Arlen Specter

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. I don't know if the Senator from Iowa knows this, but Jim Sourwine has served almost 100 different members of the Appropriations Committee during his time in the Senate. Imagine each of the desks in this Chamber filled with U.S. Senators, and you will have a sense of the number of committee members Jim served.

Mr. SPECTER. Jim came to the Senate in 1972 when he was first detailed to the committee from the Department of Labor. He found his place quickly and began responding to what were known as ``Harleygrams''--daily instructions from Harley Dirks, who was Senator Magnuson's clerk of the Labor, HEW and Related Agencies Subcommittee, as it was called then. After Senator Magnuson, Jim served under Senator Schmitt in the 97th Congress, and then Senator Weicker and Senator Chiles. Since the 101st Congress, the Senator from Iowa and I have exchanged the gavel on several occasions. I never miss a chance to mention that I always prefer to have the gavel in my hand. On this occasion, I should also say that I prefer to have Jim Sourwine's services on staff as well.

Mr. SPECTER. I would like to add several other accomplishments of Congress for which Jim should feel a great sense of pride. In 2002, Congress completed a doubling of the NIH budget over a 5-year period. Jim's thorough knowledge of the bill and the budget was instrumental in securing the doubling. If there was a way to write bill language that would save money or change a date to free up some cash, Jim knew how to do it. When Jim started working at the Department of Labor in 1967, the Job Corps program was in its infancy, just 3 years old. Today, it is a $1.6 billion enterprise widely touted for its performance standards and student outcomes, helping more than 60,000 youths each year. After the Quecreek coal mine accident, I held a hearing in Pennsylvania to look into the mine safety issues related to that situation. We have held two mine safety hearings since the Sago and Alma disasters in early 2006. Jim organized and staffed those hearings. What's more, he helped craft legislation that I introduced last year which contributed to the development of the MINER Act. This act passed last year and is now the law of the land. It is the most significant piece of mine safety legislation passed in more than 30 years and its effective implantation will save lives. Jim should feel very good about the work he did to support that legislation, as well as other worker protection programs. I believe the Senator from Iowa and I could go on for some time on all that Jim Sourwine has meant to the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Senate and the American people. For me, I want him to remember always what the long hours have done for so many. Jim, best wishes to you on your retirement. You will be missed.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition to comment about the events in the Department of Justice over the course of the past 10 days, with respect to the request for the resignations of seven United States attorneys and the disclosures that the FBI was improperly using national security letters. With respect to the matter about the request for resignations of the United States attorneys, I believe it is important for the Judiciary Committee to proceed with its inquiry to find out exactly what happened. There is no doubt--I think it is undisputed--that the Attorney General has the authority to replace United States attorneys. There is a serious question if they are replaced for improper motives. We know when President Clinton was elected, one of his first acts in early 1993, when he took office, was to replace all 93 of the United States attorneys. I had the occasion recently to discuss this with the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Tom Corbett, who was a U.S. attorney at that time for the Western District of Pennsylvania. In 1993, he had the position in the United States attorneys organization to make those telephone calls. That was handled in due course, and nobody challenged the President's authority to replace United States attorneys. Now, questions have arisen as to whether United States attorneys were replaced improperly--for example, the question has been raised as to U.S. Attorney Lam in the Southern District of California, in San Diego, and whether she was replaced because of her conviction of former Congressman Duke Cunningham, now serving an 8-year sentence, and whether she was about to investigate other people who were politically powerful. Ms. Lam was questioned about that. I asked her whether she considered the request for her resignation to be inappropriate. She said she was surprised by it. I pressed her for her own conclusion. I think we may need more by way of inquiry to examine what her performance ratings were to see if there was a basis for her being asked to resign. We had a situation with Mr. Cummins, who was a U.S. attorney in the Eastern District of Arkansas. He received a telephone call, which he then relayed to other dismissed United States attorneys, and he did it by e-mail very shortly after the telephone call. The question I had for Mr. Cummins was, what was said? The e-mail did not contain the language of the caller from the Department of Justice. It had Mr. Cummins' sense, or feelings, that it was a warning. After little discussion, one lawyer to another, he said it may have been friendly advice. Well, that perhaps requires a little more analysis, if not a little more inquiry. Then we have the situation with the U.S. attorney from New Mexico, where, according to the news reports--and we have to find this out from the actual witnesses--there had been concerns expressed by people in New Mexico as to whether he was doing his job properly. On those concerns--at least according to the press--we have to find this out from the witnesses. Those calls, according to members of the press, or according to what has been reported in the press, were relayed to White House officials, and they passed them on to the Department of Justice. We have to look at that and ask ourselves the question of whether there is impropriety in that. If the Department of Justice is to evaluate whether a United States attorney ought to be retained, is it relevant as to what people think about him or her? The comments may require that we look at whether he was doing the job. Those are matters we have yet to determine. So when we have declarations made on the Senate floor that are conclusory, condemning the Department of Justice for what it has done, I say that is premature. When the issue came up about the hearing that was a week ago today, in my capacity as ranking member of the committee, I was asked to waive the 7-day rule, and I agreed to do so. I agreed to do so because I thought it was important to move ahead promptly. When Senator Leahy has raised the issue about other witnesses coming in, I think he is correct on that. The issue was raised about bringing in former White House Counsel Harriet Miers, issues were raised about bringing in people from the Department of Justice and other people in the office of the White House Counsel. I think that ought to be done. I do not think it is necessary to subpoena them. We will see. Before subpoenas ought to be issued, or before there even ought to be an issue raised about subpoenas, we ought to make a determination as to whether people are willing to come in voluntarily. When you talk about subpoenas, the first public reaction is: Why do they have to be subpoenaed? Why don't they come in voluntarily? Do they have something to hide? The next inference or question is: Are they guilty of something that they have to be subpoenaed? So let us proceed in the regular course of business. I was a district attorney for some 8 years and an assistant DA before that, and I have been on the Judiciary Committee for 27 years. The regular way to do business is to ask people to come in. If they refuse, then you can talk about subpoenas and you can get tough if it is necessary to do that. I regret I could not be here when Senator Schumer was on the floor earlier today. He has made public statements about the Attorney General politicizing the office. Well, that may be Senator Schumer's opinion, his judgment. But let's get down to specific facts as to what is involved in the politicization. We are all working here in a political field. I, frankly, have a concern to see Senator Pete Domenici on the Web site of the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee. I have a little concern about some of the statements that have been made by Members of this body, rushing to judgment, before we have had these witnesses in. There has been a request for witnesses from the administration, from the White House. Well, why condemn the parties and condemn the Department until we have found out what the facts are? My view, as I expressed last Thursday in the Judiciary Committee's executive session, has been to tone down the rhetoric. We are now on the heels of the issue of the request for resignations of the United States attorneys. We have the disclosures that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had misused the national security letters. We gave them broader powers in the PATRIOT Act. We broadened the powers from cases involving foreign powers to national security matters generally. We put in a provision as to exigent circumstances, which means an emergency. Until we find, at least preliminarily, that the FBI used the exigent category more broadly--in some situations, they were to get statements on probable cause for the judicial authorization. In giving the FBI these broader powers under the--Madam President, the Senate is not in order.

Mr. SPECTER. We gave the FBI these broader powers under the PATRIOT Act because of the importance of fighting terrorism, and that is a major problem of the United States today, an enormous problem worldwide. We are concerned that where the FBI exercises these greater powers there has to be an appropriate regard for civil liberties and for constitutional rights. If it weren't for the fact we inserted in the reauthorization the authority of the inspector general to make these audits, we would not have found out what was going on. So then in evaluating what the Department of Justice has done, I think it is important to look thoroughly at the issues raised by the inspector general. It is a thick volume. We are going to need oversight hearings. Senator Leahy, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, already announced that. I think we may have to go further and consider changing the authority of the FBI under the PATRIOT Act. If they do not use the powers within the confines the Congress has prescribed and the President authorized, then we may have to limit their power. There are serious issues that confront the Department of Justice at this time and the Judiciary Committee, in its oversight capacity and investigative capacity, has the full authority of power to find out what the facts are, and we will speak plainly. I will have no hesitation in making a factually based judgment if they have acted improperly. Let us see the background of the firing of these U.S. attorneys, and let us see what the details are on the national security letters and what the Department of Justice does to correct the situation. I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair. (The remarks of Mr. Specter pertaining to the introduction of S. 813 and S. 814 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced bills and Joint Resolutions.'')

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, in the absence of any other Senator seeking recognition, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I listened with interest to the contentions of the Senator from Arizona and would respond in a number of ways. First, the Senator from Arizona went to some length to try to undercut the conclusion that aliens are entitled to the same rights as American citizens--aliens held at Guantanamo--and made reference to no case before Rasul had so held. But the issue is what does Rasul hold? I would refer the Senator from Arizona to the opinion of Justice Stevens, which appears at page 2686 of volume 124 of the Supreme Court Recorder, which says as follows: Aliens held at the base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to invoke the Federal Courts' authority under section 2241. Now, it is true that the Congress can change a statute, but it is equally true that Congress cannot change a constitutional right, and there is a constitutional right to habeas corpus, which is set forth explicitly in article I, section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution, which says: The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. Now, where the Constitution is explicit in the circumstances where the constitutional right can be suspended, obviously there is a conclusion that there is such a constitutional right. The Senator from Arizona goes into considerable analysis as to why the Eisentrager case has not been overruled by Rasul. Well, it seems pretty plain to me on the face that Rasul does overrule Eisentrager, and I cited in yesterday's argument the conclusion of Justice Scalia that Rasul overruled Eisentrager. Justice Scalia complains of that. If he had found some way to distinguish Eisentrager in the Rasul opinion, I think he would have done so. The Senator from Arizona says we can't rely on a dissenting opinion as to what the holding is. Well, I would disagree with that. I think a dissenting justice has a good bit of reliability, and especially Justice Scalia. When the concession is made that Justice Scalia reads Rasul to overrule Eisentrager, I think that is pretty good authority, perhaps better authority than the opinion of Arlen Specter, maybe even better authority than the opinion of the distinguished Senator from Arizona, who is a real legal scholar--on the Arizona Law Review, all the academic standards, but perhaps not superior in legal analysis to Justice Scalia.

Mr. SPECTER. I have just had a stipulation, may it please the court, that Justice Scalia's interpretation would topple Senator Kyl's interpretation. Let me pose the question directly to Senator Kyl from the debate we have just joined, and I thank him for coming and participating in the debate. It is a rarity on the floor of the Senate to have two Senators debating an issue. Isn't the flat statement by the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Stevens, that ``aliens held at base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to invoke the Federal Courts' authority under section 2241''--albeit that is a statute and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has tried to sidestep the court opinion in Rasul by saying it was a holding on a statute which the Congress can change, and denies the very strong language of the court in saying that there is a right which was established at the time of 1789, and the Constitution speaks explicitly of the ways to suspend the right, so there is a constitutional right--but taking that language, ``aliens held at base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to invoke the Federal Courts' authority under section 2241,''--isn't that conclusive that aliens are entitled to invoke the habeas corpus rights under the Constitution?

Mr. SPECTER. Well, Mr. President, may I redirect the line of contention that if the Supreme Court said authoritatively that aliens are covered under a habeas corpus statute, wouldn't that apply a fortiori necessarily to aliens being covered under a constitutional right of habeas corpus?

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I would ask the Senator from Arizona if there is anything in the legislation, 2241, statutory right of habeas corpus, which in any way suggests that it is an expansion of the right of habeas corpus to apply to aliens who were not being comprehended in the ordinary understanding of the constitutional right of habeas corpus. Anything at all in the statute or legislative history?

Mr. SPECTER. Well, Mr. President, it may be uninformative and it may be unclear, but it doesn't, on a statutory basis, extend the right to aliens. To make the contention that a reading of the statutory right of habeas corpus, which goes not beyond that language, was an attempt to extend it, and that the Court, in Rasul, was saying, well, the statute gives more rights than the Constitution, I think, is an extraordinary stretch. But I will conclude the colloquy with the contention that certainly the Great Writ, the constitutional right with all its majesty, would be no narrower than a statute. I would concede Congress could extend the statute further, but there is no indication absolutely that the Congress did intend it. And that the court of appeals' decision, distinguishing Rasul as being a statutory interpretation, and then the court of appeals saying there is no constitutional right, is thinner than tissue paper. But we will hear more from Justice Stevens, I am sure, on this point in due course. Let me now move to a portion of my argument yesterday on which the Senator from Arizona has not commented. I will begin with the memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy dated July 7, 2004, which defines enemy combatants and then says that notice will be given to all detainees and they will be notified ``of the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus in the courts of the United States.'' As I said yesterday, I hadn't noted this provision until we did the research preparing for debate on this amendment. I will first direct a question to the Senator from Arizona as to whether the Senator from Arizona was familiar, before I cited it yesterday, that the Department of Defense had acknowledged the rights of Guantanamo detainees to seek a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal courts?

Mr. SPECTER. The Department of Defense concedes that detainees have a right to a writ of habeas corpus, that Congress has delegated to the Secretary of Defense the authority to promulgate rules relating to the detainees, and where the Secretary of Defense through the Deputy says they have a right to habeas corpus, that should end the discussion. But let me pursue one other line further here; that is, the fairness of what happens under the Combat Status Review Tribunals. The memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense defines what an enemy combatant is. It says: The term ``enemy combatant'' shall mean an individual who was part of supporting Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy forces. Then the memorandum further says that: A preponderance of the evidence shall be the standard used in reaching this determination, but there shall be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government's evidence. The first question I direct to the Senator from Arizona relates to the rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government's evidence, and note that a very basic, fundamental, Anglo-Saxon, U.S. right is the presumption of innocence. Does the Senator from Arizona think it is fair that there be a presumption of guilt articulated in a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government's evidence?

Mr. SPECTER. Wait a minute. Mr. President, regular order. The Senator from Arizona may yield, but I have directed the question through the Chair to the Senator from Arizona. Having had an extensive discussion on this issue yesterday--and when I say ``extensive,'' it was extensive by the Senator from South Carolina--all factors considered, I would just as soon not hear it again but would be willing to listen to it later.

Mr. SPECTER. No coaching.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, that is a good segue into my next question, as to whether the Combat Status Review Tribunals give you a fair opportunity. I was about to quote Justice O'Connor in support of my argument that there is not a fair opportunity. Let me be very specific. The decision of Judge Green, In re: Guantanamo Cases, which I cited yesterday, which appears in 355 Fed. Sup. 2d 443--and I quote from her statement, at page 468. Judge Greene says this: The inherent lack of fairness of the CSRT's [Combat Status Review Tribunal's] consideration of classified information not disclosed to the detainees is perhaps most vividly illustrated in the following unclassified colloquy, which, though taken from a case not precisely before this judge, exemplifies the practice and severe disadvantages faced by all Guantanamo prisoners. In reading a list of allegations forming the basis for the detention, Mustafa Ait Idir, a petitioner in Boumediene--which is the case that went to the court of appeals; this is the case which they decided and upheld the procedures of the Combat Status Review Tribunal--Judge Green goes on to say: The Recorder of the CSRT asserted: ``While living in Bosnia, the detainee associated with a known al-Qaida operative.'' In response the following exchange occurred. Detainee: Give me his name. Tribunal President: I do not know. Detainee: How can I respond to this? And then the detainee later says: I asked the interrogators to tell me who this person was. Then I could tell you if I might have known this person, but not if person is a terrorist. Maybe I knew this person as a friend. Maybe it was a person that worked with me. Maybe it was a person that was on my team. But I do not know if this person is Bosnian, Indian or whatever. If you tell me the name, then I can respond and defend myself against this accusation. The Tribunal President then says: We are asking you the questions and we need you to respond to what is on the unclassified summary. And the detainee later said: I was hoping you had evidence that you can give me. If I was in your place--and I apologize in advance for these words--but if a supervisor came to me and showed me accusations like this, I would take these accusations and I would hit him in the face with them. Sorry about that. And then in parens it says: Everyone in the tribunal room laughed. That is from the transcript. The Tribunal President said: We had a laugh but it is OK. Then Judge Green says: The laughter reflected in the transcript is understandable, and this exchange might have been truly humorous had the consequences of the detainee's ``enemy combatant status'' not been so terribly serious and had the detainee's criticism of the process not been so piercingly accurate. This tribunal, as to the detainee in the Boumediene case, that got to the circuit court of appeals--how the circuit court of appeals could say this is fair, how the circuit court of appeals could say this comports with the definition the Department of Defense has set out, that enemy combatant means ``an individual who is a part or supporting Taliban or al-Qaida forces or including a person who has committed a belligerent act or who has directly supported hostilities in aid of the enemy Armed Forces'' when the only thing in the transcript is ``while living in Bosnia the detainee associated with a known al-Qaida operative''--``associated with a known al-Qaida operative'' hardly meets the definition of the Department of Defense itself, of supporting Taliban or al-Qaida forces or ``associated forces that are engaged in hostilities'' or ``a person who has committed a belligerent act.'' This detainee, whose detention was upheld by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia on as great a stretch as imaginable on legal principles, is looking at a record where all the detainee was supposed to have done was talked to al-Qaida. They couldn't even name the person. That is miles from satisfying the definition by the Department of Defense. Let me ask the Senator from Arizona, is that fair?

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I would not mind being a bit presumptuous. I wouldn't even mind being a lot presumptuous in response to the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. But I don't think it is presumptuous at all to go into the facts, which we know from Judge Green's opinion, as to the detainee involved in the Boumediene case and where the only allegation is that he talked to an al-Qaida person and they couldn't even give the name. You have the definition of the Department of Defense requiring that there be information about the detainee supporting al-Qaida forces or committing a belligerent act. However, nobody said those things about the detainee in the case. And then there is the court of appeals, a split court, with the opinion of Judge Rogers in dissent, I understand the relative merits of a two-judge majority, one in dissent, but that doesn't overcome the continuing importance of the Rogers' analysis of the majority opinion concerning their attempt to slice the apple by holding that the Supreme Court's opinion in Rasul was statutory and not constitutional. The majority said that the Eisentrager case was not overruled by Rasul. But it obviously was, as Justice Scalia acknowledged in his dissent in the Rasul case. And Justice Scalia would have all the more reason for disagreeing if there was any basis at all to say that Eisentrager was not overruled. You have the court of appeals relying on the Eisentrager case that was specifically overruled by Rasul, and not acknowledging a constitutional right of habeas corpus and not acknowledging the fact that while you can change an act of Congress, a statute cannot trump the Constitution. I do not think it is presumptive at all to say that the procedures under the combat status review tribunal ought to be changed. Regrettably we are not going to get a vote on this matter on this bill. We are not going to get a vote because a cloture petition has been filed. That is arcane. But in the unlikely event anybody is watching on C-SPAN 2, that means nongermane amendments will fall, and this is nongermane for technical reasons. I tried yesterday to get cloture on this amendment, which would have enabled us to get a vote tomorrow morning at the time of the cloture vote on the underlying bill. However, that required getting 17 signatures, and the majority leader was opposed, and the Democrats would not sign on. There are a few Republicans who were prepared to sign on; some did. But talking to Senator Leahy, who is the cosponsor, we are going to try to get the majority leader to bring it up free standing, or we can add it on to some other bill, and we will be better prepared to try to get cloture in the future. Let me say one final word, and that is, Senator Kyl and I are good friends. Senator Graham and I are good friends. We sit on many matters where we are in agreement. I have great respect for Senator Kyl. I already identified his qualifications--law review, outstanding scholar, outstanding Senator. Senator Graham is an acknowledged expert in military law, knows more about military law than perhaps anybody else in the Chamber, not that he knows more about constitutional law than anybody else in the Chamber, but as much constitutional law as anybody else in the Chamber.

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield for one question?

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, when the Senator from South Carolina says, in the case cited that got to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, where the charge was he had talked to an al-Qaida person, but they could not give the name--and the Senator from South Carolina seeks to justify that on the ground there might be some circumstance where disclosing the name would reveal a confidential source--can the Senator from South Carolina give any conceivable way there would be a disclosure of a source simply by identifying the al- Qaida person this detainee was supposed to have talked to?

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I find it very hard--really impossible--to follow that answer. I cannot conceive of what the Shaikh Mohammed case has to do with my question or has to do with the proceeding before the Combat Status Review Tribunal for the detainee whose case got to the court of appeals, where he was accused of talking to an al-Qaida person, and they could not even identify the name of the person. That is not asking any places and times and whatever other activity was taken. I would rest my case, contrary to the arguments by the Senator from South Carolina, on that point. If anybody thinks the Senator from South Carolina has given any reason that they could not identify the identity of the al-Qaida person without disclosing a confidential source--not talking about when, where, and under what circumstances--if my colleagues who will vote on this ultimately are satisfied with the answer by the Senator from South Carolina, then I will accept their judgment.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, youth violence is an enormous problem across America, including Pennsylvania. Regrettably, the city of Philadelphia had more homicides last year than any major city. This is a problem that has been present in major American cities, and Philadelphia specifically, since the days when I was Philadelphia's district attorney. A great number of those homicides are related to youth violence. On January 19 of this year, I convened a meeting that was attended by Mayor John Street; District Attorney Abraham; U.S. Attorney Pat Meehan; and representatives of Governor Rendell, with whom I discussed the matter specifically. There was a followup hearing attended by Senator Casey and myself on February 19, where we addressed the subject with a focus on trying to find mentors for these at-risk youth. We are searching for long-range solutions to the crime problem, the underlying causes of crime--which is obviously very complicated and very long term--such as education, training, job training, decent housing, and a whole host of factors that lead to crime. It is a matter I have been working on for decades, since my days as an assistant district attorney in Philadelphia. Regrettably, we don't seem to be much further along on attacking those underlying causes of crime, or dealing with the problems of criminal recidivism, after people are released from jail. It is no surprise that if we release a functional illiterate from jail, they will go back to a crime of violence. Without being able to read or write and not having job training, there is a very high degree of recidivism. We are trying to push the so-called second offender law to give people rehabilitation after the first offense. Senator Casey and I believe that addresses the issue in the short term, but it is not the answer, because there is no absolute answer. However, short-term help could be provided if we could find mentors to team up with at-risk youth on an individual basis. Many of these at- risk youth come from broken homes and have no parental guidance. If there could be a mentor, or ``substitute parent,'' in the short term, I think that could be helpful. We have also worked with the superintendent of schools of Philadelphia, on some ideas he has about trying to give motivation to high school students, to put them on a path of going to college. We are working to have some early determination from the many colleges and universities in the Philadelphia area, to try to encourage these young people to be motivated to finish high school with the prospect of college. Regarding the mentoring program, we are asking the universities also to see if they can provide mentors from their student body or faculty and, in the case of students, to give them course credit. We reached out to the athletic teams in Philadelphia, including the 76ers, the Eagles, and efforts are being made to include the Philadelphia Phillies as well, because it is well known that young people are interested in role models and might be willing to follow that lead. We have also moved forward on trying to improve the situation in the city of Reading, which has been designated as the 21st most violent city in the United States. Toward that end, on February 23, with the cooperation of one of Reading's leading citizens, Al Boscov, we convened a meeting with the U.S. Attorney's Office, the FBI, the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the State police, the local chief of police, the local sheriff, the school superintendent, and with citizens to again look at the crime problem. We intend to follow up in Reading to try to get additional personnel to assist that city, because it is, as I said, the 21st most dangerous city in the United States. We have similar meetings planned for Lancaster and York next Monday, on the 12th. We also intend to go to Allentown and other cities. In Pittsburgh, we plan to convene a meeting on April 5, looking for ways to bring more Federal resources to bear on this crime problem. We are looking to the upcoming budget to try to provide more funds, similar to the $2.5 million grant we obtained for the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to service the corridor from the Lehigh Valley through Reading and through Lancaster. I ask unanimous consent that a statement be printed, with understanding that there will be some repetition in the written statement of what I have presented extemporaneously.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the first bill which I am introducing, and that is to permit attorneys to deduct payment of litigation costs as ordinary and necessary business expenses. In litigation, illustratively on a personal injury claim, the plaintiff frequently is without funds and can only move forward with the litigation on a contingency fee basis. In these situations, it is customary for the attorney to advance the costs of filing fees, depositions, and other costs there may be. The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that those are loans from the attorney to the client, so the attorney cannot immediately deduct litigation payments as ordinary business expenses. If the litigation costs are treated as ordinary business expenses, the attorney would be able to deduct the expenses as they are incurred. The Ninth Circuit has held that the Internal Revenue Service is wrong. As a result, attorneys in States within the Ninth Circuit can deduct as ordinary and necessary expenses advances on litigation. This legislation would make it explicit under the Internal Revenue Code that these advanced costs could be deducted by attorneys across the country. Again, I ask that the Record contain my extemporaneous comments and the explanation as to why there is some repetition in the formal statement which I now ask unanimous consent be printed in the Record, as well as the two bills which follow these two pieces of legislation which I am introducing.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to introduce two bills relating to tax deductibility which impact unfairly on claimants and plaintiffs in litigation and on attorneys. The second bill relates to permitting a taxpayer to deduct expenses for attorney's fees in contingency fee cases. For example, if a plaintiff secures punitive damages of $15,000 and the attorney collects one-third contingency, $5,000 goes to the attorney. Under current law, the plaintiff is required to pay taxes on the full $15,000 without an above the line deduction for the $5,000 paid on attorney's fees. This is a result of technicalities of the Internal Revenue Code. My bill would clarify the tax law and will ensure consistent and fair treatment of taxpayers. Mr. President, I have just made an extemporaneous statement on the essence of the floor statement, and I now ask unanimous consent that the full floor statement be printed in the Record and that there be included the segue of why there is some repetition of what I have just said and the written formal statement itself.