Ted Stevens

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. I ask that the amendment be adopted.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I send to the desk a modification of amendment No. 518.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask for the adoption of the amendment, as modified.

Mr. STEVENS. I send to the desk a modification of amendment No. 519.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask for adoption of the amendment.

Mr. STEVENS. I move to reconsider the votes, and to lay the motions on the table, en bloc. The motions to lay on the table were agreed to.

Mr. STEVENS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I send to the desk a modification of No. 480. The clerk will report the amendment.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. STEVENS. I regret that the Senator from Nevada is unable to do that. Mr. President, I have come to the Senate floor now to oppose the amendment offered by my friend from Virginia. He is the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and I do so very reluctantly. However, at hearings held by the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations have opposed the goal of this amendment, which is to maintain 12 carriers in our fleet. I want to read from that transcript. I said this to the Secretary: Are you going to be terribly disturbed if we tell you to keep the Kennedy where it is? The Secretary of the Navy said: Yes, sir, we would be terribly disturbed to keep the Kennedy where it is. First of all, the money is out for the Kennedy. It is not in our budget. If we have to keep the Kennedy, then something else has to go. So we don't have the money in the budget for the Kennedy. It's gone. It is $1.2 billion and it is 40 years old. It has never been through a major upgrade. It is a Reserve carrier. So we have always had the expense and serious issues in keeping the Kennedy properly maintained. Frankly, it is so expensive for us and it has marginal capability. As the CNO said, our carriers are 4 times more capable than they were during Desert Storm. We are about to double capability by 2010 and, frankly, we do not need this carrier. We have a disagreement of opinion between the Senator from Virginia and myself caused by the testimony. Parenthetically, I say to my friend, I hope he will look at the amendment.

Mr. STEVENS. Yes.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have been so informed by the Senator from Virginia, but he has not said that in my presence. Let me note for the Senator, the way this amendment is drafted, the money to maintain 12 carriers would come out of this bill, the supplemental appropriations, to be used for nonemergency purposes. Whatever happens to my objection, I hope that you will look at this amendment because we are informed that this would take $288 million out of the funds in this bill. From a policy point of view, decommissioning the Kennedy as the Navy proposes in the fiscal year 2006 budget will have minimal near-term operational impact due to a previously scheduled complex overhaul that was scheduled to begin in May of this year. This complex overhaul would result in 2 years of nonavailability for the ship. Decommissioning the Kennedy also has minimal near-term industrial base impacts and allows the Navy to free resources necessary to fight the global war on terrorism while preparing to face future challenges. The Navy's plan to decommission the Kennedy will save $1.2 billion over fiscal years 2006 through 2011. These savings are critical for modernizing our Naval forces, and for providing the necessary resources for the Navy's shipbuilding account. The Kennedy was chosen for decommissioning because of its material condition and operational readiness. The Kennedy has never been through a major upgrade. It served as a Reserve carrier from 1995 to 1998. The Navy has always had expenses and issues keeping the Kennedy properly maintained. It is expensive for the Navy and it is of marginal capability. The Kennedy was scheduled to go through a complex overhaul from May 2005 to August 2006. It would be 40 years old coming out of this overhaul with the intent of extending it to 50 years of age. The Navy now believes it would be difficult to maintain this platform within reasonable cost even after the complex overhaul given that it did not go through a mid-life service life extension program. The overhaul risk in reducing the number of carriers from 12 to 11 is mitigated by several improvements realized in the multimission capabilities of today's carrier strike groups. For example, carrier aircraft such as the F/A-18E and F/A-18F Super Hornets, are transitioning to the fleet with improved capabilities to hit multiple targets on a single sortie. Our carriers today are at least four times more capable, as measured in number of targets serviced per day, than they were during Desert Storm. The Navy is expected to almost double this capability by 2010 as we bring on new airplanes, more precision weapons, and increased sortie rates with future carriers currently in development. The Navy's fleet of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers has significant capabilities over conventional carriers, such as the Kennedy. Nuclear- powered carriers have greater range and speed, and can operate at full speed for indefinite periods without the need for refueling. During flight operations, conventional carriers will need to refuel and re-arm every 2 to 3 days, compared to nuclear-powered carriers which will only need to re-arm and refuel every 7 to 10 days. The nuclear carriers have the capacity to carry 35 percent more fuel and ordnance than conventional carriers. Therefore, nuclear carriers are far less reliant on logistics support. The Navy is also transforming how they operate and extracting more readiness out of the force. The Navy's fleet response plan is revolutionary and is providing greater availability of carrier strike groups. The fleet response plan is supportable with an 11-carrier force as the emphasis is on enhanced readiness, speed of response, and increased carrier employability. These precepts continue to apply even with fewer carriers, as the Navy has ensured me that they will be fully able to meet combatant commander's requirements in key regions. The Department has already begun to implement mitigation strategy to address the impact of the Kennedy's complex overhaul workload cancellation. Approximately $28 million has been expended in supporting the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility to execute required maintenance on the USS John C. Stennis, CVN-74. Norfolk Naval Shipyard personnel are also executing work on the USS George Washington, CVN-73, currently undergoing a docking phased incremental availability at Newport News. Approximately $26 million has been obligated to Norfolk Naval Shipyard and the private sector to accomplish this additional required maintenance. Additionally, there are other nonrecoverable costs totaling $47.1 million. Some of these are planning costs that will be required to be spent again if the complex overhaul of the Kennedy is reinstated, thereby increasing the original cost estimate of the complex overhaul. The Navy also informs me that workload disruptions throughout all shipyards would be severe if their workload mitigation plans were changed at this point in the fiscal year. I repeat that. They have told me workload disruptions throughout all naval shipyards would be severe if their workload mitigation plans were changed at this point in the fiscal year. I will try to respond to my colleagues who suggest the Kennedy would be available to replace the USS Kitty Hawk, which is currently forward deployed and permanently homeported in Japan, if the Kitty Hawk was not available for operations. The Navy assures me the Kennedy would not be moved to Japan if something happened to the Kitty Hawk. The Navy leadership believes the Kennedy does not provide the capabilities required to meet the mission for that area of responsibility. Although the Kennedy is older than the Kitty Hawk, the Navy provides regular upgrades and maintenance on the Kitty Hawk to keep her in excellent material condition. If the Kitty Hawk becomes unavailable for operations, the Navy will rotate a nuclear carrier into the region until the Kitty Hawk would be repaired. Finally, I know many Senators are concerned that the retirement of the Kennedy will negatively impact base realignment and closure decisions, BRAC decisions, regarding Mayport, FL, and possibly leave the Nation with only one port facility on the east coast capable of supporting large-deck, deep-draft vessels. I can tell those Senators the Navy is committed to retaining two strategic ports capable of accommodating large-deck, deep-draft ships on each coast. To this end, Mayport continues to be a critical large-deck-capable port. In the near term, the Navy will look at homeporting a large-deck amphibious ship in Mayport to mitigate the impact to the community for the loss of the Kennedy. As I said, I am here to oppose this amendment because of the cost it will impose on the Navy and the risk it will impose on future capabilities being developed for our naval forces. There is no question in my mind this is the wrong way to go. The Navy has stated that to us very clearly in statements made to the Appropriations Committee, following the time of the comments to the Armed Services Committee. I want to again say Secretary English, with the Chief of Naval Operations sitting by him, said this to our committee: So we fully support taking out the Kennedy, and, Mr. Chairman, if we are required to keep the Kennedy, then we're going to have to take money out of someplace else because we do not have the money to keep the Kennedy. The impact of this amendment is it will be taking money out of this supplemental appropriations for this purpose. My good friend from Virginia I do hope will take, in any event, a look at his amendment because I do not think this emergency money ought to be diverted to a change in a policy decision and overruling the Secretary of the Navy with regard to how many carriers there are in our fleet. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. STEVENS. That was my understanding of the situation at the time. I think there have been more requests for time.

Mr. STEVENS. I have no objection.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have 5 minutes?

Mr. STEVENS. Please notify me when I have 1 minute remaining. Mr. President, pursuant to rule VI, paragraph 2, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Byrd be considered necessarily absent and he be excused from any further service of the Senate for the remainder of today.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, this amendment says the money will come out of this bill. Now, it is true that for 2005 we did appropriate money to the Navy for the CV-67, the John F. Kennedy. But I have in my hand the cancellation of the complex overhaul. We know exactly where the money has been reallocated. It has been reallocated to a series of functions. Some of those functions are already prepared. I say to my colleagues, no matter what we do, the money will come out of this bill because the money that was allocated in the 2005 bill has been used for the Stennis, for the George Washington, support travel for the CVN-73 and 74, for the USS Truman, CVN-75, for additional work at Hampton Roads, for the USS Charlotte, which is the SSN-766, a submarine, and for work inactivation of the carrier at Mayport. As a practical matter, they have already spent the $288 million in the 2005 bill--at least obligated it. The Senator from Virginia, I understand, disputes that. But that is the information we have received. What I am saying, for our committee I oppose this amendment of Senator Warner because it, No. 1, will preserve 12 carriers; No. 2, it will take money from this bill or somewhere to go back and reinstate the basic complex overhaul which, as I said to the Senate, the Navy now believes is unwarranted because of the age of this vessel. This vessel is so old and it did not have a midlife service program. So there is no reason to suspect it will have 10 years' service after this overhaul is completed. What this will do, if we spend the money, we are going to delay the modernization of the Navy. We know throughout the world nations are building more ships. We cannot keep up with them. We cannot keep up with them because we are keeping old hulls. It is time we woke up. We need smaller, faster, more capable vessels than these vessels we are talking about. To prolong their life is wrong. The Secretary of the Navy and the CNO have taken a different position than they did 6 months ago on this issue. They finally came to the conclusion they could not do what they wanted to do, and they told us that in our committee. I am reporting that to the Senate. The choice of the Senate is to support the Navy's position now as expressed by the Secretary and the Chief of Navy Operations and spend this money the way they want to spend it for the future, or to go back and reverse that decision and try to maintain a 40-year-old carrier and extend its life for 10 years when the experts say you can spend all this money and it still will not be a serviceable vessel to meet the needs of the Navy. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I regret being here with this argument because I have such deep respect for Senator Warner, the Senator from Virginia, the former Secretary of Navy. But I think this year I am going to be at this desk saying this again and again. We are in a program of reshaping our military. We are looking out to the future, based on the lessons we have learned in Afghanistan and Iraq and the war on terrorism. We note some of the failures of our system. One of them is the failure to modernize in time. We got behind. The very fact that this 40-year-old vessel is out there with overhaul appropriations was wrong to begin with. We should be looking to the future and to the needs of this Navy. I congratulate the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO for being willing to reverse their stand and come to us and say: Please oppose this amendment. Keep the schedule we have decided on and let us modernize the Navy. That is the decision before the Senate. Are we going to go forward with the people making the tough decisions? Are we going to do it after BRAC? Are we going to do it for the Air Force? We are going to have some tough ones for the Air Force. Are we going to do it for the Army? We are going to have some tough decisions on the Army. Every single part of the military is going to be realigned in terms of spending this year, and this is the beginning. I leave it to the Senate. Make the decision. Shall we follow the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of Navy, their current position, or shall we follow the position they had just 6 months ago?

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the global war on terrorism requirement for these uparmored humvees is 10,079 units. I have a letter from the Department of the Army signed by David Melcher, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, and James Lovelace, Lieutenant General, Deputy Chief of Staff, which states the amount already appropriated and supported in reprogramming actions will fund the total requirement of 10,079 humvees by June of this year. Without any money from this supplemental request, the total requirements have been set down for this system for this fiscal year. This, after all, is a supplemental request, and we will be dealing with the Army's 2006 requirements in the full bill for the fiscal year 2006. We have appropriated and programmed moneys to meet the requirements. As a matter of fact, the funds we put up already will exceed that requirement by 266 vehicles. The manufacturer is currently producing these humvees at the maximum capacity of 550 per month and will exceed the Department's requirements in June. I am sad to oppose my good friend from Indiana, but the requirement for these uparmored humvees is not going to expand, in our judgment. The Army maintains they do not need more uparmored humvees in Afghanistan because they are too heavy to maneuver in the mountainous Afghan terrain. In the areas where they are capable of being used, we are bringing more and more critically needed equipment, such as the Strikers, into Iraq. We should focus on the total funding for validated global war on terrorism requirements. These requirements were validated by the Army through its team system. There is no question that the procurement we have already paid for is sufficient to meet the total needs of the Army through the remainder of this fiscal year. As I said, we are going to look at this in terms of 2006. The Army procurement request so far for 2005 has been sufficient. We do have critical force protection requirements, but we also have the problem of recapitalization of equipment used in operation and equipment that is coming up for rotation. This is a very expensive time for the Army with the rotations that are going on. If we fund unvalidated requirements as proposed by this amendment at this time, that will come at the expense of validated requirements that have not been met. We will look at this again in conference, I promise the Senator from Indiana. There is no question this is a system we provided in recent months for the global war on terrorism. This capacity of 550 per month is an enormous amount of production. We commend the manufacturer for increasing its rate of production, but what happens when you increase rate of production is you get to the end sooner. We validated these requirements. We have met the requirements, and we do not need any additional money from this emergency bill to be spent for uparmored humvees. I do not know if anyone else wishes to speak on the matter, but I oppose it. I urge a ``no'' vote on the amendment. Again, at the request of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army I oppose the Senator's amendment. If there is no further debate, I am pleased to have the vote on this matter.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent that the rollcall vote ordered on this amendment commence at 5:45 p.m.