John Tierney

Mr. TIERNEY

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, at this point in time I understand the gentleman's objections on technical matters on this, and I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. TIERNEY. I might respectfully just disagree with the gentleman on the last point, as I think the National Academy of Science does, when they indicated that they think this idea of having three different agencies with overlapping and different responsibilities would be better served to look at what other kind of regulatory structure we could put in place that would give us more confidence. Also I want to draw a point on the study the gentleman talked about on Starlink. One, I think we want that kind of information before the problem arises, and that is partly why I filed this bill; and, secondly, there is still some controversy swirling around the study the gentleman talked about and the results of it. I suspect from the gentleman's comments and the importance he puts on genetically engineered foods that he favors my bill, which would be a confidence building measure, if we set up the right kinds of test that people could have confidence in, if we set up the right kind of monitoring system that people would know would be something we could rely on, and if we had the right kind of regulatory structure, it would benefit people that take the gentleman's position, as well as people that might be skeptical or more on that. The idea is to follow the advice of the National Academy and do just that. Let them give us the advice through this study that I propose, to tell us what would be the best testing regime, how would you monitor it, and how would you regulate it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that the chairman would just know, this is the second year we have presented this motion; and I think it is a pretty balanced motion. We are seeking here to both give consumers confidence, that the gentleman from Ohio points out very clearly is a very big concern for people; but we also are trying to make sure that farmers know that they can go to the market with confidence. It is going to do us no good in terms of the economics of our society to have a bunch of farmers that are creating a product in which the consumers have no confidence, so there is no market there. This particular amendment was a hope to strike the point where we get the National Academy of Science to determine for us what is the best testing regime, what is the best way to monitor this as it goes through, and what is the best way to make sure that we have a regulatory structure to give the confidence at both of those levels.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, there is probably no more important responsibility for a government than to protect the well-being of its citizens. For this reason, it is essential that we properly assess the best way to ensure the health safety of genetically engineered foods. This amendment presented at the desk seeks a National Academy of Sciences study to examine three important health-related aspects of genetically engineered foods. One, whether or not the tests being performed on genetically engineered foods really ensure their health safety and whether or not they are adequate and relevant; two, what type of monitoring system is needed to assess future health consequences from genetically engineered foods; and, lastly, what type of regulatory structure should be in place to approve genetically engineered foods for humans to eat. In the year 2000, more than 100 million acres of land around the world were planted with genetically engineered crops. This is 25 times as much as was planted just 4 years before. In fact, genetically engineered food crops planted and marketed by United States farmers include 45 kinds of corn, canola, tomatoes, potatoes, soybeans, and sunflowers. Today, genetically engineered ingredients are found in virtually all of our foods that are sold on supermarket shelves; and that includes baby foods, potato chips, soda, and vegetables. Despite the growing presence of genetically engineered foods and despite industry assertions that the foods are safe to eat, the public remains unconvinced. The discovery last year of genetically engineered Starlink corn that was not approved for humans to eat in taco shells was a wake-up call. Now that the cat is out of the bag, Starlink's manufacturers want the Environmental Protection Agency to declare Starlink safe for human consumption. Mr. Chairman, that is no way to protect our health. As the Centers for Disease Control noted earlier this month, we need to properly evaluate genetically engineered foods before they get into the food supply. In my home State of Massachusetts, the State legislature is considering legislation that would impose a 5-year moratorium on the growing of genetically engineered foods. Similar legislation is pending in New York. In fact, according to the Grocery Manufacturers of America, as of March this year there were eight bills in six States that would ban or put a moratorium on the planting of genetically engineered crops. We cannot afford to bury our heads in the sand and let the public's concerns continue to grow. We need to develop a standard of tests that can be applied to all genetically engineered food to ensure that it is safe for our children and ourselves to eat. The Food and Drug Administration does not conduct its own testing of genetically engineered products. Instead, the Food and Drug Administration provides guidelines and then relies upon the companies who produce genetically engineered products to test their safety. Companies voluntarily share the results of the tests on genetically engineered products with the Food and Drug Administration. Under new rules proposed on January 17 by the last administration, companies in the future will have to give 120 days' notice to the Food and Drug Administration before producing new genetically engineered products on the market. But even with these new rules, it remains the responsibility of the companies that create the market and market these products to test for their safety. We need to be sure that these companies are doing the right tests in the right way. In addition to ensuring that testing methods are adequate, we need to ensure that our regulatory system is also sufficient to protect our health. The National Academy of Sciences has said, ``A solid regulatory system and scientific base are important for acceptance and safe adoption of agricultural biotechnology, as well as for protecting the environment and public health.'' Our current regulatory system, in which the Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the United States Department of Agriculture share jurisdiction over genetically engineered food, may not be the best way to ensure the health and safety of the foods we eat. We need to be certain that testing, regulation and monitoring of genetically engineered foods over the long term are effective and appropriate in determining the potential health effects of eating genetically engineered foods. Even the center for Science in the Public Interest, an organization devoted to improving the safety and nutritional quality of our food supply, has said that the National Academy of Sciences study would provide regulators with a scientific road map of tests to ensure the safety of genetically engineered foods so the consumers would feel secure when they consume them and farmers would be confident that they have a market for their products. I think that is what we are looking for, Mr. Chairman. We want consumers to feel secure when they eat, and we want farmers to be confident when they market their products. We should heed the words from that study, and we should fund the study proposed in this amendment. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for his attention.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 24.

Mr. TIERNEY

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, people this morning have been talking about the energy situation, and I think it is important to talk calmly for a moment about some of the things that have been happening. I happen to be a member of the Subcommittee on Energy of the Committee on Government Reform, and we have had hearings with the American Petroleum Institute and others from the industry testifying before us. Also, Senator Wyden in the Senate has taken testimony on this matter. It is important for the American people to know that there is strong evidence that the industry acted to make sure that they reduced supply so that they could raise costs. Senator Wyden had thick documents, which I have just put on record in our committee hearing, showing over the last decade of the nineties there was too much refinery backlog for the companies, so they acted, or at least indicated they were going to act, to make sure that those refineries shrunk. Over 50 of them have closed. Therefore, we did not have the kind of supply that we needed; and of course, that drove up demand and drove up price. Now that that is up there, the companies will tell you the reason we do not have enough fuel at reasonable prices is because we do not have enough refineries. Now they are looking for the triple play. Instead of producing more and getting that in the pipeline and having more refineries, they now want to do away with environmental regulations. This is not something we should allow to happen. We should keep our eye on that industry and make sure we get something done for the consumer.

Mr. TIERNEY

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Connecticut for yielding me this time. Obviously, I want to congratulate the gentlewoman from Connecticut for bringing this amendment forward. In Massachusetts, there are 85,000 people who rely on LIHEAP in order to get their fuel. I also want to commend the chairman of both the committee and the subcommittee, because they have taken a look at this and they have increased the numbers somewhat and they are appreciative and sympathetic to the problems that people face. I think, however, the gentlewoman from Connecticut makes the point that we need more funds than the committee made available. We have large amounts of people that face this problem. One need only talk to the dealers who go out and deliver the oil in the winter to people in my communities to know that time in and time out there are not enough resources there for the people that need these services. So having this money on hand makes an important statement and gives important protection to people. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we go forward, approve this amendment both with respect to the LIHEAP monies and also with respect to the FEMA monies that have been asked for, because those situations are upon us, they are real and people suffer otherwise. Again I thank the gentlewoman for bringing forward this particular amendment and urge Members to support it.

Mr. TIERNEY

Mr. TIERNEY. Reclaiming my time just for a second, conjure up now information in the report that the administration and the Department of Defense should let us debate and talk about, about phantom trajectories, about the prospect of as the radar passes from one to a second radar, there are phantom tracks and that they are unable to control missiles shot against those phantom tracks, what is the message they send to a Russia or a China? How much time do they have to decide whether or not these are in fact something going after a phantom track or are they the launch of an offensive capacity against them? And now you understand somewhat why they feel that if you put this national missile defense on the drawing table, they already threatened that they will increase their supply of national defense missiles in the case of China or in Russia that they will not go into a program or agreement with us to de-alert those that they already have. We should all know that is one thing the President has talked about doing that we should support is de-alerting as many on each side as we can and moving towards incapacitating them or at least having them situated where it takes a subsequent and a sufficient amount of time to have to get them activated so we can step back from the precipice and have a more reasonable policy on that.

Mr. TIERNEY. I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin. We certainly have not, I hope. For the last word I would like to recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).

Mr. TIERNEY. I think there is an obvious answer to that. For this country to move forward and commit billions of dollars on a system that is not known to work, has not been tested, and when Mr. Coyle, the reporter of which I spoke earlier, specifically says the tests are inadequate and unrealistic and they do not even plan to do tests that would be adequate and realistic as this moves forward is a frightening prospect. I think if we were to be able to have that report instead of the Department of Defense trying to hide it and trying to keep it hushed up, if we were to have the Secretary come in and explain to us why an unclassified report is being kept from the American public or at least attempted to be kept from the American public, we would be able to debate the context of that report which specifically says not only are there tests that are unreasonable, that they had very few countermeasures in those tests, and then when they decided that they at one point were not being very successful, they dummied the tests down and they had even fewer. At one point there were plans for nine or 10 or more countermeasures to come in and then they dummied it down to just two items up there and then one of them was easily distinguishable from the other and they gave all of the coordinates and other information ahead of time and still missed. We are not going to have that luxury of any system that is expected to work, we are not going to get advance notice of where it is going, what the trajectory is and all the other information. So I think that that question answers itself, that we would be foolish as a Nation to spend the kind of money that we are talking about just for the limited land-based system. And this is testimony I referred to earlier in front of our Committee on Government Reform, the Subcommittee on National Security, where they were already up over $50 billion for a program that started at 9 to $11 billion, and that is only at that stage. Add on phases 2 and 3, you are over $100 billion. Add on the sea-based, add on the air-based, add on the space-based that they are talking about, you could be anywhere between $300 billion and $1 trillion. I think if we start down that path with no expectation that it is going to add to our national security, the answer is pretty clear, I think, that we are being pretty irresponsible as a government.

Mr. TIERNEY. I would just point out this next quote up here, the gentleman has exactly hit on the point. On June 7, Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, at a press conference, people were asking him, ``Does it even work?'' His answer was, ``This is an interesting question in the sense of what do you mean when you say that works?'' You look at that on its face value as what is he talking about? We know when it works. That is why we do studies. That is why Mr. Coyle did his study, that in case it does not work. Not only does it not work, it needs considerably more testing until it gets to a point we are comfortable that it works reasonably well or sufficiently, and they do not even plan to do the tests so far on that. But again they want to engage our pocketbooks before we engage our national brain on this and start building and committing us down that path. I would just make that point.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for joining us tonight. I have a quote here on the board. It is a quote that the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, made on May 29. He was referring to a comment made by President Bush. He stated, ``We ought to engage our brains before we engage our pocketbooks.'' What sharp contrast that statement is to the administration's apparent focus now on starting a system that they admit has not been shown to have been tested thoroughly and that has not been shown to work. We are making an exception for national missile defense, and hundreds of billions of dollars. We are not going to engage our brains, we are going to engage our pocketbooks and start down a path that creates all sorts of mishaps and mischievous. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Kind).

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman. Even if we were to assume on our wildest dreams, because that is essentially what it would be, North Korea, one of the poorest nations in the world, that cannot even feed its own people, would wake up some morning and would have the vision that it wanted to commit mass suicide, and assuming it is several years in the future and they had somehow developed a nuclear missile with the capacity to even reach our coast with any sort of precision at all, it would be much more likely they would put a biological or chemical weapon on it, in which case they would use multiple warheads. In that case, it would overwhelm any limited national missile defense system we would have. We are having to project forward and do a system that is much larger, and get into hundreds of billions of dollars and a prospect that is unrealistic. The second issue is the issue of confidence. Ostensibly we are doing this to have some sort of strategic advantage over some rogue nation holding us hostage with the prospect that they might send off a weapon of mass destruction by missile. The fact of the matter is that there is speculation that we may not be able to come close to 100 percent effectiveness. Twenty or so years ago when they were talking about President Reagan's Star Wars, one of the groups that was advocating against it used to come out with an umbrella with holes in it and say that is the kind of protection you are getting. It is essentially the same situation here. The probability that you would be able to get 100 percent of any weapon sent over in most estimations of any reasonable scientist is nonexisting. So you would have no confidence that it was 100 percent reliable, and I would suggest that leaves you with no ability to effect a strategic decision. It is not a useful prospect to have if it worked on its best abilities on any given day because even its best abilities are not projected at 100 percent. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur).

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Allen).

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I join a number of my colleagues here this evening to discuss the administration's policy on national missile defense. I put up on the board here one of the comics that was recently in a newspaper showing Secretary Powell with members of NATO and essentially asking Secretary Powell if they really expect him to buy that, and that is, of course, a used car which stands symbolically, in this instance, for the national missile defense program being discussed and being put forth by this administration at this time. Mr. Speaker, I join my colleagues to discuss that policy and specifically the administration's apparent attempt to move swiftly to deploy that system even before tests show that it is feasible. There are apparent plans to proceed beyond research and development, though no proper consideration has been given to many critical factors. We have yet to really assess all threats against the United States, whether they be from another state or a nonstate. The alleged purpose of this limited national missile defense or the early stages of the Bush administration plan is supposedly to protect us against rogue nations or against accidental or unintended launches. Rogue nation threats are primarily the national missile defense concern, or so we are told. If that is the case, we should assess them and assess them on whether or not that threat of missiles from rogue nations compares to other threats that exist to our Nation. Currently, the threat of weapons of mass destruction from missiles ranks low on the list of CIA possible threats. While some rogue nations have crude missile systems nearing the capability of reaching the continental United States, they are, according to the CIA and others, less credible threats than other forms of aggression and terrorism. In keeping with that train of thought, we should establish most likely threats and key our defenses towards those that are most likely. With limited funding resources, the United States must be sure that our spending is proportionate to our established priorities. Spending on any national missile defense must not adversely affect readiness or military personnel quality of life or modernization of conventional land, air and naval forces, nor should it adversely affect research and development efforts aimed at necessary leap-ahead technologies. It cannot ignore the benefits of timely and reliable intelligence or diplomacy. In view of all our national priorities, whether they be domestic in nature or international and defense prospects that affect our national security, the cost that is going to be incurred must be warranted by the security benefits we should expect to gain. Americans deserve to know before we deploy the realistic cost estimates and who will pay. Is it only the United States that is going to fit the bill, or will all nations that stand to benefit from any deployed national missile defense system participate in sharing the cost? So far, the projections show the following costs. Mr. Speaker, I have another chart. Mr. Speaker, as the chart indicates, the initial estimates for 20 interceptors were originally estimated to be at a cost of nine to $11 billion. The fact of the matter was that that was in January of 1999 at $10.6 billion. By November of that year, it was at $28.7 billion. By February of 2000, it had moved up to 100 interceptors being planned, and the estimate then was $26.6 billion. By April, it rose to $29.5 billion; by May to $36.2 billion; by August of 2000, $40.3 billion by the own estimate of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Now in August of 2000, the CAIG report estimates it up to about $43.2 billion. That is with a number of items not included. As my colleagues can see on the chart, other estimates in testing adjustments, alternative booster programs add another $4.5 billion, bringing it up to some $47.7 billion. Not included also is the restructuring of the program to remedy testing delays. That adds another $2.8 billion. Essentially, we are up to $50.5 billion on this program and going up, up and forever upward. We should not forget the fact that this administration is not only talking about a land-based limited system. It is talking about adding a second phase and a third phase to the land-based design, adding a sea- based provision, adding an air-based aspect, and then going on to space-based laser. So let us add those up. Adding phases 2 and 3 of a ground-based system would add another $50 billion. The sea-based system would be another $53.5 billion. An air-based system would add another $11 billion. The space-based laser, besides inviting in the number of people to secure items in space which we alone have almost monopoly on, would add a cost to seventy to $80 billion. So total estimates on this program are at a minimum of $80 billion to $100 billion or as high as a trillion dollars, depending on how far out we go. That should all bring us to the issue of feasibility. The administration now intends to use this system whether or not it works. In other words, it is going to buy it before it flies it. We have had a number of experiences in our military programs with that, most recently with the F-22 and with the Osprey. The Osprey not only costs us a lot of money to go back and cure remedies that were not caught because we did not test it properly, it has cost us the lives of 25 Marines. In keeping with this administration's ready, shoot and then aim prospect, Secretary Rumsfeld has taken an in-your-face attitude to our allies as well as to our friends as well as to Russia and China. He is determined to put all other considerations aside and deploy this system even if the technology is not available and is not proven feasible. Astoundingly, the Washington Post reported these comments from an administration official, and I quote: ``It is a simple question. Is something better than nothing?'' It went on to say, ``The President and the Secretary of Defense have made it pretty clear that they believe some missile defense in the near term is, in fact, better than nothing.'' Now my colleagues may join me in being astounded in that, but that statement should at least rest on two underlying assumptions. One would be that that something in fact works, and this does not; and, two, that deployment will not subject the country to even greater security dangers. This program will. What the Pentagon and the Department of Defense and the Secretary and the President know but do not apparently want the Americans to discover or consider or debate is that the National Missile Defense System's effectiveness has not yet been proven even in the most elementary sense. Also, there should be grave concerns regarding the disturbing side effects of the National Missile Defense System, such as uncontrollable launches and their attendant risk to world security. A study has been completed, not by groups opposed to missile defense, but by the department's own internal experts. That study makes it clear that potentially profound problems exist with the National Missile Defense System. The Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, known by its initials OT&E, is an independent assessment office within the Department of Defense. It was created to oversee testing programs and in particular to ensure that weapons development programs are adequately tested in realistic operating conditions. Its former director, Mr. Philip Coyle testified on September 8 of last year before the Subcommitte on National Security, Veterans' Affairs and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform. He testified about a report that he had compiled during the deployment readiness review that was conducted in the summer of 2000. As a result of that testimony, it became apparent that the Pentagon was overstating the technological progress and potential of this National Missile Defense System. Because I thought it was imperative that the public have full access to Mr. Coyle's study, I asked Mr. Coyle to provide the full report for the record of that committee, and he agreed to my request. My motion that the subcommittee include that study on the public record for the September 8, 2000 hearing was accepted without objection. At no time did Mr. Coyle or Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, the Director of the Missile Program, express any reservations. Well, after 8 months and at least six separate requests and a subpoena threat, the subcommittee finally obtained the study. But the Department of Defense asked that that study be kept confidential. I think this is precisely the wrong response. The Bush administration is proposing to our allies and strategic partners that deployment be speeded up even beyond optimistic evaluations. In this context, the need for public debate about the system's capabilities and its potential dangers if deployed prematurely is urgently needed. I have, therefore, written to Secretary Rumsfeld for a full explanation of the Department of Defense request to hush up this report. I have asked the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays), the subcommittee chairman, to schedule hearings on this study and its implications as expeditiously as possible. In conversations earlier this evening with the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays), I have been informed that those hearings will be pursued. Now, Mr. Coyle raises fundamental problems with the national missile defense testing programs. He tells us it is far behind schedule, and it is slipping further. The test program is severely deficient, failing to test basic elements of the system. In fact, after numerous failures, Mr. Coyle tells us that the Pentagon actually altered the test program to make it easier, and still it continued to fail. Mr. Coyle described the immature status of the program. There are limitations in flight testing and inadequacy of available simulations. Therefore, a rigorous assessment of potential system performance cannot be made. That is, no one can reliably predict that the National Missile Defense System, as planned by this administration, will perform at the required levels. Testimony of the Director found several ways the system may not work: its inability to defend against decoys. As discussed extensively in open literature, the enemy could employ various types of countermeasures and overwhelm this function. I hope that our speakers this evening will talk at length at that. I know the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) is here. He has particular expertise in this area, and we should discuss it at length. But rather than address the fatal errors, the omission of tests with countermeasures could make the system unable to fulfill its core function of defending against accidental or intended launches; and rather than discuss that, the Pentagon is hitting them by dumbing down the testing requirements. The Department of Defense also provides interceptors with key discrimination information ahead of time. In other words, it rigs the game. It tells them trajectory. It tells them timing. It tells them height. It tells them all sorts of information. Yet, the system will not have that benefit if and when it is deployed. So there is a need for rehearsed engagements without advanced knowledge, yet none have been done so far and none are planned to be done. The director criticizes the software user simulations as it suffers from an unfounded reliance on unrealistic and overly optimistic parameters. There is no plan to consider conducting flight tests with multiple targets or interceptors even though multiple engagements could be expected to be the norm. These are potential security risks of premature deployment. Phantom tracks. The system automatically allocates interceptors against phantom objects. In other words, these are created when the radar coverage transfers from one radar system to a second radar system, and the system mistakenly interprets the new radar rhythms as originating from a second reentry vehicle. The operators, the manual operators were unable to deal with that. There is one very serious immediate danger if the United States launches multiple interceptors against missiles that do not exist. Adversaries may interpret these launches as a hostile first strike and respond accordingly. So it brings us back to this idea that we are going to deploy this system before we have adequately tested it, before we have talked about the cost of this program, before we have talked about our priorities in defense and whether or not this is, in fact, the most serious issue we ought to be confronting at such an enormous cost while it is still very far from being feasible. Deployment has been defined to mean the fielding of an operational system with some military utility which is effective under realistic combat conditions against realistic threats and countermeasures, possibly without adequate prior knowledge of the target cluster composition, timing, trajectory or direction and when operated by military personnel at all times of the day and night in all weather. In almost every one of those categories, there have been tests that have been failed or tests that are not even planned to determine whether or not this system can work. Yet, we have a Secretary and apparently an entire administration that is willing to walk that plank and commit billions and billions of dollars on a system that has not been proven to work, casting aside all of our other defense needs, casting aside the questions that it brings to our national security, and casting aside the issues of others priorities within this country. We have a report that seriously calls into question the readiness of this national missile defense. I think that report leads to serious questions of this administration's ill-advised plan to deploy before it has proven technologically feasible and apparently with total disregard for costs, stability in this country and the world, and effect on other priorities. This is no time for the Department of Defense to bury a study. It is time for full disclosure, for deliberation and for debate. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt) and cede the floor to him.

Mr. TIERNEY

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky) for yielding to me. Let me just end this hour-plus, with the courtesy of our colleague, by saying that this administration, as I started off by saying, has a ready, shoot, in-their-name approach to this whole policy. This is much like what has been going on with a number of the policies of this administration. They have unilaterally claimed that the Kyoto Protocol was dead. They have started to retract on that and are now talking about limitations on carbon dioxide and talking about cooperating with our international friends. They have asserted that a pull-out of forces from the Balkans was imminent and now they are talking about cooperating and being sure that they do not pull out unilaterally. They have talked about an express intent not to engage in the Middle East but reality has struck there and they have not only one envoy by two over there. They have talked about halting diplomatic initiatives in North Korea and now, in fact, they are starting to engage, or at least in all of these respects they are using semantics in talking about that. I hope they are being truthful in their attempt to move forward in that regard, although I fear that they may be just sort of smoothing and massaging what is going on while the President is abroad. Today, their administration policies have always been leap before you think, leap before you look, whether it is domestic policy on the tax cut that cuts enormous amounts of money without deciding what we have for needs first or for obligations, and now we are talking about a national missile defense system which decidedly has not been proven to work, decidedly has not been tested and decidedly does not have tests planed to move us forward in that regard. Now I understand that the Department of Defense is going to tell us that they are pulling back and in fact they are going to start a testing regime, with a white team and a blue team and a red team that are going to throw up countermeasures and test against them and have somebody evaluate that. The fact of the matter is, Secretary of Defense Mr. Rumsfeld is still talking about deploying and moving forward at tremendous cost, not only financially but in terms of relationships and diplomatic relationships with other nations, even before we determine whether or not the system can work, even before we determine whether or not it fits within our priorities, given all the other needs that we have in national security and otherwise, and even before we determine whether or not it is going to fit into the plans of stability for this Nation and the world. So I hope that this tonight was a start in a conversation on this. I hope that we can impress upon the Secretary of Defense to allow us to release to the public Mr. Coyle's report from the OT&E office so that we can discuss that and debate it openly. It talks about some serious reservations and some serious concerns about moving forward and deploying before, in fact, we should be. I thank the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky) for joining us on that and all the other Members who participated tonight and I look forward to an open debate so the American people can really understand what is involved here and what is at stake and the dangers and responsibilities attendant to it.

Mr. TIERNEY

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I was just going to suggest to the gentleman if he started singing that, we were going to start leaving. I just want to start by saying that Jim McGovern was a friend to Mr. Moakley in life and continues to be a loyal friend even now, and I want to thank him for putting together this time and for all he did in the last couple of weeks, as well as throughout Joe's latter years of his life and being that kind of friend and doing us all the honor of befriending him in that way. I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) for participating in this hour and for also being a friend, even though he was, of course, of another persuasion in party. I think Joe transcended that, as does the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) and others. I think the public would be well served to remember that Joe Moakley gave people an idea of what people down here strive to be, and that is a person who really wants to do the people's business and wants to do it in a civilized fashion, and he did that every day of his life. I want to also mention the staff of Joe at home in his district offices, as well as here in his Washington office and on the staff of the Committee on Rules. I know how lucky he was to have such tremendous staff, and I trust they already know and have shown us how much they know they were lucky to have had a mentor and a friend that they could love and work with. I know we will all benefit in the House with their continued good services, and I want to thank them for all they have done for him and all they do for us. It is fashionable in Massachusetts now, Mr. Speaker, to start resurrecting the memory of John Adams. Joseph Ellis has written a book, ``The Passionate Sage,'' and others have started to remember the good that John Adams did as our second president and begun to wonder why he has not been memorialized. The two words that come to mind when we think of John Adams are also words that describe Joe Moakley. One is integrity. Joe always had integrity. He always let people know exactly where he stood and why he stood there. He was always on the right side of things and it did not matter whether you were rich or poor, where you came from, what your background or education, Joe seemed to know what the right thing was and he knew how to stand for people at the right moment. The other is, of course, authenticity. Just as John Adams was the authentic deal, Joe Moakley was the authentic person all the time. He never put on airs. He never tried to be something he was not. And in fact it is just as well, because he was all that any person should be. He was, in fact, somebody that everybody in the delegation looked up to. We had respect for him. Joseph Ellis talks in his book about John Adams, ``The Passionate Sage,'' about John Adams' theory that everyone strives for something, whether it was to be the captain of the economy, whether it was to be a person of title in the ministry, the clergy, the military, in politics. Whatever it might be, they all really were looking for respect. And in fact, Joe Moakley lived a life sort of subconsciously looking for respect because he just lived a life that had that agenda to him day in and day out. We all respected Joe Moakley and what he stood for. We respected the relationship he had with his constituents and with all the people down here. It was best shown, I think, by the tremendous outpouring of people that stood out there in that line from South Boston to Braintree's Blue Hill Cemetery stood there for a long period of time just so they could finally say good-by to Joe Moakley. It has been an honor to know and serve with this gentleman, and I think we will always remember his authenticity, his integrity, and we all know what great respect everybody here has for him.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, this should come to no surprise to us that there are more Members here that want to commemorate Joe, and I ask unanimous consent that we have another hour to have Members express their condolences and memories; and I ask that one-half of that time be managed by the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) and one-half of that time be managed by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern).

Mr. TIERNEY

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TIERNEY. I am still waiting to hear the answer. What does the gentleman fear about modernizing the public schools that exist? What does the gentleman fear about making smaller classrooms in the public schools that exist?

Mr. TIERNEY. What do we have to lose by actually modernizing our schools? But my colleagues were not willing to do that. What do we have to lose by having more classrooms?

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. Chairman, I heard the gentleman on the other side of the aisle refer to this money as new money. Well, this is not new money. This is money that is not being appropriated for the modernization of our schools, it is not being appropriated for smaller classrooms so there can be better discipline and the children can get more personal attention. It is not being appropriated for more teacher recruitment or mentoring or professional development so that all of the things that we know really would improve the education of our children in public schools could be done. Those are the things that work. That is what my colleagues tell us vouchers will do, is get those kinds of circumstances, yet they are unwilling to make the commitment in our public schools to see that happen. They would rather privatize education. Mr. Chairman, we have had privatized education before. It was pre- Horace Mann. What we got as a result was some very exclusive people that could afford an education and many who could not. One of my colleagues on the other side said the only hope for America is this voucher program passing. Mr. Chairman, I do not think that is close to correct. What hope is in this country is a free public education for all Americans, whatever their social and economic background. That is where we ought to be focusing our attention. False hope is a solution that gives out too little money to pay for tuition, that selects only a few and gives them that too little money, that does not guarantee them a place in any particular school, that does not have them go to a school that has standards to which they are held. Just because at Yale the President is preaching mediocrity in education is a virtue does not mean we have to fulfill that promise here. In 10 different voucher petitions across this country, the concept did not just get beat, it got hammered. When the American public understands that these voucher proposals do not pay for full tuition, do not guarantee them a school where they want to go, and does not fulfill the promise, they vote against it. If we want hope for our children, let us make sure that all of our public schools have all of the resources they need to do the things that we know work: Modernize the buildings that they are in; give them smaller classrooms; give them good teachers with good recruitment and good professional development programs. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to reject this voucher proposal.