John Tierney

Mr. TIERNEY

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, this defense appropriations bill allocates some $44.4 million for space-based boost interceptors, the so-called kinetic interceptors. According to Philip Coyle, who was the Pentagon's chief testing evaluator last year in testimony before our Committee on Government Reform, he indicated that this particular test program has been pushed back indefinitely and that it is nowhere near ready to be moved forward in terms of construction. It has not been tested adequately.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. TIERNEY. We can. If we had had more time of when this was going to happen, we would have been happy to do it ahead of time. Somebody is going to have to help you out on the floor with that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Again, I go to the point of Philip Coyle, who was the director of the operations and testing evaluation program for the Pentagon, who came out clearly and has testified before committees in this House and has made it quite known publicly on the record both while he was in office and since his retirement from the last administration that the testing regime for this national missile defense is nowhere near adequate for us to have any level of confidence that it will be workable, particularly within the time frame that this administration has now set forth, which they claim they are going to have a system workable by 2004. Certainly moving forward and looking at their proposed space-based matters, they are nowhere near that date, or any date within a decade or more beyond that, for deployment. However, within this budget they have some $44.4 million for space- based boost interceptors or the so-called kinetic interceptors and it makes no common sense at all to move forward on this until there has been a formalized plan that lays out specifically how the system can demonstrate its effectiveness and establish some reasonable time frame for accomplishing the goals that the administration has in mind. I simply put forth for this body's deliberation and consideration the fact that we are spending money here well before it is appropriate to do so, that the general practice had been in this House and should be in this House that first we test and evaluate matters for their ability to work so that we can have some confidence in their reliability before we move forward. It has been the experience of programs in the past that when we fail to test first before we deploy and construct, we get burned. We end up spending a considerable amount of money and losing a lot of time going back to the beginning to start construction over again in accordance with the tests and the evaluation. We have done that time after time. In fact, that is why this House passed a law setting up the Department of Operational Testing and Evaluation. Now we seem intent on ignoring the advice of that body and the comments of its director and moving forward and funding things well before their time, well before they have been adequately tested and well before, certainly, they have met the kind of evaluation that would give us any reasonable confidence that this would be a reliable system. We have many other things, Mr. Chairman, that we could be spending money on within the defense budget. Homeland security is only one of those that certainly has a higher priority than space-based laser systems that so far have proved well beyond our grasp and have not been adequately tested. I ask that we have some consideration for that, that we strike this 44.4 million from the budget, find a better use for it next time around, and move forward with reasonable testing and reasonable assumptions that we are not going to build something with this Congress' assent until it has been shown to have been adequately tested and shown to be able to work.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. TIERNEY

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, this particular matter, an amendment, goes to reducing the budget by $121.8 million that is now earmarked for the construction of five silos at Fort Greely. This does not deal with research but rather the construction. You will remember that earlier in our remarks we talked about the fact that the Department of Operational Testing and Evaluation had come before committees in this Congress to indicate that the national missile defense system, particularly this mid-range system, is nowhere near a point where it had been tested adequately to sufficiently give anybody confidence in its reliability; and, in fact, the experts and director of that department had indicated we should not move forward with construction until we adequately test it. The fact of matter is that is why Congress passed the act setting up the Office of Operational Testing and Evaluation, because we had in the past allowed services to go forward and build weapons systems that were not adequately tested, resulting in enormous losses of money and great losses of time in trying to build the defense of this country. So the fact of the matter here is we concentrate on the premature construction and not the research of this. You will remember that when Mr. Coyle, who was the former director of that agency, came before Congress and testified that the testing regime was inadequate, the answer we got from the Department of Defense was to pull it in and say they will now do an entirely different system of testing. This one would lump all the research and development and construction together, and it would be more difficult to separate one out from the other. They would also do what they call the capabilities- based system, as opposed to a system where we set out goals and tried to meet those goals as we went forward and we could measure and identify the progress in developing a system and whether or not it was working. When asked about the real capabilities of these Fort Greely interceptors, General Ronald Kadish, the head of the Missile Defense Agency, seems to be of two minds. On one hand, he calls it a limited capability, a residual protection, not perfect by any means, but then he testified before the Committee on Armed Services in February and said he had high confidence that this would be capable to be put in place by 2004. The fact of the matter is that that is not the case, and because it is not the case we should not be spending money to construct something that has not been adequately tested. Now the problem that we have here is that usually we would have a Test and Evaluation Master Plan, or what we call a TEMP, by which we could judge where this is going, but the administration has not given us one. We would devise specific tests and goals and time lines. That was originally due in June. It has yet to be completed. It has now been pushed off to the fall, maybe later. Normally, as an alternative, Congress would have certain minimum requirements established by military planners in so-called operational requirements documents, but the administration has canceled those as of January. Pentagon officials have also failed to deliver many other technical documents, including the program implementation plan. So, essentially, they are leaving us all out there without any guide or direction as to whether or not we can measure the progress on this. They are ignoring the technology. They are rushing ahead on construction without any thoughtful testing regimen and forcing us to get a situation where we will have to retroactively correct mistakes and errors, costing billions of dollars and a great deal of time. So we had a hearing and a briefing. We called in Mr. Coyle, and we called in people of the Union of Concerned Scientists, experts on this matter, for specific questioning about whether or not these programs and aspects of it, separate components of it, were really going to be operational and capable by 2004. We learned that that will not be the case. We first asked about the X-Band Radar System. The Pentagon thought this system is essential to any ground-based system. We were told that it will not be in place by 2004. Then we asked about the space-based infrared satellite system, the so-called SBIRS. We were told that those would not be in place near operational and capable by 2004. In fact, we are looking a decade or more out on that. We then talked about whether or not we would have a Cobra Dane Radar as a substitute for the X-Band Radar, even though it would not come anywhere remotely close to doing all of the things that the X-Band Radar was called upon doing; and we were told at best that would be extremely limited and would not serve the purposes of testing or having it be operational at that point in time. We talked about whether or not flight tests would be conducted with significant information being provided by the interceptor before the launch, because essentially that is what we have been doing. We have been telling the interceptor ahead of time where the target is. You can bet no enemy is going to do that. By 2004, Mr. Coyle and the Union of Concerned Scientists told us that we would not have had a single test conducted without advanced information on trajectory for the incoming missile given to the interceptor. Nor would we have an opportunity to have any tests done without first telling the interceptor where the launch location was. So it is noes all the way down the line to there.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, we then asked whether or not the flight intercept tests by 2004 would be able to tell us whether or not countermeasures would be effectively taken into account in the test; and we were told that, no, that would not be done. We then asked whether or not it was important to test the system for different kinds of weather, and we were told it was, but those types of tests would not be done by 2004. We asked whether or not there would be a simple target sweep or a complex target sweep and whether or not there would be tests done on complex target sweeps, and we were told that that would not be done. We talked about the fact that, so far, any target has had a beacon on it so that the enemy setting it up would have to have a red light telling it where it was to be hit, and they said there would be no test without the beacon being on target ahead of time. So right on down the line we have had a system of boosters that have been plagued with problems, and we were told that any booster productivity by 2004 would be extremely unlikely. More likely that is a decade out. So we are using a booster system that will not even be the final one when this becomes operational. Mr. Chairman, the bottom line on all of there is there is no way we should start building this, no way we should start building it until it is fully tested. We cannot under any conditions, by the former operations and technical person at the Pentagon, have this in place and operational and capable by 2004. Why are we spending taxpayers' hard-earned money when we have so many other needs in defense? Primary among those are homeland security issues, pay for our troops, housing for our troops, right on down the line. Instead, just because someone treats this program like religion, we are out here allowing them to get away with starting to build something that we have not tested. We are throwing good money after bad. The worst part of it is, Mr. Chairman, that now the Pentagon tells us, because they were found out about how bad their testing regime is, now they will classify everything so nobody will get the information. You can bet every time they have a test they will tell you it is a success. What they will not tell you is that they are testing it knowing where the launch point was, knowing what the trajectory was, knowing there is a beacon on the target, knowing there are no countermeasures, knowing everyone will know the answer before it starts, and that does not serve the American taxpayer well in the defense of this country.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, that is absolutely accurate, and when they failed to do that they then tried to change the nature in which they proceed with the system to make it harder to measure, and now they are trying to classify it. If I could add one word and make note of what the chairman said, this is strictly a matter of money in this case. It identifies only construction issues and not research issues and in no other way impedes the Department of Defense moving forward research on this. In fact, the very point is, let us research and know what it is we are building before we start throwing bad money after good.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, the way they have structured it so far, there will not be any tests before 2004 where the beacon will not be present.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, it or some of the target suite will have a missile beacon on it.

Mr. TIERNEY. It is possible, though some of the earlier tests had that scenario.

Mr. TIERNEY. That is right.

Mr. TIERNEY. I am saying that the testimony was from the Pentagon's own person, the person who was in charge of doing operational testing and evaluation, Mr. Coyle. It was his job on behalf of the Pentagon, as directed by this Congress, to evaluate whether or not the testing regime was adequate, and it was not. It was basically found that all of these things would not be ready by 2004 and that the whole testing program fell short of giving us any reasonable amount of confidence that the system would be reliable.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, they have a history of having failures. They have had some successes, but none of the successes without those additional components.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, no, it is not likely; and Mr. Coyle made that point, that they do not have the realistic testing scenarios in place and planned for execution before 2004. That is what they should be doing. They should be having realistic scenarios in place and done and completed and be evaluated before we get to the point of building. We have a very bad history in this country, prior to the legislation we passed to set up Mr. Coyle's Department, of having built things before they were adequately tested.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, we have a system here where they are testing, and they have not tested adequately to get to the point to where they should be constructing.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, it would at least stop them from starting to build something that they have not adequately tested. They could continue to research. They could continue to move in the direction of trying to find a way to make a system like this work; but we would not be spending money on building something only to run the extreme risk of having to change it later on at a higher cost and much delay in the program, and that money could then be used more fruitfully on some of the higher priorities of our defense, including homeland security.

Mr. TIERNEY

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, Republicans appear addicted to drug company money. Why else would they try to fool the American people with a plan written with the drug companies that fails to cover over 90 percent of seniors, that insurance companies say they will not participate in because it is good only for the wealthiest seniors with the highest drug costs, that would have seniors pay out of pocket $3,800 per year, and that does nothing to lower the cost of prescription drugs? In fact, the Republican bill so distrusts the President's Secretary of Health and Human Services that it forbids him to negotiate lower prices for seniors. Mr. Speaker, the Republican sham bill is just an attempt to privatize prescription drug coverage in the same way they tried to privatize Social Security. It will not help most seniors, and it will not work. So while Republicans are busy cutting taxes for less than 1 percent of the wealthiest estates in America, they trade off real prescription drug coverage, saying it is too expensive; and they offer a sham bill. The Democrats have a plan to cover seniors. It is affordable, it is accessible to all seniors, it allows the Secretary to negotiate lower and fairer prices, and it is real. Mr. Speaker, let us defeat the Republican sham privatization bill and pass the Democrats' real deal for seniors.

Mr. TIERNEY

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I have the honor of representing the North Shore of Massachusetts; and, like many of my colleagues, I am deeply concerned about a possible Amtrak shutdown and the effect on my constituents. I am doubly troubled by the fact that this situation was avoidable and totally unnecessary. Congress is now being asked to step in and help after the administration failed to take action. Mr. Speaker, 23,000 workers across the country fear job losses. A shutdown will mean lost jobs for thousands of employees already demoralized by years of wage deferrals and wage freezes that have left Amtrak workers among the lowest paid in the industry. A thousand jobs have been lost already in the past months, as Amtrak has cut corners in the absence of government support. We cannot allow additional jobs and benefits to be lost. Local commuter rail riders have voiced their fears about being left stranded by a possible Amtrak shutdown. Failure to act now will mean suspension of Amtrak service in the busy Northeast Corridor, and this will jeopardize commuter rail services for Massachusetts' communities such as Lynn and Salem in my district, not to mention the likely permanent loss of the system's long-distance trains. Amtrak's current financial difficulty is a result of unwise and unattainable congressional goals established in 1997 that forced unfortunate managerial choices and undermined Amtrak's financial viability and access to capital. Congress realized it made a mistake and has since repealed the 1997 requirement that Amtrak file a plan for its own liquidation if it not achieve operating self-sufficiency by the end of 2002. Unfortunately, the damage has been done, and it is imperative that Congress correct its public policy misadventure. We are at the point where Congress has to step in and offer some assistance. As today's Boston Globe reports, ``Rail shutdown would be a slap to the region. Amtrak ridership is on the increase.'' The article notes that ridership in the Northeast Corridor was up 23 percent in May, with a 44 percent growth in revenue over the last year. Over the years, and particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, Amtrak ridership in the Northeast Corridor has decreased traffic at the airports, providing another option for people to travel for business and pleasure. We should reward, not punish, this good service with increased Amtrak investment. Indeed, every G-8 country knows the value of investing in mass ground transportation. All of them support their national passenger rail system. Amtrak is held to a double standard as no other segment of America's transportation system is forced to meet the capital and operating needs without substantial government financial assistance. Amtrak has responded to the growing expectations placed on the passenger rail carrier since September 11; and Congress should, too. America needs better energy and environmental policies. Rail service conserves energy as compared to other forms of intercity transportation. A 1999 Congressional Research Service report determined that general aviation uses more than three times the energy used by Amtrak. Passenger rail service generates less air pollution and less energy than the airplane and the automobile. This is even more significant in high-density areas. Mr. Speaker, let us compare Amtrak with investments in airports and highways. Overall, our highways, aviation and mass transit programs receive almost $57 billion in annual government investments, but Amtrak only receives 1 percent of that. $571 million is slated for fiscal year 2003. Amtrak has only received $25 billion in Federal funding over the past 30 years in comparison with $750 billion spent on highways and aviation during that same period. We can and we should do better. While administration critics propose to shut down Amtrak because not every route is self-sufficient, we should note that the airlines received $150 million this year alone in Federal funding to provide air service to 80 cities where passenger revenues were insufficient to support the provision of service. Amtrak is a bargain by comparison to that. That is why I join my colleagues and asked appropriators to provide sufficient supplemental funding to keep the trains running. The administration seeks to privatize, their solution for government programs they just do not like, from Social Security to prescription drugs, all the way to mass transportation. The fact is, privatization is not the answer. We only have to look at the tragic accidents, delays and system failures in Great Britain to know that privatization does not work. For the security of our commuters, our workers, our environment and our economy, we must keep the trains running. Shutting down Amtrak is clearly not in the public interest. I urge the administration to listen to the American people and respond with a thoughtful, sensible plan to keep Amtrak going.

Mr. TIERNEY

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support a bill to help local officials and our emergency responders better protect our communities. I am a proud cosponsor of H.R. 4598, the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act. We need this bill so we can promote the sharing of critical homeland security threat information between Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies and State and local officials, including our first responders. We need to do this for the families who lost loved ones on September 11 and in the October anthrax attacks, for the American people who expect us to protect them, and for our children so that future generations can grow up in a free and open society. We can and must do so while protecting people's constitutional rights and civil liberties by requiring that any information that is shared must not be used for any unauthorized purpose, and that the procedures must ensure the security and confidentiality of the information, as well as remove or delete obsolete or erroneous information. I cosponsored this bill because first responders from across my district have contacted my office asking for the means to receive credible and specific threat information in order to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks. The fact is, our local first responders face real threats. They need real information and real resources to protect our communities. This bill is an important first step. It says we will be full partners in this action against terrorism. The partnership is critical in protecting communities and saving lives. We all agree that, since September 11, America's heroic first responders have risen to the occasion, protecting communities as the first line of defense against terrorism. In my district, as across America, they have marshaled the resources to track down leads on potential terrorist threats, to buy more equipment, from upgraded weapons to technology to biohazard suits and masks. They have increased hazmat training for handling suspicious packages and stepped up patrols around potential targets like water and gas supplies, power plants, harbors and airports. Now it is time for us to step up and help them. While our first responders appreciated our praise, they do not need our rhetoric. They need our information, and they need resources. This bill is the first step to allow that to happen. We need to press the administration to release direct funding to local first responders and to give them credit for $1.5 billion already spent in this effort.