Arlen Specter

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. In conclusion, it would be my hope we would take a very close look at this very important law in this very important field and recognize that harmonious relations between management and labor are very important. That is not the case today, with a few illustrations I have given in my prepared statement. We ought to exercise our standing, which we pride ourselves as the world's greatest deliberative body. Although that will not be done today because cloture is not going to be invoked, I intend to pursue oversight through the subcommittee where I rank which has jurisdiction over the NLRB. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that my extensive statement be printed in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SPECTER. I ask unanimous consent to be permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes.

Mr. SPECTER. I have sought recognition to speak in favor of the amendment which will be voted on later this afternoon which provides that we would lift the antitrust exemption which is now held by the OPEC nations. There have been judicial interpretations holding that the OPEC countries have sovereign immunity from prosecution under the antitrust laws, and it is my legal judgment that the limited judicial holdings in this field are erroneous because there was a well-accepted exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine where there is commercial activity involved. But in any event, there is no doubt that the Congress of the United States has the authority to legislate in the field, and I believe it would be very crucial to remove the antitrust exemption which the OPEC nations now have. We have a crisis--a strong word but I think an accurate word--on gasoline prices today. The price of crude oil has been hovering around $65 a barrel. The American people are paying on average more than $3 a gallon for gasoline. Consumers are paying more for products because American companies have to pay more to manufacture, and without going into great detail, there is no doubt that there is a crisis in the field. This legislation has been acted on in the past--in the 109th Congress when I chaired the Judiciary Committee--and it has been reintroduced this year. Senator Kohl is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and has taken the lead, and we have a very impressive list of sponsors: Senator Leahy, Senator Grassley, Senator Biden, Senator Coburn, Senator Feingold, Senator Snowe, Senator Durbin, Senator Boxer, Senator Lieberman, Senator Schumer, Senator Sanders, as well as my own cosponsorship of this legislation. I have been interested in this subject for more than a decade because I think the antitrust exemption which they enjoy ought not to be. I wrote to President Clinton in his term in office--and received no answer on the subject--a very lengthy letter which I put in the Congressional Record when I spoke on this amendment last week. I followed it up with a letter to President George Bush on the same subject. We passed the amendment last year. As I say, it was dropped in conference. We are asking for a rollcall vote on it this time because the practical realities are, if it gets a very strong vote--and I anticipate it will--it will have more stature when it gets to conference. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment to eliminate the conspiracy, the concerted action where the OPEC nations get together in a room, reduce supply, and that raises the price. This is an important amendment, and it will contribute to reducing the price of gasoline at the pump. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I intend to speak on an amendment which has been filed and I thought would be offered at the present time, but Senator Kohl, the principal sponsor, wishes to offer it tomorrow. But I intend to speak on my amendment, and I would like 15 minutes.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New Mexico. Amendment No. 1519 Mr. President, I have sought recognition to speak on an amendment which has been filed, amendment No. 1519, which has an impressive list of sponsors: Senator Kohl, Senator Leahy, Senator Grassley, Senator Biden, Senator Coburn, Senator Feingold, Senator Snowe, Senator Durbin, Senator Boxer, Senator Lieberman, Senator Schumer, Senator Sanders, and myself. The thrust of this amendment is to make the OPEC nations--which have conspired to limit production--subject to our antitrust laws. What we have, simply stated, are a group of oil-producing nations, that get together that make agreements to limit production. Inevitably, by limiting the production of oil, and thereby limiting supply, the price goes up. The limited supply of oil is the major contributing factor to high gasoline prices. It is high time we acted on this matter. The Judiciary Committee has approved this legislation on four occasions, most recently on May 22 of this year. In the 109th Congress, the legislation was passed out of the Judiciary Committee in which I was the chair, and it was included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, but it did not survive conference. Senator Kohl and I and the other sponsors intend to ask for a rollcall vote, which I think a substantial number of Senators will vote for the amendment. I hate to predict things in this body, but I think the vote will be substantial, and I think that ought to carry very substantial weight in conference. The facts on the current price of gasoline are very troublesome. The high price of oil drives up other prices. The statistics are worth noting with particularity. The price of crude oil reached $65 a barrel yesterday. Americans are paying an average of $3.06 for a gallon of gasoline. Consumers are paying more for products because American companies are paying more to run their factories, which require the consumption of energy. Consumers are also paying more for products they buy that have been shipped by train or truck from somewhere else. Plane fares, bus tickets, cab fares often include significant fuel surcharges. Economists have estimates that for every $10 increase in the price of oil, our economic growth falls by a half a percent. Our economy grew only by 0.6 percent in the first quarter of this year--the slowest growth rate since 2002. I believe a fair amount of that lag in economic growth can be attributed to the high price of oil. For decades, the OPEC members have conspired to manipulate oil prices through production quotas that limit the number of barrels sold. OPEC again appears to be poised to manipulate oil prices by limiting supply. The Secretary General of OPEC, Abdullah al-Badri, recently threatened to cut investment in new oil production in response to plans announced by the United States and other Western countries to use more biofuels. He warned that cutting investment in new production would cause oil prices to ``go through the roof.'' Well, we do not have to tolerate threats of that sort. We have the wherewithal to deal with this issue in a constructive way through the antitrust laws. Regrettably, the history of litigation in this field has allowed OPEC nations to avoid antitrust liability by asserting the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In the decision of International Association of Machinists v. OPEC, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California held that OPEC activity was ``governmental activity'' rather than ``commercial activity'' and therefore was not subject to the U.S. antitrust laws. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that the ``act of state'' doctrine precluded the court from exercising jurisdiction in the case. The ``act of state'' doctrine precludes a federal court from hearing a case that requires it to rule on the legality of the sovereign acts of a foreign nation. Well, those rulings are matters which can be changed by legislation. The legislation to make this change, I submit, is fundamental and very much in our national interest and ought to be undertaken. The lawsuits would have to be initiated, under our proposed legislation, by the Department of Justice. As a result, the Administration would provide a check on when to initiate a suit, avoiding diplomatic disputes. But it is a fact we have deferred too long to the practices of Saudi Arabia and practices of the OPEC oil nations out of fear of retribution, and we ought not to kowtow to them anymore. The possibility of subjecting the OPEC nations to antitrust liability has long been an interest of mine. I wrote to President Clinton on April 11, 2000, urging the administration to file suit in the Federal court under the antitrust laws in an effort to overturn the previous decisions, which I think were wrongly decided. I ask unanimous consent that the text of this letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my comments.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, then I wrote to President Bush on April 25, 2001, with a similar request, that litigation be initiated by the administration to hold OPEC nations liable under the antitrust laws. Again, I ask unanimous consent that the text of that letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. SPECTER. We have the authority to change the laws. We have a responsibility to protect American consumers from these predatory practices, from these conspiracies in restraint of trade, these cartels. I urge my colleagues to take a close look at the legislation. As I noted earlier, the amendment will be formally offered tomorrow. I thank the Chair, yield back the remainder of my time, and yield the floor. Exhibit 1 U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, April 11, 2000. President William Jefferson Clinton, The White House Washington, DC. Dear Mr. President: In light of the very serious problems caused by the recent increase in oil prices, we know you will share our view that we should explore every possible alternative to stop OPEC and other oil-producing states from entering into agreements to restrict oil production in order to drive up the price of oil. This conduct is nothing more than an old-fashioned conspiracy in restraint of trade which has long been condemned under U.S. law, and which should be condemned under international law. After some considerable research, we suggest that serious consideration be given to two potential lawsuits against OPEC and the nations conspiring with it: (1) A suit in Federal district court under U.S. antitrust law. (2) A suit in the International Court of Justice at the Hague based, perhaps, upon an advisory opinion under ``the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,'' which includes prohibiting oil cartels from conspiring to limit production and raise prices. (1) A suit in Federal district court under U.S. antitrust law. A case can be made that your Administration can sue OPEC in Federal district court under U.S. antitrust law. OPEC is clearly engaging in a ``conspiracy in restraint of trade'' in violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1). The Administration has the power to sue under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 4 for injunctive relief to prevent such collusion. In addition, the Administration should consider suing OPEC for treble damages under the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 15a), since OPEC's behavior has caused an ``injury'' to U.S. ``property.'' After all, the U.S. government is a major consumer of petroleum products and must now pay higher prices for these products. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp, 442 U.S. 330 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the consumers who were direct purchasers of certain hearing aides who alleged that collusion among manufacturers had led to an increase in prices had standing to sue those manufacturers under the Clayton Act since ``a consumer deprived of money by reason of allegedly anticompetitive conduct is injured in `property' within the meaning of [the Clayton Act].'' Indirect purchasers would appear to be precluded from suit, even in a class action, under Illinois Brick v. Illinois 431 U.S. 720 (1977), but this would not bar the United States Government, as a direct purchaser, from having the requisite standing. One potential obstacle to such a suit is whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (``FSIA'') provides OPEC, a group of sovereign foreign nations, with immunity from suit in U.S. courts. To date, there has been a ruling on this issue in only one case. In International Association of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (1979), the District Court for the Central District of California held that the nations which comprise OPEC were immune from suit in the United States under the FSIA. We believe that this opinion was wrongly decided and that other district courts, including the D.C. District, can and should revisit the issue. This decision in Int. Assoc. of Machinists turned on the technical issue of whether or not the nations which comprise OPEC are engaging in ``commercial activity'' or ``governmental activity'' when they cooperate to sell their oil. If they are engaging in ``governmental activity,'' then the FSIA shields them from suit in U.S. courts. If, however, these nations are engaging in ``commercial activity,'' then they are subject to suit in the U.S. The California District Court held that OPEC activity is ``governmental activity.'' We disagree. It is certainly a governmental activity for a nation to regulate the extraction of petroleum from its territory by ensuring compliance with zoning, environmental and other regulatory regimes. It is clearly a commercial activity, however, for these nations to sit together and collude to limit their oil production for the sole purpose of increasing prices. The 9th Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling in Int. Assoc. of Machinists in 1981 (649 F.2d 1354), but on the basis of an entirely different legal principle. The 9th Circuit held that the Court could not hear this case because of the ``act of state'' doctrine, which holds that a U.S. court will not adjudicate a politically sensitive dispute which would require the court to judge the legality of the sovereign act of a foreign state. The 9th Circuit itself acknowledged in its Int. Assoc. of Machinists opinion that ``The [act of state] doctrine does not suggest a rigid rule of application,'' but rather application of the rule will depend on the circumstances of each case. The Court also noted that, ``A further consideration is the availability of internationally-accepted legal principles which would render the issues appropriate for judicial disposition.'' The Court then quotes from the Supreme Court's opinion in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964): It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international justice. Since the 9th Circuit issued its opinion in 1981, there have been major developments in international law that impact directly on the subject matter at issue. As we discuss in greater detail below, the 1990's have witnessed a significant increase in efforts to seek compliance with basic international norms of behavior through international courts and tribunals. In addition, there is strong evidence of an emerging consensus in international law that price fixing by cartels violates such international norms. Accordingly, a court choosing to apply the act of state doctrine to a dispute with OPEC today may very well reach a different conclusion than the 9th Circuit reached almost twenty years ago. You should also examine whether the anticompetitive conduct of the international oil cartel is being effectuated by private companies who are subject to the enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws (for example, former state oil companies that have now been privatized) rather than sovereign foreign states. If such private oil companies are determined to in fact be participating in the anticompetitive conduct of the oil cartel, then we would urge that these companies be named as defendants in an antitrust lawsuit in addition to the OPEC members. (2) A suit in the International Court of Justice at the Hague based upon ``the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,'' which includes prohibiting oil cartels from conspiring to limit production and raise prices. In addition to such domestic antitrust actions, we believe you should give serious consideration to bringing a case against OPEC before the International Court of Justice (the ``ICJ'') at the Hague. You should consider both a direct suit against the conspiring nations as well as a request for an advisory opinion from the Court through the auspices of the U.N. Security Council. The actions of OPEC in restraint of trade violate ``the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.'' Under Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, the Court is required to apply these ``general principles'' when deciding cases before it. This would clearly be a cutting-edge lawsuit, making new law at the international level. But there have been exciting developments in recent years which suggest that the ICJ would be willing to move in this direction. In a number of contexts, we have seen a greater respect for and adherence to fundamental international principles and norms by the world community. For example, we have seen the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993. Each of these bodies has been active, handing down numerous indictments and convictions against individuals who have violated fundamental principles of human rights. For example, as of December 1, 1999 the Yugoslavia tribunal alone had handed down 91 public indictments. Today, adherence to international principles has spread from the tribunals in the Hague to individual nations around the world. Recently, the exiled former dictator of Chad, Hissene Habre, was indicted in Senegal on charges of torture and barbarity stemming from his reign, where he allegedly killed and tortured thousands. This case is similar to the case brought against former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet by Spain on the basis of his alleged atrocities in Chile. At the request of the Spanish government, Pinochet was detained in London for months until an English court determined that he was too ill to stand trial. The emerging scope of international law was demonstrated in an advisory opinion sought by the U.N. General Assembly in 1996 to declare illegal the use or threat to use nuclear weapons. Such an issue would ordinarily be thought beyond the scope of a judicial determination given the doctrines of national sovereignty and the importance of nuclear weapons to the defense of many nations. The ICJ ultimately ruled eight to seven, however, that the use or threat to use nuclear weapons ``would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.'' The fact that this issue was subject to a decision by the ICJ, shows the rapidly expanding horizons of international law. While these emerging norms of international behavior have tended to focus more on human rights than on economic principles, there is one economic issue on which an international consensus has emerged in recent years--the illegitimacy of price fixing by cartels. For example, on April 27, 1998, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development issued an official ``Recommendation'' that all twenty-nine member nations ``ensure that their competition laws effectively halt and deter hard core cartels.'' The recommendation defines ``hard core cartels'' as those which, among other things, fix prices or establish output restriction quotas. The Recommendation further instructs member countries ``to cooperate with each other in enforcing their laws against such cartels.'' On October 9, 1998, eleven Western Hemisphere countries held the first ``Antitrust Summit of the Americas'' in Panama City, Panama. At the close of the summit, all eleven participants issued a joint communique in which they express their intention ``to affirm their commitment to effective enforcement of sound competition laws, particularly in combating illegal price-fixing, bid-rigging, and market allocation.'' The communique further expresses the intention of these countries to ``cooperate with one another . . . to maximize the efficacy and efficiency of the enforcement of each country's competition laws.'' One of the countries participating in this communique, Venezuela, is a member of

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, first, I thank the Senator from Minnesota for yielding. I know she yielded to Senator Leahy; and Senator Leahy, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, has made some comments which I think I ought to supplement. I believe when you have the subpoena issued for Ms. Sara Taylor, the White House staff, it is appropriate at this time. A letter was sent to Ms. Taylor on April 11 requesting testimony and documents, and there has been no response. It is my hope, as I have said at Judiciary Committee meetings, executive sessions, that we will yet be able to work this out with Ms. Taylor on a cooperative basis without any further controversy. The enforcement mechanism of the subpoenas is very lengthy. The last time it was undertaken, with the conflict between congressional oversight and the White House, it took more than 2 years. That would take us into 2009, after the election of a new President. I think with respect to the subpoena to former White House Counsel Harriet Miers, there again the request went out some time ago, and they have not been forthcoming, and I think it is appropriate to proceed-- again, in a manner which looks toward conciliation, looks toward resolving it without controversy. I talked again today to White House Counsel Fred Fielding on the question as to how we are going to obtain testimony from executive branch officials who are high up in the White House, and the President made a televised statement some time ago setting forth the acceptable parameters from the President's point of view. After reflecting on it and talking to members of the Judiciary Committee--both Democrats and Republicans--I think that most of what the President wants can be accommodated. He does not want his officials, his employees, put under oath. My preference would be to have an oath, but I would not insist on that because the testimony would be subject to prosecution under the False Statements Act, 18 United States Code 1001. He does not want to have the sessions public. My preference again would be to have them public, but I would not insist upon that. He does not want to have the officials come before the Senate Judiciary Committee, then before the House Judiciary Committee, and I think we can accommodate that, having members of both committees--both Democrats and Republicans--in a manageable group to obtain the necessary information. The one point where I think it is indispensable is that we obtain a transcript. If you don't have a transcript, people walk out of the room in perfectly good faith and have different versions as to what happened. I think it is in the interest of all sides to have a transcript. It is in the interest of congressional oversight so we have it precise, so we can pursue questions and have them in black and white and know where we stand. It is important for the people whose depositions are being taken that it be written down, too, so nobody can say they said something they didn't say because we know what they said when it is transcribed. I am pleased to say to the distinguished Presiding Officer, the Senator from Rhode Island who is nodding in the affirmative, as a former U.S. attorney, attorney general, and one who has had experience with transcripts, as has the chairman and I, it needs to be written down. I hope we can accommodate the competing interests here. There is no doubt there are very important issues involved: The request for resignations from the U.S. attorneys and the reasons why they were replaced. There is no doubt the President has the authority to remove all 93 U.S. attorneys without giving any reason. President Clinton did that at the beginning of his term in 1993. I think it is equally clear the President can't replace people for bad reasons. There is a suggestion of pressure on the U.S. attorney from San Diego that she was going after some of former Congressman Cunningham's associates, who is serving an 8-year sentence, and that pressure was put on some other U.S. attorney in some other direction for an improper purpose, and that is an appropriate question for congressional oversight. We had a lengthy and heated debate earlier this week on the resolution to say the Senate has no confidence in the Attorney General. That was defeated on procedural grounds. But the issue of the operation of the Department of Justice is not yet finished. This inquiry is very important. Next to the Department of Defense, which defends the homeland and is our military defense, next in line is the Department of Justice, which deals with terrorism, deals with drugs, deals with violent crime and that department has to function in the interests of the American people. And getting to the bottom of this investigation is important for that purpose. So I wanted to appear to make these brief comments, following the statement by the distinguished Chairman. I thank the Senator from Minnesota. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, similarly reserving the right to object, I have been waiting. I wonder if we might have a unanimous consent agreement that I be permitted to speak for 10 minutes, unless the Senator from California wants to go first?

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, how much time remains on each side?

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the majority has 18\1/2\ minutes, and the minority has how much?

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to speak about the resolution of no confidence on Attorney General Gonzales. This resolution poses many currents and crosscurrents and many overlapping currents and crosscurrents. I have written down five of the currents which I believe are involved in the analysis of this issue. First: Have I lost confidence in Attorney General Gonzales? Second: Is this resolution politically motivated? Third: Does Senator Schumer have a conflict of interest? Fourth: Will this resolution likely lead to the departure of Attorney General Gonzales or give him more reason to stay on? And fifth: Is the principal reason for this resolution to help the Department of Justice or to embarrass Republicans? It is an interrelationship and a wing of these various considerations which has led to my own conclusion on this resolution. First of all, have I lost confidence in Attorney General Gonzales? Absolutely yes. Attorney General Gonzales has made representations which are false. He said he was not involved in discussions. He was contradicted by three of his top aides and by documentary evidence, e- mails. He said he was not involved in deliberations. Again, he was contradicted by three top aides and documentary evidence, the e-mails. He said he was not involved in the memoranda which were circulated on this matter. Again, contradicted by three top aides and documentary evidence. He said the terror surveillance program brought no objection within the Department of Justice, and we find on examination there were serious dissents within the Department of Justice on the constitutionality of the terrorist surveillance program. So much so that Alberto Gonzales, when he served as White House counsel, was one of those who went to the hospital room of then-Attorney General John Ashcroft to get Attorney General Ashcroft to certify that the program was constitutional. So there is no doubt in my mind that there is no confidence which is residing in Attorney General Gonzales. This is much more than a personnel matter. This is a matter for the administration of the Department of Justice, which is second only to the Department of Defense on the welfare of the people of the United States. The Department of Justice has the responsibility for investigating terrorism and antiterrorism, has the responsibility for enforcing our drug laws, has the responsibility for enforcing Federal laws of violent crime and white-collar crime. The Attorney General has the responsibility for supervising 93 U.S. attorneys from around the country who have very important positions, something that I know something about in some detail, since I was the district attorney of Philadelphia for some 8 years. There is no doubt the Department at the present time is in shambles. The Attorney General called me before his hearing came up and asked for my advice, and I said: Set out the reasons why you asked these individuals to resign. Set out the reasons why. He did not do so. The day after a very tempestuous hearing in the Judiciary Committee, he called me again and asked for my advice as to what he ought to do. I said: Al, you still haven't responded as to why you asked these people to resign. I took the position at that time, and I take the position at the present time, that I am not going to ask the President to fire Attorney General Gonzales. That is a matter for the President to decide. I am not going to let the President tell me how to vote, and I am not going to say to him how he ought to run the executive branch on grounds of separation of power. Similarly, with Attorney General Gonzales, as to what he does, that is a personal decision for him to make. But I have been very emphatic in the Judiciary Committee hearings, as we have investigated this matter, that I think the Attorney General has not done the job and that the Department of Justice would be much better off without him. The second question I looked at is: Is this resolution politically motivated? I think that it certainly is. This ties in to the crosscurrent as to whether Senator Schumer has a conflict of interest. I believe he does. I said so to Senator Schumer eyeball to eyeball, confronting him in the Judiciary Committee meeting. The day after New Mexico's U.S. Attorney David Iglesias testified about a conversation that Iglesias had with Senator Domenici, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee posted on their Web site criticisms of Senator Pete Domenici. The following day, the Democratic fundraising apparatus, led by Senator Schumer, published a fundraising letter, and there is no doubt about that conflict of interest. Senator Schumer has been designated to lead the investigation because he is the chairman of the relevant subcommittee. So I think there is no doubt about the overtone of heavy politicization and the conflict of interest. The third consideration I have is will this resolution likely lead to the departure or give the Attorney General a reason to stay on? My hunch is the thrust of the resolution, if it seeks his ouster, is going to be a boomerang and is going to be counterproductive. My own sense is there is no confidence in the Attorney General on this side of the aisle but that the views will not be expressed in this format. Already, some who have called for his resignation on the Republican side of the aisle have said they will not vote for this resolution. Others who have declined to comment about his capacity have said that this is not the proper way to proceed, that our form of government does not have a no- confidence vote. Is the principal reason for this resolution to help the Department of Justice or to embarrass Republicans? I think clear cut, it is designed to embarrass Republicans. It is designed to embarrass Republicans if the Senate says the Senate has no confidence in the Attorney General, and it is designed to embarrass Republicans who vote against the motion for cloture because it will be a ``gotcha'' 30-second commercial in later campaigns. It will be used to say that whoever votes against the motion to invoke cloture is sanctioning the conduct of Attorney General Gonzales, and anybody who votes against the motion to invoke cloture is going to be the recipient of those 30-second ``gotcha'' commercials. Now, there are many reasons to vote against the cloture motion. One reason--and a dominant reason--is that the Senate has a lot more important things to do than engage in this debate on this issue. Thursday night, the majority leader took down the immigration bill. Regrettably, he had cause to because the Republican Senators who had objected to the immigration bill wouldn't allow any amendments to come up. They wouldn't allow their amendments--they didn't step forward with their amendments, nor did they allow others to offer amendments. But we were on the verge of getting a list. It was taking a little more time. The majority leader took down the bill. But the national interest would be a lot better served had we continued with the bill on Friday or perhaps on Saturday--we can work on Saturday--or return to the bill today--or still return to the bill today, instead of taking up this resolution. Another reason why people could justifiably vote against cloture is because the investigation is not complete. That is still hanging fire, so why have the resolution before we finish our investigation? But there is another reason: the Constitution arguably expresses a way to deal with Attorney General Gonzales, and that is by impeachment, as it is not in line to have a resolution of disapproval. That is the British system of no confidence. It is my sense that many on this side of the aisle, if not most, if not almost all--I ask unanimous consent for 1 additional minute.

Mr. SPECTER. It is my sense that many on this side of the aisle-- most, if not almost all--will vote against cloture because there are ample reasons to vote against cloture. But as I look at this matter, as to which is the more weighty, the more compelling, the more important, candidly stating I have no confidence in Attorney General Gonzales or rejecting the outright political chicanery which is involved in this resolution offered by the Democrats, I come down on the side of the interests of the country, and moving for improvements in the Department of Justice is to make a candid statement that I have no confidence in the Attorney General, which I have said repeatedly. It is no surprise. I am going to deal with this resolution on the merits and vote to invoke cloture. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Will the Senator from Alabama yield for a question?

Mr. SPECTER. I appreciate the Senator from Alabama yielding for a question. I had several in mind. I have been asked by the majority leader to ask a substitute question; that is, would the Senator approve the agreement so we can proceed with the amendments?

Mr. SPECTER. It would be all right. The Senator yielded for a question and I wish to ask a question. Did the Senator make any effort to join the Democrats and Republicans, including this Senator, who were working on the legislation?

Mr. SPECTER. Will the Senator yield further?

Mr. SPECTER. If the Senator will yield for one more question.

Mr. SPECTER. I can understand that and appreciate why he would not want to give up his independence and would not want to be bound by an agreement. But I think the important factor is the Senator from Alabama wasn't excluded, if he wanted to join under those terms. The followup question I have for the Senator from Alabama is this: How would the Senator structure negotiations on a matter of this kind, as complex as it is, as many views as there are, to try to have a practical bill that would be presented on the floor of the Senate-- recognizing that this Senator has said on a number of occasions that I would have preferred the committee process? The Senator from Alabama is on the Judiciary Committee and was an active participant in the formulation of the bill in the 109th Congress. But given our situation, how would the Senator from Alabama have proceeded differently to try to structure a bill to present to the Senate?

Mr. SPECTER. I have one final question for the Senator from Alabama. I know the Senator from Alabama acknowledges the existence of the problem. Would the Senator from Alabama consider drafting legislation which the Senate could consider, perhaps in the nature of a substitute, as to how we should deal with this problem, which I know the Senator from Alabama acknowledges?

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if the majority leader will yield for a question.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I direct a question to the Senator from Alabama. What would you like on the timing?

Mr. SPECTER. Is the Senator from Alabama asking for 45 minutes equally divided for each of the amendments?