Fred Thompson

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, this is a good day for the Senate. It demonstrates once again that this body can respond to its public's needs. Even the casual observer must agree that our change from a system of the small contributor to the huge contributor is not good for this country. To those who say we are launching off into uncharted waters, that we are unsure how this might affect us as politicians or our political committees in Washington, I say that we as elected officials can never be harmed if our country is benefited. We as elected officials can never be harmed if we are doing something that increases the public trust. And if we are, Mr. President, so be it, because we must know that we are doing the right thing. Mr. President, twenty-seven years ago Congress decided to fix a campaign finance system that was clearly broken. The American public was scandal-weary and increasingly cynical about the integrity of the political process. In 1974, the President signed into law the Federal Election Campaign Act. Unions and corporations had long been prohibited from contributing to campaigns, and that year Congress decided to limit the amount of money an individual could give to candidates and parties to avoid corruption, and just as important, the appearance of corruption, in our system. Those limits on contributions were upheld by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo. The Court stated, ``[T]he Act's primary purpose--to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions--[provides] a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation.'' The Court also upheld the constitutionality of limits on contributions to political parties. The Court found such limits serve to prevent evasion of the $1,000 limitation on contributions to candidates by an individual ``who might otherwise contribute massive amounts to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate or huge contributions to the candidate's political party.'' Just last year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the position it took in Buckley. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC, the Court upheld an individual contribution limit of $1,050 under Missouri law and found, ``[T]here is little reason to doubt that sometimes large contributions will work actual corruption of our political system, and no reason to question the existence of a corresponding suspicion among voters.'' In the years following the passage of FECA, amendments to the Act and certain FEC regulations and rulings attempted to clarify the law, particularly as it related to state parties. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the a statement by campaign finance expert and scholar Tony Corrado, a professor at Colby College, that explains thoroughly the origin and rise of soft money, be printed in the Record.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, last month marked the 80th birthday of Harold Burson, the founding chairman of one of the world's leading public relations firms, Burson-Marsteller. This milestone, celebrated with good health and good humor by Mr. Burson along with his family and many friends, is especially noteworthy to the people of Tennessee because he is one of our most distinguished native sons. Harold Burson was born in Memphis on February 15, 1921. Despite a lifetime of accomplishment and honors on a global scale, he has never forgotten his Tennessee roots. Likewise, Mr. Burson's lifetime of professional achievement has earned him the deep respect of his fellow Tennesseans. I ask that a series of letters written in tribute to Mr. Burson on the occasion of his 80th birthday be printed in the Record. These letters from President Bush and others demonstrate that Harold Burson's contributions have meaning not just to folks in Tennessee, but to all Americans. Thanks to the legacy of Harold Burson, public relations is a more respected and honored profession. Those of us who have the privilege of holding public office know that public opinion is at the heart of our democratic process. Harold Burson has helped create a profession that has brought credibility and integrity to the practice of influencing public opinion. People who have worked with Mr. Burson and have had him as a mentor are leading the public relations industry today and will do so in the future. Thanks to Mr. Burson's good health and robust spirit at the age of 80, his legacy is still being written. When the last century was coming to a close, PRWeek, an industry publication, named Harold Burson the most influential figure in public relations in the twentieth century. The publication cited Mr. Burson's career as a counselor, advisor and mentor, and described him as ``the most complete PR professional in history.'' I know other Americans join me in wishing Harold Burson many more years of health, happiness and fulfillment. The letters follow. U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, March 9, 2001. Mr. Harold Burson, Founding Chairman, Burson-Marsteller, New York, NY. Dear Mr. Burson: It is a privilege for me to join your friends and relatives in saluting you on your eightieth birthday. For half a century, you have been a pioneer in the public relations profession. The respected firm you founded has set a high standard as a result of your close attention to integrating integrity and credibility. Your lifetime of good works and professional achievement has earned you the respect of your native state of Tennessee. Please accept my personal best wishes and warmest regards. Sincerely, Fred Thompson, U.S. Senator.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Tennessee, Senator Frist, who has done his usual excellent job in laying out his case. I think the concern that is being expressed is a valid concern, in that we need to keep in mind the totality of the system as we are addressing this issue. That is one of the things that makes me feel good about what happened yesterday, because I think that is exactly what we were doing. If we, for example, had lost Snowe-Jeffords somewhere along the way and just had a soft money ban without any increases in the hard money limit, I think the potential problem that my colleague expressed would really have been a significant one. I do not think that practical problem exists nearly as much as we feared, because even under a worst case scenario, if the disclosure and other provisions of the Snowe- Jeffords even were to fall and we lost soft money in the system--which I think would be a good happening--we have increases in the hard money limit. We have now doubled, under the original bill--we have doubled the amount of money the candidate can have for his own campaign, $1,000 to $2,000; $4,000 in a primary, $4,000 in a general election. We have also increased the amount of money that can go to parties. We did not increase it as much as I would like, but we increased it. We also increased the aggregate amount. We also increased and doubled the amount that parties can give to the candidates. We indexed all of it. It is not that we are not in the same position we were when McCain- Feingold started. We have taken some significant steps in order to get some legitimate, controlled, limited, hard money into the hands of candidates and into the hands of parties that they didn't have when this debate began. The problem that is being addressed today is one of the very kinds of things we were trying to address yesterday. I think this body effectively and overwhelmingly addressed it in the compromise amendment that we have. The proponents of the current amendment for nonseverability, however, make the case that we shouldn't risk the situation where the soft money limitations or abolitions and the Snowe- Jeffords requirements with regard to unions, corporations, and others would be struck down; that there would be an imbalance. My first point is that we corrected and I think significantly corrected that imbalance yesterday. My second point would be that it is not exactly as if Snowe-Jeffords were some kind of a major happening in terms of the overall picture of any given campaign. In the first place, none of it kicks in 60 days before an election. So anything goes up until 60 days. Part of Snowe- Jeffords is simply a disclosure requirement. It doesn't have anything to do with money. A part of Snowe-Jeffords has to do with corporations and unions within the last 60 days and their expenditures, and that is a money situation. Let's say that was knocked out, hypothetically. We are all talking hypothetically because obviously none of us knows what a court will do. We have argued the constitutionality of Snowe-Jeffords in the past. For the moment, let's hypothetically say that a 60-day restriction with regard to what corporations and unions could do, and nobody else--no individuals, as Senator Wellstone pointed out, for example--is a part of this. I compliment my friend for narrowly tailoring this legislation so we didn't have to deal with all of that. But that is knocked out. Then we are knocking out some corporate and union money in the last 60 days of the campaign. That is not insignificant. But I am not sure, in the total context of things, that it is all that important. It certainly doesn't justify doing what we may be doing here in terms of nonseverability. The first thing we need to understand about nonseverability and Congress passing a bill with a nonseverability provision in this is that it is extremely rare. It is rarely done. We asked the Congressional Research Service about it. Their information is that there have been 10 bills introduced or considered in the last 12 years that have had a nonseverability provision in them. They further say that there has only been one bill in the last 12 years where we have passed legislation that contained a nonseverability clause. It is extremely rare in the thousands of bills that passed during that period of time of 12 years. I said: How many public laws were there? They said 12,962. Out of 12,962 pieces of legislation, only 1 of them contained a nonseverability clause. That is some indication of the rarity and the significance of what we are doing here today, or what is being suggested that we do. There was a principle established a long time ago in this country that is honored by Congress and is recognized by the judiciary--that in a piece of legislation, which more likely than not will contain several provisions, you can have some parts of it that are constitutional and maybe one part that is not. Strike the unconstitutional part, says the Court, and leave the rest intact. That is the normal way we have handled things in this country. It is based upon a concept that I think all of us honor and adhere and we talk a lot about. That is the concept of judicial restraint. We have recognized in this country for a long time--and our courts have recognized for a long time--that they should exercise judicial restraint and make constitutional rulings only when necessary. The courts have adopted their own rulings that militate in that direction and cause them not to go off and even consider constitutional issues unless they really have to. It is for the reasons that I explained: Because of the concept of restraint and the benefit we get as a country and that the judiciary gets for adopting judicial restraint, not reaching out to take on more than it should and look for opportunities to strike down laws when they are not even really directly presented to them, and so forth. I think the Court said it very well in the case of Regan v. Time, Inc., with the Supreme Court plurality decision in 1984. This is a little long, but I think it is important because it gets to the heart of what I am saying. The Court said: In exercising its power to review the constitutionality of a legislative act, a Federal court should act cautiously. A ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of people. Therefore, a court should refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary. As this court has observed, whenever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable provisions separable from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this court to so declare and maintain the act insofar as it is valid. Thus, this court has upheld the constitutionality of some provisions of a statute even though other provisions of a statute were unconstitutional. For the same reasons, we have often refused to resolve the constitutionality of a particular provision of a statute when the constitutionality of a separate controlling provision has been upheld. I think that states it very well. In summary, I think it has been the law and the practice of the United States for many years. It is a valid one. I think we would all agree that it is a valid one. Those are the circumstances. No. 1, the extreme rarity of the situation; No. 2, these longstanding principles that our judiciary has. Those are the foundation blocks as we approach this issue this time as a Congress. What will be the legal effects of a nonseverability clause? Not only has Congress not legislated a nonseverability clause once in the last 12 years, but there are no cases ever in the history of the country where Federal courts have been called upon to construe a nonseverability clause. We really are in uncharted waters here in terms of how such a clause might be interpreted. I fear we are getting into an area of unknown consequences, and potential perversive results that we don't fully appreciate. What will be the probable result? As you think it through, you can see situations very readily that are going to produce perplexities, shall we say, that maybe we can resolve here on the floor--I don't know--and determine what intent the proponents have with regard to this amendment. Article III of our Constitution says there must be a case in controversy before a person can bring a lawsuit, have it upheld. Any law professors out there, forgive me for my shorthand as I go through this. I want to touch on the general principles, and I hope I get them right. If you are a litigant, someone challenging this act, you have to have standing. There is a criminal aspect to this statute; if you are a criminal and you are convicted, you have standing. As far as the civil aspects of it are concerned, in any kind of a situation, you have to have a case in controversy, and you have to have standing. That means you have to be injured directly by the provision you are dealing with or have been convicted of. If the statute is in force, you will be injured, if you sustained injury or you face imminent injury, something like that, not just a general public kind of a potential injury. There was a case back in 1974 where some concerned citizens got together and sued the CIA because they were not disclosing their budget. The courts held that your interests are not any different from any other citizen. You have no standing in this lawsuit. That little background has relevance because someone challenging these two provisions will refer to them as the soft money provision and the Snowe-Jeffords provision of the McCain-Feingold bill.

Mr. THOMPSON. I request an additional 10 minutes.

Mr. THOMPSON. Reserving the right to object.

Mr. THOMPSON. It has to do with how the cases would come up. If someone, let's say, was convicted under the soft money provision--in other words, somebody sent some soft money to somebody they weren't supposed to after this law was passed, and they got caught doing that and they got charged with and got convicted of it, if you had severability, then that person would clearly have standing with regard to the soft money provision they were convicted of. That is all that would be at issue. Presumably, if you had nonseverability the way that the proponents of this amendment would suggest, that person who is affected by the soft money provision that he is convicted of, presumably he could also challenge the Snowe-Jeffords part of the bill that has no relevance to him. If so, are we telling the Court, by means of this amendment, to give standing to this person to challenge Snowe-Jeffords when they are not affected by Snowe-Jeffords? If so, we are running afoul of article III because the Congress cannot give people substantive jurisdiction or grant constitutional standing for anyone such as that. If we were trying to do that, we certainly would not be exercising judicial restraint. During the course of this debate, I hope we can agree on what we are trying to do by means of this amendment. Do we want to be able to allow someone who is affected by one provision to be able to challenge the other provision? That is the question. If the answer to that is, yes, then we can talk about the constitutional implications of that. If the answer to that is, no, that they can only challenge the provision they are affected by, then what about a fellow who is convicted under the soft money provisions, which is held to be constitutional? He goes to jail. Another person comes along, he is sued under the Snowe-Jeffords provision. That is held to be unconstitutional, which wipes out the entire legislation, under this amendment. So you have the first individual sitting in jail for a period of time under an act that has been declared unconstitutional. Is that what we desire to do? It is not as easy as it seems. That is one of the reasons Congress has never passed such a law as is being suggested that would allow this particular result. There has never been a Federal case on this subject. There have been a few lower court Federal cases deciding State law. Surprisingly, in some of those cases, in interpreting nonseverability provisions, they have ignored them. I say to my friends, even if this nonseverability provision passes, which I hope it does not, there is a good chance the Court would ignore it. And, if not a good chance, depending on how it is interpreted as to what Congress' intent is, that it will be declared unconstitutional. For reasons set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, a 1992 Supreme Court case, the Court made this statement: Whether the courts were to act on their own or at the invitation of Congress in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would be discarding a principal fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the third branch. One of the essential elements that identifies these cases in controversy is that they are the business of the courts rather than the political branches. In other words, Congress, you can't tell us what is a case in controversy. You can't tell us that there is a case in controversy out there or that a person has standing in a case when he really doesn't. That is for us to decide. If you are attempting to intrude, you are violating the doctrine of separation of powers. I hope my colleagues will not view this amendment favorably. It would be not only a reflection on us, but it wouldn't do the judiciary any good. We are in danger, if we pass this amendment, in one fell swoop, of doing something that would be hurtful to two branches of our Government: the legislative branch and the judicial branch--the legislative branch, us, because after all these years, after 25 years we finally get around to addressing this issue, after going through and agreeing or disagreeing, but let's say agreeing on some fundamental principles that we believe ought to be passed, at the same time, in some cases supporting amendments which, in my estimation, pretty clearly have constitutional problems. I don't think that reflects well on us in what we ought to be doing and how we ought to be doing it. It doesn't reflect well on us when we threaten judicial independence or judicial restraint. There are some broader principles involved. Those principles are involved here. So while I appreciate the concern that has been expressed in terms of balance, in terms of the need for balance--and we saw part of that yesterday--the portion of Snowe-Jeffords that deals with money is a fairly limited segment: Never done this before; treading in uncharted waters; trying to accomplish things we probably cannot, in the end, do. For all those reasons, I will respectfully urge defeat of the amendment.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I am offering this amendment on behalf of Senator Lieberman, Senator Collins, Senator Leahy, and Senator Jeffords. It is designed to strengthen the enforcement of the criminal provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act. Four years ago, the Governmental Affairs Committee held hearings on illegal and improper activity in the 1996 presidential campaign. As a result of that investigation, we learned about a wide-ranging effort to circumvent the federal election laws by funneling campaign contributions, sometimes from foreign sources, through American citizens to benefit presidential campaigns. While I have voiced my concerns about the quality of the Department of Justice's investigation and prosecution of these violators, today I am addressing structural flaws in the statute that make it difficult for the more conscientious prosecutors to adequately pursue their cases. Specifically: FECA fails to provide for felony prosecutions regardless of the severity of the offense. Its three year statute of limitations is too short--for instance, only the administration that wins the election can enforce the law prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Finally, there is no sentencing guideline for FECA violations. Because of these deficiencies in the statute, our amendment would make the following changes. First, in the 1996 presidential campaign, the Special Investigation of the Governmental Affairs Committee identified at least $2,825,600 in illegal contributions to the DNC. Yet, regardless of the extent to which the laws were broken, all the violations under FECA were still misdemeanors. Our amendment would remedy this problem for the future by authorizing felony prosecutions of FECA violations, but only if (1) the offender committed the existing federal offense ``knowingly and willfully'' and (2) the offense involved more than $25,000. Second, criminal violations of FECA are the only federal crimes outside of the Internal Revenue Code that have a statute of limitations shorter than 5 years. Our amendment conforms FECA's statute of limitations to those of virtually all other federal crimes. Third, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which govern federal judges' sentencing decisions, do not currently have a guideline specifically directed at campaign finance violations. As a result, judges must use guidelines for other offenses, preventing them from considering factors which should enhance the punishment for FECA violations such as the size of a contribution or its origin. Our amendment would require the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a guideline specifically for violations of FECA and provide for enhancement of sentences if the violation involves (i) a contribution, donation or expenditure from a foreign source; (ii) a large number of illegal transactions; (iii) a large aggregate amount of illegal contributions, donations or expenditures; (iv) the receipt or disbursement of government funds; or (v) an intent to achieve a benefit from the government. The changes made in this amendment will provide conscientious prosecutors with the tools they need to investigate and prosecute those who violate our campaign finance laws and attack the integrity of our electoral process. For that reason, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, in 1997, the Governmental Affairs Committee spent a year in investigating some of the worst campaign finance abuses in our Nation's history. Despite a number of obstacles, witnesses fleeing the country, people pleading the fifth amendment, entities failing to comply with subpoenas, our Committee uncovered numerous activities that were not only improper but illegal. To date, 26 individuals and two corporations have been prosecuted or indicted for campaign finance violations arising from the 1996 Federal elections. Specifically, what we uncovered was a pattern of abuse in which access to people in power was bought with large campaign contributions. What made that possible was unregulated, unlimited soft money. Time after time we heard about contributions of tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars in exchange for which access was granted. In fact, one of the key reasons I have fought for the McCain-Feingold bill is to eliminate this opportunity for abuse. There is no question in my mind that the enormous soft money contributions we examined led to corruption and the appearance of corruption to the American public. The committee's findings are contained in a six volume, 10,000 page report, S. Rpt. No. 105-167, the committee's depositions, S. Prt. No. 106-30, and the committee's hearings, S. Hrg. No. 105-300). The facts and findings contained in these documents clearly provide the basis for a determination that unlimited soft money contributions lead to corruption and the appearance thereof.

Mr. THOMPSON. We are in as much equilibrium now probably as we will ever be. Behavior changes. The reason we are so soft money oriented now is because we have neglected the hard money, the small dollars, for some time. I think both parties have. If we raise the hard money limits, as we have, and do away with soft money, you will see the concentration back toward the old-time way of raising money--in smaller amounts, legitimate, limited amounts--that we had since 1974. Don't treat the legislation that was passed that year as a total abomination. The fact is, until the mid-1990s, the 1974 law worked pretty well. We didn't have any Presidential scandals. The money spent on each side was about the same. Sometimes the challenger won. Sometimes an incumbent won. We don't like it now because some people in the 1990s showed us some ways to get some whole new money into the process. That is what we are reacting to now. It is not that law. It is what has been done, not just by the courts but the FEC and the Justice Department and a few others. It is a complicated issue, but it all boils down to this: Are we prepared to get rid of the multimillionaire soft dollars that are coming from corporations and unions and wealthy individuals in this country into our political process? That is what this vote is all about.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I withdraw my objection. Amendment No. 156, as Modified

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, it continues to be such an excellent debate. I am proud to be a part of it. I commend my colleagues on both sides of the issue. I believe it is fair to say that putting nonseverability clauses into bills is not at all unusual. Congress passing a bill with a nonseverability clause in it is very usual. Let's make sure we are not comparing apples with oranges. Are campaign finance laws so different from anything else that it should be looked upon differently? Because in everything else, severability is the norm. Nonseverability is very unusual. So we say we continually do it in these bills that we don't ever make into law. But we continue to put them into bills because they are campaign finance bills, and they are intricately woven. I suggest if anybody who ever sponsored a bill--especially a large bill on the floor of this Senate--thinks this bill is pretty intricate, they think their bill was pretty intricately woven, also. I don't think there is anything that unusual about campaign finance regulations except it pertains to how we raise money. That makes it unusual. With regard to Buckley, my colleagues, of course, are correct to say the law that was passed in 1974 changed our campaign system in this country in the aftermath of Watergate. Buckley took a look at it and basically said: Congress, you can limit contributions but you can't limit expenditures. I have often wondered what the Congress would have done had they known that. My friend from New Jersey talks about soft money and all of that that was not relevant back then. That was in play. Certainly the so-called billionaire exception turned out to be in play with regard to Buckley, and limiting the expenditures was certainly in play. That was stricken. But what would they have done? Would Congress, knowing they were going to have their expenditures limited, have raised the ceiling on the contributions? I don't think so. What they were doing was in response to Watergate. Would they have lowered the contributions? Basically, that is what you are talking about--contributions and expenditures. I do not know that Congress would have done anything any differently had they known what Buckley was going to do. And, if so, why didn't they? We have been meeting regularly now for 27 years since they did that dastardly deed to us, as it has been described to us on the floor. I don't know of any serious attempt to go back and readdress the entire issue since that time. I think the longstanding practice we have had in this country both legislatively and in our court systems to be restrained to have severability clauses in most cases is a wise one. I say to my friends who talk about these outside groups that both sides have groups that support them and campaign against them. As far as I am concerned, let them come on as long as I have the right to go out and be happy when groups support me or oppose my opponent, and whatnot. And there will be plenty of each. There is plenty of robust debate out there. It makes us mad sometimes. These people have a first amendment right to do that. According to an independent study, the House of Representatives the last time had more independent money spent on them than the Democrats did with independent ads. They also said that Senate Democrats had more independent ad money spent on them than the Republicans did. Of course, in that battle, and the Presidential race, the Republicans won. And that is one race. If you look at these soft money donors--I say to my friend from Louisiana who is concerned about this aspect, if you look at the large soft money donors, of the top 10 of them, 6 or 7 are Democrats. They will find a way to support some of these organizations otherwise. In fact, that is a concern on our side of the aisle, that they will do that. The Democrats will have more support that way than the Republicans will have. Democrats say: Well, the hard money limits will hurt us more than it will the Republicans. We will never be able to figure out exactly who is marginally helped or hurt with all of these. We have never been able to do that before. Mr. President, I ask for 1 more minute from my friend.

Mr. THOMPSON. I will withhold momentarily.

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

Mr. THOMPSON. Reserving the right to object, and I do intend to object, I know my friend can bring this after--if this amendment survives a motion to table, of course, he can bring it back, or I suppose he can bring it back separately. My understanding is this amendment would cause the following result; that is, if either Snowe- Jeffords or the soft money portion of the bill were struck down, then the Thompson-Feinstein amendment language would fall also at that time. For that reason, I object.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation to repeal the 4.3-cent federal excise tax on railroad and inland waterway transportation fuels. This tax was signed into law by President Clinton in 1993 in order to help reduce the federal budget deficit. Now that the budget is in surplus, however, the tax is no longer needed. Railroad and barges should not continue to be the only forms of transportation that must pay this tax for purposes of deficit reduction, particularly during this time of high fuel prices. I am pleased to be joined in my efforts by the Senator from Louisiana, Mr. Breaux, the Senator from Alaska, Mr. Murkowski, the Senator from Vermont, Mr. Jeffords, the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Nickles, the Senator from Texas, Mr. Gramm, and the Senator from Arkansas, Mrs. Lincoln. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 imposed a Federal excise tax of 4.3 cents per gallon on all transportation fuels. The revenue raised from the tax was dedicated to deficit reduction, so tax revenue was deposited in the general fund instead of into any of the transportation trust funds. Prior to the 1993 act, the gasoline, aviation and diesel fuel excise taxes had been considered to be ``user fees.'' The revenue raised from these taxes was deposited into the transportation trust funds and was dedicated to improving highways, airports and waterways. There is no railroad trust fund. Therefore, the 1993 act was a significant departure from previous treatment of transportation fuel taxes. In 1997, Congress redirected the 4.3-cent gasoline excise tax back into the highway trust fund and the 4.3-cent aviation fuel excise tax back into the airport and airway trust fund as a part of the surface transportation reauthorization bill, TEA-21. The 1997 law restored the gasoline and aviation taxes to their previous status as true user fees. The revenue collected from these taxes are once again used for the benefit of our highways and airports. However, the final version of TEA-21 did not touch the tax on inland waterway barge fuel or railroad fuel, so that tax revenue is still being deposited in the general fund. Last Congress, the Senator from Rhode Island, John Chafee, led the effort to repeal the 4.3-cent excise tax on railroad and barge fuel. The 106th Congress actually voted to repeal the tax as part of the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999. Unfortunately, the bill was vetoed by President Clinton. I am pleased to carry on the work of our former colleague by introducing this bill to repeal the 4.3-cent tax on railroad and barge fuel effective this year. I believe the time has come to repeal the 4.3-cent tax, since it provides no benefit to the railroad and barge systems, and it only imposes a burden on these two industries that are important to my home state of Tennessee. I look forward to working with my colleagues to repeal this outdated tax.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Government Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia be authorized to meet on Thursday, March 29, at 10:00 a.m. for a hearing entitled, ``The National Security Implications of the Human Capital Crisis.''

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, the modification has been sent to the desk.

Mr. THOMPSON. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, do I control the time?

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, it is my intention to send a modification to the desk very shortly. It might take a couple moments.

Mr. THOMPSON. I ask the Senator from Arizona if he wishes to be heard at this time.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. I will ask unanimous consent----

Mr. THOMPSON. I respond to my friend from New York by saying, yes, in fact I do see a distinction. Here we are dealing with political speech, which makes it even more sensitive. What my friend's amendment would do is cut back and restrict clearly constitutionally protected political speech. The Supreme Court has decided on numerous occasions that there are only certain limited ways and times you can restrict political speech, such as if you are engaging in express advocacy, which this has nothing to do with. So I think not only is Velazquez relevant and on point, the amendment before us is more egregious than the activity in Velazquez that was struck down by the Supreme Court.