John Spratt

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, could I inquire of the Chair how much time I have remaining?

Mr. SPRATT. And the gentleman from Illinois has the right to close, or do I have the right to close?

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to respond to some arguments that have been raised. Let me go back to Public Law 102-1; the allegation that somehow, somewhere this bill supplants it. Far from supplanting that bill, which was the Afghan War Powers Act, we reassert in this legislation the primacy of our policy, and that is to go after al Qaeda. We do that by saying to the President, before we go off in pursuit of another armed objective, military objective, we want you to tell us that this is not going to divert our focus from the primary objective, which is to get the guys that did what they did in New York on 9/11. We do not want to divert or dilute our focus from that at all. That is in the centerpiece of this particular bill. My good friend, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), has said that many of us on this side of the aisle voted for action in Kosovo. I did. And I am proud of it because we stopped another butchery in the backyard of Europe by doing so. We did not go to the U.N. then, and the gentleman knows why. Because the Russians are on the Security Council and they would have blocked us. Politics and diplomacy is a pragmatic thing. That is why we did not go there. But it was multilateral, because it was an undertaking by NATO, and we tried to use collective defense in that particular case. It simply proves the points. Now, let me say something else that I said at the outset because it is important. A lot of good people have argued that we are relying too much, too heavily on the U.N., and specifically on the Security Council, because that is really the body that applies here. But I was here in 1991, and when President Bush asked for a vote to go to war in the Persian Gulf, I was one of 86 on this side of the aisle who said you have got my support, Mr. President. But remember what he did then, just days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, President Bush said this invasion will not stand, but he also declared his vision was nothing less than a new world order. His words, a new world order. He turned first to the United Nations and went to the Security Council and got the first in a series of resolutions that culminated in Resolution 678 which authorized the use of force. President Bush obtained all those Security Council resolutions, with our support, but without an express war powers resolution until literally days before the war began. Rather than asserting that he could go it alone, stiffing the Security Council, he sought the Security Council approval. He sought allies to stand with us and cover approximately $62 billion out of the $66 billion total cost of the war. The result, a successful military action, a successful diplomacy, and I think a model worth emulating. And that is exactly what this resolution does. Where does this resolution come from? A couple of weeks ago, we had one of the last of the general officers who testified before our committee who has experience in this area, Wes Clarke, whom I greatly respect. He is certainly no warrior who shrinks from a fight. He was always advocating force in Bosnia to straighten out that situation there and in the Balkans. Here is what he told us. He said, First of all, time is on your side right now. Make the maximum advantage of it. First go for beefed-up arms inspections, a more truthful inspections program. This will have a couple of benefits. It will constrain Saddam, and it will give you legitimacy when he ultimately bucks you. Secondly, he said, our diplomacy will be further strengthened if we have an act adopted by Congress expressing our resolve to use force if necessary. But he said the resolution need not at this point authorize the use of force. It need simply agree on the intent to authorize the use of force if other measures fail. Mr. Speaker, that is exactly what we have done, both of those things. Finally, he said, If efforts to resolve the problems by the United Nations fail, seek the broadest possible coalition to bring force to bear. We have done what General Clark has recommended. It is embodied in this resolution. It follows the precedent set by President Bush. It is worthy of every Member's support, and I hope Members will vote for it.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Snyder), also a Vietnam veteran and a member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute which is next made in order by the rule.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes. Mr. Speaker, on grave occasions like this when we pass a war powers resolution, surely, surely one of the things we should seek is a broad base of support. The amendment I propose in the nature of a substitute seeks to broaden the base for this resolution. If we adopt it, I believe that H.J. Res. 114 will gain votes and pass this House by an even bigger majority. I want to make it clear that we have not broadened the appeal of this resolution by watering it down. My substitute unflinchingly supports the President's campaign and the Security Council for beefing up arms inspection and backing them up with force, and if the Iraqis defy the new inspectors and the Security Council responds with military action, as it should, it authorizes the use of our Armed Forces. It empowers President Bush to use our Armed Forces just as his father did in 1991 in the Persian Gulf War in a military action sanctioned by the Security Council. If on the other hand the Iraqis defy the inspectors and the Security Council fails to take action, fails to respond, the U.S. will be faced with going it alone. In these dramatically different circumstances my amendment calls for a second vote by the Congress to approve an attack of the use of force, but it ensures the President a fast track for its consideration. There are various differences between these two resolutions. The preamble is different, but this is the key difference, and it is an important difference. I want to make clear, however, that there is no difference with respect to our assessment of Saddam Hussein. Those of us who support this substitute see him as a menace and a threat. We agree with the President in demanding that the Security Council enforce its resolution and allow him no quarter. But for several reasons we do not want to see the United States act alone, and this is not just our concern. Over the last several weeks we have spent days talking to retired general officers who have experience in this field, to General Hoar and General Zinni, former commanders of Central Command, to General Clark and General Boyd, former Commanders of Europe, and they have agreed on this much. If we act alone, they told us, instead of being the United Nations versus Iraq, any war that happens, instead of being a war legitimated by the U.N. Charter, this will be the United States versus Iraq and in some quarters the U.S. versus the Arab and Muslim world. That is why one general officer told us ``I fear if we go it alone we may pay a terrible price.'' Point number two, in any conceivable military confrontation with Iraq with or without allies, the United States will win. But having allies, especially allies in the region, could be a big tactical advantage, like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and it will make it easier to achieve victory and less costly in money and, most importantly, less costly in human life. Three, the outcome after the conflict is actually going to be the hardest part, and it is far less certain. We do not want to win this war only to lose the peace and swell the ranks of terrorists who hate us. A broad-based coalition will raise our chances of success even more in the post-war period. I know that some will say this is an imposition on the President's power, a second vote, but in truth it is nothing more than the age-old system of checks and balances built in our Constitution. It is one way that Congress can say what we believe, that any action against Iraq should have the sanction of the Security Council and the support of a broad-based coalition, and if it does not, we should have a further say on it. Others will say that this resolution relies too heavily on the Security Council, but let me say, Mr. Speaker, the precedent it follows was the precedent set by President Bush in 1991. He turned to the United Nations first. He secured a series of resolutions from the Security Council that culminated in Resolution 678. He did not threaten not to go elsewhere, he went straight to the Security Council. The end was a successful military action and I think a model worth emulating. My substitute does just that. I urge my colleagues to follow the precedent set by President Bush in 1991 and support my substitute amendment. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to myself to read what the text of the resolution would provide: ``The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate means, including the Armed Forces of the United States, to compel Iraq to comply with the disarmament provisions of the U.N.,'' and it cites those, ``and any other resolution to require the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles and the means of producing such weapons.'' That is pretty sufficient language. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member of the House Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Pastor). (Mr. PASTOR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Lipinski). (Mr. LIPINSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond to the arguments made on the other side. First, they claim that this bill somehow, even though there is not a word in it, supplants Public Law 102-1, which has the authority to go after terrorists, which is not true, and then they say that we are wrong in saying to the President, we do not want to dilute the focus on terrorism; we want you to certify to us that if we go to war in Iraq, it will in no way impair our first priority, and that is to get al Qaeda. We have to decide which way we want to go. We say, that is still the law of the land, 102-1. We backed it then, we support it now, and we want to make al Qaeda our first priority. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), a Vietnam veteran and a member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Allen).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Baldacci). (Mr. BALDACCI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. McCarthy). (Mrs. McCARTHY of Missouri asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Fattah). (Mr. FATTAH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Inslee). (Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Larson). (Mr. LARSON of Connecticut asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Tauscher).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Clyburn), my colleague.

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, the resolution that the White House has sent us is a decided improvement over the original draft, but it could be better. If the amendment that I am offering is adopted, I believe that this resolution could draw even more votes and pass this House by a huge bipartisan majority. And in passing a war powers resolution, surely, surely, that should be one of our objectives. Our resolution supports the President's campaign in the Security Council for coercive inspections backed up by force. If the Iraqis defy the inspectors this time and the Security Council replies with military action, my amendment gives President Bush the power to use our Armed Forces just as his father did in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 in a military action sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council. If, on the other hand, the Iraqis defy the inspectors and the Security Council fails to respond with force, then we will be faced with going it alone. In these dramatically different circumstances, my amendment called for a second vote by Congress to approve a military attack, but it ensures that the President will have a fast track for its consideration. Those of us supporting this amendment, and we have a broad cross- section of our caucus behind it, see Saddam Hussein as a menace. We agree with the President in demanding that the Security Council enforce its resolution and allow no quarter. But for several reasons we do not want to see the United States act alone unless there is no other viable choice. If we act alone, instead of being the United Nations versus Iraq, a war legitimated by the U.N. charter, this will be the United States versus Iraq; and in some quarters it will be the United States versus the Muslim or Arab world. This is why one general officer, a former Commander of Central Command which has jurisdiction over the Middle East, told us, I fear that if we go it alone, we may pay a terrible price. If we act alone, it will be harder to build a broad-based coalition, particularly an alliance of contiguous countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey. If we can count on these countries as allies, their airspace and ports and airfields will be open to us; and the fight will be far easier. If we act alone, we will not have allies this time to help us share the cost of this war, as they did in 1991 when they picked up $62 billion out of an overall cost of $66 billion. Right now, the administration is seeking new and tougher resolutions of the Security Council to disarm Iraq through inspection, if they work, but through armed force if it is necessary. Our resolution fully supports that objective. But if these arms inspections do not work and the Security Council does not pass a resolution calling for Armed Forces against Iraq, we believe there should be a separate vote on military action. I know that some will say that a second vote is an imposition on the President's powers, but in truth it is the age-old system of checks and balances at work. It is one way Congress can emphatically say what we prefer, that any action against Iraq should have the sanction of the Security Council and the support of a broad-based coalition. As a practical matter, I doubt that further action of Congress will be needed. The British seem to be bent on securing approval of the Security Council before war. And if Saddam stiffs the arms inspectors, the French have insisted on a second vote of the Security Council before any military action is taken. One way or another, I think a Security Council resolution is likely; and, once it passes, our resolution authorizes the President to use our Armed Forces to enforce it without further action of the Congress. But over the last 6 weeks we have heard from a host of general officers, all retired, Chuck Boyd, Wes Clark, our former commanders in Europe; Generals Hoar and Zinni, the former commanders of Central Command. They virtually agreed on two things: First of all, in any conceivable confrontation with Iraq, with or without allies, the United States will prevail. But having allies, especially in the region, will make victory more certain and less costly in money and, more importantly, in human lives. Secondly, the outcome after the conflict will be the hardest part and far less certain. We do not want to win this war only to lose the peace and swell the ranks of terrorists who hate us. A broad-based coalition will help enhance our chances of success in that post-war period. Some will say, I know, that this resolution depends too heavily on the Security Council. But the precedent it follows is the one that was set by the first President Bush in 1990-1991, an action that I have voted for and supported. Within days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, President Bush defined his goal as nothing less than a new world order. He turned to the United Nations first and sought a series of Security Council resolutions culminating in Resolution 678, which authorized the use of force. He obtained all of these Security Council resolutions with the apparent and evident support of Congress but without an actual and expressed war powers resolution until just days before the war. Rather than asserting that he could go it alone, he sought the Security Council's approval and allies to stand with us and bear the cost and the burden of war and all but a fraction of the cost. The result was a successful military action and I believe a model that is still worth emulating. My substitute does just that. I urge my colleagues to consider it carefully, and I hope that you will all support it. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I rise to recognize Taylor Bowman, of Fort Mill, South Carolina, who was named a top youth volunteer this year by The Prudential Spirit of Community Awards, a nationwide program honoring young people for outstanding acts of volunteerism. The awards program, now in its seventh year, is conducted by Prudential Financial in partnership with the National Association of Secondary School Principals. A record 28,000 high school and middle level students submitted applications for this year's program. Taylor, who graduated from Fort Mill High School this year, developed and led a mentoring program that paired high school athletes with potential at-risk students from a local elementary school. When Taylor first began tutoring a new student from Puerto Rico in his mother's third-grade class, he was reminded of ``a turtle with his head in his shell trying to forget about the world outside.'' But as he worked with him each week, Taylor said, ``I saw the turtle come out of his shell.'' Soon, other teachers were asking Taylor for help with their limited- English and academically challenged students, but he knew he didn't have enough time to help everyone. So, after getting permission from his coach and the elementary school principal, Taylor recruited 37 members of his high school crosscountry team and other friends to become mentors, as well. He also applied for grant money to purchase incentive rewards and fund a hot dog picnic, Christmas party, and other activities. The success of the first year convinced Taylor that other schools could also benefit from the program, and he began recruiting other volunteer schools and teams. ``It took a lot of time and effort,'' Taylor says, ``but it was worth it. Life is much better when you take time to help a child.'' Mr. Speaker, I am honored to join the Prudential Spirit of Community Awards in recognizing Taylor Bowman as one of South Carolina's top youth volunteers.

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight along with my colleagues to address an issue of great importance which is receiving hardly any attention at all. It is about our fiscal reversal, about the tide of red ink that has overtaken our budget, about the resurgence of deficits that we thought after long, long years of trying we had finally laid to rest. Lost in the clutter, drowned by the drums of war, the deficit sinks deeper and deeper and deeper; and there is no apparent plan by this administration or this Congress to deal with the problem. You can look at this chart here which shows graphically the deficit and how we have grappled with it over the years and see what a difficult struggle it has been. The surpluses that we had for a brief period of time did not come easily. They did not drop like manna out of heaven upon the Earth beneath. In the Reagan-Bush years, we adopted in 1985 something called Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. It did not work, but it did help us focus attention and frame the problem and turn the attention of the Congress to deficit reduction as a top-drawer concern. When Bill Clinton came to office in 1992, we had reached an agreement a couple of years before with President Bush I, George Herbert Walker Bush, called the budget summit agreement. It was 6 months in the making. Its effects were eclipsed by a recession. It did not appear to have succeeded, but in fact it laid the basis for the surpluses that we were to enjoy in the latter part of the 1990s. President Clinton sent us a budget plan on February 17, less than a month after he was in office, to show the significance he attributed to the problem. And look what happened. This red ink here represents the deficits accumulated, the precipitous decline in the budget during the Reagan years. This represents the dramatic improvement. Every year from 1993 through the year 2000, every year the Clinton administration was in office as a result of the Clinton budget adopted in 1993, the budget got better, the bottom line of the budget got better, so much so that by the year 1998, the Federal Government achieved the first unified balanced budget in 29 years. Unified means all the accounts of the budget, Social Security, Medicare, all the trust funds which are in surplus, and that helped. But in fiscal year 1999, we achieved the first balanced budget in 39 years without using the Social Security trust fund, without counting the Social Security trust fund, the first balanced budget in 39 years. Nobody would have even bet money on enormous odds that that could have been done in 1993 when the deficit was $290 billion, but we did it in 1999. And in the year 2000, the Federal Government achieved its first surplus excluding Social Security and Medicare. Backing the surplus in both of those accounts out of the budget, we had a surplus for the first time in the overall budget. In effect, what we did then, it is hard to believe now, less than 2 years ago, this was the situation of the budget; this was the situation that we presented to President Bush, the second President Bush when he came to office on January 20, 2001. For the first time in recent history, certainly since the Great Depression, for the first time, we presented President Bush with a budget in surplus, big-time surplus. By the estimation of his Office of Management and Budget, the surplus looming over the next 10 years would accumulate altogether to a total of $5.6 trillion. In 2 years, that surplus is virtually gone. As this next chart will show, what happened to the $5.6 trillion? This layered graph right here represents the $5.6 trillion that accumulated between 2002 and 2011, over that 10-year period of time. The little green tip at the far end, the upper layer, shows you the surplus that we presented President Bush when he came to office. It was his. An enormous advantage. He then took the estimate of $5.6 trillion and basically bet the budget on what was a blue-sky forecast. In doing so, as you can see from this top green layer, the remaining surplus, he left next to no room for errors and no room for the unexpected. And, guess what, there were estimating errors of major proportions and the unexpected, 9-11, came along. When it came, we had no reserve, we had no cushion, we had no margin; and the consequence was the surplus that we had depended upon turned out to be about 43 percent lower than we had anticipated, 10 percent of it because the economy was overestimated, another 33 percent because we bet the budget on the assumption that the revenue growth of the 1990s would continue. Here is the bottom line in about as stark a manner as we can possibly present it. This was the surplus in May 2001 when this body, the House of Representatives, under Republican leadership, passed the Republican budget resolution that called for about $1.4 trillion in tax cuts. In addition to that, the additional interest cost would have been about $400 billion on top of that. Here is where we are in August 2002 as a result of not allowing any margin of error or any margin for misestimation or any margin for the unexpected. Tonight we want to address that problem and the consequences of it because what has happened is the most dramatic reversal we have seen probably since the Great Depression in the fortunes of the Federal budget. Just 2 years ago, it is hard to believe that every year for 8 years we had seen a better bottom line. Now every year the budget is in deficit for the next 10 years if you do not include the Social Security surplus, and by law we are not supposed to include the Social Security surplus. It is a trust fund surplus. The deficit this year by our best estimation will be about $315 billion, excluding the surplus in Social Security. Next year, 2003, it is barely better, $315 billion. These are estimates of the Congressional Budget Office, our mutual nonpartisan budget office that does this work for us with no axes to grind. That is their best guess, that next year the budget gets no better. Even though the economy, they assume, will get better, we still have a deficit of $315 billion. The next year, 2004, it is $299 billion. Over the next 10 years, this is a baseline forecast, assuming no change in policy except enough to keep up pace with inflation, we will accumulate in the basic budget $2 trillion in deficits, and if we factor into that estimation policies that we believe will be enacted, tax cuts that we believe will be enacted, changes that we believe have a good possibility of being enacted, CBO does not include them in its baseline forecast. When we adjust this forecast for political reality, things in the pipeline and likely to be passed, we add at least another trillion dollars to that total. So here we were 2 years ago talking about a better and better bottom line. Now we are talking about a budget with deficits as far as the eye can see. Two years ago we were talking about paying off in earnest, both parties, literally talking about paying off $3.6 trillion in national debt held by the public. Today we are talking about or looking towards, unless we do something dramatic, a national debt that actually increases over that period of time. From total payoff to an enormous increase. Finally, just 2 years ago we were talking about taking the trust fund in Social Security and the trust fund in Medicare and locking it up in a lockbox. That metaphor is now derided, but nevertheless we were all that talking about not spending that money, using it solely to buy up the debt held by the public so we would reduce the debt, add to the net national savings of this country, and as a consequence lay the basis for the first step towards the long-run solvency of Social Security. All of that has been dashed by the budget policies of the last 2 years, and that is what we would like to address tonight. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price) to pick up at this point.