J. Thurmond

Mr. THURMOND

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am not going to take but just a few minutes. The point that has been raised by the able Senator is in conference now. This is not an appropriations matter. It is in the bill we passed in the Senate. It will be decided in conference. This is not an authorization bill, this is an appropriations bill. The authorization bill that the Senate passed includes certain figures for the Marine Corps and the number of generals. The House is different. So they will decide that issue there. This is an appropriations measure, and I think it will be a mistake to even consider this here, because it will be settled in conference. The conference will determine this matter, and since it is not an appropriations matter, I suggest that we not consider it here, and I ask the able Senator if he will withdraw his amendment and let it be settled in conference?

Mr. THURMOND. I assure the Senator, it will receive careful consideration in the conference.

Mr. THURMOND. I will be pleased to yield.

Mr. THURMOND

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise today to join with several of my colleagues to sponsor the Customs Enforcement Act of 1996. This legislation is designed to strengthen our laws which fight illegal trade in textile and apparel items and open foreign markets to more American products. A companion measure, H.R. 3654, was recently introduced in the House of Representatives. Mr. President, I have often stated that trade with other countries should be fair, as opposed to free. This means that when exporters from another country seek unlimited access to our markets, then our U.S. producers should likewise have open access to their country's markets. Many examples exist where the United States has given another country access to our marketplace, only to have our access limited in their country. The legislation we are introducing today attempts to mitigate this practice. This measure will require the USTR to secure effective market access for U.S. produced textile and apparel products. Further, if these markets are not opened, the USTR has the ability to impose penalties in an attempt to force these markets open. Mr. President, another major concern this legislation attempts to address is transshipping. This is a practice where an exporter ships goods through a third country to avoid U.S. import quotas. The worst offenders in the area of transshipment countries are China, India, and Pakistan. It is estimated that transshipments account for at to least 4 billion dollars' worth of the textile and apparel items shipped into the United States in a year and this figure could be as high as $8 billion. This bill, Mr. President, tightens the requirements for importing items into this country and provides for better documentation so that transshipping can be more easily traced. Further, penalties are increased for each transshipping violation. Mr. President, this is not a protectionist bill. Nor does it limit textile imports. This measure attempts to level the playing field for the domestic textile and apparel industry. I hope my colleagues will support this measure and move it expeditiously through the legislative process.

Mr. THURMOND

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, pursuant to section 303 of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. sec. 1383), a notice of proposed rulemaking was submitted by the Office of Compliance, U.S. Congress. The notice publishes proposed amendments to the rules governing the procedures for the Office of Compliance under the Congressional Accountability Act. Section 304(b) requires this notice to be printed in the Congressional Record; therefore I ask unanimous consent that the notice be printed in the Record.

Mr. THURMOND

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, going back to the defense bill, I just want to take this opportunity, although I have had printed the name of every staff member of the Armed Services Committee following my earlier remarks in the Record--they all did a fine job--I just want to especially commend the director, Les Brownlee, for the outstanding job he has done. He has done one of the best jobs since I have been in the Senate in connection with a defense bill. I also would like to commend Arnold Punaro, the director on the minority side, for doing such a fine job. He has been in the Senate since 1973. We have been very fortunate to have Les Brownlee and Arnold Punaro to work with us on this defense bill.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all remaining votes following the vote on passage of the DOD appropriations bill be limited to 10 minutes in length, and there be 1 minute for explanation to be provided prior to the votes with respect to the Dorgan amendment and the Kassebaum amendment.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the Senate has completed many long hours of debate on S. 1745, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997. I would like to thank the distinguished ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services, my good friend Senator Nunn, for his insight, wisdom, and devotion to our Nation. He and I have always worked to provide our Armed Forces with the direction and resources they need to carry out their difficult responsibilities. Our future collective efforts will be diminished by his absence. Senator Nunn was named chairman of the ad hoc Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel in 1974 and he served in that capacity until 1981. In 1983, he became the ranking minority member and in 1987 he became the chairman of the committee. He served with distinction in that capacity for 8 years, and earned the respect of leaders around the globe for his wisdom, statesmanship, and insight. A hallmark of his tenure, and a basis for his effectiveness, was the trustworthy and bipartisan manner in which he conducted the committee's business. Our Nation owes Senator Nunn its deepest appreciation for his truly distinguished service. I would also like to recognize the outstanding contributions of Senators Cohen and Exon, who are departing the Senate. They have worked and fought hard to preserve our national security, and provide for the well-being of our men and women in uniform. Mr. President, I want to extend my deep appreciation also to the distinguished majority leader, Senator Lott, who has been most helpful in every way in bringing this bill to final passage. He is a fine and able leader of whom the Senate can be proud. I also want to thank all the members from both sides of the committee, and particularly Senator Warner and Senator McCain, for their leadership and assistance on the floor. In addition, I would like to commend the entire staff of the Committee on Armed Services for their dedication and support. I would like to recognize each of them individually for their effort on this bill. I will soon ask unanimous consent that a list of the committee staff be printed in the Record. I also want to recognize and thank Greg Scott and Charlie Armstrong, the legislative counsels who crafted the language of this bill. We have achieved a number of important successes in this bill, and I commend my colleagues for their good judgment. Among these successes are: Increasing the budget request by $11.2 billion to revitalize the procurement, and research and development accounts, which form the core of future readiness; Significantly improving quality of life programs for our troops and their families, including funds for housing, facilities, and real property maintenance; Authorizing a 3-percent pay raise for military members and a 4- percent increase in the basic allowance for quarters, to arrest part of the decline in compensation; Establishing a dental health care insurance program for military retirees and their families, to keep faith with those who have kept faith with our Nation; Increasing the level of funding requested in the President's budget for Department of Defense counternarcotics activities, to combat the flow of illegal drugs; Authorizing increases for the Space and Missile Tracking System, cruise missile defense programs, and ballistic missile defense advanced technologies; Accelerating the Department of Energy's phased approach to tritium production, and upgrading tritium recycling facilities; and Providing funding for essential equipment for the Active, Guard, and Reserve components. These are important achievements that reflect significant bipartisan effort, both within the committee and on the Senate floor. I urge my colleagues to endorse this bill with a solid vote of approval, to support our men and women in uniform who go in harm's way every day to protect our Nation. I ask unanimous consent that the list of staff I referred to earlier be printed in the Record.

Mr. THURMOND. I assure the Senator we will be glad to discuss this matter in conference.

Mr. THURMOND

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, pursuant to section 304(b) of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. sec. 1384(b)), a notice of adoption of regulations and submission for approval was submitted by the Office of Compliance, U.S. Congress. The notice contains final regulations related to Federal service labor-management relations--regulations under section 220(d) of the Congressional Accountability Act. Section 304(b) requires this notice to be printed in the Congressional Record; therefore I ask unanimous consent that the notice be printed in the Record.

Mr. THURMOND

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, it is appropriate that the Senate and the House of Representatives continue to examine the troubling developments recently uncovered at the White House. The American people have a right to know the details and intentions of requests from the Clinton administration to the FBI for hundreds and hundreds of sensitive background files on private citizens. FBI Director Freeh has ordered new procedures to protect sensitive background material following unjustified and improper requests by the Clinton White House for over 700 FBI background files. Director Freeh has said that the White House had no justification for gathering these files and that the situation was an egregious violation of privacy. Director Freeh said that the requests from President Clinton's operatives in many instances served no official purpose and at one point he stated that the FBI had been victimized. The White House has said that its collection of FBI files of private citizens was an innocent mistake. That is their response before the facts are examined and seems to reflect an instinctual reaction by the White House anytime questions arise concerning their operations. The facts have yet to be fully examined and it strikes me as premature and politically convenient to describe this situation as a ``bureaucratic snafu.'' Initially, the White House would have us believe that Mr. Marceca was a random detailee from the Army who had been arbitrarily selected to work temporarily at the White House. We have since learned that Mr. Marceca--who along with Mr. Livingstone handled the sensitive files--is actually a seasoned Democrat political operative. They both have extensive political campaign experience. Mr. Marceca sought the post at the White House to work with his friend, Mr. Livingstone, and officials in the White House counsel's office wrote to the Secretary of Defense requesting his assignment. Recently, we learned that Craig Livingstone--who was the White House personnel security director--boasted on his resume that he staged counter- events for President Clinton during the 1992 Presidential campaign. Earlier, we learned that his experience in personnel security was limited to his work with President and Mrs. Clinton's Hollywood producer friends during the Inaugural activities. Clearly, Craig Livingstone was not qualified to serve as the head of the White House personnel security office. The one thing we have yet to learn is who hired Craig Livingstone. No one takes credit for his employment. Although a retired FBI agent says that he was told by White House counsel that Mrs. Clinton wanted him in that position. Mrs. Clinton has denied being responsible. At one point senior Presidential adviser, George Stephanopoulos, praised Craig Livingstone saying he was the man to see whenever you wanted anything done. Lately, Mr. Stephanopolous has said he does not know Livingstone that well, has only seen him around. The Washington Post has referred to Craig Livingstone as a phantom appointment. In a June 28 editorial, the Washington Post went on to say, At this stage, nobody at the White House will claim credit for Craig Livingstone. It gets you wondering whether there are other people working in sensitive spots in the White House who are, well, just there, and whose hiring cannot be accounted for . . . So people just walk in off the street, sit down at a desk and send for files--or what? Mr. President, as you know, we are at this point because the White House only recently turned over documents pursuant to a long-ago subpoena from the House Oversight Committee. Within the documents submitted, the House Oversight Committee found a White House request to the FBI for sensitive background files on Billy Ray Dale. The request for FBI background on Mr. Dale was dated 7 months after he had been wrongly fired as head of the White House Travel Office. It was only after this was discovered by the House Oversight Committee did the White House admit it had collected FBI reports on hundreds of private citizens. Mr. President, it is important that hearings continue because right now we have more questions than answers. The American people demand accountability. The American people want to know what right Clinton administration officials have to request hundreds upon hundreds of sensitive FBI files on private citizens. What were they doing with this information? This latest troubling development within the Clinton administration represents a dangerous practice and one that deserves careful scrutiny. It is my hope that we will continue to examine this matter and uncover all of the facts for the American people. I yield the floor. Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.

Mr. THURMOND

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to address an issue of vital important to the U.S. Senate: whether the Senate should provide its advice and consent on any succession agreement regarding the ABM Treaty, especially an agreement that would convert the treaty from a bilateral agreement to a multilateral agreement. I would remind my colleagues that existing law requires any substantive modification of the ABM Treaty to be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. The administration has asserted that it would be inappropriate for the Senate to make a judgement about the substantive nature of any potential agreement at this point. But, if the Senate's treaty making role is to be protected, we must clearly establish our views now, especially since the implications of such an agreement are fairly clear already. To do otherwise would invite a major dispute with the executive branch in the near future and put the Senate in a position where its only recourse would be to attempt to prohibit the implementation of the agreement. In my view, multilateralization of the ABM Treaty clearly constitutes a substantive change. Let me briefly outline my reasons for coming to this conclusion. First of all, the fundamental circumstances that produced the treaty in the first place have changed. The ABM Treaty, more than any other arms control agreement, was a product of the bipolar cold war confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, we face strategic and political circumstances that are vastly different. Second, by having the Soviet Union succeeded, for purposes of the ABM Treaty, by some but not all of the independent States of the former Soviet Union, each possessing full and sovereign rights under the treaty, we would be changing, limiting, and extending certain rights and obligations previously possessed by the parties. This is all but a text book definition of a treaty amendment. U.S. rights would clearly be changed given the fact that the Standing Consultative Commission, the ABM Treaty's implementing body, would now be comprised of several parties, all of whom would need to consent to changes, clarifications, or amendments to the treaty. As the administration stated in a May 3, 1996, letter to Senator Nunn: ``Each Party will participate in implementing the treaty as a sovereign entity. This includes a full and equal voice in the SCC.'' When asked if the consent of all parties would be needed before the treaty could be amended, clarified, or interpreted, the administration answered: ``Yes. The U.S. has insisted on a decision-making mechanism in the SCC under which legally binding obligations would be adopted by consensus.'' In effect, the SCC would be transformed into a corporate body in which the United States would need to receive five, six, or more affirmative votes before the treaty could be amended. In addition, some of the new treaty partners would only have partial rights. Of the former Soviet States, presumably only Russia would be entitled to deploy an operational ABM system. Third, the actual functional mechanics of the ABM Treaty will be changed through multilateralization. The ABM Treaty is based largely on a geographical description of the United States and the Soviet Union. It states specifically that certain large phased array radars may only be located along the periphery of the territory of the parties. In the case of the former Soviet Union, however, some such radars are now located outside Russia. The so-called Scrunda radar in Latvia, for example, is on the territory of an independent country that has categorically rejected membership in the ABM Treaty. Clearly, any agreement that addresses the successorship issue will also have to redefine these geographic aspects of the treaty, which in and of themselves will constitute substantive amendments to the treaty. In this regard, the Senate will be as interested to see which States do not accede to the ABM Treaty as it will be to see which countries do accede. Mr. President, as we consider this important matter, which dramatically affects the Senate's constitutional prerogatives, let me also remind my colleagues of an important debate that took place in this Chamber several years ago regarding the so-called broad versus narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. On March 11, 12, and 13, 1987, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, took to the floor to deliver a series of speeches criticizing the Reagan administration for having announced a new interpretation of the ABM Treaty. I do not wish to revisit the specific issues in that debate, only to remind my colleagues, especially on the other side of the aisle, how outraged they were at what appeared to be a challenge to the Senate's constitutional treaty-making role. On March 11, 1987, Senator Nunn stated that the State Department was directly challenging the Senate's constitutional role. ``This effect,'' he said, ``could carry over and may well produce a congressional backlash through its exercise of the power of the purse and the power to raise and support armies in a manner that would give the effect to the original meaning of the treaty as presented to the Senate.'' It is precisely such a backlash that we are seeking to avoid by including section 233 in the Defense authorization bill. The administration is proceeding down a very dangerous course and we are simply trying to ensure that the Senate plays a role before we arrive at a point of crisis. Why do I use such strong terms in describing the administration's present course? Let me be clear, Mr. President. The administration is not intending to submit any agreement to the Senate regarding ABM Treaty succession, even though such an agreement would constitute a fundamental departure from substance of the treaty presented to the Senate for advice and consent in 1972. In the same letter than I quoted from earlier, the administration makes clear that they are working on a memorandum of understanding on succession. What, I would ask, is the legal standing of an MOU? How is it possible, given the major implications of such a change, that the administration is trying to modify a major arms control treaty with an MOU, as if this were some minor agreement with a close and reliable ally? Mr. President, I do not believe that one can avoid the conclusion that the administration is negotiating major changes to the ABM Treaty, that these changes constitute substantive modifications to the treaty and the rights and obligations of the parties, and that the Senate must be directly involved. In my view, this involvement must include advice and consent to any such agreement. The executive branch cannot simply change the entire context of a major arms control treaty and expect the Senate to stand idly by. The administration has sought to use various analogies to other cases in which the executive branch has not sought, and the Senate has not insisted upon, advice and consent on succession. The examples of the Conventional Forces in Europe and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaties are frequently used. In the case of CFE, the Senate specifically recognized the impending breakup of the Soviet Union and adopted provisions taking this into account during the ratification debate. In fact, the Senate was so concerned about this issue with regard to CFE that it took great care to develop a condition to the resolution of ratification specifying procedures for adding new states parties and for evaluating the implications of the withdrawal of key newly independent states from the treaty. In the case of the ABM Treaty, no such provision has ever been made, since the ABM Treaty has always been viewed in a bipolar context. If anything, the case of the CFE Treaty argues for Senate advice and consent on any ABM Treaty succession agreement. In the case of the INF Treaty, in my view, the executive branch still should seek a formal protocol on succession. The only reason that this has not become a major issue is due to the fact that INF has already been fully implemented and there are no significant areas of contention. Unlike the ABM Treaty, there is little likelihood that the United States may require major amendments or clarifications to the INF Treaty. In the case of the START I Treaty, the succession agreement, known as the Lisbon Protocol, was in fact approved by the Senate as part of the overall ratification process. As in the case of CFE, START I was surrounded by major succession issues that the Senate had to address in a formal manner. I think it is fair to say that neither CFE or START I would have been approved by the Senate if not for the fact that the succession issues were thoroughly addressed as part of the ratification debate. In both cases the Bush administration correctly saw that a vote of the Senate was necessary. Mr. President, in summary, let me simply say that section 233 of the bill stands up for the prerogatives of the Senate. The fact that the administration is so opposed to it is very bothersome. This provision was approved by the committee on a bipartisan basis and I believe that the Senate should overwhelmingly endorse it. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, after we call the roll next week, I will make some expressions of appreciation to those who were so helpful on this matter. One of them is the able Senator from Virginia who has done a magnificent service in the passage of this bill. I want to thank him.

Mr. THURMOND

Mr. THURMOND. I yield to the Senator from Texas first.

Mr. THURMOND. Let me reassure the Senator from Michigan that section 346 as amended by the Smith amendment does not affect or alter in any way the obligation of or the need for DOD to clean up the properties it has contaminated, particularly at closed or closing facilities. In fact, as the Senator indicated, all agencies proposing to transfer property must identify specific cleanup schedules and submit budget requests that adequately address those schedules for remedial action.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Senator from Michigan for his interest. Nothing in the amended section 346 reduces or otherwise changes the responsibility of the United States for cleaning up contamination at its facilities.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I propose an amendment that would provide new personnel management authorities to the Secretary of Defense for managing the civilian personnel within the Department of Defense intelligence community. Mr. President this legislation is intended to provide the Secretary of Defense additional flexibility and the capability to manage and to adjust the skill balance within the intelligence community workforce. The flexibility and management tools in this proposal will enable the Secretary of Defense to adjust the intelligence community workforce to changing requirements and technological advances. It is part of a larger effort to enhance the effectiveness of the intelligence community. Mr. President, I want to acknowledge the cooperation and assistance of the chairman and ranking member of the Government Affairs Committee. I would not have offered this amendment without their concurrence and support. I am pleased to note, for the record, that this is truly a bipartisan cooperative effort of our two Committees. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence both recommended and support the legislation. I think the amendment will enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence community. I urge adoption of the amendment. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we accept the amendment.

Mr. THURMOND. I have grave concerns about the impact of his amendment on the current program, which uses baseline incineration technology, to destroy the chemical stockpile. This amendment would bring the program to a halt. The amendment would direct the initiation of a pilot program on an unspecified alternate technology. As I understand it, pilot program testing is only initiated after basic technical efficacy has been demonstrated at either the laboratory or bench scale. There is no independently verified evidence today to support legislation to direct the initiation of a pilot program. Mr. President, this legislation is fraught with requirements that will detrimentally impact the current destruction program. The administration is pushing the Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. If this amendment were to pass, we would be unable to meet the requirements in the CWC to begin destruction of the stockpile within 2 years of entry into force of the treaty. We would also not be able to complete destruction of the stockpile within the 10-year timeframe.

Mr. THURMOND

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I too would be happy to enter into a colloquy with my friends from Alabama.

Mr. THURMOND. The committee does not specifically endorse the Air Force proposal. I strongly support the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's existing National Missile Defense program which includes the ground based interceptor, ground based radar and the Space and Missile Tracking System. I agree that this proposal presents a number of serious questions regarding arms control implications and potential future growth. The committee supports the need to have a serious examination of these questions before any significant amount of funding is directed to further evaluating the Air Force Proposal.

Mr. THURMOND

Mr. THURMOND. The distinguished ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee fairly characterizes the situation. However, the hearings on this matter do not preclude, and should not be construed as a substitute for, the Senate's constitutional role in advice and consent to ratification of treaties and international agreements.

Mr. THURMOND

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to commend the junior Senator from Kansas on her maiden speech. It is a pleasure for us in the Senate to have such a delightful person join us in this body. She is a lady of integrity, ability and dedication, and will be a great asset to the Senate. Mrs. KASSEBAUM addressed the Chair.