Member of Congress
Fred Thompson
- Role
- Former Senator
- State
- TN
- Party
- Republican
Speeches
BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2001--Continued2001-03-20
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, following up on my earlier comments, I am concerned about this amendment because I fear it may very well be unconstitutional. If one of these amendments is unconstitutional and the reform side does not win on the severability issue, the whole thing falls. Obviously, the question of constitutionality is always important, but it is even more important now. My concern is this: We have to clearly have a compelling governmental interest to override the first amendment rights of people to give money to candidates. They clearly have that right here. We are clearly overriding it. The question is whether or not there is a sufficient governmental interest. The case that was cited from the Fourth Circuit--and that case was in North Carolina--pointed out that it only covered a narrow area and that the Legislature of North Carolina only met for a few months out of the year. This body sometimes meets the entire year. There is no way a person could raise any money at any time during the year under those circumstances. Clearly, the Fourth Circuit is not authority for the constitutionality of this bill. It might be wrong. The Fourth Circuit might be incorrect in its analysis that it should be narrowly tailored. But that causes me a great deal of concern and difficulty. As well meaning as this amendment is, and in many ways as much as I would like to see it, it causes me great concern to vote for an amendment with what I believe raises pretty serious constitutionality questions.
BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 20012001-03-19
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. I am happy to.
Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I regret I didn't get to the floor in time to discuss this a bit with the sponsor of the amendment, Senator Domenici. He is, as we all know, one of the more thoughtful Members of this body. Anything he offers I take very seriously. He is clearly addressing an issue we have talked about a lot and which concerns a lot of us, concerning a campaign where one individual can put in a tremendous amount of his own personal money and the other candidate does not have that kind of wealth and is bound by the hard money limits we have. As I understand the amendment, the well-off candidate would still be bound by the hard money limits. If that is the case, my concern is whether or not we are not getting into a constitutional difficulty. The Supreme Court has said, of course, that an individual, if they have a great deal of money, can put as much of that money as they want into their own campaign. It is a matter of free speech. If that is the case, then I wonder whether or not it would be looked upon as disadvantaging that wealthy candidate if we gave some rights to the other candidate that we did not give him. In other words, if his hard money limits were still restrained, and the hard money limits of the opponent were lifted, that would not be equal treatment under the law, it seems to me. Clearly, the wealthy candidate would still probably wind up with more money; he would have his own. But I don't think that is the issue. If, in fact, the wealthy candidate has a right under the first amendment to do that, that kind of wipes the slate clean. Constitutionally, you can't consider that, it doesn't seem to me. We have to ask ourselves whether or not raising the hard money limits for one candidate and not the other is valid under the 14th amendment equal protection law. I would also wonder whether or not, from the standpoint of a contributor, if I wanted to contribute to a wealthy candidate under those circumstances, under this amendment, if passed, I would be limited to, let's say $1,000. If I wanted to contribute to his opponent, the limits would go up incrementally, as I understand it, to say $5,000, or whatever. What about my rights as a donor? Should I be restrained from contributing more to one candidate than another because he has exercised his constitutional rights? I certainly have not had an opportunity to study this, and I am not suggesting that I have the answer to my own question. But I do wonder--and I see Senator Domenici is on the floor--I say to my friend, if we are keeping the hard money limits on the wealthy candidate, whether or not we have an equal protection problem. I would think the answer to that problem and a way to avoid the constitutional dilemma would be to raise the hard money limits for all candidates. The wealthy candidates certainly would still have the advantage, but in terms of the hard money limits they would be equalized. I think Senator Domenici is absolutely correct when he talks about the limits that we placed on candidates in 1974 being very outdated--a $1,000 contribution today is worth about $3,300, with inflation. We have hamstrung our candidates and forced more and more money being spent in outside ads and, in my opinion, become more and more reliant upon soft money. It looks to me as though we could go a long way toward solving the disadvantage, which the Senator from New Mexico has rightfully pointed out, that a candidate without the wealth has by lifting the hard money limits on that candidate. It would not have as much significance if you lifted them on the wealthy candidate, perhaps. But you would have the equality and thereby possibly avoid an equal protection problem that we might have under the amendment.
Mr. THOMPSON. Not only do I share the Senator's concern, I will go the Senator one better. I say not only raise the hard money limits for the nonwealthy candidate, but go ahead and raise it for the wealthy candidate, too. He may not use it. That might make it easier constitutionally. I am in total agreement and sympathy with what the Senator from New Mexico is saying. I am trying to figure out a way that will get us there that will stand the scrutiny.
Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I say to my friend, if I can interrupt.
Mr. THOMPSON. Essentially, as a former lawyer--I am not pretending to be a constitutional specialist here. I haven't had a chance to certainly research this. By the time we finish this discussion, perhaps others will have had time to weigh in on it. I understood the Senator's amendment, I think, correctly. My concern is that even though we do nothing here to diminish the constitutional rights of the wealthy candidate, but keeping the hard money limits on him while raising the hard money limits for his challenger, we are not dealing equally with regard to the hard money limits. Obviously, the dollars are different. The dollars will undoubtedly be outweighed in favor of the wealthy candidate. But in terms of equal treatment, that concerns me. As I said, it also concerns me from the standpoint of the donor. Does a donor have a right to give as much to one candidate as another? Should they have a right to give as much to the wealthy candidate as they give to the other? Is there an equal protection concern there? That, I must say, concerns me. I think we would be better served--and I plan to offer, if no one else does, an amendment that would raise the hard dollar limits for everybody. I think the answer to a candidate's problem--any candidate's problem--especially a challenger, is to get to that threshold. Not that he is going to be outspent necessarily because most of the time a challenger is going to be outspent, but to raise the limits so that a challenger can get to the threshold of credibility as a candidate. Someone mentioned the State of California. There are other big States where nowadays a $1,000 individual limit on a candidate makes it so it is virtually hard not only to run but to recruit a candidate to even try to run under those circumstances. What we need to do, I think, is to raise the limits for all candidates from $1,000 to $3,000 on the individual limit side. It still would not be keeping up with inflation. My concern has never been the concern the Senator from Minnesota has expressed, when he said what is bad is that we are putting more money in the system--I don't think it is for me to say how much money belongs in the system or how much should be spent in a general sense. What concerns me is large amounts of money going to individual candidates or on behalf of individual candidates. We should not be nickel and diming these individual contributions-- the difference between $1,000 and $3,000--when our real concern ought to be the hundreds of thousands that are coming in in soft money. So I make the suggestion as one who thinks we ought to get rid of soft money. If we would raise the hard money limits so that we would not unnaturally constrain the ability of a candidate to reach the threshold of credibility to run a decent race, he would not need the soft money. He would not need the benefit of the independent expenditures where all the money seems to be going nowadays. I am certainly in sympathy with the desired results of the Senator from New Mexico. He is pointing out a problem that many of us have faced from time to time. I simply wonder out loud whether or not there might be a better way of addressing this.
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 2001--Continued2001-03-15
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I agree with my colleague's assessment. This is simply an effort to abrogate a series of contracts. This was a contract dispute involving thousands of people; 97 percent of those people settled those lawsuits. There were some who didn't settle them. They went to court in England and raised a fraud claim and lost. They went to court in this country and raised the fraud claim and lost. In fact, there were two sets of lawsuits in England and two sets in America, and in every case the ultimate disposition at the appellate court level--five appellate courts in the U.S. ruled on the venue question, for example. In each and every case, they had their day in court and they lost. Some of them were on the fraud issue and some on other issues. The bottom line is that it is not our job in Congress to determine factual issues in a lawsuit. So after having lost two sets of lawsuits in each country, they have here a provision in the bankruptcy bill that would in effect open the lawsuit again. It says, ``notwithstanding any other provision of law or contract . . ..'' So it is a clear abrogation of contracts and opens the situation again for courts in this country. In addition to that, I am afraid it is clearly unconstitutional. Specifically, it violates article III in that it represents a congressional attempt to dictate a result with respect to the parties in a final determination by an article III court. As Judge Posner, of the Sixth Circuit, said, this thing has been litigated in England. The English system comports to our system. It is not exactly as if there was a due process of law situation. Most of us understand from where our court system comes. It was litigated. By this law, we are attempting to open up and overturn a final determination by an American court. If we get in the business in the Congress of overturning lawsuits with results we don't like, we will have clearly gone down a slippery slope and will be going contrary to the rule of law. Secretary Powell and Secretary O'Neill have sent us a letter, and it contains this provision: By directing the outcome in these court cases, Section 1310 has the potential to undercut the rule of law as it applies across international borders today, with serious consequences for U.S. commercial and other interests. I think they are right. Our sympathy is with the 300 or so Americans who had the opportunity to litigate this and lost, just as our sympathy is with the several thousand people who lost money and settled the lawsuits. But the rule of law must prevail, and we must be concerned about our own commercial interests if, in fact, we do this when we have a British citizen over here in our court that makes a similar determination.
Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.
RULES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS2001-03-08
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, Senate Standing Rule XXVI requires each committee to adopt rules to govern the procedures of the Committee and to publish those rules in the Congressional Record not later than March 1 of the first year of each Congress. Pursuant to a unanimous consent agreement reached on February 28, 2001, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, for the purposes of the 107th Congress, the publication date for committee rules shall not be later than March 10, 2001. On March 8, 2001, the Committee on Governmental Affairs held a business meeting during which the members of the Committee unanimously adopted the rules to govern the procedures of the Committee. In addition, a majority of members of the Committee's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations adopted subcommittee rules of procedure on March 2, 2001. Consistent with Standing Rules XXVI, today I am submitting for printing in the Congressional Record a copy of the rules of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
DISAPPROVAL OF DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ERGONOMICS RULE2001-03-06
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I rise in support of the proposition that in a democratic republic it is entirely appropriate for elected representatives to have some say-so when a bureaucracy produces a rule that so greatly affects people's lives. As we get into our discussion, we can discuss some of these broad, powerful, greedy interests that have been referred to, and we can discuss exactly who is affected by this rule and whether or not all these people fit that definition that our previous speaker has just cast on everyone who comes to us with concern about this rule. I rise in support of the resolution of disapproval of OSHA's ergonomics regulation. I do not make this decision lightly, but this regulation is so unworkable, and the process under which it was issued so unsound, I believe I have no choice but to support its disapproval. This regulation is a perfect illustration of how political gamesmanship can subvert rational policymaking. At the outset, I will address some of the claims made about this resolution of disapproval. Some assert that this resolution is an attack on worker safety. Some may even claim this resolution will bar OSHA from addressing the problem of musculoskeletal disorders. The truth is, none of us oppose worker safety. Many of us have worked on those assembly lines we hear so much about. Some have firsthand experience with such matters. This resolution prevents an irresponsible and unworkable regulation from taking effect. OSHA will still retain the freedom to address the problem of musculoskeletal disorders, including through the use of its general enforcement authority or by reissuing a reasonable regulation. Just because something has been worked on for many years does not mean the final product produced at the last minute is a reasonable product. Perhaps a lot of good work went into this over the last 10 years, but what counts, as we have learned in so many other areas, is what happened as it went out the door. There is not enough time to discuss all of the flaws and problems with this regulation. Many of my colleagues have discussed, and undoubtedly will discuss, some of these problems. They will show this regulation is the product of an unfair, biased process. The rule will unfairly burden businesses all across America, especially small businesses. Beyond the private sector burdens, this regulation will cost the U.S. Postal Service over $3.4 billion, plus $1.5 billion annually thereafter. My colleagues will also show this regulation is incomprehensible. This regulation is unworkable. All of this is cause for concern. I am particularly concerned about the burden this regulation imposes on businesses in Tennessee. But I will not rehash all of these arguments in the limited time I have today. Instead, I want to focus on how the Clinton ergonomics regulation would harm State and local governments and violate principle of federalism. As chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I have the responsibility to oversee Federal-State relations. Over the past several years, I have struggled with the Clinton administration over its federalism policy. This ergonomics regulation is consistent with their disrespect for the principle of federalism. By many measures, this would be the most burdensome regulation ever imposed by OSHA. It would amount to an enormous unfunded mandate. It would preempt traditional State and local authority. It could seriously impair State and local governments across our country, and certainly in Tennessee. It could hit hardest in many small and poor communities where local governments struggle to meet the needs of their citizens already. Yet until the 11th hour, OSHA neglected to consider how its regulation would burden State and local governments and erode their traditional authority. OSHA failed to properly consult concerned local representatives or to fully explain the potential effect on State and local employers. After spending years to study the impact of this mega-regulation, OSHA neglected to consider the economic impact of its proposed regulation on State and local governments. This is not a small oversight, to say the least. When OSHA published its proposed ergonomics standard in November of 1999, OSHA claimed ``few if any of the affected employers are State, local, or tribal governments.'' Then OSHA heard the howls of protest and conceded that the regulation certainly was going to impose very large and real burdens on these groups. Such small inconvenience did not slow OSHA's rush to ram out this regulation in final form in the last days of the Clinton administration. OSHA simply cranked out a perfunctory economic analysis last May and provided State and local governments a grossly inadequate 30-day period to comment on OSHA's slipshod economic analysis. OSHA also moved its July 7 hearing to consider the economic impact on these parties from Washington, DC, to Atlanta, GA, during a time when there was a huge convention in Atlanta and rooms were scarce. Many interested parties, including representatives of local government, were not even able to attend due to the expense and inconvenience involved. When it issued the final rule, OSHA admitted there would, indeed, be economic burdens for State and local governments--to the tune of about $558 million each year. Other estimates are much higher. The Heritage Foundation estimated that the cost of the ergonomics proposal on State and local government would be about $1.7 billion. When OSHA proposed this regulation, it claimed that the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act did not apply. In the preamble to its final rule, OSHA does not deny that the ergonomics regulation would impose an enormous unfunded mandate. But it glibly claims that the final rule is the most cost-effective alternative. We have already seen many instances where the Clinton administration thumbed its nose at the Unfunded Mandates Act. A GAO report I requested a couple of years ago concluded that the Unfunded Mandates Act has had little effect on agency rulemaking. I think this episode cries out for reexamining the Unfunded Mandates Act. I am concerned that many governmental entities--towns, water districts, volunteer fire departments, and so on--will not be able to sustain the cost of this unfunded mandate without increasing taxes or cutting vital services. Local governments simply do not have adequate resources to meet these far-reaching mandates from OSHA. This is true both in Tennessee and across America. According to the National League of Cities, out of 36,000 cities and towns in America, 91 percent have populations of fewer than 10,000. The average annual budget of these small towns and cities is about $1.6 million. At the end of the day, there is simply no money for lawyers and ergonomics experts. But the story does not end there. This standard preempts an area of traditional State authority. State workers' compensation systems are based on decades of experience and careful deliberation. We talk about 10 years working on this rule. What about the many more years it has taken to develop State workers' compensation laws that are totally abrogated by this rule? In one fell swoop, OSHA would overturn the careful policy choices of the States. This regulation supersedes existing State workers' compensation programs despite the fact that the Occupational Safety and Health Act makes clear that OSHA may not supersede or in any way affect any workers' compensation law. The rule's work restriction protection provisions, which require employers to pay 90 percent of earnings and 100 percent of benefits to employees unable to work, would effectively create a Federal system of workers' compensation. The rule would also allow employees to bypass the system of medical treatment provided by State law for workers' compensation injuries and seek diagnosis and treatment from any licensed health care provider. Did Congress intend to delegate the authority to the bureaucracy to establish a Federal workers' compensation law in this area and to preempt State laws that were formulated over the last decades? I don't think so. By interjecting a special Federal compensation system for ergonomic injuries into State compensation programs, the work restriction protection provisions would provide preferential treatment for people with musculoskeletal disorders as opposed to every other job-related injury or illness. Some local representatives have argued that the work restriction protection provisions could provide an employee who hurts his wrist playing tennis more money in benefits than current benefits provide a laborer who loses his arm. To make matters worse, the work restriction protection provisions double the opportunity for fraud by failing to provide employers any recourse for recovering workers' compensation payments from employees who have already received their earnings and benefits through the work restriction protection provisions. The double payment would take more money away from people with real injuries who have legitimate claims. My concerns are shared by many State and local governments that face this unfunded mandate and the erosion of their traditional authority. Both houses of the legislature of my home State of Tennessee are controlled by the Democratic Party. The Tennessee Legislature passed a resolution calling on Congress ``to take all necessary measures to prevent the ergonomics regulation from taking effect.'' They are concerned that the ergonomics rule will preempt Tennessee's workers' compensation system, impose drastic requirements on the state government, and cause hardship for many Tennessee businesses. I agree, and I wish the Clinton Administration had listened to the representatives of the people of Tennessee. The concerns raised by Tennessee are shared by many other state and local governments. The National League of Cities, the largest and oldest organization representing the nation's cities and towns, has opposed the regulation from the beginning. The Western Governors' Association passed a resolution detailing how the regulation would supersede the entire complex of state workers' compensation provisions and conflict with state laws. Mr. President, a couple of years ago, I fought the Clinton Administration's attempt to repeal President Reagan's Executive Order on Federalism and to replace it with a new Order that would have created new excuses for federal meddling in state and local affairs. Ironically, the Clinton Administration tried to issue this executive order, which called for more consultation with state and local government, without consulting with state and local governments at all. A firestorm of protest from state and local officials led the White House to adopt a new federalism order that mimicked the Reagan Order. The Clinton Administration promised to consult more with state and local officials. But a year later, on the most burdensome regulation ever proposed by OSHA, the Clinton Administration did not address the problems raised by state and local officials, did not seriously consider the enormous impact of this unfunded mandate, and did not trouble itself with the rule's disruption of complex areas traditionally regulated by the states. I ask unanimous consent that the resolution of the Tennessee legislature, a letter from Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist, and the letters from Mayor Victor Ashe of Knoxville and Mayor Charles Farmer of Jackson, be printed in the Record.
TRIBUTE TO DALE EARNHARDT2001-03-01
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, it has been almost two weeks since American sports lost one of its greatest legends. On a Sunday, just like any other Sunday, millions of NASCAR fans watched the concluding laps of the Daytona 500 race. But February 18, 2001 is a Sunday that even those who were not at the race track, or glued to their televisions, will never forget. This was the day that we lost the person who many say was the sport's fiercest competitor. I am, of course, speaking of Dale Earnhardt, a man who was aptly described as both ``NASCAR's greatest driver'' and ``the Intimidator.'' As fans, friends and family continue to mourn his death, he is also remembered by labels such as ``devoted husband'' and ``loving father'' whose fearlessness on the track was eclipsed only by the size of his heart. Adults and children alike are searching for the reasons why their hero was taken from them. Dale Earnhardt brought these strangers together, week after week, as a family devoted to following his career and celebrating his many victories. He became part of our lives through sports broadcasts and the media. He was only months away from his 50th birthday. He will not get to see his son follow in his footsteps and become a champion. But fans know that his devotion to the sport was so great that he was doing what he loved until the last moment. A week after this tragedy, before all of the tears had dried, NASCAR continued with the racing season, but Dale Earnhardt was far from forgotten. The respect for this man was so great that drivers and crewman, men who raced against him for years, wore black, red and silver caps with Earnhardt's number three on them to honor their fallen comrade. No one was ready to let Dale Earnhardt go. A man who had such spirit for the race of life as well as for the competition on the track will not easily fade into the past. His spectacular career statistics will certainly not let us forget and the way he lived his 49 years will be an even greater remembrance. He was admired in life and he will continue to be admired now that he has left us. He will continue to be a role model for drivers and fans alike. Dale Earnhardt will always be with us in our hearts, every time someone strives for greatness and every time someone takes the checkered flag.
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS2001-02-08
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation that will address an inequity in the tax code that affects the citizens of my state and citizens of other states that do not have a state income tax. Tennesseans are discriminated against under federal tax laws simply because our state choose to raise revenue primarily through a sales tax instead of an income tax. My bill would end this inequity by allowing taxpayers to deduct either their state and local sales taxes or their state and local income taxes on their federal tax forms, but not both. My bill would also ensure that Tennesseans who benefit from this deduction would not be caught under the federal alternative minimum tax, AMT, by allowing individuals to deduct their state and local taxes paid when computing their AMT tax liability. Under current law, individuals who itemize their deductions for federal tax purposes are only permitted to deduct state and local income taxes and property taxes paid. State and local sales taxes are not deductible. Therefore, residents of nine states are treated differently from residents of states that have an income tax. Seven states--Texas, Wyoming, Alaska, Florida, South Dakota, Washington, and Nevada--have no state income tax. Two states--Tennessee and New Hampshire--only impose an income tax on interest and dividends, but not wages. Prior to 1986, taxpayers were permitted to deduct all of their state and local taxes paid, including income, sales and property taxes, when computing their federal tax liability. The ability to deduct all state and local taxes is based on the principle that levying a tax on a tax is unfair. In 1986, however, Congress made dramatic changes to the tax code. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 significantly reduced federal tax rates on individuals. In exchange for these lower rates, Congress broadened the base of income that is taxed by eliminating many of the deductions and credits that previously existed in the code, including the deduction for state and local sales taxes. The deduction for state and local income taxes, however, was retained. The 1986 Act also tightened the alternative minimum tax rules. The AMT is a separate, complicated tax system that was originally intended to ensure that wealthy taxpayers could not use the tax code's many deductions and credits to completely zero out their federal tax liability. However, each year more and more middle income individuals are being caught under the AMT who were never intended to be affected by it. Under current law, individuals are not permitted to deduct their state and local taxes when computing their alternative minimum tax liability. This is a major factor pushing Americans under the AMT. By allowing individuals to deduct state and local taxes under the AMT, my bill will ensure that restoring equity in this area will not push more Tennesseans under the AMT. It makes no sense to me to give Tennesseans a tax cut on the one hand, then take it away with the other. I believe that our federal tax laws should be neutral with respect to the treatment of state and local taxes. As I have said, that is not the case now. The current tax code is biased in favor of states that raise revenue through an income tax. The current tax code is also needlessly complex. There is widespread agreement among tax experts that the AMT is a primary cause of complexity in the tax code and should be repealed. I strongly support comprehensive reform of the tax code that will address issues such as neutrality, fairness and simplicity. As we work to reform the overall tax code, restoring equality in these areas and should be a part of the discussion.
Introductory Statement on S. 2912001-02-08
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation that will address an inequity in the tax code that affects the citizens of my state and citizens of other states that do not have a state income tax. Tennesseans are discriminated against under federal tax laws simply because our state choose to raise revenue primarily through a sales tax instead of an income tax. My bill would end this inequity by allowing taxpayers to deduct either their state and local sales taxes or their state and local income taxes on their federal tax forms, but not both. My bill would also ensure that Tennesseans who benefit from this deduction would not be caught under the federal alternative minimum tax, AMT, by allowing individuals to deduct their state and local taxes paid when computing their AMT tax liability. Under current law, individuals who itemize their deductions for federal tax purposes are only permitted to deduct state and local income taxes and property taxes paid. State and local sales taxes are not deductible. Therefore, residents of nine states are treated differently from residents of states that have an income tax. Seven states--Texas, Wyoming, Alaska, Florida, South Dakota, Washington, and Nevada--have no state income tax. Two states--Tennessee and New Hampshire--only impose an income tax on interest and dividends, but not wages. Prior to 1986, taxpayers were permitted to deduct all of their state and local taxes paid, including income, sales and property taxes, when computing their federal tax liability. The ability to deduct all state and local taxes is based on the principle that levying a tax on a tax is unfair. In 1986, however, Congress made dramatic changes to the tax code. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 significantly reduced federal tax rates on individuals. In exchange for these lower rates, Congress broadened the base of income that is taxed by eliminating many of the deductions and credits that previously existed in the code, including the deduction for state and local sales taxes. The deduction for state and local income taxes, however, was retained. The 1986 Act also tightened the alternative minimum tax rules. The AMT is a separate, complicated tax system that was originally intended to ensure that wealthy taxpayers could not use the tax code's many deductions and credits to completely zero out their federal tax liability. However, each year more and more middle income individuals are being caught under the AMT who were never intended to be affected by it. Under current law, individuals are not permitted to deduct their state and local taxes when computing their alternative minimum tax liability. This is a major factor pushing Americans under the AMT. By allowing individuals to deduct state and local taxes under the AMT, my bill will ensure that restoring equity in this area will not push more Tennesseans under the AMT. It makes no sense to me to give Tennesseans a tax cut on the one hand, then take it away with the other. I believe that our federal tax laws should be neutral with respect to the treatment of state and local taxes. As I have said, that is not the case now. The current tax code is biased in favor of states that raise revenue through an income tax. The current tax code is also needlessly complex. There is widespread agreement among tax experts that the AMT is a primary cause of complexity in the tax code and should be repealed. I strongly support comprehensive reform of the tax code that will address issues such as neutrality, fairness and simplicity. As we work to reform the overall tax code, restoring equality in these areas and should be a part of the discussion.
Senate2000-12-15
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate-House conferees have adopted an amendment I sponsored to inform Congress and our citizens about potential violations of their privacy on Federal agency Web sites. The public has a right to know whether the Federal Government is respecting personal privacy. This amendment would require all Inspectors General to report to Congress within 60 days on how each department or agency collects and reviews personal information on its web site. The amendment is based on similar language offered by Congressman Jay Inslee in the House that would have applied exclusively to the agencies funded by the Treasury-Postal Appropriations bill. Our final language was adopted by the Senate-House conferees in the bill providing appropriations for the Legislative Branch and Treasury-Postal Appropriations Act, and it was included in the Omnibus Appropriations Act. The Internet has brought great benefits to our society, but understandably, the public is becoming more and more concerned about the way personal information is collected and handled on the Internet. The Federal Government should set an example for how personal privacy is handled in cyberspace. But unfortunately, concerns have been raised that some Federal agencies may be engaging in information-gathering practices that could only further deepen the public's distrust of government. We need to find out whether these concerns are real, and if they are, we need to decide what do about it. Although the Clinton Administration established a privacy policy in June 1999 to guide the agencies, it is not clear whether the policy did much to protect privacy. In particular, the policy seemed to condone agencies' use of ``cookies''--small bits of software placed on web users' hard drives to collect personal information. The policy stated, ``In the course of operating a web site, certain information may be collected automatically in logs or by cookies.'' It also stated that ``some agencies may be able to collect a great deal of information,'' but went on to state that some agencies might make a policy decision to limit the information collected. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, OMB is supposed to direct the agencies on privacy policy, but OMB's original privacy guidance seemed to give the agencies free rein to decide their own privacy policy for themselves. But OMB's original guidance did require the agencies to post privacy policies making clear whether they were collecting information. Earlier this year, it was revealed that the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy had contracted with a private company to use cookies to track users of the ONDCP web site. ONDCP failed to warn the public about this practice in its privacy policy. When the press reported ONDCP's practices, there was a swift and sharp public outcry. The White House's Office of Management and Budget quickly shifted into damaged control mode and issued a June 22 memorandum reversing its previous guidance and creating a presumption against the use of cookies on Federal web sites. However, more recently GAO reported to me that a number of agencies continued to use cookies, and it was not clear how these cookies were being used. This whole episode raises questions about the Federal Government's commitment to citizens' privacy. It also could undermine citizens' trust in government Web site. I am not suggesting that cookies are inherently bad devices under all circumstances. Cookies can perform beneficial tasks on the Internet, such as counting the number of visitors to a site, assessing the popularity of certain Web pages, and briefly storing information already entered into to a form so that users don't have to enter the same information multiple times. At the same time, cookies can be used to identify specific computers and track a user's actions all over the Internet. The real questions I have are, ``What are cookies on Federal agency web sites being used for, and what are the information-gathering practices of the agencies?'' Right now, I don't know. And the American people don't know. I have asked GAO to investigate which agencies are using cookies, how they are using them, and whether the practice violates the law and Administration policy. The amendment I have sponsored will provide further information from the Inspectors General on how agencies collect and use personal information. The language is based on a similar amendment that was offered to the House Treasury-Postal bill by Democratic Congressman Jay Inslee. I want to thank Congressman Inslee for working in a bipartisan way to protect citizens' personal privacy. Mr. President, the American people have a right to know what information is being collected about them on Federal Web sites. This amendment would ensure that we know agencies' data collection practices so that we in Congress can make sure that privacy rights of citizens are not being violated.
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I am pleased that today the Senate passed regulatory accounting legislation in the Treasury-Postal title of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, section 624, also known as the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act. I want to thank Chairman Ted Stevens and Senator John Breaux for helping me pass this important legislation. We have worked together over the last several years to further some basic important goals: to promote the public's right to know about the costs and benefits of regulatory programs; to increase the accountability of government to the people it serves; and ultimately, to improve the quality of our regulatory programs. This legislation will help us assess what regulatory programs cost, what benefits we are getting in return, and what we need to do to improve agency performance. By any measure, the burdens of Federal regulation are enormous. By some estimates, Federal rules and paperwork cost about $700 billion per year, or $7,000 for the average American household. I hear concerns about unnecessary regulatory burdens and red tape from people all across the country and from all walks of life--small business owners, governors, state legislators, local officials, farmers, corporate leaders, government reformers, school officials, and parents. There is strong public support for sensible regulations that can help ensure cleaner water, quality products, safer workplaces, reliable economic markets, and the like. But there is substantial evidence that the current regulatory system is missing important opportunities to achieve these goals in a more cost-effective manner. The depth of this problem is not appreciated fully because the costs of regulation are not as apparent as other costs of government, such as taxes, and the benefits of regulation often are diffuse. The bottom line is that the American people deserve better results from the vast resources and time spent on regulation. We've got to be smarter. We often debate the costs and benefits of on-budget programs, but we are just breaking ground on creating a system to scrutinize Federal regulation. This legislation will provide better information to help us answer some important questions: How much do regulatory programs cost each year? Are we spending the right amount, particularly compared to on-budget spending and private initiatives? Are we setting sensible priorities among different regulatory programs? As the Office of Management and Budget stated in its first ``Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations'': [R]egulations (like other instruments of government policy) have enormous potential for both good and harm....The only way we know how to distinguish between the regulations that do good and those that cause harm is through careful assessment and evaluation of their benefits and costs. Such analysis can also often be used to redesign harmful regulations so they produce more good than harm and redesign good regulations so they produce even more net benefits. This legislation continues the efforts of my precedessors. Senator Bill Roth proposed a regulatory accounting provision in a broader reform measure that he worked on when he chaired the Governmental Affairs Committee in 1995. In 1996, when Ted Stevens became our chairman, he passed a one-time regulatory accounting amendment on the Omnibus Appropriations Act. After I became the chairman of Governmental Affairs, I supported Senator Stevens' amendment when it passed again in 1997. In 1998, I sponsored an amendment to strengthen the Stevens provision with the support of Senators Lott, Breaux, Shelby, and Robb, as well as a bipartisan coalition in the House. This year, I worked with Senators Stevens and Breaux to make this legislation permanent. This legislation continues the requirement that OMB shall report to Congress on the costs and benefits of regulatory programs, which began with the Stevens amendment. This legislation also adds to previous initiatives in several respects. First, it will finally make regulatory accounting a permanent statutory requirement. Regulatory accounting will become a regular exercise to help ensure that regulatory programs are cost-effective, sensible, and fair. The costs and benefits of regulation can become a regular part of the annual debate between the Congress and the executive branch on the Federal budget. Second, this legislation will require OMB to provide a more complete picture of the regulatory system, including the incremental costs and benefits of particular programs and regulations, as well as an analysis of regulatory impacts on State, local, and tribal government, small business, wages, and economic growth. Finally, this legislation will help ensure that OMB will provide better information as time goes on. Requirements for OMB guidelines and independent peer review should continually improve future regulatory accounting reports. The government has an obligation to think carefully and be accountable for requirements that impose costs on people and limit their freedom. We should pull together to contribute to the success of responsible government programs that the public values, while enhancing the economic security and well-being of our families and communities. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act be printed in the Record.
THE FLOYD D. SPENCE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001--CONFERENCE REPORT2000-10-12
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I want to express my support for the Defense Authorization conference report and to thank the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, and the Ranking Member, Senator Levin, for their assistance in ensuring that the conference report includes a provision to provide compensation to Department of Energy nuclear weapons workers whose health was harmed in the course of their service to our country. Back in June, when the Senate first considered this measure, I offered an amendment along with Senator Bingaman, Senator Voinovich, Senator Kennedy, Senator DeWine and others to establish an occupational illness compensation program for these DOE workers who helped us win the Cold War. We offered the amendment after my Committee and others heard testimony and reviewed evidence that showed that, for decades, the federal government--and specifically the Department of Energy-- failed to adequately protect its workers or to properly inform them of hazards associated with the important work they were performing. In some cases, we simply did not know then what we know now about the links between some of the materials used to make weapons and certain illnesses. But in some cases, the government did know--and yet it covered up and kept people in the dark and failed to adequately protect them. We cannot go back and right that wrong. I wish we could. But we can face up to the mistakes that were made and begin to try to remedy them. That is what the Senate is about to do today. This conference report will establish a compensation program for Department of Energy and contractor employees who were exposed to beryllium, silica, or radiation in the course of their employment, and who are now suffering from illnesses that can be linked to those exposures. The program will employ eligibility criteria based on expert judgement and sound science. Under the compromise that was reached with the House, the President will be required to send to Congress by March 15th of next year a specific proposal detailing the level of compensation and benefits he believes should be paid. Congress will then have until July 31st to enact specific compensation levels. However, if Congress does not act by July 31st, a default benefit level of $150,000 plus medical benefits will take effect. Therefore, covered employees are guaranteed to receive at least that amount unless Congress enacts legislation stating otherwise by next July. I believe this is a good compromise, Mr. President. It is not everything that the Senate sponsors wanted, but it is a start. It will get a program in place, allow the Administration to begin to identify those who are eligible, and guarantee a minimum benefit level without further action by Congress. Those are important victories for these Cold War veterans to whom we owe a debt of gratitude. Today we acknowledge that debt of gratitude, as well as a responsibility to remedy mistakes we made. So again I want to thank Chairman Warner for his support of this important provision. It would not have been included without his efforts. I also want to thank Senators Bingaman, Voinovich, Kennedy, DeWine, McConnell, and Bunning for working with me on this issue, and I urge my colleagues to support the conference report.
TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT OF 2000--CONFERENCE REPORT-- Continued2000-10-11
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for the manner in which this has been handled and the opportunity this affords me to make the statement I am going to make today. This is an objection to the conference report. There are many good things in this conference report. Unfortunately, Aimee's law is a part of it. I prefer to have the consideration of that independently, separate and apart from the conference report, but that is not to be. Historically, of course, Aimee's law did pass as a part of a much larger bill, the juvenile justice bill, some time ago but was never signed into law. When I voiced my objection to it at that point, it was put into this conference report. I cannot let it go without raising my objection to something that I think has to do with an important principle. It is very unfortunate, when we have tragic circumstances that happen in this country, such as young people being killed, all the violence and abuse that goes on in this country, we take that and use the emotionalism from it to make bad law. I do not think anybody within the sound of my voice can accuse me of being soft on crime. I ran in 1994 on that issue. I ran again in 1996 on that issue. My position is clear. But my position is also clear that we are continuing the trend toward the centralization of decisionmaking in this country. In other words, if we do not like what a State is doing with regard to its criminal laws, we tend to find a way around it. I do not like the idea that some States let prisoners out sooner than they should, but if we really do not like that and we really do not have any concerns about taking over the criminal jurisdiction in this country, things that have been under the purview of States for 200 years, why don't we just pass a Federal law using the commerce clause and state that it affects interstate commerce? Perhaps the Supreme Court will allow it; maybe they will not. Why don't we just pass a Federal law on murder? Why don't we just have a Federal law that says anyone convicted of murder has to serve so much time and just get on with it? Even the people pushing things such as Aimee's law apparently recognize there is a principle that causes us problems, and that is, we are set up with a Federal system. Every kid learns in school that we have a system of checks and balances, one branch against another, also Federal versus State and local law. It is a diffusion of power. It is time honored. It is in the Constitution. It is in the 10th amendment. Some things the States do and some things the Federal Government does. If we do not believe in that anymore, if we are going to say every time there is some tragic circumstance, such as the drive-by shootings in 1992--we federalized the crime of drive-by shootings. In 1997, there was not one Federal prosecution for drive-by shootings, but yet it was in the headlines, and we could not help ourselves because we wanted to express our outrage at this crime that was being taken care of at the State level. No one has ever accused these States with high-profile crimes of not jumping in and taking care of the situation, sometimes imposing the death penalty. You cannot do much more than that. Yet we feel the necessity to pass Federal laws that will ultimately create a Federal police force to do things we have left to the purview of the States for 200 years. That is a serious matter. Nobody wants to vote against something called Aimee's law as a result of a tragedy of some young woman getting killed, for goodness' sake. Unfortunately, it happens all across this country all the time. But we have greater responsibilities when we take the oath of the office we hold. We are supposed to uphold the Constitution. Is the relationship between the State and Federal Government the one we studied in school, the one the courts tell us is still in effect, and, more fundamentally, do we need States anymore? States do not behave the way we want them to sometimes. States do not do what the Federal Government wants them to do. States do different things. People in Tennessee might not look at something exactly the same way people in New York might look at it. People in New York might not look at something the same way people in California do. We have certain basic things on which we agree in our Federal Constitution, but the Founding Fathers gave us leeway to experiment. Nobody I know of inside Washington, DC, has the answers to all these problems. We all have the same motivation: No one wants crime, no one wants these terrible tragedies, but we certainly do not have a monopoly on what to do about it. That is why we have States to experiment, to do different things. Too often, under the glare of the headlines, we want one solution; we want one answer; we want one Federal answer with our name on the legislation so we ``did something'' about some tragic murder that happened in one of the States, which is prosecuted by the State and the person has long been sent to the penitentiary or death row. We need to concentrate on the fact that we do not seem to think we need the States anymore. We had this fundamental disagreement at the founding of our country between Jefferson and Hamilton. Hamilton wanted a strong Federal Government, we all remember from our schooldays. Jefferson said: No, that is too much centralization of power; remember what happened to us earlier in our history. We need to diffuse that power, and the States need certain rights, so we need to balance that out. One of my House colleagues said: The problem with Congress is we are Jeffersonians on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays and Hamiltonians on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. We give lipservice to the proposition of limited Government, decentralization, giving more power back to the States, getting things out of Washington. We all run on that platform, and as soon as we get here, we can't wait to pass some sweeping Federal law that, in many cases, supersedes State law and the different ways States have chosen to handle a different problem. We preempt State law. We pass Federal laws all the time. The Constitution allows us, under the supremacy clause, to do that. We will not even say when we are preempting. The courts have to decide that. We pass laws all the time, and the courts have to take a look at them later on to decide to what extent we are preempting State laws, and so we strike down those State laws. We continue to criminalize State law. Five percent of the criminal prosecutions in this country are Federal. Yet last year there were over 1,000 pieces of legislation introduced in this Congress having to do with criminal law. It clogs the courts. Justice Rehnquist on a regular basis comes over here and pleads with us to stop this: You are not doing anything for law enforcement--he tells us--by trying to criminalize everything at the Federal level that is already covered at the State level; you are clogging the courts. The Judicial Conference reports to us from time to time: You are clogging the courts with all this stuff that should not be in Federal court; the States are already taking care of that. Nobody is claiming they are not. So for the same offense, we have this array of State laws and this array of criminal laws, and the prosecutor can use that against a defendant however he might choose. It is not something that will enhance our system of justice but something that only enhances our own stature when we believe we are able to say we passed some tough criminal law. We are doing more to harm criminal justice by doing this than we are doing to help it. My favorite last year was the legislation that was considered in Congress to prohibit videos of animal abuse using stiletto heels. That is not a joke. Unfortunately, we have bills such as that introduced in Congress all the time. We, from time to time, try to get around the commerce clause. We want to federalize things, such as guns in schools. Every State in the Union has a tough law they deal with in their own way as to what to do about a terrible problem--guns in schools. We get no headlines out of that, so we had a Federal law to which the Supreme Court said: No, that does not affect interstate commerce. Then we just try to basically directly force States to enforce Federal laws and regulations that we make--background checks for guns, when judges should retire, Federal regulations. Finally, the Supreme Court said: No, we cannot do that. The 10th amendment prohibits us from doing that. So we have a steady array of our attempting to figure out ways in and around the Constitution in order to impose our will because ``we know best.'' The latest, of course, now is the use of the spending clause. The courts have said, basically, if Congress sends the money, they have the right to attach strings. States blithely go along many times--not all the time, but many times. Oftentimes they accept that free Federal money and learn that they are getting 7 percent of their money for their problem and 75 percent of the regulations and redtape, the requirements that go along with it. So this is the context in which we find ourselves when we consider Aimee's law. This is all just a little bit of history we have been dealing with to which not many people pay much attention. But it has to do with our basic constitutional structure. It has to do with the fundamental question in this country and, I think, our fundamental job; that is, What should the Federal Government do, or what should Government do, and at what level should Government do it? What is more fundamental than that? What is more important than that, as we hastily pass out and introduce these thousands of bills up here? If they sound good, do it--all the while eroding a basic constitutional principle that we all claim we believe in. So this Aimee's law came about because of another tragic set of circumstances. We have seen them: The dragging death in Texas, the drive-by shooting case in 1992, the situation that produced Aimee's law. There is always something in the headlines of a tragic nature in criminal law. Under Aimee's law, if Tennessee, for example, tries somebody--let's say for murder or rape--and convicts them, and that person serves their sentence under State law, under Tennessee law, and then they are released, and that person goes to Kentucky and commits another similar criminal offense, here is where the Federal Government comes into play. The Attorney General does this calculation and says, basically, that unless Tennessee's law under which this guy was convicted provides for the average term of imprisonment of all the States--you look at all the States and say: What is the average term of imprisonment for murder?-- if Tennessee has a little less than the average of all the other States, and he goes to Kentucky and kills somebody else, then Tennessee has to pay Kentucky to apprehend the guy, to try the guy, and to incarcerate him for however long Kentucky wants to incarcerate him. That is basically what Aimee's law is. So this is moving the ball a little bit farther down the road for those who want Washington to decide all the criminal laws in this country. Here we have a standard not that Congress has set. A lot of times we will say: We want everybody on the highways to be driving under the old .08 rule because we believe that ought to be the intoxication limit. We are going to withhold funds if you don't. It is a Federal standard. You can argue with it or you can agree with it. But that is not what we have here. This is not a standard that Congress has had hearings on and has determined that Tennessee has to live up to. It is a standard that is based upon a calculation of what the average is among all the other States. What if Tennessee looks at it a little differently? They ought to have the right to have a little more stringent laws or a little more lenient laws. They have the people of Tennessee to answer to. They have their own legislature. They have their own Governor. These are things that Tennessee has been deciding for 200 years. If they do not do what the average of other States do, when it is totally within their prerogative, should they be penalized? There are several problems with this law. Some of them are constitutional because it has ex post facto concerns. I do not know, for example, in reading this law, whether it intends to apply to people who have already been sentenced or whether it applies to people who will be sentenced after this law comes into effect. I wish one or any of the sponsors of this bill would come to the floor and tell us whether or not the intent of this law is to have this law apply to people who have already been sentenced maybe 5 years ago, maybe 10 years ago. If so, then what can a State do about that to avoid being penalized the way I just described? Secondly, if a person is still serving time, and the State knows it is going to be penalized if he is released under the State law because other States might have a little more stringent law, what is going to happen next time that person comes up to the parole board? Are they going to be looking at it objectively? Or, better still, the question is, to the sponsors of this legislation: What about people who have already been convicted and already served their time and have been out of jail now for 15, 20 years, and they go to Kentucky and kill somebody else? Does this apply to them? If that is the case, there are thousands and thousands and thousands of people in every State who have been convicted of crimes and are now out of jail and going to other States. Are we going to go back and calculate what the average law provided for incarceration for all of those people? I think it is silent. If the intent is, in fact, to catch all of those people and, if they do something else, have this law apply, it has ex post facto ramifications with regard to the State. You are not doing anything to the individual, but you are forcing the State to either lose money or to try to extend the time these people stay in jail. Can you imagine the litigation you are going to have with regard to these parole board hearings, when a person apparently looks as though he is eligible for parole, but the parole board has discretion, and they know if they release this person, he is going to be one of these people caught under the law? Can you imagine the litigation that is going to come about as a result? If, on the other hand, it is not meant to be ex post facto, if, in fact, this law only applies to those who are convicted of crimes after the effective date of this law, then this law is going to be a nullity for the most part, I imagine, for many years, if people serve out terms in prison for horrendous crimes. I would like to know, seriously, what the intention of the law is because it is not clear from the legislation itself. As Fred Ansell has said: If it applies retroactively, then the law could apply retroactively in different ways. It could mean that the law applies only if an offender is released from a State after 2002 after having served a less than average sentence, and then commits a crime. Or it could even mean that a person commits a crime as early as January 1, 2002, who was released from prison many years ago. If the State is liable for what an already-released offender does in the future, and it accepts the Federal funds with these conditions, then the State has agreed to accept an unlimited future liability. It will be liable for the crimes that thousands of offenders might commit, as measured by the costs of apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration. This is not losing 5 percent of transportation funds for not enacting a 21-year-old drinking age, as was upheld in South Dakota v. Dole. This is where Federal ``pressure turns into compulsion.'' Moreover, the funds are not attached to a new program. The conditions are attached to funds that States have already satisfied conditions to receive now and are being used for law enforcement purposes now. Prisons under construction now might have to be abandoned if the States can no longer receive Federal funds for prisons unless they lengthen their sentences. Drug task forces, police assistance, prosecutorial assistance, all of which are currently functional, would be jeopardized, causing possible loss of life and limb to the citizenry, if States did not adopt Washington's sentencing policy in order to be sure to continue receiving the money. That is coercion, not inducement. If the measure is retroactive only with respect to people who are released after 2002 for earlier committed crimes, the compulsion is not as great, but is still very strong, as the State still faces unlimited liability for any prisoners for future crimes committed over many years. To avoid that, a State seeking to retain Federal funding might essentially, in the Supreme Court's words, be ``induced . . . to engage in activities which would themselves be unconstitutional,'' such as lengthening the sentences of those who would otherwise be released, violating the ex post facto clause. This wouldn't be a direct lengthening, but it would certainly have a potential effect with regard to, for example, parole board activities. So not only do you have an ex post facto problem, you have a spending loss problem. The Supreme Court has held that Congress can withhold money, unless the States engage in the behavior that Congress wants them to as they receive the money. They don't have to take the money, but if they do, they have to take the strings attached to it. The Supreme Court has basically upheld that. The Supreme Court also said the conditions that the Federal Government places on the use of the money must be unambiguous. The States must know what they have to do in order to get this money. I submit that under the present case, Aimee's law, the States could not tell what they have to do in order to get this money because they are always dealing with a moving target. If you remember what I said a while ago, the name of the game is for the States to keep ratcheting up their incarceration time so they are within the national average. If they fall below that for their own good purposes, whatever the reasons and circumstances--they want to devote more money to prevention, or they want to devote more to rehabilitation instead of prisons, whatever their decisions might be--if they fall a little below, they are going to lose their money. If they want to keep their money, how high are they supposed to raise their incarceration rates? Because by the time they change their law and raise their incarceration rates for these various offenses, other States, presumably, could be doing the same thing. You are always going toward a moving target. Each State is trying to outstrip each other, and each State, if it wants to keep its money and not have to pay for 40 or 50 years for somebody in another State--their incarceration expense--the safe thing for it to do is ratchet up the time. The safest thing for it to do would be to give life sentences without parole. For some people, I think that is a good idea anyway. But is that something we ought to be forcing States to do with regard to any and all prisoners who come before them who are charged with this particular list of crimes? It is a list that this Congress has decided is the protected list--not anything else, just this protected list. If the States don't comply, then they lose their Federal money. So the States can't tell what they are supposed to do in order to keep their money. It is a very ambiguous, bad piece of legislation. There are policy reasons in addition to what I have described and in addition to the constitutional problems. It pits one State against another. We are supposed to be doing things to unify this country--I thought. The Supreme Court and this Congress spends a lot of time and attention on implementing the commerce clause, designed to make sure there is the free flow of goods and people and information one State to another. The Supreme Court strikes down laws that States might want which might say another State can't come in, or where they are trying to impose their will on another State outside their boundary. The commerce clause promotes a free flow of commerce, but under this particular law you are pitting one State against another, calculating to see if they can get some money from another State because they have a different criminal law than this other State had, and the Attorney General of the Federal Government is the referee and she keeps the books on all of that. That is a terrible idea. Another policy reason is that Aimee's law defeats the very purpose that it is trying to carry out. Much of the money that will be withheld, if a State doesn't comply with this Federal mandate, will go for prisons. One of the reasons, presumably, why some States have to turn people out before we would like is because of a lack of prison space. They are getting this Federal money in order to help them with more prisons. This is a very circular kind of situation the Federal Government is creating. We are cutting them off from money to do the very thing that is the reason we are cutting them off because they didn't do it in the first place. It makes no sense whatsoever. There is no additional inducement--is the next policy reason--under Aimee's law for the States--other than to keep their Federal money--for the States to comply with this Federal rule. We are concerned about people getting out of jail and committing other crimes. We are all concerned about that. But seven out of eight crimes that are committed by people who have gotten out of jail happen in the States in which they were confined. So the State of Tennessee has every reason in the world to want to have laws that are reasonable for the protection of its own citizens and to keep people confined for a reasonable period of time for these crimes for the protection of their own citizens. Do they need any inducement because one out of eight might go somewhere else and commit a crime and that State might come back on them? You have a situation here of particular crimes. Murder, as defined under Federal law, could mean anything from vehicular homicide on up. So, presumably, someone could be convicted of vehicular homicide in Tennessee and go to California and be convicted of first-degree murder; they are both murder under the meaning of this law. California could get Tennessee's Federal money to incarcerate this guy for the next however many years for murder when he was only convicted of vehicular homicide in Tennessee. This has not been thought through. The Federal Government simply should not be setting the standards for State crimes. They ought to set the standards for Federal crimes. States ought to have the flexibility to choose with their limited resources. We tax the citizens of the States at a rate unprecedented since World War II. We put mandates on States with which we have been struggling, and we are trying to back off that a little bit. We have all of these regulations we put on the States. They have limited resources most years. They are doing a little better these days. They ought to have the right to decide for themselves--the people who elect their officials--how they use those resources. If they want to spend more money for education, if they want to spend more money for health care, if in the criminal area they want to spend more money for prevention, if they want to spend more for rehabilitation, those are different things that different States are doing all across the country. We can see who has been successful and who has not been successful. That is the reason we have States. That is the reason our Founding Fathers set up States. If we don't allow them to do that, what is the use of having them? Why do we have them? Why don't we just go ahead and pass a Federal law for everything and abrogate the States, if we don't need that kind of diversity and if we don't need that kind of experimentation? The Federal Government would have States keep people--let's say the elderly--and have to make the tradeoff of using limited resources to keep people in jail who are, say, elderly and long past the time when you would think they would be dangerous to people, but keep them there on the off chance that they might get out and commit a crime in another State, and so forth. It doesn't make any sense. This is simply an indirect attempt by the Federal Government--by us, by the Congress--to get States in a bidding war as to who can pass the most stringent laws in all of these areas. That is OK in and of itself. But it shouldn't be done because we are threatening them to do it. We think we have the answers to these problems, and we don't. I served on the Judiciary Committee a while back, and I was chairman of the Juvenile Justice Subcommittee for a while. For anybody who deals in criminal law, the first thing they have to come away with, if they are being fair about it, is a sense of great humility. There is so much we do not know about what causes crime--why young people commit crimes, what the best solution is, and so forth. My own view is that we should spend a lot more time, money, and research, and we should spend a lot more time, money, and effort in finding out what is going on in these various communities around the country with the various approaches communities and States have had and the various kinds of problems. It is very complex and very controversial. But that doesn't stop us. Last time I checked, we had 132 programs on juvenile crime alone at the Federal level without a clue as to whether or not any of them are working or doing any good. My guess is that some of them are probably counterproductive. A lot of people want to pass, as a part of a bill, to have youthful offenders sentenced as adults. In some cases, if States want to do that, that is fine with me. But we were going to impose a requirement that all States sentence youthful offenders as adults within certain categories until we found out that the way it plays out in some cases is they would get less time as an adult than they would in a juvenile facility. There is just an awful lot we don't know. Why should we be forcing States to adhere to some kind of a national standard as to how long a person ought to serve for a list of crimes? If we really believe we ought to do that, why don't we just go ahead and do it directly? We have seen the benefit of a system our Founding Fathers established over and over and over again. This is not just textbook stuff. It has to do with power, and the use of power, and who is going to use power, and how concentrated you want it. It has to do with innovation. It has to do with experimentation. It has to do with good competition among the States. We have seen welfare reform, education choice, competitive tax policies, and public-private partnerships all thrive at the State level. Good things are happening. This law is another step away from all of that, another step toward Federal centralization and the monopolizing of criminal policy in this country. I could not let this go and could not let this pass without making that abundantly clear once again. I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I appeal the ruling of the Chair and ask for the yeas and nays.
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I make a point of order that the conferees included matters not in the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee. I am referring specifically to Aimee's law.
FINAL PASSAGE OF S. 1198, THE TRUTH IN REGULATING ACT2000-10-04
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I am pleased that last night the House passed on suspension the ``Truth in Regulating Act,'' S. 1198, and that this legislation will now be sent to the President. S. 1198 will support Congressional oversight to ensure that important regulatory decisions are cost-effective, well-reasoned, and fair. The foundation of the ``Truth in Regulating Act'' is the right of Congress and the people we serve to know about important regulatory decisions. Through the General Accounting Office, which serves as Congress' eyes and ears, this legislation will help us get access to the cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, federalism assessment, and other key information underlying any important regulatory proposal. So, in a real sense, this legislation not only gives people the right to know; it gives them the right to see--to see how the government works, or doesn't. GAO will be responsible for providing an evaluation of the analysis underlying a proposed regulation, which will enable us to communicate better with the agency up-front. It will help us to ensure that the proposed regulation is sensible and consistent with Congress' intent before the horse gets out of the barn. It will help improve the quality of important regulations. This will contribute to the success of programs that the public values and improve public confidence in the Federal Government, which is a real concern today. Under the 3-year pilot project established by this legislation, a chairman or ranking member of a committee with legislative or general oversight jurisdiction, such as Governmental Affairs, may request the GAO to review a proposed economically significant rule and provide an independent evaluation of the agency regulatory analysis underlying the rule. The Comptroller General shall submit a report no later than 180 days after a committee request is received. A requester may ask for the report sooner when needed, as may be the case where there is a short comment period or hearing schedule. The Comptroller General's report shall include an evaluation of the benefits of the rule, the costs of the rule, alternative regulatory approaches, and any cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, and federalism assessment, as well as a summary of the results of the evaluation and the implications of those results for the rulemaking. It is my hope that the ``Truth in Regulating Act'' will encourage Federal agencies to make better use of modern decisionmaking tools, such as cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment. Currently, these important tools often are viewed simply as options--options that aren't used as much or as well as they should be. Over the years, the Governmental Affairs Committee has reviewed and developed a voluminous record showing that our regulatory process is not working as well as intended and is missing important opportunities to achieve more cost- effective regulation. In April 1999, I chaired a hearing in which we heard testimony on the need for this proposal. The General Accounting Office has done important studies for Governmental Affairs and other committees showing that agency practices--in cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, federalism assessments, and in meeting transparency and disclosure requirements of laws and executive orders--need significant improvement. Many other authorities support these findings. All of us benefit when government performs well and meets the needs of the people it serves. A lot of effort and collaboration went into this legislation, which I think is why the Senate and now the House could approve it with broad bipartisan support. The Truth in Regulating Act is based on two initiatives--a bill originally sponsored by Senator Richard Shelby with Senators Lott and Bond, as well as a similar measure that I sponsored with Senators Lincoln, Voinovich, Kerrey, Breaux, Landrieu, Inhofe, Stevens, Bennett, Robb, Hagel, and Roth. I particularly appreciate that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle worked with me to pass this legislation. From the beginning, Senator Blanche Lincoln made this a bipartisan initiative by joining me as cosponsor. Later, Senator Joseph Lieberman, the Ranking Member of the Governmental Affairs Committee, worked with me to resolve his concerns before the Committee markup. This led the way for passage of this legislation through the Governmental Affairs Committee by voice vote and through the Senate by unanimous consent. Congresswoman Sue Kelly first proposed a bill for the congressional review of regulations in the 105th Congress. After the Senate passed S. 1198 by unanimous consent in May of this year, Chairman Dan Burton of the Government Reform Committee advanced the bill through the House. I want to thank Chairman Burton for his leadership as well as Sue Kelly for her hard work that led to the final passage of the Truth in Regulating Act in the House. I congratulate my colleagues in the House and Senate for pulling together to get the job done.
JAMES H. QUILLEN UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE2000-09-18
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I would like to take a moment to recognize the many achievements of former Tennessee Congressman Jim Quillen, and express my support for H.R. 4608 which would designate the new United States courthouse in Greeneville, as the ``James H. Quillen United States Courthouse.'' As some of my colleagues may know, Jim Quillen was Tennessee's longest serving Member of Congress and represented his constituents with distinction at both the state and federal level of government for 50 years. In 1963, Congressman Quillen was elected to the United States House of Representatives to represent the First Congressional District of Tennessee. After serving for thirty-four years, Congressman Quillen retired in January 1997. Congressman Quillen worked very hard for the citizens of Tennessee throughout his legislative career, and played a major role in securing funding to build the new courthouse in Greeneville. Over the years, Congressman Quillen developed a reputation as a hard working legislator devoted to the concerns of his constituents. He served 17 terms in the House of Representatives, and in many ways lived the American dream. Born into poverty near Kingsport, he knew the hardships that many of his constituents faced, and promised that his door would always be open to hear their views. Congressman Quillen rarely accepted that something could not be done, and distinguished himself early on as a man who could get results. Congressman Quillen fought hard to establish a medical school at East Tennessee State University, which is now one of Tennessee's leading medical teaching institutions. He was also instrumental in expanding services at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in Johnson City. Congressman Quillen's tireless efforts in the House of Representatives benefitted the entire nation, and his leadership as Ranking Member on the House Committee on Rules helped pave the way for critical legislation. During his service on the House Committee on Rules, Congressman Quillen shaped the course of national policy by acting as a ``legislative gatekeeper'' and working with other Members to ensure that America's needs were addressed. Congressman Quillen never lost sight of the people he was fighting for, and we should all be proud of his many accomplishments. It is with appreciation for Congressman Quillen's dedication to public service over the past fifty years that we approve H.R. 4608 to designate the new federal courthouse in Greeneville, which he helped to build, as the ``James H. Quillen United States Courthouse.''
MORNING BUSINESS2000-09-14
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a period for the transaction of morning business with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.
AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET2000-09-14
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, September 14, 2000, at 11:00 a.m. for a hearing on ``The State of Foreign Language Capabilities in the Federal Government--Part I''.
TO AUTHORIZE EXTENSION OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA--Continued2000-09-13
Mr. THOMPSON
Mr. THOMPSON. I am not speaking either, and I will yield the remainder of my time after the Senator from Ohio is finished. I will yield the remainder of any time I have.
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, we also had a unanimous consent for an additional, I think, 5 minutes that was allotted to me. I think the Senator from Ohio should be given at least an additional 2 minutes, if that is the case. I certainly agree Senator Byrd should be given some time. There is no reason why we cannot work this out.