Arlen Specter

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.

Mr. SPECTER. I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes as if in morning business.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I compliment the Labor and Human Resources Committee for reporting out the nomination of Dr. Henry Foster to be Surgeon General of the United States. Earlier this morning, the committee met and by a 9-to-7 vote recommended the confirmation of Dr. Foster for Surgeon General. Two Republicans joined with seven Democrats in favoring his nomination and thereby bringing the nomination to the floor. It is my hope that we will take up Dr. Foster in this Chamber. It is my sense that there are sufficient votes to bring Dr. Foster to a vote in the face of what has been announced to be a prospective filibuster. There is at least one Senator on the committee as reported who favors bringing Dr. Foster to a vote even though that Senator voted against him in committee. I had occasion to meet with Dr. Foster early on, and at that time I was convinced that the sole issue was the issue of whether Dr. Foster should be disqualified from being Surgeon General because he had performed abortions, a medical procedure which is legal and authorized by the U.S. Constitution. It seemed to me at that time that all the other matters which were brought up were red herrings, and that real opposition to Dr. Foster lay in the fact that he had performed abortions, a procedure authorized by the Constitution of the United States. I said on the Senate floor early on that Dr. Foster was entitled to be heard by the committee, entitled to have his day in court, so to speak, in this Chamber for a vote, both out of fairness to Dr. Foster as an individual and really as a sign that nobody would be railroaded out of this town without having a day in court, a chance to have an up- or-down vote in the Senate. There is a very important precedent beyond Dr. Foster as an individual as to what he is entitled to as a matter of fairness and that is to others who may be interested in coming to Washington, tempted to come to Washington to perform public service. And many would be discouraged if Dr. Henry Foster would not be entitled to fair treatment by the Senate of the United States. I thought that reasons given by our colleague, Senator Frist, in supporting Dr. Foster's nomination were very important; that Senator Frist, a physician himself, emphasized Dr. Foster's commitment to try to combat teenage pregnancy, and that may be the No. 1 social problem in America today. If that can be brought under control, then there is no better person to try to do that than the Surgeon General of the United States. And also Dr. Foster's commitment to press for abstinence and to press for family values; those are positions which I think are very appropriate for the Surgeon General. So Dr. Foster has cleared a very significant hurdle in the affirmative vote of the Labor and Human Resources Committee. Some predicted he would never get that far. From what I sense, the climate in our body is to favor his nomination coming to the floor for a vote. I think a filibuster will be defeated and I think ultimately Dr. Foster will be confirmed. That is a very positive sign of respect for the laws of the United States, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, that a woman does have a right to choose, that a nominee like Dr. Foster is not disqualified because he performed a medical procedure, albeit abortion, authorized by the Constitution, and that men and women of character and good will can come to this town and get a fair hearing and perform an important public service. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I oppose the pending amendment, and I do so with a deference to my colleague from Connecticut because of his experience as Attorney General. I believe that we ought to be very circumspect and very careful before expanding wiretapping authority at all until there has been an opportunity for very careful study. That opportunity is not present here. As I have listened to the very abbreviated arguments in the course of less than 30 minutes, there may be no expansion beyond the current law. Nobody has cited an illustration as to what would be subject to wiretap under Senator Lieberman's amendment that would not be subject to wiretap under existing law. It may well be that there are sufficient vagaries in the language of the amendment which could render it overbroad. This bill has not been subjected to the usual legislative process of a markup, which is where the committee sits down and goes over the bill and considers amendments in a more deliberative fashion than an amendment being presented and debated on the floor over the course of 30 minutes, or a few minutes more. In saying this, I do not fault, at all, the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, because these are the rules of procedure in the Senate. I do say that it ought to give Members some pause. As we speak, we are on a Friday near noon and many Senators are waiting to catch planes. The distinguished clerk is nodding in the affirmative. I do not think we ought to legislate in this kind of a rush. Expanding wiretap authority may have a very, very serious impact on civil liberties. No compelling need has been shown for adopting this amendment and, therefore, I think the amendment ought not to be enacted. Under these procedures and time constraints, I am sure of that. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, on the citations which I refer to and in the full text of what Professor Stone has raised, which will be apparent to those who will see it in the Congressional Record, there are many unanswered questions as to what happened at Waco, just as there are many unanswered questions as to what happened at Ruby Ridge. It is my hope that we will have a Senate inquiry just as promptly as possible. I think it is vital that there be accountability at the highest levels of Government and that the public will be assured that the Congress will fully carry out its responsibilities for oversight under our constitutional responsibility. Yesterday, we had scheduled a hearing involving the militia movement in the subcommittee of Judiciary which I chair. That hearing, regrettably, had to be postponed because we were voting continuously all day long. But yesterday afternoon, I put into the Record the prepared statements of some witnesses that came from the militia movement. In brief conversation I had with those individuals, they expressed their concern about what the Government had done and their gratification [[Page S7588]] that at least the subcommittee was making an inquiry into what had gone on. If we discharge our duties, Mr. President, we can provide a safety valve to let the citizens of America know that their constitutional rights are being respected and that there will be congressional oversight no matter where the blame may lie at the highest level of the Federal Government, if there is any blame. I do not prejudge what went on at Ruby Ridge or at Waco, but I am absolutely convinced that there are many, very, very serious questions as to the governmental action at Ruby Ridge and Waco, and I am convinced that the safety valve and venting possible through a Senate full inquiry is very vital as we consider these problems of terrorism and move ahead to provide better protection to the American people from domestic terrorism and at the same time guarantee that the constitutional rights are preserved. I thank the Chair. Exhibit 1 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Salt Lake City, UT, May 3, 1995. Michael E. Shaheen, Office of Professional Responsibility, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Shaheen: The purpose of this letter is to request the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) conduct an investigation into the conduct of FBI Associate Special Agent in Charge (A-SAC) Charles Mathews, III and possibly others during the period A-SAC Mathews served on special assignment in Washington, D.C. from October through December, 1994, preparing the Administrative Summary Report regarding the conduct of FBI personnel involved in the Ruby Ridge matter. As a key participant in the events of Ruby Ridge, I believe I was not adequately or fully interviewed, yet the investigative report was relied upon in proposing discipline against me and other FBI Agents. As is explained below, this and other investigative deficiencies reveal a purpose to create scapegoats and false impressions, rather than uncovering or reinforcing the reality of what happened at Ruby Ridge. A-SAC Mathews was provided with the 1994 Ruby Ridge report of Department of Justice (DOJ) Attorney Barbara Berman, along with sixteen issues raised by the DOJ during their review of the Berman Report. These issues concern alleged misconduct by FBI employees. His assignment as preparer of the Administrative Summary Report was: evaluate existing documentation contained in the Berman report for evidence of misconduct, review additional documentation within the FBI that was not a part of the Berman report, and conduct or have conducted appropriate investigation to either substantiate or refute each allegation. investigative procedural requirements As is clearly documented in subsequent portions of this letter, A-SAC Mathews conducted his administrative review with little regard to FBI policy and procedure, and as such his Administrative Summary Report is critically flawed. For example, A-SAC Mathews did not follow the FBI Manual Of Administrative Operations and Procedures (MAOP) as it pertains to interviews of employees under criminal or administrative inquiry. Section 13-4 of the MAOP is particularly relevant as follows: ``13-4 Interviews of Employees Involved ``(1) Interviews of employees involved in allegations of criminality or serious misconduct should be conducted at the earliest logical time and in a forthright manner. There should be no evasiveness on the part of the Bureau official conducting the interview. ``(2) The employee should be fully and specifically advised of the allegations which have been made against him/her in order that he/she may have an opportunity to fully answer and respond to them. . . . ``(3) Such interviews must be complete and thorough with all pertinent information obtained and recorded so that all phases of the allegations may be resolved. . . . ``(4) The inquiry shall not be complete until the specific allegations that may justify disciplinary action are made known to the employee who may be disciplined and the employee is afforded reasonable time to answer the specific allegations. The employee's answers, explanations, defenses, etc., should be recorded in the form of a signed, sworn statement which should specifically include the allegations made against the employee in an introductory paragraph. The statement is to be prepared following an in-depth interview of the employee by the division head or designated supervisory representative. The employee is not merely to be asked to give a written response to the allegations, but is to be interviewed in an interrogatory fashion, and a signed, sworn statement prepared from the results by the interviewing official. . . .'' mathews actions I have enclosed and request your review of the following: (1) the form ``Warning and Assurance to Employee Required to Provide Information'' (FD-645) which states, ``This inquiry pertains to Allegations of misconduct relating to the Rules of Engagement established for the Ruby Ridge critical incident and whether the FBI fully and adequately participated in the investigation/prosecution of Weaver/ Harris,'' and (2) the compelled signed statement of Eugene F. Glenn dated December 8, 1994, provided by A-SAC Mathews and Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Jerry R. Donahoe, in which paragraph two reads, ``I have been informed that this inquiry pertains to allegations of misconduct relating to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) established for the Ruby Ridge critical incident and whether the FBI fully and adequately participated in the investigation/prosecution of Weaver/ Harris.'' It should be noted that my ten-page signed statement dated December 8, 1994, details liaison issues concerning the FBI, Salt Lake City and the United States Attorney's (USA's) Office, Boise, Idaho, for a period of time prior to the Ruby Ridge incident and extending through the Harris/Weaver trial. No questions were asked regarding ``rules of engagement.'' Specifically, I was not asked why I had allegedly approved the rules of engagement or more basically who had approved the rules of engagement. I was never informed that I faced possible disciplinary action for my alleged approval of the rules of engagement. And although contrary to the printed purpose of the inquiry as set forth on the FD-645, supra, A- SAC Mathews stated during the beginning of this interview, ``The rules of engagement are considered unconstitutional; therefore, there is no need to further discuss them.'' This is clearly in conflict with the MAOP citation 13-4(2)&(4) above. department of justice report I direct your attention to an excerpt from an article that appeared in ``Legal Times,'' on March 6, 1995, captioned, ``DOJ Report May halt FBI Official's Rise.'' This article is based on a review of the DOJ Ruby Ridge report prepared by Barbara Berman. Apparently this report was leaked to the media during late February, 1995. The ``Legal Times'' article states: ``In the Reno inquiry, Potts had told investigators that he never approved the final rules of engagement, the guidelines governing a particular operation. Reno has refused to release the 542-page report, saying that she would wait until the local district attorney in Boundary County, Idaho, completes an investigation into whether agents should be charged with murder. ``But according to testimony contained in the report, which was obtained by Legal Times, Potts did approve the shoot-on- sight rule. ``The task force found that FBI operatives on the ground in Idaho faxed an operational plan, including the proposed rules of engagement, to headquarters for approval by Potts and his then deputy, Danny Coulson. But according to Freeh, Coulson had questions about other facets of the operation discussed and did not notice, let alone read, the rules of engagement. Potts, who had been working on the matter for 36 straight hours, was not on duty at the time and, hence, did not see the written rules. ``But Eugene Glenn, the on-site commander of the FBI operation, says in a January 1994 declaration that he believes he had already obtained Potts' approval by telephone before the shooting. ``The Reno task force also seemed to give credence to Glenn's account. `(I)t is inconceivable to us that FBI Headquarters remained ignorant of the exact wording of the Rules of Engagement during the entire period,' the report says. ``But FBI officials dispute Glenn's account and criticize the Justice Department's report as flawed. ```When you piece together the evidence as best as possible after the fact, we reached our best judgment, and that's reflected in the discipline that the director announced or proposed,' says FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro, who was directly involved in the FBI's inquiry. ``Freeh and Potts both declined comment. ```I can't speak for the director personally,' Shapiro says, `but a lot turned on the fact that Potts had not approved the final form of the rules of engagement, which are admittedly problematic. Had we found otherwise, it surely would have been grounds for further sanction,' the general counsel adds. ``Shapiro declined to elaborate, saying that the FBI's conclusions about what happened are based on information that Reno has said the bureau must not release pending the outcome of the local investigation.'' I have never been interviewed/interrogated regarding the rules of engagement. I was not made aware of the charge that I had approved the rules of engagement. Additionally, HRT Commander Dick Rogers, SAC Bill Gore, and SAC Robin Montgomery were not interviewed/interrogated regarding the rules of engagement during A-SAC Mathews' preparation of the Administrative Summary Report. fbihq approval of rules of engagement I had been interviewed previously on two occasions: during September, 1992 as part of the Shooting Incident Report, and again on January 12, 1994, as part of the Berman DOJ inquiry. It is specifically detailed in the Shooting Incident Report that the rules of engagement were approved at FBI Headquarters. I call your attention to the following pages: Administrative Section, Cover Page #, Paragraph 1; Report Synopsis, Page 2, Lines 3 through 7; the body of the report, Page 3, Paragraph 2; Dick Rogers signed statement, Page 2, Paragraph 2 through Page 3, Paragraph 2; and signed statement of Eugene F. Glenn, Page 5, Paragraph 2 through Assistant Director Potts' signed statement where he articulates as part of this report that he approved the rules of engagement. The DOJ inquiry covered a broad period of time and touched only briefly on rules of engagement. Questioning concerning who approved the rules of engagement was not addressed in detail by interviewing officials during the preparation of my signed statement. Questions concerning who approved the rules of engagement did not appear to be a critical issue to be developed at the time of the Berman report. It should be noted that on September 30, 1992, the date of the Shooting Report, there was no discussion regarding who approved the rules of engagement. The report simply states that the rules of engagement were approved at FBI Headquarters. It is also noted that the Shooting Review Committee Report, dated November 9, 1992, once again concurred that FBI Headquarters approved the rules of engagement. According to the ``Legal Times'' article dated March 6, 1995, the DOJ findings were, ``(I)t is inconceivable to us that FBI Headquarters remained ignorant of the exact wording of the Rules of Engagement during the entire period.'' There was no indication that the rules of engagement presented to field command at Ruby Ridge on Saturday, August 22, 1992, differed in any way from the rules of engagement Larry Potts advised he approved during his signed, sworn statement taken during the creation of the Shooting Review Report. It was only after the interviewing began that pertained to the DOJ inquiry headed up by Barbara Berman (over one year after the incident) that statements began to waiver with regard to responsibility for approval of the rules of engagement. In the absence of approved and recognized investigative methods and techniques, A-SAC Mathews managed to take a quantum leap from the factual basis documented in three previous reports to a position of placing the blame for approval of the rules of engagement on SAC Eugene F. Glenn. It should be noted that this remarkable conclusionary quantum leap by A-SAC Mathews was accomplished without the benefit of any additional pertinent interviews of the logical parties who were aware of the rules of engagement approval process. With regard to then Assistant Director Potts, his signed statement taken on September 24, 1992, (a part of the Shooting Review Report), advised that he jointly prepared the rules of engagement with HRT Commander Dick Rogers while Rogers was flying from Washington, D.C. to Northern Idaho to carry out his assigned task as HRT Commander on-scene during Ruby Ridge. On Saturday morning, August 22, 1992, HRT Commander Rogers presented SACs Glenn and Gore with the OPS Plan that included the rules of engagement; he advised how these rules had been prepared during the flight from Washington, D.C. to Northern Idaho and that then Assistant Director Potts was involved in the preparation of these rules of engagement and that Potts had approved them. On August 22, 1992, then Assistant Director Potts advised during a telephonic conversation with SAC Glenn that he had approved the rules of engagement, and he articulated his reasons for these adjustments to the Bureau's standard shooting policy. During the ten days of the Ruby Ridge stand-off there were several occasions when SAC Glenn and AD Potts telephonically communicated with one another, and during these conversations they mutually agreed that the rules of engagement should continue to exist. On Wednesday, August 26, 1992, AD Potts approved the FBI returning to the standard shooting policy. This is reflected in the SIOC Log, page 31, item 7, as follows: ``7) AD Potts and SAC Glenn agreed effective 1:00 p.m. EDT, 8/26/92, that the rules of engagement have changed and that they are now that we should fire only in accordance with current FBI shooting policy. . . .'' fbihq oversight of crisis situations During the January 6, 1995, press conference given by Director Freeh concerning discipline of FBI Agents involved in Ruby Ridge, the Director stated that Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Coulson had not read the rules of engagement. If this, in fact, were true, I do not understand how such a dereliction could be accepted from an individual whose sole purpose for being in SIOC during this crisis was to be in command of FBI operations at Ruby Ridge. It is a long- standing FBI procedure that any time SIOC is in operation, all investigative plans, operations plans, and tactical initiatives are approved by the individual in charge of SIOC. This point can be testified to by any SAC present or former who has ever served during a crisis with SIOC in operation. Additionally, it can be testified to by any local, state, or county law enforcement officer who has worked jointly with the FBI during a crisis incident with SIOC in operation. I have had several local and state officers come forward who will testify that they witnessed this above-described procedure during the Singer-Swapp crisis in Utah in 1988. Additionally, officials of the U.S. Marshal's Service (USMS) were present at Ruby Ridge in 1992 and witnessed the procedure when the operations plan, which on page two contained the rules of engagement, was sent via facsimile to FBI Headquarters on Saturday, August 22, 1992, at 12:15 PM PST, and to the USMS Headquarters simultaneously. At 12:30 PM, PST, the USMS Headquarters responded they had no objections to the operations plan. Bureau approval was not obtained for the operations plan until the negotiation annex was faxed back to FBI Headquarters. At that time DAD Coulson advised he approved the operations plan. DAD Coulson relieved AD Potts on Saturday, August 22, 1992. It is reasonable to assume that AD Potts fully briefed DAD Coulson regarding the activities surrounding the Ruby Ridge matter, including rules of engagement, prior to turning over command responsibilities to him. I call your attention to the SIOC Log, page 8, time 18:04, which reads as follows: ``DAD Coulson sent a facsimile to SAC Glenn re questions regarding the Operations Plan submitted by SAC Salt Lake. 1. No mention is made of Sniper Observer deployment as of 5:30 p.m. EST-- (2:30 PST) 2. What intelligence has been gathered from the crisis point? 3. There is no mention of a Negotiation Strategy to secure release of individuals at the crisis point. 4. There is no mention of any attempt to negotiate at all. 5. SAC Salt Lake is requested to consider negotiation strategy and advise FBIHQ. FBIHQ is not prepared to approve the plan as submitted at this time.'' fbihq actions on operations plan When DAD Coulson received the operations plan on Saturday, August 22, 1992, he telephonically advised SAC Glenn he could not approve the operations plan because it contained nothing about negotiation strategy. DAD Coulson and SAC Glenn had a lengthy telephone conversation concerning the points 1 through 5 set forth in the previous paragraph. Item 1 which deals with sniper observer deployment was discussed at length. It should be noted there were over 200 members of HRT, FBI SWAT team members, and other tactical and investigative units who were all held in camp and were not deployed, including sniper observers, until after DAD Coulson had received the crisis negotiation annex to the operations plan and at that time the field command was free to move sniper observer teams into forward positions. The sniper log verifies that snipers were in position at 5:07 PM, Pacific Daylight Time (8:07 PM, Eastern Daylight Time), which is after DAD Coulson had approved the operations plan containing the rules of engagement. There is no logic to the assumption that FBI leadership responsible for field command at Ruby Ridge would fax the operations plan containing the rules of engagement to FBI Headquarters and USMS Headquarters (receiving approval from the latter) and then deploy FBI resources prior to receiving approval from SIOC, FBI Headquarters. Is it logical to conclude that the two FBI SACs and the FBI HRT Commander on the scene would have mutually concurred to deploy FBI resources absent prior SIOC approval? The question must asked how did DAD Coulson avoid reviewing the rules of engagement which are located on page 2 of the Operation Plan inasmuch as he obviously had reviewed the Operations Plan to come up with the questions as set forth in the SIOC Log, supra. Page 8 of the SIOC Log at 18;30 reads as follows: ``SAC Glenn advised DAD Coulson that Portland SWAT team had contact with who they believe was subject approximately \1/4\ mile `up canyon' from home. He used profanity and told them to get off property. SAC was reminded of rules of engagement and to treat subject as threat if confronted outside home. SAC is working on negotiation plan.'' It is noted that DAD Coulson's reminder to SAC Glenn regarding how to handle Weaver if confronted outside his home is in keeping with the rules of engagement that appeared in the Operations Plan and is not in keeping with the standard Bureau shooting policy. Additionally, there exist two witnesses--one an individual who had a high-level position in SIOC during the operation who advised it was common knowledge that FBI Headquarters approved the rules of engagement; and the second witness is a Bureau Supervisor who served in SIOC on Saturday with DAD Coulson and overheard him discussing the rules of engagement with Bureau Supervisor Tony Betz. conflicts on rules of engagement approval I am aware that there exist conflicting statements regarding approval of the rules of engagement. Had A-SAC Mathews conducted his administrative review with the ethical standards and integrity normally associated with any FBI Agent, each of the individuals involved (Potts, Coulson, Rogers, Glenn, Gore, and Montgomery) would have been interrogated to resolve any conflicts that appear in their statements regarding rules of engagement. Had interrogation not resolved these conflicts, polygraph examinations should have been mandated as the next logical step. This type of in- depth investigation should have been mandated by A-SAC Mathews prior to any conclusions being drawn concerning who approved the rules of engagement. deficiencies on u.s. attorney liaison conclusions Instead of being interrogated concerning charges placed against me, I was afforded a telephonic ``soft'' fact-finding chronology-type review interview concerning liaison with the USA's Office in Boise, Idaho. I was never confronted with the allegations made by former U.S. Attorney Maurice Ellsworth and/or others. Individuals I suggested to A-SAC Mathews that should be contacted to provide additional insight regarding liaison problems that existed with the USA's Office in Boise under Ellsworth's leadership were [[Page S7590]] not contacted, and the current U.S. Attorney in Boise and former Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of Idaho were never contacted to verify the current excellent liaison that exists between the FBI and USA's Office in Boise. It should be noted that U.S. Attorney for the District of Idaho Betty Richardson and former Acting U.S. Attorney Pat Malloy of that office wrote unsolicited letters to both Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis J. Freeh describing the current high quality of liaison that exists between the FBI and the USA's Office in Idaho. It is important to note that according to the DOJ report leaked to the media concerning the Ruby Ridge matter. the criticism leveled in the DOJ investigation focused on liaison discrepancies by Headquarters Units of the FBI and their interaction with the USA's Office in Boise, Idaho. Yet, the Mathews report turned the responsibility for deficiencies in liaison with the USA's Office in Boise, Idaho, to the Salt Lake City Field Division without conducting logical investigative steps and without advising those to be charged with these derelictions of the specific allegations they would be facing. deficiencies in mathews report I have not yet been given access to the Mathews Administrative Summary Report; however, I am aware of other areas that were covered within the scope of this inquiry where A-SAC Mathews: (1) failed to develop/gather all evidence regarding liaison between the FBI, Salt Lake City and the USA's Office in Boise; (2) demonstrated unethical conduct by selectively choosing FBI Field Agents for discipline and omitting others involved jointly with those selected for discipline; (3) selectively choosing ASAC Thomas Miller and SAC Michael Kahoe for discipline regarding the Shooting Review Report for ``inaccurately and incompletely analyzing the report'' while omitting discipline of others who had to have reviewed the report (then Chief Inspector of the Inspection Division, then Assistant Director of the Inspection Division, then Deputy Assistant Director Danny Coulson, CID; then Assistant Director Larry Potts, CID), all of whom had to have read, analyzed, and approved this Shooting Report prior to it being sent to then Deputy Director Doug Gow; (4) and finally, other FBI Agents were interviewed by A-SAC Mathews and were subsequently censured, yet were not advised they were the subjects of an administrative inquiry nor were they given the standard waiver form to sign (FD-645). A-SAC Mathews, a close associate of then DAD Danny Coulson, served as Coulson's ASAC in the Portland Office of the FBI when Coulson was SAC from August 24, 1988, to December 29, 1991. The only logical conclusion that can be drawn to explain the deception and lack of completeness in this investigation is that A-SAC Mathews' relationship with Coulson caused him to avoid the development of the necessary facts, and caused him to cover up facts germane to the central issues. It is beyond conceivability that any FBI Agent with 25 years of experience could have inadvertently presented such an incomplete, inaccurate document as the Administrative Summary Report prepared by A-SAC Mathews. Had A-SAC Mathews demonstrated the ethical standards normally associated with someone in the FBI of his position, he would have recused himself from this assignment because of an obvious conflict of interest. status of proposed disciplinary action More than 115 days have passed since I was publicly castigated by Director Freeh during his infamous January 6, 1995, national press conference. To date I have not been given copies of the Administrative Summary Report prepared by A-SAC Mathews, the Department of Justice Report concerning Ruby Ridge prepared in 1994 by Barbara Berman (leaked to the media in February, 1995), the FBI report concerning the Ruby Ridge matter prepared by then Inspector Robert E. Walsh in 1994 (which report parallels the Berman report but presents findings that differ), and other internal documents I have gone on record requesting under the provisions of FOIPA. Since January 6, 1995, the FBI in concert with the DOJ has moved forward to have affirmed the correctness of the discipline handed out to then Assistant Director Potts, and on May 2, 1995, finalized his promotion to Deputy Director of the FBI. This action was taken while my appeal sits unaddressed in the office of Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick. The DOJ, aware that there are unresolved issues concerning responsibility for authorization of the rules of engagement at Ruby Ridge, chose to ignore the opportunity to hear from SAC Glenn and instead took a course of action which further exasperates an already flawed Administrative Review Process. conclusion I request that a thorough OPR inquiry be initiated. There are numerous administrative guidelines and procedures that have been violated, and it is conceivable that federal statutes have been violated. The lack of professionalism demonstrated in the handling of the Administrative Summary Report in connection with the Ruby Ridge matter casts a dark cloud over the integrity of the FBI and the DOJ. I would welcome the opportunity to be interrogated regarding this matter, and would likewise welcome the opportunity to submit to a polygraph examination afforded to me by a professional, nationally-recognized operator with a total independent bearing in this matter. This letter has not been referred directly to OPR, Inspection Division, FBI Headquarters, since it would create a conflict of interest for Assistant Director Gore, who was present and intricately involved in discussions involving the Operations Plan (including rules of engagement) utilized during the Ruby Ridge crisis in Idaho. Respectfully yours, Eugene F. Glenn, Special Agent in Charge, Salt Lake City Division. Exhibit 2 Report and Recommendations Concerning the Handling of Incidents Such as the Branch Davidian Standoff in Waco, TX (Submitted to Deputy Attorney General Philip Heymann, by Panelist Alan A. Stone, M.D., Touroff-Glueck Professor of Psychiatry and Law, Faculty of Law and Faculty of Medicine, Harvard University, November 10, 1993) i. preamble The Justice Department's official investigation published on October 8th together with other information made available to the panelists present convincing evidence that David Koresh ordered his followers to set the fire in which they perished. However, neither the official investigation nor the Dennis evaluation has provided a clear and probing account of the FBI tactics during the stand-off and their possible relationship to the tragic outcome at Waco. This report therefore contains an account based on my own further review and interpretation of the facts. I have concluded that the FBI command failed to give adequate consideration to their own behavioral science and negotiation experts. They also failed to make use of the Agency's own prior successful experience in similar circumstances. They embarked on a misguided and punishing law enforcement strategy that contributed to the tragic ending at Waco. As a physician, I have concluded that there are serious unanswered questions about the basis for the decision to deploy toxic C.S. gas in a closed space where there were 25 children, many of them toddlers and infants. This report makes several recommendations, first among them is that further inquiry will be necessary to resolve the many unanswered questions. Even with that major caveat, I believe the Deputy Attorney General's suggestions for forward looking changes are excellent and endorse them. This report makes further specific recommendations for change building on his proposal. ii. introduction A: Explanation for the delay in the submission of this report This past summer, the Justice and Treasury Departments appointed a group of panelists, each of whom was to prepare a forward-looking report suggesting possible changes in federal law enforcement in light of Waco. For reasons set forth below, I decided that before submitting a report based on my particular professional expertise, it was necessary to have a complete understanding of the factual investigation by the Justice Department. Having now had the opportunity to read and study that report and the Dennis Evaluation, I concluded that I did not yet have the kind of clear and probing view of events that is a necessary prerequisite for making suggestions for constructive change. Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Philip Heymann therefore made it possible for me to pursue every further question I had with those directly responsible for the Justice Department's factual investigation and with the FBI agents whose participation at Waco was relevant to my inquiry. Their cooperation allowed me to obtain the information necessary for this report. The Justice Department has sifted through a mountain of information, some of which, in accordance with Federal Statute, can not be publicly revealed. This evidence overwhelmingly proves that David Koresh and the Branch Davidians set the fire and killed themselves in the conflagration at Waco, which fulfilled their apocalyptic prophecy. This report does not question that conclusion; instead, my concern as a member of the Behavioral Science Panel is whether the FBI strategy pursued at Waco in some way contributed to the tragedy which resulted in the death of twenty-five innocent children along with the adults. The Justice Department Investigation and the Dennis Evaluation seem to agree with the FBI commander on the ground, who is convinced that nothing the FBI did or could have done would have changed the outcome. That is not my impression. I therefore decided it was necessary to include in this report my own account of the events I considered critical. I have attempted to confirm every factual assertion of this account with the FBI or the Justice Department. Although, in my discussions with the Justice Department, I encountered a certain skepticism about what I shall report here, I was quite reassured by interviews with the FBI's behavioral scientists and negotiators, who confirmed some of my impressions and encouraged my efforts. Because they share my belief that mistakes were made, they expressed their determination to have the truth come out, regardless of the consequences. I hope that this report will bolster the FBI and its new Director's efforts to conduct their forthcoming review of Waco, which has not yet begun. I also [[Page S7591]] hope that my report and suggestions for change will in some measure enable the FBI to work more effectively with the Justice Department, the Attorney General, and other law enforcement agencies. B. Mandate to the panel as I understood it The mandate to the panelists was ``to assist in addressing issues that Federal Law Enforcement confronts in barricade/ hostage situations such as the stand-off that occurred near Waco, Texas. . . .'' Specifically, my sub-group (Ammerman, Cancro, Stone, Sullivan) was directed to explore: ``Dealing with persons whose motivations and thought processes are unconventional. How should law enforcement agencies deal with persons or groups which thought processes or motivations depart substantially from ordinary familiar behavior in barricade situations such as Waco? How should the motivations of the persons affect the law enforcement response? What assistance can be provided by experts in such fields as psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and theology?''\1\ \1\Memorandum of June 25, 1993. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These seemed to be two premises in this request by the Deputy Attorney General (DAG). The first premise was that Waco had been a tragic event, so it was important for the agencies and the people involved to examine the evidence, evaluate their actions, and initiate change based on those conclusions. Second, although there were questions about the psychiatric status of David Koresh, the DAG's use of the term, ``unconventional,'' indicated that we were also broadly to consider groups with ``belief systems'' that might cause them to think and behave differently than ordinary criminals and therefore to be more difficult for law enforcement to deal with and understand. As I understood it, the Branch Davidians' religious beliefs were considered unconventional,'' which was not intended to be a pejorative term, but rather a descriptive one. The panelists were also told that there was concern among federal law enforcement officials that more such ``unconventional'' groups might, in the near future, pose problems for which law enforcement's standard operating procedures might not be suitable. Given this important responsibility and the fact that we were asked to make recommendations ``[c]oncerning the handling of incidents such as the Branch Davidian Standoff in Waco, Texas'' (emphasis added), I felt unprepared to go forward without a thorough grasp of the events and decisions that led to the tragedy. However, the Justice Department was still in the preliminary stage of their own fact-gathering investigation at our panel briefings in early July. Hoping to convey the particular issues of concern to me, I prepared a preliminary report based on the initial briefings. Since the factual information I wanted and needed was still being gathered by the Justice Department, I did not attend the subsequent special briefings arranged for the panel at Quantico, Virginia. Because of my reticence to furnish a report based on incomplete information, the DAG and I resolved that I would submit my report subsequent to the completion of the Justice Department's factual inquiry. I have now had the opportunity to review the following documents: 1. Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell Also Known As David Koresh, September, 1993; 2. Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, Texas, February 28 to April 19, 1993 (Redacted Version), October 8, 1993; 3. Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Stand-off in Waco, Texas, February 28 to April 19, 1993 (Redacted version), October 8, 1993; 4. Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann, Lessons of Waco: Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement October 8, 1993; 5. Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco. As previously mentioned, the Justice Department and the FBI have answered my further questions, supplied me with documents, and helped me explore issues of greatest relevance to my inquiry. iii. account of the events at waco The FBI replaced the BATF at the Branch Davidian compound on the evening of February 28 and the morning of March 1. There had been casualties on both sides during the BATF's attempted dynamic entry. David Koresh, the leader of the Branch Davidians, had been shot through the hip, and the situation was in flux. It would become, as we have been told, the longest stand-off in law enforcement history. The FBI, with agents in place who were trained for rapid intervention, was locked into a prolonged siege. The perimeter was difficult to control, the conditions were extreme, and the stress was intense. Furthermore, the FBI's people had inherited a disaster that was not of their own making. ``Under the circumstances, the FBI exhibited extraordinary restraint and handled this crisis with great professionalism'' the Dennis Evaluation concludes. While this may be true from the perspective of experts in law enforcement, it does not contribute to establishing a clear explanation of what happened at Waco from a psychiatric and behavioral science perspective. The commander on the ground believes that the FBI's actions had no impact on David Koresh. He and others who share his opinion will likely disagree with the account that follows, which is the product of my own current understanding of the events. Phase I During the first phase of the FBI's engagement at Waco, a period of a few days, the agents on the ground proceeded with a strategy of conciliatory negotiation, which had the approval and understanding of the entire chain of command. They also took measures to ensure their own safety and to secure the perimeter. In the view of the negotiating team, considerable progress was made--for example, some adults and children came out of the compound; but David Koresh and the Branch Davidians made many promises to the negotiators they did not keep. Pushed by the tactical leader, the commander on the ground began to allow tactical pressures to be placed on the compound in addition to negotiation; e.g., turning off the electricity, so that those in the compound would be as cold as the agents outside during the twenty-degree night. Phase II As documented in the published reports and memoranda, this tactical pressure began at the operational level over the objections of the FBI's own experts in negotiation and behavioral science, who specifically advised against it. These experts warned the FBI command about the potentially fatal consequences of such measures in dealing with an ``unconventional'' group. Their advice is documented in memoranda. Nonetheless tactical pressure was added. Without a clear command decision, what evolved was a carrot-and-stick, ``mixed-message'' strategy. This happened without outside consultation and without taking into account that the FBI was dealing with an ``unconventional'' group. Although this carrot-and-stick approach is presented in the factual investigation as though it were standard operating procedure for law enforcement and accepted by the entire chain of command, it was instead, apparently, the result of poor coordination and management in the field. Negotiators and tactical units were at times operating independently in an uncoordinated and counterproductive fashion. Phase III During the third phase of the stand-off, the FBI took a more aggressive approach to negotiation and, when that failed, gave up on the process of negotiation, except as a means of maintaining communication with the compound. By March 21, the FBI was concentrating on tactical pressure alone: first, by using all-out psycho-physiological warfare intended to stress and intimidate the Branch Davidians; and second, by ``tightening the noose'' with a circle of armored vehicles. The FBI considered these efforts a success because no shots were fired at them by the Branch Davidians. This changing strategy at the compound from (1) conciliatory negotiating to (2) negotiation and tactical pressure and then to (3) tactical pressure alone, evolved over the objections of the FBI's own experts and without clear understanding up the chain of command. When the fourth and ultimate strategy, the insertion of C.S. gas, was presented to Attorney General Reno, the FBI had abandoned any serious effort to reach a negotiated solution and was well along in its strategy of all-out tactical pressure, thereby leaving little choice as to how to end the Waco stand-off. It is unclear from the reports whether the FBI ever explained to the AG that the agency had rejected the advice of their own experts in behavioral science and negotiation, or whether the AG was told that FBI negotiators believed they could get more people out of the compound by negotiation. By the time the AG made her decision, the noose was closed and, as one agent told me, the FBI believed they had ``three options--gas, gas, and gas.'' This account of the FBI's approach at Waco may not be correct in every detail. It is certainly oversimplified, but it has been confirmed in its general outline by FBI behavioral scientists and negotiators who were participants at Waco. This account with their assistance brings into focus for me the critical issues about law enforcement response to persons and a group whose beliefs, motivations, and behavior are unconventional. iv. analysis A. The FBI's behavioral science capacity 1. FBI Expertise in Dealing With Persons Whose Motivations and Thought Processes Are Unconventional The evidence now available to me indicates that, contrary to my previous understanding and that of the other panelists, the FBI's Investigative Support Unit and trained negotiators possessed the psychological/behavioral science expertise they needed to deal with David Koresh and an unconventional group like the Branch Davidians. The FBI has excellent in-house behavioral science capacity and also consulted with reputable experts outside the agency. Panelists may have been misled, as I was, by FBI officials at the original briefings who conveyed the impression that they considered David Koresh a typical criminal mentality and dealt with him as such. They also conveyed the impression that they believed his followers were dupes and he had ``conned'' them. Based on reports and interviews, the FBI's behavioral science experts who were actually on the scene at Waco had an excellent understanding of Koresh's psychology and appreciated the group's intense religious convictions. [[Page S7592]] My preliminary report of August 3 emphasized at some length those aspects of David Koresh's clinical history and psychopathology that contradicted the simplistic and misleading impression given at the first briefings. Much more information has been made available about his mental condition, his behavioral abnormalities, his sexual activities, and his responses under stress. All of this evidence is incompatible with the notion that Koresh can be understood and should have been dealt with as a conventional criminal type with an antisocial personality disorder. However, the evidence available does not lead directly to some other clear and obvious psychiatric diagnosis used by contemporary psychiatry. Nonetheless, based on the FBI's in- house behavioral science memoranda and other information from outside consultants, I believe the FBI behavioral science experts had worked out a good psychological understanding of Koresh's psychopathology. They knew it would be a mistake to deal with him as though he were a con-man pretending to religious beliefs so that he could exploit his followers. This is not to suggest that David Koresh did not dominate and exploit other people. He was able to convince husbands and wives among his followers that only he should have sex with the women and propagate children. He convinced parents on the same religious grounds to permit him to have sex with their young teen-age daughters. He studied, memorized, and was preoccupied with Biblical texts and made much better educated people believe that he had an enlightened understanding of scripture and that he was the Lamb of God. His followers took David Koresch's teachings as their faith. He exacted strict discipline from adults and children alike while indulging himself. Whatever else all this adds up to, it and other information clearly demonstrate as a psychological matter that Koresh had an absolute need for control and domination of his followers that amounted to a mania. He also had the ability to control them. The intensity and depth of his ability and need to control is attested to by everyone in the FBI who dealt with him, from negotiators and behavioral scientists to tactical agents and the commander on the ground. Unfortunately, those responsible for ultimate decision- making at Waco did not listen to those who understood the meaning and psychological significance of David Koresh's ``mania.'' Instead they tried to show him who was the ``boss.'' What went wrong at Waco was not that the FBI lacked expertise in behavioral science or in the understanding of unconventional religious groups. Rather the commander on the ground and others committed to tactical-aggressive, traditional law enforcement practices disregarded those experts and tried to asset control and demonstrate to Koresh that they were in charge. There is nothing surprising or esoteric in this explanation, nor does it arise only from the clear wisdom of hindsight. As detailed below, the FBI's own experts recognized and predicted in memoranda that there was the risk that the active aggressive law enforcement mentality of the FBI--the so- called ``action imperative'' would prevail in the face of frustration and delay. They warned that, in these circumstances, there might be tragic consequences from the FBI's ``action imperative,'' and they were correct. 2. Evaluating the Risks of Mass Suicide As I have previously stated, there is, to my mind, unequivocal evidence in the report and briefings that the Branch Davidians set the compound on fire themselves and ended their lives on David Koresh's order. However, I am also now convinced that the FBI's noose-tightening tactics may well have precipitated Koresh's decision to commit himself and his followers to this course of mass suicide. The official reports have shied away from directly confronting and examining the possible causal relationship between the FBI's pressure tactics and David Koresh's order to the Branch Davidians. I believe that this omission is critical because, if that tactical strategy increased the likelihood of the conflagration in which twenty-five innocent children died, then that must be a matter of utmost concern for the future management of such stand-offs. Based on the available evidence and my own professional expertise, I believe that the responsible FBI decision makers did not adequately or correctly evaluate the risk of mass suicide. The Dennis Evaluation's executive summary concludes that ``the risk of suicide was taken into account during the negotiations and in the development of the gas plan.'' It is unclear what ``taken into account'' means. The questions that now need to be explored are: how was the risk of suicide taken into account, and how did the FBI assess the impact of their show of-force pressure tactics on that risk? Gambling with death There is a criminology, behavioral science, and psychiatric literature on the subject of murder followed by suicide, which indicates that these behaviors and the mental states that motivate them have very important and complicated links. Family violence often takes the form of murder followed by suicide. Multiple killers motivated by paranoid ideas often provoke law enforcement at the scene to kill them and often commit suicide. Even more important is what has been called ``the gamble with death.'' Inner-city youths often provoke a shoot-out, ``gambling'' with death (suicide) by provoking police into killing them. The FBI's behavioral science unit, aware of this literature, realized that Koresh and his followers were in a desperate kill-or-be-killed mode. They were also well aware of the significance and meaning of the Branch Davidians' apocalyptic faith. They understood that David Koresh interpreted law enforcement attacks as related to the prophesied apocalyptic ending. In moving to the show of force tactical strategy, the FBI's critical assumption, was that David Koresh and the Branch Davidians, like ordinary persons, would respond to pressure in the form of a closing circle of armed vehicles and conclude that survival was in their self-interest, and surrender. This ill-fated assumption runs contrary to all of the relevant behavioral science and psychiatric literature and the understanding it offered of Koresh and the Branch Davidians. Furthermore, there was direct empirical evidence supporting the assumption that the Branch Davidians, because of their own unconventional beliefs, were in the ``gamble with death'' mode. The direct evidence for this was their response to the ATF's misguided assault. They engaged in a desperate shootout with federal law enforcement, which resulted in deaths and casualties on both sides. The AFT claims gunfire came from forty different locations. If true, this means that at least forty Branch Davidians were willing to shoot at federal agents and kill or be killed as martyr- suicide victims defending their ``faith.'' The idea that people with those beliefs expecting the apocalypse would submit to tactical pressure is a conclusion that flies in the face of their past behavior in the ATF crisis. Past behavior is generally considered the best predictor of future behavior. Willing to kill but not cold-blooded killers The BATF investigation reports that the so-called ``dynamic entry'' turned into what is described as being ``ambushed''. As I tried to get a sense of the state of mind and behavior of the people in the compound the idea that the Branch Davidians' actions were considered an ``ambush'' troubled me. If they were militants determined to ambush and kill as many AFT agents as possible, it seemed to me that given their firepower, the devastation would have been even worse. The agents were in a very vulnerable position from the moment they arrived. Yet, as ordered, they tried to gain entry into the compound in the face of the hail of fire. Although there is disagreement, a senior FBI tactical person and other experts confirmed my impression of this matter. The ATF agents brought to the compound in cattle cars could have been cattle going to slaughter if the Branch Davidians had taken full advantage of their tactical superiority. They apparently did not maximize the kill of ATF agents. This comports with all of the state-of-mind evidence and suggests that the Branch Davidians were not determined, cold-blooded killers; rather, they were desperate religious fanatics expecting an apocalyptic ending, in which they were destined to die defending their sacred ground and destined to achieve salvation. The tactical arm of federal law enforcement may conventionally think of the other side as a band of criminals or as a military force or, generically, as the aggressor. But the Branch Davidians were an unconventional group in an exalted, disturbed, and desperate state of mind. They were devoted to David Koresh as the Lamb of God. They were willing to die defending themselves in an apocalyptic ending and, in the alternative, to kill themselves and their children. However, these were neither psychiatrically depressed, suicidal people nor cold-blooded killers. They were ready to risk death as a test of their faith. The psychology of such behavior-together with its religious significance for the Branch Davidians was mistakenly evaluated if, not simply ignored, by those responsible for the FBI strategy of ``tightening the noose.'' The overwhelming show of force was not working in the way the tacticians supposed. It did not provoke the Branch Davidians to surrender, but it may have provoked David Koresh to order the mass-suicide. That, at least, is my considered opinion. The factual investigation reports in detail the many time negotiators asked Koresh and others in the compound whether they planned suicide. Also documented are Koresh's assurances that they would not kill themselves. Such questions and answers are certainly important from a psychiatric perspective in evaluating a patient's suicidal tendency. But the significance of such communication depends on the context, the relationship established, and the state of mind of the person being interviewed. The FBI had no basis for relying on David Koresh's answers to these questions. Furthermore, his responses provided no guidance to the more pertinent question?--`What will you do if we tighten the noose around the compound in a show of overwhelming power, and using CS gas, force you to come out?' The psychology of control The most salient feature of David Koresh's psychology was his need for control. Every meaningful glimpse of his personality and of day-to-day life in the compound demonstrates his control and domination. The tactic of tightening-the-noose around the compound was intended to convey to David Koresh the realization that he was losing control of his ``territory,'' and that the FBI that this tactic and the war of stress would establish that they were in control but would not convey hostile intent. They themselves truly believed these tactics were ``not an assault,'' and because the Davidians failed to respond with gunfire, the FBI considered their tactics effective and appropriate. The commander on the ground now acknowledges that they never really gained control of David Koresh. But, in fact, my analysis is that they pushed him to the ultimate act of control--destruction of himself and his group. The FBI's tactics were ill considered in light of David Koresh's psychology and the group psychology of the people in the compound. The FBI was dealing with a religious group, with shared and reinforced beliefs and a charismatic leader. If one takes seriously the psychological syndrome of murder/ suicide gamble with death and the group's unconventional belief system in the Seven Seals and the apocalypse, then you may conclude, as I have, that the FBI's control tactics convinced David Koresh that, in this situation, he was becoming hopeless and helpless--that he was losing control. In his desperate state of mind, he chose death rather than submission. When the FBI thought they were at last taking control, they had in fact totally lost control of the stand- off. 3. The Waco Tactics in Light of the Group Psychology of the FBI If this had been a military operation, the Waco conclusion would have been a victory. The enemy was destroyed without a single loss of life for the FBI. This situation, however, was not a military operation. The question is; did a ``military'' mentality overtake the FBI? We were told that the FBI considers a conflict which results in any casualties on either side a failure. The law enforcement experts on the panel agreed. There is little doubt that the FBI inherited a terrible situation. Federal agents had been killed and wounded, and there were killed and wounded Branch Davidians in and around the compound. The FBI knew that they were in a dangerous situation, and that they confronted a group of religious fanatics who were willing to kill or be killed. The FBI's initial decision to mount a stand-off and negotiate was a remarkable exhibition of restraint under the circumstances. In retrospect, tactical units will wonder whether an immediate full-scale dynamic entry by an overwhelming force would have produced less loss of life. The FBI stand-off, we were repeatedly told, was the longest in law enforcement history. The costs in money and manpower were mounting and, Waco had the media impact of the Iran Hostage taking as the days mounted. The FBI was under enormous pressure to do something. Given what I believe the FBI's group psychology to have been, the desultory strategy of simultaneous negotiation and tactical pressure was enacted as a compromise between doing nothing (passivity) and military assault (the action imperative). The appeal of any tactical initiative to an entrenched, stressed FBI must have been overwhelming. It may have better suited their group psychology than the group psychology of the unconventional people in the compound they wanted to affect. Given the escalating pressure to act, the final tightening-the-noose'' and C.S. gas strategy must have seemed to the tacticians a reasonable compromise between doing nothing and overreacting. This analysis of the FBI's group psychology is not intended as a matter of placing blame. If it is accurate, it at least points to what might be done differently in the future. The FBI should not be pushed by their group psychology into misguided ad hoc decision making the next time around. B. Failure To Use Behavioral Science Capacity 1. Failure of coordination between tactical and negotiating arms of the

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I shall abbreviate these comments because we are in the middle of the consideration of the broader terrorism bill, but these comments are directly relevant to this bill. I know, however, that others are waiting to speak. While I will have more to say about this at a later time, I will condense these comments at this time. Relating to the incident at Ruby Ridge, there are questions which have already been raised by many as to why Mr. Potts was made the Deputy Director of the FBI while this matter was pending and certainly before there was a congressional inquiry by the U.S. Senate or the House of Representatives. Those are among my reasons for thinking that a congressional inquiry into Ruby Ridge should have been held a long time ago, but at least ought to be held as promptly as possible. Mr. President, turning for a few moments to the incident at Waco, TX, which reached its conclusion on April 19, 1993, let me say at the outset as emphatically as I can that whatever happened at Waco, TX, whatever happened at Ruby Ridge, ID, there is absolutely no justification for what happened at the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19 of this year. But I do believe that it is more than coincidence that the incident at Waco occurred on April 19 and the incident at Oklahoma City occurred on the same day 2 years later. I believe it is vital in our democracy that accountability be present at the highest levels of our Government. It has always been my view that there should be a Senate inquiry on Waco, and I expressed that view back in the middle of the summer of 1993 shortly after the Waco incident occurred. My comments were corroborated on the floor of the Senate by the then-chairman, Senator Biden, who confirmed that I had been pressing for an inquiry into Waco at that time. We live in the greatest democracy in the history of the world, but we have to remember, especially those of us in Washington, DC, and within the beltway, that we govern by the consent of the governed and that the right of the Government to govern depends upon the Government's recognizing the rights of individual citizens. There is no mere coincidence between the existence of the Bill of Rights and the stability of the American Government. The items in the Bill of Rights have to be very, very carefully safeguarded in every respect. It is a fundamental constitutional duty of the Congress to have oversight. That oversight has not been held with respect either to Waco or to Ruby Ridge, and I believe that these matters are directly related to the pending legislation which we are considering. In just a few minutes, I think the briefest way to set some of the questions on the record which require answering by our congressional hearing would be to refer to the report and recommendations filed by Prof. Alan Stone of Harvard with other recommendations submitted to the then-Deputy Attorney General of the United States, Philip Heymann. Professor Stone was one of a group of panelists who was requested by the FBI to prepare a forward-looking report suggesting possible changes in Federal law enforcement in light of what happened at Waco. These are a few of the comments from Professor Stone. At page 1 of his report, he says: . . . Neither the official investigation nor the Dennis evaluation has provided a clear and probing account of the FBI tactics during the stand-off and their possible relationship to the tragic outcome at Waco. Then going on a few sentences later: I have concluded that the FBI command failed to give adequate consideration to their own behavioral science and negotiation experts. They also failed to make use of the agency's own prior successful experience in similar circumstances. They embarked on a misguided and punishing law enforcement strategy that contributed to the tragic ending at Waco. As a physician, I have concluded that there are serious unanswered questions about the basis for the decision to deploy toxic CS gas in a closed space where there were 25 children, many of them toddlers and infants. Skipping ahead to page 24, Professor Stone goes on to say: One might think that the highest priority after a tragedy like Waco would be for everyone involved to consider what went wrong and what would they now do differently. I must confess that it has been a frustrating and disappointing experience to discover that the Justice Department's investigation has produced so little in this regard. Moving ahead now to page 30 briefly: The FBI needs a better knowledge base about the medical consequences of CS gas. It is my opinion that the AG-- The Attorney General. --was not properly informed of the risks to infants and small children posed by CS gas. Continuing a few sentences later: The FBI, the Justice Department, and all of law enforcement that uses CS gas ought to have as clear an understanding of its medical consequences as possible. Then on his final page, page 31, under a caption ``Final Word,'' there is this statement: There is a view within the FBI and in the official reports that suggests the tragedy was unavoidable. This report is a dissenting opinion from that view. Then a final sentence: It is my considered opinion that the failings of the FBI at Waco involved no intentional misconduct. Mr. President, in order to save time, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of this report by Professor Stone be printed at the end of my statement this morning.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the distinguished President pro tempore. Mr. President, I have sought recognition this morning to comment on the pending legislation, which is obviously a bill of tremendous importance in light of the recent bombing of the Federal building in Oklahoma City on April 19 and before that the bombing of the World Trade Center some 2 years ago. Terrorism has been an enormous problem internationally for decades, and now terrorism has struck on the shores and in the heartland of the United States. In considering legislation to deal with this very critical problem, Mr. President, we should ever be mindful that an appropriate balance has to be struck between public safety and the constitutional rights of the citizens under the Bill of Rights which has served our country so well since its adoption in 1791. The pending legislation has appended to it the habeas corpus reform bill which has been introduced by the distinguished chairman of the committee, Senator Hatch, and myself under the caption of the Specter- Hatch bill, S. 623, and it is legislation which is long overdue to make the death penalty a meaningful deterrent. Last year, with the passage of the crime bill, Federal legislation was enacted which provides for the death penalty for those responsible for the bombing of the Federal building in Oklahoma City. The addition to this legislation of habeas corpus reform is important because some cases have been pending for as long as 20 years. Such delays really makes a virtual nullity of the death penalty because, in order to be an effective deterrent, the punishment must be swift and the punishment must be certain. In most of the [[Page S7586]] cases where these long delays have eventuated, the prosecutions characteristically arise in the State courts and go through with the judgment of sentence of death ultimately affirmed by the highest State court and then habeas corpus proceedings in the Federal court. The conduct in Oklahoma City, the bombing of the building and the murder of the innocent children, women, and men, is prosecutable under both Federal and State laws, and there is a slightly different habeas corpus procedure with respect to cases that originate under Federal jurisdiction. The Specter-Hatch language addresses both types of cases, and I think it is very, very important to have it contained in this bill. There are other measures in the pending legislation, Mr. President, which I think require our very calm and deliberate consideration, such as the provision which provides for secret proceedings to deport alien terrorists. While deportation proceedings are characteristically described as a civil proceeding, under the due process clause of law has been held to apply, and the due process clause of the 14th amendment characteristically incorporates most of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights including the right of confrontation. I have grave reservations that any kind of a secret proceeding can pass constitutional muster. It is my thought that we may be able to solve the problem by deporting people suspected of being terrorists or known terrorists because they are in this country illegally. We all know that there are many aliens in the United States illegally, but there are not sufficient resources to deport all of them. It would be entirely possible for us to seek to deport aliens who are here illegally where there was cause to believe that they are terrorists but to deport them not through secret proceedings because they are terrorists but because they are in the United States illegally. Toward that end, I think we can abbreviate the procedures for deportation, including limiting appellate review. I think it is entirely possible to have, constitutionally, a definite period of preventive detention, and if there are defenses such as asylum, they can be litigated in relatively short order so that deportation of illegal aliens may be achieved without a conflict with the constitutional right of confrontation. Similarly, Mr. President, I am concerned--and I have expressed this before in the hearings held in the terrorism subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, which I chair--about the provisions which would enable the Attorney General of the United States to classify an organization as engaged in terrorist activities and then deprive that organization of rights which are characteristically protected under the first amendment's freedom of association. While the bill provides for de novo review by the court, here again there are provisions for secret proceedings which I believe may run afoul of the U.S. Constitution. With respect to any wiretapping provisions which may be added to the bill, I think they will require our very, very close scrutiny to be sure we are preserving the constitutionally protected rights of those who are subject to the wiretapping. Mr. President, I will also take this opportunity to make some comments on the incidents at Ruby Ridge, ID, and Waco. With the Senate being fully occupied for the last several days on the budget, I did not have an opportunity to do so before, but it fits right in at this juncture, and I shall be relatively brief in summarizing some of the preliminary findings which I have come to. As the Congressional Record will show--and my distinguished colleague, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, is in the Chamber-- it has been my view that we ought to hold hearings on Waco and Ruby Ridge promptly. And by that I mean on or before August 4. I am well aware of the consideration of not impeding the Federal Bureau of Investigation's inquiries into Oklahoma City. But as I said some time ago, in conversations with the Director of the FBI, he thought that a period by mid-August, 8 to 10 weeks from the time of our conversation as I reported it on the Senate floor, would allow ample time for the FBI to complete its Oklahoma City investigation without having any problems created by a Senate inquiry of the full Judiciary Committee. But in the absence of that full inquiry and in the absence of the setting of a date, I had said that I was going to make a preliminary inquiry myself. I did have occasion to report very briefly on these matters last week, but I want to comment a little more extensively this morning on my preliminary findings. With respect to the incident at Ruby Ridge, ID, which came to a head back on August 21, 1992, I have had occasion to talk to a number of the people who have knowledge of that matter, including FBI Director Louis Freeh; FBI Deputy Director Larry Potts; the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, John Magaw; Jerry Spence, the attorney for Mr. Weaver; Mr. Weaver, whom I talked to when I was in Des Moines earlier this month in the presence of his attorney, Michael Mooma, Esq. I have also talked to Randy Day, Esq., the Boundary County attorney in Idaho who was considering possible State prosecutions arising out of that incident. During the course of my conversations with Mr. Weaver, his daughters Sarah, Rachel, and Alicia, ages 19, 13, and 3, were also present. One of the critical aspects of the matter involving Mr. Weaver concerns the issue as to how the entire incident arose. In my meeting with Mr. Weaver, he described the incident as starting out when an undercover agent associated, as Mr. Weaver thought, with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, came to purchase sawed-off shotguns from Mr. Weaver. As Mr. Weaver himself recounted the incident, he did provide two sawed-off shotguns to the ATF undercover agent. In my later conversations with the Director of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms unit, John Magaw, he said that, during the course of the trial, there was an acquittal of Mr. Weaver on grounds of entrapment. Mr. Magaw described it as borderline entrapment, but it raises a fundamental question as to the appropriate course of conduct of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms on initiating such a matter through an undercover agent, a confidential informant, where the incident has all the preliminary earmarks of entrapment. And that, in fact, was the conclusion of the court, and that is the concession made by the director of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms unit. Mr. President, a more critical aspect of what happened at Ruby Ridge, ID, of the tragedy which occurred there--including the killing of a deputy U.S. marshal, the killing of Mr. Weaver's son, Sam Weaver, the killing of Mr. Weaver's wife, Vicky--is the issue of the change in the FBI's rules of engagement from the standard shooting policy. On that issue, there is a direct conflict between representations made by Mr. Eugene F. Glenn, who is now the special agent in charge at the Salt Lake City office of the FBI and Deputy Director Larry Potts of the FBI. In my conversation with Mr. Potts on May 17 of this year, Mr. Potts advised me that there were never any changes in the rules of engagement and that he, Mr. Potts, had no authorization to change the deadly force policy. We do know, in the course of the incidents there, that Mrs. Weaver was killed by the bullet of an FBI sharpshooter. The contention has been made by officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that that was a matter which was necessary to defend other agents who were involved in the effort to take Mr. Weaver into custody. There is a very significant question as to the circumstances of that shooting with respect to a Bureau representation that Mrs. Weaver was shot through a door, which raises the inference and suggestion that the shooter might not have been able to see Mrs. Weaver, contrasted with the representation of others that the door had a glass pane so that, in fact, the shooter may have been able to see Mrs. Weaver. That is not ascertainable based upon what I know of the facts, because there is a possibility of glare, there is a possibility of some obstruction of vision even with a pane of glass, but that is certainly something which requires inquiry. Focusing in specifically on the conflict or at least apparent conflict between Mr. Potts and Mr. Glenn--as I have said, Deputy Director Potts told me that there were never any changes authorization to change the deadly force policy of the FBI. In a letter from Special Agent Glenn to Michael A. Shaheen, the Director of the Office of Professional Responsibility at the Department of Justice, seeking an investigation into what occurred, Mr. Glenn refers specifically to adjustments to the Bureau's standard shooting policy at Ruby Ridge, and he attributes those to Deputy Director Potts. This statement appears at page 6 of the letter from Mr. Glenn to Mr. Shaheen: On August 22, 1992, then Assistant Director Potts advised during a telephonic conversation with SAC That means special agent in charge Glenn. that he had approved the rules of engagement, and he articulated his reasons for his adjustments to the Bureau's standard shooting policy. During the ten days of the Ruby Ridge stand-off, there were several occasions when SAC Glenn and AD Potts telephonically communicated with one another, and during these conversations they mutually agreed that the rules of engagement should continue to exist. On Wednesday, August 26, 1992, AD Potts approved the FBI returning to the standard shooting policy. This is reflected in the SIOC Log, page 13, item 7. Then it follows to have the specification as to what occurred there. When Mr. Glenn requested this special investigation, he draws this conclusion at page 1 of the letter: * * * investigative deficiencies reveal a purpose to create scapegoats and false impressions, rather than uncovering or reinforcing the reality of what happened at Ruby Ridge. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of this letter from Mr. Glenn to Mr. Shaheen be printed at the conclusion of my statement.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Dole, I wish to announce that the leader time has been reserved and the Senate will immediately resume consideration of S. 735, the antiterrorism bill, and to tell all Senators, in accordance with the majority leader's request, that rollcall votes are anticipated today on or in relation to amendments to the antiterrorism bill.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, on May 18 of this year, the Appropriations Subcommittee on Health, Human Services, Education and Labor held a hearing on the funding for the National Institutes of Health, and at that time a request was made by the representatives of the various units of the NIH to submit impact statements as to what the budget reductions would do. A good bit of this information was used by me in my statement on an amendment offered by Senator Hatfield. I ask unanimous consent that the Record contain these impact statements.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the Subcommittee on Terrorism of the Judiciary Committee was scheduled to have hearings on terrorism today. Those hearings could not be held because the Senate was in session continuously from 9 a.m. with rollcall votes of 9 minutes. So those hearings had to be postponed. They are going to be held on Thursday, June 8. A good many people came from substantial distances. I expressed our regrets that we could not hold the hearing. But it was not possible to do so. But I did tell them that the statements which had been submitted would be put in the Record at this time so that their prepared statements could at least be read by Members of the Senate or those interested in reading them. At this time, I ask unanimous consent that the statement of attorney John W. DeCamp, the statement of Mr. Norman Olson, the statement of Mr. Leroy Crenshaw, and the statement of the Militia of Montana be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I had been looking for some time to talk on my own inquiries into the events at Waco and Ruby Ridge, but since the leader has scheduled the terrorism bill to come up and has limited the opening statements in morning business to 5 minutes, it is my intention to try to be the lead speaker tomorrow. That will fit into some of my opening comments on terrorism. I will present the findings of my preliminary inquiry at that time. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, for yielding time to me. I compliment him for his leadership generally, and especially on this amendment for his very spirited and eloquent articulation of the reasons for this amendment. I am pleased to join Senator Hatfield as a cosponsor, along with Senator Kassebaum, Senator Mack, and there may be others who will join in cosponsoring this very, very important amendment. Senator Hatfield has added the name of Senator Kennedy to the list as original cosponsor here, along with Senator Jeffords. The consideration of this budget resolution is very important to America. It is the toughest series of votes which I have seen in my 14\1/2\ years in the U.S. Senate. It has been very carefully crafted by the Budget Committee, under the leadership of Senator Domenici, who has great respect in this body on all counts. We have seen a series of amendments defeated so far on the budget resolution, many of which I would have liked to have voted for. But we have to make some really extremely tough choices which I think we are making. I believe this is a historic time for the U.S. Government to balance the budget. Substantial efforts were made following the election of President Reagan in 1981, when we considered a budget resolution some 14 years ago, but there was not the political will at that time to balance the budget. We did not have Republican control of the House of Representatives, with, candidly, the political determination to balance the budget. That time is now. In order to balance the budget we have had to turn down some requests on amendments which I think were very, very attractive. It was very, very difficult to vote against the amendment which offered additional funding for education because I am very much concerned about the cuts in this budget resolution on education. I am very much concerned about the cuts in this budget on Medicare and Medicaid. And I have heard from constituents about the devastating impact of what the Medicare cuts will do in closing hospitals, and not marginal hospitals but hospitals which are very important across this country, providing very vital services for the people of America. But it seems to me if we are going to move to a balanced budget we are going to have to have belt tightening all across the board. I personally would very much have liked to have voted for the amendment yesterday on a tax cut. Who would not like to have a tax cut in America? But the difficulty with the amendment was present in the additional cuts which would have been present for other very important items, and also in the direction of the tax cuts not being directed with sufficient depth and specificity at the lower income groups and raising the concern about too much of a tax cut for wealthier Americans at a time when we are going to be cutting very many important programs which impact across the board, and many on the poor. The amount offered yesterday on increasing national defense was a very attractive amendment. But there again the difficulty is that it would have resulted in cuts in other programs and added to the deficit. I think that in the amendment which we are now considering, to have a restoration of part of the budget cut on the National Institutes of Health, that we are going to have the strong bipartisan support which was not present to increase funding or restore funding for education, or the bipartisan support [[Page S7296]] which was necessary to restore funding for Medicare and Medicaid. I believe that we have this bipartisan support because of the unique importance of what the National Institutes of Health does for America. In the 14\1/2\ years that I have been on the Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, which I now chair, we have maintained an increasing amount of funding year by year, notwithstanding proposed budget cuts virtually every year from the administration, and it has been a bipartisan effort, once under the chairmanship of Senator Weicker, then under the chairmanship of Senator Lawton Chiles, then under the chairmanship of Senator Tom Harkin, and now with my chairmanship. We had a hearing last Thursday attended by the distinguished chairman of the full committee, where we heard of the devastating impact of what these budget cuts would do to medical research in the United States. There is not time enough to go through the entire array of very powerful arguments and very powerful considerations. But let me start with a few. At the present time, the National Institutes of Health funds less than 1 in 4 grant applications. If funding were cut by 10 percent, that grant rate might decrease to as much as 1 in 10. There would be a drastic reduction in clinical trials to initiate promising new treatments leaving the application of research findings for the patients on an untested basis. There would be a cataclysmic consequence with over 80 percent of the NIH budget being cut with support from colleges, universities, medical schools, and research institutes throughout the country. We are on the brink of having extraordinary advances in medical research on gene therapy on a whole range of very, very devastating illnesses in America. Let me name just a few. Last year the National Institutes of Health discovered a breast cancer susceptibility gene, and the NIH is now closing in on the gene which causes breast cancer, which would be really a remarkable achievement on a terrifying disease which strikes 1 of 9 women in America. The problems on heart disease, cardiovascular disease, which is still the number one killer of both men and women, causing 43 percent of all deaths each year; delaying the onset of heart disease by 5 years, which is right around the corner, would save almost $70 billion annually. When we take a look at the kind of economic savings which come from this research from NIH, it is really remarkable. Alzheimer's disease, such an overwhelming emotional problem in America today for those who suffer from Alzheimer's and their families; the medical research is on the brink of decreasing the incidence by half, which would mean an annual cost saving of some $50 billion. Alcoholism, the No. 1 drug problem in the United States, is on the verge of significant advances, if not a cure, with the savings of some $100 billion a year. Osteoporosis leads to 1.5 million fractures each year, affecting 140,000 people, and with the potential for saving of some $5 billion. I know the time is short, Mr. President. So I shall not go on with the list of really remarkable achievements which have been made and are right around the corner. But I will say, chairing the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and having been on the Appropriations Committee for 14\1/2\ years, that there is no more important funding item in the budget to restore, and we are not restoring it all, but to restore the amount proposed in the pending amendment. I thank the Chair. I thank my colleague.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the distinguished President pro tempore. On behalf of Senator Dole, I have been asked to announce that there will be a period of morning business until the hour of 12 noon at which time the Senate will begin consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution 13, the budget resolution. And I have been asked by Senator Dole to announce that Senators should be aware that rollcall votes may be expected throughout the day; that it is Senator Dole's expectation that 8 to 10 hours of the total of 50 hours statutory time limit will be used today on the budget resolution; and, to announce further that leaders' time is being reserved.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have asked for a period of time to be reserved this morning to speak about the incidents at Ruby Ridge, ID, and Waco, TX. And there are a number of other Senators who have stated to me their intention to come to speak. My remarks at the moment will be relatively brief, and I want to thank my distinguished colleague from Colorado for yielding to me because he was on the floor before I arrived. It is a little unusual to find Senators here in advance of the opening of the Senate session. But Senator Campbell has time reserved as well. I hope to return later during the period for morning business to speak at greater length and also other Senators will come to speak on the subjects of Ruby Ridge, ID, and Waco, TX, as well. But I have a commitment to appear before the Finance Committee at 9:30 to testify on the flat tax. (Mr. DeWINE assumed the chair.) Ruby Ridge, ID

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I think it is important that there be a positive showing by the Senate of our concerns about what happened at Ruby Ridge, ID, on August 21, 1992, and the days thereafter, and what happened at Waco, TX, on April 19, 1993, and the days which preceded to assure the American people that appropriate congressional oversight will occur and that there will be accountability at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. The House of Representatives has scheduled a hearing on the events at Waco, TX, and an announcement has been made by the distinguished chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee that the Judiciary Committee will hold hearings on Waco, TX, and Ruby Ridge, ID, as well. As I said last week on the Senate floor, it is my hope that we will do these hearings sooner rather than later because of my strong view that the American people need reassurance that there will be proper oversight. I say that I do not know what the answers are to the questions which have been raised, but I do see many important and profound questions. And I do think it is absolutely necessary that a full effort be made with congressional oversight to find answers. Mr. President, with respect to the incidents at Ruby Ridge, ID, back on August 21, 1992, I have talked to FBI Director Freeh; FBI Deputy Director Potts; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Director John Magaw; Jerry Spence, Esq., the attorney who represented Mr. Randy Weaver in the criminal proceedings in the Federal court; Randy Dade, the county attorney of Boundary County; and have attempted contact, traded calls with Special Agent Glenn, who is the agent in charge in Salt Lake City. My preliminary findings--and these are obviously preliminary--show me that there are very important questions which require congressional oversight on the appropriate use of force in taking someone into custody and on the initiation of investigations by Federal agencies like the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In discussing the incidents at Ruby Ridge, ID., and in taking them up in a preliminary way with the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, John Magaw, there is a serious question as to how that matter all began. Last Saturday, when I was in Des Moines, IA, I had occasion to talk at some length with Mr. Randy Weaver, who was tried and acquitted on murder charges. I had a chance to talk to his daughters Sarah and Rachel, ages 19 and 13. His 3-year-old daughter Elisha was present as well but was not in a position to shed any light on what occurred. Picking up just one strand in the few moments that I am able to speak on the issue now, Mr. Weaver recounted how he had been contacted by a man who had asked him about acquiring sawed-off shotguns. Mr. Weaver advised that he thought that the individual was an undercover agent for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. And that was later confirmed by Director Magaw, who told me that it was a confidential informant who had gone to contact Mr. Weaver on the subject of purchasing sawed-off shotguns. When that matter was tried, according to the information given to me by Mr. Magaw, Mr. Weaver was acquitted, on what Mr. Magaw said were borderline entrapment circumstances. When I questioned Mr. Magaw about what he meant by borderline entrapment--I know when I talk about this with the Presiding Officer, the distinguished Senator from Ohio, Mr. DeWine, knowing what entrapment is, it is really not borderline; it is either entrapment or not. And if it is a matter of acquittal, there is no entrapment. For those who do not know the details of entrapment--and it is a complex situation--that is when the idea comes from law enforcement and it is planted in the mind of the individual who ultimately does the conduct, undertakes the action which is the cause of an indictment. I think we need to focus on the specifics as to what happened there to give congressional oversight from some of us who have had more experience along that line so that we do not become engaged in the law enforcement agency, the Government itself, setting up circumstances which begin the chain of conduct which results in the indictment and look what happened beyond that in the Weaver matter because the law will not support a conviction if it is entrapment by the law enforcement agencies. I am going to have to speak at length to this later, Mr. President. But one other matter that I wanted to touch upon in the Ruby Ridge incident was the question of the use of force and the question of whether it was excessive. I do not want to come to any conclusions. There has been considerable comment about whether the rules of engagement were changed and whether that was what led to the censure of Special Agent Larry Potts, who has since become the Deputy Director of the FBI. And in my discussions with Mr. Potts, which were relatively limited because we were scheduled to meet at a later time when he will have an opportunity to have his attorney present, Mr. Potts advised me that there had been no change in the rules of engagement. And that raises a very fundamental question as to the conduct and the use of force by Federal law enforcement when Mr. Weaver was taken into custody in a very sad situation where a U.S. marshal was killed, where 14-year- old Sam Weaver was killed, and where Mrs. Randy Weaver was killed. That is a tough subject but certainly deserves and requires our attention. I touch upon those matters only briefly at this point, Mr. President, because I had said I would be making an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry, and I wanted to report on that. We had scheduled the hearings initially for the Terrorism Subcommittee for this morning, and those have been deferred until the full committee will take up the matter at a later date. I had wanted to touch on the Waco incident again to at least refer preliminarily to the report by Dr. Allen Stone, of Harvard, who was a panelist selected to help in that inquiry, but since it is almost 9:30 and I am due in the Finance Committee--and I have already taken the time of my distinguished colleague from Colorado--I am going to conclude these very brief remarks with the hope of being able to come back a little later in morning business to talk additionally, to report further on my preliminary inquiry. I thank the Chair and I again thank Senator Campbell. Mr. President, before my colleague starts, may I just add, perhaps unnecessarily, that I reserve the remainder of my time. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, earlier this week, the Supreme Court decided Hubbard versus United States. Overturning a 1955 decision called Bramblett versus United States, the Court held that section 1001 of title 18 of the United States Code, which prohibits making false statements to the Federal Government applies only to false statements made to executive branch agencies. It is highly unusual that the Supreme Court reverses a prior decision on a question of statutory interpretation. The reversal of the longstanding decision in Bramblett is particularly troubling because of the nature of the offense. The language of the statute itself criminalizes false statements made to any ``department or agency of the United States.'' Relying on the purpose and the legislative history of the provision, the Supreme Court held in Bramblett that the statute covered making false statements to Congress. The term ``department'' was read as broad enough to cover the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government. Since then, it has always been understood to cover Congress and the courts. As Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in his dissent in Hubbard, it has been ``the very justifiable expectation'' that one who lies to Congress, whether or not under oath, would be punished under section 1001. While perjury laws and other statutes exist to cover false statements made under oath or under specific circumstances, section 1001 was a broad law covering all false statements made to Congress, as well as the courts and executive agencies. In order to protect the Congress, I believe we must restore section 1001 to its meaning under Bramblett. In order to do so, I am introducing legislation to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Hubbard. We are able to do so because the Court's decision rests solely on a question of statutory interpretation. There is no constitutional dimension to the Court's decision. Accordingly, Congress is able to decide the public policy question for itself. I have no doubt of the importance of having in the law a provision that sets forth clearly and succinctly the principle that it is illegal to ``knowingly and willfully falsif[y], conceal[] or cover[] up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or make[] any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations'' to Congress or any committee or subcommittee in any matter within our jurisdiction. My bill is quite simple. It will simply add to the text of section 1001 language that will broaden the newly narrowed statute to cover false statements made ``in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department, agency, or court of the United States, or of Congress or any duly constituted committee or subcommittee of Congress.'' The purpose of this provision is to restore the meaning of the statute that it was given under Bramblett and to overturn Hubbard. No other change in meaning is intended. I believe this bill will not be controversial, and I urge my colleagues to support its prompt enactment. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to comment on the proposed Contract With the American Family which was the subject of an early morning ``Good Morning America'' telecast where Ralph Reed, Jr., appeared as the spokesman in favor of the Contract With the American Family, and I was invited to appear and did appear in expressing my personal views on that subject. It is my view, Mr. President, that we have the fundamental contract which governs the relationship of Americans with their Government, U.S. citizens with their Government, and the relationships among U.S. citizens, and that basic contract is called the Constitution of the United States. It is a document which has served this country very, very well since 1787. And there is appended to the U.S. Constitution a Bill of Rights which has served this country very well since 1791. The first amendment of that Bill of Rights provides for freedom of religion, which is the very basis of our American society--freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom to petition our Government. The United States was founded by the Pilgrims who came to this country in the early 1600's, coming for religious freedom. And if I may on a personal note, Mr. President, say that my parents came to this country in the early 1900's for the same reason. When the so-called Contract With the American Family calls for a constitutional amendment involving freedom of religion and the first amendment, I believe it is not well placed. I believe that the Jeffersonian wall of separation of church and state is firmly established for the benefit of America, and I think it is most unwise to have an amendment to the first amendment freedom of religion, which is what is called for by this newly drafted Contract With the American Family. When Mr. Ralph Reed, Jr., speaks on behalf of that contract, and when his mentor, Rev. Pat Robertson, speaks on the subject, Reverend Robertson makes the statement that there is no constitutional doctrine of separation of church and state, that it is a lie of the left, I believe that is directly contrary to the Constitution itself, to the intent of the Founding Fathers. Certainly this is not Arlen Specter's statement. This is the statement of Thomas Jefferson, articulating the doctrine of separation of church and state. When Mr. Ralph Reed, Jr., articulates a need to change the law of the land as articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Casey versus Planned Parenthood and Roe versus Wade, which held on a constitutional basis that a woman has a right to choose, there again we are looking for constitutional change, which I submit is unwise and is unwarranted. There are some parts of the proposals which I think are fine. When they call for an attack on criminals and in support of benefits for victims, I heartily endorse that and have done that for many years since my days as an assistant district attorney, through the DA of Philadelphia, through my service in this body with special reference to the Judiciary Committee. When they call to crack down on pornography as it relates to children, there is no doubt that the Supreme Court of the United States has set a very rigid standard and we should do all we can to enforce that standard. There, again, is something I have done personally over the years in the district attorney's office in Philadelphia and here in the U.S. Senate. And when there is a call to have women who are homemakers have available to them the same opportunities for individual retirement accounts, I say that is just and right. We have a contract with America in the Constitution which has served this country so well. And in the House of Representatives there has been a Contract With America which has been adopted in large measure in the House and has been adopted to some extent in the Senate and is under further consideration and I think will be adopted with few significant changes. But if every group comes forward to insist, Mr. President, on their own view of what there should be in the relationship between the Government and its citizens, among its citizens, then I suggest to you that we are going to be a very, very fragmented society, and that it is not wise to have any one group seek to determine the social mores of this country. This country is strong because it is a melting pot. It is strong because we recognize diversity. America is strong because we do not break into individual groups and have one group seek to impose its ideas on any other group. So when an idea comes forward that there ought to be an amendment to the Constitution, I say no. When the idea comes forward that there ought to be a change in the first amendment's freedom-of-religion provision, I say no. When the idea comes forward that there ought to be a change in the Constitution as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States on a woman's right to choose, I say no. It is time, Mr. President, in America for unifying actions, not for divisive actions. One Contract With America from the Congress elected by the people of the United States is sufficient. What we really need to do is rely on the basic contract with America, and that is the Constitution of the United States. Mr. President, in the absence of any other Senator on the floor, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair. Madam President, these documents will show on their face concerns which were on the record and which were apparent from such documents: that there were considerable issues to be investigated in the RTC at that time. It is unfortunate, in a sense, that there has been the long delay, because we all know, as a matter of investigative procedure, that leads grow cold and witnesses' memories diminish and that the best investigation is a prompt investigation. But the time factor is something that cannot be altered at this time, and at least now we will have a congressional inquiry which will move forward into these very, very important matters. I agree with the distinguished Senator from Connecticut when he talks about the presumption of innocence. I think that is indispensable as a matter of fairness to all concerned. But these are questions which need to be answered, and questions do not imply an answer of any sort; they raise issues which ought to be answered. We ought to let the chips fall where they may. And in a Government based on a Constitution which elevates the separation of powers among the Congress in article I, and the executive branch in article II, and the judiciary in article III, the congressional oversight function is a very, very important function. Now, finally, we will be in the context where we will be able to inquire into these matters and to find out what those answers are. I am confident that there will be a fair, judicious, quality inquiry conducted by the committee, and this resolution is one which I think ought to be supported broadly by the U.S. Senate. I thank the Chair and yield the floor. Exhibit 1 U.S. Senate, Commmittee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC, July 28, 1994 (The following is a partial transcript of the above proceedings) Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Attorney General Reno, as you know, I had intended to ask you questions about the handling by the Department of Justice in the matter involving David Hale in this oversight hearing, and I may be able to cover the principal points of my interest without undue specification, or at least undue specification from your point of view. At the outset, I would like to put into the record my letter to you dated July 26, 1994, together with the chronology of events and all the attachments which I sent over to you, except for numbers 20 and 21. I may get into 20 and 21. I think the balance have been in the record in one form or another, and even if they haven't I think they are appropriate for the public record. [The letter referred to follows:] U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC, July 26, 1994. Hon. Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Dear Attorney General Reno: I have just noted that you are scheduled to testify before the Judiciary Committee on Thursday, July 28, at 2:00 p.m. at an oversight hearing. In that hearing I intend to ask questions on the Justice Department's role in investigations of Madison Guaranty and/ or ``Whitewater.'' While I have not had access to many of the relevant documents, I have seen a few and am alerting you to those documents which will formulate at least some of the basis for my questions. Some of the documents are referred to in my floor statement on June 21. Other documents that I may refer to are listed on the attached index. Sincerely, Arlen Specter. Senator Specter. I would also want to put into the record the faxed letter from Robert Fiske, Independent Counsel, to me, dated July 27, 1994. [The letter referred to follows:] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Independent Counsel, Little Rock, AR, July 27, 1994. Hon. Arlen Specter, U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Specter: The Department of Justice has sent over to me a copy of your letter of July 26, 1994 to Attorney General Reno, together with the index of documents enclosed with it. It is apparent from a review of the documents on that index that they relate to the handling by the Department of Justice of a particular criminal referral from the RTC. Based upon interviews we have had with representatives from the Kansas City Field Office of the RTC, we are currently actively investigating this matter. Accordingly, I would respectfully request that you not go into this subject with the Attorney General at your hearing tomorrow since to do so might prejudice our ongoing investigation. (For similar reasons we request that you not go into the matter referenced by documents #20 and #21.) We have made a similar request to both the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs which, as you know, are in the process of conducting Whitewater hearings. Both of those Committees have agreed not to go into this subject until we have completed our investigation. Respectfully yours, Robert B. Fiske, Jr., Independent Counsel. Senator Specter. At the outset, I want to say for the record that I do not agree with the deference which the Congress has accorded the independent counsel because I believe that Congress has independent status, and at least equal status, if not more important status, on matters of public policy than the criminal prosecutions. But the Senate has decided otherwise as a political matter, in my opinion. As I reviewed the charter of Mr. Fiske, it seemed to me that questions about oversight on what happened with David Hale were not within his charter, his charter being to investigate matters of possible criminal or civil wrongdoing. I am advised to the contrary on that, and we may get into that in some specificity. So let me start in an effort to ask the questions in a generalized way, but candidly as they arise on David Hale's matter. I refer to a memorandum from RTC investigator Jean Lewis to Richard Iorio which quotes officials within the Department of Justice, which is why I ask you about this; specifically, Ms. Donna Henneman in the Office of Legal Counsel. Without making anything more specific as to the Hale matter, my question to you as a general matter is, any time a referral comes in to the Department of Justice that would make the Department look bad or has political ramifications, it goes to the Attorney General. Is that true? Attorney General Reno. I don't know whether any time something comes in to the Department that would make the Department look bad it comes to the Attorney General. Senator Specter. Well, if you don't know, who does, Attorney General Reno? Attorney General Reno. I would suspect that each one of the 95,000 people who hear something that might make the Department look bad. I think your question is a little bit broad. I cannot answer it. As I have tried to say from the very beginning, when I appointed Mr. Fiske I tried to make sure that he was as independent as possible. I have continued to try to do that, and I think the [[Page S6779]] worst thing that I could do would be to comment or talk about matters that he is pursuing. I should be happy, because I have great respect for the Senate and for you, at the conclusion of the matter to try to respond to anything, including the specifics. Senator Specter. Well, I don't think that is sufficient, Attorney General Reno, because I think this is a legitimate matter for Judiciary Committee oversight, and we don't have very much of it. But I accept your point that my question was too general, so I will be specific. The investigator, L. Jean Lewis, of RTC, had many conversations with representatives of the Department of Justice, as reflected in the number of the memoranda which I sent on to you. So if it is too general as to whether any time a referral comes in that would make the Department look bad or has political ramifications it goes to the Attorney General, I would ask you, were you personally informed about the referral from the RTC on the check kiting case involving Madison Guaranty? Attorney General Reno. As I indicated to you, Senator, I made a determination when I appointed Mr. Fiske that I would not comment or make any comment. He has expressed to you that he would prefer that I not comment on the specific matters. I do not want to do anything that would impair has independence. I do think you have an oversight function with respect to the Department of Justice, and when it would be appropriate for me to comment I would look forward to the opportunity to do so. Senator Specter. Well, tell me, Attorney General Reno, has would it impair Mr. Fiske's investigation or prosecution for you to answer a question as to whether you had personal knowledge of a referral to the Department of Justice? Attorney General Reno. I can't tell you, sir, because I have tried to do everything in my power to make sure that Mr. Fiske's investigation is independent and I don't know what his investigation involves. Therefore, I am not going to say anything that could possibly interfere with his investigation. Senator Specter. Well, my question to you is how could it possibly interfere with his investigation to answer a question as to when you had knowledge of a referral to the United States Department of Justice. Attorney General Reno. I don't know, sir, because I am not going to take the chance of interfering with it. You would have to ask Mr. Fiske because I don't want to do anything at this time that would interfere or impair that investigation. I do not know the nature of the process of that investigation and it would be inappropriate for me to comment, but I do---- The Chairman. Put another way, Senator, how would it shed any light in this oversight if the Attorney General answered that question? What the hell difference does it make now? Senator Specter. Well, the hell difference that it makes now is on an earlier question which I asked that whenever there is a matter with political ramifications that it goes to the Attorney General--and I asked that question in its broadest terms and was told that it was too general, so that is when I came back to the specific question. The Chairman. Let me ask the question the other way to the Senator. Mr. Fiske's investigation in this matter is likely to be wrapped up. He has been moving expeditiously. Does it matter to the Senator whether or not the Attorney General speaks to this issue today or in two weeks or a month, or whenever it is when Mr. Fiske settles this part of his investigation? I don't know when he is going to settle that, but I mean he has been moving very rapidly. In terms of oversight for next year's budget and last year's actions, it seems to me the Senator would have plenty of time to ask these questions as it would impact on the outcome of the Senator's view as to what the Attorney General should or shouldn't do in the future. Senator Specter. Well, I would be glad to respond to the chairman. It does make a difference to me, and it makes a difference to me because this is an oversight hearing and the request to the committee chairman to have oversight on these matters was declined. There has been a charter which is very, very narrow before the Banking Committee, and this does not involve, to my knowledge, a matter which is within the charter of Mr. Fiske until when I sent a letter to the Attorney General, I suddenly find a reply from Mr. Fiske. I had two detailed conversations with Mr. Fiske, the thrust of which--and I would be glad to detail them--led me to the conclusion that there was absolutely no interference with the criminal prosecution, a subject that I have had some experience with. So when I asked the Attorney General a question as to when she has knowledge of a referral, I can't conceive that it interferes with an investigation, and that is why I am asking an experienced prosecutor who is now the Attorney General how could it conceivably interfere with a pending investigation. Attorney General Reno. An experienced prosecutor, Senator, doesn't comment about something that she doesn't know about. I don't know about the details of Mr. Fiske's investigation. But if Mr. Fiske doesn't have any problem with it, what I would suggest that we do is prepare the questions, submit them to Mr. Fiske. If he has no objection to my answering them, then we will try to answer them because I honor your oversight function and I would want to be able to honor that and to not interfere with Mr. Fiske's investigation. Senator Specter. Attorney General Reno, I did not say that Mr. Fiske did not have a problem. He specifically told me that he would like the field to be totally left alone. What I said to you was that after talking to Mr. Fiske, I had no doubt that these questions were appropriate, in my judgment, on oversight by the Judiciary Committee. Let me ask you this, Attorney General Reno. In terms of the charter that Mr. Fiske has about investigating matters which may involve a violation of the criminal or civil law, is the handling by the Department of Justice of David Hale's matter something that falls within that charter? Attorney General Reno. I have tried to, again, let Mr. Fiske define that based on the charter that we described so that I would not in any way impair his independence. Senator Specter. Well, do you have any interest in whether any current employees of the Department of Justice are subject to an investigation which might be within Mr. Fiske's charter for possible criminal wrongdoings? Attorney General Reno. Yes. Senator Specter. Well, if that were so, would you have a duty as the head of the Department of Justice to take some action on those matters before a long investigation was concluded? Attorney General Reno. It depends on what they are, sir. Senator Specter. Well, suppose they were obstruction of justice? Attorney General Reno. It depends on the nature of the facts and the circumstances, sir Senator Specter. Well, do you know anything about that on the Hale matter? Attorney General Reno. Again, sir, I can't comment on the Hale matter. Senator Specter. I am not asking you to comment on the Hale matter. I am asking you whether you know anything about the Hale matter. Attorney General Reno. That would be commenting, sir, and what I would suggest, if we want to pursue this, is that you pose the questions and then let's see whether Mr. Fiske thinks that they would in any way interfere with the investigation. I am delighted to answer them if they don't interfere. Senator Specter. Well, I am not going to follow the way you would like me to proceed. I make a judgment as to what I think a Senator ought to do by way of oversight, and if you have a concern about that I am prepared to discuss it with you, but I am not prepared to take your instruction or your suggestion. The question that I pose on an investigation by Mr. Fiske as independent counsel within his charter to investigate crimes, obstruction of justice, within the Department of Justice is not something which bears on anything which could conceivably implicate the underlying facts on what David Hale is doing. Is Ms. Paula Casey--I understand that she is, but can you confirm for me that she is still the United States attorney? Attorney General Reno. Yes, sir, she is. Senator Specter. Is she the subject of a criminal investigation by Mr. Fiske? Attorney General Reno. You would have to talk to Mr. Fiske. Senator Specter. Do you know whether or not she is the subject of a criminal investigation by Mr. Fiske? Attorney General Reno. You would have to talk to Mr. Fiske. I have avoided having anything to do with Mr. Fiske's investigation in terms of any information that he may have so that I do not impair his independence. Senator Specter. Would you continue a United States attorney operating actively if that United States attorney were the subject of a criminal investigation? Attorney General Reno. It would depend on the circumstances. Senator Specter. Well, under what circumstances would you terminate such an attorney? Attorney General Reno. It would depend on the circumstances. Again, you get into a situation of hypotheticals and it is far better that we look at the actual facts, and I would be happy at the appropriate time to do that with you. Senator Specter. Well, Attorney General Reno, I consider your responses, as I see them, totally unsatisfactory, and I consider them totally unsatisfactory because I am not asking you anything about a pending investigation. I am asking you questions as to what came to your knowledge as the Attorney General of the United States Department of Justice. I am asking you questions about what you know and about what your policy would be if there were charges of criminal wrongdoing, and I don't ask these questions in a vacuum or for no purpose. I ask these questions in the context of having initiated an inquiry on oversight on something which is outside the charter of the independent counsel. The Chairman. In your opinion, Senator, right, is that correct? In your opinion? Senator Specter. Everything I say is in my opinion. You can add that to everything. I don't speak for anybody but myself, but I do speak independently for myself. I took a look at an extensive series of correspondence which has gotten to the Department of Justice and gotten to the FBI and gotten to the United States attorney's office and gotten to the executive office and gotten to the Office of Legal Counsel, according to these documents, which I sent to you as soon [[Page S6780]] as I knew there would be this hearing so you would have an opportunity to review them. I promptly advised the chairman as to what I intended to do there would be no surprises about it. The Chairman. That is correct. Senator Specter. When I pursue the matter and find I have a telephone call and a letter from the independent counsel, I call him and then I am told that it is within his charter, that there is an investigation which is underway for obstruction of justice. As I review the facts of this matter, I am struck with wonderment as to how officials in the United States attorney's office decline to have immunity granted to David Hale, and then independent counsel comes in and in a short time has a grant of immunity. Then officials in the United States attorney's office in Little Rock recuse themselves in a later matter, and I wonder how can they recuse themselves in a later matter without having recused themselves in an earlier matter, given their relationship to subjects of the investigation. I ran a big office myself as a prosecutor, and if I had any reason to believe anybody in my office had any problem, I wouldn't wait for anybody to cleanse it totally and thoroughly and immediately. I do not believe that the charter to the independent counsel takes away any of the authority or the responsibility of the Attorney General to act in that circumstance. In my opinion--everything I say is in my opinion--the questions which I have asked you are entirely appropriate questions, and I give some additional background because I think these are matters which ought to be answered, and I intend to pursue them and I don't intend to wait. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you. General, I think you have answered totally appropriately, in my opinion. I think were you to do otherwise, in light of Mr. Fiske's comments, you would be excoriated by Mr. Fiske and anyone else. I guarantee you, you would have an article saying that you have interfered if you went in and, quote, ``cleansed,'' were there a need to cleanse. You would be accused of whitewashing to avoid Mr. Fiske being able to fully look at the matter. You are answering, in my opinion, totally appropriately, and you have done what I don't know many others have been willing to do. You have said to this committee, without having to have some big show on the floor, that when Mr. Fiske says he is finished with this phase of the investigation you will come back and you will answer questions. It seems to me you are being totally appropriate, but that is why there are Democrats and Republicans, chocolate and vanilla, good and bad, right and wrong, different points of view. Our opinions are different. I respect this man. He did notify me. Stick to your guns, don't answer his questions, in my opinion. Senator Specter. If I might have just one sentence? The Chairman. Yes. You may have more than one sentence. Senator Specter. I don't think this matter has anything to do with good and bad or chocolate and vanilla. The Chairman. Well, it may not have to do with good and bad, but it has to do with what one considers to be the appropriate way for you to respond. I think you are responding appropriately because I think you are in the ultimate catch-22 position. At the request of all of us in the Senate, you appointed a Republican named Fiske. Now, the Republican named Fiske tells you, please don't respond to anything having to do with this. You are being asked to respond to something having to do with this, and if you respond or don't respond, you are in deep trouble in the minds of whoever wants to view you as being in trouble. I think you are doing just fine. My view is worth no more, probably a little less in this circumstance, than the Senator from Pennsylvania's, but good job, General. Index 1. RTC Chronology of Criminal Investigation. 2. Letter of September 1, 1992 from L. Richard Iorio (RTC- KC) to Steve Irons (FBI) transmitting criminal referral. 3. Letter of September 1, 1992 from L. Richard Iorio (RTC- KC) to Charles A. Banks (DOJ) transmitting criminal referral. 4. RTC Internal Memorandum, May 3, 1993. Background remarks and conversation with AUSA Bob Roddey's Office re: Madison Guaranty Savings referral. 5. RTC Internal Memorandum, May 19, 1993. Additional conversation with Office of Legal Counsel for U.S. Attorney's U.S. Justice Department, Washington, D.C. No record of Madison criminal referral at Washington DOJ. 6. RTC-KC E-Mail, May 19, 1993. Madison matter forwarded to Donna Henneman in ``Legal Counsel.'' Referral submitted to that office ``because of the political ramifications and political motivations.'' 7. RTC-KC E-Mail, May 26, 1993. Follow-up call from Donna Henneman (DOJ). RTC advised by an FBI agent in Little Rock that it was a `very solid case of check kiting, and was highly prosecutable.'' Henneman was growing increasingly frustrated by the situation, because she had seen the information, knew that it had come in, and couldn't understand why she was having such a hard time tracking where the referral and exhibits had gone. 8. RTC-KC E-Mail, June 8, 1993. Conversation with Donna Henneman (DOJ). Madison Referral has reappeared on her desk. Criminal Division has sent memo to Doug Frazier (in Depty. Atty. General Heyman's office) advising him that there was ``no identifiable basis for recusal of the U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Arkansas.'' Referral sent to Frazier for review and final decision. 9. RTC-KC E-Mail, June 23, 1993. Conversation with Donna Henneman (DOJ). Package returned from Frazier. Frazier appointed U.S. Attorney in Florida. 10. RTC-KC E-Mail, June 23, 1993. Further conversation with Donna Henneman (DOJ). Spoke with Doug Frazier. Decision made to return the referral back to the Arkansas U.S. Attorney. No basis for recusal. 11. RTC-KC E-Mail, June 29, 1993. Source indicates Madison referral has been returned to Little Rock. Acting U.S. Attorney will not act on referral. It is being held until U.S. Attorney designee Paula Casey takes office. 12. RTC-KC E-Mail, September 23, 1993. Conversation with Donna Henneman (DOJ). Washington DOJ would like to be copied on all future transmittal letters concerning Madison referrals with an additional one paragraph summary of the content of the referrals with the transmittal letters, so that Henneman will be aware of those with ``sensitivity issues.'' 13. RTC-KC E-Mail, September 29, 1993. Conversation with Donna Henneman (DOJ). DOJ would like copies of all future Madison referrals sent to Washington in addition to sending to U.S. Attorney in Little Rock. Henneman will confirm this in writing. 14. RTC-KC E-Mail, September 29, 1993. Conversation with Donna Henneman (DOJ). Washington DOJ withdrawing request for referrals to be sent directly to Washington, but would still like copies of transmittal letters with addendum summary paragraph. 15. RTC-KC E-Mail, October 27, 1993. Conversation with Donna Henneman (DOJ). Inquiry on whether declination letter had arrived from Little Rock U.S. Attorney. 16. Letter of October 27, 1993 from Paula J. Casey (U.S. Attorney) to L. Jean Lewis (RTC). Declination letter on the Madison referral. 17. Letter of November 1, 1993 from L. Jean Lewis (RTC) to Paris J. Casey (U.S. Attorney). Confirmation of declination letter and the stipulation from October 27th letter that the matter was concluded prior to the beginning of Paula Casey's tenure and that the RTC had never been advised of such result. Chronology of correspondence between RTC and DOJ. 18. RTC-KC E-Mail, November 15, 1993. Transmittal of white paper outlining chronology of events related to 1992 Madison referral. Challenges news article indicating that decision to decline Madison referral had been prior to Paula Casey's appointment. 19. RTC-KC E-Mail with attachment, January 6, 1994. Discussion of contact with reporter. 20. Letter of September 15, 1993 from Randy Coleman (David Hale Attorney) to Paula Casey. Coleman has been trying to negotiate a plea and senses that Casey is reluctant because of ``political senitivity.'' 21. Letter of September 20, 1993 from Randy Coleman to Michael Johnson. Reiterates interest in plea negotiations, offering David Hale's information and willingness to participate in undercover activities.

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I thank the distinguished chairman for yielding me this time. I support the resolution and commend the chairman and the ranking member of the Banking Committee for presenting a resolution which I understand will have wide bipartisan support. I believe it is important to have a congressional inquiry on this in the broad terms which are described in the resolution. It is with some regret, I note, that it has taken us more than a year to get to this point. But it is better late than never, and these are matters where congressional oversight is important. I recognize the sensitivity of a congressional inquiry on a matter which is being handled by an independent counsel, also known as the special prosecutor. But the functions are very, very different where you have an investigation which is handled through grand jury proceedings which are secret and which are directed at indictments. I know that field with some detail, having been a district attorney myself and [[Page S6778]] having run grand jury investigations. That is very, very different from a congressional inquiry where we are inquiring into matters in the public record for the public to see what is going on in Government with a view to legislative changes. The thrust and focus are entirely different between a grand jury investigation conducted by independent counsel and a congressional inquiry which will be handled through the Banking Committee. I am glad to see that the composition of the committee will be expanded to include the chairman and ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, or their designees. Madam President, the issues involved here have long been a concern of many of us in this Chamber, and I refer to statements which I made last year dated March 17, June 9, June 16, and June 21. I will not incorporate them because that would unduly burden the Record, but a good many of my thoughts were expressed last year on the matter. I was particularly concerned about issues involving the RTC as to their inclusion, which was not handled last year, and I am glad to see that the Resolution Trust Corporation is included in the scope of the inquiry which we are about to undertake. This matter was one that I focused on when we had an oversight hearing on the Department of Justice on July 28 of last year, and I ask unanimous consent, Madam President, that a number of documents be printed in the Record which have not been made a part of the Record heretofore: My letter dated July 26, 1994, to Attorney General Reno; the attachment of a list of documents which I had wanted to inquire into during the proceedings before the Judiciary Committee; the response which was made by Robert Fiske, who was then independent counsel; and a portion of the transcript dated July 28, 1994 before the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition this afternoon to respond to those who have raised an issue about the current efforts to have the United States Embassy moved to Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, instead of its current location in Tel Aviv. There have been some suggestions that we are motivated for political purposes in 1995 to raise this issue. The history of these efforts conclusively refutes that contention. A bill was introduced on October 1, 1983, S. 2031, cosponsored at that time by 50 United States Senators, which sought to have the United States Embassy and the residence of the American Ambassador to Israel hereafter be located in the city of Jerusalem. That resolution was referred to committee and was not called for a vote, but it was later noted that in addition to the 50 U.S. Senators, there were 227 Members of the House of Representatives who joined in endorsing that transfer of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Then on March 26, 1990, Senate Concurrent Resolution 106 was introduced, which called for the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and that resolution was passed in the Senate by a voice vote. Then, following those actions, on February 24, 1995, a letter was sent to Secretary of State Warren Christopher signed by 92 U.S. Senators evidencing strong bipartisan support, again calling for the moving of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Mr. President, I was an original cosponsor of S. 2031 which was introduced back on October 31, 1983; supported Senate Concurrent Resolution 106 back in 1990; and joined in the letter of February 24, 1995, evidencing my consistent support for this program. Recently, the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, was in Washington, and the issue was raised as to whether or not action by the Congress of the United States in calling for the removal of the Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem would be an impediment to the peace process which is ongoing at the present time because obviously we do not wish to interfere with the peace process. At that time, Prime Minister Rabin responded that it was a [[Page S6793]] matter for U.S. Congressmen, Senators and Representatives, to express themselves as they saw fit. He did not appear perturbed that action in this way would be an impediment to the peace process in the Mideast. The negotiators of Israel and the PLO are scheduled, as I understand it, to take up the status of Jerusalem approximately a year from now. I think there is no doubt about the Israeli position that Jerusalem is an undivided city, and certainly I think there is no doubt in the Congress of the United States about Jerusalem being an undivided city and it being the judgment of Israel as to where its capital should be. The tradition is, the unbroken tradition is that the embassies are located in the capital city, and it is a fundamental matter therefore that the United States Embassy and the Ambassador's residence ought to be located in the capital of Israel just as the Embassy and Ambassador's residence are located in the capital city of every nation with the host nation determining where its capital should be. We have to make decisions on matters of this sort, Mr. President, as we see it. There is no doubt about the strong relationship between the United States and Israel, but judgments need to be made by Senators and Congressmen as to what we think is appropriate. Many of us have joined over the years in urging that the Embassy be moved to Jerusalem, and I think that the record is consistent over such a long period of time that there is no appropriate way someone could make a claim that it is a matter for political purposes. The distinguished majority leader, Senator Dole, has been singled out in a number of newspaper editorials, others of us less prominent than the majority leader have not been so identified, but I am confident that all of us in exercising our judgment in calling for the location of the U.S. Embassy to be in Jerusalem instead of Tel Aviv are doing it because we think it is the appropriate course of conduct, and no one, no fairminded person, can say that when the record goes back to 1983 in the endorsement of this resolution, there could be any political motivation. I think that ought to be considered and the record ought to be set straight on this issue.