John Warner

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that provision reads as follows: Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman . . . A member of the Joint Chiefs-- That could be the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps. I repeat: A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--other than the Chairman--may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President-- That is the President of the United States-- --the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be. We learned that in the course of the past 18 months or maybe longer-- I will not try to define the exact period of time--when our President was making decisions in connection with certain advice he was receiving from the intelligence community--I will just touch on this lightly, and perhaps others will want to address this with more specificity--certain caveats, being other opinions--the opinions, say, of the Director of Central Intelligence--were not brought with sufficient force and effect to the attention of the policymakers. The purpose of my amendment is to enable a framework by which, following the precedents of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, certain individuals in the contemplated new legislative framework as described by the distinguished chairman and members of the Governmental Operations Committee, other opinions will be brought to the attention of the President at such time as the NID is briefing the President. I will refer with specificity to the amendment I have sent to the desk at this time. The first paragraph is technical, so I will omit that. I will go right to the operative paragraph: Advice and opinions of Members other than Chairman. ``Members'' refers to the Joint Intelligence Community Council which is established, it is my understanding, by the chairman's statute. A member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council (other than the Chairman) may submit to the chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the National Intelligence Director to the President or the National Security Council, in the role of the Chairman as Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Community Council. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such member at the same time the Chairman presents the advice of the Chairman to the President or the National Security Council, as the case may be. The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that the presentation of the advice of the Chairman to the President or the National Security Council [or the Secretary of Defense] is not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice or opinion of another member of the council. Lastly, ``Recommendations to Congress: Any member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council may make such recommendations to Congress. I presume that would be interpreted as the leadership of both Houses and the chairmen and ranking members of the relevant committees. The reason I have not been more specific here is that we are awaiting the decisions of the group on which I am privileged to serve headed by the distinguished whip, Mr. McConnell, and on other side the distinguished whip, the Senator from Nevada, Mr. Reid. In other words, as we look at the revisions that will be proposed in connection with the oversight responsibilities of the Congress, that may require some refinement. I will reread it: Any member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the intelligence committee as such member considers appropriate. I think that is the insurance that is quite visible to put in place such that other opinions can be considered by the President of the United States. Throughout, the 9/11 report referred to: We have to have imagination. We often use the phrase ``be competitive'' with opinions within the structure of the intelligence committee. I believe that is all good. I really do. And the purpose of this amendment is to ensure that there is in law a procedure that these important members of this council will have the opportunity to see that their views are presented contemporaneous--at the same time the President receives the views of the NID. That is the purpose of the amendment. I understand tonight it will be pending, and at such time as the distinguished chairman of the committee wishes to come over and review the subject with others, I would be happy to do so. Exhibit I (d) Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman.-- (1) A member of the Joint Chief of Staff (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be. (2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that the presentation of his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense is not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (e) Advice on Request.--The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, shall provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary requests such advice. (f) Recommendations to Congress.--After first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he considers appropriate.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman for her views. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Stevens be listed as a cosponsor of the amendment. There may be others in due course that would like to do so.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am privileged to offer one of the first amendments. I have other amendments of which I think the chairman is aware. We are going to comply with her request and the leadership to have the text before them within the amendments that are established. I want to be very constructive as a working partner as we move forward with this important piece of legislation.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on that note, I best yield the floor. Amendment No. 3781

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the conclusion of the vote I be recognized to speak in opposition to the Specter amendment for 10 minutes.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Specter amendment. I wish to compliment the managers of the bill, Senators Collins and Lieberman. I thought their arguments were overwhelmingly persuasive in support of the President's position and indeed the 9/11 Commission that these agencies--the National Security Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the former Mapping Agency, as we knew it; and the National Reconnaissance Office--have important intelligence functions. They are collection agencies. They must remain under the managerial supervision of the Secretary of Defense. I feel ever so strongly about that. These three agencies are designated in law as combat support agencies, servicing our troops, the men and women of the Armed Forces wherever they are in the world facing harm's way, today, tomorrow, and in the future. The President announced, on September 8, that these three agencies would not--I repeat, would not--be moved from the Department of Defense. This decision was based on two very important principles: One, no reform measures that the President advocates should disrupt ongoing operations in the war on terrorism. I am certain all colleagues fully appreciate the sensitivity of that extremely important decision and principle not to move these three agencies. Secondly, no ambiguity should be introduced in the chain of command, from the President through the Secretary of Defense down to the combatant commanders. That is vital to the war on terrorism and indeed other military operations. These three agencies are designated combat support agencies providing direct intelligence support to the unified combatant commanders currently fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in other theaters. The Secretary of Defense is accountable to the President. Under law-- I shall turn to the law momentarily. To ensure that these agencies provide the proper intelligence to our military customers, the Secretary of Defense must be able to direct them in executing their operational missions. I would like to pause for a minute and draw to my colleagues' attention the law. It reads, for the Secretary of Defense: The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall-- (1) ensure that the budgets of the elements of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense are adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the Department of Defense. . . . Further on down it reads: (4) ensure that the elements of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense are responsive and timely with respect to satisfying the needs of operational military forces. . . . I do not see how the amendment of my colleague from Pennsylvania modifies the existing law, and that is imperative if this amendment is to be effective. I draw my colleagues' attention further to the law, and that is title 10 with respect to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I read from section 193: (a) Combat Readiness.--(1) Periodically (and not less often than every two years), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report on the combat support agencies. Each such report shall include-- (A) a determination with respect to the responsiveness and readiness of each such agency to support operating forces in the event of a war or threat to national security; and (B) any recommendations that the Chairman considers appropriate. That law would have to be modified in some way were this amendment to be adopted. So, in conclusion, Mr. President and colleagues, I foresee a potential disruption to operations were this amendment to become law. Numbers are classified, but approximately one-half of the employees of these agencies are Active-Duty military personnel. In addition to national requirements, these agencies provide great volumes of tactical-level support to the warfighter. Also, in existing law, I draw to my colleagues' attention that the Under Secretary of the Air Force is dual-hatted as a Director for the NRO. So that, too, would have to be amended and changed. Furthermore, the Director of the NSA is dual-hatted. He is a Deputy Commander of Strategic Command for Information, warfighting responsibility. So in conclusion, I strongly support the position of the distinguished chairman and ranking member and urge colleagues to vote against this amendment.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the one thing we want to avoid is patchwork legislation. I have drawn to the attention of my colleague--

Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. But, I say to the Senator, I would be happy to enter into a colloquy with you on this point.

Mr. WARNER. I would hope you do so. I pointed out specific provisions of the law requiring certain accountability of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. We do not want to do patchwork legislation. My understanding, after reading and studying your amendment, is you take these three entities out of the Department of Defense. I do not read into the amendment where there is a residual authority left in the Secretary to perform the functions as prescribed in title 10 and, to some extent, title 50.

Mr. WARNER. I will wait for the Senator from West Virginia to answer. You directed it to the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. I am trying to inject a little lightheartedness.

Mr. WARNER. I say to my good friend, a little humor now and then is well advised. But I understand precisely the question directed to me. Let us read your amendment. Would you read your amendment and show me where that residual authority under titles 10 and 50 are left in the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. WARNER. I would draw that argument to the attention of the distinguished manager of the bill. My understanding, in reading some of your comments, is that I do not find in this amendment where there is a clear delineation of authority and that managerial responsibility, as required under titles 10 and 50, remains in the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am reading from section 305, Defense Intelligence Agency. I believe that is clear on the DIA, but I do not see it with reference to the National Reconnaissance Office. ``The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall be under the direction, supervision, and control of the NID.'' I just see no residual managerial authority left in the Secretary of Defense to fulfill his statutory requirements under titles 10 and 50. ``Line of authority: The Director of National Reconnaissance shall report directly to the national intelligence director regarding the activities of the National Reconnaissance Office.'' I mean, there is the clear English language. I say to my good friend, he may be well intentioned, but I am somewhat at a loss to find any reference in this amendment that preserves that residual responsibility which you have represented to the Senate.

Mr. WARNER. Might I just hand you the amendment and ask you to point to the language which you feel leaves the residual authority in the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. WARNER. I have given every opportunity to my colleague. I stand by my representations to my colleagues and I support the managers of the bill in having this amendment defeated.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the distinguished manager would yield for a question, the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, in support of his amendment, submitted for the record a letter dated September 20, 2004, signed by a number of colleagues. Here is a statement that I believe confirms the proposition I just enunciated, that the amendment would strip the Secretary of all of his responsibilities as existing in other statutes. I will read it: We are writing to you, however, to express our serious concern that current draft of the bill, as described by your summary and after review-- It is addressed to the chairman. --by the Governmental Affairs Committee members and staff, does not give the NID additional authorities that will be required to provide the unity of leadership and accountability necessary for real intelligence reform. In particular-- This is the operative sentence. --we feel strongly that the NID must have day-to-day operational control of all elements of the intelligence community performing national missions. It goes on. So it is very clear. I would say that they do single out the term ``national missions,'' but these combat support agencies perform both national missions and tactical combat missions. They are not clearly separable. I mean the soldier, sailor, airman, and marine in the field today relies on satellite intelligence, which is a national mission of, say, the NRO, as well as the tactical support the NRO gives in various ways. So I feel that as I read the amendment, it is totally contradictory of the desire of the 9/11 Commission, totally contradictory of the advice and counsel that the President has given the Congress, am I not correct?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, may I ask my distinguished colleague another question? This is a letter which is now submitted for the Record. It contains the names of about eight or nine other Senators. Have any of those Senators come to clarify this point? I would like to study what they have said.

Mr. WARNER. I hope to be on the Senate floor when they do that. I wonder if the managers of the bill might acquaint them with the title 10 and title 50 provisions and ask where in the amendment those provisions are modified; otherwise, we are going to end up with a patchwork. That is one thing I know this chairman and ranking member do not wish to have.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will pose a question to both managers, also members of the Armed Services Committee. As we proceed with this legislation, I am sure you are bearing in mind that we recall the aftermath of the 1991 war in which we participated in liberating Kuwait. You will recall as a member of the committee that General Schwarzkopf came before us at that time as sort of an after-action report. He talked in some detail about what he felt were shortcomings, particularly in the tactical intelligence, as to what he needed as a warfighter, as commander of the forces. That sounded alarms throughout the system. It startled many of us that that shortfall existed to that extent. Immediately the then Secretary of Defense and the successive Secretary of Defense--particularly Secretary Rumsfeld--have done everything possible to strengthen and remove the weaknesses that were in the system at that time. As we proceed on this bill, I hope we have been mindful of particular tactical strengths that have been built into the existing system. It would be my fervent hope that nothing in this bill would roll back that progress. I wonder if the managers might address that, since both are members of the Armed Services Committee and have experience with the gulf war and what has been done in the ensuing years.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is reassuring. If I might further inquire of my distinguished colleague, I was given today, and I expect the managers maybe earlier received this, in any event, this is the September 28 communication from the Executive Office of the President to the Senate. It is entitled ``Statement of Administration Policy.'' Has that been printed in the Record as yet today?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, at this point in the debate or at the conclusion of our colloquy, to print this Statement of Administration Policy in the Record.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think it is a document that will be of value to all Members of the Senate if they have not received it. I would like to draw the attention of the two managers to that operative paragraph 2: The Administration supports, in particular, the establishment of a NID with full, effective, and meaningful budget authorities and other authorities to manage the Intelligence Community including statutory authority for the newly created National Counterterrorism Center. The Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken the full budget authority or any other authorities that the President has requested for the NID. The Administration will work in the legislative process to continue to strengthen and streamline intelligence reform legislation and to make adjustments to ensure that the President continues to have flexibility in combating terrorism and conducting intelligence activities. It is the operative phrase that ``the Administration will oppose any amendments that would weaken the full budget authority,'' and the preceding sentence where they said ``a NID with full, effective, and meaningful budget authorities.'' Mr. President, first, I would like to ask the two managers, is the purport of this paragraph consistent with all the several provisions in the bill that refer to budget authority, in their judgment?