Fred Thompson

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President. The attacks of September 11 demonstrated that we had not done all we could to prevent or mitigate them. But even these events weren't necessary to show us that. We have known for some time that airport security was less than acceptable, and we all agree that the system used to screen airline passengers and baggage needs to be overhauled. However, in the rush to fix the problem by ``federalizing'' the security workforce, I am concerned that not enough attention is being given to a critical flaw in existing security operations, that is, the failure to set and insist on performance standards. It doesn't matter who does this work, if we continue to fail to hold those responsible for security, from top to bottom, accountable. In the past, some fines were levied, but no one was held accountable for improvement. Passenger and baggage screeners and their employers, whether civil servants or contractors, must be required to meet performance standards, and then must be subject to meaningful sanctions if those standards are not met. This has not occurred in the past. The General Accounting Office has issued several reports that document the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to hold airlines accountable for the declining performance of their baggage screeners over the last decade. Note that I said detection rates have declined virtually every year over the last decade. It's important to note that we have been trying to implement performance-based management in the Federal Government for some time. Since 1994, agencies of the Federal Government have been required to set goals for what they do and report to Congress and the American people on whether agencies are meeting those goals. Oddly, the Department of Transportation has been a leader in setting goals. It's just that in the area of aviation security, they haven't been meeting them. In 1997, we asked the Department of Transportation Inspector General to identify the Department's worst management challenges. Since that time, the Inspector General has routinely identified aviation security as the Department's greatest management challenge. And since 1999, I've been asking the Department of Transportation to set goals to address and improve aviation security. The Department did set a goal for the rate at which screeners detect dangerous objects, and it reported as recently as April of this year that it failed to meet its goal. Let me read to you from the Department of Transportation's Performance Report, which it issued this spring: DOT did not meet this year's performance target [for aviation security, which specifically measures the detection rate for explosives and weapons that may be brought aboard aircraft.] The technology is functioning well and provides superior security protection, but screener performance has not improved enough. The report states further: FAA may face a greater challenge than expected to meet the FY 2001 performance targets in some areas of screening. Like so many things in Washington, we have known this was a problem for some time. Detection rates at the Nation's airports have been declining steadily since 1993. But clearly, we weren't holding those responsible for aviation security accountable for their performance. So, I have to ask, what assurances do we have that the Department of Transportation will hold new screeners, under this bill, more accountable? Lax enforcement of standards inevitably leads to lax security, regardless of who hires those screeners. This amendment will ensure that results-oriented management is a key component of whatever changes are made to our airport security system. We can not afford more business as usual. We have to insist that the traveling public is safe from those who would perpetrate evil deeds like those of September 11. First, my amendment requires the Federal Government to set and enforce goals for aviation security. It requires the head of aviation security, within 60 days of enactment, to establish acceptable levels of performance and provide Congress with an action plan to achieve that performance. Over the long-term, the head of aviation security must establish a process for performance planning and reporting that informs Congress and the American people about how the Government is meeting its goals. By creating this process, we will be constantly assessing the threats we face and ensuring that we have the means to measure our progress in preparing for those threats. This is a new, detailed method for ensuring that performance management is in place specifically in the Government's aviation security programs. I firmly believe that good people, well managed, can substantially improve our aviation security. So this amendment gives those responsible for aviation security enhanced tools to regain the confidence of America's flying public. We employ a good mix of carrots and sticks to drive performance. For instance: This amendment establishes an annual staff performance management system that includes setting individual, group, and organizational performance goals consistent with an annual performance plan. Managers and employees would be eligible for bonuses for good performance. The amendment allows management to hold employees, whether public, private, or a mix thereof, accountable for meeting their performance standards. This approach is not new. Agencies like IRS, the Patent and Trademark Office, and the Office of Student and Financial Assistance, have performance-based management systems. But this will be the first time that performance-based management has been used to better government performance at every level of a government agency. I've been trying for many years to get agencies to set goals and strive to meet them. It seems so commonsensical, but for so many years, the Federal Government did not do that. And we in the Congress, admittedly, have not really held agencies' feet to the fire as far as performance goes. There has never been, in my opinion, a clearer example of good goals, but poor performance, as in the area of aviation security. This amendment will restore confidence in air travel. With my amendment, we will say, if you are not meeting your goals, whether it be detecting dangerous objects that people try to get on planes or preventing access to secure areas of an airport or airplane, you can be held accountable. And those who meet their goals can be rewarded. This amendment makes sense. I hope we can assure the American people that we are doing all we can, remaining vigilant, by strictly enforcing standards for the safety and security of the Nation's airports and airplanes. I urge the adoption of this simple, but critical, performance-based amendment.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I am offering an amendment to the Aviation Security Act that would ensure that results-oriented management is a key component of whatever changes are ultimately made to our airport security system. We can not afford more business as usual. We have to insist that the traveling public is safe from those who would perpetrate evil deeds like those of September 11. First, my amendment requires the Federal Government to set and enforce goals for aviation security. It requires the head of aviation security, within 60 days of enactment, to establish acceptable levels of performance and provide Congress with an action plan to achieve that performance. Over the long-term, the head of aviation security must establish a process for performance planning and reporting that informs Congress and the American people about how the government is meeting its goals. By creating this process, we will be constantly assessing the threats we face and ensuring that we have the means to measure our progress in preparing for those threats. This is a new, detailed method for ensuring that performance management is in place specifically in the government's aviation security programs. I firmly believe that good people, well managed, can substantially improve our aviation security. So this amendment gives those responsible for aviation security enhanced tools to regain the confidence of America's flying public. We employ a good mix of carrots and sticks to drive performance. For instance: Managers and employees would be eligible for bonuses for good performance. The head of aviation security may have a term of 3 to 5 years, which can be extended if he or she meets performance standards set forth in an annual performance agreement. This amendment establishes an annual staff performance management system that includes setting individual, group, and organizational performance goals consistent with an annual performance plan. The amendment allows FAA management to hold employees--whether public, private, or a mix thereof, strictly accountable for meeting performance standards. Those who fail to meet the performance measures that have agreed to could be terminated, be they managers, supervisors, or screeners. These provisions are not new. Agencies like IRS, the Patent and Trademark Office, and the Office of Student and Financial Assistance, already have many of these flexibilities. This amendment targets these flexibilities specifically to the area of aviation security so that we can immediately begin the process of ensuring the public's safety.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, was it the intention to recess immediately or will there be an opportunity to make a short statement with regard to yesterday's matters? May I ask the leader?

Mr. THOMPSON. I thank the leader.

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, we meet here today to express our outrage even though words cannot express the sorrow and anger that fills our hearts. But we must express these feelings--on behalf of the family and friends of thousands of innocent victims, many whose identities we do not yet know--and on behalf of our entire nation. Our young people must wonder why the United States who they are taught is the beacon of hope and liberty for the world--why we of all countries--should be the world's main target of such savagery. I suggest it is because those teachings to our young people are true. It is because our history and the principles on which our country was founded go against the trend of thousands of years of human history. Thousands of years of ``might makes right,'' of rulers and dictatorships of all shapes and forms, of religious intolerance and subjugation. We have shown the world that it doesn't have to be that way. And today's tyrants and would-be tyrants cannot afford to let that example stand. But stand it will. If this giant, America, has been sleeping as some say, it has been awakened once again and will not rest until an example is make of those who would murder our innocent citizens and tear at the very fabric of our national existence. Part of a great nation's responsibility for keeping peace in the world is the threat it must pose to those who would upset that peace. Therefore, we must act as a deterrent to outrageous activity when our interests are involved. And America's response in this matter should set a lasting example of what happens to those who unleash bloody attacks especially on our own soil. The time for carefully measured pinprick responses to terrorists activities has passed. But we in this body and in the House do not have the luxury of simply expressing our outrage demanding retribution. We, along with the President, set policy and we must quickly reconcile ourselves to some of things that we must do. Since our victory in the cold war, we have become somewhat complacent in the notion that the most significant danger to our nation has passed. We see it in our military budget and we hear it in our rhetoric. We see it in our debates over which threat to our country is most probable even though yesterday's events should remind us once again how faulty such predictions can be. We attempt to decide with precision what the chances are of a missile attack by a rogue nation or by terrorists versus a suitcase bomb versus a biological attack versus a cyber attack. Surely, we must now realize that as the world's number one target, we must protect our citizens from all of these possibilities. While protection can never be complete, who is going to decide which window of vulnerability we are going to allow to remain open. The old Soviet threat has been replaced by new ones that are in many ways more dangerous and more insidious. We have been warned about this repeatedly--by the Hart-Rudman Commission, the Gilmore Commission, by the Bremer Commission, and by experts in numerous committee hearings. Surely, now we will listen. Surely now we will resist the temptation to continue to squeeze out more ``peace dividends'' from the cold war which place our defense requirements in a secondary position to our domestic wish list. And surely, we will reanalyze the wisdom of America contributing to the proliferation of militarily useful technology simply because we want the sales. It is my belief that this is what we did as late as last week with the passage of the Export Administration Act. If we place short term considerations, our desire for profit, or our desire to maintain record high surpluses above our national security, we will become much more vulnerable to the potential of experiencing other days like yesterday. Historians tell us of another democracy which, after major military success, cut its military budget, turned inward, and failed to react to provocation in hopes of maintaining peace--a nation of leaders who followed the popular demand for more butter and fewer guns and who felt that if worse came to worse technology could bail them out and that treaties with dictators would substitute for defenses. That country was England after World War I and those policies contributed to causing the biggest war in the history of the world. We must not make a similar mistake. We cannot alter the past. But we can affect the future. I sincerely urge that we keep these things in mind as we consider our appropriations bills and especially as we consider what monies are necessary to keep this country safe. It is not only the right and necessary thing to do. It is the real tribute we can pay to our citizens who have so recently paid such a dear price simply for being Americans.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Will the Senator yield.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I think the Senator very well states the status of the situation and what has occurred. We have been discussing these matters as late as 30 minutes ago. I do anticipate that we will have two short amendments that have been discussed and we will be able to agree upon which will improve the bill. As a part of our understanding, there will be two letters from both advocates and opponents of this legislation to the White House on a couple matters that we believe are very important but that should first be addressed by the White House, such as the deemed export rule, which is a very complex matter that we believe should properly be handled by Executive order. So with those two amendments and those two letters, I think we are in a state of agreement with regard thereto. The only other matter, as Senator Sarbanes indicated, is the question of the commission. I anticipate that we will certainly know by 12 o'clock what the situation on that will be. We will either have a vote on that or not. But if we do, I would anticipate that would be the only rollcall vote that we would have, and we would be able to proceed forthwith to final passage.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, this amendment addresses the issue of foreign availability. As all who have listened to our discussion up until now realize, one of the more important pieces of S. 149 has to do with foreign availability. Essentially, what this bill does is say if the Department of Commerce makes a determination that some item has foreign availability status, then that item is essentially decontrolled. It does not go through the licensing process anymore, the idea being that it is out there and anybody can get it, and why control it. Frankly, I think it is not a good idea. I think that foreign availability should be taken into consideration, as we always have in our export policy taken foreign availability into consideration. We do not want to try to stop the export of items that are clearly out there in the domain, but it should not be an overriding consideration. We should not be deregulating whole categories of items, and not even being able to keep up with how much we are shipping to some country, and what kind of item we are sending to some country. This foreign availability concept takes these large categories totally outside the regulatory process that we are fearful might contain something that might turn out to be harmful to our national security. We ought to have a way for the appropriate representatives in our Government to judge these matters, item by item, and case by case, to make a determination. It may take a few days, a few weeks in some cases perhaps, to make this determination, but it is well worth it because the reason for export control laws is not primarily commerce; it is primarily national security. If you look at this bill, you will see that the purpose of the export control law is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and things that are detrimental to our national security or things that potentially are. But, anyway, I am in the minority on that. The administration supports this concept of foreign availability. The majority leadership supports this concept. So that being the case, we have attempted to enter into discussions whereby, hopefully, we could convince our colleagues on the other side of this issue that there is some validity to our concern and, hopefully, the idea being that they would make some accommodation to us on this concept. I am happy to say that we have been able to reach some accommodation on this issue that addresses some of our concerns. This amendment that I have just offered makes an important change to the definition of ``foreign availability.'' Under S. 149, items could be decontrolled and bypass any kind of review so long as similar items that were available from foreign countries were not substantially inferior to U.S. items. In other words, foreign availability would kick in and the decontrol would kick in under the bill as long as countries could get things that were not substantially inferior. Our belief is that we ought to make sure, before we decontrol our items, they can really get items that are comparable to what we have. If they can get items that are inferior to what we have, then we should still maintain controls because we have something they cannot otherwise get. And they are sensitive matters or they would not have been on the control list. So we ought to be careful about that. So this amendment changes that standard of ``not substantially inferior'' to ensure that the items are of ``comparable quality'' to U.S. items. It is a small but significant change that ensures that we will not decontrol superior American technology just because inferior items are available overseas. So I think this strengthens this provision in an important way. It certainly does not address all of our concerns, but it does strengthen this provision in an important way to make sure if we are going to enter into this, what I consider to be a very large decontrol process, in a very dangerous time, to very dangerous countries, that we ought to at least make sure that if we are claiming they can get these items anyway, it is really the same kind of items we have, the same quality we have. I think this amendment would go a long way toward ensuring that. I thank my colleagues on the other side of this issue for entering into real discussions with us on it. Hopefully, we have come to an agreement on this issue. I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I suggest that while we are waiting on another Senator, who I believe has one more amendment to consider, we discuss the matters of deemed exports and commodity classification. We have had some discussions about those subjects also. If I may, I will simply relate what my understanding is with regard to those issues. First of all, on the deemed export issue, we have had concerns on this side that the legislation did not adequately address the problem of deemed exports. As most who follow this issue know, a deemed export comes about when, in a typical situation, sensitive information is passed to a foreign national who perhaps is working at one of our National Laboratories or working in one of our businesses on sensitive information, who may or may not have a government contract, the idea being that with regard to the physical exporting of an item, that information should then be controlled when giving it to a foreign national. That should be reported. We should go through a reasonable process to make sure no damage is being done. We learned from hearings with regard to our National Laboratories, for example, that we were woefully behind as a government from even private industry; that we were not paying attention in our National Laboratories to the deemed export requirements. There were hardly any deemed export notifications or licenses issued by our laboratories. Our laboratories contain probably the most sensitive matters that we have in this Nation, including the maintenance of our nuclear stockpile, our Stockpile Stewardship Program, including information concerning our most sensitive weapons. We believed we should deal with the deemed export issue. The administration has said it would like to address this complex issue-- and it is complex--through regulation rather than include it in the legislation. We have agreed that a letter will be sent to the administration from both supporters and opponents of this bill asking the administration to review existing regulations and address this issue. Continued control of deemed exports is an essential component of our export control process. Right now there is substantial noncompliance, as I said. This letter is designed to urge the administration to develop new regulations that ensure understanding of and compliance with the responsibility to control deemed exports. I understand there are some in the business community who do not like the concept of deemed exports at all. My understanding and intention, as far as this letter is concerned, is not to give the administration the option of continuing a deemed export policy or not; it is to tighten up the policy and make sure it is updated and clear in terms of what responsibilities are under that policy. It is a reasonable request that they be given the opportunity to address it. It is a very complex issue. We don't want to create onerous requirements. These foreign students and scientists who come to America make valuable contributions in many different ways. But we simply have to exercise common sense and protect ourselves and go through an appropriate process when it comes to deemed exports. I am happy. I believe we have reached some agreement that we write the administration and express generally those thoughts. Could I get an amen on that?

Mr. THOMPSON. I thank the Senator.

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I ask the Senator from Maryland if we may make a brief statement as to our understanding on the second letter we have discussed. That will complete our business, I believe.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I do believe it would be appropriate to divide the final few minutes equally between the proponents and the opponents.

Mr. THOMPSON. Further, I want to take a few minutes right now in morning business or as a part of this UC, either one.

Mr. THOMPSON. That is satisfactory to me.

Mr. THOMPSON. Reserving the right to object.

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, this has to do with commodity classification. We have had some concern that when people in the business of exporting items come into the Department of Commerce and they get a different classification for a commodity--in other words, something might be subject to license and they believe it should not be subject to license anymore--they can come in and get that consideration. That is appropriate. That needs to be done, but it needs to be done in a manner which protects the Government and the country's interest from a national security standpoint. The executive branch has traditionally dealt with this issue through interagency agreements. We think they need to be updated. The existing agreement is 5 years old and needs to be updated to create an increased role for the Departments of Defense and State. Both the opponents and supporters of this legislation will send a letter to the administration requesting the issuance of a new Executive order on commodity classification to ensure the participation of the National Security Agency. We believe that with regard to many of these issues, as the administration is trying to staff up and with our discussions with them and among each other, we have realized just how outdated the existing agreement is. We are going to send a letter to them to bring this to their attention further, and suggest they issue an Executive order. We assume this will be done in an appropriate manner, and we will not have to take additional action. That option, of course, is always there. Pending that, we think this is an appropriate way to proceed.

Mr. THOMPSON. Madam President, one final note. We have had some discussion in this Chamber concerning the possibility of an amendment that would create a so-called blue ribbon commission to address additional concerns as to how our export policies might be affecting national security. I believe it is fair to say, not having heard from my other colleagues on this issue, that we have not been able to reach agreement with regard to that. Without a doubt, we will continue to work together among ourselves to try to agree on the composition of such a commission. I think we all agree the concept is a good idea, and that we ought to take a long impassioned look at what we are doing. We will continue to work on that, but for right now I believe we can take that off the table. That concludes our comments on the bill in terms of these amendments.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, before my colleague from Texas leaves the Chamber, I want to congratulate him on what I consider to be another major achievement of his career. He can add this legislation to the long list of legislation he has either been primarily responsible for or substantially responsible for. While we have disagreements on the legislation, this is something I have seen him work tirelessly on for at least a couple of years now, and certainly Senator Enzi carried a large share of the work, as Senator Gramm said. This is another one of those instances where Senator Gramm took an issue like a dog taking to a bone and did not turn it loose until he got it done. I must say it is another impressive performance, and I want to congratulate my good friend for adding another important legislative victory to his long legacy. I want to discuss the legislation for a minute in response to my good friend. We talked of two goals. This bill has been put to bed now, as it were. We are going to be voting on it shortly. We have made some modest improvement to it. The Senators opposite are correct in saying we have been talking about this a long time. I do not know whether we can take credit for 59 changes or not. They say 59 changes have been made, but I guess we can take credit for some changes that have been made along the way to improve the bill. We still have problems with the basic concept, and right before we go off into this good night, we need to lodge at least one summary statement with regard to the nature of our concern and where we hopefully will go from here. The nature of our concern simply is this: It is a more dangerous world out there than ever before, and we have to be more careful than ever we do not export dangerous items to dangerous people that will turn around and hurt this country. The risk of that is greater than ever before. We do not have two equal goals of trade and commerce on the one hand and national security on the other. The interest of national security dwarfs the interest of trade and commerce, although they are discussed in this Chamber somehow in equipoise. That is not the case. It should not be the case. It is not even set out that way in the bill if one looks to the purposes of the bill. The purposes of the bill are to protect this country. That is why we have an export law, not to facilitate business. A great majority of the time I am with my business friends, but when it comes to national security I must depart with those who would weigh too heavily the interests of trade. I suggest those who are interested in trade get about giving the President fast track, giving the President trade promotion authority. That will do more for trade and industry and to help the economy of this Nation than exporting dual-use high tech items to China and Russia that may find their way to Iran and Iraq. So that is what we ought to be doing if we are concerned about trade in this country. So those two goals are not equal. We need to understand what we are doing once again on these issues. Call it a balance, if you will. No matter how you weigh the factors involved, we are giving the Secretary of Commerce and those within the department responsibility for national security. The Secretary, who I have the greatest confidence in--and I think he is a great man doing a great job--should not have the responsibility for national security. That is not supposed to be his job. We are once again giving the Commerce Department, which we greatly criticized during the Clinton administration for some of their laxness, the life or death decisionmaking power in terms of these regulations or policies, in many important instances--not all instances, not always unilaterally, but many of them in some very important areas. We are deregulating entire categories of exports. Foreign availability has always been something we considered in terms of whether or not we would export something or grant a license for something, and I think properly so. We do not want to foolishly try to control things not controllable. So foreign availability ought to be a consideration. We are moving light-years away from that, letting someone over at the Department of Commerce categorize entire areas of foreign availability that takes it totally out of the licensing process, so you do not have a license, and our Government cannot keep up with what is being exported to China or Russia. That is a major move. It is not a good move. With regard to the enhanced penalties, what sanction is there to be imposed upon an exporter when he is not even required to have a license? It is saying: We will raise the penalty for your conduct, but we will make your conduct legal. That is not very effective in terms of export control, to say the least. Finally, when I hear the proponents of this legislation say 99.6 percent of these exports are approved anyway, they are arguing against themselves. They use it to make the point this is kind of a foolish process anyway. So if the great majority of them are going to be approved, why even have the process? I assume that is the logical conclusion of their position. My question is: What about the .4 percent that don't make it? Do we not have to look at the body of exports taking place in order to determine what that .4 is? Or if we didn't have a process, would that .4 be more like 3.4 if people knew there wasn't such a process? The .4 is the important thing to look at. Besides, if all the exports are being approved anyway, why is it so onerous to go through a process that will take a few days and get a clean bill of health so there is no question? Therein lies the basis of our concern. It is a fundamental disagreement as to how far we should be going in this dangerous time. As the world is becoming more dangerous, as technology proliferates, as we see those we are sending technology to using that technology for their military purposes, then passing it on to rogue nations, and we see our agencies and our committees--like the Cox committee--saying our lax export laws are causing some of this, and we are in the process of loosening export laws, I think that is unwise. I hope I am wrong. As I said yesterday, I can afford to be wrong. If I am wrong, a few companies have been held up a few days. If the proponents of this legislation are wrong, it could cause problems for the country. I hope I am proven to be wrong and that I am strong enough to be able to stand up and say it when and if that time comes. I hope it does come to that. But we will not know for a while. In the meantime, hopefully, through changes as we go along, through continuing to work with the administration in heightening their awareness of some of the problems and details we have seen in our committee work over the years, if we see we are going down the wrong track, we will be able to respond and adjust in midstream. I know my colleagues on the other side will join in that hope and desire, and I am sure we will be able to work together toward that end. I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I yield myself 4 minutes unless any of my colleagues appear and want part of that. I, too, think congratulations are in order. Senator Enzi has worked so hard on this bill, Senator Gramm and Senator Sarbanes have taken the matter of leadership in this area, and Senator Johnson did an excellent job in shepherding it through over a long period of time. It has taken a long time primarily because some Members have seen to it that it took a longer period of time than it otherwise would have. I still must respectfully oppose this bill. This bill is going to pass by a large margin. I understand that. The business community is strongly behind it. The administration supports it. The majority of both sides of the aisle support it. I believe they are in error. I believe it is a mistake. I think we should recognize exactly what we are doing. I will say it one more time; that is, in an era of increased technological proliferation, with the world becoming a more dangerous place, where rogue nations are developing technology that will enable them to endanger this country and a world where these rogue nations are getting their technology from countries such as China and Russia, for which this bill will liberalize export trade, in this environment, in this era, we are loosening our export controls. At a time when we know that some of those to whom we will be sending more high-tech sensitive exports have in times past used them for military purposes, and that committees such as the Cox committee have reported to us that part of their increased capabilities have come about due to our lax export laws, this is the environment in which we pass a bill that gives the Department of Commerce substantial powers to make decisions concerning national security. The Department of Commerce is rightfully engaged in the considerations of trade and commerce. They should not be given the responsibility of national security. We are going to pass a bill that will have broad categories of subjects that are deemed to be mass marketed or have foreign availability status. If someone over in the bowels of the Department of Commerce decides these items belong in those categories, then they are taken out of the regulatory process altogether, and you don't even have to have a license. I do not think it is too much to ask for a few days of a license process with officials of the U.S. Government who are concerned about matters of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and matters of national security, it is not too much to ask that they be given a few days to make sure, as in times past, that we are not exporting something we should not be exporting. We give the President some override authority, but it is almost as if to say, ``Catch me if you can.'' We are greatly liberalizing things on this end and giving the President some power--which cannot be delegated, incidentally--giving the President some power to catch something here and there and stop it if he deems it necessary. At a time that we are trying to persuade the world we need a missile defense system, which I believe we need because of the dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we are liberalizing export rules which I fear will contribute toward the ability of the countries with which we are trading, and in turn these rogue nations with which they are trading, to increase their weapons of mass destruction capabilities. It is not that we want to hamper trade. It is not that we want to be obstructionist--because our friends on the other side of this issue are very well-meaning and make very good points. It is not those factors at all that motivate the few of us who remain on this side. It is that we can afford to be wrong. If our concerns are too great, it will mean that a few companies are held up a few extra days before they can export goods. But if our friends on the other side of this issue are wrong, I fear it could cause serious harm. We are doing this in an environment where, even though the law has required us in times past to do a national security assessment of the decontrol of these laws, we have never done so. That is the basis of our concern. That is why, although we have had a wonderful, responsible, senatorial debate and discussion and vote, both on the floor and off, and think it has produced a better bill than we had originally, I must respectfully oppose it. I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. If the Senator will yield, I certainly agree with that. I should not leave the impression that this has been a totally adversarial proceeding. We have had discussions, and this bill does incorporate some of the points we have discussed at prior times. I appreciate that.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I will take a couple of minutes, if I may, to make brief remarks in response to my friend's statements. Foreign availability, one might say, was in the 1979 act, but foreign availability has been greatly expanded in this act. In the 1979 act, foreign availability was allowed to be considered as one of several factors in determining whether or not to issue a license. That is perfectly appropriate. In the current legislation, foreign availability is set up as a total distinct category of items, whereby if there is foreign availability, it is totally decontrolled as determined by the Department of Commerce. That is a major difference. Obviously, the proponents of this bill are going to prevail on the notion that this is a good idea, but let's not deceive ourselves into thinking we are just continuing on the 1979 policy. We are greatly expanding the 1979 policy on foreign availability. Secondly, I had not mentioned anything on jurisdiction. Apparently my friend from Arizona did and Senator Enzi just did. There is no question that the Banking Committee has jurisdiction. Since the subject has been brought up, I find it somewhat odd that we as a body have decided to take legislation whose purpose is to restrict the export of items that would contribute to the military potential of countries so as to prove detrimental to the national security of the United States, and legislation designed to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and place that in the Banking Committee. We have done it. There is no question about it. I find that kind of odd. The House did not do it. It is not in the Banking Committee on the House side, but it is in the Senate. I do not know whether anybody wants to take a look at that. They are welcome to, and it will be a fruitless exercise. But since the subject has been brought up, I find it somewhat odd that we would choose to take legislation designed to protect our country from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and place that jurisdiction in the Banking Committee. I yield the floor.

Mr. THOMPSON. Will the Senator yield for a question?