John Warner

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague for the question because earlier today I had a number of discussions related to this question. I talked to some of the White House people. I think I have spoken in the Chamber a number of times about my concern as to the future posture, standing, of this Director of Central Intelligence. He has this magnificent organization, albeit there was a problem on the weapons of mass destruction, but in terms of numbers it was a relatively minute number of people, although the problem is very serious. The organization is all over the world and they are taking risks, extraordinary in some instances, comparable to the men and women in uniform of the Armed Forces as they pursue their assignments. It is my concern in this reorganization where the director of intelligence now becomes a subordinate, and a decision is to be made by the President, in this legislation it appears to be the case he will not be at the moment on the council--are you familiar with the council of the Secretaries of State and Defense, Attorney General, Homeland Security, and others, who will be sort of a close-knit group and NID will be chairman of the council, and from time to time they will be advising the President, presumably, through the NID? I have tried to work it out so if, say, the Secretary of Defense has views at variance with the NID at the time the NID briefs the President on the NID's position, he is obligated by law to brief the President on the divergent position of one or more members of his council. That is a pending amendment. It is a joint intelligence communities council. Anyway, I felt that perhaps somehow the Director of the CIA should be involved. There is concern about protocol. It is all Cabinet. He, as such, does not have Cabinet rank. I am working on a proposition to see whether we can preserve the integrity that has been accumulated over many years of the Director of the CIA. It is not only in the United States; he is known all over the world as a person who holds that position. I don't want to see any loss in the eyes of the counterparts worldwide as this new structure, presumably, will be enacted into law. The answer to the question is, of course, the President can have whomever he wishes to brief him, but I presume NID is specifically someone that the President asked the Congress to create by law. He would be the principal briefer. From time to time he would be accompanied perhaps by others and I think more often than not by the Director of the CIA. Given that it is the President's absolute authority to decide who he wants to brief him, I don't think it should be written into law, but I am seeking some clarification to the very question the Senator has asked because it is of concern to me. As soon as I gain further information, I will be happy to share it with my colleague.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is quite correct. We do not want to do that. In good faith, the chairman of the committee has repeatedly said, in this Chamber, we are not creating a whole new department. I heard the ranking member today mention that. Therefore, we would not in any way be trying to create that number of persons. Nevertheless, who knows them better--that is, the individual members of the CIA--than the Director who has daily hands-on authority, who travels and visits in posts all over the world, who is basically responsible for their promotion, demotion, and accountability.

Mr. WARNER. And that fact is known, if I can say to my colleague, that fact is known the world over, that the man who directs the CIA and who is visiting in Great Britain or Pakistan, that is the man who will go home and look the President of the United States straight in the eye. That carries a lot of weight as it results in the creation of personal relationships between the director of our intelligence and his counterparts worldwide. I do not think it is a subject that can be legislated in law. It is something of legislative history being created in the Senate now and is a vital part of the future interpretation and implementation of this new law. I thank the Senator.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, for the Committee on Armed Services I report favorably the following nomination lists which were printed in the Records on the dates indicated, and ask unanimous consent, to save the expense of reprinting on the Executive Calendar that these nominations lie at the Secretary's desk for the information of Senators.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe I am a cosponsor of the amendment.

Mr. WARNER. This is a debate we had many years on the floor of the Senate. It has been a debate we have talked about so many times, and there has been a consistency in the voting in the Senate to recognize the wisdom not to release the budgets. As yet, with all due respect to our managers and others, I have not heard an absolutely convincing argument to turn back at least several decades that this has been an issue of debate on this floor. What is it in the public interest or, most importantly, our national security interests that requires us at this time to reverse positions that have been taken by this Chamber, together with the other body, over the period of several decades that I have been privileged to serve here? My concern is that this world today is so rapidly changing, and with the advancement of electronics and so many devices to determine what we in an open society are doing, why put the roadmap on the table for all to begin to search? It has been my experience that if you put out half a loaf, it will be followed by a request to get the other half of the loaf. Were this provision to prevail, we would be back here in a very short time, some colleagues with the best of intentions, saying: Why don't you put it all out? Why should we have any of it secret? That, coupled with the fact I have in my lifetime never seen a period where there is greater uncertainty about the security of this country--because of the progression of weapons of mass destruction, because of the progression of terrorism, and the proliferation of individuals who are willing to give up their lives to do harm in this country and other parts of the world--I just do not think at this point in time, without following, I think, the sage advice of our distinguished President pro tempore, we need to reverse what this Chamber has considered and decided upon year after year that I have been here. So I urge colleagues to support the amendment of the senior Senator from Alaska. I intend to strongly do so.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask the Senate to turn to the consideration of amendment No. 3781 which is pending at the desk.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send to the desk a modification of the amendment.

Mr. WARNER. My understanding is the modification is accepted by the managers.

Mr. WARNER. Let me explain the modification. The original text required that the national intelligence director, in his capacity as chairman of the to-be-created joint intelligence community council that was part of the President's message, originally I had it that he would have monthly meetings of the council or meetings upon the request of the members of the council. But I think it more appropriate that that be modified, which has now been done, such that the amendment will read: Strike that paragraph and in its place put the national intelligence director shall convene regular meetings of the joint intelligence community council. And then I will address the balance of the amendment. It has been my concern, and I think from a fair reading of the 9/11 Commission report, that we have to keep the views of those individuals primarily responsible for the collection, dissemination, and analysis of intelligence, those individuals who are on, incidentally, the council, who are your principal Cabinet officers--and that is the Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Energy, Treasury, and the Attorney General--those individuals from time to time could develop positions regarding an intelligence issue which are at variance with the national intelligence director. That collection of Cabinet officers is a vast array of individuals who will be working on issues of intelligence, collaborating with other agencies. From time to time, I am of the opinion that one or more of the members of the council might well have opinions that are at variance with the national intelligence director, and that when the national intelligence director goes to brief the President, there should be an obligation in law--I feel that strongly about it--that those opinions at variance with the national intelligence director must be given to the President and such others who may be in attendance at the time the national intelligence director presents his or, as the case may be, her viewpoint. The strength of our intelligence system has to be predicated on competition of thinking. I have always liked the word that the 9/11 Commission seized upon, ``imagination.'' It seems to me that type of competition and imagination is likely to develop better if we have the certainty that the viewpoints the President receives from the national intelligence director are not held by one or more of the members of that council, but that the President will receive the benefit of the other viewpoints. I think that system has to be made and put into law. It is so vitally important because, for example, as a member of the Intelligence Committee, when we examined, in extensive hearings conducted by Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller, the issue of weapons of mass destruction--and the conclusion that is being reached is that there was a substantial variance between the intelligence opinions and what is evolving as the actual, factual situation--it appears that the caveats were not given the proper emphasis by people, from the President on down, as they reviewed the work of the various intelligence-collecting agencies. For example, the CIA had its position. From time to time, the Department of Energy had opinions at variance with the CIA. At times, there were opinions of the DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, which were at variance with the opinions of other departments and agencies. I think it is essential. Those caveats, in the case of weapons of mass destruction--I will use the phrase that they were not given the emphasis that was needed. That is a whole chapter. It is all laid out in a very extensive report developed by the Intelligence Committee, which is now public record. This amendment, hopefully, will go a long way to ensure that diverse opinions will be given to our President. That is the thrust of it. It is patterned after the Goldwater-Nichols Act--a piece of legislation on which I was privileged to have a very active role, enacted by the Congress in the late 1980s--which organized some elements of the Department of Defense and, most specifically, the joint staff. Mr. President, the act said that when the Chairman of the Joint Staff meets with the President of the United States, if there were members of the Joint Chiefs--i.e., Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Commandant of the Marine Corps--who held opinions at variance with the Chairman, the Chairman was obligated under law to share those opinions with the President and such others as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was addressing. That has been a very effective piece of legislation. This amendment is patterned almost verbatim after, and consistent with, the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Frequently, the 9/11 Commission, quite properly, paid a great deal of respect to that piece of legislation. In concluding my remarks--and I have worked on this, but I have not found a solution yet--this Senator is concerned about the future of the Central Intelligence Agency as an organization and the role of the head of that agency--now our former distinguished former colleague, Porter Goss. Therein resides an enormous wealth of professional people in all the nations of the world, in one way or another, who have come up through the ranks, training and taking risks, often commensurate with the risks the men and women of the Armed Forces take, often with long separations from their families in some of the more difficult posts in the world. All of that infrastructure is going to remain under the Director of the CIA, who will now report no longer directly to the President but to the concept of the new national intelligence director. That has been decided. I may eventually come up with the solution. I am trying to figure out how, if the Director of the CIA has a view that is held strongly, and it is at variance with the viewpoint of the national intelligence director, how that view can be properly emphasized and given to the President and such other persons as the NID will be addressing.

Mr. WARNER. Yes.

Mr. WARNER. Yes. My last section, recommendations to Congress, says: Any member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council may make such recommendation to Congress relating to the intelligence community as such member considers appropriate. So in this particular law is specific authority for those Cabinet officers and others to come directly to the Congress. I am glad my colleague brought that up.

Mr. WARNER. Yes.

Mr. WARNER. It happened on mine when I was in the Department of Defense.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think it does, and that is why I have put in this paragraph, which is very explicit. This paragraph relates to the members of the Joint Intelligence Community Council, which I enumerated before as the several Cabinet officers--Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Energy, and the Attorney General.

Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct, Mr. President.

Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct. I yield the floor for a moment for the purpose of receiving the distinguished chairman's views on this matter.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished friend and colleague, the manager. Might I solicit her views on the concern I have--and I have not figured out how to do it. The views of the Secretaries of State and Defense are very important because they have their own internal intelligence functions and they are subjected to this, particularly those two Cabinet officers, on a daily basis. The Director of the CIA will report to the national intelligence director. The national intelligence director--I do not know quite what the infrastructure will be. It is conceived, as the Senator from Maine said earlier today and several times, that she is not creating a whole new department. But the CIA Director will remain in charge of what I say is the most magnificent reservoir of professionals to be found anywhere in the world. I cannot give, because of classification, the numbers, but it is in the tens of thousands of these individuals all over the world. The CIA Director has instantaneous contact with them and personal association as he travels--or she, as the case may be-- worldwide. It is a network of these intelligence people who have knowledge that comes back up to the Director. He is hands on. The NID will not have that hands-on experience, cannot possibly because he has so much to manage. One of the reasons for this legislation is to split off the functions of the former head of the CIA, the Director of the whole Central Intelligence, and to give those responsibilities, as it relates to the national collection of the intelligence program, portions of it to the NID to operate now, leaving the Director of the CIA to manage primarily that agency. Supposing the Director of the CIA has a strongly held opinion and viewpoint which is at variance with the national intelligence director, but when the national intelligence director goes in to brief the President and the Security Council, in all likelihood the Director of the CIA will be at Langley. I am not certain how that varying opinion is given to the President and the other structure at the White House and the other Cabinet officers who may be present--for instance, at the meetings of the council, how that opinion can be expressed. I have not thought of it. Maybe the chairman and I can work on this in the few days remaining on this bill. But I am concerned about it.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, all along I have expressed complete concurrence in what the Senator has done in this bill to the extent the Senator and I have looked at various sections. I may have reservations about others and tomorrow I hope to engage with the Senator on a number of amendments. As to the basic charter that the Senator outlined in her opening remarks, I am not going to at this time in any way indicate an objection. I just wanted to focus on this one individual, the CIA Director, who, as the Senator knows, under previous Presidents, and certainly President Bush, was in his office one way or another almost every day of the week working with him. The CIA Director had this--I understand all of these responsibilities may be too much for one individual and I am not arguing about shifting that at the moment, but I am talking about this magnificent collection of individuals--and he is the boss--who take all of these risks together, collect and analyze and develop opinions and it comes up to him and he may form a view which is totally opposite to the NID, and the NID goes into the President. I have guaranteed here that the Cabinet officers have the right to have their views presented simultaneously, one view after another, to the President, but I am not satisfied yet that the views of the CIA Director, which could well be different than the analysis and conclusion of the NID, would be given to the President with the weight and sufficiency I think they merit.

Mr. WARNER. I see the Senator's point. The Senator put out a very clear example of the NRO, the NSA, the old mapping agency, they report to the SECDEF--we have just given the SECDEF the right to have his views presented simultaneously if they are at variance with the NID at the time he meets with the President. That is not present in the Central Intelligence Agency. If those views vary, there is no obligation under the law to see that they are presented simultaneously. The Senator says she cannot envision how they would not be. Well, it depends on the human factor, that these two individuals would get along and have a mutual respect. I can remember in my first term on the Intelligence Committee, there was a very colorful Director of the CIA, Mr. Casey. He was an extraordinary man. I remember he used to come in and testify before the committee. All the members would lean up like this because they could not understand him, to be honest. He spoke in a rather unusual way. I think he did that to get through his testimony pretty quickly and get out of that hearing room. I am trying to put a note of humor into some serious things, but let us hope the Senator is right that as this law goes forward those individuals entrusted, the NID and CIA Director, can have a mutual respect and a mutual professional bond that will enable the views of the CIA Director to be given to the President if they are at variance with the NID. That is left up to the human quotient. This amendment, if adopted, puts it in law, not for the CIA Director but for the other members.

Mr. WARNER. In no way do I wish to in any way diminish the significance of the NID that is now being created presumably by law in the future. I think we have had a healthy discussion. I appreciate the distinguished manager accepting this amendment, and I will continue to work on the Director of the CIA issue which I continue to be concerned about. Maybe as a consequence of this colloquy, those who might be following it could come up with an idea. I hope they would communicate it to me or to the distinguished chairman. If there is no further debate, I ask that the amendment be agreed to. I ask unanimous consent that the following Senators be added as cosponsors to the amendment: Senators Stevens, Inouye, Talent, Allard, Dole, Chambliss, Cornyn, Ensign, and Inhofe.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. WARNER. I wish to express my appreciation to the distinguished manager. I look forward to rejoining her tomorrow. Let us hope that those amendments that I bring forward largely with my colleague Mr. Stevens will add to the strength of this bill.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in consultation with the managers of the bill, it is the desire of the majority leader and Democratic leader to keep moving tonight. I will send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in the study of the 9/11 report, frequent reference is made to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It is a piece of legislation in which, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I had a great deal of participation, working on this particular statute. It was an attempt, and a successful attempt, to rewrite the defense- related laws, and describes certain changes which would make the Department and particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff a more effective body. I want to refer to one provision. I ask unanimous consent that certain portions of the statute be printed in the Record following my remarks.