John Warner

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senate Armed Services Committee has taken cognizance of this very critical situation of our east coast fleet units being deployed, their state of readiness, and the degree of risk these units are facing as they deploy into the operations in Iraq, the operations in the Persian Gulf, and the unforeseen risks that seem to be ever present in that region of the world, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, that arise so quickly and demand the instantaneous reaction, if so directed by the President, hopefully as a deterrence and then, if necessary, the actual combat. We have seen this now for a decade. When we stop to think of the risks taken by these young men and women flying aircraft off these ships, and performing other military missions, the Senate owes them no less than the highest possible standard of training, the best possible equipment to reduce that risk. Therefore, having chaired the hearings of the Committee of Armed Services of recent and, indeed, under the chairmanship of Senator Inhofe, a subcommittee of our full committee, and under the chairmanship of Senator Snowe, a second subcommittee--two subcommittee hearings and a full committee hearing on that state of readiness and particularly as that state of readiness could be affected adversely by the absence of the ability of the United States to continue the use of the ranges on the islands of Vieques in Puerto Rico. That is the reason why I offer this sense-of-the-Senate resolution. I shall read in general from this resolution and comment as I go: In the Senate of the United States Mr. Warner submitted the following resolution; Resolution Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the February 2000 deployment-- That is coming in just a matter of months-- of the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit to an area of potential hostilities and the essential requirements that the battle group and expeditionary unit have received [that] training needed to certify the warfighting proficiency of the forces comprising the battle group and expeditionary unit. Whereas the President, as Commander-in-Chief of all of the Armed Forces of the United States, makes the final decision-- Under our Constitution-- to order a deployment of those forces-- And all our forces. That is his role under the Constitution. We respect that role. Whereas the President, in making that decision-- With reference to the Eisenhower battle group-- relies upon the recommendations of the civilian and military leaders tasked by law-- Laws passed by this body and predecessor Congresses-- with the responsibility of training those forces, including the Commander of the Second Fleet of the Navy and the Commander of the Marine Forces in the Atlantic; Whereas the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility-- At Vieques-- has been since World War II, and continues to be, an essential-- Underline ``essential''-- part of the training infrastructure that is necessary to ensure that maritime forces deploying from the east coast of the United States are prepared and ready to execute their assigned missions. Not only execute their assigned missions, but to accept the risk of life and limb in executing those missions. Whereas according to the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Island of Vieques is a vital part of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility and makes an essential contribution to the national security of the United States by providing integrated live-fire combined arms training opportunities to Navy and Marine Corps forces deploying from the east coast of the United States; Whereas according to testimony before the Committee on Armed Services-- Just weeks ago-- and the report of the Special Panel on Military Operations on Vieques-- Again, issued a week or so ago-- a suitable alternative to Vieques cannot now be identified; Much less identified and put into an operational status. Whereas during the course of its hearings on September 22 and October 19, 1999, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate acknowledged and expressed its sympathy for the tragic death and injuries that resulted from the training accident that occurred at Vieques in April 1999; We did that with heartfelt expression during the course of our hearings just weeks ago. Whereas the Navy-- In the judgment of the committee-- has failed [at times] to take those actions necessary to develop sound relations with the people of Puerto Rico; Indeed, with the people most specifically on Vieques. The Navy has not done a good job, in this Senator's judgment, and collectively, I think, in the majority of the committee in carrying out its responsibility of important relationships with the people and assuring them, first, of the essential need and their contribution to our national security and how to operate this range in a manner that is safe. We acknowledge that. Whereas the Navy should implement fully the terms of the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding between the Navy and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico regarding Vieques and work to increase its efforts to improve the economic conditions for and the safety of the people on Vieques; Whereas in February 2000-- Just months away-- the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit are scheduled to deploy to the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf where the battle group and expeditionary unit will face the possibility of combat, as experienced by predecessor-- Units deploying in the past years-- during operations over Iraq and during other unexpected contingencies-- That arise in that dangerous region of the world. Whereas in a September 22, 1999 letter to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, the President-- The Commander in Chief-- stated that the rigorous, realistic training undergone by military forces ``is-- I quote the President of the United States-- ``is essential for success in combat and for protecting our national security''; The President realizes this. It is not a political document I am handling. This is the recitation of the statements by the President this year on this very subject, and he has put it down here very clearly. The purpose of this sense of the Senate is to give him the support necessary to make the tough decisions and resolve this problem. Whereas in that letter the President also stated that he would not permit Navy or Marine Corps forces to deploy ``unless they are at a satisfactory level of combat readiness''; Whereas Richard Danzig, the Secretary of the Navy, recently testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that ``only by providing this preparation can we fairly ask our service members to put their lives at risk.'' Whereas according to the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps-- This testimony was just three days ago-- Vieques provides integrated live-fire training ``critical to our readiness'', and the failure to provide for adequate live-fire training for our naval forces before deployment will place those forces at-- Listen carefully-- at unacceptably high risk during deployment. Whereas Admiral Johnson, the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Jones, the Commandant of the Marine Corps-- On October 19, 1999-- testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that without the ability to train on Vieques, the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit scheduled for deployment in February 2000 would not be ready for such deployment ``without greatly increasing the risk to those men and women who we ask to go in harm's way''; Whereas Vice Admiral Murphy, Commander of the Sixth Fleet of the Navy, recently testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that the loss of training on Vieques would ``cost American lives''; and Whereas the Navy is currently prevented as a consequence of unrestrained civil disobedience-- I repeat: Whereas the Navy is currently prevented as a consequence of unrestrained civil disobedience-- In defiance of law, in defiance of a court order-- Whereas the Navy is currently prevented as a consequence of unrestrained civil disobedience from using the training facilities on Vieques which are required to accomplish the training necessary to achieve a satisfactory level of combat readiness: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should not-- I repeat: Not-- deploy the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group or the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit until: (1) the President, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, reviews the certifications regarding the readiness of the battle group and the expeditionary unit made by the Commander of the Second Fleet of the Navy and the Commander of the Marine Forces in the Atlantic, as the case may be; and (2) the President determines and so notifies Congress that the battle group and the expeditionary unit are free of [any] serious deficiencies in major warfare areas. Mr. President, I feel very serious about this issue. I thank the indulgence of my colleagues and the Senate to come before you this afternoon to introduce this resolution. I draw this resolution to the attention of all of my colleagues because this great body of the Senate, together with the House of Representatives, is a coequal--is a coequal--partner with regard to the training, the safety, above all, and the missions undertaken by the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces. Today's military has been put to one of the highest peaks of stress, stress on the actual men and women at sea and in the air and under the sea and on the land, stress on their families at home because of the high tempo, the high number of deployments of these forces all over the world. Statistically, President Clinton--and this is pure statistics--has deployed the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States into more contingency operations than any other President prior. I repeat that: More times. I am not questioning, in any way, his authority or his judgment. The fact is, he has done this. The simple sense of the Senate says: Mr. President, in your own letter you talked about the seriousness of this situation at Vieques. The Senate is on notice that you, your Secretaries of Navy and Defense, and the military are working to resolve this. But we, the Senate, exercising our coequal responsibility, are placing the concern we have for the welfare of the men and women undertaking this deployment, and the risks they share with their families at home, we, Mr. President, most respectfully say to you we want to see absolute clarity in the certifications from those military commanders and those civilian bosses of the military commanders. We have a system in our country which is the right system. We have civilian control of the military. They have the joint responsibility-- the civilian/military control, fleet commanders--to make those certifications to our President that this group is ready, or, Mr. President, respectfully this group is not ready, to undertake this mission and assume those risks. That is what we ask. I request all Senators, as an obligation to those men and women of this battle group--and I daresay there are soldiers and Marines and airmen from every one of the 50 States in that battle group--so I ask all Senators to review this and hope you will join me as a cosponsor. According to Article II, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the President is the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces. As such, he bears the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the men and women in uniform he orders into harm's way, receive the training necessary to protect their lives. I have been working to preserve the access of the United States Navy and Marine Corps to the essential training facility on the island of Vieques, since I was Secretary of the Navy. This facility is absolutely vital to the readiness of our naval forces. Over the past several weeks, the Armed Services Committee has held a series of hearings on this important issue. Over the course of these hearings, I have become increasingly convinced that it would be irresponsible to deploy our naval forces without the training provided by the Vieques facilities. On Tuesday, September 22, 1999, the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, under the leadership of Senator Inhofe, held a hearing to review the need for Vieques as a training facility and explore alternative sites that might be utilized. At that hearing both Admiral Fallon, commander of the Navy's Second Fleet, and General Pace, commander of all Marine Forces in the Atlantic, testified that the Armed Forces of the United States need Vieques as a training ground to prepare our young men and women for the challenges of deployed military operations. On October 13th, the Seapower Subcommittee, under the leadership of Senator Snowe, heard from Admiral Murphy, commander of the Navy's Sixth Fleet and the commander who receives the naval forces trained at Vieques, who stated that a loss of Vieques would ``cost American lives.'' Earlier this month, after the release of the report prepared by the Special Panel on Military Operations on Vieques, I held a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee to discuss with Administration and Puerto Rican officials the recommendations of that report, and to search for a compromise solution that addresses the national security requirements and the interests of the people of Vieques. At that hearing, Secretary Danzig, the Secretary of the Navy, stated that only by providing the necessary training can we fairly ask our service members to put their lives at risk. Admiral Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the Eisenhower Battle Group would not be able to deploy in February without a significant increase in risk to the lives of the men and women of that battle group unless they are allowed to conduct required training on Vieques. Furthermore, General Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps, testified that the loss of training provided on Vieques ``will result in degraded cohesion on the part of our battalions and our squadrons and our crews, decreased confidence in their ability to do their very dangerous jobs and missions, a decreased level of competence and the ability to fight and win on the battlefield.'' At that hearing, I asked Admiral Johnson and General Jones ``Is there any training that can be substituted for Vieques live fire training between now and February that will constitute, in your professional judgment, a sufficient level of training to enable you to say to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit are ready to go.'' In the response they stated ``no, sir, not without--not without greatly increasing the risk to those men and women who we ask to go in harm's way, no, sir.'' I remain convinced that the training requirement is real and will continue to directly affect the readiness of our Carrier Battle Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units. As General Shelton recently testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the training on Vieques is ``critical'' to military readiness. He further stated that he ``certainly would not want to see our troops sent into an area where there was going to be combat, without having had this type of an experience. We should not deploy them under those conditions.'' All of the military officers with whom we have spoken on this issue have informed us that the loss of Vieques would increase the risk to our military personnel deploying to potential combat environments. The Rush Panel, appointed at the request of the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico and at the direction of the President, recognized the need for Vieques and recommended its continued use for at least five years. What we have learned in these hearings is that Vieques is a unique training asset, both in terms of its geography with deep open water and unrestricted airspace and its training support infrastructure. The last two East Coast carrier battle groups which deployed to the Adriatic and Persian Gulf completed their final integrated live fire training at Vieques. Both battle groups, led by the carriers U.S.S. Enterprise and U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt, subsequently saw combat in Operations Desert Fox (Iraq) and Allied Force (Kosovo) within days of arriving in the respective theater of operations. Their success in these operations, with no loss of American life, was largely attributable to the realistic and integrated live fire training completed at Vieques prior to their deployment. Those calling for the Navy and Marine Corps to cease training operations on the island and convey Navy-owned land to the Government of Puerto Rico often point to the struggling economy of Vieques and the banter posed by Navy training to the local citizens as supporting evidence. They express disappointment in the Navy's failure to more fully implement the terms of the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding which outlined the responsibilities of the Navy for assisting the economic development and safety of the local community. To address those concerns, we can, and should, work together to initiate new programs to assist the Navy and the residents of Vieques in stimulating the local economy and ensuring that all possible safety measures are adopted. However, economic concerns and correctable safety concerns should not force the Navy to cease vital training when that would increase the risk to the safety and security of our men and women in uniform. Mr. President, as long as we are committing our nation's youth to military operations throughout the world; and as long as Vieques is necessary to train these individuals so that they can perform their missions safely and successfully; it would be irresponsible to deploy these forces without first allowing them to train at their vital facility. I hope that all of my colleagues will support this resolution.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, for the Committee on Armed Services, I report favorably nomination lists which were printed in the Records of September 23, 1999, September 27, 1999 and October 12, 1999, and ask unanimous consent, to save the expense of reprinting on the Executive Calendar, that these nominations lie at the Secretary's desk for the information of Senators.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I address the Senate today with regard to a bill that I am introducing which provides for the establishment of a commission to be known as the Presidential and Senatorial Commission on a Nuclear Testing Treaty. On October 15, shortly after the historic debate in the Senate and the vote taken on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, I addressed the Senate, suggesting that the President and the Senate explore options by which a commission could be appointed for the purpose of assessing issues relating to testing of nuclear weapons, and the possibility of crafting a treaty that would meet the security interests of our Nation, while enabling America to once again resume the lead in arms control. Following the historic debate and vote, I voted against that treaty, and I would vote again tomorrow against that treaty, and the day after, and the day after that. I say that not in any defiant way, but simply, after three hearings of the Armed Services Committee and one of the Foreign Relations Committee, after very careful analysis, after hours of discussion with my colleagues, after participating in the debate, it was clear to me that the record did not exist to gain my support nor, indeed, the support of two-thirds majority of the Senate. It is my view that the Senate and the President will join together to provide bipartisan leadership to determine, in a collaborative way, how to dispel much of the confusion in the world about why this Senate failed to ratify the treaty, to explain what the options are now, and to show that we are analyzing all of the other possibilities relating to a nuclear testing treaty. This, hopefully, will dispel such confusion. Much of that confusion is based on misconceptions and wrong information. But we can overcome that. We must explain that this Government has coequal branches--the executive, headed by the President; and the legislative, represented by the Congress--and how our Constitution entrusts to this body, the Senate, sole authority to give advice and consent. This body exercised that obligation, I think, in a fair and objective manner. But we are where we are. My bill is somewhat unique, Mr. President. I call for a commission with a total of 12 members--6 to be appointed by the majority leader of the Senate; 6 to be appointed by the distinguished Democratic leader of the Senate, with coequal responsibility between two members to be designated as cochairmen. I did that purposely to emphasize the need for bipartisanship. We, the Senate, will not ratify the treaty unless there are 67 votes in the affirmative. This last vote was 19 votes short--votes cast by individuals of this body of clear conscience. That significant margin of 19 votes, in my judgment, can only be overcome through a bipartisan effort to devise a nuclear testing treaty seen clearly as in our national interests. The cochairmen will be appointed--first, one by the distinguished majority leader of the Senate, and the second by the President, in consultation, of course, with the distinguished minority leader. That brings the President well into the equation. He will undoubtedly be in consultation with the distinguished minority leader throughout the series of appointments by the minority leader. This commission can have no more than two Members of the Senate appointed by the majority leader, and no more than two Members of the Senate, if he so desires, appointed by the minority leader. Therefore, up to four Senators could participate. But the balance of the 12--eight members--will be drawn from individuals who have spent perhaps as much as a lifetime examining the complexity of issues surrounding nuclear weapons, the complexity of the issues surrounding all types of treaties, agreements, and understandings relating to nonproliferation. We saw them come forward in this debate--individuals such as former Secretaries of Defense, former Secretaries of State, men and women of honest, good intention, with honest differences of opinion, and those differences have to be bridged. By including eight individuals not in the Senate along with four Senators--if it is the will of the leaders-- we can lift this issue out of the cauldron of politics. We can show the world that we are making a conscientious effort to act in a bipartisan manner. The experts the majority leader and the ones the minority leader, in consultation with the President, would pick will be known to the world--former Secretaries of Defense of this Nation, former Secretaries of State, former National Laboratory Directors, individuals whose collective experience in this would add up to hundreds of years. In that way, I believe we will bring credibility to this process and will result in this commission being able to render valuable advice and recommendations to the Senate and the President at the end of their work. Several years ago, I was privileged to be the Ranking Member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. There was a great deal of concern in the Senate toward the Central Intelligence Agency and how it was operating at that time. As a matter of fact, some of our most distinguished Members--one indeed I remember clearly--called for the abolishment of the CIA. This individual was extremely disturbed with the manner in which they were conducting business. I took it upon myself at that time to introduce in the Senate legislation calling for the establishment of a commission to make an overall study of our intelligence and to make recommendations to the President and the Congress. Congress adopted the legislation I introduced and it was enacted into law. The first chairman of that commission was Les Aspin, former Secretary of Defense, who, unfortunately, had an untimely death. He was succeeded by Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense and former Secretary of the Air Force, who I knew well. I served with him. Our former colleague, Senator Rudman, was also closely involved. I was privileged to be on that commission. It did its work. It came up with recommendations. The intelligence community accepted those recommendations. The CIA survived and today flourishes. I have given the outline of the commission I am proposing today. Let me briefly refer to the basic charge given the commission and the work they should perform. Duties of the commission: It shall be the duty of the commission, (1) to determine under what circumstances the nuclear testing treaty would be in the national security interests of our Nation; (2) to determine how a nuclear testing treaty would relate to the security interests of other nations. I was motivated to do this because of the misunderstanding about the important and decisive action taken by this body. (3) To determine provisions essential to a nuclear testing treaty such that that treaty would be in the national security interests of the United States; (4) to determine whether a nuclear testing treaty would achieve the nonproliferation and arms control objectives of our Nation. The bill includes a number of other recitations and other important provisions. We deal with the question of verification. We deal with the question of the science-based stockpile stewardship program, now being monitored and more fully developed by the Department of Energy. All of this is carefully covered in this legislation I make to this body tonight. This is one Senator who believed he had an obligation to confer with his colleagues about this important matter. I believe it is important that this legislation be laid down as a starting point. It may well be that other colleagues have better ideas. I take absolutely no pride of authorship in this effort. Perhaps others can contribute ideas as to how this legislative proposal might be amended. Eventually, collectively, I hope we can work with our leadership in establishing some type of commission so the consideration of a nuclear testing treaty can go foward and people around the globe will have a better understanding of our efforts to achieve a more secure world. I went back to do a little research which proved quite interesting. We have heard so many times in this Chamber that politics should stop at the water's edge. I was reminded of this as I was privileged, along with many others in this Chamber, to attend the presentation to the former President of the United States, Gerald R. Ford, and his lovely wife, Mrs. Betty Ford, the Congressional Gold Medal. I took down some notes from President Ford's wonderful speech. I had the privilege of serving under President Ford as Secretary of the Navy and, indeed, Chairman of the Bicentennial. I have great respect for him. He talked about Senator Vandenberg and how Senator Vandenberg was an absolute, well-known conservative. Yet it was Senator Vandenberg's leadership that got the Marshall Program through the Senate of the United States. The Marshall Program was a landmark piece of legislation initiated by President Truman. Indeed, in some of the accounts of history, some people said it should be called the Truman Plan. But Truman said ``Oh, no, don't name it after me because the Congress won't accept it; name it after George Marshall''--showing the marvelous character of the wonderful President. President Ford also talked about Everett Dirksen. He said: The executive branch and the legislative branch worked with him arm in arm on relationships that were important between this country and the rest of the world. Those are Ford's words. Bipartisanship helped get the Marshall Plan through and enabled this country to show strength in the face of the cold war period. That is history, ladies and gentleman. I don't suggest in any way that I am making history here tonight. But I think it is very important that other Senators take time to look at this and contribute their own ideas. It will require a significant measure of bipartisanship to achieve the objectives of the commission I am proposing. Let's see what we can do to work with our leadership and go forward. The events of history are interesting. Senator Vandenberg, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, in 1948, thought Tom Dewey was going to win the Presidency. He wrote into the Republican platform the following phrase. I quote him: We shall invite the minority party to join us under the next Republican administration in stopping partisan politics at the water's edge. As it turned out, Truman won that historic election. And what did Vandenberg do but go on and work with President Truman in the spirit of that statement that he put into the Republican platform, and the first landmark that the two achieved was the Marshall Plan. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, 30 years ago this fall, I met John Chafee. President Nixon had just been elected and he had appointed Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. I aspired to be the Secretary of the Navy. Laird called me to his office and he said, ``I want you to meet a very special person.'' Now, mind you, I had been closely associated with then-Vice President Nixon and worked on his campaign. Senator Chafee had been very closely associated to Governor Nelson Rockefeller. There was a little bit of a difference between Vice President Nixon and Nelson Rockefeller. I felt that I should be the Secretary of the Navy because Chafee hadn't been quite the supporter that I had been for these many years. But Laird said to me, ``I am going to introduce you to a man that you will respect, work for, and end up loving.'' I will never forget that. And so late in November, the two of us were informed, and he became Secretary of the Navy and I became his Under Secretary. We served under Melvin Laird for 3 years of the most difficult period of the war in Vietnam. Unlike myself, with very modest military service in the closing days of World War II and again in Korea, John Chafee had been a rifleman at Guadalcanal. Those of us who had been privileged to wear marine green in the generation of the World War II era we knew full well that those who had served on the canal had seen the roughest of the fighting. It was referred to as the ``old breed.'' Those who came in later years were never quite the same as the old breed. In the many years that I had been with John Chafee, very closely associated, I never was able to get out of him all the facts--to this day--about his service in Guadalcanal. One day just a few weeks ago, we were walking down the hall. I can't remember exactly the occasion, but we saw a Marine general who had medals from up on the shoulder all the way down to his waist. I said: John, that is different than the old days, where occasionally a decoration was given in the Corps. It must be different today. He said, ``Yes.'' I said to him: Did you ever get a decoration besides the Purple Heart? He said: No; didn't deserve it; didn't get it. Mind you, he served on Okinawa, on Guadalcanal, survived, got malaria, went to Australia, recovered, was picked to go to officer candidate school, and served in officer candidate school. He became a platoon leader on Okinawa. He survived the kamikaze attacks going in, and the fighting in that battle was as rough as any of them. The Japanese knew they had their backs against the wall. It was very tenacious, very rough and tenacious. He told me a few facts about those years. But then just a few years after World War II, surprisingly--4 or 5 years--suddenly we were in another war. We were in Korea. John called up for active duty. I am sure he could have found a way not to have gone because he had served so much in World War II. But he went. When he reported for duty and went to Korea, he became a company commander. In the Marine Corps and in the Army, and the other services, that unquestionably is the toughest of all jobs, with 230-plus men depending on you, with a reinforced company, an infantry company, whatever it may be. But John was there. I remember not long ago the author of this book, ``The Coldest War,'' came through and visited with John and me. I had been in Korea, but I had been in an air wing as a communications officer. He used to joke with me about how I slept in the tent with a little bit of a stove, which was true, and he slept in a bunker out in the open. He always used to tease me. But in this book, they captured John Chafee. The author discussed his bravery as a company commander and his love for his men--any man who served under John Chafee--whether it was in the Marine Corps or, indeed, in this institution. How privileged I was to sit just in front of my distinguished big brother in this Senate. Any man who served with John Chafee inherited a great deal. I say that modestly. But we all profited so much from our personal association with this marvelous man. I called former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and talked to him by phone. He sent me a short memo. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, Mel Laird was a great public servant, and he still is. He said about John Chafee: Our close and lasting friendship goes back for more than 45 years and will always be remembered. All of John's friends will remember his quick smile, his lack of pretense, his loyalty, his warm compassion, his good commonsense judgment, and his special quality as a person. John Chafee knew who he was. He never had to boast, he never had to brag, he never stopped to take credit, because this man knew who he was. He had tremendous inner self- confidence and a tremendous ability to be self-effacing. Laird goes on: John, in every way, showed he cared about all of us, his Rhode Island constituents, and our country in a most wonderful way. But his real love was his family. Ginny-- I talked to Ginny this morning at the crack of dawn. We exchanged a few words. Then we immediately recalled the happy days together throughout these 30 years--and laughter, for both of us, for a few minutes on the phone. She had the courage, like John, to muster laughter in a moment such as this. He loved his children--Zechariah, ``Zach,'' Quentin, Lincoln, John Jr., and Georgia, and was a special granddad to his many grandchildren. They will miss him very much. Yes, John was a hero in every sense of the word. But he was the greatest hero to his family. Laird goes on: There were many unusual associations we had over these 45 years--going back to Republican National Conventions, his service as Governor, his service as Secretary of the Navy, and his years in the U.S. Senate. His last interview in office occurred just last Friday with Dale Van Atta, who is working on a book on the Laird-Packard Pentagon Team. That was the team John and I joined 30 years ago. For 2 hours I worked with John last Friday setting up a hearing on the Environment and Public Works Committee, where I was privileged to be his deputy, second always in command. I will never be first. Even though he is not here, I will still get his orders. But we were there working last Friday. Yes, he was a little less spry in his step as he was recovering from his operation. But we have to remember every day in this great institution that, yes, we have our debates, we have our differences, but the man or the woman to your left or right in this magnificent institution could be gone the next day by the will of God. I always think of that. We have to treasure and value every moment we have with each other in this great institution because it brings us together. This paragraph in Laird's letter I am amused by: I remember calling John in December of 1968 and asking him to be Secretary of the Navy on the Laird-Packwood Team in the Pentagon. There were many candidates suggested for this position--President Nixon had a candidate, as did Senator Dirksen, Senator Hugh Scott, Senator George Murphy, and many others. Under the arrangement I had with President Nixon, it was my choice, and I never regretted that choice--John Chafee was terrific. There are so many. I think in the days to come I will seek the privilege of speaking again of John Chafee solely for the purpose of introducing into the Record some marvelous statements. I worked with his personal staff today in collecting some of his statements and with the staff of the Environment and Public Works Committee. There are so many lives this great American touched. He loved his work in the Pentagon for those 3 years because it brought into focus everything he had learned as a young marine on Guadalcanal, as the platoon commander on Okinawa, and as a company commander in Korea. I remember one day so well. Laird called us up. Laird was short, got on that phone, and issued an order quickly. It was Saturday. Of course, we worked Saturdays. The war was on. Absolutely, we wanted to be there. It was our choice. It was a heavy burden and responsibility. We were losing tens of thousands of casualties every week. We just finished this engagement in Kosovo casualty-free. In Vietnam, thousands of men and women were killed and wounded week after week. It is so hard to believe now. It is so hard to explain war to the current generation. But anyway, Laird called up, and he said: You two guys go down to The Mall and give me a report on what is going on. There was a demonstration down there. Chafee and I were dressed in our blue suits as worn by the Navy today. We stripped them down and put on some old khakis. We had some tennis shoes. He and I used to play a little squash in the Pentagon. We put on a couple of old T-shirts. We got into an old car. We had chauffeur-driven cars in those days. Forget them. We got in an old car and drove down to The Mall. I will never forget that sight. There were over 1 million young men and women, in a peaceful way largely, demonstrating against that war in the heart of the Nation's Capital on The Mall between this building and the Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial. There they were--1 million. I could see John was so terribly upset because it brought back the carnage he had seen in his previous military experience when the whole nation, every American, was solidly behind every person in uniform (abroad or at home). The Nation stood in solid support. We went back to the Pentagon that afternoon, and we sat in Laird's office. As I reminisced this morning, Laird had only been in office a comparatively short time and there was a lot of thought about how we were going to get America disengaged from that conflict, how we were going to stop the casualties. John Chafee from that moment on became a very special counselor to the Secretary of Defense and, indeed, to the President on the need to bring that conflict somehow to a termination with regard to these losses. Over 50,000 young men and women were killed in uniform in that conflict in Vietnam. Tough? Yes, he was a tough man. He was tough as they come. They used to say at Yale he was a wrestler; you will not get John Chafee's shoulders to the mat; you will not get them to the mat. No one ever got them to the mat. I never did. I tried. I don't think in his distinguished career anybody in this great body ever did. The interesting thing about that man, so full of courage and so full of toughness, I never heard him use a word of profanity, never a curse word. When John would get upset and he was concerned about something, he would say: ``Oh, dear.'' Remember that, colleagues? How many of you heard him say, ``Oh, dear''? That was his way of saying, hey, we have a problem, but we are going to solve it. A remarkable man. We will remember him for his modesty. I searched his web page: 40 years of public service condensed to one page. A modest man, never boasted. He had the self-confidence. I was asked, Who will take his place? Without thinking I simply said: No one. No one will take his place. God bless you, John, and your family.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am pleased to join in supporting this legislation and, also, as a cosponsor of the amendment offered by Chairman Thompson and Senator Voinovich. This important legislation will provide high school students from the District of Columbia significant financial relief to assist them in attending a public or private university in Virginia or Maryland. I am grateful to Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Lieberman and particularly Subcommittee Chairman Voinovich for taking on this effort and moving swiftly to bring this bill before the full Senate. I have had a particular interest in expanding the educational opportunities available to District students by ensuring that they are eligible to receive the reduced tuition rate or grants to attend any of the exceptional Historically Black Colleges and Universities in Virginia or Maryland. Many students from the District of Columbia currently attend an Historically Black College or University in Virginia or Maryland and there is a great tradition among these schools and District students. In Virginia, we are privileged to have five exceptional Historically Black Colleges and Universities--Hampton University, Virginia State University, Virginia Union University, Norfolk State University and St. Paul's College. I am pleased that the amendment offered today with this legislation incorporates a provision I requested to make each of these institutions eligible under this legislation. With the passage of this amendment to the bill, students from the District of Columbia will now be able to receive either in-state tuition rates or grants to attend any public institution or Historically Black College or University in Virginia. Mr. President, I applaud the efforts of my colleagues, Senator Voinovich and Chairman Thompson, and appreciate their attention to the matters involving Historically Black Colleges.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, it is unfortunate that the procedural structure that has been erected stands in the way of moving forward on significant and thoughtful reform to our campaign finance laws. I would like to have the opportunity to debate and vote on some of those reforms, particularly the measure offered by Senator Hagel, but we are precluded from doing so. Today, I want to speak about campaign finance reform legislation I introduced earlier this year and about an amendment I am prepared to offer. This past May I introduced the Constitution and Effective Reform of Campaigns Act of CERCA, which I first introduced during the 105th Congress. This legislation is the product of 2 years of hearings during my chairmanship of the Rules Committee, discussions with numerous experts, party officials, and candidates, and nearly two decades of participating in campaigns and campaign finances debates in the Senate. I view my legislation as an opportunity for bipartisan support. It is a good faith effort to strike middle ground between those who believe public financing of campaigns is the solution, and those who believe the solution is to remove current regulations. If offers a package of proposals which realistically can be achieved with bipartisan support and meet the desire of the majority of Americans who believe that our present system can be reformed. In my judgment, we will not succeed with any measure of campaign reform in this complicated field without a bipartisan consensus. In drafting this legislation, I began with four premises. First, all provisions had to be consistent with the first amendment: Congress would be acting in bad faith to adopt provisions which have a likelihood of being struck down by the Federal courts. Second, I oppose public financing and mandating ``free'' or reduced- cost media time which in my mind is neither free nor a good policy idea. Why should seekers of Federal office get free time, while candidates for State office or local office--from governors to local sheriffs--do not receive comparable free benefits? Such an inquity and imbalance will breed friction between Federal and State office seekers. Third, I believe we should try to increase the role of citizens and the political parties. Fourth, any framwork of campaign reform legislation must respect and protect the constitutional right of individuals, groups, and organization to participate in advocacy concerning political issues. The McCain-Feingold bill has been debated thoroughly in the Senate, and any objective observer of the Senate would agree that we are genuinely deadlocked. This body needs to move beyond the debate of McCain-Fiengold. I hope that all Members will review my bill as an objective and pragmatic approach to current problems with our campaign system. I commend other Members for coming forward, as I have, with proposals which objectively represent pragmatic approaches to what can be achieved. Several of the issues addressed in my legislation have been raised by other Members in the context of this debate. Amendments have been proposed on foreign soft money, increasing the hard dollar contribution limits, and disclosure of last-minute expenditures, among others. My focus today is how can we expand participation in the political process--both by voters and by potential candidates. I hope that any reform carries with it the opportunity for more small contributors to participate in the political process. And, I hope that reform will bring more candidates into the arena. To this end, I want to focus on two reforms contained in my original legislation. First, we need to ensure that the average voter can, and will, contribute to the candidate of their choice. The influence of voters on campaigns has been diminished by the activities of political action committees and interest groups. Therefore, I propose a $100 tax credit for contributions made by citizens, with incomes under specified levels, to Senate and House candidates in their states. This credit should spark an influx of small dollar contributions to balance the greater ability of citizens with higher incomes to participate. In addition, the increased individual contribution limit, as proposed by others, should balance the activities of political action committees. Second, we need to remove barriers to challengers. Compared to incumbents, challengers face greater difficulties raising funds and communicating with voters, particularly at the outset of a campaign. My solution is to allow candidates to receive ``seed money'' contributions of up to $10,000 from individuals and political action committees. This provision should help get candidacies off the ground. The total amount of these ``seed money'' contributions could not exceed $100,000 for House candidates or $300,000 for Senate candidates. To meet the constitutional test, this provision would apply to both challengers and incumbents alike, but in the case of an incumbent with money carried over from a prior cycle, those funds would count against the seed money limit. In addition, Senate incumbents would be barred from using the franking privilege to send out mass mailings during the election year, rather than the 60-day ban in current law. But elective office should not be for sale. Campaigns should be competitive. Candidates with personal wealth have a distinct advantage through their constitutional right to spend their own funds. Therefore, if a candidate spends more than $25,000 of his or her own money, the individual contribution limits would be raised to $10,000 so that candidates could raise money to counter that personal spending. Again, to meet constitutional review, this provision would apply to all candidates. Mr. President, if we can do these two things--enhance citizen involvement, and level the playing field for condidates--we will have made significant progress. Again, I hope the Senate will have the opportunity to address these issues. I was prepared to offer my amendment and I hope I will have the opportunity to do so. These are the problems which I believe can be solved in a bipartisan fashion. I look forward to working with my colleagues to enact meaningful campaign reform, by looking at creative solutions to address the real problems with our present campaign system. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill summary and the text of my amendment be printed in the Record.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on Wednesday evening, the Senate cast a historic vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In the aftermath of this vote, I am reminded of the old saying, ``The past is prologue.'' At some point we have to lift this issue from the cauldron of politics. Now, is it not time to build bridges and find common ground on the issue of a possible treaty covering nuclear testing? Let the issues be worked on, for a while, by people of the caliber, of the experience, of those who wrote to the Senate, who testified, and called or sent statements during the Senate's debate. Their wisdom can then be returned to our next President and the 107th Congress. That is why, today, I propose the creation of a bipartisan, blue ribbon commission of experts, representing differing viewpoints on the basic issues, to study this issue and make recommendations--including possible changes to the treaty. Colleagues, I ask for your ``advice and consent'' as I pursue this goal of a commission. During the course of the debate in the Senate, it was clear that a number of Members could have supported some type of a test ban treaty, but were troubled by several key provisions in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that was before us. Of a particular concern was the zero-yield threshold. Legitimate concerns were raised about our ability to monitor violations down to the zero-yield level, and with our need to conduct, at some point in the future, very low yield nuclear explosions to verify the safety of our stockpile, or to ensure the validity of the stockpile stewardship program. Perhaps it would have been better to agree to a Treaty which allowed very low yield testing--as all past presidents, beginning with President Eisenhower, have proposed. Another grave concern was the fact that this Treaty bans nuclear testing in perpetuity. When we are dealing with the safety and credibility of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, we should exercise the greatest degree of caution. Would it not have been better to have a treaty which required, specifically in its text, periodic reviews, at fixed intervals, as did the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT. At the time the Senate considered that Treaty, the NPT provided for automatic reviews every 5 years. The Stockpile Stewardship Program was another issue of concern. In my view, it is just not far enough along, as confirmed by qualified experts, for the United States to stake the future of its nuclear arsenal on this alternative to actual testing. More needs to be done on that issue. For example, there is currently underway a panel, pursuant to a provision in the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, to study and report on the reliability, safety and security of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Perhaps some of the fine work of this commission, which is comprised of experts such as former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and Dr. Johnny Foster, could be incorporated into the work of a test ban commission. These are but examples of a number of issues related to this Treaty where there are honest differences of opinion, and over which bridges must be built to reach common ground. These issues could benefit from examination now by a group outside of the political arena--a group of experts. Recent history is replete with examples of commissions, composed of a bipartisan group of experts, who have successfully advised the Congress, the President. For example, in 1994, when I was Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee and the CIA was under attack, I included legislation in the FY 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act establishing a commission to study the roles and capabilities of the Intelligence Community. The commission was formed by the President and the congressional leadership. It was chaired by former secretaries of defense Les Aspin and Harold Brown and former Senator Warren Rudman. They met the challenge; their advice was accepted. Let's join together; get it done. I ask unanimous consent that a number of items be printed in the Record at this point.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to congratulate my dear friend, Chairman Stevens, and the ranking member of the Appropriations Committee, Senator Byrd, for bringing to the floor a conference report that I know was reached through very difficult negotiations. There is no doubt that the conference on the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations Bill was the most contentious in recent history. As the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I am aware of the difficult decisions that had to be made to reach a consensus with the House, and I will vote in favor of the conference report. Despite my over all support of this conference report, I must point out one provision in the bill that is fraught with danger. That provision is section 8160 which states: ``Not withstanding any other provision of law, all military construction projects for which funds were appropriated in Public Law 106-52 are hereby authorized.'' As all my colleagues are aware the Armed Services Committee has original jurisdiction for military construction and authorizes for appropriations each military construction project. In fact, the law requires that each military construction and military family housing construction project be both authorized and appropriated. The projects authorized in this conference report were not authorized in either the Senate or House Authorization Bills. The act of authorizing military construction projects in this conference report has a profound impact on the legislative process. Senator Stevens and I work closely in developing our respective bills. We have directed our staffs to share information and resolve differences in the bills before the Senate considers them. In fact, Chairman Stevens commented in his floor statement on the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations Bill that his bill mirrors closely the actions of the Armed Services Committee. This conference report is not consistent with that cooperation. It usurps the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee and may set a terrible precedent. While the rules of the Senate do not allow us to correct this in this bill, I trust that Chairman Stevens will acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee over these matters and provide us his assurance that this conference report does not set a precedent and that military construction and military family housing projects will not be authorized in future appropriations bills.

Mr. WARNER. I appreciate the assurance of my colleague and thank him for addressing this matter. section 8008

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman. I thank the distinguished ranking member. This has been, under the limitations, an excellent debate for the Senate. This is my 21st year in the Senate, and I can think of few debates in that time that have been as informed as this one. I strongly disagree with a very dear friend, Brent Scowcroft, who described this debate otherwise. While not a Member of the Senate, he is one whom I respect. His remarks were reported widely in the newspapers this morning. This has been a good debate. Senators on both sides have stood up and displayed courage. Our two leaders, Senator Lott and Senator Daschle, have displayed the courage of their convictions. In the many consultations over the past week that I have had with the distinguished chairman and ranking member, and our leadership, I have always left with the belief that they placed the security interests of this country foremost, as each day decisions had to be made regarding this treaty. I also say to my dear friend, Senator Moynihan, I thank him for the leadership he has shown. We embarked together on a bipartisan effort, and we were joined by a very significant number of our colleagues-- whose names will be a part of the Record at a later time--in an effort simply to recognize that in the course of the hearings and in the course of conversations and consultations with so many people not only here in the United States but across the seas, that there were clearly honest differences of opinion from individuals who have spent much of their lifetime on this subject--honest differences of opinion. But lacking is that burden of proof, some would say beyond a reasonable doubt, that this treaty would not put at risk the security of this country by virtue of the terms of the treaty as presently written. This treaty requires that we put at risk in perpetuity--not just today, not just tomorrow, but in perpetuity--a stockpile which today is safe and credible, which tomorrow will be safe and credible--for the foreseeable next few years to come. Let there be no doubt in anyone's mind of that fact. But can we say that that will be the case forever? As our military examined this treaty, it is clear that they said we support the treaty, but only if the safeguard is in place which says we can get out of the treaty if the President makes that determination, and only if the Stockpile Stewardship Program--the computer simulations which are to replace actual testing--can be put in place and proven to ensure that our nuclear stockpile remains credible and safe. The Record before the Senate today does not justify that support. It does not say that each of the components of the Stockpile Stewardship Program will be in place and will work in a way that will put our stockpile, in the future, in the same category that it is in today. We do not know. There is a reasonable doubt. We simply do not know. For that reason, regrettably, I shall have to vote--that vote occurs shortly--against this treaty. But I say that honest individuals have done their very best in this Senate, and I thank all those beyond the Senate who have made very valuable contributions to this debate. I shall put in the Record, by unanimous consent, further documentation on the laboratory directors. Of all the testimony that came before the Armed Services Committee, the testimony of the lab directors was the most compelling. And indeed, that of the intelligence community, which, in a sense, asked for more time to do the work they thought necessary in assessing our ability to monitor this treaty. And many former Secretaries of Defense had an honest difference of opinion. As Senator Kyl, who has worked so hard on this treaty and probably knows it better than anyone else, has said clearly--Secretary Kissinger, one of several Secretaries of State who have expressed their opinions--has now indicated his opposition. These are men and women who have spent their lifetime on this subject. Reasonable doubt is to be found there. Lastly, the laboratory Directors: I would like to respond to some of my colleagues and the media's mis-portrayal of the testimony given at last Thursday's hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee by the Directors of the three National Labs--Dr. Paul Robinson of Sandia National Laboratory, Dr. C. Bruce Tarter of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and Dr. John C. Browne of Los Alamos National Laboratory. It is important to have a full picture of what was said at our hearing last week Many of these statements used by my colleagues and the media were taken out of context. For instance, the line of questioning that the Ranking Member engaged in with the Lab Directors on whether they were ``on board'' with the treaty, I believe has been mis- characterized. I'd like to read from the transcript the exchange that occurred between the Ranking Member and the Lab Directors. Senator Levin. What you are telling us is that if this safeguard and the other safeguards are part of this process that you can rely on, that in your words, Dr. Robinson, you are on board in terms of this treaty; is that correct? Dr. Robinson. I am on board that science-based stockpile stewardship has a much higher chance of success and I will accept it as the substitute. Senator Levin. For what? Dr. Robinson. I still had other reservations about the treaty---- At this point, Dr. Robinson was cut off and was unable to finish his answer. In response to this line of questioning, a Senator from the minority side, said that he ``detected an uneasiness on the part of some of those who testified'' and expressed concern that Dr. Robinson's response that he had other concerns with the treaty was ``blurred''. Senator Levin then asked Dr. Tarter, Director of Lawrence Livermore Labs, to respond to the same question, Dr. Tarter responded: A simple statement again: It is an excellent bet, but it is not a sure thing. Senator Levin. My question is, are you on board, given these safeguards? Dr. Tarter. I can only testify to the ability of stockpile stewardship to do the job. It is your job about the treaty. Senator Levin. Are you able to say that, providing you can rely on safeguard F and at some point decide that you cannot certify it, that you are willing under that condition to rely on this stewardship program as a substitute for actual testing? Dr. Tarter. Yes. Dr. Tarter never said that he was ``on board with the treaty.'' In fact, he attempted to avoid directly answering Senator Levin's question. Clearly, Dr. Tarter was uncomfortable with this line of questioning. It was only after Senator Levin significantly modified the question by adding certain qualifications that Dr. Tarter finally responded affirmatively. Senator Levin asked Dr. Browne whether he was on board with the treaty and Dr. Browne responded: Senator Levin, if the government provides us with the sustained resources, the answer is yes, and if safeguard F is there, yes. Dr. Browne said that he was ``on board with the treaty'' but only if certain conditions were met. In examining the complete record and considering the manner in which the responses were elicited, it is clear that the labs directors had reservations about the treaty. They were clearly uneasy with the question and the manner in which they were questioned. They were certainly not enthusiastic in indicating any support for the treaty-- even with the qualifications (i.e., safeguards) that were added. In addition to the previous line of questioning the transcript includes numerous statements by the Lab Directors which I believe, taken together, indicate that these experts have serious issues with this treaty as well as the Stockpile Stewardship program. I note that the endorsement in January 1998 of the CTBT by Generals Colin Powell, John Shalikashvili, David Jones, and Admiral William Crowe, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was conditioned, like that of the Lab Directors, on the six safeguards submitted by the President along with the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent which included a Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the stockpile. Here are some of the statements by the Lab Directors on the Stockpile Stewardship program: Dr. Browne, Director of Los Alamos stated: Each year, through a comprehensive program of surveillance of the stockpile, we find one or more problems in each weapons system that may require attention. . . . we have identified several issues that, if they had occurred when testing was active, most likely would have been resolved by nuclear testing.'' He went on to state: ``The issue that we face is whether we will have the people, the capabilities, and the national commitment to maintain . . . confidence in the stockpile in the future, when we expect to see more significant changes. Although we are adding new tools each year, the essential tool kit for stockpile stewardship will not be complete until some time in the next decade. Dr. Tarter, Director of the Lawrence Livermore stated: I think we have a challenging program [stockpile stewardship], one that is very difficult to achieve. I think, although both the administration and the Congress have had increasing levels of support for the stewardship program over these past years, they have not quite met what we said was necessary to achieve the program on the time scale that we believed was necessary in view of the aging of the designers and of the weapons. I think we all feel under a great deal of stress to try to make those deadlines with the current resources. . . . So I think to date I would give the program a--I think we have done a good job. I think we have learned things. It is not a perfect job, but I think it has been a very, very good start. I think the challenge lies in the longer term, and I think . . . if I had one simple phrase I think that the stewardship program with sustained support is an excellent bet, but it ain't a sure thing. Dr. Robinson, Director of Sandia, stated: I question the expectations many claim for this treaty. . . . I think we have got to specify with a lot more character what is the real purpose of the treaty. I secondly discuss [in his written statement] a lot of the important technical considerations as we have tried to substitute other approaches, which has come to be known as the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program, for the value that tests had always provided us in previous decades. I can state with no caveats that to confirm the performance of high tech devices--cars, airplanes, medical diagnostics, computers, or nuclear weapons--testing is the preferred methodology. . . . My statement describes the work involved in attempting to substitute science-based stockpile stewardship. It is an enormous challenge, but I agree, much very good work has been done. Much has been accomplished. But we still cannot guarantee that we will ultimately be successful. Science- based stockpile stewardship is the best way we know of to mitigate the risk to the extent that is possible. . . . But the question and where we (those who support or oppose testing and the treaty) differ the greatest is what is the best way to achieve that peace with stability. At least two very dichotomous approaches. Is the world better off with nuclear weapons in the hands of those who value peace the highest, who will maintain their nuclear arsenals in order to deter aggression and to prevent major wars, or would the world be better off it there were no more nuclear weapons, and is there really a sound plan for how you might ever achieve that? In addition, an exchange between Senator Reed and Dr. Robinson on the Stockpile stewardship Program occurred as follows: Senator Reed. Let me just ask another question, which, as I understand it, part of the effort on the Stockpile Stewardship Programs is massive computational projects. Which, if carried out, will allow you to go back and analyze data that we have accumulated for years and years and years, which has never been fully analyzed. Does that offer any additional sort of opportunities to increase your sense of reliability that, without testing, we can go ahead and more accurately protect the stockpile? Dr. Robinson. You are quite correct. The legacy data that we have, the correct statement is not that it has not been analyzed, it has not been successfully predicted by the models. We have gaps in our understanding. As we improve the codes, as we add the third dimension--we are presently going from two dimensional calculations to three-dimensional calculations--a key test of the success of these simulation codes will be how well does it predict those things we could not understand in the past. So that is a very key part of the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program. There were also statements on the value of testing. One of the most powerful statements was given by Dr. Robinson from Sandia. He said: . . . there are black issues, white issues, but mostly a lot of gray. But, I can say from my own experience over the years, I have seen that same kind of scientific debate. But when you then carried out a test and looked at the predictions of various people in the debate, the answer became very clear. The test has a way of crystallizing answers into one or the other and ending that grayness. And that is something that will be missing in a future state. . . . the President presented to you with the treaty and which he and certainly we believe are conditions for ratification. The most important of those by far is Safeguard F. We kept stressing to the White House, we cannot be sure that science-based stockpile stewardship will mature in time to handle a serious safety or reliability problem as these weapons age. Without it, without the ability at that point to test, we would be powerless to maintain the U.S. first line of defense, its strategic deterrent force. After hearing their testimony first hand, I do not know how anyone could state that the Lab Directors vigorously supported this treaty. When you examine the entire record it is clear that the Lab Directors-- the experts on the safety and reliability of America's nuclear stockpile--have reservations about the treaty and the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Their support for this treaty is tempered by specific qualifications and stipulations. I urge each and every one of you to review the full testimony of these most important witnesses. Lastly, the laboratory Directors: The lab Directors have said, based on their careers of 15 or 20 years, they cannot guarantee that the present Stockpile Stewardship Program will match or even approach in, say, 5, 10, or 15 years the sound data that we have gotten through 50 years of testing--actual testing. We are not about to resume actual testing. We don't have to at this point in time, but we might in the future. But every Senator should think about the fact that they are casting a vote that commits the United States in perpetuity. The road to arms control, whatever the goal is at the end--peace in the world--building blocks and steps have been laid both by Republicans and Democrats. Every President, and others, has worked on these agreements. Neither side should take the majority of the credit; it has been shared equally. And a hope and a prayer of this Senator is that we continue as a nation to lead in taking positive, constructive steps in arms control. So it is with regret that I believe this treaty has that degree of reasonable doubt, imposing restriction in perpetuity on one of our most valued strategic assets, and I cannot support it. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Warner- Moynihan letter to the Majority and Minority leaders dated October 12, 1999, be printed in the Record.

Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleagues. My dear friend and partner in the venture for a letter, Senator Moynihan, addressed the letter in his remarks. First, we expressed it was an effort in bipartisanship by a large number of Senators--I but one; Senator Moynihan two. This letter will be printed in the Record following the vote. I thank the Chair.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator from Wisconsin. During the period of last week, a number of Senators sought to obtain from the President a letter addressing his views on the timing of a vote on this treaty. Over the weekend, in consultation with the White House staff, I learned that this letter would be delivered. It was delivered to the Senate leadership yesterday afternoon. I shall now read it and place it in the Record: Dear Mr. Leader: Tomorrow, the Senate is scheduled to vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I firmly believe the Treaty is in the national interest. However, I recognize that there are a significant number of Senators who have honest disagreements. I believe that proceeding to a vote under these circumstances would severely harm the national security of the United States, damage our relationship with our allies, and undermine our historic leadership over 40 years, through administrations Republican and Democratic, in reducing the nuclear threat. Accordingly, I request that you postpone consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on the Senate floor. Sincerely, Bill Clinton. Throughout this debate, the hallmark has been differing views, differing views by honestly motivated colleagues on both sides of the aisle. I am not suggesting everyone on this side, in other words, is opposed to the treaty, but the practical matter is, there seems to be a division along this aisle. In addition, as recited by my good friend, the deputy leader of the Democrat side, the Senate has received communications from a wide range of individuals, again, on both sides of this issue. The Armed Services Committee held three consecutive hearings. Secretary Schlesinger came forward with a very clear statement in opposition to the treaty and expressed, on behalf of five other former Secretaries of Defense, the same viewpoint. That occurred immediately following the current Secretary of Defense, Secretary Cohen, appearing before the Armed Services Committee, together with General Shelton, and taking the view in support of the treaty. All through last week intermittently these communications came to the Senate in writing, orally or otherwise-- former Secretary of State Kissinger, former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, again, communicating their desire to see that the treaty not be voted upon at this time. I mention that because of the seriousness of the treaty, one that lasts in perpetuity--theoretically, in perpetuity--asking this Nation to take certain steps with regard to our ability to monitor the effectiveness and the safety of our nuclear arsenal. To me, it is clear such a treaty should only be voted on when those types of conflicting opinions have been, as nearly as possible, resolved. The laboratory Directors, likewise, came before our committee; they are not involved in the political arena. But one after the other in testimony tried to indicate where they are in the test program. We are not there yet. It could be anywhere from 5 and, one even said, 20 years before the milestones now scheduled are put in place for this substitute scientific, largely computerized test program will take the place of the actual tests. Against that background--and I speak only for myself--I have joined with Senator Moynihan and, hopefully, others in preparing a Dear Colleague letter, which will be circulated this morning, with the Senator from Virginia opposed to the treaty, prepared tonight to vote against it or tomorrow, whenever the case may be, and my distinguished colleague, the senior Senator from New York, who spent much of his lifetime in foreign affairs, a recognized expert, steadfastly in favor of the treaty and prepared to vote in support of it. I find on both sides of the aisle there are Senators of a like mind who believe that in the interest of national security, today is not the time to vote for that treaty. The letter from the President, it was hoped by some, would refer to his belief as to the scheduling of when this treaty should next be addressed in terms of a vote by the Senate. It is clear; his last paragraph does not address that issue. He simply says: Accordingly, I request that you postpone consideration on the Senate floor. Given that situation, it seems to me it is incumbent upon, hopefully, a majority of Senators, hopefully 25 or more from each side, to come forward and state that they firmly believe the final consideration of this treaty should be laid at a time beyond the current Congress and that final vote should not take place until the convening of the 107th Congress. The Senate at that time would review the entirety of the record. A new President will be in office, and the combination of a new President and his perspective, the Senate constituted, as it will be in the 107th, and that point in time is the critical moment for this Senate to determine the merits and demerits of this treaty to the extent that, through reservations and other means, changes could be brought about and then, if it is the desire of the majority of the Senate, to move towards a vote. That, to me, is a reasonable course of action. Next year constitutional elections of the United States take place. We all are very familiar with the dynamics of that critical period in American history, particularly in the months preceding the election. Should this treaty be subjected to the rifts of the dynamics of an election year, given its importance to our national security? Clearly in this Senator's mind, I say no. My distinguished colleague from New York has joined me in the same conclusion. This country has exercised a leadership role in arms control for 40 years. Indeed, this treaty has-- not in my judgment in its present form--in the minds of others a potential to be another milestone in our progress towards arms control and the reduction of the threat of nuclear weapons. In fairness to all sides, would it not be wiser to delay the vote and make certain it is the consensus of a majority of this Chamber, before that decision is finalized today or tomorrow, the majority of this Chamber saying we concur in the observation for a number of reasons, one of which clearly came before the Armed Services Committee, and that is, that the Intelligence Committee, on its own initiative, has initiated a new study of the capabilities of the United States to monitor low-level tests of actual weapons, should some nation, a signatory to this treaty or otherwise, decide to test live weapons. We are at a crossroads in history which will affect this Nation for decades to come. What possible rush to judgment compels a vote tonight or tomorrow? Would it not be more prudent that such a vote now be by a majority of the Senate in support of the two leaders, Senator Lott and Senator Daschle, both of whom have handled this matter, in my judgment, conscientiously, always foremost in mind the security interests of this country today, tomorrow, and the indefinite future? I salute both leaders. That is my brief opening. I wish to continue and summarize what our committee did last week. We received over 15 hours of testimony from a wide range of witnesses, from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to current and former National Laboratory Directors and career professionals in the field of nuclear weapons. We also received letters from many public officeholders, former Secretaries of Defense, State, Secretaries of Energy, Chairmen of the Joints Chiefs, Directors of Central Intelligence, and former lab Directors on the merits and the pitfalls of the CTB Treaty. Other public officeholders came forward in favor, but there is a strong division. I don't think anyone, the President or, indeed, the Senate, could have foreseen the outpouring of conscientious opinion, opinions directed solely in the best interests of this country, not politics, by these former officials. They are in the Record for all to see. These are people with decades of experience in national security. Their statements reflect honest disagreements, disagreements primarily with the stance taken by the President and senior members of his administration. In my view, the body of facts that the Armed Services Committee has accumulated over the past several days clearly puts the arguments of many of the administration officials in serious question. We have learned we do not have the full confidence in the United States' technical capability to verify this treaty to the zero-yield threshold that President Clinton unilaterally imposed, more or less, on this country. And other countries can conduct military-significant live bomb tests at levels below our detection capability. That is the essence of it. We do not have all of the seismic equipment, in the judgment of the Intelligence Committee, in place and ready to meet the deadlines of this treaty so we could detect another nation that desired to use live tests in violation of their commitments under this treaty. We have learned that our nuclear weapons will, to some degree, deteriorate over time. That is pure science. The physical properties of the materials deteriorate over a period of time. We cannot guarantee the safety and reliability of our highly sophisticated nuclear weapons in perpetuity--always remember, in perpetuity. Testing is needed. The Stockpile Stewardship Program is the concept of a substitute for the live testing that we have had these 50 years. That 50-year record of testing gives us the confidence today, and for a number of years forward, in the reliability and safety of our stockpile. But there is some point in time, due to the deterioration of weapons, and other factors, that we will have to shift to a new means of testing. The administration's proposal under this treaty is the Stockpile Stewardship Program. It is a computer simulation substitute for actual testing. The scientists tell us this will not be proven--this substitute--for perhaps 5, 10, maybe up to 20 years. I repeat, milestones are being put in place, but there is no certainty as to when, collectively, those milestones will constitute a system to replace actual testing. The estimates vary from 5, 6, 7 years, perhaps out to 20. Yet we are being asked to ratify a treaty affirming that we shall never again, in perpetuity, actually test any of our nuclear weapons. We have learned the CTBT will do nothing--not a single thing--to stop proliferation by rogue nations and terrorists. Iraq and Iran will sit back and laugh. Right now, Iraq is defying the world over similar arms control agreements, similar U.N. sanctions, and the United Nations is entangled in what appears to be a hopeless debate over how to resolve the need to continue to monitor Saddam Hussein's program of weapons of mass destruction. A clear example of how the most well-intentioned international agreements have failed is right there, today. Rogue nations can easily develop and field, with a high degree of confidence, a single stage device--a ``dirty old bomb,'' as they refer to it--without any testing. Ironically, the first weapon dropped by the United States was never tested with an actual test. Many of my colleagues, again, honestly disagree on the conclusions, pointing out that reasonable people can examine the same body of facts and reach different conclusions. That is my grave concern. We should not be ratifying a treaty as long as reasonable doubt to that degree exists as to whether the treaty is in the national security interest of the United States. The stakes are far too high. The Armed Services Committee began its hearings with a closed hearing, where we heard from career professionals and experts with decades of experience, from the Department of Energy, the National Laboratories, and the Intelligence Committee. Their testimony focused on recent facts--facts that were not fully known at the time this treaty was signed by the President some 2 years ago. Their assessment is they would have to go back and reexamine a lot of facts to determine the viability, or lack of viability, of the capability of this Nation to monitor low-level tests. Much of that information we learned was developed over the last 18 months. Therefore, those facts were not available to the Congress or the President when the CTBT was signed in 1996. The information presented to the Armed Services Committee on Tuesday is highly classified and, of course, cannot be discussed in open session. But one fact is very relevant. Because of disturbing new information, the Intelligence Committee--on its own initiative--decided to revisit and update the 1997 NIE, national intelligence estimate, on the U.S. ability to monitor the CTBT. I have been informed, as have other members of the committee, that it will take until next year to complete that work. That is a clear, credible basis for not moving forward today or tomorrow on a vote. I advised Secretary Cohen and General Shelton on the following day, Wednesday morning, when they testified before the Armed Services Committee that they had the opportunity to make their case for this treaty before the elected representatives of the American people, and that they did. I believe the burden is on the administration to prove-- maybe beyond a reasonable doubt--that ratification of this treaty is in the national security interest of our Nation. They simply did not make that case. And I say that with all due respect to my good friend and former colleague, Secretary Cohen. We are being asked to give up--permanently--our tried and true, proven ability to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile and to rely instead on a computer simulation and modeling capability that will not be fully developed or proven for many years-- if at all. We are being asked today to put at some degree of risk our nuclear deterrent capability, in exchange for the promise that we may have a way to adequately certify that capability at some uncertain future date. The question before the Senate is, Can we afford to take such a gamble? This Senator believes the answer is no. For more than 50 years, one of the top national security priorities of every American President has been to maintain a credible nuclear arsenal and deterrent to aggression against ourselves and our allies, and it has worked. The credibility of the United States in the world is a direct reflection of our military capability. If that credibility is ever called into question by our inability to ensure the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons--a vital segment of our military capability--then we have done our Nation a great disservice. The stakes for this debate are very high. For 50 years, our nuclear umbrella--the deterrent provided by the U.S. nuclear arsenal--has kept peace in Europe. Unquestionably, the threats in Europe following World War II were deterred by this capability. Yet it is that very deterrent that could be jeopardized by this treaty. Dr. Schlesinger stated it clearly when he asked, ``Do we want a world that lacks confidence in the U.S. deterrent or not?'' I hope all Members will take the time to examine carefully the body of facts that the Armed Services Committee and, indeed, the Foreign Relations Committee have accumulated and recorded for Senators. Simply put, the CTBT, at this time, jeopardizes our ability to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal--perhaps not right away but almost certainly over the long run. According to Dr. James Robinson, Director of Sandia National Laboratory: ``To forego testing is to live with uncertainty.'' Much has been said about what other Presidents have done. They have all examined the possibility of entering into some type of international treaty. But no previous President has ever opposed a test ban of zero yield and unlimited duration. President Eisenhower insisted that nuclear tests of less than 4.75 kilotons be permitted and, in fact, continued low-yield testing through his administration's test ban moratorium. President Kennedy terminated a 3-year moratorium on testing when the adverse consequences of the moratorium were realized, and he declared that ``never again'' would the United States make such a mistake. President Kennedy then embarked on the most aggressive series of nuclear tests in the history of the U.S. nuclear weapons program. President Carter also opposed a zero-yield test ban while in office. To have an effective nuclear deterrent, we must have confidence in the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons. These weapons are the most sophisticated designs in the world. It is a certainty that, over time, these arsenals, high explosives, and electronic components contained in these weapons will experience some level of deterioration. That is simple science. The nature of our nuclear weapons program over the past five decades provides little practical experience in predicting the effects of these changes. What do we say to our sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines who live and work in close proximity with these nuclear weapons? What do we say to the people of our Nation, and indeed nations around the world, who live in the vicinity of our nuclear weapons? These are weapons that are stored in various locations around the world, that rest in missile tubes literally several feet away from the bunks of our submarine crews, that are regularly moved across roads and airfields around the world. How can we take any action which in any way jeopardizes or calls into question the safety of these weapons? As Dr. Bob Barker, former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, told the Armed Services Committee on Thursday, ``to leave in place weapons that are not as safe as they could be is unconscionable.'' History tells us that weapons believed to be reliable and thoroughly tested, nevertheless, develop problems which, in the past were only discovered, and could only be fixed, through nuclear testing. As President Bush noted in a report to Congress in January 1993: ``Of all U.S. nuclear weapons designs fielded since 1958, approximately one- third have required nuclear testing to resolve problems arising after deployment.'' In three-quarters of these cases, the problems were identified and assessed only as a result of nuclear testing, and could be fixed only through testing. Let me emphasize, most of these problems were related to safety. The Clinton administration has proposed remanufacturing aging weapons rather than designing and building new ones. The problem is that we simply don't know if this new approach is possible. Almost every weapons designer we have heard from over the past 3 years has raised concerns with any attempts to change components, such as plutonium and high explosives, in the heart of the weapon. Many of the materials and methods used in producing the original weapons are no longer available. To assure that the remanufactured weapons work as intended most agree the new weapons would have to be validated through underground nuclear testing. Every system will become obsolete at some point in time--if for no other reason, for deterioration due to aging. CTBT will not allow us to replace aging or unsafe systems in the future. Supporters of the treaty, argue that if a problem with the stockpile is identified, the President can always exercise ``Safeguard F'' and withdraw from the treaty and test. The military leaders and the three lab directors have all conditioned their support for CTBT on the guarantee that the President would exercise ``Safeguard F'' and withdraw from the treaty if a problem develops with our nuclear stockpile. But how realistic is that? It is highly unlikely that this safeguard would ever be used by the United States to withdraw from the treaty even if serious problems should occur in the stockpile. Has the United States ever withdrawn from a treaty? We are struggling today under the weight of the ABM Treaty which was signed in 1972 with a nation that no longer exists: withdrawing from the treaty is simply without precedent. And what would the international ramifications be of such a withdrawal from the treaty? Wouldn't it be worse to withdraw years down the road, after other nations have presumably followed our lead, than to simply not ratify in the first place? In addition, the notion of being able to test quickly in an emergency is unrealistic. Even if the United States should decide to withdraw from CTBT, the lab directors report that it would take at least 2 to 3 years of preparation before a test could be conducted, and our testing infrastructure continues to deteriorate. By withdrawing, the United States would be announcing to the world that we have such a serious problem with our nuclear deterrent that we have lost confidence in the reliability of our nuclear stockpile, and that we must initiate a program to repair or replace the weapon or weapons and conduct tests to confirm the results. Such an action would be highly destabilizing. Proponents of the CTBT have asserted that the treaty will have no adverse impacts on U.S. national security, that we will be able to confidently maintain and modernize U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces to the extent necessary without ever conducting another nuclear explosive test. In fact, the CTBT will force the United States to forgo any number of important initiatives that may be required to ensure the long-term viability and safety of our strategic and theater nuclear deterrent forces. The CTBT will lock the United States into retention of a nuclear arsenal that was designed at the height of the cold war. Many of the nuclear systems that we developed to deter the Soviet Union are simply not suited to the subtle, and perhaps more difficult, task of deterring rogue states from using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Such deterrence will require the United States to possess nuclear weapons that pose a credible threat to targets such as rogue state biological weapon production facilities that may be located deep underground in hardened shelters. At the same time, for such weapons to be credible deterrents, they must not threaten to create significant collateral damage or radioactive fallout. Such weapons do not exist today in the U.S. arsenal. I am also concerned that this treaty's zero yield test ban is not verifiable. It is difficult, if not impossible, to detect tests below a certain level. And testing at yields below detection may allow countries, such as Russia, to develop new classes of low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons. This possibility makes recent statements by senior Russian officials claiming that they are now developing tactical nuclear weapons especially troubling. For example, this August, the Russian Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy, Lev Ryabev, stated that a key Russian objective was the development of a tactical nuclear system. This April, President Yeltsin reportedly approved a blueprint for the development and use of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Would we be able to detect tests of such tactical weapons? The development of any nuclear weapon, regardless of its yield, is militarily significant to this Senator. Further, countries that want to evade detection can do so by masking or muffling tests in mines, underground cavities, salt domes, or other geological formations. I am convinced that the United States and the international community cannot now, and will not in the foreseeable future, be able to detect such cheating or testing below a certain level. Proponents of the CTBT argue that the International Monitoring System established under the treaty will put in place capabilities exceeding those that the United States and its allies can field today. These monitoring sites will be owned and operated by the host countries, which I believe calls into serious question the reliability of the information collected and, thus, its value to our ability to detect a nuclear test. Proponents of CTBT also argue that although the treaty may not be verifiable through detection methods, the on-site inspections make the CTBT verifiable. I disagree. The treaty requires an affirmative vote of 30 of 51 members of the Executive Council to initiate an inspection. The likelihood of obtaining that number, which could include such countries as Iran and North Korea, is remote, if not impossible. Further, the United States would have to present a case to the Executive Council which would most likely compromise sensitive U.S. intelligence sources and methods. The timelines imposed by the treaty for on-site inspections permit considerable coverup and deterioration of evidence. In addition, there is no guarantee that Americans will be on the inspection teams. In fact, any state is explicitly permitted to block inspectors from countries it does not like. The treaty gives the inspected state the final say in any dispute with inspectors. Finally, ambiguities in the CTBT may allow other nations to legally circumvent the clear intent of the treaty. The treaty does not define what constitutes a nuclear test. However, President Clinton has said that the United States will interpret nuclear test to mean any nuclear explosion, thus all tests are banned unless they are zero-yield. However, if other signatory nations interpret a less restrictive definition, they could conduct very low-yield tests and argue that they are not violating the language of the treaty. I am concerned that while the United States would adhere to the CTBT, thereby losing confidence over time in our nuclear deterrent, other countries would capitalize upon U.S. deficiencies and vulnerabilities created by the CTBT and violate the treaty, by escaping detection and building new weapons. I believe the risk the CTBT poses to U.S. national security by far outweighs any of the benefits that have been identified. Mr. President, I shall reengage in this debate as the day progresses. I will pursue with Senator Moynihan the final presentation of our Dear Colleague letter in the hopes that a number of Senators will see the wisdom in giving the leadership of the Senate the support they deserve should a decision be made not to go forward today. That decision should embrace very clearly that it would be in the Senate's interest, in the Nation's interest, and our security interest to revisit this treaty in terms of a final vote in the balance of this Congress. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Arizona such time as he may consume.

Mr. WARNER. The time--

Mr. WARNER. As an opponent to the treaty, I would like to proceed, Mr. President.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thought it was understood that we would alternate sides as we proceeded this morning.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize and say farewell to an outstanding Naval Officer, Rear Admiral Norbert R. Ryan Jr., as he completes more than three years of distinguished service as the Navy's Chief of Legislative Affairs. It is a privilege for me to honor his many outstanding achievements and commend him for his devotion to the Navy and our great Nation. A native of Mountainhome, Pennsylvania, Rear Admiral Ryan is a 1967 graduate of the United States Naval Academy. An outstanding aviator and officer, Rear Admiral Ryan was assigned as Chief of Legislative Affairs from August 1996 to October 1999. Through tireless effort, a keen sense of timing and decisive action, Admiral Ryan navigated Navy leadership through aggressive and demanding Congressional action on a wide variety of Navy programs during three complete legislative cycles. He ensured support for a difficult series of high profile and at times challenging issues to include the F/A-18 E/F, CVN-77/CVNX, DD-21 Acquisition Strategy, Tactical Tomahawk, Virginia Class Submarines, Shipyard maintenance, and the Navy's role in Kosovo. Admiral Ryan initiated a ground-breaking series of Congressional Constituent Caseworker Workshops by geographical area to ensure congressional staff at the district level were provided the necessary tools and information on Navy and Marine Corps programs to be responsive to their constituents. He forged strong bonds with many key Members and their staffs ensuring the best interests of the Navy were fully understood and supported. Admiral Ryan provided outstanding advice, recommendations, and strategies to the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations that have significantly and positively affected the future size, readiness, and capabilities of the Navy. As a result, Congress passed the FY00 Defense Authorization Bill that has been lauded by many Members as the best defense bill ever written. Rear Admiral Ryan is a dynamic and resourceful naval officer who, throughout his time in Navy Liaison, has proven to be an indispensable asset to our Nation. He is a passionate advocate of the Navy, our Sailors and their families understanding better than anyone that they are truly the backbone of our national defense. His superior contributions and distinguished service will benefit both the Navy and the country he so proudly serves for years to come. As Rear Admiral Ryan leaves, we will certainly miss him. I am proud to thank him for his service as the Chief of Legislative Affairs and look forward with pride and deepest respect as we continue to work with him in his new assignment as Chief of Naval Personnel. There is no better officer aptly suited to lead the officers and Sailors into the 21st century.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. I will reply to that challenge, Mr. President.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will ask for an additional minute on our side, to be charged to our time, to ask a question of my good colleague.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of calendar No. 295, H.R. 858.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be read a third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Virginia may proceed for not to exceed 4 minutes.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair. (The remarks of Mr. Warner pertaining to the introduction of S. 1714 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')