Charlie Stenholm

Mr. STENHOLM

Mr. STENHOLM. I believe you will find it does. Therefore, under our amendment, we provide the President the other 355 days out of the year may rescind, and the Congress must vote on individual Presidential rescissions. So I do not see how you can represent our amendment as weakening. I believe it must be strengthening.

Mr. STENHOLM. Yes or no?

Mr. STENHOLM. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute for purposes of entering into a colloquy with the gentleman from New York, because I would like to believe that the gentleman misspoke a moment ago when he said our amendment weakens H.R. 2. Because in all interpretation that we have received, this strengthens H.R. 2, because we do not get into anything of the merits of H.R. 2. In fact, under H.R. 2, would you not agree, that only in the 10-day window can a President veto under H.R. 2?

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. DeFazio].

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Cardin].

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, how much time did I consume on my opening remarks?

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, the Stenholm-Spratt amendment that I offer at this time is the same amendment that passed the House of Representatives July 14, 1994, with a 342 to 69 vote, basically the same amendment in my judgment. We offer it today and it is the same amendment we offered last week as a substitute, but the will of the House was we should not substitute majority override for one-third plus one override and I respect the will of the House. Today we offer this amendment not as a substitute but as a supplement, amendment to, and I will make the argument to my friends on the other side that this does not weaken H.R. 2. In fact it strengthens H.R. 2, because in the words of the gentleman from Florida a moment ago when he was arguing against the Tauzin amendment, when he was saying we need to be able to get rid of wasteful spending at any time in any circumstance, regardless of glide path, I happen to agree with that statement. That is precisely why we offer our amendment today as a supplement to H.R. 2, because as everyone I know understands by now, under H.R. 2 it is only during that window of opportunity of 10 days after an appropriation bill is signed and sent to the President do we have the opportunity to rescind spending. Under the modified rescission process that the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt] and I offer today, the President will have the opportunity to rescind spending at any time during the year. For example, if after October 1 comes and we see that spending is getting out of hand and we are on the glide path that we have already agreed by a 300 vote to 102 I believe the number was the other day on the balanced budget amendment, that the President would have the opportunity to go into any appropriation bill and rescind spending as he can today. So there is, it seems to me, a kind of a schizophrenia in the approach that the gentleman has meant to take by giving two versions. I do think it is a helpful addition. I think obviously, if the amendment that we are dealing with here is declared unconstitutional, it is certainly one we would want to revisit, but I think to include it in the H.R. 2 provision is premature, and is weakening from that extent, and so I would have to oppose the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Chairman, in summation I would just like to say if Members want to replace the cumbersome and unworkable process for year-round authority with teeth, they need to vote for the Stenholm-Spratt amendment. This amendment has had a proud bipartisan history, despite the effort recently to portray it as partisan. Mr. Chairman, I am submitting for the Record some material on past Republican support for the amendment. I also am submitting two legal opinions. Finally, I am submitting for the Record a list of some of the most commonly asked questions about this amendment, along with the answers that have been prepared. Mr. Chairman, whether Members think H.R. 2 is constitutional or not, whether they prefer line item veto authority or expedited rescission authority, there is a reason for Members to vote for the Stenholm- Spratt amendment. This amendment provides a rare opportunity in the legislative process, a win-win scenario. I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to approve my amendment. Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the information to which I referred. [From the Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, Washington, DC., Feb. 3, 1995] To The Honorable Nathan Deal, Attention Ed Lorenzen. From Virginia A. McMurtry, Specialist in American National Government, James V. Saturno, Specialist on the Congress, Government Division. Subject: Submission dates of Presidents' rescission request. In response to your request for figures on the dates of submission to Congress of rescission requests from the President under the Impoundment Control Act since 1974, we have prepared the attached table. The table provides the number of rescission requests, by month, for each fiscal year. The actual unit of analysis is the individual rescission, not rescission messages as we initially discussed. If five separate rescission requests were included in a single message during a given month, the number entered on the table would be five. This provides a more accurate way for considering the transmission of rescission proposals, since under current law there is no requirement for the President either to combine or to separate rescissions transmitted at the same time. The number of rescissions included in a single message have varied considerably, even within the same Administration. As indicated in the notes accompanying the table, the End- of-Year Cumulative Reports on Rescissions and Deferrals, prepared by the Office of Management and Budget, provided the source. Actually, for one year, Fiscal Year 1990, OMB prepared no end-of-year report. In this instance we used the monthly cumulative report for September, 1990, which happened to include a complete listing of rescissions for that year. We hope that this information proves useful to you. If we can be of further assistance, you may reach Ginger at 7-8678, or Jim at 7-2381.

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr Chairman, I would conclude my remarks at this time by saying that I believe it grossly unfair to categorize our amendment as being weakening. If we are truly concerned about deficit reduction, I believe the language of our amendment, as a supplement to, not as a replacement for, but a supplement to, clearly stands out as being more able to reduce the deficit because of the language which we put into our amendment. As the gentleman said, again, Members have talked about this language from the standpoint that somehow current law is better. It is not. And unless we in fact add our amendment, we will have current law 355 days out of the year but 10 days out of the year, 10 calendar days out of the year we will have a much improved situation over the current system. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. STENHOLM. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I realize there has been considerable confusion and misinformation about just what this amendment would do. The last chart in all honesty has nothing to do with this amendment. It has everything to do with why I too offer this amendment. Because we do want to get after spending. The Stenholm-Spratt amendment is offered as a supplement to the line-item veto authority in H.R. 2. Even though it is presented here as a substitute here at the end of the debate, it includes all of H.R. 2, as reported. I want to repeat, this amendment we offer includes all of H.R. 2 as reported. In addition, this amendment incorporates all of the amendments approved by the Committee of the Whole only Thursday and Friday of last week, namely the Clinger, Thurman, Neal, and I will ask the same unanimous consent request that Mr. Clinger asked to add Obey to my amendment so it will do what we intended for it to do when we go into the House. This expedited rescission authority portion of this amendment would allow the President to propose to cut or eliminate individual spending items in appropriations bills throughout the year. The President could earmark some or all of the savings for deficit reduction. In addition, the President would be able to propose to repeal targeted tax breaks which benefit a particular taxpayer or class of taxpayers only within the 10 days of signing the bill. The House would have 10 legislative days after the President sends up a rescission package to bring it to the floor. There has been some debate as to whether or not that 10-day limitation would actually occur. I believe the answer is clearly yes, it would. First the rules would not permit consideration of other matters until the rescission package was dealt with. Second, any appropriation or tax item that was submitted by the President in effect would be suspended until Congress acted on the President's package. Now, just a moment ago we were talking, the gentleman from Wisconsin was talking about guaranteed cuts, guaranteed deficit reduction. I must submit, again, H.R. 2 does not guarantee deficit reduction. Only with our amendment can we have guaranteed deficit reduction, because we included the lock box provision. And that was as a result of last year's debate in which the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] was very instrumental in changing the language of the amendment that we in fact bring to Members today. The line-item veto includes no guarantee that the savings from the President's rescissions would go to deficit reduction. Congress would be free to spend the savings from rescissions proposed by the President on other programs. Although H.R. 2 allows the President to propose to reduce the discretionary caps, there is no provision for a vote in Congress to reduce the spending caps. item veto would not save one dime. We believe our substitute provides for that alternative should we, the Congress and the President, believe that was important. The Stenholm-Spratt amendment includes provisions to ensure that the savings from spending cuts would go to deficit reduction. Furthermore, under H.R. 2, standing alone, the President would have the veto option for only the first 10 days after signing a bill. Although H.R. 2 is intended to increase the ability of the President to identify and eliminate wasteful and low priority spend, it dramatically restricts the President's flexibility by setting this artificial 10-day deadline.

Mr. STENHOLM

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I reclaim my time and say they are not fundamentally different because they are user fees, because the users have the right to believe those funds are being expended in the most efficient way possible. Therefore, the argument we make, I think, is extremely valid. What we are saying today in H.R. 2, and hopefully as amended, with all the amendments added, is that we all agree the basic thrust we want to see is that the President of the United States have the right to go into appropriation bills, Ways and Means tax bills, and now Public Works bills, and if he has a different opinion, then we shall have to vote up or down on the floor on those individual projects. This is what the argument is about. As I say, in my particular feeling, I get nervous about one-third plus one, but I do not get nervous about a 50 percent plus one independent judgment.

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Orton amendment for the same reason that the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Sabo] a moment ago did, and that is for the sake of consistency. Having been involved in the line-item veto and being opposed to giving any President one-third plus one minority override on any of the issues, and then working gradually to this point, I come to the expedited rescission process in which I am perfectly willing to give any President 50 percent plus one line-item veto over any project in the 17th District of Texas. Having listened to the arguments of the appropriators for years opposing either line-item veto or modified rescission for getting into the decisions that the appropriators make and then listening to the members of the Committee on Ways and Means make the various all- substantial and very good arguments as to why the President should not get involved in tax matters, and now listening to the Public Works Committee giving all the very valid reasons why this should not be applied and that is why we will be offering our amendments later this afternoon to strengthen H.R. 2 to allow the President to go into any bill at any time, whether it is contract authority, tax authority, or spending authority, and to make an independent judgment as to whether or not that project is as good as we might have believed it to be when we came to the Public Works Committee and asked in this case for contract authority. I am perfectly willing to do that, and if we are going to do it for one, I think we should do it for all. We have heard the statement made that the trust funds are somehow different. They are not different, Mr. Chairman. Trust funds come from taxes that are in fact paid by the American people for the purposes for which we pay them into the trust fund.

Mr. STENHOLM

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, as indicated by my submission of amendments, placed into the Record on Wednesday, I intend to offer an amendment to H.R. 2, the Line-Item Veto Act. Although my first choice would be to substitute my expedited rescission authority for H.R. 2, I understand that there is great difficulty in achieving the votes for that approach. Therefore, my plan is to offer an amendment which leaves H.R. 2, as amended, entirely intact and simply adds on the expedited rescission authority. As you know, Mr. Speaker, there were three amendments approved by the Committee of the Whole during yesterday's proceedings. I was particularly pleased to see the amendments offered by the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Thurman] and the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Deal] accepted by the House. In order to guarantee that I am offering my add-on to the base package which has been approved by the House, I have redrafted my amendment to incorporate the Clinger, Thurman, and Deal amendments. I am today submitting for the Record my amendment so that everyone might have full opportunity to examine it.

Mr. STENHOLM

Mr. STENHOLM. What I am saying is that in an overwhelmingly bipartisan way, Members have stated, through their words and their votes, that the expedited rescission procedure is a very good one, and I believe much preferable to the base bill. We must bring greater accountability to the appropriations process and the tax benefits process so that individual items may be considered on their individual merits. The current rescission process does not make the President or the Congress accountable. We all agree on that. Congress can ignore the President's rescissions. The President can blame the Congress, Congress can blame the President and nothing happens. But my friend from Massachusetts a moment ago, I believe, misunderstands H.R. 2. Because under H.R. 2, I will submit to my colleagues, there is not greater deficit reduction that will occur because under the base bill, if the President chooses to line-item veto x amount of spending and the Congress does nothing, that is, lets it take effect, the deficit is not removed because the caps on spending are not changed under the base bill. Therefore, even though Members say it is much preferable, I believe a close examination of the language will show that the Wise amendment is much preferable if Members are interested in getting the deficit down by removing and lowering the caps. Another area in which the Wise amendment is much superior to H.R. 2, if Members are concerned about getting the deficit down, is the fact that we only, on tax items, say that there is a 10-day period in which it must be acted upon. Any other spending, the President can do it at any time during the year, not within a short period of time immediately following the appropriations process. If Members are really serious about getting the deficit down, which this Member is, it seems to me we would want to allow the President to go into these bills at any time and rescind at any point in time those spending measures. That seems to be preferable to only having to do it within a narrow window. I do not understand how H.R. 2 can be submitted as being stronger than the fair examination would show that the Wise amendment is in fact much stronger, if Members are concerned about letting the President go in and veto the unnecessary spending items that we all agree need to be done. The general public is fed up with finger pointing. I guess I would just like to say in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the only area of major disagreement that I have, and I think the debate last night on the Skelton amendment suddenly focused a lot of people's attention on what we are talking about, do Members really want to give any President the right to go into any bill, line item, and then only have to get one-third plus one of the Members of this body to agree? Is that really what we want to do? Do we really want to change the separation of powers to that extent? What we are saying in this substitute, let us let any President go into any bill, veto as much as he wishes to do, send it to us, and we must vote, we cannot duck, we must vote on those particular items. If it turns out to be one of our favorite programs, then we must get 49 of our colleagues to stand up and separate, so we vote on that individually. If it is Charlie Stenholm's favorite project, and I cannot get 50 percent of my colleagues to agree that money ought to be spent, it is gone, period, teetotaled. Therefore, I think it is very important that in this debate we understand and we read this legislation, because there is a gross misunderstanding of how strong H.R. 2 is for accomplishing the goals that we are all saying. I believe, upon an honest examination, the work of people going back to Dan Quayle in 1985, and going through a bipartisan effort since 1985, will show that the language in the Wise amendment is much preferable if Members really and truly want to get on with line item vetoing individual appropriation bills, out of appropriation bills, and also going further in the area of tax and even into the area, perhaps some day, of entitlements, et cetera. That is not in the amendment before us. Mr. Chairman, I ask Members again, do they really want to change the power of the Constitution regarding the separation of powers? That is the only honest-to-goodness argument my colleagues on this side have, and some of my friends on this side. The only honest difference between the two is whether we want one- third or 50 percent. The rest of it gets pretty hazy. In fact, I will submit again and again, and be glad to discuss privately, why H.R. 2 is weaker than Wise if Members in fact want to accomplish the goal of lowering the caps and lowering expenditures by congressional action.

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Wise amendment, and I know that my friends on both sides of the aisle who feel very strongly that for some reason we need a pure line-item veto, pure being defined as one-third plus one minority control, and there are those on both sides that feel that, I want to point out again that that is not what we are voting on in H.R. 2. This is not a pure line-item veto, because it is not being constitutionally imposed. I respect those who believe that we need to have stronger language than what is perceived to be in the modified version that the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. Wise] is offering at this moment. I sincerely respect those who believe that the only way we can make this language stronger is somehow to give a President one-third plus one minority. I could not more sincerely or strongly disagree with that. What some have called a modified line-item veto or what we prefer to call expedited rescission procedure is the approach that many of us have always found preferable, both sides of the aisle. Under this scenario, a President still would be given the opportunity to propose cuts to individual spending or tax items. That is not in dispute with me. That is not in dispute with the substitute before us today. We all agree that any President may go into any bill, including all of the bills. I believe it ought to be entitlements. I believe it ought to be tax bills. I believe it ought to be everything. If we are going to do what we all want to do, and that is make it more difficult for us to spend money, that is, increase the deficit, we ought to, in fact, allow the President to have a more major role in doing so. The only question is, how much power do you wish to cede to a President. That is it. Under our scenario, within 10 legislative days after the President sent such a rescission package to the Congress, a vote on that package would be taken. We keep talking about the world as it has been. The world has changed. We are no longer operating under what we used to do. I do not anticipate we are going to see supplemental bills this thick hurting people's hands when they are dropped on the table. That is not going to happen under the leadership on this side, I do not believe. If a majority of Members voted to retain fundings--if, in fact, an individual Member chooses to differ with what a President suggests ought to be vetoed, I believe very strongly that an individual Member who differs with the President ought to have the opportunity to get an up and down vote on that individual item. The base bill was amended yesterday with the Thurman amendment to provide that that can happen. If it is a program of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] in question, if I can get 49 of my colleagues to agree on a separate vote, it will be taken separately. That is now in both bills. But if the remainder of the rescissions were approved by a simple majority of the House, the bill would then be sent to the Senate for consideration under the same expedited procedure. I want to put a little historical perspective to this amendment, because I certainly do not want to stand here and take partisan credit on behalf of the Democratic side for this amendment. Because expedited rescission legislation embodies an idea which many Members, both Democrats and Republicans, have fought hard for over the years. Dan Quayle first introduced expedited rescission legislation in 1985. Tom Carper and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Armey] did yeoman's work in promoting this legislation. On the Democratic side the gentleman from South Dakota [Mr. Johnson], Dan Glickman, Tim Penny, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Payne] have spent years, as have Lynn Martin, Bill Frenzel, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Fawell], and others, made meaningful contributions to the language that we are now debating. Of course, the language which we voted on last year was the Stenholm- Penny-Kasich amendment. The deficit reduction prowess of my two cohorts in that effort is almost legendary and deservedly so. Thanks to effort of these and other Members, the House overwhelmingly passed expedited rescission legislation in each of the past 3 years. I do not in any way intend to imply that all Members have supported expedited rescission to the exclusion of, or even in preference to, a pure line-item veto, although this proposal was described a few years ago by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] as a tremendous compromise that this House can support overwhelmingly on both sides of the aisle. My friend from New York has always made it clear that he prefers the one-third plus one approach. And again, I say to those who prefer giving the President that much power on any individual item in the budget, I respect that. But I differ strongly with that view.

Mr. STENHOLM

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I, too, am a pro-defense Member of the House of Representatives. I would point out to my colleagues that with the Thurman amendment any 50 of us that took umbrage with any decision that has been made now in either bill, either the H.R. 2 or the substitute that we will offer tomorrow, any 50 standing up may get a separate vote. Therefore, we have covered a good part of the problem that has been a concern by my colleagues who I formerly agreed with in total. I choose to take a few minutes though to speak on behalf of why I oppose H.R. 2, and my colleagues have just heard the best example of why all of us in this body should be a little bit concerned before we grant to any President one-third-plus-one minority override on decisions of extreme importance to individual Members, whether it be on defense or any other area of our budget. I have opposed the real line-item veto ever since I first heard of it. We are not discussing the real line-item veto because, if we were doing the real line-item veto, we would have an amendment to the Constitution of the United States for purposes of two-thirds vote in the House, two-thirds vote in the Senate, sending it to the American people to see whether or not three-fourths of the States want to see us grant this tremendous change in power that we are about to do if we adopt H.R. 2, power as defined by the Constitution, by the original writers. That is why we have come to a conclusion that we need a modified version of the line-item, a modified version even of the modification called H.R. 2. I can no longer explain to my constituents why we do not give the President the right to go into appropriation bills, into tax bills, into any kind of a bill on this floor, and extract certain things that are embarrassing to the entire House. I could not do that. So we came up with the modified version in which we are perfectly willing, and I say this in all sincerity, any President of the United States today or in the future can go into any bill, any bill, and line-item Charlie Stenholm's, i.e., 17th District of Texas, favorite program. Something of benefit specifically to my constituency. I want them to have that power. All I ask is that I have an opportunity to stand on this floor and to argue with you, my colleagues. And if I can find 50-percent- plus-one to agree with me, it stays in. If the President wins, it goes out. That is the significant part of the debate that we will spend today, tomorrow, and Monday on. We will get further into this debate when we talk to him about the specifics of the substitute that we offer. I just have a difficult time believing that there is a majority of my colleagues that want to grant one-third-plus-one minority override, particularly now that we are talking about defense. But whatever the area is, that is the fundamental question. And to all who we have managed to muddle this so much, I want to repeat, I am perfectly willing, and want to have the President to be granted new powers to go in and extract those things in budgets that should not be there. Period. The fundamental question you have to ask is: Do you want it to be a minority override? Do you want one-third of the Senate to agree with the President and it be done, one-third of the House to agree with the House? Or do we want to stay with majority rule? If you needed a good argument for the position of the substitute of the Wise-Spratt-Stenholm amendment, you have just heard it tonight. And to my colleagues who believe that you want it to be that other way, I hope you will think twice overnight and reconsider your position. I believe the substitute is the better way for us to go.

Mr. STENHOLM. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to come to the floor today to debate proposals to strengthen the ability of Presidents to identify and eliminate low-priority budget items. The Members of the House will have the opportunity to consider a variety of approaches to this issue, including an amendment which I will be offering with John Spratt. I know that my friends on the other side of the aisle have waited a long time to pass a pure line-item veto bill. I do want to point out that even the amendment before us today is not a line-item veto constitutional amendment, which I believe is what most Americans are thinking of when they speak about ``the strongest possible line-item veto.'' Nonetheless, I have no doubt that supporters will pass the pure statutory line-item veto when the Committee of the Whole rises after debating the various amendments that will be brought to the floor during the next several days. There also has never been any doubt about my position on this so-called pure line-item veto; I have opposed it. For those who believe that any President--Democrat or Republican-- should have minority rule over Congress, should be able to get just one-third-plus-one of the Congress to agree with him on the most targeted of funding items, those people should vote for the pure line- item veto. I respect their right to have that opinion, but I strongly disagree with it. What some call ``modified line item veto,'' or what I prefer to call ``expedited rescission procedure,'' is the approach that I always have found far preferable. Under this scenario, a President still would be given the opportunity to propose cuts to individual spending or tax items. Within 10 legislative days after the President sent such a rescission package to Congress, a vote on that package would be taken on the House floor. That bill could not be amended, except that 50 House Members could request a separate vote on an individual item which had been proposed for rescission. If a majority of Members voted to retain funding for that individual item, it would be struck from the rescission bill. If the remainder of the rescissions were approved by a simple majority of the House, the bill then would be sent to the Senate for consideration under the same expedited procedure. This latter approach encourages deficit reduction and maintains the balance of power established by the Constitution, thus excusing it from the grave Constitutional concerns created by the language of the base bill. I also want to be careful not to claim individual or partisan credit for this approach. Expedited rescission legislation embodies an idea which many Members, both Democrats and Republicans, have fought hard for over the years. Dan Quayle first introduced expedited rescission legislation in 1985. Tom Carper and Dick Armey did yeomen's work in promoting this legislation. On the Democratic side, Tim Johnson, Dan Glickman, Tim Penny, and L.F. Payne spent years as particularly effective advocates of this legislation. Numerous Republicans, including Lynn Martin, Bill Frenzel, Gerald Solomon, Harris Fawell, and others made meaningful contributions to expedited rescission legislation as it has developed. And of course, the language which we voted on last year was the Stenholm-Penny-Kasich amendment. The deficit reduction prowess of my two cohorts in that effort is almost legendary, and deservedly so. Thanks to the efforts of these and other Members, the House overwhelming passed expedited rescission legislation in each of the past 3 years. I do not in any way intend to imply that all of these Members have supported expedited rescissions to the exclusion of or even in preference to a pure line-item veto. Although this proposal was described a few years by Gerald Solomon as ``a tremendous compromise * * * that this house can support overwhelmingly on both sides of the aisle,'' my friend from New York has always made it clear that he prefers the one-third-plus-one approach. What I am saying is that, in an overwhelmingly bipartisan way, Members have stated through their words and their votes, that the expedited rescission procedure is a very good one. Let me say that again. Members have stated through their words and their votes that the expedited rescission procedure is a very good one. That is important to emphasize because of the way which votes will be taken in the next few days. My colleague from West Virginia, Mr. Wise, will be offering precisely my amendment which was approved by a vote of 342 to 69 last July. If I were to have my way, that is the amendment that would prevail in the end. But I can count votes as well as anybody, and I understand that a majority of this body now wishes to pass language along the lines of the Contract With America when it comes to amendment which is not a substitute, but rather is an add-on amendment to H.R. 2. In this way, my friends on the other side of the aisle can have the best of both worlds. They can maintain their language, but they can also support language along the lines they have approved for each of the last 3 years. Where we are in agreement is in the belief that we must bring greater accountability to the appropriations process and the tax benefits process so that individual items may be considered on their individual merits. The current rescission process does not make the President or Congress accountable. Congress can ignore the President's rescissions, and the President can blame Congress for ignoring his rescissions. I believe that it is appropriate to strengthen the President's ability to force votes on individual budgetary items. To my friends on the left who feel that we don't need to take any of these actions, I would like to make one further point. The current discharge process for forcing a floor vote on the President's rescissions is cumbersome and has never been used. The President is required to spend the money if Congress has not enacted the rescissions within 45 days. In other words, Congress can reject the spending cuts proposed by the President through inaction. According to data compiled by the General Accounting Office, Congress has approved barely one-third of the individual rescissions submitted by Presidents of both parties since 1974. Congress has ignored about $50 billion in rescissions submitted by Presidents under the existing process without any vote at all on the merits of the rescissions. During the vote on the Stenholm-Kasich amendment last July, my Democratic colleagues on the Appropriations Committee correctly pointed out that Congress had passed more than $60 billion in rescissions of its own since 1974. That notwithstanding, I do not believe that the fact that Congress had approved more spending cuts than the President had submitted is a justification for not voting on the President's rescission proposals. The public is fed up with the finger-pointing in which each side argues that the problem is really the other side's fault. Constituents do not consider doing better than the other side to be a substitute for actually dealing with a problem. When we are faced with deficits in the $200 billion range, we cannot afford to ignore any proposals to cut spending. Forcing votes on individual items in tax and spending bills will have a very real cleansing effect on the legislative process and will take a step toward reducing the public cynicism about the political process. It provides the President with a real tool to ferret out questionable spending items while preserving the power of Congressional majorities to control spending decisions. When we rise from the Committee of the Whole into the Whole House, I will be submitting for the Record a number of items which will be valuable to Members evaluating this issue as well as to scholars who might be studying it. Included in this material are legal opinions from the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service and answers to the most commonly asked questions about this issue. I urge my colleagues to strengthen the process by voting for the Stenholm-Spratt amendment and then voting yes on final passage.

Mr. STENHOLM

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the ``honorable'' as a matter of decorum and protocol; but when I think of my friend and colleague Ed Madigan, the word ``honorable'' is truly appropriate. Having served with Ed since coming to Congress, I invariably found him to be a shining example of decency and civility in an environment that, all too often, can be adversarial and contentious. He was a consensus builder--one who warranted respect on both sides of the aisle as a reliable, sincere, and extremely capable statesman who stood tall and proud on behalf of his fundamental values, his constituents, and his country. As a fellow member of the House Agriculture Committee, Ed was a joy to work with in developing and deliberating our Nation's agriculture policy. He worked tirelessly on behalf of farmers and ranchers and all that rural America represents. Having earned the respect and admiration for his years of service in Congress, he was suitably appointed to the President's Cabinet as this Nation's 24th Secretary of Agriculture, where he again served with dignity and honor on behalf of the agriculture community and consumers of food and fiber. Without question, Ed has left an indelible legacy and high standard for which all of us should strive to follow. Although I join the countless many in expressing regret and sorrow for a tremendous loss, I consider us all to be extremely blessed with the opportunity to have known and worked with the Honorable Ed Madigan.

Mr. STENHOLM

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I first want to stand and commend my colleague and fellow Texan for the yeoman's work he has done in promoting his proposal to amend the Constitution to require a balanced budget. Joe has worked tirelessly for an ideal he believes in passionately, not only this year but for most of his career here in the House of Representatives. I also want to say, as I have before, that I know Joe is sincere about his desire to move us toward a balanced budget. I have seen Joe cast the hard votes which both opponents and supporters of a constitutional amendment say must occur if we are ever to reduce our deficit. For example, last July, when I offered my entitlement cap proposal on the floor, which CBO scored as saving approximately $150 billion over 5 years, Joe was one of the 37 Members, 9 Republicans, who got onto my good-guy list by supporting this amendment. I know that whatever the ultimate conclusion of this debate may be, we can count on Joe to be there in the future for the hard votes. I do want to take this opportunity to clarify one issue which has become somewhat confused in the rhetoric over the past few weeks. It is true that Joe's amendment has a stronger restriction against raising revenues, the three-fifths vote requirements, but to say that Schaefer-Stenholm is absent on tax restraint is simply wrong. After years of wrestling with various formulations, in June 1992 the principal sponsors of the leading Senate and House versions came together and arrived at the bipartisan, bicameral consensus version of the BBA embodied in Senate Joint Resolution 41/House Joint Resolution 103 of the 103d Congress. As my colleagues know, this language is now embodied in H.J. Res. 28, as well as the Schaefer-Stenholm amendment to be considered today or tomorrow. This is the strongest version--indeed, the only version--with a realistic possibility of obtaining two-thirds majorities in both bodies. H.J. Res. 28 is not a simple balanced budget amendment; it does contain a meaningful tax limitation. If this balanced budget amendment had been in effect since 1977, 7 of the 15 tax increases which were approved would not have been possible, at least in the form in which they passed. Interestingly enough, the three-fifths supermajority requirement for tax increases would have blocked only two additional tax increases. Therefore, recent history indicates that some of the hysteria about the differences between these leading constitutional proposals is limitation has made it appear that Barton-Geren and Schaefer-Stenholm are dramatically different, the practical effects would have been very similar. I also want to point out that a balanced budget requirement itself would promote tax limitation. As long as the power to deficit spend remains unrestrained, the deficit will be used as an excuse to raise taxes. A civic-minded public will be at least somewhat susceptible to this appeal for ``shared sacrifice,'' while the higher taxes actually pay for more spending. In contrast, once a balanced budget becomes the norm, the public will see the clear, $1-for-$1 relationship between higher taxes and bigger Government and reject those taxes. Therefore, even if it did not contain explicit tax limitation language, the amendment would operate to limit tax increases. It also should be noted that a balanced budget requirement itself would promote spending restraint. Currently, Federal spending escalates because the special interest political rewards for spending outweigh the generalized public interest in spending restraint. Without a balanced budget amendment, there is no clear procedural or political barrier to ever-spiraling spending--because it is the unlimited ability to borrow that creates the unlimited ability to spend without immediate consequence. In contrast, the amendment would perfect the democratic process, by visibly reconnecting the demand for new spending with its true costs to taxpayers and the economy. Finally, I would like to emphasize that the experience of the States proves how requiring a balanced budget also promotes restraint in taxing and spending. In 1992, the CATO Institute noted that 49 State governments have balanced budget requirements and found that: From 1940 to 1990, State and local spending climbed from 12 to 14 percent of national income [while] Federal spending climbed from 13 to 28 percent. * * * It is inconceivable that Federal spending would have skyrocketed as it has if Congress had had to raise taxes every year to pay for its spending, as the States do. (National Review, June 8, 1992.) Clearly, the most effective amendment is the one that passes. The bipartisan bicameral language offers the best opportunity to effect a change that is good for the country. Votes in 1986, 1990, 1992, and 1994 and the whip counts that many folks have conducted this year demonstrate that, in both bodies of Congress, support for the bipartisan, bicameral balanced budget amendment is plus or minus the necessary two-thirds majority by a hairsbreadth This is a situation that must not be wasted. Vote for the constitutional amendment in which you most sincerely believe. But if you believe in a balanced budget amendment, do not squander this rare opportunity.

Mr. STENHOLM

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, just as I felt compelled to challenge the statement of my colleague from New York regarding those of us who support the balanced budget being unwilling to make the tough cuts, I found it very, very difficult to restrain myself from the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Saxton] a moment ago in asking for time because, when I look at some of the tough votes that were cast last year, like the Solomon amendment on the budget, he did not vote for it. When I look at the entitlement cap, he did not vote for it. The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Schaefer] did, but not other Members. We have a lot of rhetoric on this floor today that has no standing with reality, and I would hope in our bipartisan spirit we could start understanding that we are serious, in the serious mode now, regarding amending the Constitution of the United States, and just as my colleague stated on the floor a moment ago that Charlie Stenholm is for cutting Social Security, that is not true. I voted against the previous amendment for the merits of the amendment. I am not for cutting Social Security one penny, and no one can ever find anything in the Record that suggests that our amendment that we will offer tomorrow does that either. But yet the rhetoric flows free in this House today, and that is what is wrong with the political rhetoric involved in this issue. I am pleased to stand here today and rise in support of sending to the States an amendment to the Constitution. I have not come to this position lightly. I have come reluctantly because I would rather be doing almost anything than amending the Constitution for any purpose, but I am convinced that we must do so for the reasons that we will hear amplified over and over. But I have three simple reasons for wanting to amend the Constitution for purposes of requiring a balanced budget. Those reasons are Chris, Cary, and Courtney Ann, my three children, and I have just this month learned that by the end of August, God willing, I will have a fourth reason: our first grandchild. Motivations do not come much stronger than that. Our Constitution has always, in large measure, been about protecting the unrepresented from the abuses of government. The threat to unrepresented, future children from continued deficit spending is the type of governmental abuse appropriately proscribed by the Constitution. This point was made by Thomas Jefferson who said, ``The question whether one generation has the right to bind another by the deficit it imposes is a question of such consequence as to place it among the fundamental principles of the government.'' Our bipartisan, bicameral consensus balanced budget amendment that the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Schaefer] and I will offer tomorrow we believe is based exactly on the same principle as the rest of the Constitution. It will protect the fundamental rights of the people by restraining the Federal Government from abusing its powers, from borrowing money day after day as we incessantly debate who is for cutting spending and who is for raising taxes. The easiest vote for any of us to cast is to vote ``no'' on everything and watch the deficit go up. The amendment which I introduce with Representatives Dan Schaefer, Joe Kennedy, Mike Castle, L.F. Payne, Nathan Deal, and 132 others on January 4, the amendment now that has been developed over the past decade. This same language was introduced on opening day as Senate Joint Resolution 1 by Senate Majority Leader Dole, Senators Paul Simon, Larry Craig, Howell Heflin, Orrin Hatch, and others. Obviously, this language has strong bipartisan, bicameral support. Requiring a higher threshold of support for deficit spending will protect the rights of future generations who are not represented in our political system but will bear the burden of our decisions today. The language of the Schaefer-Stenholm amendment is the product of years of careful review and refinement. The amendment has been improved over the years based on the advice of Constitutional scholars, budget experts, numerous Members of Congress, and others. Changes were made in the amendment to address criticisms that were raised in the numerous hearings on the amendment. This exhaustive review process has produced an amendment that is workable, flexible, and enforceable. I do have some concern that the hearings held in the Judiciary Committee this year were just the start of any such review on the language incorporated in House Joint Resolution 1. Nonetheless, I have always supported my friend and colleague, Joe Barton, in his effort to bring this language before the House of Representatives. I included his amendment in every discharge rule which I filed in each of the past three Congresses. I also know that Joe is sincere about his desire to reduce the Federal deficit. Joe was one of the 37 brave souls to vote for the entitlement cap amendment I offered last year. The horrors conjured up when opponents talk about balanced budget Constitutional amendments are not really aimed at those amendments, but rather against what those amendments will require: significant deficit reduction. To those who assert that deficit reduction will wreak havoc on the economy, I must ask, ``What do you think the deficit is doing to our economy?'' More importantly, what do you think it will do to the lives of our grandchildren? Reaching a balanced budget will require discipline, but it is a far cry from the doom-and-gloom scenario portrayed by many opponents of the constitutional amendment. Federal spending is increasing now at about 5 percent, or about $75 billion per year. Trimming that growth in spending to 3.1 percent would balance the budget by fiscal year 2002. But the hard truth is that the budget won't be balanced without passing the amendment first. I am committed whole-heartedly and single-mindedly to passing the constitutional amendment which can garner two-thirds support in the House, two-thirds support in the Senate, and ratification by three- fourths of the States. With the House scheduled to consider six different balanced budget amendment proposals from Members covering the political spectrum, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of the House supports the principle of amending the Constitution to mandate a balanced budget. The question therefore is not whether we should pass a balanced budget amendment, but whether the amendment that we pass will be effective and enforceable. There are three fundamental tests of whether an amendment will provide effective fiscal discipline and is an appropriate addition to the Constitution. First, an amendment must have enforcement to make it more difficult for Congress to borrow money. Second, the amendment must not include any loopholes that could be used to circumvent the amendment. Finally, a constitutional amendment should be timeless and reflect a broad consensus, not make narrow policy decisions. Let me first address enforcement. Allowing Congress to waive the balanced budget requirement by a majority vote would gut the amendment. To be effective, an amendment must require a substantially higher threshold of support to deficit spending. A requirement for a super majority vote to increase the debt limit is critical to ensure that gimmicks are not used to circumvent the amendment. Second, taking the Social Security trust fund or capital expenditures out of budget calculations would open up a tremendous loophole in the amendment. This loophole makes it possible for the Government to fund any number of programs off-budget by redefining them as Social Security or capital expenditures. This would make the constitutional amendment meaningless. Finally, we must ensure that the language of any approved amendment passes constitutional muster. A balanced budget amendment reflects a consensus that Congress and the President should set priorities through the regular legislative process. Items such as capital budgeting, the treatment of the Social Security trust fund, and specific budget plans represent narrow policy issues on which there is not necessarily a consensus. These issues do not belong in the Constitution. It would be particularly inappropriate to place the concept of capital budgeting in the Constitution when there is no consensus on what should be included in a capital budget. We face a historic opportunity to add a solid, credible, meaningful amendment to the Constitution, at last responding to Thomas Jefferson's concerns. I urge my colleagues to take responsibility for the future we will hand our children and grandchildren. Vote for the balanced budget amendment.

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I was just going to ask for a point of clarification because I wanted to be sure that I did not hear the gentleman saying that those who support the balanced budget amendment do not have a plan or cannot get there. I would take very strong exception to that on behalf of a lot of folks on both sides of the aisle. We do, and we can, and we will.

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?