Fred Thompson

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn until the hour of 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, September 13. I further ask consent that on Wednesday, immediately following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate then begin a period of morning business until 10 a.m., with the time equally divided between Senator Thomas and Senator Durbin.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I understand my colleague from Minnesota shortly will be wanting to take the floor. When he is ready, I will accede to him. In the meantime, I thought I would make a couple of observations. As the Chair knows, I have introduced this amendment on behalf of Senator Torricelli and myself because of our concern of what is happening in the world, especially with regard to China, at a time when we are entering into a new trade relationship with them. Our strong belief is that we cannot ignore the one thing they do that poses a direct threat to this Nation, and that is a continued pattern of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and selling those items to rogue nations which, in turn, pose a threat to us--the very reason we say we need a missile defense system. So we have put down the amendment, and there is strong opposition against it by some in the business community--frankly, some who really don't have any dogs in this fight, but who have been told they do, or think they do, and therefore they oppose it. There will be a handful of people who would even theoretically be affected by this legislation. It is not a broad parade-dampening situation. It is WTO-compliant. The only ones affected would be the ones selling armaments and munitions and dual-use items. Even then, the President has discretion to cut those items off if he wants. That is the limited focus, despite what you might hear all day. That is the limited focus of this legislation. I have sat here and listened to my colleagues who have problems with this legislation, and they say it will kill PNTR, which it will not. It is an insult to this body to say we have to adopt the House bill exactly the way the House did it--a House bill that addressed things such as labor concerns, Radio Free Asia, and others. They sent it over here, and now we are told we can't address proliferation which, with all due respect, I think should have somewhat of a more elevated status than the things the House addressed. I can't think of anything more important than the safety and welfare of this Nation. I have been listening to the concerns expressed, and it is quite clear that the opponents have not gotten together and plotted any strategy on this because some of them say our amendment is too broad and some say our amendment is not broad enough--if we focused in on three countries. And we should be focusing in on more. Some say that if we pass this unilateral legislation with unilateral sanctions there will be terrible ramifications; that it will have ramifications with regard to our foreign policy and with regard to our allies; that we will set back the cause of freedom and set back the cause of peace. Others point out that we already have numerous unilateral sanctions and laws on the books; that they work; and that they have been somewhat successful depending on which ones you are talking about. Even Sandy Berger said that. Some opponents have said that our legislation ties the President's hands. But other opponents say that the amendment is defective because you can't force the President to do anything under this bill because he has a Presidential waiver. Of course, they are correct. Some say that it makes our allies angry while others say our allies will be more than willing to be there to sell what we refuse to sell. Some say we have real proliferation problems, and yet they can see nothing that has worked so far. Others claim all we need to do is engage in diplomacy, and that will work. We have a myriad of contradictions. I think the bottom line is that there is opposition in search for a rationale because a lot of people do not want to do anything that they think might irritate the leaders in the Chinese Government at this particular point because they in some way, without being able to put their finger on it--even though it is very limited and even though it gives the President discretion, nothing can happen until he makes a finding and even then he has a waiver. The rest of it is totally discretionary. Even under those circumstances, nothing happens until a company has been found to be a proliferator and a threat to our Nation, in effect. Even in light of all of that, there is a vague feeling that this in some way may complicate the trade deal. That is why I said I hope we never get into the position in this country where our friends and allies and enemies perceive us to be more interested in trade than in our own national security. There have been several inaccurate representations with regard to what to do with us. I mention the discretion the President has. Some say we have to take people out of our capital markets and close our capital markets down to them. It is one of a list of things the President has the discretion to do. He probably has the discretion to do it now anyway. The Deutch Commission of distinguished Americans--Democrats and Republicans, former Members of this body, the House and others, including scientists--points out that we really ought to look at our capital market situation and the fact that known proliferators are raising billions of dollars in our capital markets from Chinese companies; billions of dollars in our capital markets to, in some cases, go back and use those funds to enhance their own military. That is the Deutch Commission. So we said this should be, if it is not already, something that the Chinese know about. Put it down in black and white. They should know that the President specifically has that authority. If he determines a particular company, after it has been found to have been selling weapons of mass destruction to our enemies and people who pose a threat to us--after that finding has been made, and after the decision has been made by the President not to exercise a waiver, if then the President chooses to tell that company it can't raise money in our capital markets, he ought to have the discretion to do that. Some will say: Well, they can go elsewhere. Maybe they will. But if it was that easy you would not be seeing the kind of resistance and commotion now, even because of the potential threat that the President might exercise that kind of waiver. We saw the China petro offer not too long ago. It was a precursor. They are looking. There are other major Chinese entities looking at our capital markets and ready to come forth with offerings that will raise billions of dollars. It is important to them. There are other markets, but there are not other markets such as the ones we have. And American investors, American investors could go abroad. But it is important to them. That is the point. There is no inherent right of the People's Republic of China or companies related to them or controlled by them to have access to our capital markets. One item, one potential, so as not to be trade related--it is not a trade sanction bill the way some people have thought in times past--is the low standard of evidence. Some of my colleagues, I don't think, have read the bill quite as carefully as they might. I think the implication has been that based upon credible evidence the President could impose sanctions. That is not accurate. Based upon credible evidence, if a company is found to have been proliferating, they must report. Then the President can look at that report and make his determination, and Congress will have access to that report, too. They talk about mandatory sanctions. There is nothing mandatory about them in the strict sense of the word. When it comes to countries and it is only strictly discretionary when it has to do with a company, the President has to make a determination. Then, as I say, he has a waiver on the back end. They are still talking about another misapprehension. As articulated today, they are still talking about agriculture and small business. There are no agricultural concerns anymore in this legislation. We removed any concern. However, my friend from Wyoming today said that some of his people in the farm community were concerned that if we did anything to irritate the Chinese they might retaliate against us and they might do it with regard to farm items. I can't help my friend there. I don't think that is a farmer's concern. The farmers I know would be primarily concerned about China and Russia and North Korea selling weapons of mass destruction to these rogue nations. If we did something to stop that, and that in some indirect way caused China to turn its back on the $69 billion a year trade surplus advantage they have, which is highly unlikely, I don't think they would think that was a bad thing. I think my colleague from Minnesota is prepared now. If that be the case, I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMPSON. Let me address a couple of points my colleague has made. In terms of the numerous references to second, third, and fourth drafts, these, of course, were attempts to address some of the concerns that opponents of the amendment were raising; the implication being, if we could and would be willing to address those concerns, that we might enjoy some support for the amendment. Of course, as we addressed those concerns, the goalposts kept being moved, and we soon realized that even after all these things that were originally addressed when raised, it was impossible to satisfy the critics of the amendment because basically they did not want to do anything to irritate the leadership of the People's Republic of China at this delicate moment when we are about to give them permanent normal trade relations. As to the hearings, there have been about 60 hours of hearings with regard to proliferation issues. There have been 30 hours in the committee I chair, the Governmental Affairs Committee. I point out the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee spoke on this legislation today and strongly endorses this legislation. I thought at least we could agree on the nature of the problem persistently and consistently without apology presented by the leadership in the People's Republic of China, but now it seems that some think the PRC leadership just needs help in order to be better people; that we are impinging upon the PRC's authority; that we might be doing something that might in some way be interpreted as being unfair to the leadership of the PRC; that we are requiring too much in a report; that we might identify some Chinese company that might in some way later on be determined, even though there is credible evidence, to be innocent, even though we broadened it at the request of the detractors of the amendment to include other countries. There is still concern that the word ``China'' appears in the title and that the leadership in the Chinese Government presumably are going to be upset because of that and, therefore, we should not do anything about it. My colleague from Minnesota takes the Chinese position with regard to whether or not they agreed to the annex to the Missile Technology Control Regime. My understanding is that our Government and the best evidence is that they agreed to the MTCR. They are coming back and saying they did not agree to the annex. That is not a position I thought we were taking in this Nation. There is concern there might be a requirement to report these proliferating companies to the SEC; the SEC does not know anything about giving information to investors, which, of course, is not the case. I guess we have greater problems than even I thought because I thought that while certainly we can have disagreements on the best way to approach this, now I find that some of us apparently do not even have any problems with the activities from the People's Republic of China over these last few years. I wonder where my colleagues were when the Rumsfeld Commission came out 2 years ago and talked about this threat. Where was everybody when the Deutch Commission, the bipartisan group of former Members of this body and former Members of the House, scientists, and experts in the area, talked about this threat and talked about the fact that, as late as 1996, China was leading the pack in the entire world in terms of proliferators? Now they are just identified as one of the top three of nations that are doing things to serve as threats to this country, and the information in the intelligence reports we continue to see is that with regard to part of their activities anyway, it is increasing as we speak; let's not do anything to upset the leadership of the People's Republic of China. I wish we were dealing with the people of China. We would not have this problem. But the leadership over there, counting on having this trade and keeping dictatorial control, too, is an entity whose attention we need to get. Diplomacy has not worked. It is true; we have numerous laws on the books. I said earlier that some of my colleagues were arguing that this would be catastrophic, on the one hand, and yet we have similar laws already on the books, we do not need them, on the other. I did not expect to hear that in the same argument, but I think I just heard it. We have numerous laws on the books that are unilateral sanctions with regard to countries that proliferate weapons of mass destruction. That is nothing new. We pass those bills unanimously usually. What is new about this legislation is the fact that a detailed report is required; the President has to give a reason for not exercising sanctions when a determination is made that companies are proliferating; and Congress has a voice. If 20 Members of Congress decide to file a petition, then we can address it ourselves. The President, of course, still has to sign the bill. The President, of course, can still veto legislation, but it does give Congress some additional voice, a voice that is needed. If this had worked out all right, if we did not have this continuous pattern of behavior and continuous pattern by this administration in not requiring the Chinese to clean up their act, we would not be here tonight and we would not need this kind of legislation. I make no apologies for this amendment. It is needed. It is something that is not going to go away. The People's Republic of China has made it clear they do not intend to amend their activities. It is not as if we are making progress. They told us and our delegations we sent over there in June and July of this year, and with the President of the United States and the head of the Chinese Government as late as last Friday, they continue to tell us that as long as we try to get a missile defense system through here and as long as we befriend Taiwan, they are going to continue their activities and we can take it or leave it. Obviously, many of my colleagues think we ought to take it because of the enormous benefits we are going to get from this trade deal; surely we can move forward and be optimistic and be hopeful in terms of what trade might bring because free trade leads to free markets and free markets can lead to more open societies in the long run. In the meantime, in addition to that, can we afford to blind ourselves to the only activity engaged in by this country or any other country--I am talking about the Chinese Government--that poses a direct and mortal threat, as we are continually told by our own commissions and intelligence community to this country? I think not, and I look forward to a resuming of the debate tomorrow. I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak briefly in response to one point my colleague made before Senator Kyl begins.

Mr. THOMPSON. I will take about 5 minutes.

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, we have had a good discussion of the issues today, but recently the Senator from Montana has taken to the road of describing one of the ideas in the amendment as ``nutty.'' It doesn't really bother me if the Senator from Montana calls an idea of mine nutty. I assume that Senator Torricelli from New Jersey doesn't mind, either. But he is wondering where this nutty idea comes from. I will address that. The Deutch Commission stated that: The commission is concerned that known proliferators may be raising funds in the U.S. capital markets. They concluded: It is clear that the United States is not making optimal use of its economic leverage in combating proliferators. Access to capital markets is among a wide range of economic levers that could be used as carrots or sticks as part of an overall strategy to combat proliferation. Given the increasing tendency to turn to economic sanctions rather than military action in response to proliferation activities, it is essential that we begin to treat this economic warfare with the same level of sophistication and planning we devote to military options. That is the source of that idea. The Deutch Commission, of course, is comprised of several distinguished U.S. citizens who gave up substantial portions of their time to serve on this Commission: Mr. John Deutch; Senator Arlen Specter; Anthony Beilenson of California, served 20 years in the House; Stephen A. Cambone, director of research at the Institute of National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University; M.D.B. Carlisle, who was chief of staff to Senator Cochran; Henry Cooper, who is chairman of Applied Research Associates, Inc., a private consultant; Mr. James Exon, Nebraska, former Senator of the United States; Robert Gallucci, currently dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown; David McCurdy of Oklahoma, former Member of the House of Representatives; Janne Nolan, professor of national security studies at Georgetown and director of the Ethics and National Security Project at the Century Foundation; Daniel Poneman, attorney at law, Hogan & Hartson; William Schneider, who is a former member of the recent Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States and was Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology from 1982 to 1986; Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington- based nonprofit organization. These are the people who came up with this nutty idea. I am proud to associate myself with them.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, it has been said that the vote on permanent normal trade relations with China is one of the most significant pieces of legislation this body will have voted on in a long time. That very well may be true. For a number of reasons, I think most of the Members of this body are firmly committed to the concept of free trade. It has done the United States very well. We all know we are in the midst of a technological revolution that is increasing our productivity in this country and is giving us advantages we have never known before in the international marketplace. But it is not a zero sum game either; it has been beneficial for the whole world. I sign on to the concept that free trade leads to free markets and that free markets can lead to freer societies. The new trade arrangement we will be entering into with the People's Republic of China is also unique in many respects. As we know, they have 1.2 billion-plus people in China. It is a tremendous market upon which everyone now is focused. While our trade with China only constitutes about 2 percent of our international trade at this point, there are those who believe that can be increased substantially. Usually we are trading with people who share our ideals and who share our values. This is not always true as far as the People's Republic of China is concerned. We have just been reminded again by our own State Department that the religious persecution that has been going on in China for some time actually is not only not showing any improvement; it seems to be deteriorating. Yet there are many here who argue--most of the people in this Chamber, I assume--that PNTR represents something so attractive to this country that we must adopt it, that it is a good deal. That argument is powerfully set forth, even though the PRC has not kept agreements in times past. Even its foremost advocates would have to acknowledge that its record on compliance with agreements in times past has been spotty at best. When it comes to intellectual property, for example, it has been a haven of piracy. They have been major exporters of pirated goods from this country. One must also wonder whether or not the Chinese can really comply with the commitments they have made in light of the economic conditions in their country. They are experiencing slower growth rates. They are experiencing greater unemployment. We are seeing indications of rioting in various parts of China because of unemployment and because of some of the things we have seen happen in Russia and other countries. When they begin to privatize a little bit, some of the governmental officials seem to wind up with the goods and the property, and the average people see that and don't like it. It causes instability and in some cases rioting. That is prevalent in China right now. If they lower the barriers in ways they are talking about, it will only increase that instability. Obviously, it will have to be done gradually and over a very long period of time. That is why it is wise for us not to overhype the benefits we may get out of this action. We do about 2 percent of our trade with China now. Most people think the maximum probably is going to be up to 2.5 percent of our trade. So it is important to our country, but it is not of monumental importance, in my opinion, especially in the short run, in light of all these immediate difficulties they are going to have in implementing what they say they are going to implement. We should be realistic, too, especially in light of the fact that we are going to be giving up many of the unilateral actions we could take under present circumstances. When we go into a WTO context, we will be having to depend upon that body, that organization, and the international community, as it were, in order to seek compliance. Many writers have pointed out this is going to be very difficult because China is not a transparent society. How do we prove unfair trade practices or violations of WTO if there are no records that are decipherable with which to prove it? So there are many difficulties with the implementation of this agreement which might result in greater riches to this country and doing something about the $68, $69 million trade imbalance we have with China right now. So it is a gamble. It is a gamble on our part that by gradually lowering these barriers to trade, by gradually opening up society, this trade will lead to a gradual opening up of society with the Internet and what not, additional travel and additional exchange programs and additional trade; that we will wake up one day and China will be a democratic society. And in the meantime, we will maintain their friendship so that the world will not be a more dangerous place but a less dangerous place. That is the gamble we are making because clearly if this is carried out the way that people on both sides hope it will be, China will become even more powerful economically with all those great numbers of people, and therefore they will become much more powerful militarily. You only have to read a little bit of what is coming out of China these days by their intelligentsia concerning military plans and their view of the United States and the fact that many in their country see conflict as inevitable, and that they are laying the firm economic groundwork so that they can have a growing and more powerful military in the future. That should be of great concern to us. We are limited as to what we can do about that. So we take this gamble, before that comes into fruition--if that is their path--that they can open up that society somewhat and lead to a more open society, a democratic society. On the other hand, the Chinese are taking a gamble in that they can open up economic trade somewhat, and they can adopt a more capitalistic society and still maintain dictatorial control from the top, and that it will not get away from them. Our people say that once that starts happening, once we get in there, there will be no stopping it; democracy is right down the road. The Chinese don't see it that way. They are gambling. I think it is a gamble worth taking. I think it is a gamble worth taking because of our leadership and free markets and free economies and democratic society in this country. I think we should go down that road and we should take that chance. And I am not sure we have much of an option in that regard. But while we take that chance, we should be very mindful of the dangers that are presented to this country down the road from China and others. And we should be especially mindful of one particular category of Chinese conduct right now of all the categories that concern us, including human rights, religious freedom, and all the rest. The one particular category that poses a mortal threat to the welfare of this Nation has to do with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The fact is that while we are willing to take this chance and we go down the road to trade with China, they are engaging in activities that pose a mortal danger to the welfare of this country. That is the subject of the amendment that I have just offered. The China nonproliferation amendment seeks to do something about this. I have sought to have a separate vote on this amendment because I don't consider it to be a trade-related amendment. I have sought, for about a month now, to have a debate in the context of our relationship with China but not to have it as an amendment to PNTR. I have been thwarted in that effort. I only have two choices--either relenting altogether or doing what I said I would do; that is, filing it as an amendment to PNTR. Well, that choice is obvious. I have made that choice today because of the importance that I attach to it. Mr. President, the world is a more dangerous place today because of a growing number of so-called rogue nations such as North Korea, Iran, and Libya, who have obtained and are in the process of obtaining additional weapons of mass destruction and the missile means by which to deliver them. Now, Congress has been informed of this on numerous occasions. It doesn't get a lot of attention but the information has been consistent. Two years ago, the bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission concluded that rogue states such as North Korea and Iran could develop an intercontinental ballistic missile within 5 years of deciding to do so. It is pretty clear that they have decided to do so. Shortly thereafter, North Korea surprised our intelligence agencies by successfully launching a three-stage rocket over Japan, essentially confirming what the Rumsfeld Commission had told us. Last September, the National Intelligence Estimate, released a report that ``During the next 15 years, the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq.'' It went ahead to point out that as soon as economic sanctions were lifted against Iraq, they will probably be back in business. Saddam will be reinstituting his ability to wreak havoc in various parts of the world along with the rest. We have received other intelligence reports. Much of it is classified, so I invite my colleagues to avail themselves of these reports, which are even more troubling than what has been made public. Earlier this year, Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, testified that the threats to our Nation's security are real and increasing. Mr. President, it is clear that these rogue nations may have ICBMs much sooner than previously thought, and that they will be more sophisticated and dangerous. And we have taken note in this Congress--finally, last year--by passing the National Missile Defense Act. That is the primary reason that we need a national missile defense system in this country. We belatedly recognized that because of this threat I speak of from the rogue nations. But that is only half of the story. Equally alarming is the fact that Congress has also been repeatedly informed that these rogue nations are being supplied by major nations with whom the United States is entering into increased cooperative arrangements. Last month, the Director of the CIA provided to Congress the intelligence community's biannual report on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We get these reports sent to Congress twice a year. Basically, they have always been in recent history, the same. This report identified China, Russia, and North Korea as key players in nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology. According to this report, the Chinese activity has actually increased in support of Pakistan's activities. And China has also ``provided missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several countries of proliferation concern--such as Iran, North Korea, Libya.'' China, of course, has a long history of proliferating chemical weapons technologies to Iran--nuclear, chemical, and biological. The DCI's report also describes Russia's efforts to proliferate ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, and Libya. Russia is also identified as a key supplier of nuclear technology to Iran and to India. They also have provided a considerable biological and chemical expertise and technology to Iran. North Korea, of course, was identified as a key supplier. This is an interesting country because they have a nation full of people who are apparently starving to death. Yet they not only have managed to become a threat themselves, they have become the clearinghouse for that part of the world. They have become a vendor of weapons of mass destruction. They get help from the big powers, and then with regard to the other smaller powers in that part of the world they begin to assist them. The report identified North Korea as a supplier of ballistic missile equipment, missile components, and material expertise to countries in the Middle East, south Asia, and North Africa, just as North Korea is doing. This latest CIA report is consistent with past reports. We have seen it throughout the 1990s. China is supplying Pakistan with everything from soup to nuts for their mass destruction capabilities, and assistance to North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. Just this summer, it was reported that China was helping Pakistan build a second missile factory, transferring missile equipment to Libya, assisted Iran with its missile program, and diverted a U.S. supercomputer for use to its own nuclear programs. All of this occurred in violation of a variety of international treaties, agreements, and U.S. laws. The bottom line is that these activities by China, Russia, and North Korea pose a serious threat to the United States. That threat is growing. This is at a time when we are granting permanent normal trade relations to China. This is at a time when we are sending over $1 billion a year to Russia and providing other assistance to North Korea. It is inconceivable to me that while we discuss trade issues and a new relationship with China, we will not address what China is doing to endanger our country. It is just that simple. That is what this amendment does. I know people in this body want to pass PNTR. They do not want any complications. They want to get it done, wrapped up; the President wants his legacy, and we want to please our friends in the business community; and we all know trade is a good thing, and so forth. But it is inconceivable to me that we can address these trade-related issues and embrace our new trading partner--China--in a new regime without also addressing and doing something about the fact that they are making this world, and particularly the United States, a more dangerous place to live. The Federal Government's first responsibility is national security. In July of 1999, the bipartisan Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction--commonly known as the Deutch Commission--concluded that ``the U.S. Government is not effectively organized to combat proliferation,'' despite the fact that ``Weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to United States citizens and military forces, to our allies, and to our vital interests in many regions of the world.'' It couldn't be any plainer than that, from one of our bipartisan commissions of experts that look at this and try to come to us and warn of what is happening. Therefore, Senator Torricelli and I have introduced the China Nonproliferation Act. Now we have introduced it as an amendment to PNTR. This amendment provides for an annual report to Congress and to the American people as to the proliferation activities of these three nations because they are the ones on which the CIA is required to report now anyway because they have already been identified as key suppliers--the three nations I have mentioned: China, Russia, and North Korea. It authorizes the President, if he makes the determination based on the credible evidence he has before him, to impose some non-trade- related sanctions on these Chinese companies that are selling these weapons of mass destruction. It authorizes the President to take various actions. There is a list of them. One of the things it authorizes him to do is to cut these companies out of our capital markets in this Nation. China raises billions of dollars in our capital markets on the New York Stock Exchange to go back and spend on its own military. Most people do not know that, I assume. I am not here suggesting we stop that, unless the President determines that they or their companies are engaging in activities, which are controlled by them, that are dangerous to this Nation. Is this not the minimum we can do in this legislation? There is other legislation on the books, certainly. But this legislation, by a more extensive report, requires the President to come to Congress, basically--it does not force the President to take any action, but if he doesn't take action against these companies that are found to be proliferating, he has to tell Congress why. In this legislation, if 20 percent in Congress decide they don't accept the President's conclusion, they can introduce a resolution of disapproval and get a vote on certain sanctions against these proliferating entities. The President, of course, can veto that. It would be tremendously difficult for Congress to force anything through. But it would be a very good debate, and in egregious circumstances that we have seen in times past, I think Congress actually could get some responses through. The legislation also provides for increased transparency. When the President determines that these companies are proliferating and selling weapons of mass destruction, the legislation provides that the President has to inform Wall Street, and the Securities and Exchange Commission has to come up with rules and regulations that will inform investors they are investing with a company that our country and our President has determined to be a seller of mass destruction. They can still do that, if they want to. But they ought to know about it. It is amazing that this law is not already on the books. Lastly, it provides for a Presidential waiver based on national security if the President decides, for his good reasons, that is appropriate. The bottom line is that with all of this concern, talk, and hullabaloo about what this legislation does and doesn't do, until the President makes a determination that these companies are engaging in activities that are a threat to this Nation, if our President does that, do we not want to take action? We made changes to this legislation. The critics came out of the woodwork. No one wants anything that will complicate our trade bill with China these days, it seems. I am afraid some of the pro-trade people have their blinders on. I agree with them on how important free trade is and how important this bill is, and so forth. But we have an additional obligation which I tried to suggest to my friends. We have an additional obligation not just to put money in our pockets in trade today but to look down the road for our kids and grandkids to see if our trading partners are doing something that will endanger their welfare. We have listened to our critics. We have made changes. We have tried to make sure our response was reasonable and measured. Instead of singling out China, we added the other two countries. Instead of having mandatory sanctions tying the President's hands, we gave the President additional flexibility where he must find that there is cause for a determination to be made against these companies. The bill now contains a blanket provision that protects the agricultural community from adverse impact. The bill's penalties only apply to key supplier countries and not to U.S. companies and will not affect U.S. workers. We made changes in the congressional review procedure so one person couldn't tie up the whole body. It has to be one-fifth of the Members of either House to sign a joint resolution of disapproval. It is a measured response to a very serious problem. Our critics have been numerous, persistent, and vociferous. They claim that the world will come to an end basically if, while we are passing PNTR, we irritate the Chinese by informing them there will be consequences to their irresponsible behavior. I don't think the world will come to an end if we do that. I think the world will be a more dangerous place if we don't do that. Let's take a look at some of the things that have been said: Existing laws are sufficient, that we already have the authority on the book. If that is true, why do we see an increasing problem? All we need to do is look at the latest report from the Director of the Central Intelligence. Behavior has worsened in the past year. On the eve of considering PNTR, the behavior has worsened. What will it be after we approve PNTR? On the eve of the Senate's consideration of PNTR for China, and after the House had already voted, it was revealed that China was assisting Libyan experts with that country's missile program, illegally diverting U.S. supercomputers for the use of the PRC's nuclear weapons program, and helping to build a second M-11 missile plant in Pakistan. And Iran test fired a Shahab-3 missile capable of striking Israel, capable of striking American troops, capable of striking Saudi Arabia or American bases located within the border of our NATO ally, Turkey. This missile was developed and built with significant assistance from the People's Republic of China, and the classified reports of Chinese proliferation are even more disturbing. If everything is so hunky-dory, why is this happening? Why does this continue to happen? I don't think the critics are that concerned that we are duplicating existing law or it might be useless. I think they are concerned that it might be useful and that it will substantially get the attention of the Chinese. That is exactly what I intend to do. Some say: We don't want to upset them while we are entering into this new trade relationship. I say that is exactly the time when we should upset them, if, in fact, they are making this a more dangerous world and posing a threat to the United States of America. Some say: Let us continue with our diplomacy; we can talk to them and we can work things out. Where is the evidence of this? All I see is evidence of three delegations of senior administration officials going to Beijing, hat in hand, asking them to stop the proliferation activities, and each was sent back to Washington emptyhanded and told pointblank, according to the newspaper accounts and according to the quotation of those who were on the delegation, that as long as we persisted in a national missile defense system and as long as we persisted in supporting Taiwan, they were going to persist in their proliferation activities. Basically, we can like it or lump it. Last Friday, I was interested to see three different delegations, including our Secretary of Defense, our Secretary of State--not minor; first in the administration-- perceive this problem. They just don't want to do anything to acknowledge the shortcomings of this administration in having dealt with this problem or failing to deal with it. Last Friday, the President got a face-to-face meeting with Jiang Zemin. I was interested in the subject of proliferation, and their activities with Pakistan, totally throwing that place out of balance. It is a tinderbox waiting to explode. Most accounts have Pakistan far and away leading India now in terms of their abilities. That is a dangerous situation. According to the New York Times International on Saturday, September 9, ``President Clinton yesterday urged Jiang Zemin to put a stop to China's missile exports to Pakistan.'' Well, better late than never. ``But in what had already been a week of diplomatic frustration for Mr. Clinton, Mr. Jiang offered little more than good wishes for the President's retirement in 4 months and thanks for supporting China's bid to join the World Trade Organization.'' The article went on to say: ``Mr. Clinton's aides had played down the prospects of any major progress on Chinese missile exports, Tibet or Taiwan, during Mr. Clinton's last months in office. But they had hoped that the expected Senate approval this month of permanent normal trade relations with China--which the United States promised as part of its accord with China that ushers it into the World Trade Organization-- would be rewarded.'' We were hoping that by doing all this the Chinese would reward us for this. ``They hoped to claim political progress on issues that have bedeviled Washington's relations with Beijing since the two first met in 1993. ``In a measure of the two leaders' continuing communications problems after seven years of interchanges, a senior administration official said yesterday the meeting was designed to get these two men on the same wavelength. . . . ``The conversation on China's missile exports to Pakistan came after Mr. Clinton, earlier this summer, sent a delegation to China to try to cut off the supply. The administration worries that any new missile technology would heighten Pakistan's ability to strike India. ``But Mr. Jiang, by all accounts, has paid little attention to the issue.'' I can't be bothered with you, son. We will continue our activities while we expect you to approve PNTR--no questions asked and no amendments added. We, in the United States, ought to be embarrassed and ashamed at that turn of events. Some say the unilateral sanctions can never be effected. I prefer bilateral sanctions, but we have apparently lost the ability to do much bilaterally these days. We can't even get a resolution through the United Nations condemning China for its obvious human rights violations. Our bill recognizes the value of this multilateral approach. It would be preferable. But over the years we have seen, though, that sometimes we need to act ourselves. The major threat to these missiles and weapons of mass destruction is not Belgium, or any of our allies; it is the United States of America. We can't wait until we get everybody together on the same page which, as I said, is more and more difficult to act. In times past, we have seen that U.S. economic pressure in the late 1980s and early 1990s led China's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992. In 1991, the Bush administration applied sanctions against the PRC for missile technology transfers to Pakistan. And on and on. Even the Clinton administration took measures that led to the imposition of sanctions on the PRC for M-11 missiles on one occasion, M-11 missile equipment to Pakistan in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Anyway, they backed down and Mr. Berger acknowledged that sometimes these unilateral actions can be beneficial. Some say the dialog will assist, and perhaps it will, but only in conjunction with firm action. The leaders of PRC are not irrational people. They only can go as far as they can. We have, obviously, allowed them to do what they are doing. When we take actions detrimental to them, they will respond to that, as they have in times past. We need this amendment more than we did even a few days ago. The President recently decided not to move forward on a national missile defense. As I said earlier, national missile defense, of course, is in primary response to these threats of rogue nations. According to our estimates, they will have the ability to be a threat to us in 2005. By the President's actions, now we will be unguarded for at least a year, and maybe 2 or 3. Doesn't it make sense to take this opportunity to at least have the threat of some sanctions for their activities during that period of time? Of course, China and Russia are vociferously opposing a national missile defense. I find that ironic: The same countries supplying these rogue nations with technology and missile equipment to build missiles of mass destruction are the ones that are doing the complaining. I talked about the provision concerning transparency and giving the President, if he finds that it is justified, the authority to do something about their access to our capital markets. To date, over a dozen Chinese firms have raised billions of dollars in the U.S. capital markets. The Deutch Commission again stated: The Commission is concerned that known proliferators may be raising funds in the United States capital markets. The Cox Commission review of the U.S. national security concerns with China also conclude: [I]ncreasingly, the PRC is using U.S. capital markets as a source of central government funding for military and commercial development and as a means of cloaking technology acquisition by its front companies. As we stand idly by. In conclusion, I understand there are many who are saying: Thompson, we think you are trying to do a good thing here. Yes, we really do need to address this. Yes, we let it go unattended for too long. But, as an amendment to PNTR, if you add it to PNTR it will have to go back to the House and, goodness, we don't know what will happen over there if it goes back to the House. The idea is that, I guess, what, 40 people would change their votes? With the Democratic Party thinking that they are very close to taking over the House of Representatives, and with the labor organizations having lined up support for Vice President Gore for President, the thinking is going to be that the labor unions are going to press 40 Members to change their votes so going into the election they will have a vote on each side of this issue? I think that is absurd on its face. If we agree to this amendment, the House will ratify it within 24 hours. Besides, doesn't that beg the question? Should our primary question be whether or not the House would ratify what we do? Since when does the Senate vote on an item simply because they are afraid of what the House of Representatives might or might not do? House Members included provisions in their bill regarding prison labor, import surges, religious freedom, increases in funding for Radio Free Asia. All of that was in their bill. And we are saying we can't add nuclear proliferation to that list of items? Are we going to tell the world that nuclear proliferation is not as much a concern as is funding for Radio Free Asia? I think we should ask what we would be signaling to the world if, at a time when we say we need a national missile defense system, we act as though we are not concerned about nuclear proliferation at all. What signals are we sending to our allies, such as those in Taiwan? If we don't have the wherewithal to defend ourselves, how can they ever depend upon us to have the fortitude to defend them, if it really comes down to it? What does it say about ourselves in dealing with a country that threatens Los Angeles? Since the last MFN vote--even besides and in addition to the increasing religious clampdown that we are seeing over there--they have sent missiles across the Taiwan Strait and they have unashamedly stolen nuclear secrets. They continue their proliferation activities. They tell our delegations, and even our President, that they are not going to be responsive at all to our concerns. They are not going to deny at all what they are doing. They are just going to tell us they are going to keep on doing it. And sending major delegations to Belgrade and praising Milosevic and saying the United States of America is making the world a more dangerous place because of what we did in Yugoslavia? All of that has happened since the last time we approved PNTR. What have we done in return? The President goes over and chastises our allies in Taiwan. He adopts the four ``noes'' the Chinese wanted him to. We grant concessions on WTO; We grant concessions on export control; We give China and Russia a veto on our national missile defense system; and we turn a blind eye to the proliferation activities they continue. We must ask ourselves, Is this the road to peace? Is this the road to peace? The strategic ambiguity may have worked for a little while in an isolated place, but it is getting to a place now where the Chinese do not know where we are coming from, where we will draw the line, or if we will not draw the line. I don't know, and I daresay the American citizens don't know. But there have been a couple of other wars that some historians say, because of this ambiguous kind of posture, became more likely. It has been more likely to get us into wars than to keep us out of wars. Leaving the impression that we will not act when, in fact, we might is just the kind of thing that is going to cause us to get into trouble. I finish by saying I support PNTR. There is no reason why we cannot trade, even with those who are engaging in some of the activities I have described. But we cannot do so while turning a blind eye to all of these reports of all of this dangerous activity, all of this continued activity by these countries. Because if we ever signal to the world that we are more concerned with the trade dollar than we are with our own national security, we will not remain a superpower for very long. Therefore I urge adoption of this amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn until the hour of 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, September 12. I further ask unanimous consent that on Tuesday, immediately following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and the Senate then resume consideration of H.R. 4444, the China PNTR bill, as under the previous order.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess from the hours of 12:30 p.m. to 2:15 p.m. for the weekly policy conferences to meet and that Senator Gramm and Senator Durbin be recognized as in morning business for up to 20 minutes each at a time to be determined during tomorrow's session.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Martha McSally, a fellow in Senator Kyl's office, be granted the privilege of the floor for the duration of H.R. 4444.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 352, submitted earlier by Senators Lott and Daschle.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, at 9:30 a.m. tomorrow, the Senate will begin closing remarks on the Byrd amendment regarding subsidies, with a vote scheduled to occur at 10 a.m. Following the vote, the Senate is expected to continue debate on the Thompson amendment No. 4132. The Senate will recess at 12:30 p.m. for the weekly party conferences, and upon reconvening at 2:15 p.m., Senator Helms will be recognized to offer an amendment. Further amendments are expected to be offered and debated. Therefore, Senators can expect votes throughout the day.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for the transaction of morning business with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in adjournment under the provisions of S. Res. 352 in further remembrance of the late Congressman Herbert Bateman.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, today I want to talk about one of the most serious issues facing the United States--the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. I also want to talk about the legislation that Senator Torricelli and I have introduced--the China Nonproliferation Act--to address this growing threat. The world is a more dangerous place today because key supplier countries like the People's Republic of China [PRC] continue to proliferate weapons of mass destruction to rogue states like North Korea, Iran, and Libya. China has sold nuclear components and missiles to Pakistan, missile parts to Libya, cruise missiles to Iran, and shared a wide variety of sensitive technologies with North Korea. Russia has provided nuclear weapons assistance to Iran, and missile technologies to North Korea. North Korea has provided missile technologies to a variety of countries in the Middle East and Africa, and openly acknowledges these sales are one of its main sources of hard currency. Many of these technologies are being used by rogue states to develop weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them--capabilities which are prompting many policymakers and defense experts in this country to call for the immediate deployment of a multi-tiered national missile defense system. Two years ago,a bipartisan commission headed by former defense secretary Don Rumsfeld challenged the administration by concluding that rogue states like North Korea and Iran could develop an ICBM within 5 years of deciding to do so. In fact, the Commission reported that: China also poses a threat to the U.S. as a significant proliferator of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction and enabling technologies. It has carried out extensive transfers to Iran's solid-fueled ballistic missile program. It has supplied Pakistan with a design for a nuclear weapon and additional nuclear weapons assistance. . . . The behavior thus far of Russia and China makes it appear unlikely . . . that either government will soon effectively reduce its country's sizable transfers of critical technologies, experts, or expertise to the emerging missile powers. Shortly thereafter, North Korea surprised our intelligence agencies by successfully launching a three-stage rocket--the Taepo Dong I--over Japan, demonstrating the technological know-how to hit the United States with a small warhead, and essentially confirming the Rumsfeld Commission's assertions. In July 1999, the Deutch Commission, which was organized to assess the federal government's ability to address WMD proliferation, concluded that: The U.S. Government is not effectively organized to combat proliferation, despite the fact that ``Weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to U.S. citizens and military forces, to our allies, and to our vital interests in many regions of the world.'' The report also confirmed that China ``is both a source and transfer agent for passing knowledge, technology, sub-systems, and entire systems to dangerous state and sub-national actors. Last September the intelligence community released a new National Intelligence Estimate of the ballistic missile threat. This report asserted that ``during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq.'' North Korea could convert its Taepo Dong-1 space launch vehicle to deliver a light payload-- sufficient for a biological or chemical--to the United States. And Iran's missile program is not far behind. In short, some rogue states may have ICBMs much sooner than previously thought, and those missiles will be more sophisticated and dangerous than previously estimated. An unclassified CIA report provided to Congress earlier this year said that from January to June of last year ``firms in China provided missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several countries of proliferation concern,'' including Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. The report also said that China has provided extensive support to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs in the past, and that ``some ballistic missile assistance continues.'' Additionally, ``North Korea obtained raw materials for its ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources, especially from firms in China.''; and ``Russia and China continued to supply a considerable amount and a wide variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technology to Iran.'' Iran has ``manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood, and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them.'' The report adds that, during the first half of 1999, Iran sought production technology, expertise, and chemicals that could be used for chemical warfare ``from entities in Russia and China.'' ``Throughout the first half of 1999, North Korea continued to export ballistic missile-related equipment and missile components, materials and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East and Africa.'' In February of this year, U.S. intelligence officials indirectly confirmed press reports that North Korea has delivered to Iran 12 engines that would be critical to Iran's efforts to build extended- range Shahab missiles. The next report is due out any day now, and it isn't much different, I am told. In a hearing before the Governmental Affairs subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services last month, Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, testified that the threats to our Nation's security are real and increasing. He added that the major factors fueling this threat are continued proliferation and ``increased trade and cooperation among countries that have been recipients of missile technologies.'' Many of the rogue states and other countries seeking these weapons of prestige, coercive diplomacy, and deterrence are working hard to develop an indigenous capability--which requires the acquisition of ``dual use'' items from the industrialized countries of the West. The public press accounts are equally troubling: New reports since 1997 have detailed how Russian entities have provided Iran's missile programs with speciality steels and alloys, tungsten coated graphite, wind tunnel testing facilities, gyroscopes and other guidance technology, rocket engine and fuel technology, laser equipment, machine tools, and maintenance manuals. North Korea has provided missile technologies and assistance to Iran and Libya, and is supposedly building a missile factory in Sudan for Iraq. All of these events lead to one bottom line: That dangers to the United States exist and are increasing; that the unfettered sale of ``dual-use'' and military-related technologies are abetting those threats; and that the problem is being fueled by a few key suppliers like China. Let me give a brief summary of the revised China Nonproliferation Act. The U.S. walks a delicate tightrope as it balances national security and trade with China. Free trade and open markets are essential, but the federal government's first responsibility is the protection of our national security. That's why Senator Torricelli and I have introduced the China Nonproliferation Act, which requires an annual review of proliferation, establishes clear standards, reasonable penalties, adequate presidential waivers, congressional oversight, and much-needed transparency. The goal of this bill is to address the proliferation of key suppliers like China, while minimizing any negative impact on United States businesses or workers. We received a number of comments on the original draft of this bill, and we have made substantial changes in order to address concerns raised by the administration and others. I'd like to take a moment now to set the record straight on what our bill does and does not do. The administration raised four concerns regarding the original draft of our bill, all of which have been addressed in the revisions. First, in response to the concern that the bill singled out China, we have broadened the bill to apply to all key suppliers of weapons of mass destruction as identified by the Director of Central Intelligence. Rather than singling out certain suppliers, this bill applies equally to all countries based on their proliferation activities. Those determined to be key suppliers by the DCI will be subject to the act. This mechanism allows countries to be added or dropped from the list based on their behavior. Second, in response to the concern that the original bill failed to provide adequate flexibility for the President, we have made the sanctions against supplier countries under the act discretionary, as opposed to the mandatory sanctions contained in the original bill. Third, in response to a concern that individual companies could face mandatory sanctions based on insufficient evidence, we have raised the evidentiary standard for imposing mandatory sanctions on companies identified as proliferators to give the President complete discretion in making a determination as to whether a company has engaged in proliferation activities. Finally, in response to a concern that the original bill captured legal transactions and legitimate efforts by countries to pursue their own defense needs, we have changed the language to make clear that only actions that contribute to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will trigger penalties under the act. Furthermore, the revised bill addresses additional concerns raised by the U.S. business community that U.S. firms and workers could be adversely impacted. The bill now contains a blanket provision that protects the agricultural community from any adverse impact. In addition, the bill's penalties apply only to companies of key supplier countries, not to U.S. companies and workers. We have also made changes to the congressional review procedure to ensure that Congress exercises adequate oversight without overburdening the Congress. We have raised the bar with regard to the initiation of expedited congressional review procedures. We did this by requiring at least one-fifth of the Member of either House to sign onto a joint resolution. We have also exempted the President's exercise of national security waiver authority from this congressional review process. In short, the key features of our bill are now consistent with current law and similar to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, which passed the Senate 98-0 in February. These two laws are structured in much the same way, with the difference being that our bill addresses the supplier of the weapons, and the Iran Act addressed a user. Under both bills, the President is required to supply a report, based on ``credible information,'' on foreign entities transferring WMD and missile items. The activities covered in these reports are the same, except that the Iran Act covers transfers of these items into Iran and this bill covers transfers of these items out of key supplier countries--the international equivalent of going after the drug dealers to get to the root of a pervasive drug problem. Under both the Iran Act and our legislation, the President is authorized, but not required, to impose sanctions against countries violating the act. The principal difference between our bill and the Iran Act is that our bill requires sanctions against the individual, company, or government entity, identified as a proliferator, whereas the Iran Act made these sanctions discretionary; however, our bill requires a Presidential determination that the proliferation activities have occurred prior to triggering these sanctions, leaving the President with substantial discretion. In response to the critics, we are confident that these changes will still fulfill our goal of halting proliferation from key suppliers like China and sending the right message abroad, while removing any unintended consequences. But despite our efforts, opponents of the bill continue to contend that current nonproliferation laws are sufficient and effective, that Chinese proliferation is under control, and that sanctions never work. They add that diplomacy and ``engagement'' will bring the world's key suppliers around. I ask these critics, where is your evidence? All we need to do is look at the evidence to realize that existing legislation has clearly not been effective, because we continue to receive alarming reports of China's proliferation activities. In a report issued in July of 1998, the Rumsfeld Commission called China a ``significant proliferator of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction and enabling technologies.'' Recent reports indicate that Chinese proliferation behavior has worsened over the past year, and North Korean activities remain intolerable, demonstrating the inadequacy of our nonproliferation laws. In the last several weeks, on the eve of the Senate's consideration of PNTR for China, and after the House had already voted, it was revealed that China was assisting Libyan experts with that country's missile program, illegally diverting United States supercomputers for use in the PRC's nuclear weapons program, and helping build a second M- 11 missile plant in Pakistan. And just last week, Iran successfully test-fired its Shahab-3 missile, which is capable of striking Israel, American troops in Saudi Arabia, or American bases located within the borders of our NATO ally, Turkey. This missile was developed and built with significant assistance by the PRC. The classified reports of Chinese proliferation are even more disturbing. And all we need to do is look at the events of recent weeks to see that diplomacy alone will not resolve the serious threat to our national security posed by proliferation. In the last few weeks, three senior United States delegations traveled to Beijing to discuss these issues. Each was sent back to Washington empty-handed, under the explicit threat that if the United States continues to assist Taiwan with its defensive needs or proceed with our own National Missile Defense, the PRC will continue to proliferate offensive weapons and technologies to whomever it pleases. Opponents also argue that we don't need more laws--current laws are sufficient and effective. If this is the case, then why is China's proliferation problem not improving? Moreover, why was it okay to pass the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, by a vote of 98-0, less than 6 months ago, and it's not okay to do so now? That legislation was designed to address a serious problem: The development of a credible nuclear weapons and missile program thanks to the direct assistance of the Russians, Chinese, and North Koreans. Weren't there enough laws on the books then also? Or does the potential to make a buck off the Chinese make it all different? Our bill recognizes the value of a multilateral approach to the problem and encourages the President to pursue a multilateral solution. But at the same time, we must act. Over the years, when the United States has been serious about implementing measures to signal our displeasure with a foreign government's action, these measures have had an effect. For example, United States economic pressure in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to China's accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1992. In June 1991, the Bush administration applied sanctions against the PRC for missile technology transfers to Pakistan. These measures led to China's commitment five months later to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR]. In August 1993, the Clinton administration imposed sanctions on the PRC for the sale of M-11 missile equipment to Pakistan in violation of the MTCR. Over a year later, Beijing backed down by agreeing not to export ``ground to ground'' missiles if sanctions were lifted, which occurred in November 1994. Critics of our legislation also say that the problem is not with the laws, it is with the President's willingness--or unwillingness--to enforce them. On this point I would certainly agree. In the case of Chinese proliferation, the Clinton administration has too often put ``good relations'' and commerce before national security. Time and time again this administration has jumped through hoops to whitewash or make the problems with China go away. The President himself acknowledged that he has avoided complying with current laws. In April 1998, while speaking to a group of visitors, he complained about legislation that forces his administration to penalize other nations for behavior that falls short of our expectations. He went on to say that this creates pressure for the administration to ``fudge the facts.'' I have no trouble believing this is true. A prime example is when the intelligence community discovered a shipment of Chinese M-11 missile canisters on a dock in Pakistan. The President failed to take action. His justification? He couldn't prove that there are missiles actually in the canisters. This of course only emboldened the PRC, as evidenced by their recent substantial assistance to the Pakistani missile program. The Clinton administration has never made nonproliferation a policy priority. We've never acted aggressively in the face of these violations, and have never treated nonproliferation as a serious agenda item in our official dealings with the PRC. It is not surprising, then, that the White House does not want to see any legislation considered by the Congress which might reflect negatively on its stewardship of the proliferation problem. But that is precisely why this legislation is needed. This legislation attempts to enhance congressional oversight by requiring reports from the President on proliferation activities and his response to those activities, and by creating expedited procedures for the Congress to consider a joint resolution of disapproval of the President's actions where that is warranted. Opponents argue that the congressional review procedures in our bill are also unwarranted and infringe on the rights of the President. However, Congress has a responsibility here. We do not have the luxury of sitting back and avoiding a matter that involves our national security when we see that things are going in the wrong direction. Our goal is not to tie up the Senate with annual votes on China's proliferation activities, but it is to provide a procedure for Congress to exercise its oversight role when the President has truly failed to respond to these threats. In response to concerns raised by other Members that the original review procedure would allow individual Senators to disrupt the business of the Senate, we have raised the standard to initiate the expedited procedures to one-fifth of the Members of either House, more than that required to initiate a cloture petition in the Senate. And regardless of how the Senate votes, the President can still veto the measure. All this provision does is ensure that Congress' legitimate role in foreign policy is preserved, that we are made aware of the proliferation activities of key suppliers countries and what actions the President is taking to deal with this threat, and Members have the means to fulfill our constitutional duties to ensure that America's security is safeguarded. Other critics of my bill have argued that we need to hold hearings and subject the bill to committee review. Over the past four years, the Governmental Affairs Committee alone has held 15 hearings on proliferation. Over 30 hearings have been held by my committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the Foreign Relations Committee. Furthermore, this legislation has the full support of the chairman of the committee of jurisdiction, the Foreign Relations Committee. The issue of proliferation has received a full hearing and it is time to act. In the past, the Senate has not hesitated to act in an expedited fashion where a serious threat to U.S. interests was involved. I find it ironic that some of those members who so eagerly call for hearings are the same ones that voted last year for the Food and Medicine for the World Act--a sanctions relief bill which was offered to the Agriculture Appropriations bill without prior hearings, and was voted for by 70 Members of this body. This bill significantly affected our relations with several states, most notably Cuba and the other state sponsors of terrorism. This bill would have changed U.S. policy that had been in place for decades, through several administrations, and tightly bound the President's ability to initiate sanctions against a country. Moreover, the bill required congressional approval to implement sanctions, and did so through the same expedited procedures found in our original bill. Again, I ask what is different here? Some have even raised the argument that the transparency provision in our bill is bad and will do great harm to our capital markets. Why is that transparency fine everywhere but in this bill. Whether it be within the government, campaign finance reform, you name, it, transparency is fine. But not when we want to let U.S. investors know when a foreign company that they have invested in, or are considering investing in, has been reported by the intelligence community as a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Is it so bad to let American investors know that their hard- earned dollars might be providing the capital to support a weapons proliferation program for North Korea or Libya that might one day threaten their hometown? We warn Americans that cigarette smoking might be hazardous to their health, that cholesterol might cause heart failure, and that driving without a seat belt on could result in serious injuries in an accident, but we're unwilling to tell them that their pension fund might be helping China ship chemical weapons to Iran? Do we think Americans aren't smart enough to make responsible decisions, or are we actually afraid that they might do just that? This is not some stretch of the imagination. A few months ago, PetroChina attempted to raise $10 billion through an IPO to finance its operations in Sudan, a country that has been listed as a state-sponsor of terrorism. While this case raised the level of public attention on this issue, the problem started before PetroChina. The California Public Employees' Retirement System (or Calpers) has invested millions of dollars of employee pension funds in companies with close ties to the Chinese government and the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Calpers has invested in four companies linked to the Chinese military or Chinese espionage: Cosco Pacific, China Resources Enterprise, Citic Pacific, and Citic Ka Wah Bank. According to the Wall Street Journal, American workers own $430 billion worth of foreign equities through pension funds. Congressionally mandated commissions studying the issue of proliferation have concluded both that the Chinese government is using the United States capital markets to fund its proliferation activities and that the United States needs to address this issue as part of a solution to proliferation. The Deutch Commission study of the threat posed by proliferation stated that ``the Commission is concerned that known proliferators may be raising funds in the U.S. capital markets'' and concluded, ``It is clear that the United States is not making optimal use of its economic leverage in combating proliferators . . . Access to U.S. capital markets . . . [is] among the wide range of economic levers that could be used as carrots or sticks as part of an overall strategy to combat proliferation. Given the increasing tendency to turn to economic sanctions rather than military action in response to proliferation activity, it is essential that we begin to treat this economic warfare with the same level of sophistication and planning we devote to military options.'' The Cox Commission review of United States national security concerns with China also concluded that ``increasingly, the PRC is using United States capital markets as a source of central government funding for military and commercial development and as a means of cloaking technology acquisition by its front companies.'' The committee also concluded that most American investors don't know that they are contributing to the proliferation threat saying, ``Because there is currently no national security-based review of entities seeking to gain access to our capital markets, investors are unlikely to know that they may be assisting in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by providing funds to known proliferators.'' It is clear that China has been using United States capital to fiance its military and proliferation activities, and it seems that this activity will only increase in the future. At least 10 Chinese companies are currently listed on United States stock exchanges, and the PetroChina initial public offering was a test case designed to pave the way for additional offerings. China Unicom, the second largest telecommunications operator in China, was recently listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and has already raised approximately $5 billion in its initial public offering, and total proceeds of the IPO are expected to exceed $6.3 billion. These problems have gone unaddressed for too long. That is why we have included a provision regarding capital market transparency in the China Nonproliferation Act. However, even in light of all of the above, the capital market response is optional. It is merely one of several responses available to the president if a foreign company is determined to be a persistent proliferator. In conclusion, let me end by reiterating that our bill is not an attempt to derail the vote on permanent normal trade relations [PNTR] for China. I have long been a strong supporter of free trade. That is why we have asked for a vote separate from, but in the context of, the China-PNTR debate all along. We want Members to vote based on their conscience and the right solution to this serious national security issue, not based on parliamentary concerns or on how such a vote might affect the pending trade bill. But it is essential to address this issue now. At a time of monumental change in our relationship with Beijing--when China is asking to become a member in good standing of the global trading community--is it asking too much for a fellow permanent member of the U.N. Security Council to obey international rules and norms with regard to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? The United States cannot continue this charade of confronting Chinese proliferation by establishing more commissions, holding more hearings, passing more ineffective legislation, or seeking more empty promises from Beijing. We are confident that our bipartisan approach to this serious threat addresses the problem in a firm, responsible, and balanced manner. The United States must send the right message abroad, and as strong proponents of free trade, we believe that requires engaging and trading, while establishing a framework for appropriate United States response to China's actions that threaten this country. We cannot take one approach without the other--not when our national security is at stake.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be given 10 minutes to speak in morning business.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader and the minority leader for trying to work out these complicated matters. There is, understandably, some interrelationship. I think it is well known that we are looking for a way to get a vote on the important issue of proliferation. It should not be considered to be a trade issue. It is an issue separate and apart. Many of us believe it is extremely timely because of the trade issue, and that while we need to extend our trade relationship with China, at the same time, we need to demonstrate to them and to the world that they must do something to improve their habits in terms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Every day, we see in some media outlet a further indication that the Chinese are intent upon continuing their proliferation habits, as long as we support Taiwan and as long as we perceive a national defense system. I hope the objection is not based upon the desire by the Democratic leader to prevent a vote from happening on the issue of China's proliferation. Just as the majority leader and the Democratic leader have been working together, so have the staffs been working together across the aisle to try to bridge some of the differences on this bill. We have made changes to the bill to accommodate some of the concerns. This bill will not affect agriculture; this bill will not affect business, except in those narrow circumstances when a business may be dealing directly with a known and determined foreign proliferator. At that point, it is not too high a price to ask our American businesses not to deal with those kinds of companies. That is what this is about. So now that the majority leader has set a date for a vote on PNTR, I certainly hope we will be able to rapidly reach a date prior to that when we can vote on the important issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Although trade, being as important as it is, it pales in comparison with the national security of this Nation. I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, as we debate this bill to provide funding for the Department of the Interior in the next fiscal year, I would like to discuss an issue that is of increasing concern to me: our underinvestment in our national parks. There are 379 national parks in the United States and U.S. territories, covering over 80 million acres. These parks provide Americans with an opportunity to enjoy activities such as hiking, camping, white water rafting, or horseback riding in some of the most beautiful sites in the world. The Great Smoky Mountains National Park in my home State of Tennessee is often referred to as the crown jewel of the national park system, and for good reason. But one can't help but be concerned about what is happening in our parks today. I have seen first hand the problems associated with air pollution, traffic congestion, and invasive species in our parks. Folks come to the Smokies to escape the big city and breathe the clean mountain air. Unfortunately, there are too many days now when the air quality in the Smokies is worse than in major cities. Already this year, the park has recorded 13 days with unhealthy ozone levels. Who would believe that visiting a national park could be hazardous to your health? Air pollution is also diminishing the experience of visitors in the park. People visit the Smokies for the magnificent mountain vistas. Unfortunately, the pollution reduces their visibility not only by affecting how far they can see from a scenic overlook, but also how well they can see. Ground level ozone washes out the bright colors of the leaves in the fall and the flowers in the spring. These air quality problems have landed the Great Smoky Mountains National Park on the list of 10 most endangered national parks compiled by the National Parks and Conservation Association. Another major threat facing many of our national parks, including the Smokies, is damage from invasive species. Organisms that are not native to parks are finding their way in and are killing wildlife. Virtually all of the frasier firs on top of Klingman's Dome in the Smokies are dead. At first glance, it would appear that they were killed by fire, but that is not the case. These trees were killed by the balsam woolly adelgid which is not native to the Smokies and has no natural predator there. These and similar problems afflict our entire national park system. That is why I'm pleased that the appropriations bill before us today recognizes these serious threats by providing $11 million for the National Park Service's Natural Resource Challenge. This money will help fund air and water quality studies in our parks. It will also fund efforts to address the problems caused by non-native invasive species. I thank the Senators from Washington and West Virginia for their attention to these needs. I especially thank Senator Gorton for his leadership as chairman of this very important subcommittee. I am also growing increasingly concerned that our national parks are showing the wear and tear of neglect. Each year our parks are host to more and more visitors. In 1998, almost 300 million people visited our national parks. Ten million of those visitors went to the Smokies, making it the most visited national park in the country. That is more visitors than the Grand Canyon and Yosemite combined--which rank second and third in terms of park visitation. We in Tennessee and North Carolina welcome these visitors to our beautiful mountains. National parks are here to be used and enjoyed. But our parks are laboring under their popularity. One might say our parks are being loved to death. We must face up to the stresses to infrastructure that result from increased visitation. More visitors cause more wear and tear on the trails, campgrounds, and roads. Growing visitation also requires higher staffing levels in the parks since more visitors mean more stranded hikers that need to be rescued, more comfort stations that need to be cleaned, and more trash that needs to be picked up. Unfortuantely, park budgets have not kept pace with increases in visitation. The National Park Service estimates that there is currently a $4.3 million maintenance backlog. Park Service staff are struggling to do more with fewer resources. Fortunately, they have been able to rely on a number of organizations for help such as friends groups, the National Park Foundation and other cooperating associations. These organizations raise money to fund maintenance and educational projects within the parks. I am proud that the Friends of the Great Smoky Mountains National Park is held up as the model friends group for the country. Over the last 7 years, the Friends of the Smokies has raised $6 million--$1.5 million last year alone. This money has come from donation boxes in the park, license plate sales, telethons and direct contributions. And, it is used for a variety of projects. For example, the Friends just produced a new orientation film to welcome park visitors. The Friends funded the restoration of the historic Mount Cammerer Fire Tower. And, the Friends help organize and manage volunteer projects in the park. When a team of volunteers goes out to work on a trail, it's the Friends of the Smokies that buys the materials needed to do the job. The hard work and generosity on the part of the Friends of the Smokies is critical to assisting the Park Service officials maintain our valuable natural resource. Just as important as the financial contributions to our national parks are the generous donations of time. This year alone, volunteers will donate almost 75,000 hours valued at $1.1 million to run the visitor centers and help maintain trails and campgrounds in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Because the Smokies was a gift from the residents of Tennessee and North Carolina to the Federal Government, citizens living near the park have a strong sense of ownership. They want to volunteer to take care of their park. Several years ago, Congress also recognized the need to increase resources to our national park system, and we passed legislation to provide the Park Service with new sources of funding for maintenance projects. This new law allows national parks to retain most of the entrance and other fees they may charge, and use that money for visitor services. Fee revenue can be used to fund maintenance projects or to pay seasonal employees, but it cannot be used to fund basic operations. This year, Smokies' fees will generate $1.9 million over and above the park's $13.2 million annual appropriated budget. Fee revenue, volunteer hours, and donations are critical to keeping our parks running, but they are just not enough. Without an adequate operations budget and enough permanent full-time staff, the Park Service lacks the capability to handle the generosity of groups like the Friends of the Smokies. Again, I compliment my colleagues from Washington and West Virginia for recognizing the most pressing needs of our national park system by providing a substantial increase in the Park Service's basic operations budget in this bill. The bill before us includes over $1.4 billion for the National Park Service. That's an increase of more than $80 million over FY 2000. But as impressive a job as the managers have done here today, I'm sure they would both agree with me when I say that Congress still must do better for our national parks. I believe that the Federal Government has a fundamental responsibility to ensure the protection of these natural resources for the enjoyment of both the current and future generations. But we are not meeting that responsibility fully. We must provide our park officials with adequate resources to maintain the trails and campgrounds. We must give them better tools to combat threats like air pollution. As Congress debates what to do with the projected budget surplus, I think we should start by determining whether government is meeting its fundamental responsibilities now. If we see that we are neglecting certain responsibilities, then we need to make fulfilling those obligations a priority. I believe that increasing our investment in our national parks is a priority. I intend to work closely with my colleagues in the years to come to ensure that Congress provides the funding necessary to protect our precious natural resources for the enjoyment of my grandchildren and their grandchildren. I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I thank my friend from Nevada for those comments. This is something upon which I believe we can all agree. Even those who view the role of Government to be a limited one must agree that there are certain basic obligations and functions the Federal Government has. Of course, national defense is one of them; infrastructure is one of them. Our national parks are a precious resource that we must all protect. They are, as the Senator indicates, being attacked from so many different directions right now. We are taking them for granted and slowly, but surely, they are falling into disrepair, and they are being damaged environmentally. We in the Smokies have a particular problem with the weather patterns, for example. Not only do we have some old coal-fired plants in the area, but we have a weather pattern that brings the pollution in from other parts of the country that just seems to hover over that particular area. We have days where there is more pollution on top of the Smoky Mountains than there is in downtown New York City. It is an increasing problem. Hopefully, as my colleague suggests, we can join together and do even more next year.

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.