John Warner

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I wish also to accommodate the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I concur in the distinguished chairman's observation. I wish to compliment you and the ranking member, Mr. McCain, for the progress you have made this week on this bill. Having had this responsibility, sharing it with you for these many years, I would say the two of you have done exceptionally well. Mr. President, also it is my intention--I am doing the final bit of drafting on an amendment by myself, with the distinguished Senator from Indiana, Mr. Lugar. I hope to be filing that before 12 noon today.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. No objection.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and Senator Lugar, I send to the desk an amendment to H.R. 1585.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, providing for our men and women in uniform, and their families, is our highest priority on the Armed Services Committee, and this bill will provide a comprehensive approach to caring for those, who through their courage, have sacrificed greatly for our country. Our Nation owes these brave men and women nothing less than the finest possible care. Madam President, I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Might I inquire as to the floor? I understand it is available to anyone at this time; no time constraints? I would like to speak for a few minutes.

Mr. WARNER. Fine. I thank the Presiding Officer, and I wish to commend the Presiding Officer for his work, as, indeed, my good friend, Senator Alexander, and this colleague. I must state, with a sense of total modesty, that my contribution tonight would be just to express some concerns. I have followed the work of your group. Very kindly, the principals on this have invited me to join, but I have thus far not done so because I can't find yet the answers to some critical issues I have in mind. First, I say to my colleagues that I had a little to do with starting the group now known as Baker-Hamilton, or the Iraq Study Group. I think I worked with my colleague who did the major part of the work, Congressman Frank Wolf, and then we engaged a local, highly recognized, and well-qualified group in Washington associated with studies to take on some of the infrastructure. It was a remarkable recruiting of talent, which my colleague recited, and I think they did a very credible and fine job. It was a major contribution at a time in the fall of 2006 when there was a great deal of concern among many of us about the situation in Iraq. I had returned in that fall from a trip to Iraq and expressed publicly my thoughts that the country was just drifting aimlessly sideways, and that remark, together with remarks of others of a similar nature, sparked the intensity of the administration's undertaking their, I think, very thorough review leading up to the President's remarks when he announced a change in strategy on January 10, 2007. Now, I have referred to the Iraq Study Group work. I think there were 7, 8, 9 months that they studied, with hearings and so forth. But when they put pen to paper and wrote it, it was a snapshot of the situation that faced this Nation and, indeed, our partners, the coalition forces, in Iraq. They made certain assumptions at that time which led to the strategy they outlined. Among those assumptions was that we had reason to believe the Iraqi Government, freely elected, in place, was going to become a truly representative unity government of all factions. They committed a certain number of benchmarks, and it was thought at that time that those benchmarks could be met. That, I think is fair to say, was an assumption they had. Our country, together with our coalition partners, had been in training with the Iraqi forces for some 2 years plus at that time, building up their own internal army, national guard, and police force. So the Iraq Study Group, in my judgment, took a snapshot of the situation in the fall of 2006, put it to paper, and it was in the President's framework of things that were considered when he derived his policy and enunciated it in January. I, together with, I think, the colleagues on the Senate floor tonight, said to the President, after his announcement on January 10, that I was concerned that more of the Iraq Study Group concept was not infused into his new strategy. I remember specifically addressing the issue of the sectarian violence, now described by some as a civil war of some stage, and injecting the American GI, who really had no background in the complicated culture of the Muslim religion and the Muslim people, into that situation. And I am not in any way denigrating that religion or that culture. Indeed, it is one of the oldest and, I think, most respected on Earth today. But, nevertheless, there are among the Muslim religion a few who really are dead set on changing the world--we know all about that--and now they are wreaking utter havoc, primarily in Iraq, and to an extent now in Afghanistan. But that snapshot and those assumptions have not been borne out. We do not have any real evidence before us today, or real basis for much hope as to what this Iraqi Government might achieve in the foreseeable future. The President specifically said on January 10, the Armed Forces of Iraq will take the lead. We will be largely in a supporting role. We will embed forces, we will train, we will supply, but they are taking more of the lead. In fact, they have to a limited extent but not to the extent that I believe are the hopes and expectations that were raised in the President's January 10 framework of remarks. Certainly the Government has not performed as we had hoped and expected. The Armed Forces are making a contribution today but not to the degree that was anticipated in the fall of 2006. I could go on and recite other concerns I have about this report, namely, can anyone point to where the Department of Defense sat down and studied the strategy in this report and has reached conclusions as to whether it would work better than the current strategy? Would it bring about a greater strength of government? Would it bring about a greater will, simple will among the Iraqi forces, to take on more and more responsibility? I think, before we recommend to this body and, indeed, if it were to pass and become legislation, to the President, that he consider implementing a major portion, as this amendment describes, of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, someone better bring forth a careful military analysis of what might occur given the situation today--not the situation in the fall of 2006--of what would happen if we made a shift in strategy from the one now employed to this. That is essential, if we are asking Senators to support that. Show us some analytical study of this strategy and how it would bring about greater results than the current strategy being employed. There is great credibility attached to this report, primarily because of the extraordinary membership--their experience, their achievements in the private and public sector. Do we know for a fact that all members of that committee are endorsing the concept that now the Senate should lift their report as written and prepared some 8 months ago? Are there not some among that group who might question today whether the assumptions that they had that led to their report are still there to support now a shift of strategy? I don't know. I don't see that evidence. I wish to see something from the members, each one, because I think it would be difficult if we shifted to this Iraq Study Group and one or more of the members of that group got up in the public and said: What we said then is simply not going to work today. I think that is important because you are trading on the credibility of men and women of clear conscience, extraordinary backgrounds, who did, I think, a very fine job as best they could based on facts which have largely changed, or facts or assumptions that have not materialized. We talk about a bipartisan resolution. I think the colleagues tonight joined me some weeks ago in putting together a consensus of a bipartisan nature, to go forward and to guide this Nation. It was, somewhat to my surprise, taken almost verbatim by the appropriators and included in the recent appropriations bill--I say recent, it was 6 or 8 weeks ago--and is now the law. Part of that report that I wrote together with colleagues here said we ought to have an independent analysis of the Iraqi security forces as they exist today and what they might represent 2, 3, 4, 5 months into the future. I must say--I say it with a sense of humility--I persuaded a former commandant of the Marine Corps, Jim Jones, a man who has enormous credibility on both sides of the Congress, House and Senate, to head that group. I have met with him. He brought in distinguished retired military officers. Tonight, as we are here debating, they are in Iraq, preparing a report for this Congress and for the President as to their best judgment as to the military proficiency, the capability and will to fight of the Iraqi forces today and what is the likelihood that will improve in the months to come, because so much of all of our strategy, be it the surge strategy or any strategy, is dependent on that. As the President has said most eloquently: When they stand up, we will stand down. I believed we needed an independent study, not to criticize the Department of Defense which for months has provided report after report of their analysis, but we ought to get a second opinion. That is now being prepared and will be brought forth, I think, in large part and made public prior to the President making his September 15 analysis. That report we put together, which was adopted by the appropriators, the bill we had here, required the President to report to the Congress on or before July 15. I believed it was very important for colleagues to have a current analysis by the President, drawing upon the CENTCOM Commander, Admiral Fallon, drawing upon General Petraeus and other elements of the administration, to provide the Congress with a set of facts so, on the assumption we leave here early in August on a recess, we have a current analysis provided by the executive branch. That report will be forthcoming. I think it is imminent. I happen to know the dates--I think we do--but I am not at liberty to divulge them tonight. That report will also analyze the benchmarks, which benchmarks we recited in that bill which was voted on by this Chamber, or adopted by over 50 votes. We had to have a 60-vote margin. We couldn't make the 60 but we made it over 50. They will talk about each of the benchmarks and whether the Iraqi Government has made them and, if they have not, what the administration has done to try to encourage the Government to meet those benchmarks. At this point in time there is a lot of conscientious work going on directed at the September timeframe when reports by General Jones and his group will come forth, the President will make another report, I am hopeful that the intelligence components of our Government will have an upgraded National Intelligence Estimate--so much is to be learned, when all this information is brought to the attention of the American public and to the Congress in the first weeks of September. It is my urging that colleagues at this time in the debate on this bill, the annual authorization bill, try not to preempt and prejudge how this information will be formulated and given to the American public early in September. I will close with a bit of a personal story. In 1951, 1952, I was privileged to serve in the United States Marine Corps. I was with a squadron of fighter bombers in old, cold Korea during that winter. I was a ground officer, a staff officer. I don't claim any fame whatsoever. I was doing my duty. But I watched those aviators as they would take off every day. I had occasion, because of my duties, to go up to visit the infantry and watch them. At the same time, in the fall of 1951-1952, there was sort of a conference going on, largely in Panmunjon and elsewhere, to try to bring about peace and resolve that conflict. I remember these individuals who had to go out in harm's way each day, many of them, and said: I am wondering if I am going to be the last soldier, marine, or airman to take the last bullet because next time we may wake up and they have resolved this problem. It dawned on them, but they went on and performed their duties. I say there is some parallel to this situation. Were the Senate to adopt this piece of work--about which I say to my colleagues, you have worked hard on, your hearts are in it--it would send a signal that what the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are doing today, carrying out the orders of the Commander in Chief, it would put in question that strategy. Their minds would go through that same thought: Well, if they are going to change it, why don't we change it right away? Because I don't want to be the last soldier to take the last bullet, if we are going to change this strategy and this strategy is not achieving the goals that were laid down. It has the possibility of bringing about a great concern of those young people, so valiantly fighting and giving life and limb to carry out the orders of the President. I think we have to pause, reflect on what we say and what we do as we are working on this bill. It seems to me the President is Commander in Chief and has made a decision. He is within, I think, 48 hours going to release this report and speak to the Nation. Practically speaking, this amendment I presume will not be brought up--I know as a fact--prior to his statement. But it seems to me we ought to listen carefully to what he has to say and his resolve as to what strategy we should be following in the ensuing days and weeks to come. I translate that into the minds of these young people fighting this fight and their families here at home, so worried, understandably, about the welfare of their loved ones. I say to my colleagues, have you looked at the intelligence? I have taken it upon myself to go out to the various entities of the intelligence part of our community and specifically asked them about what they think the consequences would be if there were a change to this strategy. I am not at liberty to give their responses but I urge you to access on your own initiative that information and reflect upon it as you move forward and you endeavor to persuade other colleagues to join you in this endeavor. Mr. President, I thank you for the opportunity to come tonight to express my views to good friends, friends who worked with me and did work with me on that piece of legislation which eventually became a part of the appropriations bill and is now the law of the land. That is the legislation that requires the President in 48 hours to make a report to the Nation and to the Congress and to lay down what his intentions are for the weeks to come, until he gives his next report on September 15. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have had the privilege of serving in this body for 29 years. I have never met a finer gentleman than my colleague from Tennessee. I thank you for your gracious reference to this humble Senator. I simply say that this has been a constructive debate. We have an honest difference of opinion. But I would urge that perhaps you check into some of the analysis that has been performed in certain segments of the Government about the current operations and how the benchmarks, so to speak--or maybe I withdraw those words--the points of strategy that are in the Iraq Study Group will or will not adopt. I would simply say the obvious to my colleagues, that that report of the Iraq Study Group is still on the President's desk. I do not think he requires the need of the Senate to tell him what is in it. He knows. He looked at it, I have been given that assurance, very carefully before he devised his January 10 strategy. The concern, the greatest concern I have is sort of sending out a signal we have throughout, that this strategy would be working better than this current strategy. I frankly felt that and expressed that on January 10. But I have to accept the fact that he is the Commander in Chief. He made the decision. He decided not, at this time, to implement the framework of the Baker-Hamilton report but to go ahead with the surge. I am hesitant to criticize him now. I criticized pretty heavily, if you look at the Congressional Record, in January. I urged in several speeches that more of this Iraq Study Group concept be incorporated in the surge strategy. But having done that, I feel obligated now to support the President because he is committed to follow the law of the land as originated in this Chamber in a bill which I sponsored, and I believe my distinguished colleague from Tennessee did vote for. That bill, almost in its entirety, was incorporated into the appropriations bill by the conference of the House and the Senate, and it is the law of the land. I hope the report that will be forthcoming in 48 hours reflects the seriousness of how the President approached the mandates of the Congress: Report to us on July 15. I have every reason he will do a report no later than September 15. At that time, he will have the benefit of a surge which is now, as envisioned, fully staffed and implemented by our complement of soldiers, together with such other Iraqi complements and perhaps some coalition forces, and we will then have been shown, did the surge work. I, frankly, think the surge, if allowed to continue in the September timeframe, will have achieved a measure of what they set out to do. But the corollary obligation of the Iraqi Government to accept an improved security situation in Baghdad, created by the sacrifice of soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and marines in the surge, and the Iraqi fighters with them, they will not have taken advantage of what was achieved by that enormous sacrifice. That is my great concern. I hope I am wrong. But in the time that remains, I am doubtful the concept that greater security in the Baghdad region will translate into greater activity and accomplishments by the Iraqi Government. While there may be some military success, I don't see the signs now of the success that was anticipated by the Iraqi Government. I close by saying I thank you for the opportunity. I commend you for your hard work and what you believe in. That is important in this institution, your own personal involvement and will to fight for what you believe. But I do urge you to take a look at what the intelligence community is looking at, determine the current military analysis. I say to my colleague from Colorado, indeed, there were a number of witnesses, professional retired witnesses with military experience that contributed to this. But again, they were looking at a situation and a factual basis that has substantially changed. I say to my colleagues, look at the intelligence, get some military analysis, and then think through carefully if the President has this on his desk still, it is there, do we need to pass a bill in the Senate and send a signal that would begin to engender some doubt in what we are doing now as being the best course of action and the risks associated with the men and women trying to carry forward and respond to the orders of the Commander in Chief. That is my fervent plea to you. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. That is correct. I wonder if my colleague will yield for the purpose of a unanimous consent request?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the remarks of the distinguished Senator from New Jersey, the Senator from Arizona, Mr. Kyl, be recognized for a period of 15 minutes.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could ask the distinguished managers, this amendment by Messrs. Salazar and Alexander is of considerable importance, and there are some of us who would like to comment on that.

Mr. WARNER. Not as a part of that hour. I think they wish to have an hour reserved under the two principals together with their distinguished list of cosponsors. There are some of us who are not cosponsors who may have comments.

Mr. WARNER. Well, it is simply that I have some concerns about the Salazar-Alexander amendment. I do not wish to encroach on such time as they wish, but it would seem to me those of us who may have some concerns should have the opportunity to speak in the proximity of their discussion so the Members would have the benefit of both views.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would perhaps seek to have 10 minutes. That is all.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on the Defense bill, I ask unanimous consent that Scott Suozzi, a military fellow in my office, be granted floor privileges.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator yield, so I might propose a unanimous consent request?

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Presiding Officer. Mr. President, following the remarks of the Senator from Nebraska, I would like to ask unanimous consent that I be recognized so I can speak on behalf of the ranking member, Senator McCain, with regard to the bill which is now being brought up.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to say what a pleasure it is to join my good friend from Nebraska, a member of the Armed Services Committee, on the floor on the occasion of the 29th authorization bill that I have been privileged to join with other colleagues on the floor submitting to the Senate. Earlier today, I had a lengthy meeting with Senator Levin, our distinguished chairman, and I have also had the benefit of a report from the distinguished ranking member, Senator McCain, who has returned from a trip to Iraq. So on behalf of our two principals, we are here today to initiate consideration of this all- important bill at a very critical juncture in the history of our great Nation. I am privileged to rise in support of this piece of legislation, Mr. President. The bill was voted out of our committee unanimously, and that has usually been the case. I say that with a sense of pride through the many years I have served on the committee, over half that time as either the chairman or the ranking member. Our committee is proud of the fact that members of the committee, as well as our respective professional staffs, work together to try to achieve the highest possible degree of bipartisanship, given that we are entrusted, under the Constitution, the Senate, and the Senate has entrusted our committee with bringing forth each year the recommendations on behalf of the men and women in the Armed Forces. I commend our distinguished chairman, Mr. Levin, and Mr. McCain, the ranking member, for the markup session, which my colleague and I were in attendance I think throughout. It was done expeditiously, fairly, and openly, in terms of all Senators being given every possible option to present their views in preparing for the bill that is now on each Senator's desk. So again, I thank and join my colleague from Nebraska in thanking the chairman and ranking member and our staffs because I think we have achieved a truly bipartisan endeavor on behalf of the committee and forwarded to the Senate. As the ranking member, Mr. McCain, and I worked with our subcommittees, and indeed Mr. Levin. I attended a number of subcommittee meetings. We were fortunate to have strong chairmen of the subcommittees and ranking members, as my colleague from Nebraska mentioned in his opening statement, together with a strong professional staff, and their reports, by and large, were incorporated in the bill. Therefore, the committee has met its responsibility and fully funded--I repeat, fully funded--the President's $648 billion budget request for national defense. As Members of the Congress, funding our Nation's defense is a fundamental responsibility. We must ensure our military is prepared, well trained, and well equipped to defend us and our allies in today's very complex world of threats. We must provide the best resources with the best value for our Armed Forces. We owe that to our service men and women, to their families, and, indeed, to the taxpayers. I am proud to say that, in my judgment, this bill meets those criteria. The bill approves $2.7 billion for items on the Army Chief of Staff's Unfunded Requirements List, including $775 million for reactive armor and other Stryker requirements, $207 million for aviation survivability equipment, $102 million for combat training centers, and funding explosive ordnance disposal equipment, night vision devices, and other weapons. These are critical items in our fight against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other threats throughout the world. Given the dangers we face as a nation, our men and women in uniform should want for nothing in our battle against terror. I selected the Army to start with because I am very admiring of the Chief of Naval Operations, who is alleged to have said recently that while he is proud to be Chief of the Navy, his biggest concern today is that of the needs of the U.S. Army, and, indeed, the President has recently indicated that if all goes well in the course of the hearings in the Senate and our committee and the Senate confirms Admiral Mullins to be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he truly inherits that mantel of heavy responsibility showing equal regard for our services. But he did single out the Army as an institution at this time badly in need of the attention, not only of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs office but indeed of the Congress of the United States. I believe with the increase in the end strength of the Army, we have met the President's request to do what we can at this critical time to keep our Army strong, particularly for those families who at this very moment--thousands and thousands of families--have their loved ones serving abroad in Iraq and Afghanistan. Likewise, the committee approved for the Navy the first next generation--that is the first ship in the next generation of our carriers, proudly named, in large measure by the urging of the Senate, the U.S.S. Gerald Ford for the former President of the United States, the former Republican leader in the House of Representatives. It has also restructured the littoral combat ship program to achieve maximum value and accountability. Moreover, we approved $4.1 billion of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected--that is the MRAP--vehicles for all the services. The committee also decided to assign fixed-wing, intra-theater airlift functions and missions to the Air Force and shift Army aircraft funding in 2008 to the Air Force, which was unusual but necessary to achieve improved efficiency and synergy in our airlift capability. While weapons and equipment are critical in any conflict, it is the support we give our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that determines success or failure. We are asking more of our troops today than we did a generation ago-- with longer and successive deployments. Our troops deserve our respect and gratitude for the countless sacrifices they and their families make daily. I welcome the committee's decision to approve a 3.5 percent across-the-board pay raise for all military personnel and the authorization of $135 billion in allowances, bonuses and other benefits. We are improving the quality of life for our men and women in uniform while enhancing our future readiness. The committee has approved measures that satisfy our current and future requirements. We've increased the end strengths of the Army and the Marines to 525,400 and 189,000, respectively. By boosting the Army's and the Marines' numbers, I hope we can build a more flexible active-duty force and deploy reservists more prudently. I thank the chairman for his leadership. The committee has approved a bill that meets the President's request, the needs of our troops and is fiscally responsible to our constituents. I hope my colleagues will join me and members of the committee in supporting this year's Defense authorization bill. I wish to draw the attention of the Senate at this time to the following. We today start this bill amidst great concern. We start very important legislation at a time in our history unlike any I have witnessed. I share the privilege of being among the elder Senators in this Chamber. The conflict in Iraq in particular is posing extraordinary challenges both to our President, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and to the Congress which must provide the needed support. Indeed, we owe no less than the greatest obligation to the many people of our United States of America whose families, one way or another, are involved in these conflicts--largely by virtue of proudly wearing the uniform of one of our services--but there have been literally tens of thousands of other Americans who are taking risks in these conflicts to give support to the men and women of our Armed Forces. Many colleagues over the recess period have expressed their concerns, quite properly, about certain directions that our Nation could be taking and is now taking, and otherwise, to address the conflicts-- primarily in Iraq. I anticipate a number of amendments will be brought forward in the coming days--weeks, perhaps--as the Senate debates this bill. I encourage that. I thoroughly believe the depth of the complexity of the Iraq situation deserves the attention of each and every Senator. I hope they will avail themselves of such opportunities as they can to address their fellow Senators and convey their thoughts. Several have recently spoken out very strongly on this issue. I personally have commended each and every one, even though I may not fully agree with all of their statements. This is a critical time in America's history. That is the purpose of this Senate, which is recognized perhaps as the one forum among the legislative branches throughout the world where there is literally almost total freedom for any Member of this body to come forward and address his or her fellow Senators and express his or her views. I look forward in the coming days and weeks to engaging in debates. A number of us--I don't single myself out, but quite a few--have been asked by the press, do we have views at variance with the President's, at variance with those of some of our colleagues. I am speaking only for myself. I have decided to withhold some of the views I currently am looking at. I spent a good deal of time in the recess period visiting personally at the various agencies and departments of our Federal Government entrusted with intelligence responsibilities, security responsibilities, and other responsibilities with regard to these conflicts. I profited greatly. Each time, while I may not have agreed with everything that was related to me, I was certainly impressed by the quality of people and their professionalism throughout the Civil Service ranks of our Federal Government with regard to their discharging their individual responsibilities at this point in time in our history on issues which are extremely complex to resolve. I also briefly responded to press inquiries this morning about the timing of what thoughts I may have, and when I might share them with my colleagues. I am frequently--today being an example--speaking privately with a number of colleagues in this body on their views. But publicly I have decided to withhold some ideas I may have which may be incorporated in one or more amendments until such time as the President has had the opportunity to address the Nation. I wish to go back in a very respectful way and remind the Senate of the legislation, the appropriations bill passed some 6 or 7 weeks ago. That bill included a bill that I and others brought to the Senate floor. It received, I think, over a majority of votes. That bill that I brought to the floor together with a number of cosponsors--indeed, my distinguished colleague from Nebraska was very much an active party with it--that bill was embraced in the final version of the appropriations bill which became the law of the land. In that bill the provisions that we discussed and debated here in the Senate, and indeed which had passed by a majority vote, required as follows. I wish to read the ``Reports Required'' portion. The President shall submit an initial report, in classified and unclassified format, to the Congress, not later than July 15, 2007, assessing the status of each of the specific benchmarks established above, and declaring, in his judgment, whether satisfactory progress toward meeting these benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved. I had the opportunity this morning to join his senior staff at the White House and discussed my views with them. We discussed this report. I left that meeting this morning with the definite impression that the White House and other elements of our Government are approaching this legislative requirement--which originated in this Chamber and was adopted by this Chamber and eventually became law--they are approaching that responsibility with an absolutely sincere depth of commitment. I was asked by the press whether I thought they would brush it off. I resoundingly replied, ``No.'' As a matter of fact, I have reason to believe that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense are very actively working with senior White House staff and others--the Director of our Intelligence, the Director of the CIA--they are all actively working in preparation of that report. I read the next provision in our bill. The President, having consulted with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Commander of Multi- National forces--Iraq, and the United States Ambassador to Iraq, and the Commander of U.S. Central Command, will prepare the report and submit [it] to the Congress. Paragraph 3: If the President's assessment of any of the specific benchmarks established above is unsatisfactory, the President shall include in that report a description of such revisions to the political, economic, regional, and military components of the strategy, as announced by the President on January 10, 2007. In addition, the President shall include in the report, the advisability of implementing such aspects of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group--commonly referred to as Baker- Hamilton--as he deems appropriate. No. 4: The President shall submit a second report to the Congress, not later than September 15, 2007, following the same procedures and criteria, outlined above. No. 5: The reporting requirement detailed in section 1227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 is waived. . . . --given that these reports are going to be put in. Speaking only for myself, I am going to withhold any comments I have specifically in large measure out of deference to exactly what we asked the President to do and exactly which I feel the President is about to do. I have reason to believe and it is my hope that it is done possibly a little earlier than the 15th, since the 15th falls on a day this weekend, thereby giving Members the opportunity to see exactly what he has done in response--again I reiterate--to the law as written by the Congress and a law that originated in this Chamber. With that, I look forward to the week, working with my colleagues. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I understood that at 4:30 the Senate was to turn to the debate on the pending judicial nominations which will be voted on at 5:30. Now, the two Senators who were to come to the floor at this appointed time--

Mr. WARNER. I wish to speak to the judicial nominees. I will tell my colleague what I will do to accommodate the Senator, if he will give me a few minutes and I will put this into the Record.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to accommodate my good friend in any way he wishes to be accommodated, if that is his desire, but with the appearance of one of the Senators on the floor, I hope I can get in under this unanimous consent agreement.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I note with great respect and approval the Senator's comments to support his nomination. The Senator and I have discussed this nomination, and I strongly endorse the President's nomination of General Lute and welcome the support of our distinguished chairman of the committee. The Senator made reference to General Sheehan and others who apparently had some contact with the White House personnel, and others, regarding possibly taking on this assignment. In no way can I believe their comments should be held against the distinguished nomination of General Lute. They are part of the public records, but I think sometimes when the President speaks with individuals about the possibility of serving him, those matters are best left confidential-- for any President. I certainly treat them that way. I was somewhat taken aback by the judgments of General Sheehan and others. No disrespect to the chairman, but they are of no significance here. This is a highly distinguished officer. He fought in the second armored cavalry regiment in Operation Desert Storm. He later commanded the second armored cavalry regiment in 1998 to 2000, and the multinational brigade east in Kosovo in 2002. In 2003, he was assigned as deputy director of operations in headquarters European command and, in that capacity, played an important role in responding to the impending humanitarian crisis in Liberia. It was in that context that I first met this distinguished officer. General Jones was, at that time, NATO commander. I talked with him about the problems we were experiencing over the African coast at that time. As you may recall, elements of the Marine Corps and other Naval units were sent down there to try to--and indeed they did--succeed in contributing to a cessation of a lot of the tensions which could have erupted into a civil war. At that time, General Lute was director of operations for the U.S. Central Command, where he served over 2 years. I was privileged to join him off the coast aboard those naval vessels, and he accompanied me when I went in and worked with the Ambassador in the incipient days of that potential conflict. As a key member of the joint staff, I visited him many times in the Department of Defense and received excellent briefings from him about the worldwide situation. I have witnessed firsthand the extraordinary, professional capabilities of this fine officer. In the estimation of GEN David Petraeus: Doug Lute knows Iraq. Doug Lute knows Iraq, the region, and in Washington will be a great addition to the team that is striving to achieve success in Iraq. He is also a doer. Ambassador Crocker added: General Lute's knowledge and experience will make him a valuable partner to our efforts in Iraq. I look forward to working closely with General Lute in the coming months. There has also been some indication that people are concerned about the precedents connected with this assignment. I will put into the Record a list of individuals who have served Presidents in this capacity over the past years. Notably among them were General Haig, military assistant to the President for national security affairs; Lieutenant General Scowcroft; Admiral Poindexter; GEN Colin Powell; General Kerrick; GEN Michael Hayden, Director of Central Intelligence at the present time and on active duty. I ask unanimous consent that this list be printed in the Record.

Mr. WARNER. I would also put this into the Record at this point. I solicited the White House's views regarding any legalities of this nomination. I have the letter of Mr. Fielding, counsel to the President. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.