Jason Smith

Mr. SMITH of Missouri

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 6500, the AGOA Extension Act, legislation to reauthorize the African Growth and Opportunity Act trade preference program. Our Nation's economic, strategic, and national security interests are front and center in AGOA. Think about it: This program strengthens our critical supply chains and helps us counter the harmful global influence of nations like China and Russia. Don't just take my word for it. A witness testifying before the Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee put it bluntly when discussing the potential for a lapse in AGOA when he said: ``There will be a party in Moscow. There will be a party in Beijing if we don't reauthorize it.'' To achieve this, however, we aren't going to lower our standards. This extension maintains the most stringent eligibility criteria of any trade preference program, with annual reviews to defend IP rights, human rights, market access, and the rule of law against corruption. To be eligible, countries must also ensure they are not undermining America's national security or foreign policy interests. While we still need a longer-term AGOA extension, this reauthorization provides a much-needed level of certainty and stability in the near term so that Congress can continue its work on future reforms to address and strengthen U.S. priorities. After all, U.S. businesses have invested $8 billion annually under AGOA while our African trading partners have begun to open their markets for U.S. agriculture. Protecting market access for America's farmers and ranchers is incredibly important to the rural communities I represent in Missouri, a point I have made in my travels to the regions going back to 2015 when I attended the AGOA forum in Gabon. After we take this step, we can build further. Americans would benefit if African nations graduated into formal bilateral trade agreements with the U.S. Right now, the nation of Mauritius is on track to graduate from AGOA within the next 5 years. When African nations take steps to expand their markets to American products, graduating from AGOA should have clear benefits, not negative consequences. Africa is home to 30 percent of the world's critical mineral reserves, and China is quickly moving to corner the market on critical minerals and exploit Africa's vast resources. Stronger partnerships with African nations mean we will limit China's ability to make further gains in the region and protect our national security interests. Madam Speaker, for example, last year the Trump administration announced a strategic partnership agreement with the Democratic Republic of the Congo to develop critical minerals. I thank the chairman of our Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee, Congressman Adrian Smith, for his tremendous work and leadership in proactively building support for this renewal effort. I urge my colleagues to support this extension of AGOA, which received strong bipartisan approval in the Ways and Means Committee. I look forward to continuing to work across the aisle to further strengthen this critical program. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Smith).

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, we have no additional speakers and are prepared to close.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time. Madam Speaker, first, I say thank you to Ms. Sewell, and Mr. Neal for their help in order to get this across the finish line. This is an important piece of legislation that I know my staff, Josh Snead and Hilary Pinegar, have worked tirelessly on for a long time to make sure that this program does not die. I thank both the Democrat and Republican staff. I thank Jorge Rueda and Alexandra Whittaker, as well. I appreciate the hard work. This is super important. Reauthorization of the African Growth and Opportunity Act will advance the economic, strategic, and national security interests of the United States today and pave the way for future reforms to strengthen this critical program. AGOA has a proven track record of holding our trading partners accountable to the strictest standards, while opening markets to American producers, particularly our farming community. It is a vital tool to combat the harmful influence of nations like China and protect America's supply chains, including access to critical minerals. Madam Speaker, I include in the Record an article discussing the strategic importance of critical minerals. [Sept. 3, 2025] Why Is Renewing AGOA Strategic for U.S.-Africa Minerals Diplomacy? (Critical Questions by Gracelin Baskaran) The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), first signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 2000, is a unilateral U.S. trade preference program set to expire in September 2025. Its pending reauthorization has sparked debate over whether--and how--it should be extended and reformed. A failure to extend AGOA could have larger ramifications at a time when the United States is doubling down on its commercial diplomacy--and more specifically, its mineral diplomacy efforts--with Africa. Q1: What is the strategic role of AGOA nations in reshaping critical mineral supply chains? A1: There are 33 African countries eligible to participate in AGOA. Many of these countries--such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia--are among the world's most well endowed with critical minerals. In fact, five of the world's top fifteen destinations for rare earths exploration in the past year were AGOA beneficiaries: South Africa, Malawi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Angola. Together, they have roughly 50 high-grade rare earths deposits. Moreover, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Tanzania cumulatively hold graphite reserves on par with China's, even though China accounted for 77 percent of global graphite output in 2023. According to internal calculations, AGOA beneficiary countries also hold 70 percent of the world's manganese, 89 percent of the world's platinum group metals, 54 percent of cobalt, 23 percent of graphite, and 10 percent of copper. Much of this resource wealth remains untapped, underscoring the vast potential for deepening U.S.- Africa supply chain partnerships in critical minerals. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has financed--or is preparing to finance--mineral projects in a number of AGOA countries, including Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. Q2: What is AGOA's impact on critical minerals supply chains? A2: AGOA offers limited tariff advantages to the mining sector, since most minerals already face relatively low tariffs. Its real value lies in the realm of soft power. In June 2025, China announced that it would expand market access by removing tariffs on all imports from 53 African nations. If the United States were to let AGOA expire and reimpose tariffs on African exports, it would send a damaging signal about the future of U.S. commercial diplomacy on the continent. When African governments see comparable opportunities from both the United States and China in the mining sector, they will be more likely to lean toward Beijing. Q3: Why is renewing AGOA crucial for building long-term minerals diplomacy? A3: AGOA is important for building commercial diplomacy. While mining generates significant revenue, it is not a major source of employment. Compared to sectors like manufacturing, agriculture, or services, mining has a much lower labor multiplier. Modern operations are highly mechanized, relying more on advanced technology and machinery than on large workforces. The jobs that are created are typically specialized--geologists, engineers, and metallurgists-- limiting wider employment opportunities. Yet Africa urgently needs large-scale job creation, as its population of 1.4 billion is expected to grow to 2.5 billion by 2050. Mining alone is not positioned to meet this demand. By contrast, AGOA has supported the expansion of more labor-intensive industries, such as textile manufacturing and agriculture. Namibia illustrates this potential. With more than 7.7 million cattle, sheep, and goats, its livestock sector is substantial. After spending 15 years working to meet stringent safety and logistical standards, Namibia became the first African nation to export beef to the United States in 2019. Exports reached 860 tons in 2020 and are projected to grow to 5,000 tons by 2025. Namibia's Meatco has significantly benefIted from duty-free access to the U.S. market through AGOA. Given the infancy of the beef export relationship with the United States, a disruption to AGOA could risk its sustainability and undermine capital investments within the sector. Sustaining a positive economic relationship with Namibia is key to advancing minerals diplomacy, particularly given its significant mineral wealth. The country is home to the world's fourth-largest uranium reserves--resources that could support the U.S. nuclear renaissance. Today, Namibia hosts three active uranium mines--Rossing, Husab, and Langer Heinrich--all of which have significant Chinese ownership through entities such as the China National Uranium Corporation, China General Nuclear Power Group, and the China Africa Development Fund. The Lofdal heavy rare earths project, partly owned by Japanese investors, produces around 2,000 tons of rare earth oxides annually and contains some of the world's most valuable heavy rare earth metals. In addition, Namibia is on track to become Africa's third- largest lithium producer by 2026. Namibia's vast resource base, combined with its reputation as one of Africa's most politically stable and well-governed nations, positions it well to develop a growing industrial processing ecosystem. But allowing AGOA to lapse would deal a serious blow to Namibia's labor-intensive beef industry and could undermine future U.S. minerals diplomacy in this resource-rich nation, further ceding ground to China. Zambia is another important jurisdiction for minerals diplomacy. In the last few years, the U.S. government opened its first-ever Commercial Service Office at the U.S. Embassy in Lusaka and launched a Tripartite Alliance with Zambia and the DRC to advance raw material extraction, processing, and battery manufacturing. The DFC has also provided support to a U.S. company developing one of Zambia's largest copper projects. Deepening minerals diplomacy will depend on strengthening the bilateral economic relationship. Interviews with Zambian stakeholders reveal mounting frustration among voters that the mining sector is failing to deliver meaningful benefits to the population. Zambia's heavy reliance on copper as its dominant export, coupled with limited economic diversification, has left the country highly exposed to commodity price swings. Expanding U.S. investment into other industries, such as agriculture, textiles, and manufacturing, could ease pressure on the mining industry while simultaneously strengthening Zambia's broader economy and employment generation efforts. Such diversification would generate shared benefits, improve public perceptions of mining, and lessen the risk of abrupt policy shifts that complicate operations for U.S. firms. The tax benefIts derived from AGOA are an important investment incentive. In 2022, 55.3 percent of Zambia's exports to the United States went through AGOA, making its renewal vital to sustaining U.S.-Zambia commercial diplomacy. More broadly, the expiration of AGOA would likely prompt many African countries to reassess their economic diplomacy strategies. Without preferential access to the U.S. market, governments may find it more attractive--or even necessary-- to expand commercial and strategic partnerships with China, which has already established itself as the dominant player in Africa's trade, infrastructure, and minerals sectors. In the critical minerals space in particular, Beijing's willingness to provide financing, infrastructure, and guaranteed offtake agreements could accelerate African alignment with Chinese interests, potentially sidelining U.S. efforts to build resilient, diversified supply chains. Q4: Is AGOA congruent with the Trump administration's Africa approach? A4: It is. Since 2016, U.S. policy toward Africa under the Trump administration has placed a strong emphasis on commercial diplomacy, with critical minerals at the forefront. A major step came in 2018 with the creation of the DFC, which made its first equity investment in the critical minerals sector the following year. In 2023, a review was undertaken of the effectiveness of the President's Advisory Council on Doing Business in Africa (PAC-DBIA), an initiative launched during the Obama administration with the mandate to advise the U.S. president, through the commerce secretary, on strategies to expand the United States' commercial engagement across Africa. The review found that the Trump administration convened more PAC-DBIA meetings than either Obama or Biden. Since returning to office, Trump's Africa policy has been characterized by senior officials emphasizing business and trade over aid. U.S.-Africa engagement has increasingly focused on critical minerals. One major initiative has been a ``minerals-for-security'' proposal in which President Felix Tshisekedi offered the United States access to the Democratic Republic of the Congo's resources in exchange for security support. Following negotiations in Washington and Doha, the DRC and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington, D.C., on June 27, 2025. Attention is now turning to advancing mineral cooperation and broader regional economic integration. In July 2025, the DFC approved financing for two critical minerals projects in sub-Saharan Africa. According to its announcement, these investments are intended both to spur regional development and to strengthen U.S. critical mineral supply chains vital for energy, defense, and advanced technologies. The challenge for the Trump administration is balancing AGOA, which is a unilateral trade preference program, with its strong preference for more bilaterally beneficial economic statecraft instruments. Q5: What could AGOA 2.O look like? A5: AGOA can become more bilaterally beneficial. Linking a unilateral trade preference program with a mining investment incentive could significantly boost capital flows into Africa's mining sector. Such a framework could unlock greater capital flows into Africa's mining sector, while ensuring that off-take agreements from new projects are secured with the United States and its allies. A useful precedent for an investment incentive came from the Inflation Reduction Act's Section 30D tax credit, which offered up to $7,500 for the purchase of a new electric vehicle if its batteries met specific sourcing requirements for critical minerals and manufacturing. To qualify for the minerals portion of the credit, a portion of the battery's mineral content had to be extracted or processed in the United States or a country with a U.S. free trade agreement (FTA). This enabled graphite mined in Mozambique to qualify, since it was processed in Louisiana--yielding benefits to Mozambique's economy while strengthening graphite security for the United States. Although the 30D provision was recently eliminated, future tax incentives of this kind could be powerful tools to attract mineral investment in AGOA-eligible countries, with the extracted resources routed to the United States or allied partners for processing. The incentive should be industry agnostic, so minerals sourced for defense, semiconductors, and energy would be eligible for the incentive. However, in the meantime, ensuring AGOA's renewal without interruption is essential to signal the strength and continuity of the U.S.- Africa economic relationship.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes,'' and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6504) to extend duty-free treatment provided with respect to imports from Haiti under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, and for other purposes, as amended.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and submit extraneous material on the bill under consideration.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 6504, the Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act, introduced by my colleague, Representative Murphy. This legislation extends the HOPE and HELP trade preference programs which provide trade preferences for certain apparel and textile imports from Haiti. Haiti has endured years of profound hardship, political instability, economic collapse, and repeated natural disasters. As our bill author, Dr. Murphy, shares from his time serving as a medical missionary in Haiti, these trade programs represent an economic lifeline that supports tens of thousands of jobs and sustain one of the last remaining formal industries in the country. Failing to extend these programs would further destabilize an already fragile situation, worsening humanitarian conditions. Strengthening economic opportunity in Haiti promotes regional stability, pushes back on malign actors trying to gain influence with our neighbors, and advances U.S. interests. Prosperity in our hemisphere enhances security right here at home. Renewing HOPE and HELP supports nearshoring and more resilient supply chains, benefiting American workers and businesses, while reducing reliance on distant and unreliable sources. I commend Dr. Murphy for his leadership on this issue. Through his numerous trips to Haiti, he has seen firsthand the human consequences of economic collapse. He also understands the value these programs provide to American businesses, including those in North Carolina that have built reliable partnerships in Haiti. Last month, the Ways and Means Committee passed this bill unanimously, 41-0, a strong bipartisan signal that these programs work. Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Smith).

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Lawler).

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I have no additional speakers, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remainder of my time to close. This bill represents a practical, bipartisan step toward stability, security, and shared prosperity right here in our hemisphere. By renewing the HOPE and HELP programs, we reinforce an effective trade partnership that supports jobs in Haiti, strengthens American supply chains, and advances our nearshoring goals. At a time when Haiti faces extraordinary challenges, Congress should not end a program that has proven to be a force for economic opportunity and regional stability in our hemisphere. This legislation passed the Ways and Means Committee unanimously because members on both sides recognize the humanitarian and strategic value these programs provide. A stable economy in Haiti contributes to a more secure United States. I commend Dr. Murphy for his leadership, and I urge adoption of the Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Arrington).

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bean).

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Moran).

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Kennedy).

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Kiley).

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I remind this body that the reason why these COVID-era tax credits expired is because the Democrats focused all their resources on helping their wealthy environmentalists with permanent tax credits for electric vehicles and solar panels. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a bombshell GAO report documenting evidence of widespread fraud, with billions of dollars going to fraudulent enrollees, including as many as 58,000 dead people. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC, December 3, 2025. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Preliminary Results from Ongoing Review Suggest Fraud Risks in the Advance Premium Tax Credit Persist Hon. Brett Guthrie, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives. Hon. Jim Jordan, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives. Hon. Jason Smith, Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) provides premium tax credits to those who purchase private health insurance plans and meet certain income and other requirements. Individuals may have the federal government pay this credit to their health insurance issuers in advance on their behalf, known as the advance premium tax credit (APTC), which lowers their monthly premium payments. Millions of consumers have purchased health insurance plans through the marketplaces established under PPACA. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for maintaining the federal Marketplace and overseeing state- based marketplaces. Under PPACA, states may elect to operate their own state-based marketplace or to use the federal Marketplace. These marketplaces determine eligibility for APTC, based in part on income, and allow individuals to compare and choose among insurance plans offered by participating private health care coverage issuers. CMS estimated it paid nearly $124 billion in APTC for about 19.5 million enrollees for plan year 2024. Consumers can enroll in health insurance coverage through a marketplace independently or with assistance, such as from an insurance agent or broker. As discussed later in this report, agents and brokers can help a consumer apply for coverage, including for related financial assistance, and enroll in a plan. Assistance from an agent or broker is of no cost to a consumer. Rather, agents and brokers are allowed to receive compensation directly from health insurance issuers in accordance with agreements with those issuers and any applicable state requirements. Indictments from December 2024 and February 2025 highlight concerns about agent and broker practices in the federal Marketplace. Specifically, the indictments allege that bad actors enrolled consumers in insurance through the federal Marketplace by falsifying information on their applications. Additionally, according to CMS, the agency received approximately 275,000 complaints between January and August 2024 that consumers were enrolled in a plan or had their plan changed without their consent. Such practices can result in wasteful federal spending on APTC for enrollees who are not eligible. Further, such practices can result in harm and unexpected costs for consumers. These can include loss of access to medical providers and medications, higher copayments and deductibles, or repayment of APTC if income or other eligibility was misrepresented. We previously reported that APTC is at risk of fraud. For example, in September 2016, we found that federal and state marketplaces approved coverage for our fictitious applicants. Nearly all of these fictitious applicants remained covered after we sent fictitious documents or no documents to resolve issues with our applications. Further, in July 2017, we found that CMS did not design processes to verify eligibility for APTC, including preventing duplicate coverage. You asked us to review issues related to fraud risk management in APTC. This report is based on preliminary results and analyses from that ongoing work. Specifically, this report addresses preliminary results from our 1. covert testing of federal Marketplace enrollment controls for plan years 2024 and 2025, 2. analyses of federal Marketplace enrollment data for plan years 2023 and 2024, and 3. evaluation of CMS's fraud risk assessment and antifraud strategy for APTC. To perform covert testing of federal Marketplace enrollment controls, we created 20 fictitious identities and submitted applications for individual health care coverage in the federal Marketplace. We submitted applications for four of these fictitious identities in October 2024 for coverage through December 2024, which was the remainder of that plan year. We pursued coverage for plan year 2025 for all 20 fictitious identities, including the four identities for which we already submitted applications. Our covert testing for plan year 2025 is ongoing, since the plan year is not yet complete. As a result, we will describe additional details of the 2025 applications in a future report. Our covert testing included applications submitted independently through HealthCare.gov, which is the federal Marketplace's website, and applications submitted with assistance from an insurance agent or broker. For all our applicant scenarios, we sought to act as an ordinary consumer would in attempting to make a successful application. For example, if, during online applications, we were directed to make phone calls to complete the process, we acted as instructed. For applications for plan year 2024, our covert tests included fictitious applicants who provided invalid (i.e., never issued) Social Security numbers (SSN). Additionally, we stated income at a level eligible to obtain APTC. As appropriate, we used publicly available information to construct our applications for coverage and subsidies. We also used publicly available hardware, software, and materials to produce counterfeit documents that we submitted, if appropriate for our testing, when instructed to do so. We then observed the outcomes of the document submissions, such as any approvals received or requests to provide additional supporting documentation. The results of our covert testing, while illustrative of potential enrollment control weaknesses, cannot be generalized to the overall enrollment population. To examine federal Marketplace enrollment for plan years 2023 and 2024, we obtained and analyzed federal Marketplace enrollment and payment data, including APTC information, from CMS. We also matched enrollee SSNs in the data to two additional data sources: (1) Social Security Administration's (SSA) full death file, a database containing records of death that have been reported to SSA, as of November 2024 and (2) April 2025 data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on APTC reconciliation from tax forms filed for tax year 2023. We assessed the reliability of all data sets by performing electronic tests to determine the completeness and accuracy of key fields. We also reviewed agency documentation and interviewed knowledgeable agency officials about the reliability of the data. Overall, we found that the data were reliable for our purposes. To examine CMS's fraud risk assessment and antifraud strategy for APTC, we reviewed documentation of CMS's policies and fraud risk management activities related to APTC. This included CMS's 2018 fraud risk assessment for APTC. Additionally, we interviewed agency officials about CMS's fraud risk management activities in this program. We reviewed relevant reports from GAO and HHS's Office of the Inspector General. We evaluated information from relevant documentation and interviews of agency officials against relevant leading practices in GAO's A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Fraud Risk Framework). To support all three objectives, we interviewed CMS officials and representatives from seven stakeholder organizations that represent agents and brokers, state insurance regulators, researchers, and one of the entities that CMS approved to host a non-marketplace website where consumers can apply for and enroll in a plan offered through the federal Marketplace. The ongoing work upon which this report is based is being conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our preliminary findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additionally, our related investigative work is being conducted in accordance with standards prescribed by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Background