Fred Thompson

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I yield back all time of the opponents of the amendment.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their statements. I think they accurately state the conversations we have had. I welcome their commitment to try to work with me toward finding another vehicle in order to alleviate some of the concerns I have had. I intended to offer a second-degree amendment to this amendment, but I can count the votes. The better part of valor is for me to accept the commitment and assistance from my colleagues in order to try to interject some expertise into the consideration of the MTOP level issues in the future. What we are seeing with regard to this amendment is a manifestation of a discussion that is going on in this country that is very important. We obviously are leading the world in terms of high technology. We are building supercomputers that no one else has. It is natural that our people want to develop their markets and have an export market. That is important to them from an economic standpoint. Many people in the computer industry are under the impression that if they can build something, it is immediately available worldwide, internationally, by everyone. I respectfully disagree with them on that. But they are of that opinion, and they are moving aggressively in Congress and otherwise to try to raise the level of the computers they can ship without an export license. Let's keep in mind, that is the issue: What is going to be shipped without a license or with a license. We are not talking about stopping any sales. We are talking about time periods and how fast computers can be sold and what can be sold with or without a license. That is one side of what is going on in the country today in this discussion. The other side is that all of the statements about our capabilities and our need to market and all those kinds of things may be true. But there is another side to the story, and that is the danger that sometimes is being interjected into the world by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have been told in no uncertain terms by the Cox committee, and others, that the Chinese, for example, are using our technology. They are specifically using our high-performance computers to enhance their own nuclear capabilities. Potentially, they will be used against our own country. We know the Chinese are selling and supplying technology to rogue nations around the world--a big problem. That is a part of the discussion we are going to have over these next few weeks, I hope, in terms of how we address that with the Chinese. So while it is important to have a viable high-tech market, and while the technological ``genie'' is out of the bottle to a great extent, there are some of us who still believe we should not abrogate all of our export control laws. And on what we are dealing with here tonight, Congress should have an adequate time to consider how much we want to raise the MTOP levels and how liberal we want to be in terms of allowing these computers to be exported--again, mind you, without a license. They can still export them at any level, theoretically. But they have to go through a license process. Is the congressional review too long? Is 180 days too long? I point out that, I believe as late as a year ago--I think July of last year-- while it was not in law, the practice was for the review time for Congress to take between 18 and 24 months. So 6 months kicked in just about a year ago. So we have gone from 18 to 24 months a year ago, and now Congress has 6 months. We narrowed it to 6 months now that we have to review it, when the administration decides it wants to raise the MTOP levels and become more liberal with exports. Now under this bill, we are narrowing the time further to 60 days--from 6 months to 60 days--for Congress to review the raising of a particular MTOP level. I have a great problem with that. I know there is tremendous momentum in this Congress to accede to those who want Congress to have less and less a part in this process. I agree with colleagues who said Congress has not always done its due diligence, has not always used that process to its best advantage; we have sometimes sat on our hands. What I am trying to do, and what I was going to do by my second- degree amendment, which I will now, with the help of colleagues, try to do separate and apart, is to say, OK, we will go down to 60 days, although I don't like it; but we will say, within that 60 days, let's have GAO take a look at it; let's have some expertise from the people who are used to analyzing these things because they don't always agree with the administration, as to what the foreign availability is or what the mass marketing for a particular component is. So why do we want to fly blindly on something that is so technical and important? We need to have GAO in this process and then give Congress just 10 days after the GAO does its work, after 50 days, to look at what GAO has come up with, and then we can act if we want to. So I think it is a very compressed timeframe. But I understand the momentum for this. I hope we are not making a mistake. I hope we are not placing too much faith in an administration that I think has been entirely too lax in terms of matters of national security, our export laws, the security of our laboratories, and everything else. I hope we are not making that mistake. But I know it is going to happen now. It passed overwhelmingly in the House, and I expect it to tomorrow. I can count as well as the next person. But I am hopeful that within the next few days, as I say, we can interject into this process at least a little bit of extra deliberation by the GAO and those with the expertise to tell us what they think about a particular increase in the MTOP levels. I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I rose on the floor on June 22 to address a matter of great concern to everyone, the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A couple of years ago, I was watching late night television and ran across a seminar being conducted by former Senator Sam Nunn. Someone asked him during a question and answer period what he considered to be the greatest threat to the United States of America. He mentioned terrorism and the new emerging threat of weapons of mass destruction. A short time after that, I was watching the Charlie Rose Show late one night with former Secretary of State Warren Christopher. When asked the same question, he gave the same answer: That post cold war, we have not concerned ourselves perhaps very much with some of these issues but that we should, and there are emerging threats out there. I think the Senator from West Virginia is contemplating a proposal that deals with this very issue. I have been specifically concerned with that issue with regard to China for a couple of reasons: One, they continue to lead the nations of the world in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, according to our intelligence community; two, because we are now getting ready to embark on the issue of permanent normal trade relations with China. Many of us are free traders; many of us believe in open markets; many of us want to support that. I think the majority of the Senate certainly does. Is there not any better time, and is it not incumbent upon us in the same general timeframe and the same general debate, that we couldn't, shouldn't, consider something so vitally important to this country as the issue of our nuclear trading partner, that we are being asked to embrace in a new world regime, that sits with us on the Security Council of the United Nations? Is it too much to ask of them to cease this dangerous proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the supplying of these rogue nations with weapons of mass destruction--be they chemical, biological, or nuclear--which pose a threat to us? We are considering now the issue of the national missile defense system. Many people in this Nation, I think a majority of people in this Congress, are very concerned that we have no defense against such a terrorist attack, an accidental attack, an attack by a rogue nation with weapons of mass destruction, and that we need such a missile defense. One of the primary reasons we need a national missile defense system has to do with the activities of the Chinese and their supplying of rogue nations with these materials, expertise, capabilities, military parts that have nuclear capabilities which we are so concerned that, by the year of 2005, could be turned against us. Must we not consider this as we consider permanent normal trade relations? As important as trade is, is it more important than our national security? I think that question answers itself. I pointed out on June 22 that the Rumsfeld Commission reported in July of 1998 that: China poses a threat as a significant proliferator of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and enabling technology. The commission went on to say China's behavior thus far makes it appear unlikely that it will soon effectively reduce its country's sizable transfer of critical technologies, experts, or expertise to the emerging missile powers. A little later, on June 22 of this year, the Far Eastern Economic Review reported: Robert Einhorn, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, left Hong Kong on June 11 with a small delegation bound for Beijing. The article said: Neither the American nor Chinese side reported this trip. Einhorn is on a delicate mission to get a commitment from Beijing not to export missile technology and components to Iran and Pakistan. It went on to say: . . . U.S. intelligence reports suggest that China may have begun building a missile plant in Pakistan. If true, it would be the second Chinese-built plant there. If that article is indeed true, it would certainly be consistent with what we know about other Chinese activities. There is a recent report that there is growing Chinese support for Libya and their missile program. We know they have supported the Iranian missile program. We know they have supported the North Korean missile program. So those are some of the things we discussed back on June 22. Let's bring ourselves up to date now. Just this last Sunday, Sunday a week, July 2, the New York Times reported: American intelligence agencies have told the Clinton administration and Congress that China has continued to aid Pakistan's effort to building long-range missiles that could carry nuclear weapons, according to several officials with access to intelligence reports. The story goes on to say: . . . how China stepped up the shipment of specialty steels, guidance systems, and technical expertise to Pakistan . . . since 1998. That is very recent activity. Shipments to Pakistan have been continued over the past 8 to 18 months, according to this story. This, of course, would be in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime to which the Chinese Government agreed to adhere. Strangely enough, weeks ago, our Secretary of State praised the Chinese for complying with the MTCR. It is pretty obvious now they are not complying. Some answers need to be forthcoming from the Secretary of State with regard to that. But things are more serious than that because we now know, because of these recent developments and, perhaps, because of some of the issues we are considering in this Senate, the administration sent another envoy to the Chinese for 2 days of talks concerning some of these proliferation problems. On July 9, we got a report back from that latest trip, where our people went over there to plead with the Chinese to change their behavior at a time when we are about to consider permanent normal trade relations. We have gotten the results back. According to the New York Times on July 9, this visiting American official, who is Mr. J.D. Holum, adviser to the Secretary of State on arms control, said: After 2 days of talks, the Chinese would not allay concerns about recent Chinese help for Pakistan's ballistic missile program. He is quoted here as saying: We raised our concern that China has provided aid to Pakistan and other countries . . . That is according to Mr. Holum. The article goes on to say: Some Chinese arms experts say that China is unlikely to promise to end exports of missile technology anytime soon because such trade, or the threat of it, gives China a bargaining chip over the scale of American weapons sold to Taiwan. Apparently, what the Chinese Government is saying is that as long as we assist Taiwan--which we are determined to do--for defensive purposes against the aggression of the Chinese Government, they are going to continue to assist these outlaw nations in their offensive designs that might be targeted toward the United States. That bears some serious consideration. The Chinese Government is saying if you continue to be friendly with Taiwan and assist them in defending themselves against us, we are going to continue to make the world more dangerous for you and the rest of the world by continuing to assist these nations of great concern. We have to ask ourselves: Are we willing to acquiesce to that kind of blackmail? We have a policy with regard to Taiwan. It is well stated. Are we going to withdraw our support for Taiwan, which might assist in doing something about this proliferation? I don't think so. I would certainly oppose it. I think most every Member of this body would oppose that. So you can take that option off the table. What are we going to do? The other option would be to continue to sit pat, continue our policy, and see the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We will try to build a missile defense system that will catch them. While they are building up over there, we will build up over here. There is a third option, of course. That is to tell the Chinese Government that, yes, we will trade with you; yes, we want to engage with you; yes, we will help you see progress in human rights and other issues; yes, we acknowledge you have taken a lot of people out of poverty and opened up your markets somewhat; yes, we will do all those things, but if you continue to do things that pose a mortal threat to the United States of America, we will respond to that in an economic way. There will be consequences to you. It does not have to be directly related to trade. We can do some other things that would not hurt our people. For example, the Chinese have access to our capital markets. They raise billions of dollars in our capital markets. It is free and open to them. It is not transparent at all. We don't know what they do with that money. Some people think they use it to build up their army. But Chinese interests raise billions of dollars in our capital markets. Should we allow them to continue to doing that when they are supplying these rogue nations with weapons that are a threat to us? It makes no sense at all. Must we read in the paper someday that the North Koreans or the Iranians, sure enough, have a missile and have the nuclear capability of send a nuclear missile to the United States of America? People say: They know they would be wiped off the face of the Earth. We could retaliate and they would never do something like that. No. 1, we made a lot of mistakes in this country by assuming other people think the same way we do. No. 2, I am not sure we are always going to be able to detect the source of a missile such as that. The United States would not likely, as some people say--having it trip off their tongue so easily--wipe a nation off the face of the Earth unless we were absolutely sure. So there is no need to go down that road. We must do something on the front end that will ameliorate the possibility of our ever getting into that situation and that condition. That is why 17 of my colleagues and I have proposed a bill called the Chinese Nonproliferation Act, which basically calls for an annual assessment of the activities of the Chinese Government and Chinese Government-controlled entities within China, to see how they are doing on a yearly basis in terms of their proliferation activity. Then, if there is a finding that they continue their proliferation activity, the President has the authority to take action. I believe that is the least we can do under the circumstances. Our bill has become quite controversial because many people think it complicates the issue of permanent normal trade relations with China. They do not want to do anything--No. 1, they say--to hurt our exporters. We have made changes. No one can arguably say our bill hurts U.S. exporters now. We don't want to hurt our agricultural industry. We have made changes to accommodate that concern. We are not designing this in order to hurt our agricultural industry, so that is not an issue anymore. When you get right down to it, the opponents of this bill are primarily concerned about doing anything to agitate the Chinese at a time in which we are trying to get permanent normal trade relations passed. I don't think we ought to gratuitously aggravate them. But if we are not prepared to risk the displeasure of a nation that is doing things that pose a mortal threat to our national security, what are we prepared to do? What is more important than that? I am not saying let's cut off trade with them. I am not saying let's take action against them for precipitous reasons or reasons that are not well thought out. I am saying we must respond to these continued reports from the Rumsfeld Commission, from the Cox Commission, from our biennial intelligence assessments, from these reports from our own envoys coming back saying the Chinese are basically telling us to get lost. We know what they are doing, and they are apparently not even denying it anymore. And we are going to approve PNTR without even taking up this issue? We are trying to get a vote on this bill. So far we have been unable to do so. I ask my colleagues to seriously consider what kind of signal we are going to be sending. We talk a lot about signals around here. I ask what kind of signal we are going to be sending to the Chinese Government, to our allies, to the rest of the world, if we are not willing to take steps to defend ourselves? A great country that is unwilling to defend itself will not be a great country forever. I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I say to the Senator from West Virginia how much I appreciate that rendition and bringing us back to a better reality here from time to time. I remember the comments by that same poet who once said: Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers, Little we see in nature that is ours. I don't think anyone can ever say that about the senior Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. THOMPSON. I appreciate that very much.

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 20 minutes as in morning business.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. I say to Senator Domenici, this is a piece of legislation that is in response to the continuing array of reports and information that we have concerning the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in which the Chinese are engaged. As you know, we are in the process of having an extensive national missile defense system debate in this country. Much of the reason for that need is what the rogue nations are doing. Much of what the rogue nations are being supplied with is coming from the Chinese Government and Chinese governmental entities. What this bill does is provide for an annual assessment. It is China specific. It is an annual assessment as to their level of proliferation activities. If any entities are engaged in those activities, there are certain responses in which our country engages to cut off those entities with regard to dual-use trade, munitions trade, access to our capital market. There is an array of things the President has to choose from to respond to that.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, if I might please respond to my colleague.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, today Senator Lieberman and I are introducing, by request, the Federal Asset Management Reform Act of 2000. This legislation is the result of the work of the General Services Administration, under the leadership of its Administrator David Barram, to modernize and reform the management, use and disposal of the Federal government's real property and surplus personal property. The Federal government owns or controls over 24 million acres of land and facilities which have been acquired for use and operation by Federal agencies in support of their missions. Since 1949, the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act has provided the foundation for the management and disposal of these properties as well as for surplus personal property. This legislative proposal is intended to improve life cycle planning and management of Federal assets. We are introducing this proposal today for the purpose of encouraging study and comment by all interested parties. Key participants in the current property disposal process are state and local governments, non- profit organizations and federal agencies. The Governmental Affairs Committee intends to review this legislative measure and all comments received about it to better understand what changes are desirable in the management of the Federal government's billions of dollars worth of real and surplus property. The Committee expects to follow through with further legislative action in the next Congress. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the Federal Asset Management Reform Act of 2000 be printed at this point in the Record.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, we will shortly be taking up the matter of permanent normal trade relations with China. Mr. President, normally, I do not think matters of trade should be encumbered by other non-trade considerations; however, in the case of China, the situation is different. Not only are we considering trade with someone other than an ally, someone other than a nation that shares our values and outlooks on life, but we are beginning a new relationship with a nation that is actively involved in activities that go against the national security of this nation, and go against the security of the entire world. China still is one of the world's leading proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. We are right now engaged in a debate in this country over a national missile defense because of the activities of certain rogue nations and the weapons of mass destruction that they are rapidly developing. They're developing those weapons, Mr. President, in large part because of the assistance they're getting from the Chinese. The Rumsfeld Commission reported in July of 1998 that ``China poses a threat as a significant proliferator of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and enabling technology. It has carried out extensive transfers to Iran's solid fuel ballistic missile programs, and has supplied Pakistan with the design for nuclear weapons and additional nuclear weapons assistance. It has even transferred complete ballistic missile systems to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. China's behavior thus far makes it appear unlikely it will soon effectively reduce its country's sizable transfers of critical technology, experts, or expertise, to the emerging missile powers. Mr. President, I speak today not to get into the middle of the PNTR debate, because that is yet to come, but because something has come to my attention that I think deserves comment. Under issue cover dated June 22--today--the Far Eastern Economic Review reports this: Robert Einhorn, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, left Hong Kong on June 11 with a small delegation bound for Beijing. Neither the American or Chinese side reported this trip. Einhorn is on a delicate mission to get a commitment from Beijing not to export missile technology and components to Iran and Pakistan. China has agreed in principle to resume nonproliferation discussions with the U.S. in July. But Einhorn's trip has an added urgency because recent U.S. intelligence reports suggest that China may have begun building a missile plant in Pakistan. If true, it would be the second Chinese-built plant there. A senior U.S. official declined comment on the report, but said that Washington is concerned that China has resumed work on an M-11 missile plant it started building in Pakistan in 1990. Work stopped in 1996 when Pakistan, facing U.S. sanctions, pledged itself to good behavior. Mr. President, if this report is true, I must say it's totally consistent with everything else the Chinese have been doing over the past several years. In summary, they have materially assisted Pakistan's missile program; they have materially assisted North Korea's missile program; they have materially assisted Libya's missile program. They have now been responsible apparently for two missile plants in Pakistan. The India-Pakistan part of the world is a nuclear tinder box. They are going after one another with tests of missiles with the Indians saying they're responding to the Pakistanis' tests. The Pakistanis in turn are developing capabilities almost solely dependent on the Chinese. All of this activity by China is in clear violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which they have agreed to adhere to. In addition, they have assisted in the uranium and plutonium production in Pakistan. This is in violation of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty. They have been of major assistance to the Iranian missile program. They have supplied guidance systems to the Iranians. They have helped them test flight their Shahab-3 missile. They have now successfully conducted a test flight of that missile. They have supplied raw materials and equipment for North Korea's missile program. Plus, in addition, they have supplied cruise missiles to Iran, and they have supplied chemicals and equipment and a plant to Iran to help them produce chemical weapons. Now, all of these have to do with reports, most have to do with intelligence reports, that we have received in open session before Congressional committees year after year after year where the Chinese have promised that they would do better, promised that they would adhere to international regimes and norms of conduct, and they have consistently violated them. We cannot turn a blind eye to these factors as we consider PTNR. What is to happen to a nation that will not protect itself against obvious threats to its national security? That's why, Mr. President, we have introduced a bill that will establish an annual review mechanism that assesses China's behavior with regard to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And if it is determined that they continue this conduct, we will have responses. They will be WTO-compliant; for the most part they will not be trade-related. They address things like Chinese access to our capital markets. They now are raising billions of dollars in our capital markets, and there's no transparency. We do not know what the monies are going for. We know precious little about the companies except that they are basically controlled by the Chinese government. Many people feel like the money is going back to enhance their military and other activities such as that. There needs to be transparency. They need to be told that if they continue with this pattern of making the world less safe, creating a situation where we even need to have to worry about a national missile defense system, assisting these rogue nations with the capability of hitting us with nuclear and biological and chemical weapons, that there's going to be a response by this country. It will be measured; it will be calculated; it will be careful; it will be tiered-up in severity based upon the level of their activities. And this is what we're going to be considering in conjunction with the PTNR debate. I thought it was important that I bring this latest information concerning the Chinese activities in building apparently another missile plant in Pakistan, which is a nuclear tinder box, even at the time--even at the time--that we have under consideration permanent normal trade relations with them. That shows no respect for us; it shows no respect for the international regimes which seek to control such things, and it is time we got their attention. I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be given 10 minutes in morning business.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I offer this amendment on behalf of myself as chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee and Senator Lieberman, the committee's ranking minority member. This amendment deals with the important issue of information security at the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies. The amendment is essentially the same as S. 1993, a bill reported by our committee this past April. Senator Lieberman and I introduced the original S. 1993 last November as the result of the considerable time spent by the Governmental Affairs Committee last Congress examining the state of Federal government information systems. Numerous Governmental Affairs Committee hearings and General Accounting Office reports uncovered and identified systemic failures of government information systems which highlighted our nation's vulnerability to computer attacks--from international and domestic terrorists to crime rings to everyday hackers. Report after report, agency after agency, we learned that our nation's underlying information infrastructure is riddled with vulnerabilities which represent severe security flaws and risks to our national security, public safety and personal privacy. In fact, GAO believes the problems in the government's information technology systems to be so severe that it has put government-wide information security on its list of ``high-risk'' government programs-- programs which are most vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement. For example, GAO told us: That unknown and unauthorized individuals were gaining access to highly sensitive unclassified information at the Department of Defense; That weaknesses in IRS computer security controls continue to place IRS systems and taxpayer data ``at serious risk to both internal and external attack''; That ``pervasive, serious weaknesses jeopardize State Department operations''; That ``many NASA mission-critical systems face serious risks''; That flight safety is jeopardized by weak computer security practices at FAA; and That, based on the most recent review of the government's 24 largest agencies, computer security weaknesses place critical government operations, such as national defense, tax collection, law enforcement and benefit distribution, at risk. At our hearings, we learned from the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, that information warfare or cyberterrorism has the potential to deal a crippling blow to our national security if strong measures are not taken to counter it. Potential threats range from national intelligence and military organizations, terrorists, criminals, industrial competitors, hackers, and disgruntled or disloyal insiders. Director Tenet stated that several countries, including Russia and China, have government-sponsored information warfare programs with both offensive and defensive applications. These countries see information warfare as a way of leveling the playing field against a stronger military power, such as the U.S. We learned from the Director of the National Security Agency, General Minihan, that severe deficiencies exist in our ability to respond to a coordinated attack on our national infrastructure and information systems. We heard from agents of the Social Security Administration's Office of Inspector General who described how computer crimes were committed by SSA employees. This demonstrated the danger of the ``inside threat'' to agencies that do not adequately monitor and limit access to computer information by their own employees. And finally, we heard from reformed hacker, Kevin Mitnick, and learned of his ability to crack into systems without ever touching a computer. He told us that, even if we did everything else right, without strong personnel security, nothing is safe. He described how he successfully tricked the employees of a multi-national company into giving him pass codes to the company's security access devices. He said ``The human side of computer security is easily exploited and constantly overlooked.'' And, yet, even with evidence from all of these various experts on how information systems should be managed to prevent against attacks, year after year, we continue to receive reports detailing significant security breaches at Federal agencies. The one thing that came through loud and clear is that at the core of the government problems is the absence of effective management. GAO told us ``Poor security program planning and management continue to be fundamental problems . . . What needs to emerge is a coordinated and comprehensive management strategy.'' To identify potential management solutions, we asked GAO to study the management practices of organizations known for their superior security programs. When GAO looked at eight organizations--most of which were private companies--GAO found that these organizations implemented information security policies on an ongoing basis through a coordinated management framework. Agencies clearly must do more than establish programs and set management goals--agencies and the people responsible for managing information systems in those agencies must be held accountable for their actions. That is what Senator Lieberman and I intend with this amendment. The primary objective of the amendment is to address the management challenges associated with operating in the current interdependent computing environment. It will provide a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to protecting information. For example, the bill would: Vest overall government accountability within the highest levels of the Executive Branch [Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget]; Create specific management rules for agency heads, such as requiring agency-wide security programs; Require agencies to have an annual independent evaluation of their information security programs and practices; Focus on the importance of training programs and government-wide incident response handling. Our amendment reflects changes made to S. 1993 based on comments received from our colleagues in the Senate and working with the Department of Defense and others in the intelligence community, the Office of Management and Budget, the agency Inspectors General, and industry. We urge support of our amendment and believe that, through continued vigorous oversight, we will drive the Federal government to focus on improving its computer security deficiencies. I look forward to working with my colleagues to ensure that government information technology systems are secure and that the information within those systems is protected from further attacks.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I offer this amendment on behalf of myself as chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee and Senator Lieberman, the Committee's ranking minority member, and Senators Warner and Levin, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee. Senator Lieberman and I thank the Armed Services chairman and ranking member for their cooperation and assistance in preparing this amendment which will benefit not only the procurement process within the Department of Defense, but other agencies across the Federal government as well. The amendment which we offer today began as a request from the administration and others to include additional procurement-related reforms to those enacted over the past several years and those already included in S. 2549. Our amendment includes language which would (1) express a governmentwide preference for performance-based service contracting; (2) move the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) Board out of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, making it a separate office within the Office of Management and Budget, and conform the delegation of authority levels relating to the CAS with those for the Truth in Negotiations Act; (3) extend the authority of certain pilot programs under the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996; (4) prohibit the use of mandatory minimum educational and experience requirements on performance-based service contracts and certain other contracts; and (5) ensure that the implementing regulations of the Prompt Payment Act treat partial payments on contracts for services as periodic payments covered by the Act. I ask unanimous consent that a joint statement of sponsors explaining the amendment be placed in the Record immediately following my statement. This statement represents the consensus view of the sponsors as to the meaning and intent of the amendment.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment along with a bipartisan group of Senators, including Senator Bingaman, Senator Voinovich, Senator Kennedy, Senator DeWine, Senator Reid, Senator Thurmond, Senator Bryan, Senator Frist, Senator Murray, Senator Murkowski, Senator Harkin, and Senator Stevens. Mr. President, watching President Clinton's summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin last weekend, I think we were all reminded of how far our two nations have come over the past decade, since President Reagan implored President Gorbachev to ``tear down (the Berlin) Wall,'' and President Bush presided over its destruction. While dangerous new threats have emerged, the Cold War that dominated the politics of our security for four decades is over, and the United States won. We should be proud of that victory and we should never forget the strength and resolve through which it was achieved. But it has become clear in recent months that that victory came at a high price for some of those who were most responsible for producing it. I am talking about workers in our nuclear weapons facilities run by the Department of Energy or their contractors. We now have evidence that, in at least some instances, the federal government that they had dedicated themselves to serving put these workers in harm's way without their knowledge. I first became concerned about this issue three years ago when my hometown newspaper, the Nashville Tennessean, published a series of stories describing a pattern of unexplained illnesses in the Oak Ridge, Tennessee area. Many of the current and former Oak Ridge workers profiled in the stories believed that their illnesses were related to their service at the Department of Energy site. In 1997, I asked the Director of the Centers for Disease Control to send a team to Oak Ridge to assess the situation and to try to determine if what we were seeing there was truly unique. Unfortunately, in the end, the CDC did not take a broad enough look at the situation to really answer the questions that had been raised. And that, of course, has been a pattern at Oak Ridge and at many DOE sites over the years. Countless health studies have been done, some on very narrow populations and some on larger ones, some showing some correlations and some not able to reach any conclusions at all. The data is mixed, some of it is flawed, and we are left with a situation that is confusing and from which it is very difficult to draw any definite conclusions. And yet, there is a growing realization that there are illnesses among current and former DOE workers that logic tells us are related to their service at these weapons sites. For example, hundreds of current and former workers in the DOE complex have been diagnosed with Chronic Beryllium Disease. Many more have so-called ``beryllium sensitivity,'' which often develops into Chronic Beryllium Disease. The only way to contract either of these conditions is to be exposed to beryllium powder. The only entities that use beryllium in that form are the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense. And there are other examples, perhaps less clear cut, but certainly worthy of concern. Uranium, plutonium, and a variety of heavy metals found in people's bodies. Anecdotes about hazardous working conditions where people were unprotected against both exposures they knew were there and exposures of which they were not aware. It's time for the federal government to stop automatically denying any responsibility and face up to the fact that it appears as though it made at least some people sick. The question now is: what do we do about it? And how do we make sure it never happens again? This amendment attempts to answer the first of those two questions. It would set up a program, administered by the Department of Labor, to provide compensation to employees who are suffering from chronic beryllium disease, or from a radiation-related cancer that is determined to likely have been caused by exposures received in the course of their service at a DOE facility. It would also provide a mechanism for employees suffering from exposures to hazardous chemicals and other toxic substances in the workplace to gain access to state workers' compensation benefits, which are generally denied for such illnesses at present. Mr. President, our amendment takes a science-based approach. It is not a blank check. It does not provide benefits to anyone and everyone who worked at a DOE facility who has taken ill. In the case of beryllium, we can say with certainty that if someone has chronic beryllium disease and they worked around beryllium powder, their disease is work-related; there is no other way to get it. The same is not true of cancer, of course. A physician cannot look at a tumor and say with certainty that it was caused by exposure to radiation, or by smoking, or by a genetic disposition, or by any other factor. However, we do know that radiation in high doses has been linked to certain cancers, and we now know that some workers at DOE facilities were exposed to radiation, often with inadequate protections. What this amendment does is employ a mechanism developed by scientists at the National Institutes of Health and the National Cancer Institute to determine whether a worker's cancer is at least as likely as not related to exposures received in the course of their employment at a DOE facility. The model takes into account the type of cancer, the dose received, the worker's age at the time of exposure, sex, lifestyle factors such as whether the worker smoked, and other relevant factors. In many, if not most, cases, it should be possible to determine with a sufficient degree of accuracy the radiation dose a particular worker or group of workers received. However, in some cases--because the Department of Energy kept inadequate or incomplete records, altered some of its records, and even tampered with the dosimetry badges that workers were supposed to wear--it may not be possible to estimate with any degree of certainty the radiation dose a certain worker received. For these workers, who are really the victims of DOE's bad behavior, our amendment provides an expedited track to compensation for a specified list of radiation-related cancers. Mr. President, the Governmental Affairs Committee, which I chair, held a hearing on this issue back in March. We heard testimony from several workers from Oak Ridge, Tennessee and Piketon, Ohio who are suffering from devastating illnesses as a result of their service to our country. And of course, it is not just the workers who are affected--it is their entire family that suffers emotionally, financially, and even physically. In the end, we must remember that these workers were helping to win the cold war, to defend our Nation and protect our security. They were patriotic and proud of the work that they were doing. If the Federal Government made mistakes that jeopardized their health and safety, then we need to do what we can to make it right. That is what this amendment would do. I want to thank the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, for his support, as well as Senator Levin. I urge the rest of my colleagues to support it as well.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, Senator Lieberman and I are today introducing the Presidential Transition Act of 2000 on behalf of ourselves and Senators Akaka, Durbin, Levin, and Voinovich. The ability of a President-elect to effectively transition from campaigning to governing is obviously of critical importance and this legislation is designed to initiate much needed improvements in the process. A President-elect must face the management challenge of transitioning from leading a successful campaign operation to leading the nation. There are only 73 days from election day to inauguration day. Transition planning should begin prior to election day. The President- elect should have the ability to move immediately to put a new team in place. That team should receive the critical information it needs to be prepared to take over the management of the federal government on inauguration day. Potential nominees should be able to move through the nomination and confirmation process without unnecessary barriers. The magnitude of the need for an effective presidential transition and the recognized problems with past ones have led a number of private sector organizations to focus on the problem and solutions to it. Several, including the Presidential Appointee Initiative of the Brookings Institution, Transition to Governing of the American Enterprise Institute and Brookings, and the Heritage Foundation's Mandate for Leadership 2000, have contributed to our consideration of this problem. These groups and others are independently preparing a body of knowledge which will assist the new administration to get an effective, timely start. I ask unanimous consent that an article by Carl Cannon in National Journal and one by David Broder in the Washington Post, which describe the significant work which is underway, be printed at the conclusion of my remarks, followed by the text of our legislation. The legislation encompasses and expands on H.R. 3137, legislation sponsored by Representative Steve Horn, Chairman of the Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology and passed by the House of Representatives. Representative Horn's bill provides for the payment of expenses during the transition for briefings and other activities designed to transfer key policy and administrative information to prospective presidential staff in order to ensure a smooth transition from one administration to another. The current Administration has recognized the importance of these activities by including additional funds for it in its FY 2001 budget request for the General Services Administration. Our bill supplements the framework established by H.R. 3137. Our bill includes the authorization of federal funds to be spent to provide for the training and orientation of officials a President intends to nominate to key positions. This important provision allows political appointees to hit the ground running by preparing for the job before they are nominated. Additionally, our bill requires the preparation of a ``transition directory.'' This valuable tool will be a compilation of materials that provide information to prospective appointees about the organization of federal departments and agencies, as well as the statutory and administrative authorities, functions, duties, and responsibilities of each federal department and agency. With this tool, prospective appointees can better manage the new, important positions they are preparing to undertake. Finally, the bill requires the Office of Government Ethics conduct a study and submit a report to Congress on potential improvements to the current financial disclosure process Presidential nominees are currently required to undergo. Certainly, nothing the Office of Government Ethics recommends should in any way lessen the requirement that potential nominees disclose possible conflicts of interest. But, the Office of Government Ethics should recommend ways to improve the process of obtaining, reviewing, and disclosing such information in order to reduce the burden the current process places on potential appointees and the people who review the information. Mr. President, we believe this legislation will help improve and smooth the process by which elected Presidents and their political appointees transition to power and assume their responsibilities. We hope the incentives provided in this legislation will encourage and enable presidential candidates, presidents-elect and newly sworn presidents to be up and running on the day after the inauguration. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be printed in the Record.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I ask for the bill's second reading.

Mr. THOMPSON. I didn't hear the majority leader.

Mr. THOMPSON. I now ask for the bill's second reading.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I rise to introduce a bill, the China Nonproliferation Act, which I now send to the desk on behalf of myself and Senator Torricelli, as well as the following original cosponsors: Senators Collins, DeWine, Inhofe, Kyl, Santorum, and Specter.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, my distinguished colleague from Virginia and I direct the distinguished Managers to a matter that relates to a revenue raising provision that was considered in the conference on the Trade and Development Act of 2000, but ultimately was not included in the final agreement. The revenue raising provision limited the non- accrual experience method of accounting. The related matter is the application of the formula in the Treasury Regulations on the non-accrual experience method of accounting to qualified personal service providers. The formula contained in Temp. Reg. Section 1.448-2T does not clearly reflect the amount of income that, based on experience, will not be collected by many qualified personal service providers, especially for those where significant time elapses between the rendering of the service and a final determination that the account will not be collected. Providers of qualified personal services should not be subject to a formula that requires the payment of taxes on receivables that will not be collected. To this end, we believe the Treasury Secretary should amend the temporary regulations to provide a more accurate determination for such qualified personal service providers of the amount to be excluded from income that, based on the taxpayer's experience, will not be collected. In amending such regulations, the Secretary should consider providing flexibility with respect to the formula used to compute the amount of the exclusion to address the different factual situations of taxpayers. Do the distinguished Managers agree with our view of the temporary regulations and the action the Treasury Secretary should take?

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. That is correct.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I am pleased that today the Senate has passed by unanimous consent the ``Truth in Regulating Act.'' This legislation would support Congressional oversight to ensure that important regulatory decisions are efficient, effective, and fair. The foundation of the ``Truth in Regulating Act'' is the right of Congress and the people we serve to know about important regulatory decisions. Through the General Accounting Office, which serves as Congress' eyes and ears, this legislation will help us get access to the cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, and other key information underlying important regulatory proposals. So, in a real sense, this legislation not only gives people the right to know; it gives them the right to see--to see how the government works, or doesn't. GAO will be responsible for providing an evaluation of the analysis underlying a proposed regulation, which will enable us to communicate better with the agency up front. It will help us to ensure that the proposed regulation ultimately is sensible and consistent with Congress' intent. It will help improve the quality of important regulations. This will contribute to the success of programs the public values and improve public confidence in the Federal Government, which is a real concern today. Under the 3-year pilot project established by this legislation, a chairman or ranking member of a committee with legislative or general oversight jurisdiction, such as Governmental Affairs, may request the GAO to provide an independent evaluation of the agency regulatory analysis for any proposed economically significant rule. The Comptroller General shall submit a report no later than 180 calendar days after a committee request is received. The Comptroller General's evaluation of the rule shall include the following: an evaluation of the agency's analysis of the potential benefits of the rule; an evaluation of the agency's analysis of the potential costs of the rule; an evaluation of the agency's analysis of alternative approaches as well as of any cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, federalism assessment, or other analysis prepared by the agency or required for the rule; and a summary of the results of the evaluation and the implications of those results. Mr. President, it is my hope that the ``Truth in Regulating Act'' will encourage Federal agencies to make better use of modern decisionmaking tools, such as benefit-cost analysis and risk assessment. Currently, these important tools often are viewed simply as options--options that aren't used as much or as well as they should be. Over the years, the Governmental Affairs Committee has reviewed and developed a voluminous record showing that our regulatory process is not working as well as intended and is missing important opportunities to achieve more cost-effective regulation. In April 1999, I chaired a hearing in which we heard testimony on the need for this proposal. The General Accounting Office has done important studies for Governmental Affairs and other committees showing that agency practices--in cost- benefit analysis, risk assessment, federalism assessments, and in meeting transparency and disclosure requirements of laws and executive orders--need significant improvement. Many other authorities support these findings. All of us benefit when government performs well and meets the needs of the people it serves. A lot of effort and collaboration went into this legislation, which I think is why the Senate can now approve it unanimously. S. 1198 was originally the ``Congressional Accountability for Regulatory Information Act of 1999,'' sponsored by Senator Richard Shelby with Senators Lott and Bond. I sponsored S. 1244, the ``Truth in Regulating Act of 1999,'' with Senators Lincoln, Voinovich, Kerrey, Breaux, Landrieu, Inhofe, Stevens, Bennett, Robb, Hagel, and Roth. We synthesized these two similar bills, and I negotiated certain changes and clarifications with Joe Lieberman, the Ranking Member of the Governmental Affairs Committee. On November 3, 1999, the negotiated changes were offered as a Thompson/Lieberman substitute amendment to S. 1198, and the bill was reported by the Governmental Affairs Committee by voice vote. Afterwards, I worked on clarifications with Senator Levin. I thank my colleagues for pulling together to get the job done.

Mr. THOMPSON. That's right.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I rise today to acknowledge the historical significance of April 30th to the State of Tennessee and the Nation. Casey Jones, a legendary Tennessee railroad engineer, made history when his engine collided with another train on April 30, 1900. Casey's infamous ride and his selfless actions to save the lives of innocent bystanders have been lauded in folk music and drama throughout the past century. It is in his memory and the spirit of his efforts that I ask my colleagues to join me in recognizing Casey Jones' bravery and heroism. Americans have been fascinated by the life of Casey Jones not merely for his heroism but also for his personification of the American dream. Casey's legendary life is a universal tale, and one that was guided by the foundations of this great nation: diligence, perseverance, determination, and sacrifice. Casey began as a cub operator for the railroads, then worked as a fireman, and eventually became an engineer in 1891, an accomplishment that was rarely seen in those days. He moved his family anywhere he could find employment, but he never neglected his role as a caring father and devoted husband. Casey had a reputation as a trusted and capable engineer, and he soon found himself in charge of regularly scheduled passenger trains. On the night of April 29, 1900, Casey departed Memphis aboard Engine 382 with six passenger cars one hour and thirty-five minutes late. Protocol demanded that engineers make their arrival time regardless of the tardiness of their departure. Casey was renowned throughout the region for his ability to make time, and he was doing an excellent job until he arrived at Vaughn Station, only eleven miles from his final destination. While attempting to maintain his scheduled arrival, Casey missed a flag signal warning that a freight train was still on the tracks ahead of him. Casey's engine collided with the caboose, but instead of abandoning his engine as instructed, he stayed behind in the hope that the lives of his passengers could be saved. Due to Casey's heroic attempts to stop and slow the train, none of Casey's passengers were injured and he was the only one killed in the crash. Throughout this year, Casey Jones' hometown of Jackson, Tennessee, will celebrate the centennial of his gallant ride and recognize his contributions to American history. The events will culminate on the anniversary of the crash with a celebration sponsored by the Casey Jones Village, the Casey Jones Home and Railroad Museum, and the City of Jackson. I encourage everyone to take part in these events and remember the legacy of Casey Jones--an American folk hero.