John Spratt

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Madam Chairman, the devastation wreaked by terrorists on September 11, 2001 was horrendous. But had the terrorists used nuclear weapons, the death and destruction would have been even worse. The one essential element terrorists lack in making nuclear weapons is fissile materials, and we should make every effort to ensure that they do not obtain them. Only days before September 11, smugglers were apprehended in Turkey trying to move weapons-grade uranium out of Russia. This was not the first instance, and there is no doubt that terrorists and their sponsors are trying. There is however, reason to doubt that we are doing all that we should to keep such materials and nuclear know-how out of their hands. The Department of Energy shares the non-proliferation campaign with the Department of Defense and focuses on its particular realm of expertise: nuclear materials. Despite the gravity of this mission, this bill follows President Bush's request, and without explanation, cuts the DOE budget for stopping the spread of nuclear materials. The Department of Energy oversees several programs to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. All told, the DOW non-proliferation budget for FY 2001 is $874 million. The President cut those programs in his FY 2002 budget request by $101 million, a cut of almost 12 percent. The committee's original mark did not restore this cut at all, even though the House and Senate Appropriations Committees added $71 million and $106 million, respectively, to the President's budget. The manager's amendment to the bill before us today restores only $10 million, leaving the DOE's non- proliferation budget $90 million below the 2001 level, and well below the appropriated levels in the House or Senate. DOE's Non-Proliferation and Verification R&D Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory have been involved for years in developing sensors placed on U.S., satellites to monitor the production, testing, or use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Before 1991, the program was diffuse and unfocused. This changed in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf when U.N. inspectors discovered that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs were far more advanced than the U.S. intelligence community or anyone else had anticipated. Shortly after the Gulf War, Congress established a specific line in the DOE budget for non-proliferation and verification to develop technologies that detect the production, testing, transfer, or use of such weapons. The President's budget request for this critical research in FY 2002 is $170 million, which is $57.5 million (25 percent) below the 2001 level of $227.5 million. The bill ratifies the administration's request--not one dime is added to restore this cut. Here are examples of items that will not be funded if these cuts are not reversed: New seismic monitoring devices that will help ensure that Russia, China, or others are not improving their nuclear weapons by conducting underground tests with a nuclear yield below 1 kiloton. The Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (``BASIS'') which is designed to detect a bio-terrorism attack within a few hours so that public health agencies can react quickly and effectively to stop the spread of the agent. We do not have this capability in hand, but it is maturing: BASIS was field-tested at Salt Lake City in March 2001. This cut will slow down the development of a promising technology. Devlopment of new sensors that can detect atmospheric nuclear explosions. Our satellites that have such sensors are retiring. We do not have any of the old sensors on hand--they were all custom built. This cut may delay the effort to build new sensors in time to be placed on replacement satellites. If not built on time, the U.S. will not be assured of the ability to detect an atmospheric nuclear explosion. New sensors specifically geared to go on platforms to detect the production, testing, transfer, or use of WMDs. The sensors detect various ``signatures''--tell-tale clues that may be chemical, electromagnetic, infrared, optical, or radio-nuclide in nature--all absolutely critical to improving the ability of the U.S. intelligence community to keep watch on what countries like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya are doing. Although the threat of WMDs is seen as the gravest threat facing the U.S., we are depriving our intelligence community of the resources to improve the technical means to gather information and track the threat if this cut stands. Another victim of this cut is people. Dr. John Browne, Director of Los Alamos, was in my office a few weeks ago. Besides the programmatic impacts I just described, Dr. Browne is worried that these cuts will force long-time employees to seek employment elsewhere. And when they leave, they will leave for good. They will not come back to their work when the funding comes back, and not only will we lose their expertise, we will lose their ability to pass their expertise on to the next generation of scientists and engineers at the national labs. That's way these cuts are so shortsighted and the exact opposite of what we should be doing. I had an amendment in committee that would simply have restored funding to the 2001 level, and I sought, to no avail, to do the same through my BMD amendment included in the managers' amendment. We should not be so single-minded, so focused on the threat of ballistic missiles that we allow cuts like these to stand while bestowing a 49 percent increase on BMD. Summary of DOE Non-Proliferation Activities Non-Proliferation and Verification Research and Development--This program develops technologies to help the U.S. meet four primary goals: 1. Detecting nuclear weapons development efforts. The labs develop sensors that detect the tell-tale signatures of a nuclear weapons development program--which can be chemical, infrared, optical, radionuclide, or electromagnetic in nature. 2. Monitoring Nuclear Explosions. The labs develop methods to detect nuclear explosions, either atmospheric events or underground, low-yield events that require seismic detection. 3. Deterring the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. The labs develop technologies needed to improve the detection and tracking of fissile materials. These technologies include hand-held devices for border security forces and autonomous sensing devices that can be stationed at fissile material holding areas. 4. Responding to Chemical and Biological Attacks. The labs are developing technologies that will quickly identify the exact nature of a chemical or biological weapon. Quick identification is essential to providing first responders the information they need to treat victims and to contain the damage caused by such weapons. Arms Control--The Office of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation includes several programs well known to Congress: the longstanding Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) program, the Nuclear Cities Initiative, and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention. The office also provides DOE expertise to ensure that nuclear reductions are transparent, improve export controls, and generally strengthen existing nonproliferation agreements. The major responsibilities of this office include: 1. Nonproliferation in the Newly Independent States (NIS). The DOE tries to make sure that nuclear materials and human expertise in nuclear weapons resident in the NIS do not spread to other countries, such as North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. Two recent programs to stop such proliferation are the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP). The IPP tries to prevent ``brain drain'' from the ten major laboratories and engineering institutes that were involved in the former Soviet Union nuclear weapons programs. IPP establishes projects that gainfully employ these scientists, engineers, and technicians. Some of the projects are joint ventures with U.S. industry. The Nuclear Cities Initiative is a ``sister'' program to IPP that focuses exclusively on the closed nuclear cities of the former Soviet Union, creating new jobs through economic diversification at these closed cities. 2. Nuclear Nonproliferation throughout the World. The Arms Control office supports programs that aim to curb the ability of countries to convert spent nuclear fuel into nuclear weapons. Activities include: (i) a major program to control and protect spent fuel in Kazakhstan; (ii) implementation of the agreement with North Korea to switch to nuclear reactors that produce little weapons-grade fissile materials; and (iii) the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor program (begun by the Eisenhower Administration) to ensure that spent fuel from test and research reactors throughout the world is not used for military purposes. 3. Export Controls. DOE is active in U.S. government efforts to internally improve and enforce export controls on nuclear materials, and to help train other nations in detecting/interdicting illegal exports of nuclear materials. 4. International Safeguards and Treaties. DOE helps verify that other countries are living up to various nonproliferation agreements and treaties. The Arms Control Office is the principal U.S. entity for assessing and proposing new treaties and agreements, and the means to verify and enforce them. Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)--This program was established by provisions that I helped write in the FY 1994 Defense Authorization Act. MPC&A helps Russia improve security at the 95 sites identified as having nuclear weapons or nuclear materials. These sites contain about 850 metric tons of weapons-usable fissile materials, and many are poorly protected. These sites include 53 Navy sites, 11 MinAtom sites, and 31 civilian sites. To date, MPC&A has completed security upgrades at 37 of these sites which contain about 400 metric tons of weapons-usable fissile materials. Security improvements are underway at many, but not all, of the remaining 58 sites. HEU Transparency--DOE is in charge of the 1993 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. Under this agreement, the U.S. is to purchase civilian reactor fuel derived from 500 tons of weapons-grade HEU over a 20-year period. This activity verifies that the fuel the U.S. is buying is indeed from former Soviet nuclear weapons, and supports reciprocal monitoring by Russia to ensure that the U.S. is using the HEU for fuel. Through December 30, 2000, this program has resulted in the purchase of 111.3 metric tons of NEU. Fissile Material Control and Disposition--The DOE is in charge of safely disposing of surplus U.S. fissile materials (plutonium and HEU) as well as helping Russia get rid of its surplus stocks. Both countries have agreed to track each other's progress toward elimination of these materials, so that both can be confident the other will not be able to quickly expand its stock of nuclear materials (a ``break-out'' scenario) and gain strategic dominance in nuclear weapons. These U.S. efforts with Russia are currently focused on plutonium disposition, since the 1993 agreement on HEU is already underway. U.S. and Russia have to convert much of their respective plutonium (34 metric tons each) into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel to be burned in civilian nuclear reactors. The U.S. also plans to vitrify (also known as ``immobilize'') approximately 13 of its 47 or so metric tons of plutonium because these materials are not in a form suitable for easy conversion into MOX. International Nuclear Safety--This program helps Russia and the NIS prevent another Chernobyl disaster. There are 66 operating nuclear powered reactors at 21 sites in Russia and 7 NIS countries. Many of these reactors are either identical to the Chernobyl reactors or have their own serious design defects. This program helps these nations improve the training of their operators and create safety procedures for these plants, which still operate far below international safety and operational standards. Program Direction--This pays the salaries of the Nuclear Proliferation workforce, as well as the expenses normally charged to salary and expense accounts. The workforce is comprised of 233 Full- Time Equivalents (FTEs) at DOE headquarters, 34 FTEs in field offices, and 25 FTEs in offices located abroad.

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, the federal government must come to the aid of the airlines, and help them quickly, or the repercussions will be felt from coast to coast, all over our economy. Before September 11, our economy was at the tipping point; if the airlines fail, the economy will surely move into a recession, and the downturn will be deeper and longer. I also believe that the victims of this tragedy, whether in the air or on the ground, deserve compensation, and most citizens will be pleased to know that this bill uses their tax dollars for that purpose. But in this case, where the liability of the airlines is unsettled, I do think there are limits to which victims' compensation by the government should be provided. This bill sets up a Victims' Compensation Fund, but does not specify the size of the fund or the maximum that any beneficiary can recover. Many of the victims in the World Trade Center earned many times the incomes of the firemen and police who died trying to protect them. Under this bill, the heirs of those victims will be eligible for many times more benefits than this bill will allow those brave firemen and police. Quite a few claimants will be able to show substantial incomes. The earning capacity of their decedents will run into millions of dollars. I do not doubt their losses, or the grief their survivors must feel, but I do think the compensation to which they are entitled under this bill should be subject to some fair and reasonable limit. At this point, no one has any idea what the government's liability under the Victims' Compensation Fund may be, though it is likely to be substantial. I wanted to propose that we set a fair but generous cap on the victims' benefits paid by the government, and use some of the money saved to help the thousands of airline workers who are being terminated or laid off, and are in a real sense, victims of the September 11 tragedy also. H. Resolution 244, the rule allowing this bill to come to the House floor, would not permit me to offer such an amendment, and for that reason, I voted against the rule. I will vote for the bill, but it would be a much better bill if such an amendment had been made.

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, the Federal Reserve used to have a regulation called Regulation V, for V loans. It dated back to the war but was carried over from the war and renewed each year in the Defense Production Act. The last entity that I know which qualified for a Reg V loan was the Penn Central. They were to have obtained a $400 million V loan in the early 1970s, until the Reagan administration reversed course and decided against it on the day of closing. I know, because I was working in the Pentagon then. I was tangentially involved with it. I do not know whether the V loan authority is still on the books, but it applied to transportation nexuses. Where significant transportation nexuses in this country were at risk, it is my recollection it was applicable to those circumstances.

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, in a strict sense, this resolution is not necessary, because the Constitution makes the President commander in chief; and as such, he has the power to strike back when our country is struck, as it was struck on September 11, and the War Powers Act confirms that power. Even though the President can retaliate without this resolution, he is far stronger with it. This is our way of saying that we are together in this cause. We approve the mission. We are one in our resolve. By this resolution, we say that unmistakably to the whole world, friends and foe alike. On occasions in the past, we have been aware of invoking the War Powers Act and becoming implicated in military actions we were not sure about. But the world should note that in this instance we set such concerns aside and give the President broadly the power to use all necessary and appropriate force. These words have large scope. We do not know for sure who the enemy is, where he may be found, or who may be harboring him. Congress is giving the President the authority to act before we have answers to these basic questions because we cannot be paralyzed. We need to answer this treacherous attack upon our people on our soil, and that is why we grant the President this broad grant of authority. We trust the President to use this authority with care and, above all, to consult continually with Congress so that the partnership that exists now will endure for the long fight that lies ahead. We do not expect to huddle before every play, but we do expect a seat at the table. We do expect to be advised and heard as we prosecute what is sure to be a long, hard mission.

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, was a dark day in the history of our country. Today, we are bloodied but not bowed. We are a country united. Here in Congress we are neither Democrats nor Republicans, we are Americans, and we have closed ranks behind our President. We come here in this hallowed hall of democracy to express the grief and profound sympathy of the whole country for the victims of yesterday's heinous attacks and their families, and we come together resolved to see that their loss will be avenged and never repeated. These attacks were not just vicious crimes committed against innocent people. As many have already said, they were acts of war against the United States of America, and we must respond accordingly. We should spare no effort in tracking down these culprits and their cohorts, wherever they take haven, and striking back swiftly and severely; so severely that even fanatics like these see that there is no gain from such violence, not when it is committed against the United States of America.

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Hansen). (Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Guam (Mr. Underwood).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged resolution (H. Res. 234) and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 30 minutes to my colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Graham).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Hayworth).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, while we were on recess, Floyd Spence, a native South Carolinian, a friend of us all, and a Member of excellent standing passed away. Floyd was a star athlete, a student leader, a naval officer in Korea, a State legislator, and a pioneer Republican in a State that, at the time, was thoroughly Democratic. For 30 long, dedicated years he served here proudly, with total loyalty to this grand old institution of the Republic and to the Armed Forces of the United States, whom he effectively represented on the Committee on Armed Services for all of that time, 6 of them as a very able chairman of the committee. Many Members overcome obstructions or hurdles or suffer hardships to serve here. Few of us endure what Floyd Spence endured, a double lung transplant. At the time, he was one of the few in America ever to survive such a procedure. I can recall his recounting how after the operation every movement of his body was excruciatingly painful. Yet, even though he had reason, I never heard him complain. I never heard him express anxiety about his condition. I never heard him boast. I often heard him stand before groups, particularly from South Carolina, and tell them, ``I am glad to be here.'' He would pause a minute and say, ``Heck, I am glad to be anywhere.'' It was that kind of understated humor, that kind of affability, that kind of civility, that made him the gentleman from South Carolina on this floor, in the committee, not just in name but in the truest sense of the word. He left us all a worthy example to emulate, personally and professionally. To his family, to his four proud sons, to Debbie, his wife, we extend our heartfelt sorrow. We will miss Floyd too, but rest assured, we will always, always, remember him, and never forget his courage, his spirit, and the sterling example he left us of what it means to serve in this great institution. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Ortiz).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Stump), chairman of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to add to what the gentleman just told. The best part of the doctor's story was he said he was beeped. He thought surely something happened to Floyd. He was well away from the hospital so he rushed to the telephone. He called the number. They put Floyd on the phone; and he said to the surgeon, Doctor, I am getting married. He said, Fine. That is wonderful. When? Floyd said, Right now. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Brown).

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, last night, at about 11:23 pm, the House voted 206-223 against an amendment to H.R. 4 offered by Representative Markey. I arrived at the House floor a moment after the vote was closed, so my vote was not recorded, but I intended to vote ``aye'' on the Markey amendment. I want the record to be clear regarding my position on drilling in Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, or ``ANWR.'' I do not support drilling on the coastal plain of ``ANVR.'' While estimates of the amount of oil that might be recovered from the area vary, I am simply not convinced that spoiling one of the world's last pristine areas is the right answer to our nation's energy problems. In fact, I am a cosponsor of legislation to declare the coastal plain of the reserve, often referred to as ``Section 1002,'' a wildlife refuge so that no drilling can take place. This bill, H.R. 770, the Morris K. Udall Arctic Wilderness Act of 2001, was introduced by Representative Markey earlier this year. I feel strongly enough about protecting ANWR that during debate on H.R. 4 yesterday, I voted against two amendments offered by Representative Sununu to H.R. 4--rollcall votes No. 315 and No. 316-- designed to make drilling in ANWR more palatable. Furthermore, my vote against final passage of H.R. 4 and for the Motion to Recommit was based in no small part on my disappointment in the bill's ANWR provisions. I regret that I was not able to record my vote on the Markey amendment, but the record should be clear: I support it.

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, day by day, bill by bill, the surplus is washing away. The House is driving this budget straight into the Medicare trust fund. Yesterday, it was the energy bill, with an impact on the budget, according to the Congressional Budget Office, of $33 billion over 10 years. Today it is the Patients' Bill of Rights whose impact is $15 billion to $25 billion brought to the floor without being scored. In each case, Democrats have offered offsets to protest the trust funds and the surplus, and in each case, Republicans spurned the offer of offsets. Mr. Speaker, in 2 days, this House will have whacked $40 to $50 billion out of the surplus. It is a good thing we are going home. Mr. Speaker, let me warn Members, mid-August when we are at home, the Congressional Budget Office will complete its midyear update of the budget, and when we come back, there will be no question, the House will be in the Medicare trust fund. That is where the budget activity today will have taken us, by passing bills like this and paying no heed whatsoever to the budget. Bring it up, ignore the offset. I direct Members' attention to this chart. This shows what thin ice the budget is now sitting on. After the energy bill last night and the defense bill we reported yesterday, there is a $12 billion bottom line remainder in fiscal year 2002. That is black. But if we come down here to where we have estimated the August update by the Congressional Budget Office, and we have only estimated that they will take the economy down by one-half of one percentage point in the next year, Members will see that black 12 turns to a red 16. We go from a surplus of $12 to $16 billion in deficit, meaning we are $16 billion into the Medicare trust fund. So much for the lockbox. That is not just 1 year, it is every year from now until 2011; so much so, we consume the entire Medicare surplus over this period of time. Mr. Speaker, the only honest vote is for the motion to recommit, which will pay for this bill.

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, on Rollcall No. 317, I missed the bells and was not here. Had I been here, I would have voted ``aye'' on the Markey amendment. Announcement by the Chairman Pro Tempore

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentlewoman yielding me time. Mr. Speaker, we are now in the eighth of 13 appropriations bills, and, as we drive this process to conclusion, I think it would be smart to stop and look at the fuel gauge. That is what we have here, a gas gauge. We started out with a full tank, flush with surpluses, $95 billion this year. We did our resolution, 302(a), and gave $4 billion more than the baseline, so you take that out. We did a budget resolution with a placeholder number for defense. Now we are having to come back and put in a real number for defense, and, in outlay terms, it is $12 billion. Because we did not adequately provide for defense and because we did not provide at all for emergencies, even though the chairman of our committee wanted to institutionalize that, it appeared that a bigger tax cut was feasible. So the tax cut for this year takes out $75 billion, but for a gimmick I will mention in just a minute. So when you factor in those changes you get down to $3 billion. That is how close we are to being empty. Now, one thing saves us, and that is we did an artificial one-time transfer of funds from September 15 to October 1. The problem is, when we go home in August, that money may disappear when CBO does its update of the budget and economy. If that is true, we will really be running right on empty. That is all we have got left to provide for emergencies, to provide for other priorities that come along in this process before it is completed. That is what is wrong with the tax cut. What happened? I do not blame the subcommittee at all. I did not get up to criticize the subcommittee. I think they have done as well as they could do with what was allocated. But we pointed out if you went with this budget with these tax cuts and this allocation, this was going to happen to veterans. We could not fund fully the basic needs of the Veterans Health Care Program. It has happened. It has come to pass. We have less than they need. They have done a good job in trying to plus it up as well they could, but there is not enough there. In the Housing Program, how could one pick a program that helps the vulnerable more than housing? We have a $20 billion backlog in capital requirements and maintenance needs. What are we doing? Taking a half billion dollars out of it. The housing projects are a haven for drugs. We are eliminating the Public Housing Drug Elimination Program. This is a consequence of having a budget where we did not adequately provide for emergencies, we did not adequately provide for defense, we fooled ourselves about the size of the tax cut, and now we are inheriting the consequences. You see the fruits of this in the bill before us today. I commend the committee for doing the best they could with what they have got, but these are the consequences of the tax bill that we adopted just a couple of months ago.

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Let me just take a minute to comment on the legislative history of this resolution. I first learned of this resolution when I got a call yesterday afternoon from the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) on the golf course. He had his staff busy at work on this, and he wanted to send me a copy of it. Over the evening, we proposed a number of changes to the preamble and to the resolving clause. The gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), to his credit, acknowledged our purpose, which was to confine this resolution to the purpose at hand; that is, commending those who have accomplished what is a daunting feat. It is done every day, but this is a particularly daunting feat. It was a big challenge. So we want to send them a message of commendation. We took out references as to how much we should infer or read from this particular success as to whether or not we would one day have a big missile field over the country so that those who disagree could at least send a word of commendation to the people who have so ably pulled off this test. Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) for working with me, but I want to say to my side that this is a much pared-back resolution which we resolved through genuine compromise and I agreed to cosponsor about 1 minute before this debate began.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Allen).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, on Saturday night, in the euphoria after the test, General Kadish warned against reading too much into this single test. He warned specifically that we have a long way to go before we have a system we can deploy. I think, at this moment and in days ahead, we should bear his caution in mind and take his prudence to heart. This test shows that the technology for an operational system is within our reach, and that is good news. This was a daunting feat. That is why I support this commendation. But it is not yet within our grasp. We should continue with this ground-based system, we should commend the people who were developing it, testing it. They are working hard, and they deserve our gratitude. But we should not fool ourselves. Challenges remain. This system should be held to the same standards as any other weapons system before we make the decision to deploy. Mr. Speaker, I think it would probably be appropriate to quote Churchill after North Africa at this point, who was asked, ``What does this signify?'' He said ``It is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. It is, perhaps, the beginning of the beginning.'' Maybe we are a bit farther ahead than that, but that is where we stand. We should not get too carried away or euphoric about one single test. There are many more to come. This resolution itself says we had better be prepared for failures, because they are likely to happen, particularly if the program does what we have asked it to do, and that is begin with the simple and move to the complex; add with each test more rigor, more difficulty, countermeasures, and other things. We are going to see failures before we have a system that we can judge. One further point, and it is a critical point. This system, the ballistic missile system and all its components, is different from other weapons systems in the sense that it is affected and controlled by a treaty called the ABM treaty of 1972. This treaty, some support it, some do not, but in any event, it is an integral part of our arms control relationship with the Soviet Union and today with Russia. It underlies START II, it makes possible START III, and we must be careful not to create a rupture with Russia over the provisions of the treaty. In anything we do, we should try to make it treaty compliant, or at least make it possible by a mutual amendment to the treaty. If we deploy this system and create a rupture in our relationship with Russia, if we abrogate the ABM treaty and simply walk away from it defiantly, we can see the Russians, as they have threatened, pull out of START II, forego START III, and call an end to cooperative threat reduction, which has removed hundreds of warheads that were a menacing threat to us. If we did that, if that was the end result, then the net result for our national security would be a greater threat and not a lesser threat as a result of deploying ballistic missile defense. Those sober words need to be borne in mind as we pass this celebratory resolution. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott).