John Warner

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. With that understanding, I thank my good friend from Connecticut and I thank my good friend from Massachusetts. We will proceed to have the Senator from Utah, followed by the Senator from Alabama, for not to exceed 5 minutes each.

Mr. WARNER. I don't know that we are wasting any time. We are just trying to do our best. We have been here since 9:30. We have had the chairmen of the Appropriations and Foreign Relations Committees and this humble Senator. Let us try the following. That would not leave the Senator from Virginia, who has control of this side of the debate, any time whatsoever to provide for some rebuttal.

Mr. WARNER. Time is moving. On my side, the distinguished Senator from Utah and the distinguished Senator from Alabama desire 4 to 5 minutes each. They have been here for some period of time. If they were to take those periods, then the other side would allocate their time as they desire, and perhaps we would be willing to extend the time to accommodate such additional time as you might desire.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, we have, under the order that now is in effect, morning business until 12:30. I see four colleagues, at least I have been notified, two on this side, two on that side, who desire to continue the debate on matters of national security. I am wondering if I might suggest a framework and then see if we can have a mutual understanding.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.

Mr. WARNER. I must say, if I could just ask the indulgence of my colleague, my father served in World War I as a doctor in the U.S. Army in the trenches in France. My most prized possession, I say to my good friend, is on the wall in my Senate office. For these 25 years that I have been here, on that wall hangs this Croix de Guerre awarded him by the French Government for his heroism in the trenches for administering healing to Americans, British, Frenchmen, and Germans. I sometimes thought myself, and when the French ambassador visited my office a few days ago, in a courteous way I pointed it out and I said, you know, I am thinking of taking it down, but perhaps better judgment will prevail in your leadership. And therefore for a while I am going to leave it up, in the hopes that reality can be brought to bear. I thank my colleague for his time. I recognize the order entered into at the direction of both the majority and minority leaders of the Senate was that the Senate would proceed this morning on the debate with regard to the worldwide situation on terrorism with an emphasis on Iraq, North Korea, and other areas, and the time under the control of the Senator from Virginia, the time having been equally divided, is rapidly approaching the 2-hour mark which is the halfway. I see a colleague desiring recognition, but I remind that colleague, who courteously advised me that perhaps the subject matter was not that in the order, but I would have to say the time that he uses would have to be charged to the other side. I have some maybe 15 minutes remaining under the control of the Senator from Virginia, which I will hold in reserve for such rebuttal as may be required on the issues specifically recited in the order before the Senate.

Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague. I guess what both you and I find so perplexing is how responsible world leadership, most particularly France and Germany, which have seen the same facts, have access to basically the same intelligence, and cannot reach those logical conclusions which our President and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have reached.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague. If I might bring another issue to the forefront on which he has a great deal of experience? As this debate is taking place in the Senate Chamber this morning, Hans Blix presumably is addressing the Security Council. I, frankly, think that the inspection process under his leadership--they have tried and tried hard. What the world fails to realize is that Saddam Hussein, having observed the first inspection process, has carefully made his infrastructure, which has gone on creating the weapons of mass destruction, be they biological, chemical, or indeed his vigorous efforts to acquire a nuclear capability. They have gone right on throughout this entire period of time. And they have been constructed in such a way that they are moveable. He did that recognizing that at some point in time another inspection regime could be imposed upon him by the United Nations, as was done with Resolution 1441. I think the inspectors have tried. They have unearthed very little. They have not received the cooperation from Saddam Hussein that was the predicate on which Resolution 1441 was adopted. It simply said you are to cooperate, the inspectors to verify and destroy. But in reality the inspectors have been converted to a group trying to search out, given the failure of cooperation, where these weapons might be located. I will discuss later this morning a letter I received yesterday from the Central Intelligence Agency, under the signature of George Tenet, responding to the cooperation that our country has given the inspection efforts of Hans Blix, by virtue of sharing the intelligence information we had with regard to the location of probable caches of these weapons. In fact, it has not borne out to be very fruitful because of Saddam Hussein's skill of moving these caches, of moving the infrastructure of manufacturing in such a manner that they cannot be detected and discovered without his cooperation, which he has steadfastly refused to give. Our President addressed that issue last night. I wonder if my colleague would comment a little bit on the inspection process. As we are speaking, Blix is giving his most recent report. As you know, there are statements to the effect, from other nations, that perhaps the period of time should be extended. The President last night, when confronted with those questions, simply said, as I think he should and very properly said: Time will tell. I invite the Senator's observations.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am pleased to be joining my colleague Senator Dodd in the introduction of the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Act. The SAFER Act establishes a new grant program that will provide direct funding to fire and rescue departments though the new Department of Homeland Security. This funding will help to cover some of the costs associated with hiring and training new firefighters. Our Nation's fire departments must be able to hire the necessary personnel in order to meet the ever increasing demands on local first responders. Many Americans are not aware of the staffing shortages we may face in our fire and rescue departments. The role of firefighter in our communities is far greater than most realize. They are first to respond to hazardous materials calls, chemicals emergencies, biohazard incidents, and water rescues. These are dangers which our fire rescue personnel deal with on a daily basis. The National Fire Protection Association, a nonprofit organization which develops and promotes scientifically based consensus codes and guidelines, issued minimum staffing standards of at least four firefighters per apparatus. Furthermore, local departments are expected to comply with Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA, standards, which require a minimum of two qualified firefighters inside and two qualified firefighters outside of a structure fire or similar incident. Except in cases of a known need for rescue, a fire company with less than four personnel cannot enter that structure to fight a fire or respond to an incident until additional firefighters arrive on the scene, ready to go. I am honored to be an original cosponsor of this important legislation. I encourage my colleagues to support this measure not only because of the firefighters role in our homeland security endeavors, but also in recognition of the critical day-to-day services they provide in our Nation's communities.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Virginia be allowed to proceed as in morning business for such period of time as he may require.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if it is agreeable to the managers of the bill, I would be pleased to address my remarks at this time to the important matter before the Senate--the treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reduction. I rise to express my strong support for the ratification of the treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reduction, more commonly known as the Moscow Treaty. In my career as a public servant, I have had a number of opportunities to work with the former Soviet Union and with the current Russian Federation. I remember when I was Secretary of the Navy, I was asked to negotiate over a period of 2 years an executive agreement in the years 1970 to 1972 between the United States of America and the then Soviet Union. That executive agreement applied to the naval forces which I was privileged to be associated with at that time as Secretary of the Navy. It was a very important executive agreement. It is still in existence today. It has been used as a pattern for other nations for executive agreements between themselves and other countries. It related to how we operated our ships and aircraft in the international waters of the world--operated them in a manner that provided the maximum degree of safety to the vessel or aircraft itself and, of course, the crews who operated those platforms. We had experienced, in those days, incidents not unlike the one provoked by North Korea just days ago--where one of our aircraft, on a routine mission, in international airspace, operating under clearances given by the international programmers of airspace--when we were broached upon, as we use that phrase in the military, by North Korea's fighter aircraft. And, indeed, that broaching took the form of actions that bordered on literally hostile actions, in my judgement. But time will settle out that event. I just mention this chapter of history as showing my support for the people of Russia and the need for our two nations to work together. I still look upon Russia as a superpower, certainly in the arena of diplomacy, the arena of world economics. Indeed, I have profound respect for their armed forces today, even though those armed forces are somewhat significantly reduced in size. But against that background, I remember so well a number of trips to the Soviet Union. I remember so well one with the distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia, Robert Byrd, when he put together a delegation. We were the first Members of Congress to meet with then- President Gorbachev. It was a momentous day for all of us, having traveled those long distances, and then waiting in the anteroom, and then being escorted in to see that figure of history, a very important figure of history for Russia. I have a lot of respect for President Gorbachev. I remember another codel with Robert Dole, again, leader of the Senate, as was Senator Byrd. We went to visit President Yeltsin. At this time, I note, the delegations to visit President Putin certainly have not been large in number. I am not so sure that is for the good of our two nations. I would hope that Russia might look more favorably upon delegations of the Senate to come and visit with their leaders of today. In any event, I commend Senators Lugar and Biden for their leadership on this issue. It has been exemplary. I think this Chamber can take rightful pride in each of those individuals--one the former chairman and one, of course, Senator Lugar, the current chairman of the distinguished Foreign Relations Committee. I certainly commend President Bush for his vision and leadership in negotiating this treaty and establishing a new strategic relationship with Russia. It is truly remarkable how our country's relations with Russia have evolved and deepened over the past 2 years. Groundbreaking U.S.-Russian cooperation on the war on terrorism has been critical to our success in Afghanistan and more broadly in our efforts to root out terrorism and deny terrorist groups safe havens and access to money and destructive weapons. On the subject of destructive weapons, the Nunn-Lugar program, I have had a strong interest and support for that program from the very day it was conceived. I remember Sam Nunn had a small breakfast and sat down. What an audacious concept. We stood there in awe, as the cold war was very much in evidence in those days. But I think the bold foresight of Senators Nunn and Lugar to envision this program has reaped a great deal of mutual benefit for both nations and, indeed, perhaps the world at large, to further limit the proliferation of not only weapons of mass destruction but the materials by which those weapons are made. Equally remarkable is President Bush's success in implementing the bold vision he set forth in his May 2001 speech at the National Defense University for a new strategic relationship with Russia. President Bush decided to move the U.S.-Russian relationship beyond the cold war not incrementally, but in a bold leap. He articulated the controversial view that it would be possible to pursue a vigorous missile defense program to respond to the growing proliferation threats of the post-cold-war world, and at the same time dramatically reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals. President Bush set out to break the cold war linkage of restraints on missile defense to reductions in nuclear weapons, and he did so in a way that caused no harm to U.S. relations with Russia. No harm--I would say, indeed, it brought about a strengthening of those relations. This was a remarkable accomplishment. There were many who thought it could not be done. But their fears proved unfounded. President Bush deserves our respect and admiration for leading the world out of its conventional cold war mindset. Russian President Putin shares in that credit. He, too, exercised admirable vision and leadership when he understood and convinced doubters in his own country that U.S.-Russian relations had evolved to the point where the ABM Treaty was no longer critical to Russian security. Because the United States and Russia no longer threatened each other, the ABM Treaty was no longer a necessary linchpin in regulating what used to be a U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. If I might just digress a minute, again, in my years of 1969 to 1974, being the Navy Secretary, and my early years in the Senate, when we experienced so many periods of tension with regard to the cold war, there was always an underlying theme, which I will describe as follows. I remember President Reagan used to say, ``Trust but verify''--a very magical phrase that captured the relationship between our two nations. But there was the feeling among the professional military who were responsible for these awesome weapons of mass destruction--and I think a feeling among those who negotiated, as did I in a very minor way on the Incidents at Sea Agreement--that the bottom line, the Russian Government, the Russian military were always there with a measure of prudent, sensible realization of these weapons, and there was an inherent responsibility in all of those individuals, both in Russia and in the United States, and their respective Governments, to exercise that judgment. The concept of deterrence, the concept of massive retaliation always had the underlying theme that individuals had sound judgment as to any final decision, and that sound judgment would be exercised. That is not true today with Saddam Hussein. We cannot find, in the history of his dictatorship over Iraq, that level of sensible responsibility as it relates to weapons of mass destruction. And I question whether that exists with North Korea today. I am not here to use any words of condemnation, but underlying the cold war period was that sense of some security with regard to the ability of those in possession of weapons to use good judgment, even in the times of the greatest of tensions. President Bush's readiness to negotiate a legally binding nuclear reduction agreement was instrumental in persuading President Putin that the new strategic framework proposed by President Bush--including withdrawal from the ABM Treaty--would serve Russian interests. The result: A treaty that was negotiated in record-breaking time, will bring sweeping mutual reductions in deployed nuclear weapons, and will enhance the national security of both the United States and Russia. The Moscow Treaty is unlike any treaty we have had before. It is the first arms control treaty to embrace the new Russian-U.S. strategic relationship. In negotiating this treaty, both sides consciously rejected the cold war mentality of distrust and hostility that previously had required lengthy negotiations and extensive legal structures and detailed verification regimes to ensure that both sides would abide by their treaty obligations. This simplicity puts the focus where it belongs--quickly achieving deep, equitable reductions in deployed nuclear weapons. This breakthrough treaty will reduce the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals from their present levels of approximately 6,000 strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads over the next decade. These reductions, which amount to about two-thirds of the warheads in the Russian-United States arsenals, are the most dramatic in the history of arms control agreements. Such reductions are clearly in our national security interest. Russia is no longer perceived, or in actuality, an enemy. Our strategic arsenals, swollen by the cold war, no longer need to be sustained at such high levels. Another great strength of this treaty is the flexibility it accords our leaders to meet the uncertainties both in the international security environment and in the technological status of our nuclear stockpile. September 11 was a vivid reminder that we are vulnerable to attack in ways we never imagined. It is critical to our national security that our leaders retain the maximum flexibility to respond to emerging threats and changes on the world scene. The witnesses who testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee during our committee's review of the military implications of the treaty unanimously supported ratification of the Moscow Treaty. General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated: The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I all support the Moscow Treaty. We believe it provides for the long-term security interests of our nation. We also believe that it preserves our flexibility in an uncertain strategic environment. Throughout its history, the Senate Armed Services Committee has played a critical role in assessing the national security impact and military implications of arms control agreements negotiated by the executive branch. Based on the hearings conducted by the Armed Services Committee and subsequent analysis, I am convinced that the Moscow Treaty advances the national security interests of the United States and deserves the Senate's unqualified support. I strongly urge my colleagues to join all of us in giving our advice and consent favorably to ratification of the Moscow Treaty. Mr. President, I see others about to address the Senate. I am happy to yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WARNER. I thank him for those remarks. I made reference to my distinguished colleague from West Virginia moments ago in addressing this treaty and recalled when he led a delegation of which I was privileged to be a member----

Mr. WARNER. And President Gorbachev said, we have this amount of time. And you very graciously, as the leader of the delegation--Senator Thurmond was with us as well----

Mr. WARNER. Anyway, it was a brilliant dissertation between yourself and at that time President Gorbachev, and it was a historic meeting. I said on the floor moments ago, I only wish we could do more of that with President Putin because I felt those delegations--I went on two delegations to the Soviet Union with the distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. They were very meaningful and helpful.

Mr. WARNER. Yes. The Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Pell.

Mr. WARNER. Senator Mitchell, Senator Sarbanes.

Mr. WARNER. Yes, it was, but it was under your leadership. You were the first Member of Congress to go and meet with President Gorbachev.

Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator entertain a question?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, over my years in the Senate, I have had the privilege many times of working with my distinguished colleague. I have listened very carefully to his remarks. The bulk of the facts the Senator relates with regard to how North Korea has violated the framework agreement are accurate. I think his assessment of the potential threat as to how they address the serious issue of nuclear weapons is correct. But I respectfully say I believe this administration has been pursuing a policy--now my colleague may differ--of diplomacy to resolve this dispute. Our President recognizes the seriousness. As the Senator said, the bombers were promptly dispatched. My understanding was that that mission of those bombers had been in the planning for some time and, coincidentally, they were dispatched right after the eve of this very serious incident by which the hostile aircraft broached our unarmed aircraft. The Senator was dead accurate in his characterization of that serious incident. The point I wish to make is that I think our President has taken the correct tack at this time in diplomacy of saying that there may come a time in the future on bilateral talks, but at this juncture of this serious situation--and our President fully recognizes and I think shares with my colleague from West Virginia the seriousness of it--the multilateral approach; namely, that the talk should initiate with a table at which Russia, of course, South Korea, Japan, and China are there to participate. That is the way this administration quite appropriately desires to approach it. I believe Secretary of State Powell, in his most recent trip to the region not more than 10 days to 2 weeks ago, clearly said that out of that multilateral approach could evolve the situation whereby bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea would follow. Am I correct in my summary of how the President is approaching this? The Senator may have differences with it, but at least for the basis of our debate, I think I am correct.

Mr. WARNER. We have clearly not had the opportunity to fully exhaust the potential of a preliminary round of multinational talks such that these nations believe they are a partner with the United States. Now we may take the lead, but so often our Nation is criticized that we are the ones who are saying, you do this, you do that. Rather, in this crisis I think our country is saying that we want to work together with other nations as partners in addressing this issue before the possibility of bilateral talks.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might reply to my good friend, first on the issue of diplomacy, I do believe our President has worked very hard with the Prime Minister of Great Britain and other heads of state of the nations willing to proceed on the diplomatic route. Today we had a speech by the Secretary of State. I don't know if my colleagues had an opportunity to read it as I have. But it clearly says we are on a diplomatic course. No decision has been made to go to war. What little success the diplomats have had to date--and I frankly think Resolution 1441 was a high water mark of this whole controversy-- is owing to the fact that this President had the courage to put our troops in forward deployments to back up the words of the diplomats and to send a signal to Saddam Hussein and others that we have a commitment to those men and women there, 200,000 of them in that gulf region. I visited the gulf region just 10 days ago. They are there as a symbol of our commitment to make diplomacy work. I recognize the Senator and I were with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld the other day when my good friend from West Virginia expressed, as he has done now, the question of cost estimates. But the Secretary of Defense said he believed at this time he could not give those projections which would enable, I think, some very serious and finite parameters to be established. My good friend might recall President Clinton one time--I am not here to be political--said about the Balkans, we would be home in a year. I think the Senator remembers that because he and I collaborated on an amendment to require the other nations to come forward with their allocation of commitments to try to resolve some of the problems in that region. I remember we stood toe to toe on that. Here we are, 8 years later, and we are still in the Balkans with a not insignificant force. We have learned from that and experienced the need to exercise caution with regard to the questions of casualities. How well I remember being in the Chamber in 1991. The projected casualities we might encounter in the gulf war of 1991 were in the estimates of the tens of thousands. We thank the dear Lord that it did not in any way near approach that amount, although this country did lose brave soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and experienced the wounding of others in that very important conflict. The better side of prudence is being demonstrated here by the President and his Secretaries who are entrusted with dealing with the Congress. I printed in the Record earlier today, I say to my good friend, a recitation of a number of hearings the Senate Armed Services Committee, on which I am privileged to say my colleague serves, has conducted. That committee has, in connection with our debates on Iraq, held a number of briefings and so forth, in which I have been in attendance, on Iraq. Those are helpful for the public in its important debate now, and which I respect the diversity of opinions on Iraq, as I respect the opinions of my colleague from West Virginia. Nevertheless, I think our Senate has taken a constructive role in addressing that conflict.