Jeff Sessions

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, the Senator from Illinois is very eloquent in the position he takes, and he argues pretty aggressively in this political season one point of view on the question of nuclear weaponry and how the Senate was briefed. He said one thing that is true. I was not a member of the Intelligence Committee, but as a Senator, we received repeated briefings on the weapons of mass destruction issue, and in the briefings we received, all Members of the Senate, and that includes the Democratic nominee for the Presidency, a Member of this body, Senator Kerry, the issue of what those tubes were for was discussed and both sides of it were presented. It was left to the Senators, I guess, to decide how they would call the question. I felt as if the weight of the evidence indicated to me that Saddam Hussein was doing what he had done before, that this was just one of the weapons of mass destruction he was desirous of having, he was desirous of possessing and that he wanted to use to threaten his neighbors, his own people, and to improve his threat standing in the neighborhood in which his country existed. In other words, he was clearly desirous of that, else why would he not agree to a full inspection to prove what he did with the remains of his nuclear program that we know he had previously? Else why would he not show what he had done with the chemical weapons we know he used against his own people? And we all heard those briefings. I know the Presiding Officer was there in those briefings. We heard them, and we knew the issues involved. We debated it on the floor of this Senate for months and months and we discussed all those issues and we had to make a decision about whether or not to allow Saddam Hussein to remain in violation of 16 U.N. resolutions. We said we could not continue in this way. They fired at airplanes on a regular basis as they enforced the U.N. no-fly zone over Iraq, and we voted on it. After having all of those issues discussed, after having received the intelligence with both sides of this question discussed before the Senators, Senator Kerry, as referred to by the Senator from Illinois-- he referred to him in his campaign--voted to allow the President to make one final effort with Saddam Hussein and authorized him to commence hostilities if that did not succeed. Those last discussions did not succeed and we made one more effort. They did not succeed and we went to war as every Member of this body knew when we cast that vote. This body was not misled and Senator Durbin was not misled because he heard the same briefings as he has told us, and neither was Senator Kerry when he cast his vote in favor of allowing this war to proceed. I think it is critical for leadership in America that if an American makes a commitment and a decision on an issue as important as that to keep the commitment and not flip-flop on it next week, not change their mind next week and go back and try to find some excuse to blame the President who is leading troops in the field and make complaints on the floor of this Senate and in press conferences, statements which make it more difficult for us to be successful. We know what the challenge is, and we as a nation have made a commitment. This Senate, by a three-fourths plus vote, voted to allow this war to begin. We knew it was going to happen if Saddam Hussein did not back down and admit what he was doing and allow inspectors to come in and demonstrate clearly that he did not have these weapons of mass destruction. We received intensive briefings on that subject. We cast our votes and God gave us the ability to make a clear decision. We ought to stand by that decision, and we are going to stand by it. There are some who want to cut and run, bob and weave, flip and flop, but the American people will not and this Senate is not. We are going to stand firm and we are going to be successful in Iraq because it is the right thing to do. Those people have suffered greatly but progress has been made and will continue to be made. We are going to train the military, get them up to speed, and get them equipped. As we have seen in Samara when that happens and they work with the American military, progress, success can and will occur. This is a longrun solution. We have had so much success in Afghanistan where it is so wonderful to see over 10 million people registered to vote there, and 40 percent of them are women. To say that we cannot make progress in this area of the world is a mistake. Yes, it is tough. Yes, it is difficult. Yes, a significant but small number want to disrupt everything that has gone on and to make sure that democracy cannot take hold and a good and decent government will not be established to allow the Iraqi people to use their capabilities and work ethic to allow them to be successful, which is important for us. I just would make that response. I see Senator Collins is in the Chamber. I was going to make a statement on a separate issue, but if the Senator needs the floor for matters important to the bill, I would be glad to yield.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of an amendment previously offered, No. 3871, and to share some thoughts about what I believe to be a critical issue facing us in terms of security for this country. One thing this legislation we are discussing today could do better is it could more effectively help deal with weaknesses that exist in our system today. We are moving blocks around at headquarters and creating responsibilities. Some of that may be good and some of that may not, but what I have not seen enough of is focus on what really is a problem and a weakness in our system and proposals that will actually fix that and make it stronger. We know, for example, that lack of human intelligence over decades since I guess the Church Committee has left us far too few intelligence officers around the world. We know that we have far too few translators who can translate foreign languages that may involve people who have connections to terrorism. Those are things we know are problems, and I am afraid we do not do enough about it. This is a matter that I think is critically important that is a problem generally recognized by people today in this country who give it much thought. It is simply this: That if a police officer in any town in America were to stop an individual he or she believes to be here illegally, I would suggest that most Americans do not know what will happen at that point. As a former Federal prosecutor and Attorney General of Alabama, I travel the State and frequently meet with local law officers, sheriffs and police officers, and I ask them what they do when they discover someone who has been in this country illegally. The answer is, they let them go. They used to call the Immigration and Naturalization Service and they would tell them that if there were not at least 15 people in this group illegally they would not bother to come and even pick up this individual. As a result of that and a few court rulings that, in my view, are not persuasive, are not binding, the mentality has developed among State and local law enforcement that they do not have any role in enforcing our immigration laws, and they do not do it. I raise this simply because it used the same language I have used before. This is an article from, I believe, a Portsmouth, New Hampshire, paper. It involves the Kittery, ME, police chief. The first line of the article says, ``This country is facing a tremendous security issue when it comes to illegal aliens.'' The chief of police sent that strong message after his department detained a Colombian citizen and a Bulgarian citizen. Both were found to be in the country after their visas had expired--illegally: . . . but the police were told by Immigration and Naturalization Service agents, to release them. ``They just let them go,'' the Chief said. That is what happens in America today. That is reality. Anyone who suggests that our police are able to participate effectively in apprehending people who are here illegally does not know what is happening in the real world. We have 650,000 State and local police officers in America--sheriff deputies, police officers, State troopers, and the like. But there are only 2,000 Interior enforcement officers for the Department of Immigration--ICE, they now call it; only 2,000 in the whole country. So, to tell our local people we don't want your help in this is unwise. It is a serious flaw in our system and I propose that we fix it. I understand the way we are proceeding here that this amendment is probably not germane. Therefore, if it is not germane, with cloture probably we will not get a vote on it. But it is something I wanted to share with the Members of this Senate. We have Senator Cornyn, Senator Ensign, Senator Chambliss--who chairs the Immigration Subcommittee in Judiciary--and Senator Miller from Georgia. They have signed onto this amendment. Senator Inhofe, I see just came in, is a signer and supporter of this amendment. It is common sense. It is plain common sense. What we are doing now is wrong. I am very concerned about it. In addition to the fact that they are told not to participate in the apprehension or detention or holding of someone who is here illegally, even more bizarre is the fact that we now have 400,000 alien absconders in this country. That is 400,000 people who were determined to be in this country illegally, by one forum or another, by administrative ruling or court determination, and have been issued final orders of deportation, but are still at large. What do you think would normally happen if that occurred, if someone is found here illegally and determined so by an administrative or court proceeding? You would think they would be asked to leave. They would be deported. What happens is they are released on bail pending a final order of deportation and 80 percent of those never come back. They don't show up for their deportation hearing. They abscond. Mr. President, 86,000 of those are criminal felons; of that 400,000 who absconded, 86,000 are criminal felons who came to this country with permission to live here and work here according to the rules and regulations. They have been convicted of a felony and they have been ordered deported, but they abscond and they are out there--criminals, many of whom are threats. Fifteen thousand of these 86,000 have been determined to be of ``national security interest,'' and 3,000 come from state sponsors of terrorism. We know that three of the 9/11 hijackers had contact with State and local police during routine traffic stops prior to 9/11. Hijacker Mohammed Atta, believed to have piloted American Airlines flight 77 into the World Trade Center's north tower, was stopped twice by police in Florida. Hijacker Ziad S. Jarrah was stopped for speeding by Maryland State police 2 days before 9/11. Hani Hanjour, who was on the flight that crashed into the Pentagon, was stopped for speeding by police in Arlington, VA. Right now, if a State or local officer stops one of these 400,000 absconders, they have no real way of knowing the person has been ordered removed from the country by an immigration court. Do you understand that? The key thing here is that people need to understand how the system works. Let's say a Mohammad Atta had been arrested for reckless driving or DUI, that he was in violation of his immigration laws and was ordered deported, and that he absconded back into the country and he is stopped in Maryland or Alabama or Maine by a local police officer. What would happen? If he had committed larceny and had a warrant out for his arrest from Maine, I will tell you what would happen if he is stopped in Alabama. The police officer will run the National Crime Information Computer check. It will come out that there is a warrant out for his or her arrest for larceny in Maine, and he will be held and turned over to the Maine authorities to be prosecuted. What happens if a person is one of the 400,000 alien absconders? That information is not being put in the NCIC database, so it is not available to the police officers who make a check. They can't determine whether this is a danger to America. This is what our amendment would do. It would simply clarify the authority of State and local police, that they have a voluntary role in their local role that requires information, and it requires information such as revoked visas and final orders of deportation be listed in the NCIC so the State and local officers can have access to it in the course of their routine duties. It does not say people have to go out and start looking for illegal aliens, but if they apprehend somebody, they run the NCIC check and see whether there is a final order of deportation in the system. Action by state and local police is totally voluntary. There has been some concern that similar legislation would require the local police to participate in enforcing immigration laws, which I personally think most should--or at least they ought to. But this amendment would not require any action by state and local officers. It also has no link to any funding they are currently receiving. The amendment goes a step further to clarify the voluntary nature of this amendment it includes language saying that nothing would require the State and local officers to report the immigration status of witnesses of crimes or victims of crimes. Some say if you do that, people will not come forward and report a crime; if they are a victim, they will not come forward and report if they are a witness. This amendment does not require any of that. Let me briefly conclude. I could say much more about this. But the 9/ 11 Commission dealt with this issue. They recognize the ``growing role''--that is a quote in the 9/11 Commission report--of our State and local law enforcement agencies in the area of immigration law enforcement, and for effective cooperation of all levels of immigration law enforcement--Federal, State, and local. They also noted this challenge. On page 383 of the 9/11 report: The challenge for national security in an age of terrorism is to prevent the very few people who may pose overwhelming risk from entering or remaining in the United States undetected. We ought to listen to that. It is a threat to our country, that the people who are here illegally remain here without being apprehended. They say there is a growing role for State and local law enforcement in this area. That is why we have offered this language. That is why, even before 9/11, I recognized the problem would be crucial for this country. I am very frustrated but we need to step up to the plate and make sure every local and State law enforcement officer knows what their authority is; that the Federal ICE people will come and retrieve people who are here illegally; that people who have absconded after a valid order of deportation and a warrant for their arrest has been issued. That ought to be in the NCIC for an immigration offense just as much as a petty larceny offense or a DUI offense. That is not the way it is today. We have to confront this issue. In one fell sweep we could add 600,000-plus law officers--the eyes and ears of America on the streets of every city and town in America. We could add them to the effort to make this country secure. We could add them as eyes and ears with the ability to identify and arrest people who have warrants out for them, who may be 1 of 3,000 from countries that harbor terrorism. I thank the Chair. I believe we need to continue to work on this. I intend to do so. We ought to have a vote on this, if possible. If not, we will just keep coming back at it. Amendments No. 3850, No. 3851, No. 3855, No. 3856, and No. 3872 I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside, and on behalf of Senator Grassley, I would like to call up en bloc five amendments that are filed at the desk. I call up amendments No. 3850, No. 3851, No. 3855, No. 3856, and No. 3872, and I ask unanimous consent that the amendments be set aside.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendments be dispensed with.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, these amendments deal with important matters in a number of areas. I will provide more information at the appropriate time about them. I just note that one thing we certainly need to do--I believe there is uniform agreement on this--is that the provisions that deal with the wall between the FBI and CIA, basically, between domestic enforcement and foreign intelligence--that has been identified as one of the primary reasons we did not coordinate our intelligence effectively prior to 9/11--that that wall that we have temporarily removed be removed permanently. That is one of the provisions I suggested in these amendments that have been called up. We will go into more detail as time goes by. I thank Senator Lieberman for his thoughtful comments, as always. He is very astute in the history and development of intelligence and his interest in the security of the United States is not surpassed in this body. I would say that my concerns are numerous about the legislation in general. Sometimes it is like when you are getting ready to buy that new car or new house and you get the pen in your hand and angst arises because you are afraid to sign it. But when you do sign it, everything goes along fine and it wasn't nearly as bad as you thought. That could be what we are dealing with. Also, maybe there are some reasons to be concerned about buying this house or this automobile; perhaps because it is a lemon. Maybe we don't have the money. Maybe this isn't the best way to do it. I am concerned about governmental bureaucracy and the real possibility that we will make it worse. As a Federal prosecutor for 12 years, I worked to try to coordinate all the Federal agencies involved--for example, in drug law enforcement. In Mobile, AL, under the Treasury Department, you had the IRS and they would do financial investigations of drug dealers. The Customs officers were at the ports and they did investigations of drug dealers who shipped in through the ports. They had a lot of abilities-- remarkable ability, really, to help in those instances. You had the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, also part of Treasury. And ATF often got involved in drug cases, although it didn't have direct jurisdiction in such cases. On the other side, you had the Department of Justice, and you had the U.S. Marshal Service and, of course, the U.S. Attorney, FBI, DEA, and Immigration Service. Then, before it went into Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, a part of the Transportation Department, which patrolled the Gulf of Mexico and frequently stopped boats loaded with drugs. They were all independent agencies. I would try to get them to work together and at times it was very difficult, but we made great progress. How did it happen that we made progress in cooperation during the years that I was an U.S. Attorney? I have thought about it. There was not any major reorganization. In fact, there was no real reorganization of the Government. Ronald Reagan declared a war on drugs, and, we had a war on drugs. It raised the attention level of every Government agency. He said that we will cooperate with one another. The Attorney General of the United States, William French Smith, hired a young, aggressive, talented prosecutor and made him third in command at the Department of Justice, the associate Attorney General, and he directed him to work with the U.S. attorneys and every agency in the Government to make sure they cooperated and worked together to deal with the war on drugs. That young prosecutor, Mr. President, is well known today. It was Rudy Giuliani. He made things happen. People knew he spoke for the President and we made tremendous progress. If there was a discussion about how to investigate a major drug gang, and the FBI didn't cooperate with Customs or the DEA was unhappy with Customs or the FBI, the U.S. attorney could just call up somebody in Washington and say: Look, these guys are fighting over bureaucratic turf. We have a case we need to prosecute, and we need to work together. It worked. The turf battles would end. Things happened in an extraordinary way. There was no new bureaucracy established. That is all I am saying. No new entity was established to create coopertion. A number of years later, in order to obtain more coordination, Congress, after much debating and ballyhoo, created a drug czar, and that was supposed to coordinate these activities. The drug czar has some interesting powers, and the model of the drug czar might not be bad for this entity, for the challenge of improving our intelligence capabilities. The drug czar has the responsibility to get with every department and agency of the Government and to write, with their input, a plan to fight drugs in America. He does that. They all sign off on it. Then the drug czar, before the budget request of each one of these agencies goes to the Office of Management and Budget, approves their budget, and if he concludes they are not funding or not asking for funds to carry out the agreement they signed, then he has the ability to object and block that budget. It eventually goes to the President if there is a dispute. But the drug czar has quite a bit of power. It is a small office compared to the other major departments and agencies in the Government. We have to be careful with this legislation that we are not creating another layer of Government. Mr. McLaughlin, who was the Acting Director of the CIA before Mr. Goss was confirmed, appeared before Senator Warner's Armed Services Committee. Chairman Warner asked him a number of questions. One of the things he said that was important to me as a person who has been involved in dealing with Government agencies and knows how people pass the buck and how they cover their own problems--all tendencies that are natural inclinations of governmental entities--I have been there; I know it--Mr. McLaughlin said: I think we need to ask ourselves a couple of questions. One is, who will brief the President of the United States on matters involving intelligence? Who is going to tell the President whether there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? Right now, it is clear the CIA Director does that. The second question is, who will be responsible if it is wrong? Today that is clear still. It is the CIA Director. We do not have the same CIA Director that we did. He told the President it was a slam dunk that WMD products were in Iraq, and apparently they were not, or at least we have not found them, which is more accurate. And he no longer holds the office. If we come up with a new organization that organization leaves it less clear who is responsible for stating the intelligence situation of the United States to the President, and we make it even less clear who can be held responsible, then we have not made progress. My colleagues say the national intelligence director can do it. He could. Where does he get his information? Is he going to interview the CIA and then repeat what the CIA told him to the President? And then if he is wrong, will he say: It wasn't my fault; the CIA told me that? We get into a little bit of a mess here. The idea of having an enhanced unification of intelligence-gathering capability and dissemination of intelligence appeals to me very much. I remain somewhat confused how we should do it, however. I just do not know what is the best way to do it. I so much appreciate the time Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman have put into this legislation. I know it has many good things in it, but I am just not sure how much progress we will have made when we do this because we know what the real problems are: we did not have enough linguists; we had legal walls between intelligence agencies. We have taken those down. At the President's leadership and insistence, we are bringing in more human intelligence, a critical need, and we are bringing in more foreign language speakers at an incredible new rate. We are moving more aggressively than we ever have against al-Qaida. Three-fourths of them have been captured or killed. We have made progress all over the world. We have enhanced our partnerships with not only our agencies within the United States but around the world. It is not appropriate to mention or talk about all the cooperation we are getting from agencies of other nations, foreign intelligence agencies. They are sharing with us much better. A lot of things are going well. I think it is fair to say the military feels the intensity of the leadership from the President on down has forced, such as Rudy Giuliani and President Reagan did on the war on drugs, a lot better cooperation between intelligence entities today. The DOD people know the people in the CIA. CIA and the FBI are meeting daily with Homeland Security. And those people know each other's names. They have had months of partnerships working together. The system is working, and I am afraid if we reorganize all this, it may look good on paper, but the personal relationships that have caused confidence to be built up may be undermined. If that were to happen, in the middle of a war, we would not be proud of ourselves. I thank the Chair. Those are thoughts and concerns I have. I love this country. I know we are in a dangerous period. This struggle against terrorism will continue for decades--for decades it will continue--and the key to victory is intelligence and identifying these dangerous cells before they attack us. I think we are discussing an important issue. I thank the people who have worked so hard on it. I yield the floor.

Mr. SESSIONS. I say to Senator Lieberman, I would share your view that the President is the No. 1 customer of the intelligence that comes forward. I think he may well need a No. 1 adviser to help assimilate all of it. But let's go back now. Would it normally be that the person who walks in there and looks the President in the eye--should not that person have line, control, and supervision over the people who provided him with that intelligence? And isn't that the only way he can be held responsible for the brief and the opinions to the President, if he obtained the information from sources that are accountable to him or her? Whereas, in this case, if the NID does it, and the information is coming up through the vast CIA network around the world, as it most often would be--not always but most often would be--then, isn't that a weakness in our concept here?

Mr. SESSIONS. Would the distinguished managers of the bill, for whom I have so much respect, care to comment on the question that Acting Director McLaughlin posed at our hearing when he said one thing we had to be clear about was who would be responsible for stating the intelligence position of the United States to the President and who would be held accountable if they were wrong. It is a question we need to be clear about.

Mr. SESSIONS. The chairman is correct. For the people following this debate, they need to know that the CIA has operations in virtually every country in the world and it is from those agents that much of our intelligence comes. It comes through the CIA Director and he has always briefed the President as the Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. SESSIONS. I thank Senator Warner for his comments. It does appear if we pass this new procedure, we ought to understand who Congress contemplates would be the person most likely to brief the President. I think I understand what the Senator was saying. It is so important that if the main person is going to be the NID, the national intelligence director who does the briefing, it seems to me he or she would have to reach down and take about half of the CIA up to be on his staff to help him prepare the brief or else he will be regurgitating what came from some other agency and then we have created a weakened CIA, a muddled NID, and who is responsible. Is that a problem?

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I see the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I know he was present when Mr. McLaughlin was Acting Director of the CIA and he testified, along with a number of distinguished Government officials, including the Secretary of Defense. He made clear one point. I mentioned it earlier. He said that in any reorganization, it needs to be clear where the responsibility and accountability lies. He asked the question, who will brief the President, and, in fact, who will be held accountable if he briefs the President incorrectly? I see Senator Warner, and I would like to ask the bill managers, also, but my question to Senator Warner is, from his study of the bill, which is more extensive than mine, does he think there is any clear answer in this legislation that is moving forward to the question asked by Mr. McLaughlin? Who briefs the President and who is responsible if he is in error?

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside, and I call up amendments Nos. 3928, 3873, 3871, 3870, and ask for their immediate consideration.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SESSIONS. Well, I thank the Senator. I can see the concept there. I guess in my own mind I am having difficulty understanding why we should not raise up the CIA director and make sure that entity exercises the power that it is supposed to have now. It is supposed to be the central intelligence center for the country. And just to add another office above it has a number of problems. As Senator Warner said, there are agents all over the world gathering intelligence who are responsible directly to the CIA Director, who then is supposed to directly advise the President. So I hope we will think about this problem as we go forward. If we follow the model of the drug czar, I might feel a bit more comfortable. The drug czar, the Office of National Drug Control Policy Director, as I said earlier, requires that there be a written plan for combating illegal drugs in the United States. Every agency involved in that effort has to participate in drafting the plan and sign off on the plan when it is agreed to. And then that Director, the drug czar, reviews their budget request to make sure they are funding the effort in a coordinated way and has the ear of the President if an entity or agency refuses to cooperate. But organizations have integrity. I do not think, in general, anyone would argue that it is healthy governmental philosophy or political science to have a person the head of an agency and then people under him and parts of his budget be decided directly by somebody else, and department heads have to be approved or appointed by other people. It classically undermines responsibility. In America we have one Government. And within the Government there are three parts. There are the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. But we have created so many fiefdoms in the executive branch it is hard to hold the President accountable. The FBI Director has--what?--a 12-year term? So it is hard to hold the President responsible for these entities. And then you have Secretaries who do not even have control over the people within their agencies. So those are some of my concerns. As I said, it may be that nervousness before you sign the deed on the new house. But, again, it could be that some of these things may not work as well as we project them to at this time.

Mr. SESSIONS. It is a difficult thing. I remember the story very distinctly. There was an attempt to merge the FBI and DEA in the early 1980s. I wrote Associate Attorney General Giuliani a letter suggesting what should be merged is DEA and Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. I saw him not long after that and he said: Jeff, we can't even merge agencies within the Department of Justice, don't you know? To merge an agency in Treasury with one of Justice is impossible. While it is weird that we in the Congress and the President of the United States are not capable of merging agencies, as a practical matter, it is very difficult to do these things. I don't think most people realize how our Government really functions. It has great points. Some of the best people I have ever known serve in our Government. But there are problems in making it efficient. I thank the managers for their leadership and hard work.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I thank Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman for their hard work on this bill. I called one of my Democratic colleagues who has been around this body for a long time. I didn't know whether it was a good bill; he said he didn't either. It certainly has good intent. I certainly believe that improving our intelligence is of important national interest. I want to be supportive of this bill, but I do think it is important that we keep an eye on it because we have learned in the past that bills with language that may sound good at the moment, may not be what is best for the country. We may find out that very language, that one sentence or what have you, can be the very language that undermines the ability of our intelligence community to be effective in protecting the interests of the United States. I certainly believe we need to do everything we can to create an effective joint national intelligence effort. Unfortunately, I am afraid there are things in this bill that, indeed, may pervert the very purpose of the legislation; that will handicap the intelligence community rather than assist it. The language would prevent the national intelligence director from having the very capabilities that allow unhindered and meaningful intelligence collection and analysis. The bill establishes four new offices, additional new privacy and civil liberty officers within each agency, and it creates a new civil liberties board, all with management authority. If this was the kind of language we could work with, I would be supportive, but I am afraid the way this language has been put together could create bottlenecks and could undermine our ability to be effective. If so, I have a problem with it. I certainly don't want to have a problem with a bill initiating such important reform, but I do. September 11 did not happen because there was too little bureaucracy. It did not happen because the intelligence community needed more offices and boards, more monitoring personnel, more supervision and more second-guessing. In fact, the problems happened--many of them-- because the intelligence community found it difficult to work through the maze of bureaucracies that already exist in what we have today. Adding more to this bureaucracy only serves to exacerbate intelligence-gathering problems, not help them. Proliferation of government panels, boards, agencies, and ombudsman is not the answer. There are six sections of the bill, including four offices, a board, and still more additional officers, all tasked with the same bureaucratic management responsibility: No, 1, section 126, officer for civil rights and civil liberties of the national intelligence authority; No. 2, section 127, privacy officer of the national intelligence authority; No. 3, under section 141, the inspector general of the national intelligence authority; No. 4, ombudsman of the national intelligence authority; No. 5, section 211, the privacy and civil liberties oversight board; and under section 212, the privacy and civil liberties officers. That is quite a bit of bureaucracy, and I know the Presiding Officer is concerned. We have four new offices added to the national intelligence authority, a board added to the Executive Office of the President, and additional officers added to the various offices within the intelligence agency, all virtually with unrestrained management responsibilities. I don't believe this is what the 9/11 Commission had in mind. In fact, the 9/11 Commission uses the words ``privacy'', ``civil rights'', and ``civil liberties'' 23 times in the 567-page document. We have marked with blue tabs the references to these terms. The Commission was concerned about it and wanted to make sure we had the right provisions to deal with it. They confronted that issue and dealt with it seriously, mentioning it 23 times. How about the legislation before the Senate today? How about the legislation we now have under Collins-Lieberman? It has fewer pages, only 213. Yet it has 126 such references to the terms. Members can see the red marks I put on there. They are the marks that show references to these issues. The whole report is chock full of detail on this. Of course, we know what our problems were with intelligence. We did not have enough linguists. We did not focus enough on human intelligence. We had too much bureaucracy because of the wall between CIA and FBI intelligence that was thought being shared around the world. Those are the real problems, not how much oversight we might create and make it even more difficult for our agents to function without fear that somebody will second-guess whatever they might do in areas of the world where their very lives could be at stake and, indeed, are at stake. The legislation before the Senate mentions the terms six times as much as the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission recommended a single-- one--civil liberties oversight board. It certainly did not recommend numerous layers of bureaucracy throughout the intelligence community. These, I am afraid, would undermine or distract our ability to protect our security in this country. I think one of our fears with regard to intelligence and national security, as Senator Kyl has so eloquently mentioned, is timidity, a concern that our agents around the world, who are working to find those people who want to do us harm before they actually do us harm, identify them, could make a mistake resulting in criticism and punishment. Timidity can be damaging to our work. That is the problem I am concerned about. We need to create a system that promotes courage, innovation, and creativity on the part of our agents. When somebody does something new and creative, occasionally things do not turn out the way you would like. Certainly in the intelligence field, that is so. I used to be a Federal prosecutor. We would use undercover operatives, and we would do things, such as put recorders on them. All kinds of things could happen, and sometimes things went astray. But, you want to encourage agents to try to do the kinds of operations that work, not want them in fear that somebody is looking over their shoulder every time they do something that might blow up and then their career would be ruined. I feel strongly about this issue. I hope we can focus on it more clearly. If you look through the offices that would be created in this bill, they are duplicative and have many problems with them. For example, the officer for civil rights and civil liberties, in section 126 of the bill, is tasked with assisting the national intelligence director in ensuring that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties is appropriately incorporated in the policies and procedures under the national intelligence authority. This official is also given oversight authority and can ``review, investigate, and assess complaints and other information indicating possible abuses of civil rights and civil liberties'' in the administration of and relationships among the National Intelligence Authority, unless the NIA's Inspector General determines that the IG can better review the matter--basically, they have to take over the matter. Here the officer is given powerful authority to conduct as many investigations into any area of the NIA as the officer chooses, all without having to get the agreement or approval of anyone. Only the IG, the Inspector General, could intervene, and then basically only to take over the investigation. So this section provides for a powerful officer who could prove to be disruptive to the goals of the NID. While protecting and defending civil liberties is an important factor for our Nation, granting an officer free, unfettered, and unchecked authority to tie up intelligence operations and analysis through investigations is not the goal of intelligence reform, or the intention of the 9/11 Commission. The Inspector General, is checked ``from initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States.'' The Inspector General is constrained by the national security interests of the United States, but not this new officer for Civil Rights and Liberties. That officer should be subject to similar constraints. Secondly, there is a privacy officer provided for in section 127. That officer is tasked with coordinating with the officer of civil rights and civil responsibilities to ensure that privacy policies are upheld. This person will conduct ``privacy impact assessments when appropriate or as required by law.'' Once again, the bill grants unrestrained access and power to a person to check up on the national intelligence director and the intelligence community. This superfluous management could be a handicap to our intelligence-gathering activities. It is something I am concerned about. We also have in this bill an Inspector General for the NIA, an ombudsman, the board mentioned in section 211, and the officers mentioned in section 212. The Inspectors General of the CIA and the Defense Department are made duplicative officers to the IG in Section 141. And it can have the effect of not only creating excess officers and expense, but also creating competition and undermining the initiative of the agency in question. We want to be sure that civil rights and civil liberties are protected. We want to be sure that American citizens are protected, not only their civil liberties, which we absolutely intend to protect, but we want to protect their lives, their health, and their families from people who do not share our values and have the goal to destroy us. While I believe we can defend America with a high degree of fidelity to the liberties and freedoms we cherish, I also know one of the biggest problems we have had is the timidity and the restraint that people feel who work in our intelligence community. For example, I see Senator Kyl is the Presiding Officer. He, for years, recognized the terrible impact on the intelligence-gathering process that resulted from legislation--well intentioned--that constrained the ability of CIA agents and other agents of this United States from dealing with a person who had a criminal record. These agents were prohibited from dealing with these disreputable people. Well, many of the people who have the critical, life or death information may have a reputation or conviction in some country around the world of doing bad things. We know, after hearings, and after much debate on this floor, Senator Kyl eventually got that reversed. But it was late. We lost a lot. The real problem with that constraint on intelligence gathering was that agents themselves said: ``OK, they don't want me to do this. I am not going to do it. I am not going to take a chance. I am not going to deal with somebody who might have a criminal record because it may come back to haunt me, and they will haul me before the Church Committee or some other such committee and embarrass me and my family and undermine my career and record in this agency. I am not going to take a chance.'' That is what we know happened. It was not a good thing. We fixed that, just as we fixed the wall between the FBI and CIA. These laws sounded like a good idea at the time to those who passed them. And, I am not saying people were not sincere about it. But the net result was, we created timidity, pockets of information, and stovepipes, that did not share information between one another. As a result, there may have been a possibility, had that not been in existence, that we could have protected better the lives and fortunes of American citizens. I thank Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman and the people who have worked on this. I believe we do need to strengthen our intelligence community, but there are a number of things in this legislation that cause me great concern. We need to be realistic, to work in a way that protects the great traditions of freedom and liberty in this country, but also protects the lives and safety of our families and our communities. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I wish to recognize the achievements of Antoine Pettway on the occasion of his being honored by his high school, Wilcox Central High School, in Camden, AL. During ceremonies for Mr. Pettway, the Mayor of Camden, Henrietta Blackmon, presented him with a key to the city and a series of speakers praised their native son for his skills on the basketball court and for his strengths as a person. I have watched his career unfold with special interest because I too went to school in the small town of Camden. While the community is not a wealthy one, it has produced many outstanding young people, and Antoine is one of the most noteworthy. Antoine Pettway was born on November 13, 1982, to Joseph Pettway and Linda Crawford. Growing up in the small, rural town of Alberta, AL, Antoine ate, slept, and breathed basketball, when he was not working on his father's cattle farm or in his grandfather's country store. Pettway was a high school basketball standout averaging 24.3 points, 5.2 rebounds, and 6.7 assists, per game. Subsequently, with his athletic skills and strong leadership on and off the court, Antoine was able to help clinch State championship titles in 1998 for Keith High School, and in 2000 for Wilcox Central High School. Antoine was not only known for his athletic success, but also his academic success. He was a 4.0 student in high school and Salutatorian of his graduating class. Pettway received athletic scholarships from Jacksonville State, Louisiana Tech, Alabama State, and Alabama A&M, but his heart belonged to the University of Alabama. Standing at only 6 feet, he was not noticed by the Tide's coach, Mark Gottfried, until the State tournament and after all scholarship positions had been filled for the upcoming season. However, Antoine was approached by Coach Gottfried and asked to walk on as a freshman. So, with the help of his father and an academic scholarship, Antoine Pettway entered the University of Alabama in the fall of 2000 and joined the Crimson Tide basketball team as a walk-on for the 2000-2001 season. Antoine, determined to prove to Coach Gottfried that he belonged, averaged 2.9 points, 1.6 assists, and 1.1 rebounds per game during the 29 games he played his freshman year. His best game was a stand-out performance at Ole Miss in which he scored 19 points. His energy and skills on the court earned Pettway a scholarship in July of 2002. During his sophomore year, Antoine became a well-recognized figure on the Crimson Tide's basketball team not only for his charisma and athletic ability, but also his bright red, shiny sneakers. They became his trademark. His ``ruby slippers'' earned him fame around the country, but he is probably most remembered that year for his lay-up at the buzzer that gave Alabama a 65-64 victory over Florida, clinching the Tide's first Southeastern Conference title since 1987. In the 2002-2003 season, Pettway started 10 games and averaged 6.3 points, 2.5 rebounds, and 2.4 assists per game. He was ranked 7th in the SEC in assists to turnover ratio and shot 81.8 percent from the free throw line, making 36 of 44. His hard work and awesome talent was recognized by the basketball community when he was awarded the MVP of the Basketball Hall of Fame Tipoff Classic. Antoine remained the heart and soul of the Crimson Tide's basketball team through his senior year and led his team to the Elite Eight of the NCAA Tournament, a plateau that Alabama basketball had never reached before. He was the starting point guard and averaged 9.38 points, 3.62 rebounds, and 3.31 assists per game. Antoine's dedication and extraordinary work ethic can be seen not only on the basketball court, but also in the classroom. In his senior year, he was named Academic All-Southeastern Conference. To make the honor roll, an athlete must be a sophomore or higher in academic standing and have a 3.0 (on a 4.0 scale) or higher grade point average. He graduated from the University of Alabama in May of 2004 with a degree in Health Care Management. Most recently, Antoine Pettway was selected as the World Basketball Association's ``Rookie of the Year'' and was named to the 2nd Team All- WBA All-Star Team. He helped lead his team, the Kentucky Reach, the first Christian-based professional basketball team, to an 11-9 record and averaged 4.6 assists and 12.7 points per game. He is ranked second in the league in assists and 14th in scoring. The people of Camden and Wilcox county are proud of his basketball success, and they are even more proud of his leadership, his academic achievements, and his character. Indeed, Antoine Pettway's accomplishments on and off the court have inspired young and old to strive for excellence. He has high ideals and is true to his faith. The people of the State of Alabama are proud to call him their native son, and I wish him best of luck with his future endeavors. Whatever the future holds for this Wilcox County native son, it will be bright because he has his priorities straight. I am proud to recognize the accomplishments of a great American and Alabamian, and a wonderful representative of Wilcox County, Antoine Pettway.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 655, H.R. 982.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. I ask unanimous consent the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to this matter be printed in the Record.

Mr. SESSIONS. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 444, which was submitted earlier today by Senator Frist.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. I ask unanimous consent the bill be read a third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Governmental Affairs Committee be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 4259, and the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of calendar No. 634, S. 2436.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee-reported amendments be considered and agreed to. I understand Senator Inouye has an amendment at the desk, and I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered and agreed to; the bill, as amended, be read the third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table without intervening action or debate, and any statements relating thereto be printed in the Record.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate adjourns today, it adjourn until 9:30 a.m. on Thursday, September 30; I further ask that following the prayer and pledge, the morning hour be deemed expired, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the time for the two leaders be reserved, and the Senate then resume consideration of S. 2845, the intelligence reform bill; provided that upon conclusion of the debate on the pending Warner amendment, Senator Graham of Florida be recognized to offer the next amendment.