Ted Stevens

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I understand S. 1657 is at the desk and is due for a second reading.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask we proceed.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I object to further proceeding on this measure so it can go to the calendar.

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am here this morning to announce that we will have a markup of the supplemental request presented by the President, the emergency supplemental request for Iraq, on Tuesday morning at 10 a.m. I wish to state some of the reasons that I have scheduled this hearing. Secretary Rumsfeld appeared before our committee and made several statements. I want to repeat a few quotes from his statement to our committee. He said: Standing between our people and the gathering dangers is the courage of our men and women in uniform. The vast majority of the funds the President has requested are going to troops who are risking their lives in this struggle. Of the $87 billion the President requests, $66 billion is to support ongoing military operations, money for military pay, fuel, transportation, maintenance, weapons, equipment, lifesaving body armor, ammunition, and other critical military needs. Further on he says: So $66 billion or 75 percent of this request is for troops. They need it and they need it soon. Again, continuing on through his statement, he pointed out that: In less than 5 months virtually all major Iraqi hospitals and universities have been reopened and hundreds of secondary schools, a few months ago most often used as weapons caches, these have been rebuilt and are ready to start the fall semester; 70,000 Iraqis have been armed and trained in just a few months and have been contributing to the security and defense of their country. A new Army is being trained. More than 40,000 Iraqi troops are conducting joint patrols with coalition forces. By contrast, it took 14 months to establish a police force in post-Germany, and 10 years to begin training a new German Army. He went on to say: As security improves, so does commerce. Some 5,000 Iraqi small businesses opened since the liberation on May 1 and the Iraqi Central Bank was established and a new currency announced just two months ago--accomplishments that would have taken 3 years in postwar Germany. He mentioned other items. He said that all of this and more has taken place in less than 5 months. The speed and breadth of what Ambassador Bremer, GEN Tom Franks, GEN Rick Sanchez, and GEN Abizaid and the civilian military and civilian teams have accomplished is impressive and it may be without historical parallel, whether compared to postwar Japan, Germany, Bosnia, or Kosovo. I listened with great interest to the Secretary of Defense, and I am convinced he has made the case for the early consideration of this supplemental. Before the Armed Services Committee, my distinguished colleague from West Virginia, Senator Byrd, asked Ambassador Bremer: I believe you said you didn't need the money until January. I believe you said in the Appropriations Committee or in the Democratic caucus--whichever request it was. Is that a fact? Ambassador Bremer said: No, Senator. We need this money right away. I think there is some confusion. I was asked a specific question which was, When does the Iraqi government run out of money? And I said sometime in January. That's not the same as this. We have got to get these reconstruction programs going right away as quickly as possible. There is nothing more urgent. Later, in response to a question by Senator Warner, Ambassador Bremer said: Yes, Senator. This is the most important thing that is accelerated by the supplemental. There are the security parts where we can speed up the training of the Iraqi army; instead of taking two years, take one. We can't do that without more money speeding up particularly the training of the Iraqi police force which requires almost $2 billion. Each month that goes by where we don't start those projects is a month longer where those guys potentially leave our troops with some of the duties that I have outlined in my statement. The same is true for the infrastructure. We need to get started letting contracts that we have to open--that we have to open bids. It is going to take time. If we can get started to get those bids started now quickly, we can get the repairs started quickly. Chairman Warner asked General Abizaid: Is there a correlation, in your professional judgement, General? The general said: Sir, there certainly is. The more the Iraqis are policing and patrolling the security work to defend their own country the sooner we will be able to draw down our forces and the sooner we will be able to turn over the country to the rightful owners, which are the Iraqis. Chairman Warner asked: It has a correlation to the tragic death, loss of life and limb by our forces and our coalition. Am I correct? General Abizaid said: Sir, there is a correlation. We should all make sure we understand as long as American troops are in Iraq there will be casualties. I take the position that winning the war on terrorism requires us to finish our job in Iraq. Very clearly, we are in a different situation now than we were in World War II. In World War II, after the defeat of the Nazis, we went to the point of having an occupation force there for over 4 years. That occupation force had a military government. We have determined not to establish a military government in Iraq. We want to move toward having the Iraqis themselves start a new form of government for themselves. In doing so, we are in a position where the lives of our soldiers and our military there in Iraq depend upon the speed with which these people can establish their own government and their own military. I came across an article this past week in the RAND Review for the summer of 2003. It is a most interesting article about ``The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower.'' It points out that, from Germany to Afghanistan, we had a period of training. In terms of the training for the operations we are facing now in Iraq, each succeeding effort--what this person calls ``nation building''--was somewhat better managed than the previous one. This article compares Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan to Iraq in terms of the problems we face. I find it very interesting to note, quoting the article: Among the recent operations, the United States and its allies have put 25 times more money and 50 times more troops on a per capita basis in post-conflict Kosovo than into post- conflict Afghanistan. We are already learning how to move forward and establish the new governments in the countries we are involved with. Afghanistan is a good example. If you follow through on what this person is stating, he is taking the position of the RAND organization: We at RAND believe that Iraq will require substantial external funds for humanitarian assistance and budgetary support. It is highly unlikely that taxes on the Iraqi oil sector will be adequate to fund the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy in the near future. Judging by the experience of Bosnia and Kosovo, territories that have higher per capita incomes than Iraq, budgetary support will be necessary for quite some time. To manage immediate operating expenditures, we suggest that post-conflict authorities in Iraq first establish a reasonable level of expenditures, then create a transparent tax system and ask foreign donors to pick up the difference. We have a donors' conference scheduled later next month. The article goes on to say: Post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction with the objective of promoting a transition to democracy appear to be the inescapable responsibility of the world's only superpower. Therefore, in addition to securing the major resources that will be needed to carry through the current operation in Iraq success, the United States ought to make the smaller long-term investments in its own institutional capacity to conduct such operations. I find this article very interesting in terms of the problems we face. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record at the end of my remarks.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, going back to the statements made before our committee, as Ambassador Bremer said to us on September 22: There are some things I would like to point out about this $87 billion request. No one part of the supplemental is indispensable and no part is more important than the others. This is a carefully considered request. This is urgent. The urgency of military operations is self-evident. The funds for nonmilitary action in Iraq are equally urgent. Most Iraqis welcome us as liberators and we glow with the pleasure of that welcome. Now the reality of foreign troops on the streets is starting to chafe. Some Iraqis are beginning to regard us as occupiers and not as liberators. Some of this is inevitable, but faster progress in reconstruction will help. Unless this supplemental passes quickly, the Iraqis will face darkness eight hours daily. The safety of our troops is indirect but real. The people who ambush our troops are small in number and do not do so because they have undependable electricity. However, the population of a few is directly related to their cooperation in hunting down those who attack us. Earlier progress gives an edge against terrorists. As chairman of the Appropriations Committee, I take the position that we should act as quickly as possible on this bill. If we can get it to third reading before we leave here the next week, the House will act on the bill while we are gone. We can marry our version of the bill to the House version of the bill here in the Senate and take it up the first week we are back after the recess. If we do that, we should be able to get this bill to the President and to the Department of Defense and to Ambassador Bremer's operation by mid-October at the latest. It is urgent we do that. We have the option to demonstrate to the world we are not going there to occupy Iraq. We did not intend to occupy Iraq. As a matter of fact, under the Iraq Liberation Act enacted in 1998, Congress stated the policy: It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime. Further, it stated: It is the sense of the Congress once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq's transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals, and by convening Iraq's foreign creditors to develop a multilateral response to Iraq's foreign debt incurred by Saddam Hussein's regime. That is what we are trying to do. We are trying to escape the long delay of military occupation and carry out our goal of liberation of the Iraqi people as we decided in 1998. It is essential we proceed with this markup and get the bill to the Senate as quickly as possible. It is my hope it would be on the floor by Tuesday night. I hope the leader will give us the time during the next week to take this bill, that provides the funds, to third reading so we can act as an Appropriations Committee in conjunction with our colleagues from the House on the bill they will produce when we are on recess. Nothing is more important than demonstrating to those people in uniform in Iraq that we mean business. We need this money. There is no question they need this money. Because of the requests made during the debate on the last supplemental, we convinced the administration to submit a 2004 Defense bill. The 2004 Defense bill did not contain any money for Iraq. That was in the separate supplemental submitted to us in response to the request from the Congress to do just that. For the first time in history the President has requested money in advance to conduct a war. All Presidents in the past have taken money from existing Government funds, spent them, and then came to Congress to replace the funds from which those moneys were taken. This President submitted a concise request. As a matter of fact, one Member of the other side of the aisle in the budget markup asked for $100 billion for the Iraqi defense activities. This President asked for a total of $66 billion plus $20.3 billion for the activities conducted under Ambassador Bremer's aegis to hasten the ability of the Iraqi people to take over their own government, their own security, and their own future. If we can act quickly, we can escape a long period of occupation. Compare the two sections of this bill: $66 billion for defense, $20 billion for the humanitarian and governmental activities. The longer we keep our troops in Iraq, the more expensive it will become from a military point of view. The sooner we can help these people establish their own government, provide their own security, their own army, the sooner we can bring our people out of Iraq and release these extraordinary expenses. The President has enabled us to view those expenses. The bill we just passed, and the President will soon sign for 2004 for Department of Defense, does not contain money for Iraq. The money for Iraq is in a separate bill and demonstrates to everyone how expensive it is to keep an army in Iraq. Our goal is to get that $20.3 billion as quickly as possible. It is needed as much as the Defense money. I hope the Senate will work with us next week as we try to bring this bill to the floor and get it to third reading before we recess on the 3rd. Exhibit 1 [From the Rand Review, Summer, 2003] Nation-Building (By James Dobbins) We at the RAND Corporation have compiled what we have found to be the most important lessons learned by the United States in its nation-building efforts since World War II. Not all these hard-won lessons have yet been fully applied to America's most recent nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. We define nation-building as ``the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy.'' We have compared the levels of progress toward this goal among seven historical cases: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These are the most important instances in which American military power has been used in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin democratization elsewhere around the world since World War II. From our review of the historical cases, we at RAND have derived a number of overarching conclusions: Many factors--such as prior democratic experience, level of economic development, and social homogeneity--can influence the ease or difficulty of nation-building, but the single most important controllable determinant seems to be the level of effort, as measured in troops, money, and time. Multilateral nation-building is more complex and time- consuming than a unilateral approach. But the multilateral approach is considerably less expensive for individual participants. Multilateral nation-building can produce more thorough transformations and greater regional reconciliation than can unilateral efforts. United of command is as essential in peace operations as it is in war. This unity of command can be achieved even in operations with broad multilateral participation when the major participants share a common vision and tailor the response of international institutions accordingly. There appears to be an inverse correlation between the size of the military stabilization force and the level of casualties. The higher the proportion of troops relative to the resident population, the lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted. Indeed, most of the post-conflict operations that were generously manned suffered no casualties at all. Neighboring states can exert significance influence, for good or bad. It is nearly impossible to put together a fragmented nation if its neighbors try to tear it apart. Every effort should be made to secure their support. Accountability for past injustices can be a powerful component of democratization. Such accountability can be among the most difficult and controversial aspects of any nation-building endeavor, however, and therefore should be attempted only if there is a deep and long-term commitment to the overall operation. There is no quick fix for nation-building. None of our cases was successfully completed in less than seven years. These lesions are drawn from the ``best practices'' of nation-building over the past 60 years. We explain the lessons in greater detail below and then suggest how they might be applied to future operations and, in particular, to Iraq. Although the combat phase of the war against Iraq went very well and the regime collapsed much faster than many had expected, the United States has been left with the unenviable task of seeking to build a democratic, economically vibrant Iraqi nation. From Germany to Afghanistan The cases of Germany and Japan set a standard for post- conflict nation-building that has not been matched since. Both were comprehensive efforts at social, political, and economic reconstruction. These successes demonstrated that democracy was transferable, that societies could be encouraged to transform themselves, and that major transformations could endure. For the next 40 years, there were few attempts to replicate these early successes. During the cold war with the Soviet Union, America employed its military power to preserve the status quo, not to alter it; to manage crises, not to resolve the underlying problems; to overthrow unfriendly regimes and reinstall friendly ones, not to bring about fundamental societal change. After 1989, a policy of global containment of the Soviet Union no longer impelled the United States to preserve the status quo. Washington was now free to overlook regional instability in places like Yugoslavia and Afghanistan as long as the instability did not directly threaten American interests. At the same time, though, the United States had the unprecedented opportunity of using its unrivaled power to resolve, not just to manage or to contain, international problems of strategic importance. In addition, the United States could secure broader international support for such efforts than ever before. Throughout the 1990s, each successive post-cold war effort became wider in scope and more ambitious in intent than its predecessor had been. In Somalia, the original objective was purely humanitarian but was subsequently expanded to democratization. In Haiti, the objective was to reinstall a president and to conduct elections according to an existing constitution. In Bosnia, the objective was to create a multiethnic state out of a former Yugoslav republic. In Kosovo, the objective was to establish a democratic polity and market economy virtually from scratch. From Somalia in 1992 to Kosovo in 1999, each nation- building effort was somewhat better managed than the previous one (see table). Somalia was the nadir. Everything that could go wrong did. The operation culminated in the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1994 after a sharp tactical setback that had resulted in 18 American deaths in October 1993. This reverse, which became memorialized in the book and film ``Black Hawk Down,'' was largely the result of an unnecessarily complicated U.S. and United Nations command structure that had three distinct forces operating with three distinct chains of command. Despite its failure, the Somalia mission taught America crucial lessons for the future. One was the importance of unity of command in peace operations as well as in war. Second was the need to scale mission

Mr. STEVENS. I yield the floor.

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now begin a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes.

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am pleased to present to the Senate, on behalf of myself and the Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye, who is currently chairing the Indian Affairs Committee, the Defense appropriations conference report for fiscal year 2004. This conference report was approved by the House of Representatives by a vote of 407 to 15. It has overwhelming bipartisan support. The agreement provides for a total of $368.7 billion for the Department for fiscal year 2004. Throughout our conversations with the House over the past months, Senator Inouye and I have sought to strike a balanced agreement that we believe addresses key requirements for readiness, quality of life, and reconstitution of our defense force. As we take up this conference report on the floor today, there are hundreds of thousands of men and women in uniform deployed and serving our country at home and abroad. They are performing superbly, and we are extremely proud of what they are accomplishing. This agreement is a demonstration of our support, the Congress's support, for our men and women in uniform. It provides a 4.1 percent average pay raise for all military personnel. It funds an increase in basic allowance for housing to reduce average out-of-pocket expenses from 7.5 percent to 3.5 percent for our military people. It provides an additional $128 million for the continuation of increased rates for imminent-danger pay and family- separation allowances. This agreement honors the commitment we have made to our Armed Forces--one we will maintain. It helps ensure they will continue to have good leadership, first-rate training, modernized equipment, and quality infrastructure. The agreement provides $115.9 billion for operation and maintenance, $74.7 billion for procurement, and $65.2 billion for research and development. Defense is a very expensive concept for our country. That is so not only because we have a volunteer service but because we are modernizing our force for the future. This agreement is the result of a bicameral, bipartisan approach. I urge the Senate to adopt this conference report. Let me once again thank my co-chairman, Senator Inouye, for his support and invaluable counsel on this bill. I would also like to note the dedicated work of his chief of staff Charlie Houy, Betsy Schmid, and Nicole DiResta. I thank my hard-working staff led by Sid Ashworth and including Tom Hawkins, Kraig Siracuse, Bob Henke, Lesley Kalan, Jennifer Chartrand, Menda Fife, Brian Wilson, Mazie Mattson, Nicole Royal, and Alycia Farrell. They have helped put together this conference report and worked with us through the year to bring us where we are today with the largest defense budget in history and the best bill we have ever presented to the Senate. I yield to my good friend from Hawaii.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I do thank the Senator from Arizona for his comments about the supplemental. This bill before us now is what we call the peace budget for defense. It does not contain any of the monies for Iraq or for Afghanistan. That money is in the separate supplemental emergency appropriations bill on which we are working. That was handled in that manner because of the request that we have a clear delineation of the monies to be spent for Iraq and Afghanistan. I will comment on two things, but first I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the pending conference report occur at 12:10 today, and that Senators be so notified.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, we only have notification of one person who wishes to speak. If that is the case, I believe we will have a vote on this conference report sometime around noon. It is my hope that we will have it before lunch if possible. So I put the Senate on notice that we will be voting around noon. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. STEVENS. I did not hear the Senator. If there is an objection to the time agreement, I will continue with my comments. The Senator from Arizona did mention the money in this bill for the Alaska railroad. The Alaska railroad goes through two military reservations, and this money is to straighten out that railroad as it goes through those two military reservations. We have done this for a period of years now. We are straightening it out so it does not provide a hazard to the people who live on base. It moves the sound as far as we can from the military operations. It is much more safe as it is straightened out and does not have a circuitous route through those two military bases. In addition, for the Senator's information, a utilidor is a facility that we put into the ground in Alaska to carry our utilities. In effect, it is an underground tunnel so that the utilities can all be maintained underground during the wintertime. It contains water, sewer, electric, all cables, and they are capable of maintenance through the winter. As a matter of fact, I would welcome the District of Columbia to follow our path and put the utilities underground because every time there is a storm, all the electric lines, power lines, and cable lines come down because they are not buried. We do not just bury them under the ground. We bury a long, continuous container that is capable of being walked through so we can maintain all of the utilities on our military bases. They, at times, need modernization. The money in this bill is for modernization. I know my friend wants to comment. I have been asked--we do expect a vote. We will try to get a vote on the pending bill. We are having a communications problem. I yield to my friend.

Mr. STEVENS. If the Senator will yield, I am informed if I make a request for a vote on this conference report at 1:15, that will be acceptable. Is that not correct?

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the conference report occur at 1:20, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. STEVENS. That is my understanding. We will stay on this bill until 1:15.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn until 9:30 a.m., Thursday, September 25. I further ask unanimous consent that following the prayer and pledge, the morning hour be deemed expired, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate then begin a period for morning business for 60 minutes, with the first 30 minutes under the control of the minority leader or his designee, and the remaining 30 minutes under the control of Senator Hutchison or her designee; provided that following morning business the Senate then proceed to the consideration of the conference report to accompany H.R. 2658, the Defense appropriations bill.

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. For the information of all Senators, tomorrow, following morning business the Senate will begin debate on the Defense appropriations conference report for 2004. We do not anticipate a great deal of debate on that important conference report prior to a vote on its adoption. In addition, the Senate will resume consideration of the DC appropriations bill. Senators therefore should expect rollcall votes throughout the day, and Members will be notified when the first vote is scheduled.

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. If there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order, following the remarks to be offered by Senator Pryor.

Mr. STEVENS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.