John Warner

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Yes, of course.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this is the time for cool heads, sound minds, to make most difficult decisions. I listened very carefully to our distinguished majority leader. And I have listened to my colleague and friend from Delaware. My colleague from Delaware dwells on the process. This situation today is solely the result of the unanimous consent agreement, proposed at first by the majority leader of the Senate, and studied for a period of 3 days. Our majority leader has a right to believe that 3-day period of study enabled my good friend from Delaware and all others to examine this situation and determine, on the fairness, the propriety and, indeed, the national interest of bringing this treaty up today and Tuesday for floor debate. And for having hearings in the Senate Armed Services Committee--I am sorry that my friend somewhat disparages the jurisdiction of this committee. But we have the jurisdiction. And I can point to the rules over the critical part of this debate, and that is the stockpile of nuclear weapons; that is the exclusive province of our committee. It is an integral part. In that vein, we held 3 days of hearings. One was behind closed doors, when the intelligence community, to the extent I can reveal it, on their own initiative brought up the need to start a total new survey about the ability of this country, and indeed others, to monitor the terms of this treaty. We did not ask for it. They did it on their own initiative. They brought it up. That survey and study will take a period of some months and go into next year. But the point is, I say to my distinguished friend from Delaware, this institution operates on the basis of rules. It was total comity between the distinguished majority leader and the distinguished minority leader for a period of 3 days; and finally the Senate--all 100 Senators--participated either by being on the floor or consultation with their respective leaders in the unanimous consent agreement. So process is behind us. To me, to constantly bring up, as the Senator from Delaware did, the issue of the process, it has been covered by our distinguished leader today. It has been covered by the Senator from Delaware. We should move forward at this moment with this serious debate on the fundamental issue; and that is whether or not this treaty is in America's national security interest. I think the press is accurately reporting the facts of the hearing held yesterday, again in the Armed Services Committee, when the Directors of the laboratories--these are not politicians, these individuals who have served in their capacity as top scientists for our country for 10, 12, 15 years--came before the Senate Armed Services Committee and told us, with the Secretary of Energy, their boss, sitting right there, their own opinions. Any reasonable individual, in examining their statements in their totality, must come to the conclusions which are accurately reported in the very article that appeared today in the New York Times: They cannot give that degree of opinion that is needed to move forward on this treaty. They simply cannot do that.

Mr. WARNER. On our time, Mr. President.

Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator----

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I concur in my good friend's comments. In other words, I have been urging him to say these things for some time. I thank him because this is very helpful as I and other Senators, hopefully with him, continue to work to provide our leadership with a framework within which this can be achieved.

Mr. WARNER. Each Senator has an opportunity to address that.

Mr. WARNER. Primarily, Mr. President, international intervention of some type.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield on our time. The distinguished ranking member of the Armed Services Committee and I, the distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations and Senator Moynihan--a group of us are trying to work on a framework for the purpose of our two respective leaders, and, indeed, the President is involved. Yesterday, in the course of our hearings, I addressed my concern--I support the delay of the final consideration, as now under the UC, but I am also very concerned that whenever the Senate resumes consideration of this treaty it be done in a time period after careful records have been created on this treaty and questions that concern General Powell about the conflict of testimony have been resolved to the best of our ability, and that it not be done under the dynamics of the U.S. constitutional process of electing a President and the Members of the Congress. That is the thing that concerns me. Those dynamics might, in all fairness, affect the outcome of this treaty which could be adverse to the national security interests of this Nation and our allies who depend upon us. In searching for the format of a consensus to move off the UC consent of having the vote next week, we need to address that issue. Will my dear colleague say exactly what he did in open session yesterday about how he basically endorses my concerns over the year of the national elections under our Constitution?

Mr. WARNER. They are very important reasons, Mr. President.

Mr. WARNER. The reasons he gave me are in view of the conflicting testimony that has evolved since the point in time at which he made that statement. That is the predicate on which he now thinks the vote should be delayed.

Mr. WARNER. Earlier, my distinguished colleague referred to General Powell. I have had the opportunity to be counseling with General Powell, soliciting his views, and he has been soliciting mine for some several days. He just telephoned me because he is watching this debate. He authorized me to say the following, that in view of the mounting conflicting testimony--primarily before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the course of the three hearings which my colleague is now addressing and I shall address at some point here--in view of the mounting conflict of testimony, particularly as it relates to the credibility of this deterrent and, indeed, safety issues--we need only look at the testimony by the lab Directors yesterday--he has authorized me to say at this time he joins those who recommended the delay of final consideration of the treaty at this point in time. That should be clearly understood. He feels it should not be killed because he thinks, hopefully, if it is modified in certain ways, that it can be another brick in our walkway leading towards nonproliferation and stronger arms control regimes. However, at this time, he wishes to be on record as saying the Senate should not act and should not act because of the mounting conflicting testimony on the key essential elements that he and other uniformed officers--I addressed this earlier in the safeguards provision and likewise, which says at some point in time a President could withdraw from this treaty because of information brought to his attention. So that is an important part of the treaty. It is under the ``supreme'' clause, which is in all of our treaties, but it is amplified. So I just wanted to correct the record.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator. I yield the floor because I know others are anxious to speak.

Mr. WARNER. I say to my friend, I will work during the course of the day, and he has indicated a willingness to join me in this venture.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have had some discussions with the distinguished senior Senator from New York, as have others, on the question of the timing of the Senate's final deliberation of the treaty. Indeed, I think our leadership and all of us are looking at this in a very serious way. But it seems to me--and this is my judgment--that an element of such consideration has to be a recognition that under our Constitution, next year elections are held across this Nation for the Office of the Presidency, one-third of the Senate, and the entire House. To inject a treaty which, in the minds of many--not this Senator, but I respect the views of others--is so vital to our security interests into that atmosphere and the dynamics of an election year, in my judgment, would not give a fair and objective opportunity for this treaty to be considered solely on its merits. I use the phrase ``solely on its merits.'' Does my colleague agree with me?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question on my time?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in fairness to other Senators, we must yield the floor. However, I hope at some point this issue is revisited with my good friend, the distinguished Senator from Delaware. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I simply focus your attention on one or more nations, should this treaty be ratified, saying there is no necessity for us to launch our own program because there stands the United States, the leader. And nowhere in the history of the United States have we ever exercised such a clause as this, I say to my good friend. I don't think there is a precedent in our 200-year history of ever pulling out. But, nevertheless, we could be faced with those facts. Otherwise, there would have been no reason to have put that clause in there. It was a real situation to the President at that time in transmitting the treaty to the Senate that these conditions could arise, and he put that clause in. I daresay it was put in there such as the military uniformed community could lend their support. But what happens to that nation that did not start this program and 10 or 12 years hence is left out there? Take, for example, Japan. It has the capacity to generate a program in a matter of a few years. They have relied in many respects on our nuclear deterrent. But if that is ever put in doubt, that nation and others would want to start this program. But it would take a decade for them--perhaps not Japan but most nations--to put into place any credible nuclear deterrent. I say to my good friend--I know other Senators want to speak; it is important, and we are going to have a good debate today--in my opinion, you jeopardize substantially the world community if at any time you say we might pull out pursuant to that clause.

Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on the time allocated to those in opposition, I want to ask my good friend a question. First, we joined this institution at about the same time a number of years ago. I very much respect the Senator. So much of the Senator's career has been devoted to international relations, and he reflects very warmly one of the great teachers he had, and that was Senator Tower, former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. But I want to go back to a particular reference that the Senator made in his opening remarks to the support by the uniformed officers of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and others for this treaty. It is true that there is a division of opinion between the Joint Chiefs. I don't speak in terms of those in opposition today, but I mean those who precede. We have letters on both sides pointing out how men and women of good conscience--men and women who have had extensive experience in these fields--are different on this treaty. But the question I put to my good friend relates to the President's letter of transmittal of this treaty on September 22, 1997. I am reading from that document which accompanied the treaty to the Senate. There is a provision in there called ``the safeguards.'' I recite a sentence of that. The understanding that if the President of the United States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE)--advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command--that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type that the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with the Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard ``supreme national interests'' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required. Speaking for myself--and I have in the course of the last several days as Chairman of the Armed Services Committee dealt extensively with this entire issue before the Senate today--I have time and time again referred to the fact that it is my conclusion, drawn from talking with a number of these senior military officers who have given their support, and who in years past have given their support, that it is this clause that is the foundation for their opinion of support. But I say to my good friend that were we to ratify this treaty, and if it would go into force, then many nations could rely on the act of the United States--as a matter of fact, one of the principal reasons for this treaty is to induce other nations to follow--and then 8, 10, or 15 years down the road we exercise the right under this, what happens to those nations? They are left out there stripped of protection that they could, with their own systems, have developed. And, worse yet, if we were ever compelled to announce to the world that we have concern about the credibility and safety of our nuclear arsenal, that would send a frightening message across the land that what we have had in place these 50 years, referred to as the ``nuclear umbrella,'' which umbrella preserved the peace from major conflict in Europe for 50 years, is now in doubt. Mr. President, as you talk about who is supporting the treaty, let's go back and examine the reasons. I say that the military relied very heavily on that clause. In my judgment, if that clause were ever utilized, this country would be in a far worse position than if the Senate were to exercise its right and withhold the advice and consent on ratification. I ask my good friend, if that clause were invoked, what would be the reality among the world's community of nations? What would be the reality of the signal going out that our credible deterrent is in question?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield time.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Page 50 of the official transcript of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is 117 pages. I sat there for 5 hours 10 minutes. How well I know the various parts of this system. I was weary after 3 days of testimony. But it is all here for all Senators to read. I invite them to spend as much time as they can on the record. It comes down to honest men, well-intentioned individuals--men and women on both sides of the issue--cannot agree, and should we move forward with a treaty that will vitally affect our security interests, unless the preponderance of the evidence is overwhelming, and beyond a reasonable doubt? Give us the certainty to make that step. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. I ask the Chair to report the pending business.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each, with the exception of the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, who will take such time as he may require to deliver a very important address to the Senate.