John Spratt

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 6 minutes. Mr. Chairman, I was trying to get the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kasich) to tell us why Function 950 of his budget resolution provides no adjustment as it is required to do to provide for the pay raise, the extra pay raise for selected pay grades and officers and NCOs and for the military retirement benefits. The fact of the matter is, Function 950, the military retirement account, where that charge needs to be made, is absolutely unadjusted in their budget resolution. So it does not provide for the pay raise and the benefits that our troops have been promised. Let me go to the overarching subject, the budget, and the happy occasion that we find ourselves in today. I did not ever think that I would serve to see the day where we have surpluses as far as the eye could see. I think it is worth taking just a minute to track down the trail we have followed for the last 10 years that have led us to this happy set of circumstances. In 1990, we had a budget summit that lasted 6 months. We finally brought it to the floor. It was defeated once. Then the Democrats put the vote up to pass President Bush's budget summit agreement. There were only 80 votes on that side of the aisle. It implemented discretionary pay caps, a pay-as-you-go rule, and the kind of disciplines that have served us well to get rid of the deficit. But it did not have any obvious effect because it was eclipsed by a recession. In 1993, when President Clinton came to office, he found on his desk awaiting him the economic report of the President. In it, Michael Boskin, his Economic Council chief, said the deficit this year will be $332 billion. That was the baseline from which the Clinton administration began. From that baseline, in 1993, we reduced the deficit with the Deficit Reduction Act of 1993, which had exclusively Democratic votes in the House and the Senate from $330 billion projected level, $290 billion actual level in 1992, to $22 billion in 1997. Then our colleagues on the other side of the aisle joined with us, and we finished the job and wiped out that additional $22 billion of deficit and lay the basis for going into the next century. It is critically important that we did this, because until we dealt with the year-to-year deficit, we could not deal with the next problem; and that is the problem, the challenge of an aging society. Our society is getting older and older. I am a war baby. A huge generation of young people were born, babies were born in 1946 until 1964, and they will start retiring in about 10 or 12 years. When they do, they will put unprecedented strain on the most popular, most successful program ever invented by the government, the Social Security program, so much so that they may put in jeopardy its solvency by the year 2032. The Medicare program, which runs a close second in popularity, is in even greater jeopardy because the cost of medical care is rising along with the demographic increases, and it, too, is threatened with insolvency in the year 2008. We have an opportunity to do something about that. We have an opportunity to take the work we began in 1990 and 1993 and 1997 and deal with the next problem, which is a daunting challenge, preparing this country and this government for the burdens of the next century cast upon us by an aging society. Our budget, the Democratic budget, rises to that challenge; theirs does not. We are going to have other speakers who will turn to this topic, but let me just give my colleagues the highlights and tell them what is the difference between us and them. I will give it to my colleagues in a nutshell. We protect the Social Security Trust Fund. We proposed to protect the Trust Fund so that 100 percent of the payroll taxes coming into it are spent exclusively for the benefit of that particular program for the first time probably in 30 or 40 years. We propose to do it by directing the Treasurer of the United States to take that percentage of payroll taxes not needed to pay benefits that year and to buy down public debt. How does that happen? That means that, when the obligations come due in 2020 and 2030, the Treasury will be in better shape than ever because it will have lower debt and lower debt service to meet those obligations. We also, unlike the Republicans, do something about Medicare, because we see Medicare and Social Security as linked together. We extend the life of Medicare, the solvency of the Medicare program from 2020. They leave it as it is. They leave it in a lurch. We are still opposed to huge tax cuts in the out years, $143 billion in the first 5 years and $450 billion plus in the second 5 years, rising to as much as a trillion dollars between 2009 and 2014, which will drain the budget dry of the funds needed to do something about the Medicare program. Do my colleagues want to know the difference between us and them? Look at the Trust Fund account for Social Security. In our plan, Social Security will have $3.4 trillion more money at the end of 15 years. They will add $1.8 trillion. We are twice as good as they. With Medicare, we add $400 billion. To their Trust Fund, they add a paltry $14 billion. There are significant differences. If my colleagues care about meeting the challenge in the next century, this is a budget resolution to vote for. Mr. Chairman, I yield 14 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott), and I ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to control that time.

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Function 950 of this budget is fatally flawed. That is the best reason yet to vote against the rule.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. This rule allows just 2 hours of general debate for a budget with $1.7 trillion of spending authority. That is a travesty. Let me tell my colleagues how this kind of haste makes waste, just one way that you can mask the numbers in a debate so short about a matter so complex as the budget. This budget, as now drafted, this Republican budget resolution, means that our military personnel will not get the 4.4 percent pay raise that the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for and the troops thought they were promised by the President and the Congress. The Republican resolution does provide extra money for defense, but nothing for an increase in military retirement benefits, nothing for extra pay raises to help retain critical personnel. Now, we were able to ferret this out because every pay raise requires a corresponding increase in the contribution to the military retirement trust fund, function 950 of the budget. Look at function 950 in their budget, the Republican budget. There is no entry, no adjustment, no provision for these major pay increases, these major retirement reforms that have been promised. They are in ours. We followed the President's lead. We did it right, they did it wrong. You pass this budget and everybody is on notice. Unless you do the numbers in this resolution over, you are breaking faith with our troops. You are denying them the pay raises and the benefits that they have been told were coming. This is no way to treat the armed services. The same goes for the civil service. The same mistake has been made. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia to explain that briefly.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, it is down the gentleman's alley. I would like for him to elaborate, to explain this so-called trust box that my colleagues are proposing. It is my understanding that the basic protection is a rule of order here on the House floor. As the gentleman knows, as the chairman of the Committee on Rules, he is in the business of waiving points of order every day of the week.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I have followed this issue for a long time, since chairing a panel of the Committee on Armed Services in the mid- 1980s on SDI for 4 years, and I want to put this whole matter in some context, explain to my friends who do not understand why I am supporting this simple bill. In March of 1983, Ronald Reagan launched the strategic defense initiative, and with it a charged debate. The arguments over the old perennials of the Cold War, the ASATs and the B-2 and the MX, ended long ago but this one smolders on. Unlike any other weapons system I have seen in the time that I have served here, this one has become a political totem. Its advocates not only disagree with its opponents but they accuse them of leaving the country vulnerable to missile attack. They diminish the fact that deterrence worked for all of the Cold War and they act as if missile defenses were almost off the shelf, available to shield the country, the whole country, from attack, when this capability is far from proven and may never be attained. On the other hand, opponents accuse the advocates of firing up the arms race again. They give too little credit to the advantages of defending ourselves against nuclear attack and moving away from massive retaliation, mutual destruction, complementing deterrence with defense. Today, the House takes up that missile defense debate again, this time with a resolution that is notable for its brevity, if nothing else, that it is the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense system. Of course the United States has deployed a national missile defense system. We spent $15 billion in today's money building Sprint and Spartan and setting up Safeguard at Grand Forks, North Dakota, only to shut the system down in 1976. Even then the Pentagon did not quit spending in missile defense. In the year Reagan made his speech and launched SDI, the Pentagon put $991 million in its budget for missile defense and that sum was budgeted to rise annually to $2.7 billion by 1988, most of it to go for protecting MX missiles in their silos. After the eighties, the mid-eighties, the defense budget, as all of us know, barely kept up with inflation. With Ronald Reagan pushing it, SDI kept on increasing, rising so fast that within 4 or 5 years of his speech SDI was the largest item in the defense budget, a big defense budget. At nearly $4 billion, SDI was getting almost as much as the entire research and development account of the United States Army. Sixteen years have passed and the Defense Department has spent some $50 billion on ballistic missile defense and has yet to field a strategic defense system. Now by anybody's reckoning, that is real money. It is hard to claim, with this much spent, that the absence of a deployed system is due to the lack of commitment. The problem is more lack of focus than a lack of commitment or lack of funding. Plus the fact, the plain hard fact, that this task is harder than Ronald Reagan ever realized. Early on, the architects of strategic defense decided that it had to be layered; one layer would not do. The system had to thin out some missiles in the boost phase as they rose from their silos. It had to take out some reentry vehicles in the mid-course as they traveled through space, and the remainder had to be taken out as they descended in the atmosphere to their targets. So the Pentagon developed a whole family of systems. There was the Endo-atmospheric interceptor, and Exo-atmospheric interceptor, a terminal interceptor. There was Space-Based Kinetic-Kill Vehicles which later became Brilliant Pebbles. All of those were kinetic killers, which meant they were designed to collide head on with their targets. Since hitting a target that is moving 7 kilometers a second is a daunting task, to say the least, SDI put some money into an alternative technology: Directed energy. At one time, the SDI program supported five different laser systems, space-spaced and ground-based. Since missile defense requires better acquisition of targets, better tracking, and a means of discriminating real targets from decoys, SDI had to put money into those systems, too. We developed a pop-up system, known as the GSTS. We developed space- based infrared sensors first known as Space and Missile Tracking System, now known as SBIRS Low and SBIRS High. We even went into interactive discrimination with an esoteric technology called the neutral particle beam, which would have been based in space. Now let me emphasize, not all of these pursuits took us down blind alleys. Not all of this money was wasted, not by any means. The ERIS, for example, was bypassed for a better interceptor but the projectile that the Army developed for the ERIS, the Exo-atmospheric interceptor called the LEAP, is now on the top of the Navy's upper tier system. It has been used there. The Army has a system called the THAAD, which intercepts in the atmosphere. In the atmosphere, there is a lot of friction. That system, the THAAD, has a sapphire window aperture on it developed for the HEDI. So we have used the technology for other systems and it has evolved forward. We have made progress with this $50 billion. After the Gulf War, SDIO eventually evolved into BMDO, and BMDO had theater missile defense and strategic defense, a bigger plate and less money. It decided it had to put its money where it would pay off so it started taking assessment of what worked and what did not work. The first thing they did was discard lasers because lasers were too futuristic. Ground-based lasers are hard to propagate in the atmosphere without distortion. Spaced-based lasers in fixed orbits are easy to counter attack, hard to power. They were discarded. Boost-phased interceptors are also vulnerable to attack if they are in fixed orbit in space, and given the fact that there have to be so many on target on station all the time, we need thousands of them, literally thousands launched to do the job. Even if all of these problems could be overcome, for boost-phased interceptors they could still be outrun by missiles like the SS-24 which had a boost-phase burnout time of 180 seconds. Why go through all of this? Because it shows the frustration of these efforts. We are not here today because we have not had the will to do it. We have spent the money. We have pursued these things. We simply have not yet been able to prove that the system can work. Where we have ended up is with ground-based interceptors, mid-course interceptors. These have the merit of being treaty compliant. They are technically mature. They are clearly the best candidate to go first, but nobody should think that they answer Ronald Reagan's dream. The first problem they face today and 15 years ago is countermeasures in the form of decoys and chaff and RVs that are attached to and enveloped in balloons which lure the interceptors off course. The next is a limiting condition that the SDIO acknowledged in the 1992 report. Because of the radiation and the heat and the electromagnetic effects that are generated when an RV is destroyed with a nuclear warhead inside it, SDIO decided that it could not postulate the destruction of more than 200 oncoming RVs at any given time. If we were attacked by an adversary as sophisticated as Russia, with an arsenal as large and diverse as theirs, the first wave attack could easily exceed 200 RVs. So nobody should assume that we are anywhere close to protecting the whole American continent from ballistic missiles. We are not even close to that. Now, H.R. 4 says it is our policy to develop a national missile defense. The mid-course interceptor is clearly the candidate for this mission. This is not a system, however, that will render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. If we have learned anything over the past 16 years, we have learned that a leak- proof defense is so difficult it may never be attained. H.R. 4 calls for a national missile defense, but the committee report acknowledges that this is a system that will protect us against limited strikes. By limited strikes what we mean is up to 20 oncoming RVs. There is a legitimate concern, I think, that Russia may react adversely to this but, in truth, Russia has nothing to be concerned about here because this system would not begin to defend us against the threat that the Russians still pose to us. That is why we should not push too hard. That is why we should not be talking about breaching the ABM Treaty, because START II and START III are still more important to us, to our security, than launching this NMD system with its limited effectiveness. The merit of this bill to me is, as I have said, not what it says but what it does not say. It is simple. It does not say that the technology is in hand. It does not try to prescribe what we should do. It leaves that to be worked out in time. It just commits us, focuses us on a deployable system. It does not mandate a date for deployment. It does not call for the revision of the ABM Treaty. It simply says, let us focus on getting something done. Let us see if we cannot bring to fruition a system that will at least give us limited protection against a ballistic missile attack. Then we can, first of all, reap some return on the $50 billion we have spent. Secondly, with a treaty complaint system we can tell what its potential is, test its practical potential. That is the only way we can find out if we can overcome the countermeasures of decoys and balloons and all the other things that can lure these interceptors off track. Thirdly, this technology that we are talking about is not on a continuum with theater missile defense, and we all agree in this House that that is something we should do, having seen the consequences of it in the Gulf War. Finally, if we do this, we will have a system, if it has proven its mettle, that may give us some protection against an accidental strike, which could happen; against a rogue attack, which could be threatened. It may give us some protection, and it will certainly give us something that we can learn from and build upon and, as I said, reap some investment. I support this bill finally in the hope that we can put BMD on a bipartisan footing. Theater missile defense enjoys bipartisan support, we all support it. National missile defense has been a bone of contention. What we sought in this bill was something that we could all come to common ground on. I am not just advocating that we build anything. National missile defense needs to stand the test of any weapons system. It ought to be put to rigorous testing, made to prove that it can hold this country harmless against a limited missile attack. If a strategic defense can rise to this mettle, I think we should buy it and deploy it. If it cannot, there is nothing in this bill that says we should buy a dud.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Speaker, let me quickly close by giving everyone the reasons that I support this bill. First of all, it allows us to realize a return on the investment of more than $50 billion that we have already sunk in ballistic missile defense. Secondly, it supports ground-based interceptors, the best candidate. They are treaty compliant and they fit very easily into the infrastructure of radars that we have already got that will need to be upgraded that are basically already installed, and also into the infrastructure of space-based sensors, SBIRS Low and SBIRS High, that we are going to build, anyway, and deploy because they are a complement to theater missile defenses. They help them acquire and track their targets better. Thirdly, it will focus our efforts on completing the one form of strategic defense that can be developed and deployed in the short run. In doing this, in making this investment, we will be making an investment on technologies that are common to theater missile defense which are also kinetic-kill interceptors like the interceptor we will be building. It will also promote the THAAD and the Navy's Upper Tier. Finally, if it is proven capable, these ground-based interceptors will give us a defense against rogue attacks and accidental attacks. I think that is a threat that exists and is emerging and possibly expanding. It will give us also a working system that we can learn from and build upon. But I want to stress ``if proven capable.'' It has not been done yet. NMD, national missile defense, needs to be put to the test, rigorous testing, made to prove that it can hold this country harmless against a limited missile attack. If it can do that, then I think it is worth buying. If it cannot, I would emphasize there is nothing in this bill that requires us to develop and deploy a system that will not protect us. I would say one final thing, because yesterday we marked up the budget resolution in the House Committee on the Budget. Next week it will be on the floor. This system will not come cheap. It does have the advantage of being an incremental investment on top of a huge investment we have already made, but I am really dubious that the budget resolution coming to the floor next week has enough room to accommodate the cost of this system and at the same time buy an F-22 and a Joint Strike Fighter and V-22 and the Comanche and all the other procurement items that will be coming to fruition at the same time that this bill would call for deployment of a ballistic missile defense system. On the evening of March 23, 1983, President Reagan went on television to marshal support for his defense budget. His words would be forgotten, except for a question he popped at the end: What if . . . people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest on the threat of instant retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, but that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reach our own soil or that of our allies? Reagan answered that question by launching the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and with it, a charged debate. The arguments ended over the old perennials of the cold war--the MX, ASATs, the B-2--years ago, but the argument over missile defense smolders still. Unlike any other system, missile defense has become a political totem. Its advocates not only disagree with its opponents; but thinking they can score politically, they accuse them of leaving the country vulnerable to missile attack. They diminish the fact that deterrence worked for all of the cold war, and act as if missile defenses are available to shield the whole country from attack, when this capability is far from proven and may never be attained. On the other hand, opponents accuse advocates of firing up a new arms race. They give little credit to the advantages of defending ourselves from attack and moving away from massive retaliation and mutual destruction, and complementing deterrence with defense. Today, the House starts the missile defense debate again, this time with a resolution notable for its brevity. It consists of a single sentence stating: ``That it is the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense.'' The United States has deployed a national missile defense system. We spent $15 billion (in today's money) building Sprint and Spartan and setting up Safeguard at Grand Forks, ND, only to shut the system down in 1976. Even then, the Pentagon did not quit spending on missile defense. In the year Reagan launched SDI, the Pentagon put $991 million in its budget for missile defense, and that sum was budgeted to rise annually to $2.7 billion by 1988. Most of it was for terminal defenses to protect MX missile silos. After the mid-1980's the defense budget barely kept up with inflation. But with Reagan promoting it, SDI kept on increasing, rising so fast that within 4 years of his speech, SDI was the largest item in the defense budget. At $4 billion a year, SDI got almost as much as the Army's entire account for research and development. Sixteen years have passed, the Defense Department has spent almost $50 billion on ballistic missile defense, and it has yet to field a strategic defense system. By anybody's reckoning, this is real money. It's hard to claim, with this much spent, that the absence of any deployed system is due to a lack of commitment. The problem is more a lack of focus than funding--plus the fact that the task is tougher than Reagan ever realized. Early on, the architects of strategic defense decided that it had to be layered. The system had to take out some missiles to the boost phase, as they rose from their launch pads; some re-entry vehicles in the mid-course, as they traveled through space; and the remainder in the atmosphere as they descended to their targets. So, the Pentagon sank money into a family of systems: the High Endo-atmospheric Defense Interceptor (HEDI); the Exo-atmospheric Re-entry Vehicle Interceptor System (ERIS); and two boost-phase interceptors, one known as the Space-Based Kinetic-Kill Vehicle (SBKKV), the next more cleverly called ``Brilliant Pebbles.'' All of these were ``kinetic killers,'' designed to collide with their targets. But since intercepting a target moving 7 kilometers per second is a challenge and subject to countermeasures, SDI supported directed energy as an alternative. In fact, SDI was at one time funding at least five different lasers, ground-based and space-based. Missile defense demands earlier acquisition and better tracking of targets and a means of discriminating real targets from decoys. So, SDI put money in popup infra-red sensors known as the Ground-Based Surveillance and Tracking System (GSTS) and space-based infra-red sensors known as the Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS) and now known as Space-Based Infrared Sensors (SBIRS) Low. It even tried interactive discriminators as esoteric as a neutral particle beam, based in space. Not all of these pursuits were blind alleys, and by no means was all of the money wasted. The ERIS, for example, was by-passed for a better interceptor. But the projectile built by the Army for the ERIS was adopted by the Navy for its theater missile interceptor. By the same token, the Army's theater missile interceptor has a sapphire window, developed for the HEDI as a heat-resistant aperture to see within the atmosphere, where friction produces terrific heat. After the gulf war, SDIO evolved into BMDO (Ballistic Missile Defense Organization), and its charter was broadened to include theater defense as well. With billions of dollars spent on research, BMDO began to assess what was feasible. Laser systems were deemed futuristic, too far over the horizon. Ground-based laser beams were hard to propagate through the atmosphere without distortion, and space-based lasers were hard to power and protect from attack. Boost-phase interceptors orbiting in space were also vulnerable to attack, technically challenging, and expensive to deploy, given the number needed for enough always to be on station. Even if all these problems were overcome, boost-phase interceptors could be outrun by missiles with fast-burn boosters, like Russia's SS-24, a mobile missile with a booster burn-out time of 180 seconds. Emphasis shifted, therefore, to the ground-based systems. Since interdiction in the atmosphere is hard to do, the endo-atmospheric interceptor was sidetracked, and the whole mission devolved to mid- course interceptors. These have the merit of being treaty-compliant and technically mature, and are clearly the best candidate to go first. But no one should think they answer Ronald Reagan's dream. The first problem they face are counter-measures in the form of decoys, chaff, and re-entry vehicles (RV's) enveloped in balloons, which lure the interceptors off course. The next is a limiting condition SDIO acknowledged in a 1992 report. Because of the radiation, heat, and electromagnetic effects generated when RV's are destroyed and exploded, SDIO decided that it could not postulate the take-out of more than 200 re-entry vehicles by mid-course interceptors. If our country were attacked by an adversary with an arsenal as large and sophisticated as Russia's, the first wave could easily include more than 200 warheads, and even with a smaller attack, the same problem could thwart tracking with infrared sensors and radar. H.R. 4 says that it is our policy to deploy a national missile defense. Although not identified, the mid-course interceptor is the clear candidate for this mission. This is not a system, however, that will ``render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete,'' in the words of President Reagan. If we have learned anything over past sixteen years, we have learned that a leak-proof defense is so difficult, it may never be attained. H.R. 4 calls for a ``national missile defense,'' and the committee report makes it clear that this means system to protect us against limited strikes. By ``limited'' strikes, the committee report means that the objective system should take out up to 20 oncoming warheads. This is the near-term goal, and even it is not ready to deploy. There is legitimate concern about how Russia may react to this push for deployment. In truth, the system this bill anticipates will not defend us against a concerted attack by a nation with an arsenal as large and diverse as Russia's, not in the near future anyway. If it can be shown to work, it should defend us against rogue or accidental strikes and some unauthorized strikes, and Russia should have no objection to that. This level of missile defense seems to be within our reach, but it is not yet within our grasp. Secretary Cohen has just added $6.6 billion to BMD recently and put his support behind national missile defense (NMD), but he warned that the technology is ``challenging'' and ``highly risky.'' Look at our experience so far with theater missile defense (TMD) systems. They are not comparable one-to-one to NMD, but when the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) is 0- 5 in testing, and the Navy's Upper Tier is 0-4, we should be wary of just presuming that a ground-based interceptor can travel thousands of miles into the exo-atmosphere and hit an RV four feet long. The merit to me in this one-sentence bill is not what it says but what it does not say. It recognizes that the technology of missile defense has yet to be tested and proven, and it does not presume to say what will be deployed, when it will be deployed, or where it will be deployed. This bill does not mandate a date certain for deployment. There is no threat now that requires us to rush development and testing or to settle for a substandard system just to say we have deployed something. In 1991, the Senate imposed on us in conference a ``Missile Defense Act'' which made it a national ``goal'' to deploy a missile defense system by 1996. It is now 1999, and nothing has been deployed, which shows the folly of legislating deployment dates. This bill also does not mention the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Everyone knows that we are developing ground-based interceptors that are treaty-compliant. This bill does not specify the number of interceptors or where they will be deployed, and it does not need to-- not yet. We will not enhance our security by pushing NMD so hard that we derail Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II and doom START III. Unlike past bills, H.R. 4 also does not tell the Administration what it must negotiate with the Russians, and it should not. For now, compliance with the ABM Treaty is necessary to ratifying START II and negotiating START III. If we are concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons, or the risk of unauthorized or accidental attack, or the cost of maintaining our strategic forces at START I levels, both treaties are important--probably a lot more important to our near-term security than a limited missile defense system. The treaties are important also to the long-run role of the missile defense, because nuclear warheads in the United States and Russia must be lowered to a couple of thousand on each side if national missile defense is ever to become an effective complement to deterrence. If this bill's attraction is its brevity, it's fair to ask, ``What purpose is served by passing it?'' I know some think this bill is to stiffen the resolve of the Clinton administration, but I don't think that's necessary. The Clinton administration has put a billion dollars a year into developing a ground-based system, and for the last several years, Congress has generally acquiesced in that level of spending. This year the President's budget includes funds for deploying an NMD which amount to a plus-up to $6.6 billion or a total of $10.5 billion over FY 1999-FY 2005. That sounds like a system taking shape to me, and that's one of the reasons I support deployment as our objective. At this level of effort, we should be thinking about a deployable system, and not more viewgraphs to go on the shelf. If anything, it may be the House that needs to check its resolve. Yesterday, the House Budget Committee reported a Budget Resolution that takes $205 billion out of the President's defense budget for the years 2004-2009. This is the very time period when the system this bill supports will be ready to deploy, along with a host of others: the Army's THAAD, the Navy's Upper Tier, PAC-3, the F-22, the F-18 E & F, the Comanche, the V-22, and the JSF. You cannot load on to this full plate ballistic missile defense--ground-based interceptors, SBIRs Low and SBIRs High, radar upgrades, and BMCCC--and pay the billions it will cost with a defense budget that's flat-funded for six years, from 2004- 2009. I think there is an emerging threat and there are good reasons for developing ballistic missile defenses, but let's not fool ourselves. Like all weapon systems, missile defense will not come cheap, and when the time comes to buy it, rhetoric won't pay the bills. In summary, here are my reasons for supporting this bill: (1) It allows us to realize a return on the investment of nearly $50 billion made already on ballistic missile defense. (2) It supports ground-based interceptors that are treaty-complaint and fit easily into an infrastructure of ground-based radars that are already installed and space-based sensors (SBIR's Low and High) that are already being developed for targeting theater missile interceptors defenses and tactical intelligence. (3) It focuses BMDO on completing the one form of strategic defense that can be developed and deployed in the short-run, and further develops technologies on a continuum with theater missile defense systems, particularly THAAD and Navy Upper Tier. (4) If proven capable, ground-based interceptors will give us some defense against rogue and accidental attacks and a working system to learn from and build upon. The best way to find if midcourse interceptors can discriminate decoys from real RV's is to build and test the actual interceptors and the target and guidance systems. (5) Finally, I support this bill in the hope that we can put BMD on a bipartisan footing. TMD enjoys bipartisan support; NMD has been a bone of contention. Now that the technology is taking shape and showing promise, NMD needs to stand the test of any weapons system. It ought to be put to rigorous testing, and made to prove that it can hold this country harmless against a limited missile attack. If strategic defense can prove its mettle, I think we should buy it and deploy it. If it can't, nothing in this bill requires us to buy a dud.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Guam (Mr. Underwood). (Mr. UNDERWOOD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is remaining?

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt). (Mr. HOLT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Tierney). (Mr. TIERNEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Lewis).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 11 minutes. (Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Doggett).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Allen).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Hoeffel).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews). (Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio).

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Tauscher). (Mrs. TAUSCHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. SPRATT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.