Ted Stevens

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. I still have the floor, do I not, Mr. President? Amendment No. 3826, As Modified

Mr. STEVENS. Has the amendment been modified, Mr. President?

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I will say for the record the Senator from Maine is correct. We have modified this as requested by the committee.

Mr. STEVENS. I call up amendment No. 3830.

Mr. STEVENS. Now what is the regular order, Mr. President?

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3830.

Mr. STEVENS. There is an objection to calling up the amendment?

Mr. STEVENS. I just want to call it up and set it aside and qualify it for a vote later.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I renew my request.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, what is the pending amendment that was set aside?

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, am I interfering with a time agreement now by continuing on the floor?

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am constrained to say that I am disturbed at the process that has just been used. I was out of town. I left town saying I was willing to work. I come back and find a series of my amendments have a 2-minute time limit. I was not consulted on that at all. I think in view of the haste with which this bill is moving forward, it is very sad. It is going to change this Senator's vote on cloture tomorrow because I am tired of having this bill being pushed so hard. It is being pushed by a group of people who were part of a commission that went out of existence. They went out and raised a million and a half dollars, and they are lobbying this Senate. They are lobbying hard, principally the two leaders. They are no longer leaders of that Commission, and they are demanding that we act. Are they registered lobbyists? Are they? What right have they to push this Senate so hard? I think we should take some time and consider what we are doing. If we are not careful, we will destroy the intelligence system we are trying to reorganize. I am in favor of reorganizing it. I said that in the beginning. But this is going too fast, when I am prevented from even reading, perhaps just 1 minute to read a 3-minute statement, and nothing in front of the Senators on our side indicated the President of the United States was in favor of this amendment. I offered it because the statement came from the administration. I think we should slow down. If we don't slow down, we are going to be around a long time because I remember Senator Allen who stretched out a cloture vote once for 3 weeks. I really believe there should be some senatorial courtesy involved when a Senator is trying to oppose a pressure group like this. It is not easy to do. I know that. But I am up to it, I tell you. I am up to it. And people better understand that. I ask that that amendment be set aside for the purpose of further consideration tomorrow.

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have a series of requests for cosponsors of amendments that I have introduced. I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the Record.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I call up the four amendments at the desk. I ask unanimous consent that each of them be read and then set aside so we can go through calling up the four of them, and then I will make some comments about them. They are amendments Nos. 3826, 3827, 3829 and 3840.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I will address the amendment first in order, amendment No. 3826. This is offered to clarify the duties and responsibilities of the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. The bill currently states that the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall serve as the principal adviser to the President and the national intelligence director on joint operations related to counterterrorism. This amendment strikes ``joint operations'' and inserts in lieu thereof ``strategic planning.'' The bill under consideration creates the National Counterterrorism Center to develop and unify strategy, to develop interagency terrorism plans, not to conduct joint operations. I call attention to page 83, lines 3, 9, and 10, of the committee print. In support of the bill under consideration, this amendment clarifies the role of the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center to support planning and not conduct operations. It is the intent of this amendment to make it perfectly clear that the national counterterrorism director would have no control over the conduct of joint operations. Having the intelligence director to report directly to the President would be inappropriate. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense is the principal adviser to the President on military operations. As currently drafted, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center shall serve as the principal adviser to the President on joint operations. This is very unclear. Does it include military operations? Our amendment eliminates that ambiguity by striking ``joint operation'' and inserting ``strategic planning,'' which would appear to be consistent with the amendment adopted by the committee in the markup to change the directorate of operations to directorate of planning within the National Counterterrorism Center. I would hope that the manager of the bill would give this amendment serious consideration because I think it clears up a defect in the bill as it is presently written. Amendment No. 3829 Now I will address amendment No. 3829. This amendment would delay the implementation of the bill from 6 months to 1 year. I want to make it clear that this amendment would not delay the implementation of the office of the national intelligence director or the National Counterterrorism Center but gives the administration 6 more months to implement the many offices, councils, and changes in the intelligence community that the bill requires. We are facing an election. We do not know what the outcome of the election is, but to put the burdens of this bill in the first 6 months on the administration, whether it is the existing one or a new one, is entirely inappropriate. The first 6 months of a new Congress and the new year of an administration go by very quickly, and I think there is just too much to do with regard to budget, presentation of State of the Union message, so many other things, to have this implementation done within 6 months. I make this recommendation because many of the individuals I have spoken to in the intelligence community and those who appeared before our Appropriations Committee suggest that executing these changes should not be at an accelerated pace. Here are the important quotes from Dr. Kissinger. What I say and what I have written should be read in conjunction with a joint statement that is being issued today by the following group of individuals: former Senator Boren, former Senator Bradley, former Secretary of Defense Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Robert Gates, former Under Secretary of Defense John Hamre, former Senator Gary Hart, myself, former Senator Sam Nunn, former Senator Warren Rudman, and former Secretary of State George Shultz. It is obviously a bipartisan group, and we are concerned that the reforms of the magnitude that are being talked about and with the impact that they will have on the conduct of intelligence and on the national security machinery should not be rushed through in the last weeks of the congressional session in the middle of a Presidential election campaign. The consequences of this reform will inevitably produce months and maybe years of turmoil as the adjustments are made in the operating procedures of the national security apparatus and of the intelligence machinery. That is inherent to reform. But we should not have to explain in retrospect why it was so necessary to come to a conclusion in the middle of a Presidential election campaign. Whatever decisions are made this week, we will have to deal with the immediate terrorist challenge by the apparatus that now exists, as it has already been reformed in the light of the experience of September 11. So urgency should not trump substance. From Dr. John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense: Mr. Chairman, we are now very far along the road in this debate. Unfortunately, from my perspective, the shape of this debate has been driven more by political imperative than deep analysis of the challenges we face in this area. We do need intelligence reform, I believe. But I believe the debate to date, and the proposals before the Congress, are too narrowly constructed around one perceived failure of the intelligence community, and that is the failure to coordinate the activities of the components of the intelligence community. Without this extra 6 months, I feel the administration would be hard- pressed to meet the strict requirements, recommendations, and guidelines this bill imposes. It does not require a delay of 6 months; it just gives 6 more months. If they can do it in 2 months, fine, but why put a 6-month deadline when the study that is involved has a 6- month deadline? My amendment allows the President to move fast if he believes it is prudent but does not mandate a rush to finish. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment which would only work to help the administration to execute this mission well. amendment no. 3827 The amendment strikes line 20 on page 130 of the bill and all text that follows to line 2 on page 153 which relates to creation of a huge information sharing network. The current occupant of the Chair will be very interested in this amendment. I understand the need for this office to be created, and my amendment will create such an office. But, it would strike the specific requirements and guidelines that the national intelligence director would have to follow to establish a network for intelligence information sharing. My amendment would allow the intelligence community, and more importantly the national intelligence director, to be using the information to determine what type of network they need. During our Committee hearings, Dr. Henry Kissinger made the following analysis: Different components of the government have different missions and priorities that cause them to assign different levels of importance to protecting intelligence information. Good management requires that, when there are contradictions between using intelligence and protecting it, decisions are made by established procedure. Sharing should be optimized, not managed in detail. To attempt to prescribe all the circumstance in bureaucratic or legalistic language would involve so much detail and so many exceptions as to defeat its own purpose. Also, sharing of this information will not be the ultimate panacea. ADM James Ellis, former Commander of U.S. Strategic Commander until a few months ago, made the following point: We should be wary of homogenizing centralized processes that, albeit unintentionally, may suppress or filter differing views. Recent op-ed pieces have noted the inevitability of surprise in our past and offered as well that often a surprise is a result of deficient analysis, not collection or even sharing of data. Also, from our intelligence reform hearings, Judge Richard Posner, from the 7th Circuit, Court of Appeals stated the following: The Commission thinks the reason the bits of information that might have been assembled into a mosaic spelling 9/11 never came together in one place is that no one person was in charge of intelligence. That is not the reason. The reason, or rather, the reasons are, first, that the volume of information is so vast that even with the continued rapid advances in data processing it cannot be collected, stored, retrieved and analyzed in a single database or even network of linked databases. Second, legitimate security concerns limit the degree to which confidential information can safely be shared, especially given the ever-present threat of moles like the infamous Aldrich Ames. And third, the different intelligence services and the subunits of each service tend, because information is power, to hoard it. Efforts to centralize the intelligence function are likely to lengthen the time it takes for intelligence and analyses to reach the President, reduce diversity and competition in the gathering and analysis of intelligence data, limit the number of threats given serious consideration and deprive the president of a range of alternative interpretations of ambiguous and incomplete data--and intelligence data will usually be ambiguous and incomplete. I point out that the administration's statement, so-called SAP which came from the administration, says: the administration supports the strong information-sharing authorities granted to the NID in the bill. The administration is concerned that the extensive authorities and responsibilities granted the Office of Management and Budget to implement the information-sharing network are both outside of OMB's usual responsibilities and are inconsistent with the goal of ensuring an NID with effective authority to manage the intelligence community. These responsibilities should be granted to the NID in such a way as to remain consistent with section 892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The administration also believes that the detail in which the legislation prescribes the network is excessive. The network would be more likely to accomplish its beneficial goal if the bill simply provided the authority necessary for its establishment while leaving the details to be worked out and altered as the circumstances require. I am also concerned with the very ambitious schedule that the bill delineates. In 90 days, just 3 months, the Director of OMB would be required to submit to the President and the Congress a description of the Network, establish a director of services and conduct a review of relevant current Federal agency capabilities; it would seem to me that we are setting the administration up to fail with such an unreasonable time frame. I am also concerned about the cost. The bill estimates this could cost at least $50 million dollars. Where would the funds for this program come from? Also, how would they influence existing programs to coordinate these activities? Currently there are not any funds designated for these activities. Would they be requested from a supplemental or would they be taken from the intelligence community's very tight budget? Also, I was hoping that the chairman and the ranking member could provide a clearer picture about the protection of civil liberties. I understand that the Privacy and Civil Liberties Boards will be included in discussions--but I worry about the extent to which--and I am quoting from the bill now: private sector data, including information from owners and operators of critical infrastructure, is incorporated into the Network; and that the private sector is both providing and receiving information. This is another czar. We already have an intelligence czar. Now this provision in this bill creates an information czar. It ``requires that the national intelligence director is to set standards for information technology and communication.'' By the way, it does not say necessarily related to intelligence--across the entire executive branch, for every Cabinet Secretary and I presume for the FCC. The NID would also develop an integrated information technology and communication network that ensures information sharing across the entire executive branch again for every Cabinet Secretary and agency, as I understand it, in the Federal Government and with the State and local governments and the private sector. The scope of this is beyond comprehension. How can this group, now, created by the OMB, assure that privacy and civil liberties will be ensured when there is only one person at the helm, and that person is selected by the OMB? Am I reading the bill wrong? I don't think so. What purposes are to be gained from a governmentwide database that includes every part of the Government--Federal. State, local? Are we dreaming up a new net? Is this a new Internet? Is this a government net? What is it and why should we give one person the authority to control communications in this manner in this bill? It would create the largest technological surveillance system ever seen in the world. I repeat that: The largest technological surveillance system ever seen in the world. I think it should be given very thoughtful analysis. We have to give NID time to establish what and how such information should be gathered, how it is to be analyzed, how it is to be stored, and how it is to be shared. That is to take place in 90 days. I hope the administration, the committee members and their staff take a look at this amendment. This provision is going to delay this bill, unless my amendment is adopted or some form of that. Again, I am ready to hear if we have misanalyzed this, but we have checked it with people who have been in the system a long time and they agree our reading is correct. I again refer the administration and the committee to amendment No. 2837. That is a significant amendment, in my opinion. Amendment No. 3840 I turn my attention to amendment No. 3840. This is an amendment cosponsored by Senators Warner, Inouye, and the current occupant of the chair, Senator Burns. It concerns the acquisition of major intelligence systems. The purpose of this amendment is to strike the provisions of the bill which transfer major decisionmaking authorities relating to acquisition of national security and defense systems to the national intelligence director. My concern stems from a few items, based on the language in this bill. It is unclear to me and to us if the national intelligence director would be responsible for the creation of an entire new staff for the acquisition of major systems or if the Department of Defense shall have to transfer to the NID its personnel to provide the manpower, expertise, and staff for these acquisition functions. If that is the case, then how would the Department of Defense execute its own oversight of its own programs? And, if the national intelligence directorate were to have to use its own people until they can hire new people, the national director would have to fall back to utilizing the personnel of the existing agencies, the people Congress deemed in 2004 were the problem and not the solution. Until it is clear to the Secretary of Defense whether the national intelligence director must create a bureaucracy or parallel structure, it is my recommendation that we continue the current structure which permits the Secretary of Defense the decision authority over these vital programs. The NID should request what authority he needs. We should not give it all to him and then have the Secretary of Defense fight to get back some of the normal functions of the Department of Defense. The underlying bill leaves that determination now to NID to begin with. The Secretary of Defense should continue to oversee the execution of acquisition programs within his Department, and the agencies related to defense, especially those combat support agencies such as the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The Congress recognized the fact that neither the National Security Agency nor the National Geospatial Agency currently possess capability to manage major acquisition programs by passing the fiscal year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 108-354, which transferred these very responsibilities to the Department of Defense. We, the Senate, just transferred these authorities and responsibilities to the Department of Defense. What led to this transfer of acquisition responsibility was a series of critical mistakes regarding the ability to obtain and manage the acquisition of major systems. Some of these mistakes wound up costing the taxpayers close to $1 billion. This is not something we should experiment with, especially with new, untested leadership or personnel. I repeat, we just changed this this year. We moved it over to prevent the further loss of money and now the committee suggests it should be changed again and now put under a new director who has no experience and no background in acquisition at all. The administration has taken a policy in that statement, indicating they believe the committee's provision relating to the NID's role in acquisition of major systems needs further study to ensure that the requirements of major consumers are met. They understand this transfer is premature. It may be the Congress should reverse itself now and move this acquisition authority back to the NID. But let's let the NID get up and running. Let's find out whether we have confidence in that system before we take it away from the Department of Defense, when we just took it away from the Intelligence Committee because of the failures of the past. Finally, the language currently in the bill would only cover the Department of Defense programs and not the programs in the National Intelligence Program, and that is where the problems lie. I urge the Senate not to act in haste where such large amounts of funds are currently in play. They currently have a considerable amount of money we have already put up for these acquisitions. The Senate should not break a system that is now working well since this transfer earlier this year, nor put up obstacles to our obtaining major acquisition systems necessary for national security as quickly as possible. Again, I urge members of the committee to take a look at that. Amendment No. 3882 Mr. President, have I called up amendment No. 3882? If not, I do wish it to be called up at this time. I ask all other amendments be set aside and this be called up, amendment No. 3882.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, this is the final amendment I would call up now. Again, I apologize for the way it is brought forward. The time factors involved are very narrow, I know. I do want to say, parenthetically, again, one paper said I shouted at the chairman yesterday. I certainly hope I did not shout at the chairman of the committee. Having formerly been the chairman--and Senator Lieberman also has been the chairman--I know the vast diversity of this committee and the difficulty we have had bringing this bill to the floor. I think they have done an extremely fine job under the circumstances we have. I don't know why we are being pressured as we are, but the decision has been made to get this bill out, and so we share the leadership position to accomplish that goal. But I am worried, as I told the managers personally, that some of the in-depth study others of us have given to this bill is not being listened to. The problem will be not in having the bill passed; the problem will be in having the bill implemented if some of these amendments are not adopted. The timeframes in particular worry me greatly, the timeframes within this process. This is worse than establishing a new department, really. This is a control mechanism over a system that abhors control. It is hard to control. If we do it wrong, we are going to bust this system. We are going to destroy the morale. As I said the other day, it takes a minimum of 5 years to get an agent in the field, and it will take another 5 years before that agent can actively recruit people and deal with the nationals and really help control the national assets we need for our security. The people we have in the field right now really started out around 1994 or 1995. They are out there. If we disturb their morale so they decide to pursue other courses, positions, or other goals, this Government is going to be left literally exposed. All of these people are extremely capable people. I have never encountered the intelligence quotient in any other area in our Government that I have run into in the intelligence field. They are high-strung people. They are people whose morale is absolutely essential. I urge the Senate to consider the morale of the people in the system now and those who will be coming into the system as we moved forward. Do not set timeframes such that it is designed for failure. Give them time. The system is working now. I have said that time and again. I don't think most people know how much change has occurred in the intelligence community since 9/11. It is working. The fact that we haven't had another 9/11 shows that it is working. I hope we will be careful. I want to talk about this one amendment.

Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Senator. We made progress in a lot of areas outside of Iraq. I am in contact now with people in the Philippines. We have problems. We have problems in Indonesia. We have problems throughout the area. We have problems with all of these drugs from Afghanistan. This is a complex world. When we visited with the station chiefs throughout the world recently, they all said the same thing. Ours is a very difficult problem. It is hard to figure out our priorities right now. They are going to have to wait until NID gives them their priorities. How long must they wait? My amendment suggests an alternative to the inspector general of the National Intelligence Authority as proposed in this bill. This is amendment No. 3882. Under the committee bill, the inspector general would have the authority to provide policy direction on interagency relationships without consulting with the department heads of the affected agencies. I see you shaking your head. You had better read the bill if you disagree. I don't like to see that from staff, anyway. If you are going to shake your head, move. I think this is a situation where we have been through the creation of inspectors general on the Governmental Affairs Committee. People ought to look at what is being done under this bill. This is the only inspector general I know that would have the authority and direction to provide policy direction on interagency relationships without consulting with the department heads of the affected agencies. Here is an inspector general of the intelligence community from NID. He has the authority to interrogate people in other agencies to find out interagency relationships of his agency with these other agencies without consulting the heads of the other agencies. Nothing indicates they are even going to consult the inspectors general of those agencies. There are inspectors general of every agency covered by this bill. That would give the inspector general of the NIA unprecedented authority over appointed officials of other independent agencies and departments. I don't know why the inspector general of the NIA should have unprecedented powers that no other inspector general has. I raised this question before and I was told that was not the case. When I raised the question, I was told on the floor earlier that the inspector general has the same authority as the inspectors general. I challenged that. And this amendment would bring that bill back into the situation where I was told it was, and that is the inspectors general have the same authority as any other inspector general. They would still have the authority to audit programs and operations of the national intelligence authority. They shall have the authority to investigate interagency relationships if they wanted to among the elements of the intelligence community both within and outside the national intelligence program, but the inspector general of the National Intelligence Authority will not direct the policy of other independent agencies or any other agency. As a matter of fact, IGs should not direct anything. They should make findings and report their findings to the head of the agency. My amendment is based on existing law that has proven successful in ensuring that the authority of inspectors general of the intelligence community does not infringe upon independent inspectors general of other agencies. I urge the Senate to take a look at this. To have anyone authorized to investigate interagency relationships? How are you going to get along with your colleagues in the other group? Inspectors general should look for performance or for honesty and integrity, to examine the operations and report. But to report on interagency relationships involving other departments and agencies that are not under his control and are under the control of other inspectors general, that is really going too far. I will say this categorically: If that provision is not changed, I will vote against this bill. I have lived with inspectors general now too long, and that goes too far. I will not vote for this bill unless it is altered.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I apologize, I do have to go. I want the Record to show my support for Senator Byrd's amendment No. 3845, which a few of us have endorsed. I hope we can negotiate some of that because that covers, as the distinguished senior Member of this body has said, the relationship that many of us have had with this process for a long time. I hope we will have a chance to work it out.

Mr. STEVENS. Shout doesn't count. Sometimes I am loud. I apologize.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, Senator Byrd and I have asked and urged all chairmen and ranking members of the appropriations subcommittees to start conferencing the substance of their bills with the House. We need to resolve our differences now, before the recess next week, if possible. We have a short period of time when we come back. The continuing resolution will expire November 20. I conferred with the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Chairman Bill Young. He agrees that something needs to be done while we are gone. I don't know if it is possible, but I hope the Senate and House staff will do their best to work with the chairmen and ranking members of the subcommittees on their recommendations and make sure we have them available when we come back on November 16. There will be no time to do such preliminary conferencing when we get back. At best, we will have 5 days to get something out of conference and resolve the issues and pass a conference report of some kind to deal with as many bills as we can handle. That is a tall order. I thank my friend, Senator Byrd, ranking member, former chairman of our committee. We are working together with the objectives of trying to finish these bills this year. When the two chairmen retire from the House and the Senate Appropriations Committee, with us will go our staffs. If the next chairman of the House and Senate Appropriations Committee has to continue the work that we should accomplish this year, it is going to take months this time because the trained staff, the people who know the subject, will not be there. We move on to other subjects. Congress must get these appropriations bills done this year.

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, Tuesday, September 14, was National POW/ MIA Recognition Day. American citizens in towns and communities all across our Nation commemorated this occasion by pausing to remember American prisoners of war, those who continue to be missing, and their families. A national observance was held on the River Parade Field at the Pentagon with an honor guard parade consisting of units from the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard. Guests included the families of former POWs and MIAs and representatives of veterans' organizations. The guest of honor for this occasion was our distinguished colleague and our dear friend, Senator Dan Inouye of Hawaii. Senator Inouye spoke eloquently about the significance of this remembrance as did Gen Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Secretary Wolfowitz's statement included an introduction of Senator Inouye that captured the life and legacy of this great patriot. The eloquent remarks of General Myers, Secretary Wolfowitz and Senator Inouye deserve the attention of the Senate. I ask unanimous consent that the speeches of General Myers, Dr. Wolfowitz and Senator Inouye be printed in the Record.

Mr. STEVENS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have filed a series of amendments. I would like to address the one on disclosure of intelligence funding.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I direct the attention of the Senate to page 115. This is title II. It pertains to the amounts to be disclosed. It deals with amounts authorized and appropriated in each fiscal year. My amendment follows the recommendation of the administration and, I might add, the intelligence community to think twice before we do this. It may be that we will want to do this after the NID comes into being and we all have a better knowledge of how these funds are going to be handled. This amendment would require a further study of the disclosure of funds that are provided for intelligence programs. The basic need for this amendment rests on the testimony of the Acting Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin before the Governmental Affairs Committee. He said: I would not go so far as to declassify the numbers for the individual agencies. I think that gives too much opportunity for adversaries to understand how we are moving our money from year to year from technical programs to human source collection and to other objectives. In the administration's statement of policy, the administration is also concerned that the committee bill mandates disclosure of sensitive information about the intelligence budget. The legislation should not compel disclosure, including to the Nation's enemies in war, of the amounts requested by the President and the amounts provided for the conduct of the Nation's intelligence activities. I understand that the committee intends to comply with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission with regard to this. But I think it is time we slow down a little bit and respond at least in part to some of the comments of those people who have spent their lifetimes now in our intelligence service. I can tell you that I have not spent my whole lifetime there, but I have spent some 30 years now in terms of watching over the Defense Appropriations Committee and being part of it at least. In terms of being chairman and ranking member, it has been now 23 years. This concerns me greatly because one of the problems of the appropriators is to find ways to have an honest budget but to put the money where the enemies of this country, those who want to do us harm, do not know what our emphasis is way out into the future. I remember when we started transitioning to electronic intelligence and how we traveled from place to place to look at these new satellites and the things they were going to do and got briefings on capacities. Those were developed over a series of years, and they got more complicated as they went along. But the money that was involved was substantial. To have a disclosure of ``we are engaging in an entirely new effort in intelligence'' would be highly unwise. I quote from the second page of the administration statement: The Administration is also concerned that the Committee bill mandates disclosure of sensitive information about the intelligence budget. The legislation should not compel disclosure, including to the Nation's enemies in war, of the amounts requested by the President, and provided by the Congress, for the conduct of the Nation's intelligence activities. I am deeply concerned about some of the problems of how we find a way to maintain the secrets of this country with regard to what we are doing in terms of human intelligence. We are building up human intelligence at the same time as we are changing the utilization of the electronic concept of intelligence. And while I believe the time may come when we can find a way to disclose certain portions of the budget, I have a real resistance to this proposal that says: Congress shall disclose . . . for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated by Congress for such fiscal year for the National Intelligence Program. Then it directs the study of disclosure of additional information. We are certainly not opposed to the study. It is the mandate beginning in 2005. We are going to start, for the fiscal year 2006, disclosing these amounts at a time when there is great change in the intelligence community. The whole structure of the intelligence community will be changed by this bill. To start disclosing where money is going is to tell the enemies of this country where our emphasis for the future is. It is the future I am concerned about in terms of disclosure. In the future we set up reserve accounts, and I will be talking about some of those soon. But if we set up reserve accounts, the reserves are classified as reserves because that is where they get the money for innovation and new developments. We don't have to disclose it. We don't have to tell them: Yes, we are going to build new satellites or we are going to build other devices that can listen to transmissions in the air and on the land and under sea. We have a lot of secrets in this country. They are all related to intelligence. Let me repeat that. Every one of our secrets is related to intelligence. They are highly classified. Many of them are known only to the President and a close circle. Part of that circle includes Members of Congress who deal with the very high-level, classified programs of the intelligence services. I urge that the Senate listen to us and listen to the administration and to those who have been involved in these activities. Again, I call to the attention of the Senate that when we returned and found there were a whole series of people who had not been heard on their viewpoints--they wanted to express their concerns--we held a hearing and listened to the intelligence people, who had great, distinguished records in the past. We listened to Secretary Kissinger and a whole series of people who wore our uniform and have been the top officers of our military. To a person, they do not believe we should move this fast on this disclosure item. Let us have the study. We are entirely in favor of the study. But to mandate the disclosure in the bill we will prepare in 2005, I think, is much too early, in view of the changes taking place in the area of intelligence. This is where we are going to start to see if there is any reaction to those who have had experience in the area, to the President, and to those who have reviewed the whole thing. Is the Senate going to listen to these people with some experience and say, OK, let's study it, but not make the judgment first and then study it? This disclosure in the next fiscal year is wrong, until we know what the policies of the NID are and what are going to be the policies of Congress and how we are going to handle this appropriation. It appears to me that the result of this bill will be to fractionalize the intelligence appropriation, anyway. Part of it is going to go to the Department of Defense; part will be split up into several agencies within the NID. I think we ought to know first what we are doing before we decide what we are going to disclose so we can maintain the secrecy that is required in order to prepare for the future. This is not something to correct mistakes of the past; this is something to prevent making mistakes in the future.