Jeff Sessions

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Kentucky for allowing me to speak on this amendment. It is something about which I have felt strongly for a long time. I find absolutely nothing unreasonable or unfair about the Domenici proposal. I think it fits precisely the circumstances in a very realistic way. I remember when I was running for the Senate in 1995, a prominent leader was on television. He said: People are going out deliberately recruiting millionaires to run for office. In fact, he said, we are creating a millionaires club, particularly in the Senate. Since I was running in a Republican primary, facing seven different candidates, two of whom were spending over $1 million of their own money, I listened to that. It meant a lot to me at the time. Two others in that race I think spent approximately a half million dollars each in the race. It was a total of $5 million spent by my opponents, and I was able to raise $1 million in that primary and was able to win that primary. I am not complaining about the Supreme Court ruling that says a millionaire, multimillionaire, or billionaire can spend all he or she wants to spend. What I am saying is we have all these restrictions on people who have to raise money. It limits their ability to raise money. Then a wealthy candidate can waltz in out of left field with hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars in his account and can just overwhelm their opponent, and it creates, I believe, an unfair situation. I think it is very difficult for anyone to contend this is not an unfair situation. We can deal with it, in my view. Senator Domenici has given a lot of thought to it. He and I have talked for some time about this. I believe he has moved in a direction that can deal with it. We are saying individual candidates in a primary, for example, can only raise $1,000 from a contributor to combat the money that was poured in it by a wealthy opponent. I believe we have an unfair situation. It makes it difficult for candidates to run on a level playing field. I was a former Federal prosecutor and attorney general of Alabama at the time of my campaign. I had two children in college. I had some public service experience. I wanted to take my record to the people of Alabama. We were able to raise enough money. I didn't have any problem asking people for money. I was able to raise enough money to get my message out and win in a runoff in that primary. But it really creates an unlevel playing field if I am restricted to these levels of contributions. What if my opponent had not spent $1 million? What if they spent $5 million, $7 million, or $40 million in that primary in a State such as Alabama? Could they have gained enough votes to tilt in their favor while a candidate who is a public servant is subject to limited funds? I think that is quite possible. That could have occurred. The Supreme Court, in my view, may not have been perfectly brilliant in the Buckley case in suggesting that an individual who has a lot of money has no potential for corruption. If their money is in one sector of the economy--health care, finance, high tech--if that is where their wealth is and maybe they have another billion dollars of investment, they have a lot to lose. Who says they are more or less corrupt than somebody such as the Senator from Alabama who worked as attorney general and took a State salary every day? I don't know. But the Supreme Court has ruled that a wealthy person cannot be limited in the amount of money they can put into a campaign. We are going to live with that. That is what the law is. Let me mention that there has been a trend in recent years of large amounts of personal wealth going into campaigns. In 1996, 54 Senate candidates and 91 House candidates each put $100,000 or more of their own personal money in the campaign through direct contributions or loans. In the 1998 general election campaign--that is a final election campaign--Senate candidates gave about $28.4 million to their own campaigns while House candidates gave close to $25 million to their own campaigns. This is compared to 1988 when the Senate candidates used only $9.7 million of their own money in Senate campaigns and House candidates gave $12.5 million. This means that the share of the total Senate donations from personal funds more than doubled--from 5.4 percent to 11.4 percent in 1988. That is pretty significant. In the Senate races alone, about 1 out of every 5 dollars raised in 1994 came from the bank accounts of the candidates themselves. This is clearly significant, and I think under the present tight financial rules on people raising money it is an unfair advantage to people who have access to unlimited funds. Can there be any doubt why a candidate or recruitment committee for any party, Republican or Democrat, is going to look out for people who can put in that kind of money? It gives them a clear advantage in the candidate recruitment process if they can write that kind of check. This amendment, I believe, deals with it quite fairly and justly. First, it talks about disclosure. Within 15 days after a candidate is required to file a declaration of candidacy under the Federal law, he or she must declare whether they intend to spend personal funds in excess of $500,000, $750,000, or even $1 million of their own money. It didn't say they can't do that. They can. They simply have to state an intention. I have to state and have to abide by the rule that I cannot raise more than $1,000. What is wrong with asking them to at least say how much they intend to spend? I think that is reasonable. What could be unfair about that? Then this triggers the events that occur to give the opponent of the billionaire candidate, or the one-hundred-millionaire candidate, a little advantage. It sort of balances the scales a little bit. It is not a lot. It is still tough to compete against a candidate who will put in $40 million or $7 million. But they don't always win when they go to the American people. If a wealthy candidate declares his or her intent to spend in excess of $500,000, the opponent of that candidate can increase individual and PAC contribution limits threefold. In the present circumstance, instead of being able to ask people for only $1,000, it would be $3,000. Instead of a PAC giving $5,000, a PAC could give $15,000, to give you some chance to compete against that wealth. If the candidate says in his declaration that he or she intends to spend more than $750,000, his or her opponent can increase individual and PAC contribution limits by five times. It would be $5,000 per individual. If some friends of mine say: Jeff Sessions is getting overwhelmed by a multimillionaire candidate, they could all rally and try to go out there and help me have a fair playing field. I think some people would. They would rally under those circumstances. But under current law, they cannot help a candidate any more than the maximum contribution. If the wealthy candidates exceed $1 million in personal expenditures, under the Domenici amendment the direct party contribution limit and party coordinated expenditure limits are eliminated. Why not? There is a chance to buy an election by pouring $1 million-plus into a campaign, and the opponent can be left helpless. I think that is a good law. It also has a give-back provision that any excess funds raised by the opponent of a wealthy candidate may be used only in the election cycle for which they were raised. So they couldn't be used in the next election. Excess contributions must be returned to the contributor, if there is any left after that. It also prohibits wealthy candidates, who incur personal loans in connection with their campaign that exceed $250,000, from repaying those loans from any contributions made to the candidate.

Mr. SESSIONS. I ask unanimous consent to have 1 additional minute.

Mr. SESSIONS. I know there were large contributions in this last Senate campaign from candidates of $10 million, $60 million, and other amounts of money that the winning candidates in this body contributed from their own funds. I tell you, I am glad I didn't face a person who could write a check for $60 million, $10 million--or $5 million, for that matter. If so, I would like to be able to have a level playing field so I could stay in the ball game. This is a fair and reasonable bill. I believe it is the right thing to do. I totally support the Domenici amendment. I ask that I be allowed to be listed as a cosponsor to the Domenici amendment.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation which will simplify and update a provision of the tax code that affects the sale of timber. It is both a simplification measure and a fairness measure. I call it the Timber Tax Simplification Act. Under current law, landowners that are occasional sellers of timber are often classified by the Internal Revenue Service as ``dealers.'' As a result, the small landowner is forced to choose, because of the tax code, between two different methods of selling their timber. The first method, ``lump sum'' sales, provides for good business practice but is subject to a high income tax. The second method, ``pay-as-cut'' sales, allows for lower capital gains tax treatment, but often results in an under-realization of the fair value of the contract. Why, one might ask, do these conflicting incentives exist for our nation's timber growers? Earlier in this century, outright, or ``lump sum'', sales on a cash in advance, sealed basis, were associated with a ``cut and run'' mentality that did not promote good forest management. ``Pay-as-cut sales'', however, in which a timber owner is only paid for timber that is actually harvested, were associated with ``enlightened'' resource management. Consequently, in 1943, Congress, in an effort to provide an incentive for improved forest management, passed legislation that allowed capital gains treatment under 631(b) of the IRS Code for pay- as-cut sales, leaving lump-sum sales to pay the much higher rate of income tax. It is said that President Roosevelt opposed the bill and almost vetoed it. Today, however, Section 631(b), like so many provisions in the IRS Code, is outdated. Forest management practices are much different from what they were in 1943 and lump-sum sales are no longer associated with poor forest management. And, while there are occasional special situations where other methods may be more appropriate, most timber owners prefer this method over the ``pay-as-cut'' method. The reasons are simple: title to the timber is transferred upon the closing of the sale and the buyer assumes the risk of any physical loss of timber to fire, insects, disease, storms, etc. Furthermore, the price to be paid for the timber is determined and received at the time of the sale. Unfortunately, in order for timber owners to qualify for the favorable capital gains treatment, they must market their timber on a ``pay-as-cut'' basis under Section 631(b) which requires timber owners to sell their timber with a ``retained economic interest.'' This means that the timber owner, not the buyer, must bear the risk of any physical loss during the timber sale contract period and must be paid only for the timber that is actually harvested. As a result, this type of sale can be subject to fraud and abuse by the timber buyer. Since the buyer pays only for the timber that is removed and scaled, there is an incentive to waste poor quality timber by breaking the tree during the logging process, underscaling the timber, or removing the timber without scaling. But because 631(b) provides for the favorable tax treatment, many timber owners are forced into exposing themselves to unnecessary risk of loss by having to market their timber in this disadvantageous way instead of the more preferable lump-sum method. Like many of the provisions in the tax code, Section 631(b) is outdated and prevents good forestry business management. Timber farmers, who have usually spent decades producing their timber ``crop'', should be able to receive equal tax treatment regardless of the method used for marketing their timber. In the past, the Joint Committee on Taxation has studied this legislation to consider what impact it might have on the Treasury and found that it would have no real cost--only a ``negligible change'' according to their analysis. The IRS has no business stepping in and dictating the kind of sales contract a landowner must choose. My legislation will provide greater consistency by removing the exclusive ``retained economic interest'' requirement in the IRC Section 631(b). Reform of 631(b) is important to our nation's non-industrial, private landowners because it will improve the economic viability of their forestry investments and protect the taxpayer from unnecessary exposure to risk of loss. This in turn will benefit the entire forest products industry, the U.S. economy and especially small landowners.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation which will simplify and update a provision of the tax code that affects the sale of timber. It is both a simplification measure and a fairness measure. I call it the Timber Tax Simplification Act. Under current law, landowners that are occasional sellers of timber are often classified by the Internal Revenue Service as ``dealers.'' As a result, the small landowner is forced to choose, because of the tax code, between two different methods of selling their timber. The first method, ``lump sum'' sales, provides for good business practice but is subject to a high income tax. The second method, ``pay-as-cut'' sales, allows for lower capital gains tax treatment, but often results in an under-realization of the fair value of the contract. Why, one might ask, do these conflicting incentives exist for our nation's timber growers? Earlier in this century, outright, or ``lump sum'', sales on a cash in advance, sealed basis, were associated with a ``cut and run'' mentality that did not promote good forest management. ``Pay-as-cut sales'', however, in which a timber owner is only paid for timber that is actually harvested, were associated with ``enlightened'' resource management. Consequently, in 1943, Congress, in an effort to provide an incentive for improved forest management, passed legislation that allowed capital gains treatment under 631(b) of the IRS Code for pay- as-cut sales, leaving lump-sum sales to pay the much higher rate of income tax. It is said that President Roosevelt opposed the bill and almost vetoed it. Today, however, Section 631(b), like so many provisions in the IRS Code, is outdated. Forest management practices are much different from what they were in 1943 and lump-sum sales are no longer associated with poor forest management. And, while there are occasional special situations where other methods may be more appropriate, most timber owners prefer this method over the ``pay-as-cut'' method. The reasons are simple: title to the timber is transferred upon the closing of the sale and the buyer assumes the risk of any physical loss of timber to fire, insects, disease, storms, etc. Furthermore, the price to be paid for the timber is determined and received at the time of the sale. Unfortunately, in order for timber owners to qualify for the favorable capital gains treatment, they must market their timber on a ``pay-as-cut'' basis under Section 631(b) which requires timber owners to sell their timber with a ``retained economic interest.'' This means that the timber owner, not the buyer, must bear the risk of any physical loss during the timber sale contract period and must be paid only for the timber that is actually harvested. As a result, this type of sale can be subject to fraud and abuse by the timber buyer. Since the buyer pays only for the timber that is removed and scaled, there is an incentive to waste poor quality timber by breaking the tree during the logging process, underscaling the timber, or removing the timber without scaling. But because 631(b) provides for the favorable tax treatment, many timber owners are forced into exposing themselves to unnecessary risk of loss by having to market their timber in this disadvantageous way instead of the more preferable lump-sum method. Like many of the provisions in the tax code, Section 631(b) is outdated and prevents good forestry business management. Timber farmers, who have usually spent decades producing their timber ``crop'', should be able to receive equal tax treatment regardless of the method used for marketing their timber. In the past, the Joint Committee on Taxation has studied this legislation to consider what impact it might have on the Treasury and found that it would have no real cost--only a ``negligible change'' according to their analysis. The IRS has no business stepping in and dictating the kind of sales contract a landowner must choose. My legislation will provide greater consistency by removing the exclusive ``retained economic interest'' requirement in the IRC Section 631(b). Reform of 631(b) is important to our nation's non-industrial, private landowners because it will improve the economic viability of their forestry investments and protect the taxpayer from unnecessary exposure to risk of loss. This in turn will benefit the entire forest products industry, the U.S. economy and especially small landowners.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I think we can fix this. I ask unanimous consent the votes now commence under the previous order, with the vote relative to the Boxer amendment being postponed, to occur at the end of the voting sequence, and the Leahy amendment being first in the sequence.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I yield back my time on the amendment and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SESSIONS. I thank the Chair.

Mr. SESSIONS. I thank the Chair. Vote On Amendment No. 19

Mr. SESSIONS. We are not going to vote on my amendment.

Mr. SESSIONS. I would like to have it accepted before, and I would not need but 1 minute to comment on it.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I will refer to a letter from Congressman Henry Hyde, chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations and former chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, a man of great knowledge and experience. He says: This provision does not impact State regulation of insurance and it does not violate any treaty obligations of this country. Consistent with the Hague Convention, recognition of a foreign award may be refused if the court in the country where enforcement is sought finds that ``recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.'' It certainly is contrary to the public policy of this country [Chairman Hyde continues] for an individual to be defrauded and then denied the right to assert fraud as a defense. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record letters from the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama, and a former Democratic Senator from this body, Howell Heflin, who said: As a former judge, I am appalled at this entire situation. I also ask unanimous consent to have a letter from Senator Robert Kerrey of Nebraska and Mary Landrieu of Louisiana in reference to this matter, as well as a letter from Laura Unger, acting chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, printed in the Record.

Mr. SESSIONS. This is a front page copy of Time magazine: Lloyd's of London, 1688--? Its watchword is utmost good faith. So why does Lloyd's stand accused of the greatest swindle ever? I was a Federal prosecutor for 12 years in Alabama. I was also in litigation. I am personally aware that there is fraud in big insurance companies. I had the opportunity and the responsibility to prosecute perhaps the largest insurance fraud case in the history of the United States that had even been investigated by committees here in the Senate. In that case, people were defrauded out of over $50 million- plus. The guy who did that, Alan Teal, was convicted. It just so happened he had previously, years before, been a member of Lloyd's. That has nothing to do with this, but I relay it here to let you know that I understand insurance fraud and I have been involved in prosecuted the big cases. In addition, I was involved in asbestos litigation in the late 1970s. I know in the late 1970s there were thousands of asbestos cases being filed, tens of thousands were being filed, and more were on the way. Everyone knew it. Plaintiffs were beginning to win tremendous verdicts. Everybody who knew anything about the litigation wondered if there would ever be enough money to pay those verdicts. During this same period of time, the companies that had the guaranteeing of the insurance, the reinsurance, was Lloyd's of London. What did they do? They were sending representatives to the United States, asking those people to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars of their own money into these accounts, and they told them: People have done well investing in Lloyd's. We think you will do well. But you are liable for everything that can come up. It is in the fine print. But they invested, thinking Lloyd's had a good reputation. The company began in 1688 with Members of Parliament, with lords and earls as investors in this. So they invested, little knowing that the bullet was already in the heart, that this company faced absolute financial ruin as a result of the most unprecedented series of lawsuits in American history, asbestos lawsuits. Now, when this case went to trial, they said they had a trial over there. They passed a securities law in England similar to our securities law, except they exempted one named entity--Lloyd's of London. Many Members of Parliament who passed that law were investors in Lloyd's. I don't know if they recused themselves or not. These are some of the facts at which we are looking. The heart of the claim is this, that these American investors were not allowed to put on evidence in the British court that omission could lead to liability. In other words, they were not allowed to show under the law under which they were forced to operate, that Lloyd's had any duty to tell them when they were investing in these syndicates, that they were doomed to lose, and there would be money they would have to pay--really, tens of billions of dollars in asbestos claims, enough to ruin all of Lloyd's. They sold these investments to American citizens, who did not fully know what they were facing. As one said, these were massive, unquantifiable losses that were heading Lloyd's way like a tidal wave, visible only to the few professional insiders who were tracking asbestos claims. That was a fraud, I think, under any definition of the word. The British judge, who excluded all evidence except the written documents that were submitted to the investors as the only evidence that went in on the question of fraud, those documents were submitted and they said you could be liable for any claims that may come against Lloyd's, but they did not say this tidal wave of claims was coming. Up to 7 or more people all over the world, possibly up to 12, have committed suicide as a result of this. It has ruined the lives of many, many citizens. The judge who tried the case and who was bound by the law so he didn't let this evidence in, said, ``The catalog of failings and incompetence in the 1980s by underwriters, managing agents, members and agents and others is staggering and has brought disgrace on one of the city's great markets.'' He goes on to skewer Lloyd's for their behavior, yet we can't get a remedy. This says you don't get money as a result, you only go to court and show in a court of law you may have been defrauded. Mr. President, let me take just a moment to more fully explain the issues involved in this section of S. 420 that we are debating here today. The Lloyd's of London provision would allow American investors in Lloyd's to defend against debt collection actions by Lloyd's in American courts by attempting to show that Lloyd's defrauded them when it recruited them as investors in the United States. The investors claim that Lloyd's of London recruited them as investors with unlimited liability and without disclosing to them massive impending liabilities for asbestos and pollution losses. This provision was added in the quasi-conference on the Bankruptcy Bill last year. Republicans and Democrats alike agreed to it. The provision was in the Bankruptcy bill as introduced and passed by the Judiciary Committee of the House and by the whole House this year. It was in the Bankruptcy Bill as introduced and passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee this year where Senator Feingold mentioned his objections to it. There are legitimate arguments on both sides of this issue. I have listened to investors, and I have listened to Lloyd's of London. Further, my colleague from Wisconsin has spoken against this provision, and I respect his view. Lloyd's asserts that an English court has found that Lloyd's, as a corporate entity, was not liable for fraud to several American investors that participated in that trial; that international law and comity among nations demands that we respect the judgment of the English courts; That the agreements signed by the investors had forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses which provided that any dispute would be litigated in English courts under English law; and That American courts have upheld the forum-selection and choice-of- law clauses. On the other hand, the investors contend that Parliament precluded suits against Lloyd's for negligence and breach of contract in 1982 and for securities fraud in 1986; that after the investment contract was signed, Lloyd's changed its by-laws to require investors to pay their losses before asserting fraud as a defense even though many investors can't afford to pay their losses in full!; That the English court failed to address allegations of fraud that took place in America; That in 1995 a Colorado court, at the behest of state attorneys working under Gale Norton, issued a preliminary injunction against Lloyd's stating its statements to American investors were ``materially misleading and false because, as a result of underwriting and reinsurance of asbestos-related liabilities in various syndicates, which liabilities had not been disclosed to [investors], those [investors] . . . are exposed to indefinite liability both in terms of amount and duration . . . .''; That in 1996, Lloyd's settled the fraud claims of numerous State securities regulators by agreeing to reduce its claims against settling investors by $62 million; and That in the February 26th edition of the Wall Street Journal it was reported that Lloyd's is currently under criminal investigation relating to defrauding its American investors. In my view, this comes down to a very simple question: Is this situation egregious enough to warrant an exception to the general rule of comity on judgments? I believe that it is because of my personal experience as both Attorney General my State and a federal prosecutor. I prosecuted criminals who defrauded policy-holders and investors. In 1979, I became aware that insurance companies knew of large asbestos losses discovered in litigation in Pascagoula, Mississippi, and that these losses would be catastrophic to the insurance companies. I know what it means to a family to be defrauded by an insurance company. It is wrong. I believe in the sanctity of contract, but there is no contract if the investors were fraudulently induced to enter the investment agreement. I believe in comity with the British government, but there is no comity if Parliament protects Lloyd's, but Congress does not protect American investors. I believe that helping wealthy investors should not be at the top of our priority list, but many of these investors are not wealthy and as Time Magazine reported some have even lost their homes to Lloyd's. I also believe that defrauding investors is intolerable, but that it is possible Lloyd's did not commit fraud. However, under the current post-contract term that requires the investors to pay before they assert fraud as a defense, investors who cannot afford to pay their loss in full cannot prevent debt collection actions by Lloyd's even if Lloyd's did defraud them. This amendment says that international comity is a two-way street. The British Parliament cannot protect wealthy British Investors from negligence and securities law claims and expect the American Congress not to at least give American investors a chance to assert fraud as a defense to debt-collection actions--a right that the investors had when they signed their investment contracts but that was unilaterally stripped away from them by Lloyd's after the fact. Accordingly, I support this narrow provision in the bill to allow pre-1994 American investors to assert fraud as a defense prior to payment. If they cannot prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence, they will lose. If they can prove it, they will win. That is only fair.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 59 be further modified so that it strikes section 311 of the Kohl amendment No. 68.

Mr. SESSIONS. I believe we have, and I will not object.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, this would be an amendment on the surface that appears to be good. However, I am of the firm opinion that it would be unwise and cause a very difficult problem with filing for bankruptcy. Under the present law, the median income is determined by household size which includes a spouse when married and living together. Yet a debtor filing singly will be tested based on his or her income only and not based on the income of the spouse as well. Under the current bill, for a debtor who is married but has been abandoned by her spouse, that will be corrected. She will be tested under the means test from her income. If she is abandoned, her expenses will exceed her income and she will not be prevented from filing under chapter 7. However, the ability of couples to maneuver income----

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of S. Con. Res. 25, submitted earlier today by Senators Miller and Cleland.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the concurrent resolution be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table and that any statements relating thereto be placed in the Record at the appropriate place as if read, with no intervening action or debate.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. On behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn until the hour of 12 noon on Monday, March 19. I further ask consent that on Monday, immediately following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed to have expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate then begin a period of morning business until 1 p.m., with Senators speaking therein for up to 10 minutes each, with the following exceptions: Senator Durbin, or his designee, 12 noon to 12:30 p.m.; Senator Murkowski, 12:30 to 12:50 p.m.; Senator Thomas, or his designee, 12:50 to 1 p.m. I further ask that following morning business, the Senate begin consideration of S. 27, the campaign finance reform bill, as under the previous order.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. For the information of all Senators, the Senate will convene at 12 noon on Monday and be in a period of morning business until 1 p.m. Following morning business, the Senate will begin consideration of the campaign finance reform bill. Under the previous order, there will be up to 3 hours of debate on all first-degree amendments, with a vote on or in relation to the amendments to occur following the use or yielding back of time. Amendments are possible on Monday, and therefore votes are expected. However, any votes ordered on Monday will be postponed to occur at 5 p.m. All Members should be aware that the next 2 weeks will be extremely busy, and everyone should expect votes throughout the day and evening.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order following the remarks of Senator Biden and Senator Reid of Nevada.