John Warner

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. I appreciate that. But the question before the Chair is, if we do not have time within that hour, are we then unable to speak?

Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague. I know we can go to the bank on your word. I withdraw any objection.

Mr. WARNER. Reserving the right to object, would the Senator allow me to ask unanimous consent that I be recognized following the conclusion of such time as the Senator from West Virginia takes?

Mr. WARNER. I would presume that I would have whatever time is between the conclusion of the Senator from West Virginia and 4 o'clock.

Mr. WARNER. I intend to share it with other colleagues.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say this to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia. I have been privileged to be here but a small fraction of the time that he has, 29 years here and well over 40 for my colleague from West Virginia, but in that period we have worked many times on behalf of coal miners.

Mr. WARNER. As the Presiding Officer recognized, my fellow colleague from Virginia, our States are joined.

Mr. WARNER. Those mines have a great deal of comparability, those in Virginia and those in West Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. They are joined. The plight of the miners and their families has been a subject that no Senator in the modern history of this Senate has fought harder for than the senior senator from West Virginia, and very often you have involved me and my colleagues, whoever they might be. I have served with three now, the distinguished Harry Byrd, Jr., whom you will recall, Senator Robb, and Senator Allen. All of us have worked on this subject. I hope to join you on this, and I hope the Presiding Officer, likewise, will work on this subject of coal mine safety. So I thank my friend.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague, and we will work together.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the cloture vote was very fully discussed by the distinguished Senator from Nevada and the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, with leadership and our ranking members, so I am confident that somehow this matter can be worked out. I want you to know, however, that I stand steadfast behind the content of a resolution I put together, along with Senator Ben Nelson, Senator Susan Collins, and some eight other cosponsors. The question is how does the Senate bring it into focus under the complexity of our rules. I won't take the time to deal with that now, but I would say to those following this debate that we stand, the Senators I mentioned, the two principal cosponsors and myself, firmly behind this resolution, the content of which has been amended. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amended copy of the resolution be printed in the Record following my remarks, allowing ready reference for those persons examining the Congressional Record.

Mr. WARNER. That resolution has been distorted and misunderstood in the debate thus far. That is one of the reasons I am so anxious to proceed with this debate. I want to make clear, because it was mentioned that perhaps these resolutions were brought along for political cover, that on that issue each Senator has to speak for themselves, but I assure my colleagues that this Senator from Virginia has moved forward with my thoughts and my ideas in the best interest of the country and the best interest of the men and women of the United States military, and not for any political cover. Nor will I, in any way, impugn the motives of Senators whose opinions differ from mine. This being my 29th year in the Senate, I have never, to my knowledge, ever intentionally, and I don't think indirectly, impugned the motive of any Senator for the position he or she has taken on a matter. We are all patriots. We are equal patriots. We all support the men and women of the Armed Forces. Let that be understood. I firmly believe, as we are approaching this debate, that it is imperative that the Senate work its will, and work its will in the open, on this issue which is so critical at this point in time in our many years of involvement in the Iraq situation. I solidly support the President in his view that we cannot accept failure in getting a government, whether it is this one or an ensuing government, in Iraq up and running and functioning such that it can seize the full range of sovereignty in this nation, and not let this nation implode, causing absolute disaster throughout the region. Indeed, certainly as it relates to energy and other issues, it could impact severely on the rest of the world, not only in energy but in a signal that the terrorists have won. We cannot let that happen. So let's let the Senate work its will, and I think our colleagues here, the distinguished leaders, will work out a procedure by which we will do that. The comment was made, and understandably, that this is a nonbinding resolution. Nonbinding. Well, we have them in the history of the Senate. At this time, this Senator is not voting for any cutoff of funds. That is our one constitutional lever we can pull. As a matter of fact, in our resolution--I refer to our resolution as the one that I, together with Senator Ben Nelson and Senator Susan Collins of Maine have put together--we specifically have included an iteration of the concept advanced by our distinguished colleague Senator Gregg, which may come before the Senate. We solidly support that concept of no cutoff of funds. What do we do short of that? Well, we have a debate. Somehow you have to have some focal point, something written down, some document in writing as to the ability of this institution, the Senate, to reach a consensus, and a bipartisan consensus, on how best we go forward with a new strategy in Iraq. That has been my motivation from the very beginning, to put this institution on record on a bipartisan basis. I am not talking about one or two Senators on that side joining all the Senators on this side or vice versa, no, a truly on its face bipartisan consensus, albeit a resolution without any legal force and effect. It is important that the people of this country give their support to the men and women in uniform and to a strategy which they hope will succeed in our goal of not letting Iraq implode and fall into greater disaster than it is experiencing today. So how do they go about it? The President, in his speech on January 10, explicitly said those who have other ideas, generally speaking, or concepts, bring them forward. That is what we have done. We have exercised what the President has given us, the option to come forward. To quote the President: ``If Members,'' referring to Congress, ``have improvements that can be made, we will make them,'' he said. ``If circumstances change, we will adjust, showing flexibility,'' said the President. Using that as our chart, we then proceeded as a group to figure out how best to comment on the President's strategy. We did say, and I repeat it, that the Senate disagrees with the plan to augment our forces by 21,500 and urge the President, instead, to consider all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic goals set forth below. Each Senator has to interpret that phrase, that sentence, as he or she so desires. I repeat that. Each Senator has the right to look at that and decide, one, do you disagree in any way with what the President is doing and the force of 21,500. I believe we can accomplish the goals this country has set out to accomplish in Iraq, goals that were enumerated by the Baker-Hamilton commission, in a manner that we do not need a full force of 21,500. Indeed, that force, we now learn, could be somewhat higher than that number if you are going to have the essential support troops joined. Unfortunately, there was no reference to that made in the President's speech, and right now it is a matter of debate and contention. I don't know what the additional figure is, but in my judgment, I say most respectfully that we do not in this resolution in any way challenge or contravene the constitutional provision that you are Commander in Chief and that you can deploy troops which, in your best judgment, are for the security of this Nation and the welfare of the troops. We don't challenge that. We simply accept your offer, we have expressed it, so we support it. I support, for example, additional troops if they are necessary over and above the current level for operations in Al Anbar. On my last trip to that region, it was clear that the marines had enough troops to do certain portions of their mission, but it was also clear that additional forces were needed. Perhaps they could come from within the current force structure currently in Iraq. But perhaps you need--to use the word ``surge''--some modest surge to meet the requirements for Al- Anbar to be brought under a higher level of security. Nothing in this resolution prohibits the President from having some portion of that surge force of 21,500 utilized to do those things which are essential--further training of the Iraqi forces, further embedding, enlarging the number of troops to be embedded with the Iraqi forces. Those are the sorts of things this Senator supports. Within the framework of this resolution, I can take those stands. But I turn now to the principal thing we have in this resolution, and that is one of the main things that I believe has to have greater emphasis. It is as follows. We state it very clearly in a provision in our resolution: The United States military operations should, as much as possible, be confined to these goals, which were enumerated by the Baker-Hamilton Commission. I go back and I read the goals here, all set forth on page 6 of the resolution. The military part of this strategy should: focus on maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, supporting Iraqi efforts to bring greater security to Baghdad, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for their own security. Therein is the principal motivation.

Mr. WARNER. I wonder if I could ask unanimous consent that I could proceed until such time as Senators desiring to come forth and address the standing order, namely----

Mr. WARNER. Fine, if the Presiding Officer desires to do that.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. I wonder if I can ask unanimous consent at this time to proceed for another 5 minutes. Seeing my distinguished colleague on the Senate floor----

Mr. WARNER. If I might finish the unanimous consent request? Then I will be happy to listen to the Senator. In other words, at this point in time I ask unanimous consent that we proceed as in morning business such that I could complete in 5 minutes. And my distinguished colleague. We have been waiting for about 2 hours this afternoon. I do not know--perhaps I am mistaken--if there are Senators in the Chamber who wish to address the subject matter of the order just given by the Chair. I wouldn't want to interfere with them going forward.

Mr. WARNER. If I might say to my distinguished colleague, Mr. Reed of Rhode Island, I think the Chair has granted me 5 minutes, to be followed by a period of about 5 minutes to my colleague from Nebraska, Senator Ben Nelson. From that point on, there may be those who wish to address the underlying order, or the Chair could recognize other Senators who wish to speak on the subject.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Presiding Officer and the preceding Presiding Officer, my distinguished colleague. I was speaking about the need to have greater involvement of the Iraqi forces. I ask unanimous consent to have this chart printed in today's Record.

Mr. WARNER. It is dated as of January 27, 2007. It says, ``Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance--Iraq Security Forces.'' It lays it out. This is what the American taxpayer has been expending--an enormous sum of money for 2\1/2\ years to train the Iraqi forces. I bring to your attention, for the Ministry of Defense Forces: the army, 132,700; air force, 900; the navy, 1,100; total, 134,700. Ministry of Interior, trained and equipped: police, 135,000; national police, 24,400; other MOI forces, 28,900; total, 188,300. That is a total of 323,000 forces trained in the past 2\1/2\ years. In the resolution my distinguished colleagues and I have put together, we specifically say look at all options. I say the Iraqi's are the ones who should be responsible for these problems in Baghdad. We will give them support. We will give them the training. But I say to my colleagues here in the Senate, this is what we have trained these people to do. The Iraqi forces understand the language. They understand the culture. How does an American GI, being thrust into the darkened alleys of this city, with all of the crossfire between the Sunni and the Shia, and Shia upon Shia decide whom to shoot, how to direct the force? The National Intelligence Estimate just released made mention of this. The report states--I shall read it. The intelligence community judges that the term ``civil war'' does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qa'ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless, the term ``civil war'' accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacement. I say most respectfully to our President: Mr. President, recognize what we have done in 2\1/2\ years to train these people. Let them take the point. Let them take the brunt of the fight. And maybe we do not need 21,500, together with support troops, to go in and do the job we have trained these people to do themselves. In this regard I would like to quote from T.E. Lawrence. This quote is also cited in the Army Field Manual on Counterinsurgency. Lawrence said: Do not try to do too much with your own hands, better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Additionally, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq also describes a very complex conflict between all parties in Iraq. Putting American soldiers in the midst of that will require military plans and orders to contain exquisite tactical detail sufficient to afford our men and women in uniform the ability to discern friend from foe in an urban environment. I, and others, also remain very concerned about the command and control structure that has been planned for this operation in Baghdad. In his January 10, 2007, address to the Nation, President Bush stated that U.S. troops would be ``embedded'' in Iraqi formations. This left a very serious question about the unity of command. On February 1, General Casey described the command and control as `` a nonstandard arrangement.'' This nonstandard arrangement must be clarified and our resolution addresses this serious concern. I yield the floor. Exhibit 1 S. Con. Res. 7 Whereas we respect the Constitutional authorities given a President in article II, section 2, which states that ``The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States''; it is not the intent of this resolution to question or contravene such authority, but to accept the offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007, that, ``if members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust''; Whereas the United States strategy and operations in Iraq can only be sustained and achieved with support from the American people and with a level of bipartisanship; Whereas over 137,000 American military personnel are currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the United States Armed Forces, and are deserving of the support of all Americans, which they have strongly; Whereas many American service personnel have lost their lives, and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and the American people will always honor their sacrifices and honor their families; Whereas the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their Reserve and National Guard organizations, together with components of the other branches of the military, are under enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan; Whereas these deployments, and those that will follow, will have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention and readiness of our Nation's all volunteer force; Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that ``calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq''; Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723, approved November 28, 2006, ``determin[ed] that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security''; Whereas Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever- widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence based upon political distrust and cultural differences between some Sunni and Shia Muslims; Whereas Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq; Whereas the responsibility for Iraq's internal security and halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces; Whereas U.S. Central Command Commander General John Abizaid testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, ``I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked together. And I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future''; Whereas Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on November 27, 2006, that ``The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians''; Whereas there is growing evidence that Iraqi public sentiment opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, much less increasing the troop level; Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private sector, began to express concern that the situation in Iraq was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; and, as a consequence, the Administration began an intensive, comprehensive review by all components of the Executive Branch to devise a new strategy; Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy that includes ``new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly''; Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new strategy (hereinafter referred to as the ``plan''), which consists of three basic elements: diplomatic, economic, and military; the central component of the military element is an augmentation of the present level of the U.S. military forces through additional deployments of approximately 21,500 U.S. military troops to Iraq; Whereas, on January 10, 2007, the President said that the ``Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two deputy commanders for their capital'' and that U.S. forces will ``be embedded in their formations''; and in subsequent testimony before the Armed Services Committee on January 25, 2007, by the retired former Vice Chief of the Army it was learned that there will also be a comparable U.S. command in Baghdad, and that this dual chain of command may be problematic because ``the Iraqis are going to be able to move their forces around at times where we will disagree with that movement'', and called for clarification; Whereas this proposed level of troop augmentation far exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the reinforcements that would be necessary to implement the various options for a new strategy, and led many members of Congress to express outright opposition to augmenting our troops by 21,500; Whereas the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband militias, consider Constitutional amendments and enact laws to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve the quality of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, despite those promises, little has been achieved; Whereas the President said on January 10, 2007, that ``I've made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended'' so as to dispel the contrary impression that exists; and Whereas the recommendations in this resolution should not be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in, or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now, therefore, be it-- Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the Senate disagrees with the ``plan'' to augment our forces by 21,500, and urges the President instead to consider all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic goals set forth below; (2) the Senate believes the United States should continue vigorous operations in Anbar province, specifically for the purpose of combating an insurgency, including elements associated with the Al Qaeda movement, and denying terrorists a safe haven; (3) the Senate believes a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long- term security interests of the United States are best served by an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and serve as an ally in the war against extremists; (4) the Congress should not take any action that will endanger United States military forces in the field, including the elimination or reduction of funds for troops in the field, as such an action with respect to funding would undermine their safety or harm their effectiveness in pursuing their assigned missions; (5) the primary objective of the overall U.S. strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen the unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in the security situation; (6) the military part of this strategy should focus on maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, supporting Iraqi efforts to bring greater security to Baghdad, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for their own security; (7) United States military operations should, as much as possible, be confined to these goals, and should charge the Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian violence; (8) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should reflect this delineation of responsibilities, and the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should clarify the command and control arrangements in Baghdad; (9) the United States Government should transfer to the Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, such equipment as is necessary; (10) the United States Government should engage selected nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process for Iraq; (11) the Administration should provide regular updates to the Congress, produced by the Commander of United States Central Command and his subordinate commanders, about the progress or lack of progress the Iraqis are making toward this end; and (12) our overall military, diplomatic, and economic strategy should not be regarded as an ``open-ended'' or unconditional commitment, but rather as a new strategy that hereafter should be conditioned upon the Iraqi government's meeting benchmarks that must be delineated in writing and agreed to by the Iraqi Prime Minister. Such benchmarks should include, but not be limited to, the deployment of that number of additional Iraqi security forces as specified in the plan in Baghdad, ensuring equitable distribution of the resources of the Government of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the oil resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner, and the authority of Iraqi commanders to make tactical and operational decisions without political intervention.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will not, I would like to have Senator Collins included for 10 minutes.

Mr. WARNER. Could Senator Collins be accommodated subsequent to the other names that have been enumerated, just to add her to the list, for 10 minutes?

Mr. WARNER. Very well. I will try and work with colleagues to see if we can find time for Senator Collins on somebody else's time.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair. My question to my good friend and colleague is as follows: This debate is well under way. The plans are being discussed. I just inquired at the desk, and the McCain resolution is not filed. Yet I understood you to say it had been filed. Could you help clarify for the Senate the position on that?

Mr. WARNER. But it is not a part of the record so----

Mr. WARNER. I feel very strongly that the Senate should work its will on facts that are out in the open. I have filed my resolutions, one after the other, at the desk so all Senators could have the benefit. Is that a possibility, that we could have the benefit of this resolution?