John Warner

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Having had the floor, I have to reply to the assertions you made about yesterday's hearings over which I presided and sat there for 5 hours and 10 minutes.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, no, indeed; I am right here. At such point as the Senator will entertain a question, I will be happy to put it to my colleague.

Mr. WARNER. You said he supported the treaty but at this point in time----

Mr. WARNER. Our distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has joined us. He has been in contact with me frequently through this day. Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I commend my colleague. He has been steadfast throughout this period of the week when we had hearings and attended some of the hearings himself. Throughout the day, he has been very skillful and evenhanded in the way he has helped me and others, the leadership, Senator Helms, who is going to join us momentarily in handling this floor situation. I thank my colleague.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator can go right ahead and take all the time he wants.

Mr. WARNER. I say to my colleague from Delaware, I will not comment on the comments made at the dinner. I was there, but I think what was said there was confidential. I have always, as a policy when dealing with Presidents, not commented. I am not criticizing the Senator. I ask unanimous consent to have printed remarks by President Clinton from October 8, 1999.

Mr. WARNER. Yes.

Mr. WARNER. I add to it this phrase in which he concluded: ``The whole thing is about politics.'' I have been here since 9 o'clock this morning, and the Senator has been here the same period; we are working throughout the day. We will be the last Senators to leave this floor tonight and return on Tuesday. This is not about politics. This is about trying to help our colleagues reach a correct decision on the security interests of this country, I say to Senator Byrd.

Mr. WARNER. Put it in context; is the Senator reading from the Ottawa speech?

Mr. WARNER. I am reading a press report.

Mr. WARNER. Absolutely. Do not worry about small matters. Worry about what I am about to tell my dear friend. We are all making the best of efforts. I am listening to Senator Byrd, in a very clear and precise way, an evenhanded way, state his case. Then I am handed the President's speech in Ottawa. A Reuters report states: It is clear now that the level of opposition to the treaty and the time it would take to craft the necessary safeguard to get the necessary votes are simply not there. So I hope the Senate will reach an agreement to delay that vote. That expresses our common purpose. All I have called upon the President to do is to share the burden the leaders would bear should this decision go forward. I turn the page. Again, quoting: Establish an orderly process, a nonpolitical orderly process to systematically deal with all the issues that are out there and take whatever time is necessary to do it. As I told the press a few minutes ago, the President, each day, is taking a step in realization of what has to be done. His National Security Adviser is quoted this morning saying the President asked the vote be delayed. The day before, the Secretary of State said for another day this treaty should be decided by the Senate. I say to my good friend, Senator Byrd, the last quote of the President: ``The whole thing is about politics.'' Is everything you are saying today about politics?

Mr. WARNER. They did in my mind also. The Senator from West Virginia knows in private conversations I have had with him and other colleagues that this Senator on this side of the aisle is doing what I can, although I will vote against that treaty today, and tomorrow, and the next day, as it is currently written. I recognize its importance. I stayed here until 9:30 last night working with others to see what we can do to adopt a framework. I just left the Press Gallery. They asked me, Senator, what are the components? I said the essential component is for the President to share equally the responsibility of the very serious decision that our two leaders, Democrat and Republican, are faced with about vitiating this time agreement. The Senator from West Virginia recognizes that as a former majority leader himself. I have just been handed this document.

Mr. WARNER. We serve together on the Armed Services Committee. The Senator from West Virginia came to every hearing and listened. And he asked the question that elicited a critical answer which indicated that the intelligence community needed time within which to complete this analysis regarding the ability of our country tomorrow or in the future to monitor another nation's testing if that testing constituted cheating under the treaty. The Senator was there yesterday throughout the laboratory hearing, and he had the courage to stand on this floor and say that he listened to those Directors, and, indeed, those raised the legitimate concerns.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator, and I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are going to be here. But as a matter of courtesy, I just wanted to thank my colleague for his very valuable contribution. He is a member of our committee. He attended the hearings that we have had in the course of this week, and he referred, with great accuracy, to the testimony that was given to our committee. But clearly, good, sound, public servants, nonpoliticians, having spent anywhere from a decade to three decades of their lives working in their respective fields--whether it was the technical field, with the laboratory directors, or the military field, they had honest differences of opinion. There was no consensus, no strong consensus except the case, the weight of the case against the treaty grew day, by day, by day from that testimony, culminating, as you know, in this article in the New York Times this morning, which addresses the very heart of this treaty in which these lab directors--I don't know whether they are Republicans or Democrats or what they are; they are not wrapped up in this process of the Senate; they are not arguing a unanimous consent--are simply telling their fellow scientists the world over, the citizens of this country, the scientists in charge of maintaining the safety and reliability of the Nation's nuclear arsenals, they might not be able to do their job without nuclear tests. That is actual firing of weapons that would be outlawed--outlawed, they used the word--under this treaty. I thank the Senator. I want to come back to the laboratory, the testimony my colleague from Delaware and I were in colloquy about. We intermittently yield to other Senators. I yield at this time.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could I ask my dear colleague and friend a question in the friendliest of veins?

Mr. WARNER. I think I have recognition.

Mr. WARNER. I will be here throughout the entire day, Mr. President.

Mr. WARNER. I will provide that. We have to extend Senatorial courtesy to our colleague.

Mr. WARNER. Following that, we could resume our colloquy.

Mr. WARNER. We will resume our colloquy thereafter. I think it is important that we have our colleague's remarks.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Virginia has the floor for the purposes of a question. But the distinguished Senator from Georgia--it had been indicated he could speak.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the best deterrent from keeping those thousands of missiles coming in is precisely what we have had these 50- plus years--a credible safe deterrent in our stockpile. And the person whose finger is on the button firing those missiles knows that. I am reading from yesterday's proceedings of the Senate Armed Services Committee on page 50 where the chairman, myself, asked the following questions. This is one of the laboratory Directors testifying: ``We moved this year toward the development of the SSP, and last year toward putting in place the supercomputers on a path that we think we need to have. We are on a path that by 2004 we will have a supercomputer in place that begins''--begins--``to get us into the realm of what we need to do this job''--namely certifying the stockpiling. ``The issue that I think you are trying to address''--this is the hardest point I think as a scientist--``is that we cannot predict that by such and such a date we will know everything we need to know.'' ``It is an evolving process. Each year we learn something else.'' Bit by bit, year by year. I then asked: ``My time is running out.'' And it is running out. We want to control time. ``Give us your best estimate, doctor,'' Senator Warner said. ``Dr. Brown: I think we are going to be in the best position sometime between 2005 and 2010.'' ``Chairman Warner: Dr. Tarter.'' ``Dr. Tarter: I agree with Dr. Brown.'' ``Dr. Robinson: My guess is somewhere in the 10 years hence to 20 years hence period.'' There it is, short answers directed to the question.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am anxious to receive the remarks of our distinguished chairman. But I was right there when Senator Levin asked the questions. I will put in the Record my edification of their replies. We have to understand, this Stockpile Stewardship Program, SSP, is basically a computer and other adjuncts, scientific devices that we are going to put in place--that is the key, ``put in place''--at the minimum, 5 or 6 years from now, but more likely 10 years from now. In the opinion of the Director of Sandia Laboratories, it could be 20 years. That is all in the Record in response to my question. These Directors carefully said: Yes, we are meeting the current milestones in putting together this computer and other high-tech test programs, but we are a long way away. It could be as much as 20 years. So we could go to a period of, at a minimum, 8 to 10 years without any testing of the type that is a substitute for actual testing. Today, the stockpile is safe. Tomorrow, it is credible and safe. But as the years go on--and Senator Byrd used the words, as the years go on--the natural degrading under the law of physics of metallic parts, of chemical parts, and other parts takes place. Therefore, this hope for SSP, in sum, is almost a dream, but these men conscientiously are working on it day and night. Hopefully, in a period of anywhere from 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, maybe 20 years, it will be on line for that type of database which actual testing will give. In the meantime, we are going through with part of the SSP program, but not all of it--bits and pieces of it--largely relying on the test data of a bank of information we have in this country developed over the period of 50 years in which we did actual tests. I thank my colleague.