, it was my conclusion that there had been ample warnings about the potentiality of terrorists at the perimeter fence, and the possible use of a large bomb. That is something that will be considered in greater detail by the Downing Task Force, but there is an urgent need for stepped-up force protection, certainly in places like Khobar Towers, and doubtless around the world considering the escalating threat of terrorism. We had a chance to meet with Defense Minister Sultan, Crown Prince Abdullah, and urged cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the inquiries to determine who the terrorists were at Khobar Towers, and reregistered our complaints that the FBI had not an opportunity to interview the four men who were executed for the November 13, 1995, car bombing in Riyadh, and raised the issue about the need for Saudi Arabia to undertake a greater share of the cost of the defense burdens. Before arriving in Saudi Arabia, we made a brief stop in Mongolia, an independent nation, landlocked between China and Russia, quite a product of an emerging democracy, having thrown off the yoke of the Soviet Union even before its disintegration. There we saw an effort for democratic process succeeding in its embryo stage, and an effort for the free market. Coming to the Mideast, we had an opportunity to confer with Prime Minister Netanyahu, Syrian President Assad, and Palestinian Chairman Arafat. There is obvious difficulty with the new government being beset by problems on all sides. We find disagreements within the Likud government, but it is my impression that Prime Minister Netanyahu is up to the challenge. We had an extended discussion with Chairman Yasser Arafat, and I must say that every time I meet with Chairman Arafat, it is a wonder to me that we are doing business with a man who has had such a long record of terrorism. Going back to September 13, 1993, when then Prime Minister Rabin, and then Foreign Minister Peres shook the hand of Yasser Arafat, it seemed to me that if the Israeli leaders were prepared to do so, the United States should be supportive of their efforts toward the peace process. Certainly the Israelis have suffered the major burden of the terrorist attack by the PLO in the Mideast area. In the conversations with Chairman Arafat, we discussed the resolution that Senator Shelby and I had introduced, which was enacted, which conditioned U.S. aid on a change of the PLO charter. Chairman Arafat assured us it had been done. And when he produced the document, it was evident on its face that it was insufficient, the document saying merely that all provisions inconsistent with the September 13, 1993, agreement would be revoked. That is not sufficient, and we made that point as emphatically as we could. We then talked about terrorism, and with Yasser Arafat, a man who has been on a first-name basis, and has dealt with the terrorists of the area, Abu Nidal, Abu Abbas and Hamas, and emphasized as strongly as we could the need for the Palestinian authority to be proactive in stopping terrorist attacks in that area. Chairman Arafat assured us that he was doing what he could, emphasized the point that he himself was subject to terrorist assassination plots, and said that he would do what he could. But I think that is an area which requires increasing U.S. pressure. We need to be as emphatic as we can that if we are to continue United States military aid to the Palestinians, they are going to have to take effective action against terrorism. Mr. President, in accordance with my practice to report on foreign travel, this floor statement summarizes a trip taken from August 16 through 31, 1996, to Asia and the Mideast, focusing on the North Korean threat, the question of sanctions against China for selling M-11 missiles to Pakistan and for firing a ballistic missile 100 miles from Taiwan, the June 25 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, the Mideast peace process and terrorism, with a stop in Paris for discussions on terrorism and trade en route back to the United States. We had hoped to visit North Korea to personally inspect the North Korean nuclear facility and to meet with North Korean leaders. But, despite several months of efforts, the North Koreans ultimately refused to allow my visit. We were able, however, to discuss the North Korean situation with local American authorities and with leaders of North Korea's immediate neighbors: Japan, South Korea, and China. Specifically, we met with American military leaders, including our commanders in Japan and South Korea; Japanese, Korean, and Chinese foreign affairs and trade ministers; and with our ambassadors and embassy teams. We wanted to investigate not only the North Korean threat, but whether we should ask South Korea to shoulder a larger share of the defense burden--no small matter when we face deficits and difficult domestic spending cuts. Upon arrival in Japan on the evening of August 18, we met with Marine Brig. Gen. Terrance Murray, deputy commander of United States forces in Japan. I continued my discussion with General Murray and his top aides the next morning, focusing largely on the North Korean threat and the allocation of United States resources in Japan. It struck me that our arrangement with Japan, in which the Japanese Government pays 70 percent of the cost of United States forces in Japan, offered a model for renegotiating with South Korea, and our costs in defending Saudi Arabia. When dealing with such prosperous nations, there is no reason why they should not pay the full cost of their own defense. Following our second meeting with General Murray, we met with Rust Deming, our Charge d'Affaires, and the Embassy team in Tokyo. We agreed that Congress should focus on unfair trade practices in Japan that cost American companies millions of dollars and American workers tens of thousands of jobs. By demonstrating sustained interest in trade issues, and by more congressional visits to Japan, we can send Japan a message that the United States has staying power. Mr. Deming and his team of issues experts discussed how American companies find themselves competing for a small portion of various Japanese markets, or find themselves shut out entirely, as networks of Japanese firms buy only from each other, while enjoying the profits as American firms buy from them. We do not even have the recourse of some developing nations, which are allowed under GATT to set formulas that require, for example, that the Japanese build one automobile in a host country for every given number of cars they sell there. Industries in which American firms suffer from unfair Japanese market restrictions include semiconductors, automobiles and auto parts, insurance and civil aviation. Several major corporations in my own State of Pennsylvania are being handcuffed. Following my meeting with the Tokyo Embassy team, I took up trade issues in an hour-long meeting with Masaki Orita, Director General of Japan's North American Affairs Bureau. I told Mr. Orita there was a lot of anger in America, which I see almost every time I hold an open-house town meeting in Pennsylvania, that American markets are open to Japan, but Japanese markets are closed to America. I told Mr. Orita I did not agree with him that the atmosphere has improved on United States- Japanese trade, when we face a $59.5 billion deficit even though it has been reduced from $65 billion. After our meeting, I asked Mr. Orita to pose for a photograph with me. As I prepared to snap the photo, Mr. Orita remarked with pleasure that my Olympus pocket camera was made in Japan. I told Mr. Orita that we believed in free markets, and were pleased to buy Japanese products, if they were the best available at the best prices. I said Japan ought to allow Kodak to compete with Fuji in its film market. When my flash failed to fire, Mr. Orita immediately said the problem was with the batteries, and not with the camera. I told Mr. Orita that my batteries were also made in Japan. I brought up trade again at my next meeting, with Kenzo Oshima, Deputy Director General of Japan's Asian Affairs Bureau. During our hour-long talk, we also focused on the North Korean situation and the prospect for Four Power Talks among the United States, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan. Mr. Oshima told me he was apprehensive about North Korean military aggression. North Korea is already over the line, I said. By legal definition, an arm raised in a threat to strike--or missiles massed on the DMZ-- constitutes assault. The actual act of striking constitutes battery. We agreed that food should be given to North Korea for humanitarian reasons, even at the risk that some of our contributions would be diverted to uses that increase friction on the Korean Peninsula. On costs, I pressed Mr. Oshima that Japan should contribute more to the North Korean process, especially in light of an additional $25 million in United States aid recently approved by the United States Senate. Mr. Oshima promised a meaningful contribution from Japan, but would not offer a figure. On Tuesday, August 20, we met in Seoul, South Korea, for 2 hours with Ambassador James Laney, members of the Embassy team, and Marine Maj. Gen. Frank Libutti. Our experts stressed that we faced a threat of miscalculation or desperation from North Korea. Ambassador Laney and General Libutti, like the experts in Japan, thought the North Korean regime was weakening, and was near destabilization. Mr. Laney noted that the room where we were sitting at the United States Embassy in Seoul was 23.4 miles from the North Korean border. General Libutti added that a North Korean rocket could reach Seoul in less than 1 minute. We also discussed efforts to find remains of the 8,000 United States soldiers unaccounted for during the Korean war. Until recently, those efforts have been stymied by North Korea's refusal to admit United States search teams. But recently, joint United States-Korean teams have found some remains. I told Mr. Laney that South Korea should pay more of the costs of the protection it enjoys from the 37,000 United States troops stationed there. Under a 1954 treaty, the United States pledged to defend South Korea, a rare and sweeping commitment. I noted that Japan pays 70 percent of the cost of the United States forces within its borders, while South Korea now pays only one third of its cost, and is scheduled to pay an additional 10 percent each year. I told Ambassador Laney that I did not find that arrangement adequate. We met next at Yongsan Garrison, headquarters of the combined United States-Korean force, for an hour with Gen. John Tilelli, the United States commander in chief. We discussed the North Korean threat and military strategy in some detail. General Libutti also attended and participated in that meeting. We discussed, in greater detail than I had with General Murray in Japan, the massive, 3-week war game that United States and its allies had just begun involving various scenarios of military conflicts with North Korea. I told General Tilelli I thought it was essential, apart from the game's value as training, to show the North Koreans that we are ready. Afterward, we met with Ambassador Yoo Chong Ha, South Korea's Senior Presidential Secretary for Foreign and National Security Affairs. We had a somewhat tense conversation about whether South Korea could not share more of its defense costs. I pointed out that Congress was very uneasy about the amount of money we are spending in South Korea, and about the number of United States troops stationed there. I pressed Mr. Ha that South Korea should contribute more toward its own defense. I asked him why South Korea should not bear the entire cost of its defense. Mr. Ha replied that South Korea is already buying substantial amounts of United States armaments, and is increasing its share of defense costs. Stating my own personal disagreement, I said that South Korea was not paying enough. Our final meeting in Seoul was with South Korean Foreign Minister Gong Ro Myung. We talked at length about North Korea's terrorist threat. I noted that North Korea remains on our terrorist nations list, which bars most United States contact. While North Korea has not been charged with committing a terrorist act since 1987, Mr. Myung said he was investigating allegations that a North Korean agent had murdered a South Korean man in China just a week earlier, in mid-August. On August 20, we traveled to Harbin, China, a sprawling city of 3 million in Heilongjiang Province. We were especially interested in visiting China's outlying provinces to get a feel for United States market potential. In Harbin, we continued our talks on trade. We were accompanied throughout by United States Consul General Carl Wycoff. We met with Gov. Tian Fengshan, leader of the Heilongjiang Province, and discussed opportunities for development and American industry within his borders. The Governor said he was encouraging Americans and other foreigners to invest in his province, and was working on a cooperative agreement with the State of Alaska. I met next with a group of American businessmen working in the Harbin area. They reported frustration with China's redtape. A fiberglass pipe manufacturer, for example, complained about Chinese requirements that he secure a separate permit for every shipment of the same type of imported materials. We were warned that the Chinese often welcome innovators, learn their techniques, and exploit them or force them out. In the evening, we attended a dinner with the Deputy Governor and several of his aides. We covered a gamut of subjects, including free elections and the democratic process. The Deputy Governor, proposed by the State committee, had been elected without opposition. In response to my question, he said he found Boris Yeltsin's recent campaign for President of Russia, including campaign stops at a disco, effective in appealing to voters. On August 21, I met with the Vice-President and several professors at the Harbin Institute of Technology, all of whom had been among the first wave of Chinese academics who studied in the United States in the early 1980's. One computer science professor had briefly been one of my constituents, when he studied for 2 years at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh. I toured the city, including stops at an open market and a western- style department store, and was struck by the strong demand for western mechanized goods, and the opportunity for American firms. I chose to visit Harbin largely because it was not a westernized southern port, which draws most foreign traffic and interest. On August 21, we traveled to Mongolia, largely to investigate what the United States could do to foster the fragile democracy and market economy that only recently freed itself from the Soviet yoke. Upon arrival in the evening in the capital city of Ulaan Baatar, we met with Charge d'Affaires Llewellyn Hedgbeth, members of the Embassy team, Peace Corps Director Mark Zober, and three Peace Corps volunteers assigned to Mongolia. In the morning, we met with the economic adviser to the Prime Minister, an American policy expert named Jim Bikales; with the Chief of the Mongolian National Intelligence Agency, Dalhjavyn Sandag; and with the Secretary of the Mongolian National Security Agency, Jargalsaihany Enkhsaihan. We discussed the host of economic travails threatening Mongolia's fledgling market economy, including a banking crisis that spurred a credit shortage; a budget crisis; and shrinking GDP growth. We met next with Radnaasumberel Gonchigdorj, Chairman of the Hural, the Mongolian Parliament. Mr. Gonchigdorj said U.S. assistance is vital, especially for a Mongolian economy so weak that social services are an unaffordable luxury. I told the chairman that his country was a shining example of the trend toward democracy, and that we wanted to help, and would help, but faced a deficit problem of our own. Asked for my suggestions, I urged the chairman and his colleagues to privatize as soon as possible the two-thirds of the Mongolian economy that they have not yet privatized. Later in the day, we returned to the Government complex to meet with Prime Minister Mendsaihny Enkhsaihan, an economist by training. For almost an hour, we discussed primarily economic and fiscal matters. The Prime Minister told me his goal was to privatize 60 percent of state assets by the year 2000. I urged him, as I had urged Hural Chairman Gonchigdorj, to privatize the rest of the economy as fast as he could. We spent the evening with Sanjaasurenglin Zorig, a key government leader who holds the title Chairman of the Standing Committee on State Structure, and several other members of the Hural. During a wide- ranging, 2-hour conversation, I urged Mr. Zorig, as I had urged the Prime Minister and Hural Chairman earlier, to privatize the rest of the economy. I was struck to learn that Mr. Zorig and several of his colleagues had followed the 1991 confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, which they had watched on then-Soviet television. I was heartened that they grasped, through the often-heated proceedings and Soviet censorship, the theme of judicial independence that we Americans prize. From Mongolia, we flew to Beijing, China, on August 23 for a series of meetings with Chinese national leaders and with United States Ambassador James Sasser, a former Senate colleague, and his Embassy team. My concerns included China's sales to Pakistan of M-11 missiles, which could potentially deliver nuclear warheads to India; Chinese ballistic missile tests near Taiwan; China's relationship with North Korea; our trade deficit with China; and human rights violations, including alleged persecution of Christians. After an hour-long discussion with Ambassador Sasser and his experts, we attended a luncheon with Chinese Friendship Association President Lui Shuqing, who serves as an ambassador to American Government leaders. After much prodding, he allowed that China fired ballistic missiles within 100 miles of Taiwan as a warning to the breakaway republic not to go too far down the road to independence. We met next for an hour with Vice Premier Qian Qichen, who also serves as China's Foreign Minister. Mr. Qian was also guarded, from the outset. Mr. Qian flatly maintained that China had not sold missiles to Pakistan in violation of international agreements, despite evidence and acknowledgments. ``We'll just have to disagree about that,'' I told the Vice Premier. I added that the Senate was considering taking action against China, including sanctions. Mr. Qian said the Chinese opposed sanctions on principle, because they were unwarranted. He added that sanctions would not work against China, and were a two-edged sword that could hurt both China and the United States. On trade, the Vice Premier and I again reached an impasse. I maintained that a $35 billion trade imbalance was unacceptable. Mr. Qian dismissed the disparity as a matter of my statistics, which he said improperly included trade with Hong Kong. When I told the Vice Premier we were concerned about freedom of religion for Christians in China, he assured me that China allows freedom of worship for all sects. We ended the day with a meeting, followed by a formal dinner, with Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Cao Cangchuan, the equivalent to our vice-chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. Our substantive conversation focused on defense budgets and manpower allocation. We traveled to Muscat, Oman, on August 24, to begin a series of Mideast stops, focusing on the Mideast peace process; the Khobar Towers bombing and terrorism; Iran's role in the region and its relationship with the United States; and Saudi Arabia's role in and reimbursement for its own defense. After a briefing by Ambassador Frances Cook and members of her Embassy team, we met for an hour with Sayyid Badr, Chief of the Omani Office of the Foreign Minister. I complimented Mr. Badr for Oman's recognition of and rapport with Israel, including the two nations' exchange of trade representatives and Oman's lifting of its boycott against Israel several months earlier. Mr. Badr said Oman's relationship with Israel was complicated by Oman's need to maintain relations with its Arab neighbors who were hostile to the Jewish State. We began the morning of August 25 by having breakfast with Pennsylvanians on the Embassy staff. Afterward, I fielded questions from Omani journalists at an airport news conference, mostly offering my assessments on the prospects for Mideast peace and for combating terrorism. We have to be tougher with Iran, which may be sponsoring terrorism and fundamentalism, I told the reporters. On the issue of the June 25 Khobar Towers bombing, which may have been state-sponsored, I said terrorism today is an act of war, and we did not intend to be victims of acts of war without reprisal. We spent August 25 in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, inspecting the Khobar Towers Air Force apartments that were hit by the June 25 truck bomb, and discussing the situation with base commander Maj. Gen. Kurt Anderson, Brig. Gen. Dan Dick, Consul Gen. Doug Green, Capt. Rick Reddecliff of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and FBI and CIA officials. My staff and I conducted interviews, then held a detailed discussion at the Consul General's headquarters and toured the apartment complex. Afterward, I met with 20 officers and airmen who had been in Khobar Towers when the bomb exploded, including many who were injured. Khobar Towers Building 131 was a horrible sight, more ghastly up close than even television or news photographs can convey. The building's front wall had been sheared off by the blast, exposing twisted wreckage and blood-stained walls. The wire fence in front of the building, the subject of so much controversy, measured 60 feet as I paced it off--far less than the 80 feet as previously reported. The officers and airmen who had been at Khobar Towers on the night of June 25 described, calmly and precisely, how the blast blew out their windows, lacerating them with glass shards, and propelled them across their living rooms. I told them that the United States now has extraterritorial jurisdiction, based on a 1984 law that I helped draft, to investigate terrorist attacks against Americans anywhere in the world. I told them terrorism is a war, and that we would do our utmost to bring those responsible to justice. We traveled to Riyadh in the evening, and discussed the Mideast situation with Charge D'Affaires Theodore Kattouf, the Embassy team, and senior Air Force, focusing on Saudi Arabia's contribution to regional defense. I expressed the opinion that Saudi Arabia, with its oil wealth, should pay more of the costs of United States forces committed to defend the kingdom, citing as an example Japan's 70 percent contribution to the cost of United States forces there. We have vital national interests in the Mideast, but it is, first, a Saudi property right that we are protecting. I noted there was great concern in the Congress about Saudi Arabia's refusal to let us interrogate the four suspects in the November 13 car bombing in OPM-SANG in Riyadh that killed five Americans. In mid-morning of August 26, we flew to Jeddah for meetings with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz Saud and Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud. In each hour-long meeting, we focused on the Khobar Towers bombing and Mideast terrorism. In response to my questions, each Saudi leader said some suspects had already been arrested in the Khobar Towers bombing, some had been released, and the process was continuing. I asked whether the Saudis would allow the CIA and FBI to interrogate suspects in the Khobar Towers attack when they are found, noting our concern that United States officials were denied the chance to interrogate the OPM-SANG suspects before they were beheaded. The crown prince was noncommittal, but the defense minister indicated such interviews would be permitted. At each meeting, I asked whether the United States would be justified in taking military action against any nation which might be responsible for the Khobar Towers bombing. By reference, I cited our bombing raid against Libya in 1986, in retaliation for the German discotheque blast that killed two American soldiers and our missile attack on the Iraqi Intelligence headquarters following discovery of the Iraqi plan to assassinate former President Bush. Neither agreed with such retaliatory action. The crown prince volunteered a reference to Hizbollah and said if Hizbollah is found to be involved, retaliation should be directed against them. Each Saudi leader rejected my suggestion that Saudi Arabia exchange ambassadors or trade representatives with Israel. Such an exchange would work against peace, the defense minister said. We traveled to Israel on the afternoon of August 26, and proceeded directly to a gathering in Tel Aviv for Israel's new ambassador to the United States, Eliahu Ben Elissar. We began the next morning with an hour-long briefing from United States Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk, focusing on the dynamics of Israel's new Likud Government and the challenges it faces, at home and from its Mideast neighbors. From there, we met for an hour with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Mr. Netanyahu said he wanted to begin peace negotiations with his Arab neighbors, and felt bound by the Oslo Accords that Israel's Rabin/Peres government had signed before Mr. Netanyahu took office, even though those agreements did not reflect Mr. Netanyahu's own position. The Prime Minister said, however, that he was not obligated to go beyond those contracts, which were vague. He said that friction with Syrian President Assad, among others, centered on differences over the extent of Israel's commitments. Mr. Netanyahu said he was eager to get to the negotiating table with Syrian President Assad. I noted that years earlier, I had urged Mr. Assad, without success, to meet with Mr. Shamir when he was Israel's Prime Minister. Prime Minister Netanyahu asked me to carry a message to President Assad, whom I was scheduled to meet with the next day. We next met for an hour with Natan Sharansky, the dissident and former Soviet prisoner turned Israeli Minister of Industry and Trade. Mr. Sharansky, whose immigrant party now holds seven seats in Knesset, said he wanted to accelerate immigration into Israel, but was contending with Israeli housing that, as he put it, took the worst from capitalism and socialism. I told him my father had immigrated from Ukraine to the United States as a boy in 1911, and that I understood the immigrant's position. We agreed that Russian Jews should have a choice where they emigrate, rather than being limited to Israel. We met next with David Levy, the Israeli Foreign Minister. Mr. Levy said he was not satisfied that Palestinian Chairman Yasir Arafat was doing enough to combat terrorism. I told Mr. Levy that legislation I sponsored with Alabama Senator Richard Shelby, which is now law, requires the Palestinians to crack down on terrorism and to delete references in their charter to the destruction of Israel, in order to receive $500 million in United States aid. Mr. Levy replied that Mr. Arafat had told him the charter changes would have to go before a committee and would take 6 months. Mr. Levy said he told Mr. Arafat those efforts did not satisfy Israel. I told Mr. Levy I had pressed Mr. Arafat about the charter changes in the past, and that I would press him again when I met with the Palestinian leader later in the day. I also asked Mr. Levy if he wanted me to convey any message to Syrian President Assad. Mr. Levy asked me to tell Mr. Assad to cease creating an atmosphere of terrorism, and that the Israelis were willing to enter direct negotiations with the Syrians without preconditions. We met next with former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Mr. Shamir maintained unequivocally that Israel must be strong and hard in its negotiations with its Arab neighbors, or will get nothing. He inveighed against any Israeli concessions, including land for peace. His position has always been the same, I told the former Prime Minister. We met next with Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon, the former general. Mr. Sharon said Israel is struggling to accommodate an ongoing immigration in the face of increasing water shortages. One of Mr. Sharon's deputies said the water crisis is more difficult than the Arab-Israeli situation. But Mr. Sharon, touting the education and skills of Israeli immigrants, said the desert nation would find a way to provide enough water for all its newcomers, even if a million Jews emigrate from the United States. In response to a question about the controversy over a possible Israeli withdrawal from Hebron, Minister Sharon produced a map of the city and detailed the thousands of years of Jewish presence there. The minister stated that Israel would give the 100,000 Palestinians who reside in Hebron control of the city only under an arrangement that protects the rights and interests of the Jewish population there. We ended August 27 with an evening meeting with Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat at Mr. Arafat's Gaza headquarters. Chairman Arafat opened our 90-minute session with a litany of complaints about his treatment by the Israelis, including the demolition of a community center earlier in the day. I pressed Chairman Arafat about his obligations, under the Specter- Shelby amendment, to crack down on terrorism and to delete from the Palestinian charter all calls for the destruction of Israel, in order to receive the United States aid. Chairman Arafat claimed that he had deleted all references to destroying Israel from the Palestinian charter, at great personal and political cost. He said he had cut so much from the Palestinian charter that nothing remained of the document, and that the charter would have to be redrafted, probably in November or December. The Chairman showed me documents that he said proved he had made the required changes. After reviewing those documents, I said the changes were insufficient. All that was said was that all references to Israel were revoked where inconsistent with the September 13, 1993 agreement. Chairman Arafat told me he had been warned that Iranians would assassinate him for changing the charter. I asked Mr. Arafat what we could do to stop terrorism. He replied that it was very difficult. He suggested we pressure Libya through the United Nations, rather than by taking unilateral action. The next day, August 28, we traveled to Damascus to meet with Syrian President Assad. Our meeting lasted 3\1/2\ hours. We focused on the Mideast peace process and on terrorism. I conveyed Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's message that Israel had only peaceful intentions toward Syria, that both sides should move immediately to reduce military tensions, and that Mr. Netanyahu wanted to reopen direct negotiations between Israel and Syria. President Assad replied that Syria would not go back to the table until Prime Minister Netanyahu reaffirms the land-for-peace basis of negotiations, and agrees to pick up where Israel's previous Labor Government left off. President Assad dismissed current Syrian troop movements in Southern Lebanon as merely technical and routine, and not threatening. He rejected a Lebanon-first approach, the Israeli offer to negotiate the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon as a first step before re-opening bilateral peace talks. I urged President Assad to sit down with Prime Minister Netanyahu, even if they seemed to have no common ground. On the issue of terrorism, I told President Assad the American press had reported that the bomb-making materials used in the Khobar Towers blast had passed through Syria. He said that this was possible. He said it was unlikely that Iran was involved in the bombing. I urged President Assad repeatedly to share with us any information that he may get about the Khobar Towers bombing. President Assad suggested the United States adopt a law-enforcement response to terrorism, rather than a military response. As for the Hizbollah and other terrorist groups reputed to operate within Syria, President Assad asserted he had no control over what some individuals do, and that it was inappropriate for the United States to ask Syria to go to war against these groups, even though Syria had the power to destroy them. Hizbollah considers itself to have the political and religious duty to liberate its land, President Assad said, and has taken a leading role in the struggle with Israel. After returning to Israel in the evening, I met again with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, to brief him on my discussion with President Assad, and telephoned Foreign Minister Levy for the same purpose. We made a final stop in Paris on the way back to the United States, to explore the French and European response to terrorism and France's relationship with Iran and the Middle East. We met for an hour with French Interior Minister Jean Louis Debre, who is roughly equivalent to the United States Attorney General, and at length with United States Ambassador Pamela Harriman and her Embassy team. Madam President, there is a great deal more to be said, but I know colleagues are awaiting floor time for morning business. So I will conclude this summary, noting that a much more extensive comment than my floor statement is contained in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, at the conclusion of my remarks, an article which I wrote for the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, that is what I understand.

Mr. SPECTER. Reserving the right to object, I worked it out with the manager 5 minutes to speak after he finished the business matters. If I could be incorporated in that, I shall not be long. I would not raise an objection. I worked it out with the manager.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished managers and my colleague from New Jersey for a brief opportunity to comment about a trip which I made to Saudi Arabia, to Dhahran on August 25 and Riyadh on August 26, and a report made by the staff of the Intelligence Committee. Mr. President, the Khobar Towers at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, was the scene of a tragic terrorist attack killing 19 Americans and wounding hundreds of other Americans. There has been a suggestion made that there was an intelligence failure leading to that attack. In my capacity as chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the committee has made an exhaustive study of this subject, and I made a personal visit to Saudi Arabia, to Dhahran on August 25 and Riyadh on August 26, and my personal conclusion, backed up by the staff report, was that there was no intelligence failure. In fact, in the preceding year, there had been more than 100 intelligence reports on alerts of a general nature, and very specific reports on an alert to the danger of a car bomb at Khobar Towers. That was the essence of a report by the Office of Special Investigations of the U.S. Air Force in January 1996. There had been previous reports about terrorist attacks at Khobar Towers--the same report about a car bombing, which, in fact, did take place in Riyadh on November 13, 1995, claiming the lives of five Americans; the State Department alert on June 13, just 12 days before the terrorist attack; and a report by the Defense Intelligence Agency on June 17, just 8 days before the attack, which emphasized the vulnerability of the area and the necessity for increased security. Specifically, what the DIA report said about Khobar Towers, with a large picture, was, ``A pattern appears to be developing that warrants improved security efforts.'' Notwithstanding these warnings, improved security efforts were not undertaken by the Pentagon, by ranking military-civilian DOD authorities. I visited the scene, Mr. President, and was amazed to see how close that fence was to those towers--less than 60 feet away, which was an open and notorious invitation to terrorism. For anybody to say, on the basis of this record, on the basis of what I have personally observed, and on the basis of a staff report by the Intelligence Committee, that there was intelligence failure is, simply stated, preposterous. It was obvious that that fence had to be moved back. That issue has been raised in hearings before the Senate oversight committees and has not yet been answered by top officials in the Pentagon. Requests have been made for the oversight committees to be informed about what military personnel made what request of Saudi officials and what the responses of those Saudi officials were, and no information has been provided to the oversight committees. The Intelligence Committee asked ranking DOD officials what the obligation was to report up the chain of command any failure by Saudi officials to move the fence back, and that has not been done. But on the face of this record, Mr. President, it is plain that there has not been a failure of intelligence on the terrorist attack at Khobar Towers on June 25, 1996. The United States Code requires that the oversight Intelligence Committee be informed of significant intelligence failures. My conclusion is that there was no such intelligence failure, but, in fact, there was a failure of DOD officials to follow up on a well-known and obvious terrorist threat. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the report by the staff of the Intelligence Committee be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I would like to address the issue of funding for the Erie Federal Complex construction project, which includes a courthouse annex. The current courthouse provides inadequate space and is not consolidated at a single location. The new facility will accommodate the existing and anticipated future demands of the courts and will allow for the consolidation of the courts in one convenient location. The House bill for fiscal year 1997 provides the $3.3 million required for site acquisition and design work, as requested by the General Services Administration. I am troubled, however, that the Senate bill does not include funding for the Erie Federal Complex. I join with my constituents in Erie in recognizing the importance of this project to the community and support funding the Erie project in fiscal year 1997. This project is duly authorized. Further, $3.135 million for site acquisition and design was contained in both the House and Senate versions of the fiscal year 1995 Treasury, postal appropriations bill, but was dropped in conference that year because of an internal House decision to defund certain projects which I am advised was not based on the merits of the proposed Erie project. I would ask the distinguished Chairman, my good friend from Alabama, for his views on the Erie project and whether he believes it merits favorable consideration during conference.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, on August 31, 1996, while the Senate was in recess, Thomas R. Vokes retired from the U.S. Marshals Service after a distinguished law enforcement career of 33 years, including 26 years with the Marshals Service. Mr. Vokes was born and raised in Clearfield, PA. He attended the public schools there through high school. In 1963, he embarked on what proved to be a most distinguished career in law enforcement when he joined the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Police Department as a police officer. In 1966, Mr. Vokes joined the Federal service by becoming a White House police officer, a predecessor to today's Uniformed Division of the Secret Service. Four years later, Mr. Vokes joined the U.S. Marshals Service, the agency from which he just retired. Upon joining the Marshals Service, Mr. Vokes returned to Pennsylvania as a deputy U.S. marshal for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Five years later, in 1975, Mr. Vokes became a supervisory deputy marshal in the Middle District. In 1980, Mr. Vokes was promoted and moved to California to become a court security inspector. He received a court appointment to serve as the U.S. marshal for the Central District of California, one of the Nation's largest Federal judicial districts, in January 1981 and served until March 1982. Upon completing his term as U.S. marshal in Los Angeles, Mr. Vokes returned to Pennsylvania and served as chief deputy U.S. marshal, the senior career position, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania for 2 years. After additional service as chief deputy U.S. marshal in North Dakota, Mr. Vokes returned once again to Pennsylvania in 1991, having been appointed by the Attorney General to serve as the U.S. marshal for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, based in Philadelphia. It was in this capacity that I came to know Mr. Vokes. As the U.S. marshal for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Mr. Vokes was widely recognized and esteemed by Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and by the Federal courts for his effective leadership and management of the functions of the Marshals Service in the district. I knew the security of the Federal courts in Philadelphia was in good hands when Marshal Vokes was at the helm. In March 1994, Marshal Vokes left Philadelphia and returned to Washington, where he had started his law enforcement career, to serve as the chief of the Marshal Service's Prisoner Operations Division, managing the agency that ensures that Federal prisoners awaiting trial show up in court at the appointed time. It was from this position that Marshal Vokes just retired. If the measure of the man is the trust reposed in him, Marshal Vokes has been highly respected throughout his career. Twice he was selected to serve as chief deputy U.S. marshal, the senior career position in the Marshals Service. And twice he was selected to serve as the U.S. marshal in two of the Nation's largest and busiest judicial districts, Los Angeles and Philadelphia. Finally, he ended his career in charge of one of the operational divisions of the entire Marshals Service. Too often we in Congress fail to recognize publicly the thousands of dedicated civil servants like Marshal Vokes who carry out the laws that we adopt. I am pleased to honor Marshal Vokes for his dedication to our Nation and its people. He is one of Pennsylvania's finest, and we have been honored to share his talents with the rest of the Nation. I know all my colleagues join me in wishing Marshal Thomas R. Vokes all the best in his retirement.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition to discuss briefly one of the aspects of the immigration conference report which will come before the Senate either today or shortly after we return from recess. I think that it is very important that we reform our laws to provide increased resources to protect our borders and combat illegal immigration. Nevertheless, I have been very much concerned about a number of provisions of the immigration bill. The provision which concerns me the most is the so-called Gallegly amendment, which would give the States the option to limit education opportunities to children of illegal immigrants. In my opinion, it is unthinkable in America to deny education to any children, regardless of their status, whether their parents are illegal immigrants. That is something I feel particularly strongly about because both of my parents were immigrants. My mother came to this country as a child of 5 with her parents from a small town on the Russian-Polish border. My father came from Ukraine Russia, literally walked across Europe with barely a ruble in his pocket, sailed steerage--the bottom of the boat-- to come to America to make a better life for himself. He did not know at the time he had a return trip ticket to France, not to Paris but to the Argonne Forest, where he fought in World War I as a buck private, to make the world safe for democracy, and carried shrapnel in his legs until the day he died. My parents had legal status as immigrants, but sometimes that is a hard thing to determine. I do not think any child ought to be deprived of educational opportunities because of the status of his parents, even if they are illegal immigrants. I have been strongly opposed to the Gallegly amendment. I have agreed to sign the conference report, however, because of a significant change which I have insisted upon. That change is that, in addition to some other modifications which have already been made for a child in the first grade to complete the sixth grade and a child in the seventh grade to complete the 12th grade, the modifications I pressed to have included, and I think have been included by agreement, would provide for a comprehensive study to be conducted by GAO, the General Accounting Office, at the end of 2\1/2\ years, which would determine what impact the Gallegly amendment had on the children who were excluded from education, what impact it had with respect to juvenile delinquency, the crime rate, what impact it had on their educational status, what impact it had on their family status, and what impact it had on reducing illegal immigration. Following release of the study there will be a mandatory vote on repeal of the Gallegly provision in the Congress, both Houses, within a very short period of time, whatever the results of the GAO report may have been. If the Gallegly amendment was not repealed on that vote, then there will be a similar study after 5 years, and then another mandated automatic vote on the repeal of the Gallegly provision by the Congress. It is my judgment, Madam President, that if the Gallegly amendment is subjected to a vote at 2\1/2\ or 5 years, it would be repealed by the Congress and signed by whomever might be the President. Whether it is President Clinton or Senator Dole, the then President would sign it. I think if the Gallegly amendment were standing alone now, it would be rejected by the Congress. I do not think that the entire immigration conference report ought to be rejected because of this single provision, considering the modification that I have presented, which, as I say, I think is being accepted and will be in the conference report. I wanted to make that brief explanation. I yield the floor. Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I would take strong exception to any language if it refers to anything which my distinguished colleague, I, or others in the advocacy of this position have done. We have spoken of it directly. I did so earlier this week in the conference, and we do so on the floor today. We need medical research. We need these wonder drugs to be produced. It is a matter of fairness as to how we are going to compensate those who produce them. If we are to have them for the consumers, we will have to be able to pay for them. And I think ultimately we will have to take this matter up on the merits, and I think at that time we will see that it is an appropriate position which Senator Santorum, I, and others have advocated.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, contrary to the statement by the Senator from Minnesota, this matter has been considered in the Judiciary Committee as part of the markup on the drug patent bill. It was on the floor as a part of the Hatch amendment, which was a part of the defense authorization bill. This measure was also considered by the House, which passed a 2-year patent extension for this drug on separate occasions; in 1992 and again in 1996. It has been so considered as a matter of basic fairness. The FDA delayed action on this matter for some 97 months, contrasted with 27 months on the average. This matter has been considered extensively. I raised it in open session in the Agriculture Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee earlier this week. It had been in the House Agriculture appropriations bill and was dropped in conference. I do not vouch for the provision where it was added to the health care bill after conference. I do not know about that and was not a party to that. But we have a very basic problem in America about research expenditures for drugs that benefit sick people. These drugs benefit everybody including the elderly, the young, and those not in either category. If we are going to expend a very substantial sum of money on research, there is going to have to be a reasonable return. We have a patent period, and the patent period was not honored in this case. The manufacturer here, Wyeth-Ayerst, is a major Pennsylvania constituent of Senator Santorum's and mine, employing thousands of people in the Philadelphia suburbs. If they are to be able to continue, they are going to have to have a reasonable return. Those who added it to this bill did so because this is a health bill. One way or another, these sorts of matters must be considered. I am very sympathetic to generic manufacturers, and I have a very strong voting record for senior citizens on issues like this. But if we are to have the kind of research, productivity and the great miraculous advances, we are simply going to have to have a reasonable rate of return on the patent period that is realistic. That is why on the merits and as a matter of fairness, I have advocated this position publicly and do so today, because I think it is an appropriate and sound position. I yield to my colleague from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. I do.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I support the welfare reform bill with substantial reservations. I support the welfare reform bill because I think it is our best chance to break a pattern which has existed for decades where people rely upon welfare and find themselves dependent upon welfare and have no way to break out of the welfare cycle, the welfare chain to find jobs. I believe this legislation, while far from perfect--it does not contain many amendments that I voted for--is the best chance to do it at this time. This legislation has advanced to this stage with substantial bipartisan support; 23 of 46 Democrats voted for this bill. The President of the United States has stated his intention to sign the bill when it reaches his desk if the conference report is passed. It seems to be a very high probability. One of my colleagues on the Republican side has voted against the bill because it is not tough enough, not strong enough in limiting welfare benefits. Those are some of the indicators that this bill perhaps is, if not balanced, about as good a job as we could do given the problems of our society and given the problems of a campaign year. I think it does not advance our cause at all to talk about Bob Dole and Willy Loman or to talk about a Republican majority coming to its wits, but, instead, to try in a bipartisan way to fashion welfare reform which will serve the American people, which will help take those on welfare off welfare, because I think it is certainly true that people on welfare would much rather have a job and not be on welfare, and to try to take away the burden of this entitlement on our society. The issue of welfare reform is something which this Senator has been concerned about for a long time. In the 99th Congress, I cosponsored S. 2578 and S. 2579 with Senator Moynihan, those bills being directed toward improving the welfare system. In the 100th Congress, I introduced similar legislation on a bipartisan basis with Senator Dodd, and then worked closely with Senator Moynihan on the legislation that first became comprehensive welfare reform on the 1988 Family Welfare Reform Act, which was signed by President Reagan. This year, after welfare reform had faded from the picture, after the President's vetoes, I joined my colleague from Delaware, Senator Biden, on June 12 in introducing bipartisan legislation captioned S. 1867, which was an identical bill to a bipartisan bill introduced by Congressman Castle and Congressman Tanner in the House. The Biden-Specter bill was not successful, nor was the Chafee-Breaux proposal successful, both of which would have eased the problems for children and eased the problems for immigrants, and I think made for a more orderly transition on welfare reform. I regret very much that Senator Breaux's amendment did not pass, Senator Breaux's amendment being directed to provide vouchers for children beyond the 5 years. Senator Ford's amendment did not pass. It was a narrow vote. I supported it. It would have provided noncash benefits after 5 years. We have crafted a bill here which takes out a good bit of the inflexibility which was presented in the legislation by the House of Representatives and comes somewhat close to the bill which passed the Senate last year by a lopsided vote of 87 to 12. Mr. President, this bill does provide an opportunity for those who are on welfare to take a job which they would have never taken before because there are many jobs which pay less than their welfare benefits. Why would someone take a job which pays less than their welfare benefits? They stay on welfare. This legislation, going to a core issue, will provide an opportunity for someone to take a job which pays less than welfare, which that individual would not now take since welfare pays more, because there will be flexibility to add a supplement, so that there will be a supplement from welfare funds, which means the welfare payment is less and the individual will be getting more with his lower wage in the private sector and the welfare supplement, and will have the benefit of Medicaid where the employer does not pay health benefits. So there is an opportunity to move from the welfare roll to the payroll. This legislation provides that able-bodied individuals will be limited as to how long they can be on welfare, receiving 2 years of assistance if they are not working; lifetime benefits are limited to a maximum of 5 years, but the States do have flexibility to provide a hardship exemption up to 20 percent of the State's caseload if those requirements are not met. This, I think, is realistically calculated to encourage able-bodied men to work. With respect to finding jobs, there is job training provided and flexibility to the States, and the States are given substantial incentive to take individuals off the welfare rolls. This legislation also moves to a core problem of teenage mothers who are on welfare with the requirement that they live at home unless there is some showing that there is brutality at home or something which is incompatible with living at home. But the teenage mothers are required to live at home. They are required either to be in school or on jobs or in job training, and there is a very substantial amount of funding in this bill for child care so that mothers can realistically do that. There are some provisions in this legislation which I think should have been corrected. I think the amendments offered to leave noncitizens on the welfare rolls and apply the limitations only to the future would have been more sensible so people who come into the United States would have notice that they are not going to have the benefits. I think the moratorium which was suggested on Medicaid benefits would have been sensible. This bill provides for tough enforcement measures for child support, so parents have an obligation to support their children. When you take a look at this legislation in its totality, it is a step in the right direction. It has been crafted in a contentious political year where there are deep political divisions in the Congress, so there is a substantial block of Democratic support--23 Democrat Senators having voted for it; an equal number on the other side. The President, a Democrat, has stated his intention to sign the conference report. There is very substantial support on the Republican side, with one Republican Senator having voted against it because it gives too much to welfare recipients. But there is a real need to move ahead, to try to give people an opportunity to have jobs. During my tenure as district attorney of Philadelphia, I saw many people in that big city trapped in the welfare cycle. I think, when they have an opportunity to take a job which is a low-paying job, they are not going to take it today if they lose medical benefits under Medicaid and they get less on the low-paying job than they have on welfare. But, when you have flexibility with the States--and there are many examples where the States have moved ahead on a flexible system, Wisconsin, illustratively, Michigan, illustratively, and other States. Governor Thompson is ending welfare, not just talking about it but ending welfare in 1997--this welfare bill goes a substantial distance. I know it is going to result in some holes in the safety net. But we will have an opportunity to revisit those issues. But taken as a whole, my view is it is a significant step forward, and that is why I am supporting it. I yield the remainder of my time and yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. I may be able to do it in less than the 20 minutes I request. I will try to.