Jeff Sessions

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, we have it within our power to fix the broken immigration system. Last year, approximately 600,000 people were arrested entering our country illegally. That is lower than it has been, but a determined leadership from the President, from the Congress, can, within a matter of 1 or 2 years, end this problem, and then we can begin to wrestle with the difficult question of those who have been in our country for some time. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, essential to America's greatness, I truly believe, is our respect for the rule of law. The American people understand this. For years, they have asked Congress and the President to secure the borders and to enforce our immigration laws, but for years Congress has refused to do that. Indeed, as part of this legislative session, there has been no serious movement to do anything that would improve the grievous situation of illegality at our borders. So what we have is contrary to that today, when we will be dealing with the DREAM Act. Leaders in Washington have not only tolerated lawlessness but, in fact, our policies have encouraged it. Americans living near the border are the ones who often pay the steepest price. Illegal drugs, guns, people pour into States such as Arizona and Texas every day. Phoenix has turned into the kidnapping capital of the world. Ranchers in the southern part of the State are forced to accept chaos as a part of their daily lives. Smugglers, traffickers stream across their properties, homes are broken into, livestock killed, families placed in danger. Our government has failed in its duty to protect these citizens in the peaceful possession of their property. Consider the fate of Robert Krentz, the son of one of Arizona's oldest ranching families working land that had been in the family 100 years. His home had been robbed, their livestock slaughtered. On the night of March 27, he went to mend a fence and check his water line. He reached his brother on the radio to say he was helping someone he believed to be illegally entering the country--helping them--and that was the last time anyone heard from Mr. Krentz. He was found several hours later, shot dead. The death of Robert Krentz is sadly just one of the many tragedies that could have been avoided if the Federal Government had done its job. Instead, when Arizona tried to support the Federal immigration authorities, they were sued by Attorney General Holder, and the Department of Justice said stay out. They were sued for trying to protect themselves because the Federal Government would not. Yet here we are in the final days of a lameduck-- some say dead duck--Congress considering a bill that would create a major problem to the effective enforcement of immigration laws. People are not happy with us, Mr. President. I had a little recognition and recalled in the shower this morning a little event with Oliver Cromwell with the long Parliament in England. He said: It is high time for me to put an end to your sitting in this place. You have grown intolerably odious to the whole nation. In the name of God, go. I don't think we are odious around here, but I think the American people are not happy with us. I think it is time for us to quit trying to move political bills in a way that is not appropriate, not through the regular process. The American people are pleading with Congress to enforce our laws. But this bill is a law that, at its fundamental core, is a reward for illegal activity. It is the third time we have tried to schedule a vote on it, and during this lameduck session it is the fifth version of this legislation that has been introduced in the past 2 months. Not one of these bills has gone through committee. Not one of them is subject to amendment. The House passed a bill after 1 hour of debate, having announced it being brought up 1 day before. In fact, the version we are now considering is the same one that was rammed through the House. The majority leader has filled the tree. So, once again, the legislation cannot be amended. For 2 years, Democratic leaders have ignored the public. They have rammed through a lot of unpopular legislation, and sometimes--and too often-- the process has been skirted, and it has not been healthy for the Republic, which is one reason people have not been happy with it. So we are at it again, in these last hours, attempting to force through legislation that is not acceptable to the people. Proponents of the DREAM Act are sincere, and they insist this is a limited bill for young children of illegal immigrants who graduate from high school, get a college degree, and join the military. But the facts of the legislation are different. The DREAM Act would grant legislation to millions of illegal aliens, regardless of whether they go to or finish college or high school or serve in the military. It is certainly not limited to children. It would apply to people here illegally who are as old as 30. Because the bill has no cap or sunset, they will remain eligible at any future time. Mr. President, I know my good friend, Senator Durbin, who is such an able advocate, challenged me last night, or my staff, saying we were incorrect in saying that the Secretary of HHS would have the ability to waive some of the requirements in the bill. Just for my staff's sake, I want to read this part of the bill. He said it wasn't in there. My staff explained to his staff why they thought it was in there. The waiver section states: The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the ground of deportability under paragraph 1 of section 237(a) for humanitarian purposes or family unity. Maybe we can disagree how that might all be played out, but I think that is clearly a waiver provision in the bill. The amnesty provision--and this is an amnesty bill, because it provides every possible benefit, including citizenship, to those who are in the country illegally, and I think that is a fair definition of amnesty. The amnesty provisions are so broad that they are open to those who have had multiple criminal convictions of up to two misdemeanors--just not three--and many criminal cases that are felonies are pled down to misdemeanors, including certain sex offenses, drunk driving, and drug offenses. But the bill goes further, offering a safe harbor to those with pending applications, even if they pose some risk to the country. In other words, if you have filed and sought protection under the act, this can stay any action against you in any deportation proceedings. I think it is particularly dangerous because the safe harbor would apply to those even from terror-prone regions in the Middle East. In fact, the DREAM Act altogether ignores the lessons of 9/11, going so for as to open up eligibility to those who previously defrauded immigration authorities, provided false documentation, as did many of the 9/11 hijackers on their visa applications. Some have suggested this should not be a debate about policy but instead about compassion. But good policy, faithfully followed, is compassion. I ask my friends who support the legislation, what is compassionate about ignoring the public wishes and forcing people to live with a lawless border and a lawless immigration system that must be reformed and Congress refuses to reform? I ask them, is it compassionate to put illegal aliens in front of the line, ahead of those who have patiently waited and played by the rules? Is it compassionate to act in a way that undermines the integrity and consistency of our legal system--a system that is so important to our prosperity and liberty? The message from the public has never been in doubt. Before we consider regular status for anyone living here illegally, we first must secure the border. My friend, Ben Nelson from Nebraska, has spoken on this for a half dozen years. When he speaks, he has a sign behind him that says ``border security first.'' That is what Senator McCain has said. He has been a champion of immigration reform. He says he has come to understand with clarity that we must have security first. That is what the American people have told us, I am convinced. If we do not do those actions first, if we pass this amnesty, we will signal to the world that we are not serious about the enforcement of our laws or our borders. It will say that you can make plans to bring in your brother, sister, cousin, nephew, and friends into this country illegally as a teenager, and there will be no principled reason in the future for the next Congress then sitting to not pass another DREAM Act. It will only be a matter of time before that next group that is here illegally will make the same heartfelt pleas we hear today. It is time to end the lawlessness, not surrender to it. It is time to end the lawlessness that is occurring. This is a decisive vote. I urge my colleagues to oppose this reckless bill and commit ourselves, as a nation, to creating an immigration system that is just and lawful and that befits a nation as great as ours. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time remaining that I have not used that has been allocated to the Republicans be divided as follows, and not necessarily in this order: Senator McCain, 10 minutes; Senator Chambliss, 5; Senator Inhofe, 10; Senator Kyl, 5.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I would ask to be notified after 6 minutes. I wish to thank Senator Kyl and Senator McCain for their leadership on this issue and state that I believe the McCain amendment is perhaps the most critical amendment that will be raised during this debate because the future of missile defense is critically important for America. I chaired the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces in the Armed Services Committee. I have been the ranking member of the subcommittee and a member of the committee for 12 years, and I know all of the history on this issue. It has gone on for a great deal of time. I believe missile defense is critical to our national security. We have invested billions of dollars over 30-plus years developing it, and now that we are actually deploying it in Alaska and California, it is proving to be a shield that will work. We had plans for a long time to deploy a site in Central Europe. The Bush administration negotiated with the Poles and Czechoslovakia. They signed agreements that they would allow a radar base in the Czech Republic and a missile base in Poland. When President Obama was elected, the Russians immediately started pushing back on our missile defense plans for reasons I have never fully understood. We are only talking about 10 defensive missiles against hundreds--hundreds, maybe thousands--of Russian missile and launch vehicles. It would in no way threaten their power. Some experts--and I am inclined to agree--thought it related more to the Russian concern about us having a defense relationship with Czechoslovakia and Poland, but I don't know. For some reason, it has been a big deal for them. They have pushed back very hard. From the Bush administration, Doug Feith, in a Wall Street Journal article recently said--he negotiated in 2002--that they pushed back on it at that time. They said they would not sign a treaty unless we agreed not to proceed with missile defense. He said no deal. They insisted, and he said no deal. They said: We won't have a treaty if you don't agree. He said: Well, we won't have a treaty. We don't have a treaty with England, India, Pakistan, China, or France, who have nuclear weapons. We don't have to have a treaty with you. We are bringing our numbers down anyway, and you are, too. We would like to have a treaty, but we are not going to limit our missile defense. The Russians signed that treaty. Now we come and they start the same bluster against the Obama administration, which, unfortunately, gave in. These negotiations started early in the year. The treaty negotiations started in March of 2009. By September of 2009, President Obama unilaterally announced, to the shock of our Polish and Czech allies, that we were not going forward with the Polish site--much to the delight of the Russians, who had achieved a significant victory in a negotiating point that had gone on for many years. So to say that this treaty has nothing to do with missile defense is not correct. Did the Russians say, thank you, we will be glad to work with you on the treaty? No, they still wanted language in the treaty that put them in a position to walk away from this treaty any time they wanted to if we deployed a missile defense system in Europe. They got it in there, in the preamble. It leaves not just an ambiguity, as I said earlier, it is a misunderstanding, or a disagreement of a central issue. Repeated Russian statements indicate they believe that if we move forward quantitatively or qualitatively with a missile defense system, then they would have a right to get out of the treaty. I can hear what would happen in the Senate if we start deploying a missile defense system in Europe. A lot of our colleagues would say: If we do that, the Russians will get out of the treaty. We can't do that. It will make it difficult. In addition, the system we were going to deploy was a GBI two-stage missile in central Europe, Poland. The President stopped this. It was ready and able to be deployed by 2016. It is the same system we have in the United States, except it is two-stage instead of three. The National Intelligence Estimate shows that Iran can reach the United States with a ICBM, and now they are developing nuclear weapons, and they can do it by 2015. We were trying to get this system in by 2016. When they canceled this, it caused an uproar. The White House said: Don't worry, we have a new plan--one I had never heard about. We are going to do an SM-3 Block 2B. We are working on it. Well, have you started? No. Is it under development? We just conjured this up. It is a bigger, rounder missile than the existing SM-3, and it is quite different.

Mr. SESSIONS. I thank the Chair. It is a different thing. It would be ready only by 2020. So I contend that this administration, as part of the negotiations over this treaty, in their too-anxious-desire to get this treaty, to reset the relationship with the Russians, which we of course want to do, made a very serious error in capitulating on the third site--sending shock waves among our sovereign nation allies in Central Europe, which used to be a part of the Soviet empire. They have made concessions that are significant. As a matter of fact, they pretend it had nothing to do with the treaty, but I would say there is no doubt that the abandonment of the Polish site was a way to gain support of the Russians as part of the negotiations in this treaty. And we now have this ephemeral, chimeric vision of a 2020 entirely new missile system for Poland that may or may not ever reach fruition. Those are my concerns. The McCain amendment would say let's get this straight with the Russians and make Congress know that if it requires a new negotiation with the Russians, so be it. Maybe we can reach an understanding. You could never enter into a treaty or any contract in which the parties have a serious misunderstanding or actual disagreement on a critical part. I thank the Chair and reserve the remainder of the time on this side.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will object, I wish to share a few thoughts with my colleagues. I think if they knew the basis for the objection I have, they would be supportive of it, and I do object.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, let me say, with regard to this legislation, I have supported free trade probably more than my colleagues. I believe in the Andean Trade Agreement that is a part of this. I support the trade assistance that is in the bill and would be glad to remove my objections to them if they wish to move forward with that. But I have worked for 2 years to try to obtain a simple justice to close a loophole in the tariff laws that has impacted and will close a sleeping bag textile manufacturer in my State. It is in Haleyville, in Winston County, AL. It is in northwest Alabama. It is a poor county. They have a great history. They call it ``the free State of Winston.'' They claim they seceded from the State of Alabama during the Civil War, and most of their public officials from then until today remain Republicans. But they are an independent, hard-working people. This bill, as written, will close that plant, and it should not happen. I want to share with you the Chamber of Commerce, NAM and the AFL-CIO have been made aware of this, as we have discussed it over the past years, and they believe this company should receive some relief. But the people who put the bill together did not. And I am very much of the belief--I know my colleagues are--that when you have good people in your State who are being put out of business by a company that was moved to Bangladesh to try to capture this loophole--it is not a little matter. These are human beings. As I said, I do believe in trade. I think it is best for the world. But I would say to my colleagues, we have to have fair trade. We have to have just trade. And nations around the world, I think, have taken advantage of the overconfidence of the United States in our economy that they can cheat on agreements and manipulate agreements and close down businesses in the United States, and that somehow we are going to pass on by, and that eventually we will get to the point where we just have banking and hospitals in this country. But manufacturing is an important part of our economy. This company has been able to withstand competition from China and has been successful. But they cleverly figured out how to move it to Bangladesh, using 85 percent Chinese products, and shipping it to the United States and getting around the small tariff that makes a difference between success and failure. I plead with my colleagues to consider the justice of this matter. Move your bill. I do not think there is any real substantive objection to it. The U.S. Trade Representative expressed a lot of sympathy for this situation, and I thought somewhere the bureaucrats and the politicians were going to put together a bill that would grant relief so this company would have a chance to continue to be very competitive. They are modern, have high-tech equipment, sewing equipment, good employees. They pay them health care and benefits far more than they are paid anywhere else in the world. And they can still win except for this loophole. I am at a point where I am not going to go for it anymore. I am not going to stand by and allow nations to cheat on their trade agreements and manipulate trade agreements that, in effect, destroy our industries. I am aware that the Smoot-Hawley trade agreement was part of the Depression. I know all that argument, and I am not against free trade. But I am telling you, we need to stand and defend our industries. I know both of my colleagues share that. I want to say, I feel strongly about it. I believe this is just. And I think this bureaucracy, this Senate, this Congress, ought to listen to what we are saying and give us some relief. Otherwise, I would be willing to move the parts of the legislation that are not directly relevant to this. I thank the Presiding Officer.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I will be glad to discuss it with my colleague, but I would note that the exemption I am concerned about goes to Third World countries. They are given, under the generalized system of preferences, or GSP, the right to import pretty much duty- free, but it comes with a crucial condition. That condition is that you do not get to import into the United States under this zero tariff if you are competing with American companies and American jobs--unemployed Americans. If we don't have that manufacturing in the United States, they get this exemption. This is a loophole they achieved under the tariff rules by calling a sleeping bag not a textile, and it is a textile and it should be covered by this. That is all I am saying. I would ask my colleagues, isn't it true that if the leadership of both parties agree to this amendment, there is plenty of time for it to be accepted, go back to the House, and be passed before we recess? That is what I would ask to be done.

Mr. SESSIONS. I thank Senator Brown and Senator Casey. I do believe that is possible, and I think maybe there is a growing belief that somewhere in this debate about trade, we can reach a common accord across the aisle that, yes, we want to have trade, we want to expand trade that can benefit America, but at the same time we have to not unnecessarily destroy American jobs, and this little part of it is damaging. I tried last year. We spent a year talking about this. It is not something that just got sprung on the floor here at this moment. I think there is a way out of it. I thank the Senators for being openminded today.

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Reserving the right to object, I would not be able to finish my full remarks on this tonight. I mean, I could later tonight, at the end of that, in my 30 minutes, or tomorrow.

Mr. SESSIONS. The amendment, and I would ask to be added on at the end or in the morning.

Mr. SESSIONS. Thirty minutes.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I just want to say a couple of things. First, the treaty is important, but its----

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, a treaty of this nature is very important. I have served as chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which deals with missile defense and nuclear issues. I think we dealt with it in more detail involving the budgets and those kinds of things than the Foreign Relations Committee that is handling this bill. I would say it is very important to know how we got to where we are. I think it is very important that we understand the significance of what is happening and the meaning of it. It is going to take some time to do that. A lot of things that have been said this afternoon I don't think fully capture what has happened, and I believe it ought to be corrected. I would say with regard to missile defense that I have been involved in that for 14 years since I have been in the Senate on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of Armed Services. I think I know something about it. And I have to disagree with my distinguished colleague, one of the most distinguished Members of this Senate, that the Russians did not win on missile defense. They have already won and have attempted to codify it in this treaty. It is a very serious matter. I feel that we are going to have to take some time to go through it and understand how we got where we are. I know it is late on this night, but it is not because I want to be here; it is because this Senate, under the majority, has not been able to move appropriations bills or pass other legislation, and it has all now been jammed up after this election into this lameduck Congress. Now we are not going to be rushed. We should not be rushed. I would add one more thing. I cannot understand and I am deeply disappointed that the Russians have been so intransigent, hardheaded about this treaty and other relations with the United States. We had every reason to believe and expect and hope we would be moving forward with Russia today in a far more close and harmonious relationship. I cannot understand why, for example, the Russians are negotiating a treaty that gives less inspection capability to the United States than they had before. If they have nothing to hide, what is going on here? I am concerned about this. Finally, as to whether the treaty is essential, I would note that we don't have a nuclear treaty with the UK--England. We don't have one with France. We don't have one with China. We don't have one with India. We don't have one with Pakistan. We don't have to have this treaty. If it is not a good treaty, we ought not to sign it. Mr. Feith negotiated the START treaty with the Russians. He told them no on issue after issue, these very same issues, as he recently wrote in the Wall Street Journal in an op-ed, and eventually they accepted the American position. The very issues they raised that Mr. Feith and President Bush rejected have been accepted as a part of this treaty. Let's talk about a few things that happened. In July of 2006, North Korea tested a ballistic missile, leading many, including myself, to the conclusion that the long-range missile threat against the United States from a rogue threat was imminent. This was constantly talked about on the floor of the Senate, in committee, and, in particular, our subcommittee. A lot of people do not know. We try to be responsive to threats. What is the threat? The North Korean threat not only increased in the intervening years, but it is also compounded by the reality that Iran has also developed a ballistic missile capability, leading to a recent intelligence estimate that stated that ``with sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could probably develop and test an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States by 2015.'' By 2015--that is our intelligence estimate, and we generally rely on what they tell us about what they estimate. So how is this national security imperative--an agreement that we are dealing with today and one that would reduce our nuclear arsenal while our enemies are building theirs up--helpful to us? The truth is, fundamentally, we spent weeks on this. The administration had its top people working on this treaty with Russia that the Russians negotiated so vociferously because they really weren't concerned about it, frankly, whether it was signed or not, and they knew we wanted it worse than they did. But why have we not been discussing what is really serious; that is, Iran and North Korea and their development of nuclear weapons, how they threaten their neighbors, how North Korea has attacked South Korea, our ally, with which we are bound in a mutual defense treaty, attacked them and killed civilians and military personnel just a few weeks ago. These are the critical issues this Nation ought to be dealing with, and we ought not to at this time be weakening our national missile defense system. In London, in 2006, I made a talk in which I said I believe we reached a bipartisan consensus on going forward with a missile defense system for the United States and that we were going to plant a missile defense system in Poland, with radar in the Czech Republic, and that the budget had just been approved under the Democratic majority, and I thought that represented a bipartisan agreement to move forward with ground-based interceptors in Europe. And it could have been done. It was expected originally to be capable of being deployed by 2013. Because Congress delayed and funding was not always there, it was set to be deployed by 2016. Remember, the Iranians are capable of hitting the United States, according to the intelligence estimate, by 2015, and we were trying to be sure we met that. We were going to use basically the same system that is utilized in Alaska, utilized in California, that we have in the ground right now to be deployed in Europe. Many leftists in the United States and some in Europe opposed that, and it was somewhat controversial. I never understood why. The Russians did not like it. They did not like it, but the Czechs and the Poles stood up, they faced down the people who objected, and they were supportive of it. We were planning to go forward when President Bush left office. That is the basic status. It was in the summer of 2008 that the Bush administration actually signed agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to install the 10 ground-based interceptors and a fixed radar base in the Czech Republic. At the same time, Candidate Obama said he would support deployment of ballistic missiles that were ``operationally effective.'' The day after the U.S. Presidential election, November 5, 2008, President Medvedev in Russia stated that Russia would deploy short- range missiles to the region of Kaliningrad, Leningrad, which borders Poland, if the United States proceeded with their site. It was a threat to the new administration. In typical Russian fashion--issue a threat and test the new President. Then on January 15, 2009, at the nomination hearing for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy, she was asked this by Chairman Levin: On the European missile defense issue, do you believe that it would be important to review the proposed European missile defense deployment in the broader security context of Europe, including our relations with Russia, the Middle East, and to consider those deployments or that deployment as part of a larger consideration of ways in which to enhance ours and Europeans' security? Ms. Flournoy replied: Yes, I do, sir. I think it is an important, candid issue for the upcoming quadrennial defense review. That is our internal defense review. What was that question? That question suggested we might not should go forward without Russia and we should consider how it could affect the relationship. Within 2 weeks of that hearing, in late January of 2009, but not long after the President had taken office, the Russian media reported that Moscow had cancelled the deployment of these missiles in the Kaliningrad area because the Obama administration was not ``pushing ahead'' with the third site. Now, that is pretty stunning. The third site has been a part of our strategic policy for years. The President and Secretary of State under President Bush said they had worked hard to negotiate with the Poles and the Czechs, had gotten their agreement. They had publicly stood up, their leaders had, to defend this third site. Here, the President is waffling right off the bat in the face of Russian pressure. On February 7, at the annual Wehrkunde Conference, Vice President Biden stated: We will continue to develop missile defenses to counter growing Iranian capabilities. We will do so in consultation with our NATO allies and Russia. Well, Russia did not want this. They had never wanted this. But President Bush did not let it stop him. President Obama's statement was followed by an announcement from Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Lynn, and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, James Cartwright, in 2009, in the summer, that the administration was reviewing its defense options in Europe. Finally, on September 17, 2009, President Obama delivered a bombshell announcement, stunning and surprising and embarrassing our Czech and Polish allies, and announced his decision to cancel the European third site, saying: This new approach ``will provide capabilities sooner, build on proven systems and offer greater defenses against the threat of missile attack than the 2007 European missile defense program.'' So I have been involved. Let me parenthetically say this new system he talks about would be better was not even on the drawing board. There was no development planned for this new system, the SM-3 Block 2B. It was not on the drawing board. They conjured it up out of thin air and said: We will have it developed by 2020, when we had a two-stage, ground-based interceptor capable of being deployed by 2016. The Iranian threat, remember, is to be ripe by 2015. I would just say to generals and others who think this is such an easy deal, how many appropriations processes do we have to go through without failing on a single one to develop an entirely new SM Block 2B by 2020 that is not even on the drawing board today? What kind of difficulties may occur? We had the bird in hand. We let it go for a bird in the bush. This was a huge concession. Let's go a little bit further. How did it happen? The President, and his negotiators for this treaty, have insisted there is no connection between their negotiations and missile defense: We have not conceded a thing on missile defense. It is a win for us on missile defense. Senator Kerry said it would not lessen our ability to do a missile defense program. So I would just go a little further. The New START negotiations with the Russians concluded in March of 2010. But they began in March of 2009, before the President canceled the Polish site. So what happened was, as part of the negotiations over this treaty, the Russians made absolutely clear they were not happy and did not want, and would not accept, a missile defense system in Europe, the same thing they told President Bush. But President Bush did not acquiesce. They said: We do not have to have a treaty. We are going to reduce our weapons systems anyway. We will reduce our weapons system. We will not have a treaty. We do not think you are going to attack us, and we are not interested in attacking you. We do not have to have a treaty. But if we have a treaty, we are not conceding our missile defense system one with, and we believe Poland and the Czech Republic are sovereign nations. If they want to enter into an agreement with the United States to put a missile defense system there, you, Russia, sorry, do not have a veto over it. They no longer are under the Communist boot. They are a free nation. That is the way all of that went down. I think that is a fair summary of what happened. The Bush GMD, the ground-based midcourse defense plan, was based on proven technology and was deployable and a new phase-adaptive approach is way out in the future. It is so far out in the future, this President will not be in office, if he is reelected, to see that it happens. It is a promise in the vapors. Now, what am I saying? Why am I concerned about this? I just want to repeat that the essence of what happened was, the administration, in negotiating with the Russians, faced a hard-headed approach, typical Russian negotiating strategy, and they blinked. They have always been defensive about it, however. They always did not want it to be believed that this treaty, in any way, compromised our missile defense systems. And their Members have been on the floor defending that. I am not sure they know all of what I am saying to you. But it is plain to me. I was involved in it. This little quote recently in the Washington Post from Greg Thielmann, a former professional staffer on the Select Committee on Intelligence, stated, concerning the missile defense provisions in the New START treaty: One of the greatest ironies is that he-- President Obama-- made sure there was no way to attack the treaty as being tough on missile defense. You see, the President had a spin. That spin was, nothing in this treaty weakens missile defense. But the truth is it had already been weakened. They already canceled a decade-old policy of the United States to place a missile defense system in Europe and backed off of it and gave us, instead, a bird in the bush way out in the future, a new system not even under development. Why? Well, it was to walk a fine line, I would suggest, to give into the Russians, on the one hand, and to be able to come back to Congress on the other and say they have not given in. The Russians issued a unilateral statement after the START treaty had been announced that the treaty would be viable only if ``there was no qualitative or quantitative build up'' in U.S. missile defense capabilities. Well, a lot of you say that does not mean anything. They can say what they want. But as we discussed earlier, at best, there is a very serious misunderstanding between the parties in this treaty. When you have a serious misunderstanding that goes to the heart of what a treaty is about, you do not need to go forward, just like you would not do so with a contract that was being signed. The parties clearly have a misunderstanding of quite a significant nature--about the nature of the contract. What about foreign policy experts? What have they said? Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Doug Feith, wrote this in the Wall Street Journal very recently: The incoming Obama administration was eager to repudiate its predecessor's policy. Russian officials saw their opportunity. They asked again for the concessions that they had before unsuccessfully demanded of Mr. Bush. Mr. Obama agreed to treaty language linking offensive reductions with missile defense, limiting launch vehicles and restricting conversions of ICBMs for missile defense purposes. Mr. Obama's poor negotiating is a cautionary tale: If you want it bad, you get it bad. Well, I remember early on in this process, in private briefings--and I can say what I said to officials there; it is not in any way classified. I said: I am concerned you want this treaty too badly and the Russians will take advantage of that. I think that is what happened. They wanted this treaty so badly as a symbol, as an effort to express leadership, and to advance an agenda of the hard left in America that does not always like nuclear weapons and things. They have never liked missile defense. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who had done her advanced work on Russia, said this recently--she has indicated she would like to see the treaty confirmed. Very significantly, Secretary Rice said: Still there are legitimate concerns about New START that must and can be addressed in the ratification process. Must be addressed in the ratification process. She goes on: The Senate must make absolutely clear that in ratifying this treaty, the United States is not reestablishing the Cold War link between offensive forces and missile defense. The New START treaty preamble is worrying in this regard as it recognizes the interrelationship of the two. They say, well, it does not mean much. But it was signed by both Russia and the United States. It means something. The New York Times, on November 29, reported this, again, to show how we got into this mess concerning diplomatic cables: Throughout 2009, the cables show the Russians vehemently objected to American plans for a ballistic missile defense site in Poland and the Czech Republic. In talks with the United States, the Russians insisted that there would be no cooperation on other issues until the European site was scrapped. . . . Six weeks later, Mr. Obama gave the Russians what they wanted: he abruptly replaced the European site with a ship-borne system. That is my observation. I was in the middle of all of these negotiations. We had hearings on these matters. That is what happened. So I can only conclude that the administration negotiated away a necessary missile defense system in Europe, the ability to deploy a proven system at the expense of our national security, at the expense of our NATO allies' security, because they were too anxious and too committed to this treaty, for what purpose I am not sure. All this time we have been working on this and the biggest concern to America is other nuclear threats, proliferation and the like. Mr. Hoagland said in the Washington Post a few days ago that this treaty didn't go far enough. We ought to go to 500 weapons or lower. If you continue to draw down the weapons system, we cease as a Nation to be seen as a credible nuclear power. We encourage others, in my opinion, to develop their own systems, even to the belief that they could be a peer competitor with the United States. This is not a step toward progress and security. The steps we should take are steps that send clear, unmistakable messages that we believe in our freedom, our integrity, and we are prepared to defend it. We are going to maintain a strong nuclear arsenal necessary for that goal. Once that occurs and we are unequivocal in it and we are prepared to build missile defense systems to defend ourselves from Iran or North Korea or some rogue nation, to defend ourselves against even, I would say, an accidental launch from one of these nations or even Russia, those things are good for peace and good for security. We cannot give them away after 30-plus years of development of a missile defense system that people said would never work. We have proven that we do have a system that can work. It can help protect America. It can give our President strength in negotiating with a nation that happens to have missiles that can reach the United States because he can look them in the eye and say: Send off a missile. We will knock it down. You are not pushing us around. That kind of thing is important. I believe this administration, through the negotiation of this treaty, through their unilateral actions during the time of negotiating the treaty to capitulate on the European site and alter it dramatically, has done something unfortunate. So while the Europeans say this SM-3 is OK and they can live with it, I suppose they can, but we lost something significant. We lost at least 5 years in being able to deploy a system that we need right now. I know others want to speak. I respect differences of opinion. But the scenario I have given I believe is correct. I am telling the truth. I believe a lot of Senators have not been aware of it. If I am wrong, let's talk about it. But let's don't run this treaty through so fast that we don't have an opportunity to fully understand what this administration has committed our Nation to in such a way that it could weaken our security and create more instability in the world instead of greater stability. Just signing an agreement on a piece of paper does not create security. A consistent, principled, just approach to our legitimate national defense, advocated clearly and forthrightly without misunderstanding, is the best way to have security in this dangerous world. I yield the floor.

Mr. SESSIONS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. SESSIONS. Will the Senator yield for a question--Senator Kyl. You have been a practicing lawyer and a successful one. You negotiated a lot of agreements here in the Senate. To follow up on what Senator Graham said, it seems to me that at the very heart of this treaty is a very apparent misunderstanding about the meaning and ability of the United States to deploy a missile defense system. When two serious parties enter into negotiations on a matter as serious as nuclear weapons, isn't it a basic part of a good agreement that there are no misunderstandings on important issues? It seems to me quite clear from repeated Russian statements that they are taking a position very fundamentally contrary to the one the United States should be taking.

Mr. SESSIONS. I have been here for a couple hours.

Mr. SESSIONS. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. SESSIONS. I say to Senator Kyl, you, as a lawyer, have negotiated agreements. It seems to me, what I hear you saying is, the United States enters into a binding treaty, equivalent to a party entering into a binding contract, but the other party has laid a groundwork that allows them to exit the treaty and the contract whenever they want to, in essence. Is that correct?

Mr. SESSIONS. Further, it is not a question of whether the U.S. diplomats and negotiators are telling the truth and the Russians are not telling the truth. It is a question of, is there a meeting of the minds? It is a question of what is in the Russian mind as to whether they could have a right to leave the treaty if we proceed with the missile defense?

Mr. SESSIONS. I thank the Chair.

Mr. SESSIONS. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, as we begin consideration of the New START treaty, we must understand that the proposal is not made in a vacuum. In one sense, it is an important part of our Nation's strategic policy. I have served as chairman, ranking member, and a member of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, for 12 years in the Senate. Thus, on these matters of nuclear policy and missile defense that have been before us so many times, I have had a front-row seat on it. Our President, whose work and proposals absolutely deserve fair and just consideration in the Senate, after appropriate debate, has stated that this treaty is a critical part of his approach to strategic issues, repeatedly insisting that it is needed so the United States can set an example and show leadership in moving toward what he has often stated to be his goal--a nuclear-free world. This treaty now comes at a time when our Nation is the world's only nuclear power. We are the only nuclear power to have no nuclear production facility ongoing at this time. It will have to be reconstituted. That has been a sore spot in this Congress for quite a number of years, but it has not happened. For over a decade, the Senate's efforts to modernize our aging weapons stockpiles--which our scientists have told us are getting to a point where they have to be fixed--have been blocked by House Democrats, mostly, and some Republicans there. We have gotten bills out of the Senate to do this, but they have failed in the House. It has been an article of faith on the left in America and abroad on the international left that our goal must be to eliminate all nuclear weapons from the world. President Obama and his administration have often used that rhetoric. But our modernization capability hasn't been started, and that is a troubling situation. As Secretary Gates has said about modernization, we cannot continue at this rate. In 2008, I sponsored legislation to create a bipartisan commission of experienced statesmen to do a study of our nuclear posture. The legislation passed and the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States did its work. It was headed by Dr. William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger, a former Defense Secretary of this country--a Democrat and Republican. They reached a consensus on a number of key issues. They concluded that we could reduce our nuclear stockpile more than the current number, but that ``modernization is essential to the nonproliferation benefits derived from the extended deterrent.'' So they said it was essential to have a modernization program. I know a lot of the discussion has been ongoing about that. I do believe Senator Kyl has done an excellent job in raising this issue, and the administration responded positively in some regards. The Commission also, nicely, in diplomatic language, deflected the administration's goal of zero nuclear weapons by saying: It's clear that the goal of zero nuclear weapons is extremely difficult to attain and would require a fundamental transformation of the world political order. I think that is about as close as you come from a bipartisan commission expressing serious concerns about this policy. Meanwhile, China, Russia, Pakistan, and India continue to expand their stockpile, while rogue, outlaw nations, such as North Korea and Iran, posing great risk to world peace, advance their nuclear weapons programs. We will need to talk about this more as this debate goes forward. It is quite clear that the greatest threat to world peace and nuclear danger arises from the rogue nations and other nations that have less secure situations than the Russians do. While it could be very beneficial to have a good treaty with the Russians, this is not the core of the danger this Nation faces today. We have had very little work, very little success, in getting the kind of robust support from Russia and China that we should have regarding North Korea and Iran. It is inexplicable to me why they would jeopardize their reputation as a positive force in the world to curry favor with rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea. But this administration has been unsuccessful in gaining the kind of support to ratchet up the sanctions to get those countries that could perhaps make a difference. The Russians are steadfast in their nuclear program. They have absolutely no intention of going to zero nuclear weapons. I had an opportunity to talk to some of their people, and it is pretty clear to me they thought it was outside the realm of good judgment to discuss going to zero nuclear weapons. They were never going to zero nuclear weapons. They have a 10-to-1 advantage over the United States in tactical nuclear weapons--more maneuverable--and this treaty does absolutely nothing to deal with that situation. The Russians may make some changes in the future, perhaps, but I don't think they are going to do much on tactical nuclear weapons. It is a critical part of their defense strategy. We understand Russia is willing and has plans at this time to reduce their strategic nuclear stockpile, which is what this treaty deals with, not the tactical weapons, and that is because it represents a necessary economic move for them. Frankly, I don't think they see the United States or Europe as the kind of strategic threat they used to be, and they are willing to pull down those numbers. It is a good thing, and we should celebrate what gains we can obtain. Some close observers believe this treaty curtails the U.S. programs, such as missile defense, while not curtailing certain Russian modernization programs of the systems they want to advance. In short, the Russians seem to have negotiated more effectively than the United States in this treaty. That is my observation. We wanted it too desperately. I warned our negotiators that they were too committed, too desperate to get this treaty. It would make more difficult the negotiation also with the Russians. I think that has proven to be true. Let me be plain about my overall concern. First, the idea that it should be the goal of this country to move toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons is not just a fantasy, a wild chimera or some harmless vision; I think it is dangerous. It can only raise questions about the quality of the judgment that underlies our strategic policy. The question arises, is the fierce determination of this administration to get a treaty a part of their stated goal of moving to zero nuclear weapons and setting ``an example'' for the world? Is the United States of America, under whose nuclear umbrella resides a host of free and prosperous nations, no longer reliable as a nuclear power? We know many other nations that are part of our nuclear umbrella are worried about our nuclear policy. I can understand that. How far, how low does this world leadership role take us? How few weapons should we go to? Down further from 1,500, as this treaty would have it--and that might be a sustainable number--to 1,000 or 500? Well, not 500, somebody would say. But I note that Mr. Jim Hoagland, writing in the Washington Post on December 10, declared that the treaty fails, in his view, because the numbers are not low enough. He says that ``500 or fewer'' would be sufficient. Well, will this example of reducing our weapons cause other nations to follow our good example? I think not. If Iran and North Korea risk their security and their financial soundness on building a nuclear arsenal today, will our example cause them to stop? I think not. Rather, I must conclude it will embolden them. As our weapon numbers fall lower and lower, these rogue nations can begin to see clearly their way to being a peer nuclear competitor of what is now the world's greatest military power. Why would we want to encourage them in that fashion? I think it is a risky goal. Thus, to the extent that the treaty is an effort to advance the stated goals of this administration--a nuclear-free world--the treaty will be counterproductive and dangerous, I think. If that is what it is about, it is counterproductive, and it will enhance and encourage other nations to have nuclear weapons, and any country that has advanced under our nuclear umbrella who does not now have nuclear weapons may decide they have to have their own, further proliferating nuclear weapons. At the Halifax International Security Forum a few weeks ago, supported by the German Marshall Fund, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy repeated the administration's goal of zero nuclear weapons, and further stated, ``It is a vision. It's an aspiration.'' She acknowledged, ``It may not happen in our lifetimes.'' I can tell you it is not happening in our lifetimes, with a high degree of certainty. The name of the panel, by the way, had a little bit of an irony to it. It was ``A World Without Nukes, Really?'' Good question. So some of my Democratic colleagues may say these statements about ``no nukes'' or, you know, they are just rhetoric, you have to say those things to keep the President's political left in line. The President is not really serious about it. It is not a real goal of his. Well, I do not know. America leaders usually mean what they say. He has not renounced the policy. Secretary Flournoy was repeating it a few weeks ago at an international conference. I've got to say, a lot of people were not too impressed with that policy, frankly, from our allies around the world. Even if the President is not telling us accurately what his philosophy is, these words do not mean anything. He is throwing out astonishing visions about what he would like to happen, the lamb lying down with the lion. What else is he not serious about as we consider this treaty? If one is not accurate about matters as significant as nuclear weapons, we have a grave problem of leadership in this country. Does it mean the President favors modernization of our stockpile? He says so. But, in essence, he has conditioned that support on passing of the treaty when we need to modernize the stockpile whether or not we have a treaty. Does this give me confidence that the President is clearheaded about our nuclear policy when the Secretary of Defense and former Secretary of Defense and the laboratory directors and the top military people have, without exception, said we need to modernize our nuclear forces, and he is only going to support it if this Congress ratifies the treaty? I do not feel good about that. A lot of people have opposed modernization. They think modernization is a step toward more nuclear weapons, in their mind, and we ought to eliminate nuclear weapons, not have more. That is, frankly, where the President's political ancestry is. That is where he came from politically. So forgive me if I am not real comfortable about this. Does the President mean it when he says he has not compromised and will not compromise our ability to deploy strategic missile defense systems in Europe? There is a rub here. Some in this relativistic, postmodern world may not have the slightest concerns that our Commander in Chief's words are ambiguous on matters such as this. They do not believe much in the authority of words anyway. But call me old fashioned. I think words are important. These words that I am hearing worry me. So these views that are fantastical place a cloud of unreality over this entire process. Secondly, I am not persuaded that this administration has not retreated on nuclear missile defense to a significant degree. I am not persuaded that that has not occurred. For example, the latest WikiLeaks reveal that the administration negotiated away President Bush's plan for a forward missile defense site in Poland in exchange for the Russian cooperation. The New York Times summarized these cables on November 29: Throughout 2009, the cables show, the Russians vehemently objected to American plans for a ballistic missile defense site in Poland and the Czech Republic. . . . In talks with the United States, the Russians insisted that there would be no cooperation on other issues until the European site was scrapped. . . . Six weeks later, Mr. Obama gave the Russians what they wanted: he abruptly replaced the European site with a ship-borne system. So it makes me a bit nervous. We had a plan to place that in Europe, a two-stage system instead of the three stage we have in the United States, to give us redundant coverage from Iranian attack, and the Russians did not like it. They did not want a missile defense system on their border, even though, at best, it would have only minimal support against a massive number of missiles that they have. We were only going to put 10, I think, in Poland. But they objected. They objected. The Bush administration stood firm. They got the last treaty by standing firm. Indeed, former Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith wrote an article in one of the major newspapers, an op-ed, I think the Wall Street Journal, saying that they said no, and eventually the Russians agreed to sign. He raised an important issue. I want to share this with my colleagues whom I know believe so deeply we have to have this treaty or all kinds of bad things will happen. Mr. Feith told the Russians: We do not have to have a treaty with you. We do not have a treaty with other nations that have nuclear weapons. If it is not a good treaty, we are not going to agree to it. Eventually the Russians agreed. He said the very same insistences, the positions they asserted at that time against the Bush administration that they rejected were demands acquiesced in by this administration in this treaty. So forgive me if I am a bit dubious about how wonderful this treaty is. I asked the State Department about those cables, and we have not heard any information on them. So there are many more things we need to talk about with regard to the treaty and the overall strategic situation we find ourselves in. Are we making the world safer? I am worried that we are not. I am worried that this approach may not make us safer. I am well aware that some of our best allies are worried now about the constancy of the United States, the commitment of the United States to a defense, even if, God forbid, nuclear defense of our world allies, that we will not follow through, and so they may have to have their own nuclear weapons. I know there is a good bit more to discuss in this debate. I encourage this body to be deliberative in its consideration of the treaty. I am not happy that it is being shoved at this point in time. I was so hopeful and expectant that we would be able to give a firm date to start the debate early next year, and we could have a robust debate, not only about the treaty but how it fits into our overall nuclear strategic posture, what are we going to do about missile defense, what are we going to do about updating our stockpile, and what about our triad and delivery systems, what are we going to do about those. Now it is being jammed in here. I understand why. They have got more votes they think now, and the likelihood of it passing is greater now. I think it has a realistic chance of passing next year. But, more significantly, I think the administration wishes to avoid a full debate about the strategic nuclear policy of the United States. If that is successful, then I think the American people will be the losers, as will the security of the United States. I yield the floor.

Mr. SESSIONS. Well, it is difficult to amend a treaty, as the Senator knows, once it has been signed. There are things that can be done. I think, first and foremost, we need to ask ourselves, is this a good thing for the country? Will it advance our interests? I believe we need a pretty big discussion about that and where we stand. I know Senator Kerry has been supportive of modernization--I believe you have--at least as this treaty has moved forward, if not in the past. And we need to do that. But I am a bit uneasy that the President is basically saying, if you do not pass my treaty, we are not going to modernize, when I think modernization is critical to the security of our country. I also want to know how it fits into our overall strategic policy. So that is kind of my biggest concern, I say to Senator Kerry. I do not know that the numbers that the treaty takes us to, the reduced numbers themselves are dangerous. Some people say they think it is a bit dangerous, but most experts do not think so. I am not inclined to oppose a treaty on whether it is 1,550 or 1,700 or 1,800. But I think if it is part of a trend to take our numbers down further--perhaps you saw Mr. Hogan's article saying it ought to be 500 or lower. That would make me very concerned and I think would cause serious ramifications internationally. Would you agree? If this treaty would be, say, for 500, it would definitely create some concern and angst around the world?

Mr. SESSIONS. May I ask, I believe earlier today the Senator made the point: Make no mistake, we are not going to amend the treaty itself. We are willing to accept resolutions that don't kill the treaty. I think I understand that. But I do assert that, as we both know, amending a treaty is not something that is easily done. So we have to deal with whether we think the treaty is helpful. We can do some things through the amendment process to make it more palatable and acceptable to people who have concerns. I do not dispute that. But I do believe that, fundamentally, this day ought to be about discussing the overall strategic impact of the treaty. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts.