Christopher Shays

Mr. SHAYS

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to myself to correct the ``hmm'' of my colleague, who basically said something that simply was not accurate. They cannot use soft money to pay off a hard-money debt. That is simply not true. This bill is different. Our bill is different than it was because a funny thing happened. The Senate got to look at our bill and they made some changes. They added the Levin amendment, which allows soft money, no more than $10,000 if a State allows it, not for Federal elections, and it cannot be used for any campaigns. That is what they do. So the Levin amendment makes our bill different. Then we have the Snow-Jeffords amendment in the Senate which says 60 days to an election. So that is why, in fact, the bill is different. The bill is different because the Senate changed it, and we want a bill similar to what the Senate has done.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to myself to just say my colleagues have to read the bill and know the law. The law makes it illegal to use soft money for a hard-money expenditure. The purpose of this is if they incurred a soft-money expenditure before the election day and the person wants to get paid afterwards, they get paid up to the date of January. A soft-money expense for a soft-money expenditure, a hard-money expense for a hard-money expenditure; but one does not always pay the bill before the expense.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. SHAYS. It was not in the Senate bill; that is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, it is my distinct pleasure to yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Capps).

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds to point out to the gentleman that there is nothing in this bill that allows soft money to be replacing hard money; nothing in this bill whatsoever. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Graham).

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Greenwood).

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds. Mr. Chairman, I just would like to point out to the gentleman that soft money had its introduction to enable people to build buildings. We did not create this. It has been in the bill forever. We are just simply saying that if a party is, frankly, stupid enough to spend its soft money to build a building instead of campaigning against us, be our guest. If they have committed to it, they cannot raise any soft money after November 6, but they certainly can pay their bills on money they set aside. I would prefer them building a building rather than running against us, and that is their choice. You cannot use any soft money for any hard-money expenditure, which the gentleman is also incorrect about.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds to point out to the gentleman that our bill does not ban outside ads 60 days to an election. It just says you cannot use corporate treasury money, union dues money or unlimited money. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute to say to the distinguished gentleman, he is just dead wrong. He is dead wrong about what he has said. First, this bill was not brought in at the midnight hour. That is just simply inaccurate. He is simply inaccurate about somehow that this is a sly thing to have the bill take effect in November. No, the reason why it is taking effect in November is that we have had 16 months already pass. Sixteen months have already passed. And so it becomes extraordinarily difficult to implement a bill in which 16 months have passed.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume to respond to my colleague. He says they do not have the money to respond to all the big guys, and that is the whole point of this amendment. We do not allow corporate treasury money and union dues money 60 days before an election; we allow individual contributions and PAC contributions to compete. Nobody is shutting up. It is just a level playing field. They can run their ads. They are not the big guys, but they can do it with a unified effort on the part of a whole number of farmers who are fighting for their cause. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of the time to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Wamp), an extraordinary leader and a very courageous person.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Davis).

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I just want to say honestly to this Chamber that I believe that the comments made by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis) were correct. I am going to be voting against this amendment, but I do believe his point that my colleagues can raise them from the FHA and others is an accurate point and makes it easier to raise that soft money for those purposes.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Let me first say, Mr. Chairman, you have been an extraordinary person at the helm, and I thank you for the graciousness you have shown to both sides. I would also like to extend my gratitude to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood) for the way he did it previous to you. It has been a long, long, long, long day. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Houghton).

Mr. SHAYS

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remaining time. This is going to be a long day. I think it will be a good day. I think we will have disagreements, but I think we can do it with graciousness. We are going to have three substitutes that come before us, the gentleman from Texas's (Mr. Armey) substitute, the gentleman from Ohio's (Mr. Ney) substitute, and the Shays-Meehan substitute. We are asking for a ``no'' vote on the first two substitutes and passage of the Shays-Meehan substitute; and then we will have 13 amendments brought before the House if, in fact, the Shays-Meehan substitute is the one that stands. We are trying to enforce the 1907 law banning corporate treasury money, the 1947 money banning union dues money, and enforce the 1974 law banning unlimited sums of money. That is what our attempt is.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today as a principal sponsor of the campaign finance legislation before the House. I want to explain what this legislation seeks to accomplish and why banning soft money is critical for our democracy. Last year, the Senate courageously passed the McCain-Feingold bill. It is now time for this House to take a similar stand and finally put an end to the deluge of soft money contributions that weakens our democracy. Our system is awash in soft money, and everyone is degraded as a result. Not surprisingly, in poll after poll, voters express their cynicism about politics and their dismay with the current campaign finance system. Disgusted with the overriding influence of money in Washington, citizens, in ever-increasing numbers, are not exercising their precious right to vote in federal elections. Our flawed campaign finance system is also taking its toll on qualified and principled candidates for political office. Since soft money contributions are essentially limitless, we and other elected officials are under unrelenting pressure to raise more and more money, thus increasing the potential for actual and apparent corruption. In increasing numbers, good people decide not to run, or drop out of public life, because they cannot stomach the hunt for huge donations and all that comes with it. Those elected officials who stay spend far too much time fundraising and not enough time listening to their constituents and doing their jobs. The reform legislation we introduce today strengthens First Amendment values. It will ensure that elected officials are more responsive to the voices of their constituents and do not appear beholden only to big money. As your own constituents would surely tell you, stemming the tide of soft money would improve their access to government--and enhance their First Amendment rights--by allowing them to participate in the process. And it will keep good people interested in serving in Government. Neither the First Amendment nor or Nation is served by large soft money donations that drive citizens away from voting in elections and candidates away from running in them. So, this is not only a campaign finance reform bill, it is a democracy revitalization bill. Let's look at the growth of soft money in our campaigns. According to Common Cause, in 1988, the two parties raised a total of $45 million in soft money. In 1992, the figure rose dramatically to $84.4 million. In 1996, soft money contributions ballooned to $235.9 million--almost a quarter of a billion dollars. In this past presidential election, the total amount of soft money raised by both parties climbed still further to a staggering $463.1 million--nearly double the soft money contributions of the previous presidential election and ten times the amount raised only a decade ago. These vast amounts could not have been raised directly for a candidate's campaign under current law, which subjects individual contributions to an aggregate $25,000 annual limit and a $1,000 per candidate per election limit. Despite these clear caps on legal contributions, individuals are contributing up to $100,000 and $250,000. Moreover, unions and corporations--entities that are barred from giving directly to candidates from their general treasuries--are responsible for many of these contributions. Opponents of reform argue that this flood of soft money does not corrupt our politicians and does not even appear to corrupt the political process. They argue that soft money contributions are technically made to political parties, and not to candidates, and thus any exchange of favors for contributions is unlikely. Soft money may not be used to advocate expressly for a candidate, they argue, so there is less chance that soft money donors will actually influence candidates, or at least appear to influence them. That argument elevates form over the substance most Americans ruefully see. First, even though the money often goes to parties, it's the candidates themselves and their surrogates who solicit soft money. The candidates know who makes these huge contributions and what these contributors expect. Candidates not only solicit these funds themselves, they meet with big donors who have important issues pending before the government; and sometimes, the candidates' or the party's position appear to change after such meetings. Additionally, the soft money candidates raise for their political parties is often directed back into their campaigns. This creates the appearance of corruption that pervades politics today--on both sides of the aisle. Let me discuss some powerful reminders of this distressing fact about our democracy. Let's take the already infamous Enron story as an example: in the 1999/2000 election cycle Enron contributed over $2 million in soft money to the national parties--$1.4 million to the Republicans, and $600,000 to the Democrats. These large soft money gifts have cost a pall of doubt over the many elected federal officials who raised or received Enron's money. The Enron example proves that the appearance of impropriety has the same corrosive effect as actual impropriety. Federal officeholders, knowing that their reputations are being tainted and their good character being questioned by receipt of Enron contributions are rushing headlong to return contributions they were only too willing to accept before the scandal broke. The actions and motives of government officials who did deal with, or could have dealt with Enron, are being called into question. For example, The New Yorker asks whether Administration officials, who might have taken actions that would have cushioned the impact of Enron's fall on employees and the economy, declined to act precisely because they were afraid the public would conclude their actions were motivated by the large soft money contributions Enron gave to the Republican Party. The Washington Post asks whether the policy views of a Senator as esteemed for probity as Senator Lieberman are subject to question because of his receipt of contributions. Even in the investigations into Enron do not yield convincing proof of a particular quid pro quo, the Enron contributions have brought leaders of both parties into disrepute in the eyes of the public. Let's also recall the Hudson Casino story. A few years ago, three bands of Wisconsin Indian tribes wanted to open a casino in Hudson, WI, near the Minnesota border. A neighboring set of Minnesota tribes opposed the plan, because the Wisconsin casino would compete with their profitable casino. These Minnesota tribes gave large sums of soft money to the Democratic National Committee. This gave them instant access to the Chairman of the DNC, who promised to get the Administration to help. He immediately called a high-ranking White House official, who in turn contacted the Department of the Interior--immediately after the Minnesota tribes had made substantial contributions to the DNC. This chain of events, and Interior's rejection of the Wisconsin application, created the strong appearance of impropriety even though Interior career staff had decided the case on the merits. This led to an independent counsel investigation and two debilitating congressional investigations into whether the government was for sale. The tobacco industry provides another example. As the Thompson Committee Minority Report makes clear, in the 1996 election cycle, the tobacco industry gave roughly $10.1 million in political contributions, of which $6.8 million was soft money. In previous election cycles, the industry divided its campaign contributions equally between the parties, but in 1996 over 80 percent went to the Republicans. The GOP collected $5.8 million in soft money from tobacco interests and tobacco PACs. A study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association noted that ``House members receiving the most tobacco money were 14.4 times as likely to vote with the industry as members receiving the least; in the Senate the number was 42.2. In the 104th Congress, the Republican majority defeated legislation that would have raised taxes on tobacco and preserved millions of dollars in subsidies for the industry. Again the appearance of improper influence is overwhelming. Finally, we have Roger Tamraz. He served as a Republican Eagle in the 1980s during Republican Administrations and a Democratic Trustee in the 1990s during a Democratic Administration. In 1996, Tamraz has already contributed $200,000 to the Democratic National Committee, and made it clear he was considering donating an additional $400,000. These promises enabled him to hold six private meetings with the President to discuss Mr. Tamraz's proposed oil pipeline project in the Caucasus. Although the National Security Council, which strong opposed this plan, ultimately prevailed, a series of calls were made to employees of the Department of Energy and the National Security Council making it very clear that a change in policy would mean ``a lot of money for the DNC.'' Tamraz unabashedly explained why he gave--to gain access to officials in power. At the Thompson Committee hearings Tamraz spoke plainly--``I think next time I'll give $600,000. . . . [Y]ou set the rules, and we are following the rules. . . . This is politics as usual. What is new?'' Sadly, there are other blockbuster stories like these. But, as Representative Eric Fingerhut wisely reminded us a few years ago, people often focus just on ``the grand-slam example of the influence of these interests. But you can [also] find a million singles . . . regulator change, banking committee legislation . . . a change in when you get audited. . . . Think of the committee and you can think of the interest group or the company that will have an interest. . . .'' Let's all be honest with ourselves: we have all been in situations where we would rather fit in an appointment with a contributor than risk losing his or her donation. When, as a result of a Member's efforts, someone makes a significant donation to the party, and then the donor calls the Member a month later and wants to meet, it's very difficult to say no, and few of us do say no. A majority of the Supreme Court correctly observed in its Colorado Republican II decision, which upheld limits on the coordinated expenditures of political parties, that the parties ``act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders.'' The Supreme Court quoted former Senator Paul Simon, who explained: ``I believe people contribute to party committees on both sides of the aisle for the same reason that Federal Express [and other industries do], because they want favors.'' The former Senator also recounted a debate over a bill favored by Federal Express during which a colleague exclaimed ``we've got to pay attention to who is buttering our bread.'' The Supreme Court concluded in Colorado Republican II that it would be myopic to refuse ``to see how the power of money actually works in the political structure.'' Mr. Chairman, the massive soft money loophole that has eviscerated the campaign finance laws is having an insidious effect on the health of our democracy. Our democracy is dependent for its vitality on citizen participation and engagement--citizens who care, citizens who vote, citizens who run for and serve in office. But look what is happening. The current system has turned voters off--they are increasingly cynical about politics and politicians, and fewer are exercising their right to vote. In poll after poll, voters express their cynicism about politics and the campaign finance system. A recent Time magazine poll found that in 1961, 76 percent of Americans said they trusted the government; in 2001, only 19 percent expressed the same trust. A 1997 New York Times poll found that 89 percent of Americans believe the country's campaign finance system is in need of fundamental changes, 75 percent polled believe that their public officials make or change policy decisions as a result of money received from major contributors. A Fox News poll from May 2001 found that over 80 percent of the public believes that big companies and PACs have too much control in Washington. As former Senator George Mitchell has said: ``The public has come to believe that members of Congress are not responsive to their constituents, but rather are responsive to those who contribute the funds that help members of Congress get elected. It is a corrupting view, in that it corrupts the trust and confidence that people must have in a democratic society. . . .'' Former Senator Wyche Fowler echoed these views: ``The public has now lost confidence in [Congress]. Because the public now thinks that it is money--and only money--that makes the decisions.'' This general distrust has discouraged our future leaders--the young generation--from going to the polls. In 1972, the first time 18-year- olds could vote, 50 percent of 18-24 year-olds cast a vote. By 1996, that number had fallen to 32 percent. There is much evidence--and our own experience with our constituents confirms--that one of the major reasons citizens increasingly fail to vote is their perception that their vote makes no difference because of the role of money in politics and the influence of special interest groups. In one survey asking young people why they do not vote, a plurality said ``they don't think their vote makes a difference''; 64 percent agreed that ``government is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, not for the benefit of all.'' In another recent poll, 57 percent expressed dissatisfaction with the political system. Many emphasized that politicians can't be trusted, that money plays too large a role in politics, and that special interest groups disproportionately influence policy. It is vital to the continued health of our democracy that the citizenry remain alert and involved and participate by, among other things, voting in federal elections. The need to reverse the lack of confidence voters feel in their elected officials and their resulting lack of engagement in the political process is a compelling justification for banning soft money contributions. The Supreme Court would seem to agree. In its recent Shrink Missouri decision it said: ``[l]eave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.'' Our Supreme Court has consistently held that view for over 25 years. In Buckley, the Court observed that even where the influence of money does not rise to the level of bribery, it can work subtly to erode public confidence in the system to the detriment of our democracy. It is also important to the health of our democracy that qualified people come forward to run in elections and to serve as elected representatives. Having the best candidates is good not only in and of itself for obvious reasons but will increase citizen participation in elections. Unfortunately, in recent years, some of our finest legislators across the nation--such as Senator Nunn--have left public service, bemoaning our system of financing campaigns. The average senator has to raise $11,600 every week during his or her six years in office in order to be reelected. Former Senator DeConcini of Arizona put it: ``You walk around on eggshells. One of the reasons I got out of the race was that I didn't want to raise the money.'' As Thomas Mann of the Brookings Institution has explained: ``The threat to the health of the American democracy stems rather from what candidates and their supporters must do to raise the sums needed to complete successfully. The cost of mounting a major campaign is a huge disincentive to candidacy for people of ordinary means who lack the stomach for nonstop fund raising.'' The soft-money ban that forms the core of this legislation aims to restore public faith in our democracy. By enacting this legislation, we will, in Senator McCain's words, ``change the public's widespread belief that politicians have no greater purpose than [their] own reelection.'' We have a historic opportunity here not only to end the appearance of corruption, but to reinvigorate our democracy by making individual citizens' votes count, and by encouraging the most qualified candidates to run for election. Mr. Chairman, since the 1971 passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act and the Buckley decision, there have been strict limits on contributions given by individuals and political action committees to federal candidates. But, as many have recognized, the soft-money loophole undermines these curbs. As the Washington Post put it: ``The national party organizations are used to raise and spend on behalf of their candidates funds that the candidates are forbidden to raise and spend themselves. It's a fictional distinction.'' Although FECA provides clear contribution limits, candidates and parties easily circumvent FECA's hard money restrictions by raising soft money. In its most recent decision on campaign finance, the Supreme Court observed that our political parties are ``in a position to be used to circumvent contribution limits that apply to individuals and PACs, and thereby to exacerbate the threat of corruption and apparent corruption that those contribution limits are aimed at reducing.'' In a recent memorandum of Soft Money Rulemaking, the Federal Election Commission's General Counsel found that ``national party committees rely in large part on the access they can provide to federal officials, or on the more direct influence of federal officeholders and candidates, to solicit large sums from corporations, labor unions, and other donors that provide most of their soft money.'' Mr. Chairman, it is vital for our democracy that we act today to ban soft money. Soft money has reintroduced into the Federal campaign finance system the very kinds of contributions that the federal laws intended to exclude--namely donations from corporations, unions, as well as large individual contributions. Soft money is not just a loophole, it is the loophole that ate the law. Let's send a clear message today that our democracy--and our integrity--is not for sale.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds. I just point out we are trying to enforce the 1907 law banning the corporate treasury money, the 1947 law banning union dues money, and the 1974 law which bans unlimited sums by one individual in a collective campaign and to enforce all three laws. You can still advertise 60 days prior to an election with hard money. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my colleague, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Leach).

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds. I will explain to the gentleman that this bill was not written in the dead of night. It was introduced last year. It was brought before the House before 10 o'clock. And it is very clear what it does. It enforces the 1907 law and the 1947 law and the 1974 law, all of which are constitutional. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gracious gentlewoman from Maryland (Mrs. Morella).

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle).

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute, and then I intend to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Wamp). Mr. Chairman, just to correct the inaccuracies of the previous speaker, we say 60 days to an election, you have to use hard money contributions. We limit no speech. We just say you cannot do it with corporate treasury money, union dues money, or unlimited money from individuals. The effective date begins November 6 because we are 16 months already into this election. We already have primaries in process, and our bill basically has a 30-day provision in primaries. There is absolutely nothing in our bill, it is a red herring, that suggests one can use soft money to pay hard money obligations. It is against the law. We did not change that law. So with all due respect to one who I think is really the best majority whip ever to be in this House, he is just dead wrong on all the issues he described. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Wamp).

Mr. SHAYS

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Meehan).

Mr. SHAYS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the members of the Democratic Caucus who have worked so diligently on this for so many years, and also to thank the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hastert) for acknowledging the petition of 218 Members and allowing this to proceed under the spirit of the petition, but basically without having to call it out on a particular second or fourth Monday. We thank the leadership on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. SHAYS

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and belatedly apologize for the fact that I think this was a debate he introduced a few months ago, and we are finally debating it, I think under a very fair rule. It gives both sides the opportunity to present their case. When Abraham Lincoln addressed this Chamber during the Civil War, when we were losing 10,000 Americans a month, he looked at Congress and said, ``The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, we must think anew and act anew, and then we will save our country.'' I happen to believe what we are going to do tomorrow is about saving our country and our democracy. It is about enforcing the ban on corporate treasury money that took place in 1907; it is about enforcing the ban on union dues money that was passed in 1947; and about making sure that rich individuals cannot buy elections with the law that passed in 1974. I do not know what the prediction outcome will be tomorrow, but I do know this: we came to this Chamber with a good bill, the Senate took this bill and changed it slightly; and we have taken the Senate changes and incorporated them in our bill with the hope and the prayer that this House will act and pass campaign finance reform and send it back to the Senate for the President's signature. I do not know if that will happen. But in order for it to happen, we have to kill amendments that gut our proposal. We have to kill amendments that supposedly improve it but break apart the coalition that we have in the House. And we have to make sure that this bill ultimately can be passed by the Senate. I urge my colleagues to pay attention to this debate, to vote their conscience, and we will all live with the consequences.