John Warner

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WARNER. I want to pick up on the last point. I find there is no effort to change the authority of the Secretary of State in the selection of his people to do the work. But I feel strongly that the work done by the Department of State serves the whole community. It isn't exclusive to the Secretary of State. I bring to the Senator's attention the fact that the Department of State had some thoughts at variance with the Central Intelligence Agency as related to the aspect of the critical issues relating to the weapons of mass destruction. Does the Senator recall that?

Mr. WARNER. Therefore, they serve the whole community. And perhaps if a caveat on some of that had been brought to the forefront in a more strengthened fashion, who knows what the outcome might have been. I do not believe the Senator can tell me that the person in the FBI who has responsibility isn't serving the entire community. I think the Senator ought to go back and reexamine that representation. I do not find it strengthened by making an exception for the Secretary of Defense as relates to these three individuals. For example, I draw on my experience as Secretary of the Navy. There was quite a competition when vacancies of the NRO and NSA came up. The service Secretaries were invited to make nominations to the Secretary of Defense for the offices. In the capacity of a service Secretary, you get to know these individuals as they work their way up through the ranks and are promoted. You have a special knowledge of their capabilities and their strengths. You can advocate that to the Secretary of Defense, who then in turn makes the decision with regard to who should be selected to head the NRO based on the cumulative advice of the several service Secretaries. Those positions are often rotated between the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy, and they are extremely important assignments. With all due respect to the NID, he has so much to be done that he cannot possibly have the knowledge about the achievements of all of the various individuals to make a recommendation. He can, of course, come in after study and concur or not. But you are holding the Secretary of Defense saying you have all the responsibility with regard to this agency. In many respects personnelwise, you are reducing the Secretary of Defense to a payroll clerk when you do not allow him to make the selections of the people he thinks are best qualified. In the case of the NRO, he serves as an under secretary of the Air Force with duties related to the NRO and duties related to the entire space program in the Department of the Air Force. The Secretary of Defense should make the appointment of the people who serve his Department. I cannot accept the Senator's distinction about how you leave the State of Department alone, the FBI alone, the Energy Department alone, let those Secretaries make their recommendation and decisions with regard to personnel, and then in almost a demeaning way say to the Secretary of Defense, Oh, no, when it comes to your people, you have the right to concur or not.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is obvious the managers at the moment are somewhat entrenched in their views. I hope we will have an opportunity to appeal to the broader and hopefully more open minds of the collective Senate as a whole. Could the managers advise those Members who have deferred other plans, with the importance of being here today to advocate amendments, what will be the procedure when this will be laid aside? There will be a record when we return Monday. I presume it would be scheduled in some order, at the discretion of the managers, together with the leaders of the Senate, as to the vote. Do I get 2 minutes, 3 minutes, 4 minutes at the time the amendment is brought up? I would like to weigh in a little bit now given that I have not thus far persuaded my two distinguished colleagues, both members of the Armed Services Committee, who are interfering, in my judgment, with the direct chain of command between the President and his combatant commanders and principal civilian appointees.

Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague. I shall certainly be here. As a matter of fact, I will preside for a period of time. Maybe when I get in the chair and have the gavel, I can do something about this amendment. In any event, I am appreciative of the courtesies that have been extended to Members of the Senate deliberating on this bill. This is an important matter. Hopefully, in the interim, I can persuade not only the Senate but the White House to indicate its position on this amendment. I thank the Chair. I thank my distinguished colleagues. I will be available for further amendments as the managers decide to have them scheduled during the course of the day. This amendment will now be laid aside?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for 1 minute? I associate myself with his remarks about how we are going about this. We have made enormous progress since the 1991 operation in Iraq, as the Senator well knows, particularly in the tactical level and in military intelligence. I am hopeful that in this haste, we do not unintentionally go back from the progress we have made so far.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to compliment our distinguished colleague. He has spent a lot of time on the Senate Armed Services Committee. He is very familiar with these processes and the people. We can write the laws as best we can, but it comes down very often to those human relationships to which he referred and this particular framework in the NID. Because the NID cannot, as the distinguished chairman has said, create a whole new department, he has to rely on subordinates who have direct line of authority over a lot of troops, but he is not going to have troops in the sense the Senator from Alabama and I have used them for the departments and agencies of the Government as they function today. He is a step removed. Those personal relationships with his immediate subordinates and advisers are going to be very important. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, at this time, if it is convenient to the managers, I will proceed on an amendment. Amendment No. 3876

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask for its consideration.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I refer to the September 28, 2004 Statement of Administration Policy in which the administration expresses their support for the very able work of the distinguished chairman and ranking member on S. 2845. However, equally important are a number of items that were referred to in this document called the SAP. I draw the attention of my colleagues to the last paragraph. I shall read the first sentence: The Administration notes that the Committee bill did not include Section 6 (``Preservation of Authority and Accountability'') of the Administration's proposal. I ask unanimous consent that the entire paragraph from the SAP be printed in its entirety in the Record.

Mr. WARNER. Immediately following it, I ask unanimous consent that section 6 to which it refers, drawn from the policy statement forwarded by the administration in its efforts to give the very helpful advice and counsel to the Senate--and I presume the House, as we are working on this matter--be printed in the Record.

Mr. WARNER. The amendment which the Senator has drawn here, myself, Senator Stevens, and Senator Inouye as cosponsors, we have lifted essentially the language of that into the amendment such that the administration's request in that SAP document is met. In support for the action I am taking, I refer as follows: The President made two basic decisions with respect to intelligence reform designed to implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations. First, he decided that the national intelligence director should have ``full budget authority'' with respect to the national foreign intelligence program. The bill before us contains a number of provisions intended to carry out that decision. Second, the President made an equally important decision that the heads of the departments should continue to be in charge of and therefore continue to be accountable for the performance of their respective departments. This amendment I have submitted would carry out the second Presidential goal. The language of the amendment, as I said, is virtually identical to the language of the administration's proposal which I have now placed into the Record. The amendment makes clear that the principal officers of the executive departments will remain as the organic statutes, for their departments currently provide the heads of their departments with authority over and responsibility for those departments. The amendment also preserves the existing authority of the Director of Office of Management and Budget with respect to the budget administrative and legislative proposals. With this amendment, the bill would provide for a strong national intelligence director and would also ensure that the heads of executive departments remain accountable for the performance of their departments, including the intelligence elements of those departments. It seems to me that is essential. Again, we come back to the basic concept, we are not creating a new department of government. Consequently, the NID has to rely on the department agency heads to perform their services, and to do that they have to be put into a position of accountability. That accountability is essential to the smooth operation of the goals of this particular legislation. A strong national intelligence director and accountable heads of departments are compatible concepts. As part of their responsibility, heads of the departments will be accountable for ensuring faithful implementation by their departments' intelligence elements of the guidance and tasking issued by the national intelligence director under such authority as may be granted by the final draft of this legislation. The President gave a very clear example that illustrates the need for this amendment when he discussed the intelligence reform on August 2, 2004. He said: The national intelligence director will work with the respective agencies to set priorities, but let me make it also very clear that when it comes to operations, the chain of command will be intact. When the Defense Department is conducting operations to secure the homeland, there will be nothing between the Secretary of Defense and me. Consequently, I would add one other thought. The chief of staff thereafter echoed on the quote: We do not want to do anything that would undermine the chain of command and the responsibilities that go with the Department of Defense, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of the Homeland Security Department, and other intelligence agencies, the Attorney General, for example. I am certain they meant to include the Department of State. This amendment carries out that objective. I would be interested in the comments of the chairman and the ranking member, and I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would have to reflect on that because it seems to me the Senator is trying to have it both ways, and I am sure my distinguished colleague would not be seeking that goal.

Mr. WARNER. Let me repeat that. I did not have the microphone on.

Mr. WARNER. I say that the distinguished Senator is trying to have it both ways.

Mr. WARNER. Fine. So what is the proposal of the Senator?

Mr. WARNER. That is not my intention.

Mr. WARNER. Yes, but let's work around it and be very mindful of the President's language. He said: Equally important that the heads of the departments should continue to be in charge of and therefore continue to be accountable for the performance of their respective departments.

Mr. WARNER. Then I read his direct quotation, which seems to me we have translated into this amendment in good faith.

Mr. WARNER. Obviously you tried to express the good intentions of trying to work this out. Certainly I desire to do so. But we must be very careful, under the extraordinary circumstances under which this very important piece of legislation is being put together. I am sure lots of work will take place over the weekend, but Monday and Tuesday are days in which certainly this bill, in its construction, is likely to be completed. We have to be careful that we do not create gaps in it, where a department head now can say: Look, the bill took that authority away. If a problem occurred, that is the NID's problem. And then the NID says: Oh, no, that is your problem on your account. We just cannot have finger-pointing when it comes to issues as important as our Nation's intelligence.

Mr. WARNER. I think that consultation would be helpful. I have undertaken it in connection with this amendment. I believe my views are consistent with theirs. But an awful lot of work has gone on now. It may be that there is some refinement that would further strengthen this. For the moment, if the distinguished chairman wishes to speak, I will be happy to hear it and we will just put the amendment to one side. I would like to come back this afternoon to modify an amendment that is at the desk, again, to clarify that in hopes that it comes near to what your goals are. I will be back. If the chairman could advise me, is there going to be further time?

Mr. WARNER. That should be adequate time.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I fully understand the import of the language you are quoting. But that is almost putting a blessing on everything that is written into the bill. I am not sure I am prepared as yet to say that. That is going to require a little study on the part of both of us because I think the effect of your language is, don't touch the bill, but what the bill leaves they are accountable for. That has to be thought through.

Mr. WARNER. I understand that.

Mr. WARNER. We are trying to make certain just that undefined but all important concept of accountability remains. As you possibly take portions of the responsibility of department heads away and give it to the NID, I want to make sure, if something goes wrong, who is accountable. We will work. I understand your perspective, but I am not prepared, as yet, to accept that amendment. So we will lay this aside. I thank you. Mr. President, I am prepared to go ahead with the other matter, if I might. Amendment No. 3877, As Modified Mr. President, I would like at this time to send to the desk a modification to amendment No. 3877 by the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, earlier today I engaged in a colloquy and submitted the original form of this amendment. Subsequent thereto, I had the opportunity to consult with a number of individuals. It is my desire now, basically, to revise my amendment to comport with section 106 of the President's proposal, which he forwarded to the Senate. That is entitled: Appointment of officials responsible for intelligence- related activities. Requirement for National Intelligence Director concurrence with respect to certain appointments, with respect to any positions that heads of agency or organization within the intelligence community. . . . My concern, what I am trying to achieve by this succession of amendments, is to provide some uniformity in the process designating and selecting the heads of the various--for example, the combat commands, as I refer to them, that was the subject of my earlier amendment. I find that the President's approach in the proposal that he forwarded to the Senate is preferable to my earlier attempt at this. It reads: If the appointment to such position is made by the President, any recommendation to the President to nominate or appoint an individual to such position shall be accompanied by the recommendation of the National Intelligence Director with respect to the [proposed] nomination or appointment. . . . (2) if the appointment to such position is made by the head of the department containing agency or organization [within the intelligence community or] the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or a subordinate official of such department or of the Central Intelligence Agency, no individual shall be appointed to such position without the concurrence of the National Intelligence Director. I believe that, then, confirms there is a certain degree of uniformity and preservation of accountability for the people selected in the various heads of the departments and the agencies. With that, I will yield the floor for such comment as may be forthcoming from the chairman and ranking member.