Arlen Specter

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. I thank my colleagues and look forward to working with them on this issue.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, Senator Casey and I, along with our colleagues, Senators Stabenow, Conrad, Lautenberg, Schumer and Dorgan, filed an amendment to H.J. Res. 52, the appropriations continuing resolution for fiscal year 2008, to extend the Medicare section 508 program for 2 years. For a considerable period of time, there have been a number of hospitals in Pennsylvania and across the country that have been suffering from low Medicare wage index reimbursement, which has caused them great disadvantage in comparison to surrounding areas. Hospitals in these counties are surrounded by MSAs--metropolitan statistical areas--with higher Medicare reimbursements, and as a result, a flight of critical medical personnel occurs as hospitals are not able to provide employees with competitive wages. During the consideration of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, I met with Finance Committee chairman Charles Grassley and ranking member Max Baucus about the bill provisions, including the need for a solution to the Medicare area wage index reclassification problem in Pennsylvania. Section 508 was included in the bill, which provided $300 million per year for 3 years to increase funding for hospitals nationally to be reclassified to locations with higher Medicare reimbursement rates. As part of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act, which was signed into law on December 20, 2006, a 6-month extension of the section 508 Medicare wage index program until September 30, 2007, was included.

Mr. SPECTER. This issue also affects an airport in my home State, in Lancaster, PA. Based on the provisions in the full FAA authorization, I agree that it is the intent of the committee that EAS funding should be extended to the airports currently affected by the EAS state- determination mileage waiver.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, will you advise me when the 2\1/2\ minutes have expired?

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, contrary to the arguments of the Senator from Oklahoma, the National Drug Intelligence Center has been functioning since 1993 and has never been challenged on this floor in any respect. It has not been challenged until today because it has performed so well. Yesterday I had printed in the Record the extensive compliments which have been paid by the FBI in an expansive letter on November 21, 2001, by DEA, the Drug Enforcement Agency; on June 21, 2006, by FBI field offices around the country, including Tampa, Detroit, and Charlotte, by U.S. attorneys around the country. It has performed with very strategic results. It is important to decentralize operations such as the National Drug Intelligence Center. Everything does not have to be in Washington. It costs about a third to do it in Johnstown as it would in Washington. When the Senator from Oklahoma says it ought to be in El Paso because all the drugs come from El Paso, that is simply not true. Drugs come into this country from Miami, from New York, from Detroit, from California. They come from everywhere. It has been in existence for 14 years and is functioning successfully. It is not a minor matter that it has 340 jobs. Johnstown has become accustomed to having this. Johnstown, as is well known historically, has had its tough time with two major floods. It doesn't deserve another flood by having this body saying the office ought to be removed at this time. I yield to my distinguished colleague from Scranton, PA.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to respond to the amendment offered by the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Coburn, to eliminate the National Drug Intelligence Center, which is located in Johnstown, PA. That center was created in 1992 and performs a very important function. The National Drug Intelligence Center, commonly referred to as the NDIC, partners with the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, to provide intelligence, to identify, track, and sever the nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism. The NDIC created an entity called HashKeeper, a company software program which is provided to the Federal Government for use in Iraq. The cost of this center is about one-third of what it would be if it were located in the Washington, DC, area. I think it makes good sense to decentralize Federal functions to the extent it is possible and practical. Everything does not have to be located in Washington, DC. Everything does not have to be located in a big city. Our country is more vulnerable when everything is concentrated in one area. Johnstown has the advantage of being much less expensive, being able to provide these vital Federal services for about one-third of the cost, while being reasonably close to Washington, DC, which is the location of many of the other entities with which it cooperates. The jobs which are provided are very substantial for my constituents in Pennsylvania; an obvious interest that I have as a Senator representing the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. These are several hundred jobs; they are very important. It is a legitimate interest to want to maintain our industrial base in Pennsylvania and to maintain governmental activities in Pennsylvania. But there is good value in having the NDIC function, in general, and there is extra good value in having it function in Johnstown, PA. The NDIC has been complimented by a broad number of agencies. In a November 21, 2001, letter, the FBI praised the NDIC for its work on financial crimes, saying: Through the analysis of these documents, over 400 specific intelligence products have been produced for the FBI, the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, and U.S. Attorney's Offices. The work NDIC produces continues to initiate actionable leads and identify avenues of investigation. NDIC has integrated seamlessly with the FBI investigation and has enhanced the way the FBI will investigate future financial cases. The participation of NDIC . . . continues to be invaluable. In a June 23, 2006, letter, the Drug Enforcement Agency had this to say: The Fort Worth Resident Office-- that is of DEA-- amassed thousands of documents, but was unable to properly exploit the information they contained. The valuable report-- referring to the NDIC report-- caused several of the principals to negotiate pleas to pending charges. If not for the willingness of the members of NDIC to confront these challenges in a cooperative effort, this investigation would not have reached its current level of success. There have been many plaudits given to the NDIC by the special agents in charge of FBI offices, such as the FBI agent in charge of the Tampa Field Division, the FBI special agent in charge of the Detroit Field Division, the DEA special agent in charge of the Dallas Field Division, the FBI special agent in charge of the Charlotte Division, and the DEA special agent in charge of the Oklahoma City District Office. This last is ironic, in a sense. In a March 25, 2006, DEA cable, the DEA Oklahoma City District Office had this to say. In support of phases one and two, NDIC deployed two teams in Oklahoma, each consisting of one special agent, one computer exploitation and five document exploitation personnel. Actionable intelligence was generated and passed to the appropriate DEA offices. The OKCDO thanks all NDIC personnel-- that is the Oklahoma City District Office thanks all NDIC personnel-- who planned and participated in this operation. The intelligence and operational knowledge gained was beneficial to OKCDO, and its law enforcement partners. . . . President, National High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, HIDTA, Director's Association Executive Board: May 24, 2007, Letter to the Attorney General in support of NDIC: NDIC produced thirty-two HIDTA drug market analyses for the HIDTA program. Production of the HIDTA drug market analyses required a full-time effort of twenty-six analysts for extended periods of time working side-by-side with the HIDTA Intelligence Center personnel. NDIC is a very valuable asset in addressing the nation's drug problem. This entire effort lead to a valuable working relationship with not only the HIDTAs but federal, state and local drug enforcement entities. FBI Special Agent in Charge--Tampa Field Division: January 16, 2007, Letter of Appreciation for NDIC assistance. The purpose of this letter is to recognize the assistance of the National Drug Intelligence Center's (NDIC) Document and Computer Exploitation Branch for the superb analytical support they provided the Violent Crimes/Gang Squad on an investigation into the Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation. FBI Special Agent in Charge--Detroit Field Division: December 11, 2006, Letter of Appreciation for NDIC: The teamwork displayed in working with investigators from the DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a true measure of what can be accomplished when agencies work together. NDIC's analysis of the [redacted] Pharmacy evidence assisted in obtaining a sixty-two count indictment . . . The FBI characterized NDIC's performance as exemplary in this letter. DEA Special Agent in Charge--Dallas Field Division: June 23, 2006, Letter of Commendation for Document Exploitation support to a major drug investigation: The Fort Worth Resident Office (DEA) amassed thousands of documents, but was unable to properly exploit the information they contained. The valuable [NDIC] report listed the seized documents and collated them, which created a valuable tool for Investigators and Prosecutors in this investigation. In conclusion, this effort caused several of the principals to negotiate pleas to pending charges. Subsequently, 19 search warrants and over 100 seizure warrants were executed, which resulted in the seizure of approximately $20 million, in assets. If not for the willingness of the members of NDIC to confront these challenges in a cooperative effort, this investigation would not have reached its current level of success. FBI Charlotte Division: May 2, 2006, Letter of Commendation for NDIC: In February 2006, your staff presented to the North Carolina Law Enforcement Community, the most comprehensive Intelligence Assessment ever conducted within the state of North Carolina relating to gangs. I commend NDIC in exceeding all expectations in providing this valuable assessment. Executive Office of the President--ONDCP Director: April 17, 2006, Letter of Commendation regarding drug market collection effort: I want to express my thanks for NDIC's domestic market collection effort. I know that this was a serious, time consuming undertaking by your agency, and I truly appreciate the efforts of everyone involved. Thanks for the hard work. DEA Oklahoma City District Office: March 25, 2006, DEA cable: In support of phases one and two, NDIC deployed two teams to Oklahoma, each consisting of one special agent, one computer exploitation and five document exploitation personnel. Actionable intelligence was generated and passed to the appropriate DEA offices. The OKCDO thanks all NDIC personnel who planned and participated in this operation. The intelligence and operational knowledge gained was beneficial to the OKCDO and its law enforcement partners in the state . . . Executive Office of the President--ONDCP Assistant Deputy Director: March 13, 2006, E-mail of Appreciation for drug market collection effort: Please, convey our thanks to your staff for their outstanding job on the ONDCP Market Collection Effort. Once Again, we greatly appreciate the superb support and please pass on our thanks for a job well done! U.S. Department of Justice--Assistant Attorney General: March 7, 2006, Letter of Commendation regarding the National Drug Threat Assessment: In a letter to the Director of NDIC, the Assistant Attorney General praised NDIC's National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA) stating: The NDTA report is extremely helpful to me and prosecutors who are charged with devising new and creative strategies to achieve that goal. I know that you and your entire staff have put a tremendous amount of work into creating the NDTA. I wanted to let you know that the effort was well worth it. U.S. Attorney--District of New Mexico: January 18, 2006, Letter of Praise for NDIC: I am writing to express my thanks for a job not just well done, but rather for an extraordinary, and in my career, unprecedented collaborative effort to support the federal prosecution of significant drug traffickers and money launders. Once again, thank you for allowing your amazing staff to dedicate their time, skills and NDIC resources to this important case. The work done in support of this case by NDIC is invaluable. . . U.S. Department of Treasury--Under Secretary, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence: December 28, 2005, Letter of Appreciation for support in completing the national U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment: I am very pleased to inform you that the Money Laundering Threat Assessment is complete. [I]t is thanks to active and substantial contributions by the NDIC and the other participants. I can't thank you enough for the extraordinary contribution. Office of Counter Narcotics Enforcement/U.S. Interdiction Coordinator--Acting Director: September 7, 2005, Letter of Appreciation for support to a drug/terror tasking: As I am sure you are aware, NDIC is actively supporting the expanded mission of the Office of Counter Narcotics Enforcement (CNE) by aiding us in the response to the new drug/terror nexus (DTX) tasking as assigned to my office in the Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. I wanted to take this opportunity to let you know how much I appreciate NDIC's support to this office and to our country's overall counterdrug interdiction efforts. FBI--Chief, Terrorist Financing Operations Section, TFOS: March 5, 2003, Letter of Thanks for providing long term assistance to post-911 investigations: As always, it is a pleasure to write to you, as it affords those of us within the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) an opportunity to thank you for the continued exceptional assistance NDIC provides to the Counterterrorism Division here at FBI Headquarters. FBI--Chief, Financial Crimes Section: November 21, 2001, Letter of Appreciation to Deputy Attorney General commending NDIC: Since 09/20/2001, the NDIC team, consisting of NDIC Intelligence Analysts and FBI Financial Analysts, has analyzed over 75,000 subpoenaed financial documents. Through the analysis of these documents, over 400 specific intelligence products have been produced for the FBI, the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, and U.S. Attorney's Office. The work NDIC produces continues to initiate actionable leads and identify avenues of investigation. NDIC has integrated seamlessly with the FBI investigation and has enhanced the way the FBI will investigate future financial cases. The participation NDIC in this investigation continues to be invaluable. In concluding--the two most popular words in any speech--I acknowledge and respect the work the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Coburn, is doing. He and I have worked very closely in his almost 3 years in the Senate. I observed his work in the House of Representatives, and I know his work as a medical professional. I understand what he is doing in subjecting to an analytical eye Federal expenditures. But I do not believe he should target the NDIC. I concur that we ought to be holding down Federal expenditures, and I think that close scrutiny of all such projects is very much in the national interest. But I believe the facts are very strong in support of continued operation of the NDIC in Johnstown, PA. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I believe I have 10 minutes reserved at this time.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I will act as the acting designee since no one is on this side of the aisle.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank my distinguished colleague from Vermont. Mr. President, the arguments advanced by the Senator from South Carolina a few moments ago are outdated. The Supreme Court of the United States has held in the Rasul case that the Guantanamo detainees have rights under the Constitution to proceed in court in habeas corpus. In my view, that decision was based on both constitutional and statutory grounds. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that it is a matter of statutory interpretation. I believe that will be reversed by the Supreme Court in a case now pending there. But the existing law is governed by the Military Commissions Act, and the question is whether the Congress should now correct the provision in the Military Commissions Act which eliminated the right of Guantanamo detainees to challenge their detention by habeas corpus proceedings in Federal court. The District of Columbia Circuit has held that the provisions of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal are adequate. I believe that an examination of those proceedings will show that they are palpably deficient and obviously inadequate on their face. The constitutional right of habeas corpus is expressly recognized in the Constitution, with a provision that habeas corpus may be suspended only in time of invasion or insurrection, neither of which situation is present here. That fundamental right has been in existence since the Magna Carta in 1215. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court, in Rasul, has recently applied that constitutional right to Guantanamo Bay detainees. Now, Congress has acted to legislate to the contrary. Of course, Congress cannot legislate away a constitutional right; that can be done only by amendment to the Constitution. That matter is now pending before the Supreme Court, and I believe on the precedents it will be held that it remains a constitutional right. But the issue which we confront today is the statute, the Military Commissions Act passed by Congress 2 years ago which eliminates habeas corpus. The Supreme Court has held, in the case of Swain v. Pressley, that habeas corpus in the Federal courts may be eliminated by an adequate substitute. In that case, the substitute held to be adequate was a proceeding in the District of Columbia courts. The Supreme Court said: That was adequate judicial review to superintend executive detention. But when we take a look at the provisions of the Combatant Status Review Board, as examined by the District Court in the District of Columbia, in the In re: Guantanamo cases, this is illustrative. An individual was charged with being an associate of al-Qaida individuals. When asked to identify whom he was supposed to have associated with, the tribunal could not identify the person. I discussed this case at some length yesterday, and the courtroom broke into laughter. It was a laughing matter to be detaining somebody who was allegedly associated with someone from al-Qaida when they could not even identify who the person was. Now, there has been a very revealing declaration filed by LTC Stephen Abraham, who was a member of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal and observed the process. This is the way Lieutenant Colonel Abraham described the process: Those of us on the panel found the information presented to try to uphold detention to ``lack substance.'' What were purported to be specific statements of fact lacked even the most fundamental earmarks of objectively credible evidence. Statements allegedly made by witnesses lacked detail. Reports presented generalized statements in indirect and passive forms without stating the source of the information or providing a basis for establishing the reliability or credibility of the sources. I put this in the Record yesterday, but it shows a proceeding totally devoid of any substance. You don't have to have sufficient evidence to go to court to detain someone at Guantanamo, but there has to be some basis for the detention. An examination of what is happening with the Combatant Status Review boards shows they are entirely inadequate under the standards set down by the Supreme Court in the case of Swain v. Pressley. Therefore, the alternative established by Congress in the Military Commissions Act is totally insufficient to provide fair play. The Supreme Court of the United States has laid it on the line. Even the Guantanamo detainees are entitled to fairness. Guantanamo has been ridiculed around the world and Guantanamo is not being closed. No alternative has been found for it. But at a minimum, those who are detained at Guantanamo ought to have some proceeding to establish some basis, however slight, for their continued detention. When Congress established the Military Commissions Act and provided for Combatant Status Review boards, we did so with the thought that we could have an alternative to going to Federal court, which would provide a basic rudimentary element of fairness required by the Geneva Conventions and required by the Supreme Court, which brushed aside the practices from World War II, overruling the prior precedents. So now it is up to the Congress of the United States to correct that mistake which we made 2 years ago. I believe any fair reading of what happens with the Combatant Status Review boards would demonstrate that we ought to correct the 2005 legislation. This amendment ought to be adopted. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, the issues relating to Iraq have been very complex, have aroused an enormous national reaction, and have been consuming for those of us in the Congress trying to decide what is the best course of action. Had we known Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction, I do not think we would have gone into Iraq. But once there, we do not want to leave precipitously, and we do not want to leave Iraq in an unstable condition with all of the potential forces that might bode ill for the United States in the future with respect to terrorism, with respect to Iran moving into a vacuum, and many complex problems which might arise. The President, in his recent speech, and General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, in their testimony before Congress, have gone to considerable distance in trying to move toward some of the areas of concern. There have been commitments of troop withdrawal before Christmas. There are projections for additional troop withdrawal next year. There has been a modification to some extent of the mission. But still there is an unease with the current policy. I voted against the Levin-Reed amendment when it came before the Senate because I think it is unwise to fix a firm date of withdrawal. It just gives the insurgents a target date to shoot at to declare victory. I think the provisions of the Warner-Lugar amendment had much to recommend them and joined as a cosponsor. I have already expressed on the floor my concern that the Warner-Lugar amendment was not called before the Senate. I think its thrust to have required a report by the President by October 15 and the possibility of a withdrawal date later but leaving the ultimate discretion to the President would have been a step forward. It would have imposed an obligation on the part of the President, the administration, to come forward with a plan. I have also cosponsored the Salazar-Alexander amendment, which incorporates the findings of the independent study group. I believe that is a general outline which is desirable to follow. Again, I expressed my concern when the majority leader took down this bill before calling up the Salazar-Alexander amendment. I have cosponsored that as an outline. Again, it does not place the administration in a straitjacket but outlines certain goals and certain objectives. I believe the idea advanced by Senator Biden for some time now, to divide Iraq into three parts--the Shiites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds-- where those factions have been engaging in violent warfare, is an idea which is worth pursuing. Again, that is a matter which has to be decided by the Iraqi Government, not by the Congress of the United States, but Senator Biden has couched it in the form of a resolution, really, on what amounts to a recommendation. I have been considering the amendment offered by the junior Senator from Virginia, Mr. Webb. I discussed the issue with him last week and since that time have undertaken to try to find out what the impact of the Webb amendment would be on force projection. I met with LTG Carter Ham last week. General Ham is in charge of operations at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the course of that meeting, General Ham outlined the projection by the Department of Defense that they could meet that 1-to- 1 ratio--12 months in Iraq and 12 months at home, which is the thrust of the Webb amendment--that they could meet that objective by October 1, 2008, the beginning of the next fiscal year. General Ham was not supportive of the Webb amendment because he raised a number of concerns that on its face, if you enact the Webb amendment, there are troops in Iraq now who will have to stay longer. There would have to be additional calls to the Reserves and National Guard. There might be a need to take people out of units which would impact on morale, but that if there were an October 1 date, 2008, that the 1-to-1 ratio could be achieved, according to the Department of Defense projections. Earlier today, at the invitation of Senator Warner, I met to talk again to LTG Carter Ham and to LTG Lovelace who works with General Ham. During the course of that meeting, the target date of October 1, 2008, to be the 1-to-1 ratio was reaffirmed. There was an additional factor injected into the discussion, and that is the factor of some 5,500 additional troops in a variety of categories, special forces and others, where this 1-to-1 ratio could not be met by October 1. Following that meeting, I have had telephone conversations with Secretary of Defense Gates and National Security Adviser Hadley to get some sense of the position of the Department of Defense and the administration. Secretary Gates confirmed the ability of the Department of Defense to meet in general terms the 1-to-1 ratio by October 1, 2008. He talked about some other difficulties and, obviously, is not endorsing any plan. The administration would prefer not to have any congressional action on this subject. Similarly, after an extended telephone conversation with National Security Adviser Hadley, I heard the reasons there is opposition--the difficulty of knowing whether the factors on the ground will be as they are projected now, and they are resisting congressional action which would tie the hands of the administration. In considering these issues, I have been very concerned about the problems of micromanaging the Department of Defense by the Congress. There is no question we are not equipped to do that. I have studied the constitutional law aspects, and I studied the case of Fleming v. Page [50 U.S. 603 (1850)], a decision by Chief Justice Taney, and the case of the United States v. Lovett [328 U.S. 303 (1946)], decided by the Supreme Court in 1946. I am well aware of the authority, the broad authority the Constitution vests in the President under Article II as Commander in Chief, but I am also cognizant of the authority of the Congress under Article I, Section 8: ``To raise and support Armies;'' ``To provide and maintain a Navy;'' ``To make rules for the government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;'' ``To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.'' We have seen the Supreme Court recently strike down executive action on military commissions, saying it is the function of the Congress of the United States, and the Congress has acted there. So there is authority for the Congress on that premise, in addition to our power of the purse, our power of appropriation. I have discussed the matter with Senator Webb and have indicated-- have stated an interest on my part in supporting the Webb amendment, if the concerns which have been expressed to me by the Department of Defense could be accommodated, and that is a change of date to October 1, and an accommodation of the 5,500 specialty forces that cannot be enumerated. Of course, there is the waiver provision which is already present in the Webb amendment. I asked about the possibility of deferring the vote. I think that if there was an understanding by other Senators about the ability of the Department of Defense to meet a 2008 October 1 date, and the flexibility needed on some 5,500 additional troops, there might be some additional interest in the amendment. I am told, at least as of this moment of 4:36, the vote is going to go ahead 5:15. But I have discussed the matter, as I say, with the sponsor of the amendment, Senator Webb. There is also the obvious factor that what we do here is unlikely, in any event, to have the full effect of law. If the Webb amendment gets 60 votes and is embodied in congressional enactment, it is virtually certain to be vetoed by the President of the United States, and there are not 67 votes to override a Presidential veto. But our function in the Congress is to exercise our best judgment and pass what we think is appropriate. Then, under our constitutional system, it is the prerogative of the President to either sign or veto. So we take all of these matters a step at a time. There is a lot of concern in the Congress of the United States about what is happening now, and an interest in, if it can be structured, congressional action which would be helpful. All of this is obviously very involved and requires a lot of analysis and consideration. I think it would be a very helpful thing for the U.S. effort, generally, if the Congress and the President could come to an agreement on a policy and a plan without leaving it solely to the discretion of the executive branch. The Congress is going to continue funding, and I have voted for that. We are not going to put the troops at risk. We are not going to set times for withdrawal. It is possible we could use the Vietnam model, where funding existed up to a certain date on the condition that the troops be reduced to a certain number and then by another date. That hasn't been tried, but I think it unlikely the Congress is going to go that route. We are too concerned about the troops and we want to support them, but we are also gripped with a sense of unease as to what is happening. There is agreement between the Department of Defense, for the purpose of Senator Webb's amendment, that the stays in Iraq are too long. We have noted the increase in the suicide rate, the increase in the divorce rate, the increase in psychiatric problems and stress disorders. The policy of the Department of Defense is to have 2 months at home for every 1 month in Iraq for the Army; 5 months at home for every 1 month in Iraq for the Reserves. We are far from that. So we are struggling and groping to try to find an answer. In the course of the remaining time before the roll is called, I am going to see if it is possible to find some constructive way forward and some rational basis for the vote I will cast. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 20 minutes as in morning business.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to comment on the amendment to restore the constitutional right of habeas corpus--an amendment that is pending before the Senate and will be voted on tomorrow morning at 10:30 on a motion to invoke cloture. The issue of the availability of habeas corpus for the detainees at Guantanamo is a matter of enormous importance. It is a matter of a fundamental constitutional right that people should not be held in detention unless there is an evidentiary reason to do so, or at least some showing that the person ought to be in detention. It is a constitutional right that has existed since the Magna Carta in 1215, and it has been upheld in a series of cases in the Supreme Court of the United States. In the decision of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O'Connor, speaking for a plurality, said that they ``all agree that, absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the United States.'' What Justice O'Connor was referring to was the express constitutional provision in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, that habeas corpus may not be suspended except in time of invasion or rebellion. Obviously, if there cannot be a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, there is a provision in that clause recognizing the existence of the constitutional right of habeas corpus. You cannot suspend a right that doesn't exist. As amplified by Justice Stevens, in the case of Rasul v. Bush, the statutory right to habeas corpus applies to those held at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Although Guantanamo Bay is not within the territory of the United States, it is under the complete jurisdiction and control of the United States. In that case, Justice Stevens noted that ``application of the [writ of] habeas corpus to persons detained at the base is consistent with the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus. At common law, courts exercised habeas jurisdiction over the claims of aliens detained within sovereign territory of the realm, as well as the claims of persons detained in the so-called `exempt jurisdiction,' where ordinary writs did not run, and all other dominions under the sovereign's control.'' That is obviously a conclusive statement of the Supreme Court that in Guantanamo, under the control of the United States, the writ of habeas corpus would apply in accordance with the historic reach of habeas corpus under the common law. Although Justice Stevens wrote as to statutory habeas, his historic analysis implicates the right to habeas under the common law and the Constitution Justice Stevens went on to point out: Habeas corpus is, however [citing from Williams v. Kaiser] ``a writ antecedent to statute, . . . throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law.'' And continuing, he said that the writ had ``received explicit recognition in the Constitution, which forbids suspension of `[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus . . . unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.' '' Obviously, the exceptions--Rebellion or Invasion--do not apply in the Guantanamo situation. Justice Stevens went on to say: [A]t its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest. Justice Stevens then went on to note this--referring to the opinion of Justice Jackson, concurring in the result in the case of Brown v. Allen: The historic purpose of the writ has been to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial. And he goes on to say: Executive imprisonment has been considered oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man should be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed, or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. The judges of England developed the writ of habeas corpus largely to preserve these immunities from executive restraint. Going on, Justice Stevens pointed out: Consistent with the historic purpose of the writ, this Court has recognized the federal court's power to review applications for habeas corpus in a wide variety of cases involving Executive detention, in wartime as well as in times of peace. In a very curious decision, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ignored the historic common law analysis of the Rasul case in concluding that the Supreme Court's decision was based solely upon the statutory provision for habeas corpus. The Boumediene court reasoned that Rasul could be changed by an act of Congress, the Military Commissions Act, which was passed in 2006. In that case, instead of looking to Rasul, as noted in the New York Times article by Adam Liptak on March 5 of this year, the Boumediene court looked to case law decided before Rasul. Liptak points out: Instead of looking to Rasul, which was recent and concerned Guantanamo, the appeals court, reverting to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, justified its decision by citing a 1950 Supreme Court decision, Johnson v. Eisentrager. That case involved German citizens convicted of war crimes in China and held at a prison in Germany. The court ruled that they had no right to habeas corpus. Liptak points out the inapplicability of the Eisentrager case, stating: The Court's reliance on Eisentrager was curious. Both Antonin Scalia, dissenting in Rasul, and John Yu, an architect of the Bush administration's post-9/11 legal strategy, have written that they understood Rasul to have overruled Eisentrager. The Boumediene decision seemed to ignore the finding in Rasul that the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay fell within the jurisdiction and control of the United States. If detainees at Guantanamo Bay fall within United States jurisdiction, as Rasul found, the aliens held at Guantanamo have a greater claim to habeas corpus rights. For example, Courts have held that aliens within the United States cannot be denied habeas corpus without violating the Suspension Clause. Following its discussion of Rasul and Eisentrager, the Boumediene decision relied upon the proceedings in the Combatant Status Review Tribunals which, realistically viewed, are totally insufficient. The procedures of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals were taken up by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in a case captioned: In re Guantanamo Detainees Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d 443 (2005). Beginning on page 468 of the opinion, the district court noted a proceeding in the Combatant Status Review Tribunal where an individual was accused of associating with al-Qaida personnel. The court noted: ``. . . [T]he Recorder of the [Combatant Status Review Tribunal] asserted, `While living in Bosnia, the Detainee associated with a known Al Qaida operative.' '' The detainee then said: ``Give me his name.'' The Tribunal President said: ``I do not know.'' The detainee then said: ``How can I respond to this?'' The detainee went on to say: ``. . . I asked the interrogators to tell me who this person was. Then I could tell you if I might have known this person, but not if this person is a terrorist. Maybe I knew this person as a friend. Maybe it was a person that worked with me. Maybe it was a person that was on my team. But I do not know if this person is Bosnian, Indian or whatever. If you tell me the name, then I can respond and defend myself against this accusation.'' Later in the court's opinion, the detainee is quoted to the following effect: ``That is it, but I was hoping you had evidence that you can give me. If I was in your place--and I apologize in advance for these words--but if a supervisor came to me and showed me accusations like these, I would take these accusations and I would hit him in the face with them.'' And at that, everyone in the tribunal room burst into laughter. This is illustrative of what goes on in the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. They charge someone with being an associate of al-Qaida, but they cannot even give the person a name. There was a very informative declaration filed by Stephen Abraham about what goes on in a Combatant Status Review Tribunal. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks this declaration.

Mr. SPECTER. Colonel Abraham identified himself as a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves who served as a member of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal and had an opportunity to observe and participate in the CSRT process. Among other things, Colonel Abraham points out: On one occasion, I was assigned to a CSRT panel with two other officers. . . .We reviewed evidence presented to us regarding the recommended status of a detainee. All of us found the information presented to lack substance. What were purported to be specific statements of fact lacked even the most fundamental earmarks of objectively credible evidence. Statements allegedly made by percipient witnesses lacked detail. Reports presented generalized statements in indirect and passive forms without stating any source of the information or providing a basis for establishing the reliability or the credibility of the source. Statements of interrogators presented to the panel offered inferences from which we were expected to draw conclusions favoring a finding of ``enemy combatant'' but that, upon even limited questioning from the panel, yielded the response from the Recorder, ``We'll have to get back to you.'' The personal representative did not participate in any meaningful way. On the basis of the paucity and weakness of the information provided both during and after the CSRT hearing, we determined that there was no factual basis for concluding that the individual should be classified as an enemy combatant. The details of Colonel Abraham's statement are very much in line with the opinion of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in the matter captioned: In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases. They had charges but presented absolutely no information. Consequently, there can be no contention that Combatant Status Review Tribunals are an adequate and effective alternative approach to Federal court habeas corpus. There must be a type of review which presents a fair opportunity for determination as to whether there was any basis to hold a detainee. For such a purpose, Combatant Status Review Tribunals are totally inadequate. It is for that reason that I urge my colleagues to legislate in the pending Department of Defense authorization bill to reinstate the statutory right of habeas corpus. It is my judgment that the Supreme Court of the United States will act on the case now pending there to uphold the constitutional right, disagreeing with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Boumediene v. Bush. Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court had denied to take certiorari in the case, and it was curious because Justice Stevens did not vote for cert. where three other Justices had. But then after the declaration by Colonel Abraham was filed on a petition for rehearing, which required five affirmative votes by Supreme Court Justices, the petition for rehearing was granted, and the Supreme Court of the United States now has that case. I have filed a brief as amicus curiae in the case, urging the Supreme Court to overrule the District of Columbia case and to uphold the decision in Rasul v. Bush, which holds that there is a statutory right to habeas corpus and that is rooted in historic common law that predates the Constitution, tracing its roots to the Magna Carta with John at Runnymede in 1215. But pending any action by the Supreme Court of the United States, which is not by any means certain, notwithstanding my own view that the Supreme Court will reaffirm Rasul and reverse the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's ruling in Boumediene, the Congress should now alter the statutory provision in 2006 and make it clear that the statutory right to habeas corpus applies to Guantanamo because of the total inadequacy of the fairness of the procedures under the Combatant Status Review Tribunal. Exhibit 1 Declaration of Stephen Abraham Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army Reserve I, Stephen Abraham, hereby declare as follows: 1. I am a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army Reserve, having been commissioned in 1981 as an officer in Intelligence Corps. I have served as an intelligence officer from 1982 to the present during periods of both reserve and active duty, including mobilization in 1990 (``Operation Desert Storm'') and twice again following 9-11. In my civilian occupation, I am an attorney with the law firm Fink & Abraham LLP in Newport Beach, California. 2. This declaration responds to certain statements in the Declaration of Rear Admiral (Retired) James M. McGarrah (``McGarrah Dec.''), filed in Bismullah v. Gates, No. 06-1197 (D.C. Cir.). This declaration is limited to unclassified matters specifically related to the procedures employed by Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (``OARDEC'') and the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (``CSRTs'') rather than to any specific information gathered or used in a particular case, except as noted herein. The contents of this declaration are based solely on my personal observations and experiences as a member of OARDEC. Nothing in this declaration is intended to reflect or represent the official opinions of the Department of Defense or the Department of the Army. 3. From September 11, 2004 to March 9, 2005, I was on active duty and assigned to OARDEC. Rear Admiral McGarrah served as the Director of OARDEC during the entirety of my assignment. 4. While assigned to OARDEC, in addition to other duties, I worked as an agency liaison, responsible for coordinating with government agencies, including certain Department of Defense (``DoD'') and non-DoD organizations, to gather or validate information relating to detainees for use in CSRTs. I also served as a member of a CSRT, and had the opportunity to observe and participate in the operation of the CSRT process. 5. As stated in the McGarrah Dec., the information comprising the Government Information and the Government Evidence was not compiled personally by the CSRT Recorder, but by other individuals in OARDEC. The vast majority of the personnel assigned to OARDEC were reserve officers from the different branches of service (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) of varying grades and levels of general military experience. Few had any experience or training in the legal or intelligence fields. 6. The Recorders of the tribunals were typically relatively junior officers with little training or experience in matters relating to the collection, processing, analyzing, and/or dissemination of intelligence material. In no instances known to me did any of the Recorders have any significant personal experience in the field of military intelligence. Similarly, I was unaware of any Recorder having any significant or relevant experience dealing with the agencies providing information to be used as a part of the CSRT process. 7. The Recorders exercised little control over the process of accumulating information to be presented to the CSRT board members. Rather, the information was typically aggregated by individuals identified as case writers who, in most instances, had the same limited degree of knowledge and experience relating to the intelligence community and intelligence products. The case writers, and not the Recorders, were primarily responsible for accumulating documents, including assembling documents to be used in the drafting of an unclassified summary of the factual basis for the detainee's designation as an enemy combatant. 8. The information used to prepare the files to be used by the Recorders frequently consisted of finished intelligence products of a generalized nature--often outdated, often ``generic,'' rarely specifically relating to the individual subjects of the CSRTs or to the circumstances related to those individuals' status. 9. Beyond ``generic'' information, the case writer would frequently rely upon information contained within the Joint Detainee Information Management System (``JDIMS''). The subset of that system available to the case writers was limited in terms of the scope of information, typically excluding information that was characterized as highly sensitive law enforcement information, highly classified information, or information not voluntarily released by the originating agency. In that regard, JDIMS did not constitute a complete repository, although this limitation was frequently not understood by individuals with access to or who relied upon the system as a source of information. Other databases available to the case writer were similarly deficient. The case writers and Recorders did not have access to numerous information sources generally available within the intelligence community. 10. As one of only a few intelligence-trained and suitably cleared officers, I served as a liaison while assigned to OARDEC, acting as a go-between for OARDEC and various intelligence organizations. In that capacity, I was tasked to review and/or obtain information relating to individual subjects of the CSRTs. More specifically, I was asked to confirm and represent in a statement to be relied upon by the CSRT board members that the organizations did not possess ``exculpatory information'' relating to the subject of the CSRT. 11. During my trips to the participating organizations, I was allowed only limited access to information, typically prescreened and filtered. I was not permitted to see any information other than that specifically prepared in advance of my visit. I was not permitted to request that further searches be performed. I was given no assurances that the information provided for my examination represented a complete compilation of information or that any summary of information constituted an accurate distillation of the body of available information relating to the subject. 12. I was specifically told on a number of occasions that the information provided to me was all that I would be shown, but I was never told that the information that was provided constituted all available information. On those occasions when I asked that a representative of the organization provide a written statement that there was no exculpatory evidence, the requests were summarily denied. 13. At one point, following a review of information, I asked the Office of General Counsel of the intelligence organization that I was visiting for a statement that no exculpatory information had been withheld. I explained that I was tasked to review all available materials and to reach a conclusion regarding the non-existence of exculpatory information, and that I could not do so without knowing that I had seen all information. 14. The request was denied, coupled with a refusal even to acknowledge whether there existed additional information that I was not permitted to review. In short, based upon the selective review that I was permitted, I was left to ``infer'' from the absence of exculpatory information in the materials I was allowed to review that no such information existed in materials I was not allowed to review. 15. Following that exchange, I communicated to Rear Admiral McGarrah and the OARDEC Deputy Director the fundamental limitations imposed upon my review of the organization's files and my inability to state conclusively that no exculpatory information existed relating to the CSRT subjects. It was not possible for me to certify or validate the non-existence of exculpatory evidence as related to any individual undergoing the CSRT process. 16. The content of intelligence products, including databases, made available to case writers, Recorders, or liaison officers, was often left entirely to the discretion of the organizations providing the information. What information was not included in the bodies of intelligence products was typically unknown to the case writers and Recorders, as was the basis for limiting the information. In other words, the person preparing materials for use by the CSRT board members did not know whether they had examined all available information or even why they possessed some pieces of information but not others. 17. Although OARDEC personnel often received large amounts of information, they often had no context for determining whether the information was relevant or probative and no basis for determining what additional information would be necessary to establish a basis for determining the reasonableness of any matter to be offered to the CSRT board members. Often, information that was gathered was discarded by the case writer or the Recorder because it was considered to be ambiguous, confusing, or poorly written. Such a determination was frequently the result of the case writer or Recorder's lack of training or experience with the types of information provided. In my observation, the case writer or Recorder, without proper experience or a basis for giving context to information, often rejected some information arbitrarily while accepting other information without any articulable rationale. 18. The case writer's summaries were reviewed for quality assurance, a process that principally focused on format and grammar. The quality assurance review would not ordinarily check the accuracy of the information underlying the case writer's unclassified summary for the reason that the quality assurance reviewer typically had little more experience than the case writer and, again, no relevant or meaningful intelligence or legal experience, and therefore had no skills by which to critically assess the substantive portions of the summaries. 19. Following the quality assurance process, the unclassified summary and the information assembled by the case writer in support of the summary would then be forwarded to the Recorder. It was very rare that a Recorder or a personal representative would seek additional information beyond that information provided by the case writer. 20. It was not apparent to me how assignments to CSRT panels were made, nor was I personally involved in that process. Nevertheless, I discerned the determinations of who would be assigned to any particular position, whether as a member of a CSRT or to some other position, to be largely the product of ad hoc decisions by a relatively small group of individuals. All CSRT panel members were assigned to OARDEC and reported ultimately to Rear Admiral McGarrah. It was well known by the officers in OARDEC that any time a CSRT panel determined that a detainee was not properly classified as an enemy combatant, the panel members would have to explain their finding to the OARDEC Deputy Director. There would be intensive scrutiny of the finding by Rear Admiral McGarrah who would, in turn, have to explain the finding to his superiors, including the Under Secretary of the Navy. 21. On one occasion, I was assigned to a CSRT panel with two other officers, an Air Force colonel and an Air Force major, the latter understood by me to be a judge advocate. We reviewed evidence presented to us regarding the recommended status of a detainee. All of us found the information presented to lack substance. 22. What were purported to be specific statements of fact lacked even the most fundamental earmarks of objectively credible evidence. Statements allegedly made by percipient witnesses lacked detail. Reports presented generalized statements in indirect and passive forms without stating the source of the information or providing a basis for establishing the reliability or the credibility of the source. Statements of interrogators presented to the panel offered inferences from which we were expected to draw conclusions favoring a finding of ``enemy combatant'' but that, upon even limited questioning from the panel, yielded the response from the Recorder, ``We'll have to get back to you.'' The personal representative did not participate in any meaningful way. 23. On the basis of the paucity and weakness of the information provided both during and after the CSRT hearing, we determined that there was no factual basis for concluding that the individual should be classified as an enemy combatant. Rear Admiral McGarrah and the Deputy Director immediately questioned the validity of our findings. They directed us to write out the specific questions that we had raised concerning the evidence to allow the Recorder an opportunity to provide further responses. We were then ordered to reopen the hearing to allow the Recorder to present further argument as to why the detainee should be classified as an enemy combatant. Ultimately, in the absence of any substantive response to the questions and no basis for concluding that additional information would be forthcoming, we did not change our determination that the detainee was not properly classified as an enemy combatant. OARDEC's response to the outcome was consistent with the few other instances in which a finding of ``Not an Enemy Combatant'' (NEC) had been reached by CSRT boards. In each of the meetings that I attended with OARDEC leadership following a finding of NEC, the focus of inquiry on the part of the leadership was ``what went wrong.'' 24. I was not assigned to another CSRT panel. I hereby declare under the penalties of perjury based on my personal knowledge that the foregoing is true and accurate.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, a very close, personal friend and a great American died the day before yesterday, Howard Gittis, a very distinguished Philadelphia lawyer in the great tradition of Andrew Hamilton who defended Peter Zenger. Those of us who are Philadelphia lawyers take great pride in that tradition from Andrew Hamilton and the historic defense of Peter Zenger, and Howard Gittis was in that mold. I have been a personal friend of Howard Gittis for some 50 years. I was told he went to sleep on Sunday night and didn't awaken, died in his sleep apparently of a heart attack. Howard Gittis was a partner in the very prestigious firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen for some 23 years. He then joined a noted entrepreneur, Ronald Perelman of New York, and was the executive vice president of McAndrews & Forbes in New York City. Howard was noted for his charitable contributions both as an alumnus of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, where he contributed substantially to Penn's law school which named Gittis Hall and the Gittis Center for Clinical Legal Studies at Penn in honor of Howard Gittis's contribution to the law school and his charitable support of the university. Not only did he support the University of Pennsylvania, but he also served on the board of Temple University for 31 years, including 5 as chairman of the board, and the Temple Student Center is named for him. Always affable, always cheerful, always ready to lend assistance to friends or even to those who were not close friends. He left an indelible mark in the Philadelphia legal community and in the New York business community. His funeral services occurred earlier today in New York and burial occurred this afternoon in Philadelphia. I think it appropriate to pay tribute to an outstanding American who did so much for the legal profession and so much for charitable contributions with both the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I seek recognition to discuss the False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007. The False Claims Act was passed by Congress in 1863 in order to combat war profiteering during the Civil War. The goal of the law was to encourage individuals to alert the Government when fraud against the Government was occurring. The statute does this by providing a portion of the Government's recovery to the whistleblower. This law is as important today, as it was in 1863, because we still must combat fraud and abuse of Government programs. These amendments ensure that the False Claims Act has not been eroded in scope or application. I am cosponsoring the bill offered by the distinguished Senator from Iowa because Congress needs to clarify its intent that there is liability under the False Claims Act for submitting false claims for Government funds and property--regardless of whether they are submitted directly to Government agents or are submitted to others who disburse Government money or property. A defendant may not make a preemptive disclosure that operates to bar the whistleblower or relator from recovering--the only claims that should be barred are those that are true piggyback claims, where the relator was not the original source of the information, and the whistleblower's actions were not the impetus for the recovery. Government employees may be qui tam relators--whistleblowers--and may be awarded a portion of the Government's recovery based on false claims if, when the Government employee has learned of fraudulent conduct on the job and has reported it up the chain of command, and then reported it to the Office of Inspector General, still no action has been taken within 12 months. Retaliatory action based on protected activity by whistleblowers is prohibited. Federal prosecutors who are investigating False Claim Act complaints filed under seal may share information obtained by Civil Investigative Demands, CIDs, with relators. For purposes of the running of the statute of limitations, if the Government intervenes in a False Claims Act case, the intervention relates back to the date the whistleblower filed suit. Taxpayer dollars must not be wasted or fraudulently paid to unscrupulous contractors.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I seek recognition to discuss the False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007. The False Claims Act was passed by Congress in 1863 in order to combat war profiteering during the Civil War. The goal of the law was to encourage individuals to alert the Government when fraud against the Government was occurring. The statute does this by providing a portion of the Government's recovery to the whistleblower. This law is as important today, as it was in 1863, because we still must combat fraud and abuse of Government programs. These amendments ensure that the False Claims Act has not been eroded in scope or application. I am cosponsoring the bill offered by the distinguished Senator from Iowa because Congress needs to clarify its intent that there is liability under the False Claims Act for submitting false claims for Government funds and property--regardless of whether they are submitted directly to Government agents or are submitted to others who disburse Government money or property. A defendant may not make a preemptive disclosure that operates to bar the whistleblower or relator from recovering--the only claims that should be barred are those that are true piggyback claims, where the relator was not the original source of the information, and the whistleblower's actions were not the impetus for the recovery. Government employees may be qui tam relators--whistleblowers--and may be awarded a portion of the Government's recovery based on false claims if, when the Government employee has learned of fraudulent conduct on the job and has reported it up the chain of command, and then reported it to the Office of Inspector General, still no action has been taken within 12 months. Retaliatory action based on protected activity by whistleblowers is prohibited. Federal prosecutors who are investigating False Claim Act complaints filed under seal may share information obtained by Civil Investigative Demands, CIDs, with relators. For purposes of the running of the statute of limitations, if the Government intervenes in a False Claims Act case, the intervention relates back to the date the whistleblower filed suit. Taxpayer dollars must not be wasted or fraudulently paid to unscrupulous contractors.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman. We have worked harmoniously in a bipartisan way on the Judiciary Committee. An expression I like to use when we change chairmen: It is a seamless transfer of the gavel in a bipartisan way. I join Chairman Leahy in asking for the confirmation of the three judicial nominees who are pending this morning. I start with Janis Lynn Sammartino, who is up for the District Court for the Southern District of California, because she was born in Philadelphia, PA: magna cum laude from Occidental College in 1972, Phi Beta Kappa at that university; law degree from Notre Dame; law clerk to a superior court judge in California, Judge Douglas Seely; deputy city attorney; judge on the Municipal Court of the City of San Diego; a judge on the Superior Court for San Diego for the past 12 years--a very distinguished resume. She has a majority ``qualified'' rating from the American Bar Association, and some rated her as ``well qualified.'' She comes to the floor with the unanimous recommendation of the Judiciary Committee. Similarly, I urge the confirmation of Martin Karl Reidinger for the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. He has an outstanding academic record: a bachelor's degree from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill; a law degree with honors from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill School of Law; Order of the Coif, which means top 10 percent academically; North Carolina Law Review. He has had an extensive practice with the law firm of Adams Hendon Carson Crow & Saenger--associate for 5 years and partner for the last 18 years--distinguished qualifications. I think he is well suited to become a Federal district court judge. Third, I urge the confirmation of William Lindsay Osteen, Jr., for the District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. He has a bachelor's degree from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill in 1983 and a law degree from the same university in 1987. He practiced law for the last 20 years--first as an associate and later as a partner--in Adams & Osteen, and has a distinguished curriculum vitae. I ask unanimous consent that the resumes of these three distinguished nominees be printed in the Congressional Record.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I see the Senator from North Carolina. I am going to yield the floor to him and perhaps take a minute or two at the conclusion of his comments.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for an additional 3 minutes.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I note the time has come for the scheduled votes.

Mr. SPECTER. The time is yielded back.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am cosponsoring the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota because I believe there are very serious safety issues involved here which have not been answered sufficiently by the Department of Transportation. Here we have a situation where the Secretary of Transportation announced a pilot program on February 23 of this year to allow up to 100 Mexican trucking companies to ship goods to and from the United States. The Iraq supplemental appropriations bill delayed implementation of this program until there was a report by the inspector general and a response by the Department of Transportation. The inspector general released his report and the Department of Transportation submitted responses on the same day--on September 6. As I read these documents, it is insufficient to have the requisite guarantees of safety. And of no little concern to me is that all of this should be done on the same day, without taking into account some very serious underlying problems. There are safety concerns here which include the database deficiencies that prevent the Department of Transportation inspectors from being able to accurately gather information on truckdriver convictions and driving violations, vehicle accident reports, and insurance records. The inspector general confirms that these databases are still under development. The Department of Transportation report does not respond to these issues. The inspector general report also states that the Department of Transportation has not developed and implemented adequate plans for checking trucks and drivers participating in the demonstration project as they cross the border. The DOT report responded by stating they created border-crossing plans with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Well, that is hardly an assurance of safety. We do want to have good relations with Mexico. We do not want to impede legitimate commerce. But safety is a very vital factor, and there are good reasons to insist on safety and verification before we permit this pilot program with 100 trucking companies, which we can obviously expect to be supplemented in a very substantial number. When you are dealing with issues on truckdriver convictions and driving violations and vehicle accident reports, you are talking about something which is very probative on whether it is a safe program. When you are talking about insurance records, those are necessary in order to be sure that if there are accidents, and there is liability, there is adequate insurance to protect Americans from these trucks which are coming into our country. We have had a fair amount of experience here. I believe there is ample time to reevaluate this program if and when this database is updated and there is sufficient record documentation to guarantee the requisite safety. But on this date of the record, it seems to me this program ought not to go forward, and the amendment which Senator Dorgan has advanced is very sound. I intend to support it and I urge my colleagues to do the same. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from North Dakota for yielding me time at this stage of the debate.