Arlen Specter

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we proceed to rollcall votes on the Clinton amendment at 6:20, to be followed by a rollcall vote on the Cornyn amendment, with the Cornyn amendment being a 10-minute vote.

Mr. SPECTER. Reserving the right to object, how much time does Senator Cornyn have left?

Mr. SPECTER. We are talking about how much Senator Cornyn needs and how much Senator Schumer needs. We could delay the votes a bit. How much time does Senator Cornyn need?

Mr. SPECTER. I amend the unanimous consent request to give 5 more minutes to Senator Cornyn, 5 minutes to Senator Schumer, and that would bring us to 6:25, at which point I ask unanimous consent that we have rollcall votes on Senator Clinton, then a rollcall vote on Senator Cornyn, with the second vote to be 10 minutes.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am advised that we have not seen the amendments of the Senator from Louisiana. I repeat, we are going to be in here next week. We will take a look at them. We will accommodate her tomorrow, if we can, but we have to see the amendments before we can say anything.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, another aspect of our evening business is, at the conclusion of the sequencing stated in the unanimous consent agreement, to then lay down the Chambliss amendment. I am advised there are quite a number of Senators who want to speak on that. They can speak as long as they like. A vote will occur tomorrow on a tabling motion.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, we would be glad to respond after we see the amendments. We may need more time. We haven't seen the amendments. That has been a problem continuously, not having seen the amendments. I repeat to the Senator from Louisiana, if we can see the amendments, we can answer the question.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, may we start on the Kyl amendment?

Mr. SPECTER. Senator Reid has accurately stated the unanimous consent request. I adopt his statement.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, we are on the immigration bill. We have a lineup of amendments which we are anxious to take up. We have a considerable number of amendments pending on both sides of the aisle. Our lead amendment is the one to be offered by Senator Kennedy. The amendment has now been reviewed, and I think it may be necessary to have a little extra time, which ought not to pose a problem since the vote will not occur until 10 o'clock. But Senator Cornyn would like 10 minutes of time, and Senator Kyl may want a little time, so my suggestion would be that, if the Senator from Massachusetts wants to start the debate, that would be agreeable. It is his amendment, obviously. We would then turn to Senator Cornyn for 10 minutes. I would like to put other Senators on notice that we want to proceed with the other amendments. Senator Inhofe is next in line, then Senator Akaka, Senator Ensign, Senator Nelson, Senator Vitter, Senator Durbin, Senator Kyl, and Senator Chambliss. It would be appreciated if those Senators would come here at least 15 minutes ahead of the anticipated time their amendment will come up so that we could move right along and not lose floor time. I yield to my distinguished colleague from Massachusetts.

Mr. SPECTER. Ten for Senator Cornyn, ten for Senator Kyl, and I would like five.

Mr. SPECTER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Suppose we divide the time equally.

Mr. SPECTER. That is acceptable.

Mr. SPECTER. Agreed.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes. Mr. President, I opposed the amendment from the distinguished Senator from Texas yesterday because I believe there ought to be an opportunity for the immigrant himself or herself to file the petition. The amendment now pending by Senator Kennedy would leave it optional, leave the alternative: to be filed by the employer or to be filed by the immigrant. The vote yesterday was 50 to 48, and I was tempted to move to reconsider--I would have to change my vote to do that--but decided in the alternative that we would discuss the subject today with a different amendment. The issue of not having the immigrant subject to the control of the employer is an important one, to see to it that the immigrant is treated fairly. When the Senator from Texas seeks to be sure the immigrant has a job so that the employer has to make the application and the job will not be taken from some other American, I can understand his point. But I think there is a higher value in not having the immigrant subject to the control of the employer, where there may be coercion and pressure as to the amount of compensation or as to working conditions, notwithstanding any other provision of law. There is ample protection that citizenship will not be granted, or the process will not move forward, because the Kennedy amendment simply gives the immigrant the right to file a petition. After the petition and the efforts are made to get into the citizenship line, it will be evaluated by the appropriate authorities. I think the concerns Senator Cornyn has in mind will be met. I notice Senator Dorgan has come to the floor, and time has been reserved for Senator Dorgan--10 minutes. I yield to him at this time.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, following this vote, the next scheduled amendment is by the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Inhofe. There are negotiations in trying to work it out. They are supposedly very close. So we are not sure whether we will have Senator Inhofe's amendment and a side-by-side laid down. We will try to determine that while the vote is on. If they are table to work it out--or immediately following that, we will go to the amendment by Senator Akaka. We are going to try to work out time agreements so we can move the bill along on all of them. Let me remind my colleagues, we are going to enforce the rules strictly to 15 minutes and 5 so we can move the bill along. Let me also remind my colleagues on the Judiciary Committee that we are going to have our executive meeting in the President's Room. We had planned to have an executive meeting at 9 o'clock this morning, but then when the hearing on General Hayden was moved by the Intelligence Committee from 10 to 9:30, we could not have that meeting, so we are going to have it in the President's Room immediately following this vote. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, may I ask the Senator from West Virginia how long he would like?

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, that is entirely acceptable. I announce that following Senator Byrd we will be going to the Inhofe amendment. I understand they are very close on an agreement. If that agreement is reached, then I would like to move--although I am not asking consent for that now--to a 20-minute time agreement, if an agreement is reached, equally divided. If it is not reached, we will have side-by- side amendments. I alert Members as to what the schedule will be. Following that, Senator Akaka is next in line, and we are considering a time agreement there, also. I have been asked when the next vote will occur. I think we can move the bill most expeditiously if we continue to take up the amendments one at a time, but after the first votes bring all the Senators in to stack the votes. We will have a better idea as to when we will stack the votes when we have a better idea as to how many votes we will have. Meanwhile, the Judiciary Committee is meeting in executive session in the President's Room, so I ask Judiciary Committee members to go to that meeting. I thank the Chair and yield the floor to Senator Byrd.

Mr. SPECTER. By all means. I will yield to Senator Ensign. And I ask unanimous consent that then Senator Lugar and I be recognized for 5 minutes each to introduce a bill.

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, the distinguished Senator from Tennessee has been a leader in this field going back to his days as the Secretary of Education and Governor. Ten minutes would be fine. I think that is acceptable to Senator Alexander. I would like to remind Senators we are trying to move the bill along. The next Senator in line is Senator Akaka, and I think we are likely to be ready for Senator Akaka very briefly. If he could come to the floor, we could move ahead with his amendment. I thank the Chair, and I yield to Senator Alexander.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, on scheduling, we have not been able to work out an agreement on the Inhofe amendment. The Ensign amendment is about to go. We are trying to juggle schedules with one Senator going to a graduation and another Senator going to Florida. And if we can structure our schedules to have 12:30 votes, we can have two votes at 12:30, if the Senator from Nevada would be agreeable to a time limit between now and 12:30 equally divided. We will then be in position to vote on the Kennedy amendment. We will be in a position to vote on the Ensign amendment at 12:30. If we have the consent of Senator Inhofe--I have already discussed it with him informally--to set aside his amendment, the plan is to have a vote on the Inhofe amendment this afternoon. That will give time for others to have a side-by-side. That is how I would like to proceed.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am pleased to join with Senator Lugar, the principal sponsor, and Senators Dodd, Graham, and Schumer on the introduction of legislation which will codify a reporter's privilege, something that is very necessary. The matter came into sharp focus recently with the contempt citation and the incarceration of New York Times reporter, Judith Miller, for some 85 days. The Judiciary Committee held two hearings on this subject. Senator Lugar, with Congressman Pence in the House, introduced legislation which has formed the nucleus of the bill we are introducing today. The Branzburg v. Hayes case, 33 years ago, which was a 5-to-4 decision, with a concurring opinion by Justice Powell, has led to what is accurately called a ``crazy quilt'' situation in the circuits--five circuits going one way, four circuits going another way, and laws unsettled in some circuits. This bill, modeled significantly after the Department of Justice regulations, will codify this important issue. There is an exception on reporter's privilege for national security cases. Keeping in mind the incarceration of Judith Miller, this bill makes a sharp distinction between national security and an inquiry in the grand jury for obstruction of justice or perjury. As a prosecutor in the past, I have great appreciation for the offenses of obstruction of justice and perjury. But in my judgment, they do not rise to the level of importance as a national security case. When a special prosecutor's investigation shifts from the disclosure of a CIA agent, to a question of obstruction of justice, it is a very different situation. This bill would not permit, would not compel the disclosure of a source for obstruction of justice or perjury, but would compel the disclosure of a source for a national security case. This legislation has the endorsement of 39 of the major media organizations in the United States: The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Associated Press, Time, Hearst Corporation, Philadelphia Inquirer, Newspaper Association of America, ABC, NBC, and CBS. It goes a long way to protecting sources, but it also leaves latitude, in the form of a balancing test, for Federal prosecutors to gain information under limited circumstances for plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases to have access to sources. And, it does not have a shield if a reporter is a witness to some criminal incident. In recent months, there has been a growing consensus that we need to establish a Federal journalists' privilege to protect the integrity of the newsgathering process--a process that depends on the free flow of information between journalists and whistleblowers, as well as other confidential sources. I do not reach this conclusion lightly. The Judiciary Committee held two separate hearings in which it heard from sixteen witnesses. Included in this number were seven journalists, six attorneys, including current or former prosecutors and some of the Nation's most distinguished experts on the first amendment. These witnesses demonstrated that there are two vital, competing concerns at stake. On one hand, reporters cite the need to maintain confidentiality in order to ensure that sources will speak openly and freely with the news media. The renowned William Safire, former columnist for the New York Times, testified that ``the essence of news gathering is this: if you don't have sources you trust and who trust you, then you don't have a solid story--and the public suffers for it.'' Reporter Matthew Cooper of Time magazine said this to the Committee: ``As someone who relies on confidential sources all the time, I simply could not do my job reporting stories big and small without being able to speak with officials under varying degrees of anonymity.'' On the other hand, the public has a right to effective law enforcement and fair trials. Our judicial system needs access to information in order to prosecute crime and to guarantee fair administration of the law for plaintiffs and defendants alike. As a Justice Department representative told the committee, prosecutors need to ``maintain the ability, in certain vitally important circumstances, to obtain information identifying a source when a paramount interest is at stake. For example, obtaining source information may be the only available means of preventing a murder, locating a kidnapped child, or identifying a serial arsonist.'' As Federal courts considered such competing interests, they adopted rules that went in several different directions. Rather than a clear, uniform standard for deciding claims of journalist privilege, the Federal courts currently observe a ``crazy quilt'' of different judicial standards. The current confusion began 33 years ago, when the Supreme Court decided Branzburg v. Hayes. The Court held that the press's first amendment right to publish information does not include a right to keep information secret from a grand jury investigating a criminal matter. The Supreme Court also held that the common law did not exempt reporters from the duty of every citizen to provide information to a grand jury. The Court reasoned that just as newspapers and journalists are subject to the same laws and restrictions as other citizens, they are also subject to the same duty to provide information to a court as other citizens. However, Justice Powell, who joined the 5-4 majority, wrote a separate concurrence in which he explained that the Court's holding was not an invitation for the government to harass journalists. If a journalist could show that the grand jury investigation was being conducted in bad faith, the journalist could ask the court to quash the subpoena. Justice Powell indicated that courts might assess such claims on a case-by-case basis by balancing the freedom of the press against the obligation to give testimony relevant to criminal conduct. In attempting to apply Justice Powell's concurring opinion, Federal courts have split on the question of when a journalist is required to testify. In the 33 years since Branzburg, the Federal courts are split in at least three ways in their approaches to Federal criminal and civil cases. With respect to Federal criminal cases, five circuits--the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh circuits--have applied Branzburg so as to not allow journalists to withhold information absent governmental bad faith. Four other circuits--the second, third, ninth, and eleventh circuits--recognize a qualified privilege, which requires courts to balance the freedom of the press against the obligation to provide testimony on a case-by-case basis. The law in the District of Columbia Circuit is unsettled. With respect to Federal civil cases, nine of the twelve circuits apply a balancing test when deciding whether journalists must disclose confidential sources. One circuit affords journalists no privilege in any context. Two other circuits have yet to decide whether journalists have any privilege in civil cases. Meanwhile, 49 States plus the District of Columbia have recognized a privilege within their own jurisdictions. Thirty-one States plus the District of Columbia have passed some form of reporter's shield statute, and 18 States have recognized a privilege at common law. There is little wonder that there is a growing consensus concerning the need for a uniform journalists' privilege in Federal courts. This system must be simplified. Today, we are taking the first step to resolving this problem by introducing the Free Flow of Information Act. This bill draws upon 33 years of experience, as embodied in the Department of Justice's regulations, the law established by the Federal courts of appeals, State statutes, and existing national security provisions. The purpose of this bill is to guarantee the flow of information to the public through a free and active press, while protecting the public's right to effective law enforcement and individuals' rights to the fair administration of justice. This bill provides ample protection for the Nation's journalists, as demonstrated by the fact that it has been endorsed by 39 news organizations identified in a list I will include at the end of my remarks. This bill also provides ample protection to the public's interest in law enforcement and fair trials. In drafting this legislation, we started with what works. Both the Department of Justice and the vast majority of journalists with whom we have met--in individual meetings and over the course of two hearings--have generally voiced strong support for the regulations that the Department of Justice currently applies to all of its prosecutors. Moreover, time has proven that these regulations are workable. The Department of Justice has been effectively prosecuting cases under these regulations for 25 years and a majority of State prosecutors carry out their duties under similar statutes. I have two concerns with the Department's regulations, however. First, under current law, these regulations do not apply to special prosecutors. Special prosecutors are often called upon in cases that are politically sensitive, may potentially be embarrassing to senior government officials, and are high profile--those cases that seem to carry the greatest risk of an overzealous prosecutor needlessly subpoenaing journalists. Second, the Department regulations are presently enforced by the Attorney General, not a neutral court of law. This places the Attorney General in a difficult position; namely, the primary check on Federal prosecutors' ability to subpoena journalists is the nation's highest Federal prosecutor. Most Americans, I believe, would feel more comfortable having the competing interests weighed by a neutral judge instead of a political appointee who answers to the President. Accordingly, this bill, in large part, codifies the Department of Justice's regulations into law; applies them to all Federal prosecutors, including special prosecutors; and provides that the courts, not a political official, shall decide whether the public's need for information outweighs the interest in allowing a journalist to protect a confidential source. The Free Flow of Information Act addresses two additional areas of considerable confusion and concern. First, it addresses the situation of a criminal defendant who subpoenas a journalist. To ensure that every criminal defendant has a fair trial, a criminal defendant has less of a burden than a prosecutor does, to show that the journalist's privilege should be waived. This is consistent with our long standing belief as a nation that a criminal defendant must be given ample opportunity to defend himself. Second, it addresses private civil litigation. This bill provides that before a private party may subpoena a journalist in a civil suit, the court must find that the party is not trying to harass or punish the journalist, and that the public interest requires disclosure. Again, this should help clarify the existing law in federal courts. Finally, the Free Flow of Information Act adds layers of safeguards for the public. Reporters are not allowed to withhold information if a federal court concludes that the information is important to the defense of our Nation's security or is needed to prevent or stop a crime that could lead to death or physical injury. Also, the bill ensures that both crime victims and criminal defendants will have a fair hearing in court. Under this bill, a journalist who is an eyewitness to a crime or takes part in a crime may not withhold that information. Journalists should not be permitted to hide from the law by writing a story and then claiming a reporter's privilege. It is time to simplify the patchwork of court decisions and legislation that has grown over the last three decades. It is time for Congress to clear up the ambiguities journalists and the Federal judicial system face in balancing the protections journalists need in providing confidential information to the public with the ability of the courts to conduct fair and accurate trials. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and help create a fair and efficient means to serve journalists and the news media, prosecutors and the courts, and most importantly the public interest on both ends of the spectrum. I ask unanimous consent to print the list of organizations and companies that support the legislation in the Record.

Mr. SPECTER

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am pleased to join with Senator Lugar, the principal sponsor, and Senators Dodd, Graham, and Schumer on the introduction of legislation which will codify a reporter's privilege, something that is very necessary. The matter came into sharp focus recently with the contempt citation and the incarceration of New York Times reporter, Judith Miller, for some 85 days. The Judiciary Committee held two hearings on this subject. Senator Lugar, with Congressman Pence in the House, introduced legislation which has formed the nucleus of the bill we are introducing today. The Branzburg v. Hayes case, 33 years ago, which was a 5-to-4 decision, with a concurring opinion by Justice Powell, has led to what is accurately called a ``crazy quilt'' situation in the circuits--five circuits going one way, four circuits going another way, and laws unsettled in some circuits. This bill, modeled significantly after the Department of Justice regulations, will codify this important issue. There is an exception on reporter's privilege for national security cases. Keeping in mind the incarceration of Judith Miller, this bill makes a sharp distinction between national security and an inquiry in the grand jury for obstruction of justice or perjury. As a prosecutor in the past, I have great appreciation for the offenses of obstruction of justice and perjury. But in my judgment, they do not rise to the level of importance as a national security case. When a special prosecutor's investigation shifts from the disclosure of a CIA agent, to a question of obstruction of justice, it is a very different situation. This bill would not permit, would not compel the disclosure of a source for obstruction of justice or perjury, but would compel the disclosure of a source for a national security case. This legislation has the endorsement of 39 of the major media organizations in the United States: The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Associated Press, Time, Hearst Corporation, Philadelphia Inquirer, Newspaper Association of America, ABC, NBC, and CBS. It goes a long way to protecting sources, but it also leaves latitude, in the form of a balancing test, for Federal prosecutors to gain information under limited circumstances for plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases to have access to sources. And, it does not have a shield if a reporter is a witness to some criminal incident. In recent months, there has been a growing consensus that we need to establish a Federal journalists' privilege to protect the integrity of the newsgathering process--a process that depends on the free flow of information between journalists and whistleblowers, as well as other confidential sources. I do not reach this conclusion lightly. The Judiciary Committee held two separate hearings in which it heard from sixteen witnesses. Included in this number were seven journalists, six attorneys, including current or former prosecutors and some of the Nation's most distinguished experts on the first amendment. These witnesses demonstrated that there are two vital, competing concerns at stake. On one hand, reporters cite the need to maintain confidentiality in order to ensure that sources will speak openly and freely with the news media. The renowned William Safire, former columnist for the New York Times, testified that ``the essence of news gathering is this: if you don't have sources you trust and who trust you, then you don't have a solid story--and the public suffers for it.'' Reporter Matthew Cooper of Time magazine said this to the Committee: ``As someone who relies on confidential sources all the time, I simply could not do my job reporting stories big and small without being able to speak with officials under varying degrees of anonymity.'' On the other hand, the public has a right to effective law enforcement and fair trials. Our judicial system needs access to information in order to prosecute crime and to guarantee fair administration of the law for plaintiffs and defendants alike. As a Justice Department representative told the committee, prosecutors need to ``maintain the ability, in certain vitally important circumstances, to obtain information identifying a source when a paramount interest is at stake. For example, obtaining source information may be the only available means of preventing a murder, locating a kidnapped child, or identifying a serial arsonist.'' As Federal courts considered such competing interests, they adopted rules that went in several different directions. Rather than a clear, uniform standard for deciding claims of journalist privilege, the Federal courts currently observe a ``crazy quilt'' of different judicial standards. The current confusion began 33 years ago, when the Supreme Court decided Branzburg v. Hayes. The Court held that the press's first amendment right to publish information does not include a right to keep information secret from a grand jury investigating a criminal matter. The Supreme Court also held that the common law did not exempt reporters from the duty of every citizen to provide information to a grand jury. The Court reasoned that just as newspapers and journalists are subject to the same laws and restrictions as other citizens, they are also subject to the same duty to provide information to a court as other citizens. However, Justice Powell, who joined the 5-4 majority, wrote a separate concurrence in which he explained that the Court's holding was not an invitation for the government to harass journalists. If a journalist could show that the grand jury investigation was being conducted in bad faith, the journalist could ask the court to quash the subpoena. Justice Powell indicated that courts might assess such claims on a case-by-case basis by balancing the freedom of the press against the obligation to give testimony relevant to criminal conduct. In attempting to apply Justice Powell's concurring opinion, Federal courts have split on the question of when a journalist is required to testify. In the 33 years since Branzburg, the Federal courts are split in at least three ways in their approaches to Federal criminal and civil cases. With respect to Federal criminal cases, five circuits--the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh circuits--have applied Branzburg so as to not allow journalists to withhold information absent governmental bad faith. Four other circuits--the second, third, ninth, and eleventh circuits--recognize a qualified privilege, which requires courts to balance the freedom of the press against the obligation to provide testimony on a case-by-case basis. The law in the District of Columbia Circuit is unsettled. With respect to Federal civil cases, nine of the twelve circuits apply a balancing test when deciding whether journalists must disclose confidential sources. One circuit affords journalists no privilege in any context. Two other circuits have yet to decide whether journalists have any privilege in civil cases. Meanwhile, 49 States plus the District of Columbia have recognized a privilege within their own jurisdictions. Thirty-one States plus the District of Columbia have passed some form of reporter's shield statute, and 18 States have recognized a privilege at common law. There is little wonder that there is a growing consensus concerning the need for a uniform journalists' privilege in Federal courts. This system must be simplified. Today, we are taking the first step to resolving this problem by introducing the Free Flow of Information Act. This bill draws upon 33 years of experience, as embodied in the Department of Justice's regulations, the law established by the Federal courts of appeals, State statutes, and existing national security provisions. The purpose of this bill is to guarantee the flow of information to the public through a free and active press, while protecting the public's right to effective law enforcement and individuals' rights to the fair administration of justice. This bill provides ample protection for the Nation's journalists, as demonstrated by the fact that it has been endorsed by 39 news organizations identified in a list I will include at the end of my remarks. This bill also provides ample protection to the public's interest in law enforcement and fair trials. In drafting this legislation, we started with what works. Both the Department of Justice and the vast majority of journalists with whom we have met--in individual meetings and over the course of two hearings--have generally voiced strong support for the regulations that the Department of Justice currently applies to all of its prosecutors. Moreover, time has proven that these regulations are workable. The Department of Justice has been effectively prosecuting cases under these regulations for 25 years and a majority of State prosecutors carry out their duties under similar statutes. I have two concerns with the Department's regulations, however. First, under current law, these regulations do not apply to special prosecutors. Special prosecutors are often called upon in cases that are politically sensitive, may potentially be embarrassing to senior government officials, and are high profile--those cases that seem to carry the greatest risk of an overzealous prosecutor needlessly subpoenaing journalists. Second, the Department regulations are presently enforced by the Attorney General, not a neutral court of law. This places the Attorney General in a difficult position; namely, the primary check on Federal prosecutors' ability to subpoena journalists is the nation's highest Federal prosecutor. Most Americans, I believe, would feel more comfortable having the competing interests weighed by a neutral judge instead of a political appointee who answers to the President. Accordingly, this bill, in large part, codifies the Department of Justice's regulations into law; applies them to all Federal prosecutors, including special prosecutors; and provides that the courts, not a political official, shall decide whether the public's need for information outweighs the interest in allowing a journalist to protect a confidential source. The Free Flow of Information Act addresses two additional areas of considerable confusion and concern. First, it addresses the situation of a criminal defendant who subpoenas a journalist. To ensure that every criminal defendant has a fair trial, a criminal defendant has less of a burden than a prosecutor does, to show that the journalist's privilege should be waived. This is consistent with our long standing belief as a nation that a criminal defendant must be given ample opportunity to defend himself. Second, it addresses private civil litigation. This bill provides that before a private party may subpoena a journalist in a civil suit, the court must find that the party is not trying to harass or punish the journalist, and that the public interest requires disclosure. Again, this should help clarify the existing law in federal courts. Finally, the Free Flow of Information Act adds layers of safeguards for the public. Reporters are not allowed to withhold information if a federal court concludes that the information is important to the defense of our Nation's security or is needed to prevent or stop a crime that could lead to death or physical injury. Also, the bill ensures that both crime victims and criminal defendants will have a fair hearing in court. Under this bill, a journalist who is an eyewitness to a crime or takes part in a crime may not withhold that information. Journalists should not be permitted to hide from the law by writing a story and then claiming a reporter's privilege. It is time to simplify the patchwork of court decisions and legislation that has grown over the last three decades. It is time for Congress to clear up the ambiguities journalists and the Federal judicial system face in balancing the protections journalists need in providing confidential information to the public with the ability of the courts to conduct fair and accurate trials. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and help create a fair and efficient means to serve journalists and the news media, prosecutors and the courts, and most importantly the public interest on both ends of the spectrum. I ask unanimous consent to print the list of organizations and companies that support the legislation in the Record.