John Warner

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. WARNER. I am 99.99 percent certain that this would be the last vote at 8:00.

Mr. WARNER. That is the intent.

Mr. WARNER. That is the prerogative of the leader, but I have reason to believe that you are correct.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say in reply that this section was crafted with the views of the Secretary of Defense firmly in mind. Nothing in this provision prohibits the Secretary from undertaking any action he plans for fiscal year 2000. And since the provision expires at the end of the fiscal year 2000, we will have the opportunity in the next year to review any new recommendations coming from the administration. A year from now we will have more clarity, hopefully, of the relationship with China, of the relationship with Russia and, indeed, this Senator's concern about North Korea and its advancements in missile technology. So I think we can focus on the superpowers but this, in my judgment, talks to the entire strategic defense of the United States of America.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is correct. But I am advised by the principal sponsor, Senator Allard, that the matter has been settled. It is being written up. Of course, Senator Harkin would be consulted. If for any reason that writing fails to resolve it, then we will have to revisit this amendment tomorrow at a time that you and I will discuss to accommodate Senator Harkin and other Senators.

Mr. WARNER. I think it is gone, but what is on your mind?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that is quite clear. I will read the UC and incorporate that in it. This gives an opportunity for Senators to plan the balance of the evening. I now ask unanimous consent that when Senator Smith from New Hampshire offers an amendment regarding Kosovo, which will take place not later than the hour of 7:00, there be 60 minutes of debate equally divided in the usual form prior to a vote on or in relation to the amendment. I finally ask consent that no amendment be in order to the amendment prior to the vote.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I know of no amendments at this point. I ask unanimous consent that prior to the motion to table there be no amendments in order.

Mr. WARNER. With that representation, I ask unanimous consent that we proceed to the amendment by the Senator from Nebraska for a time not to exceed 40 minutes under the control of the Senator from Nebraska and, say, 5 minutes under the control of the Senator from Virginia, making a total of 45 minutes. At the conclusion of that we will proceed to a vote.

Mr. WARNER. I realize that what I offered to the Senator is hopefully a reduced period of time. In return, there would be no further debate on this side. That is a fairly generous offer. I thought we were in the area of 40 minutes.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the managers are desiring to turn to the Senator from Nebraska who desires additional time. Can we enter into a colloquy on this subject?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have listened very intently to my colleague from New Hampshire, and I have studied the history of the Indianapolis. His opening statement I found persuasive to the point where I would like to go back to neutral on any question of tabling and offer to my good friend the opportunity for the Senate Armed Services Committee to have a hearing, because, as you recall yesterday--I certainly do vividly, because I spent hours in the debate--our distinguished colleague, Senator Roth of Delaware, brought in a most significant record, and I think the Senate would likewise want a live record on this critical issue that you bring before the Senate. Therefore, a hearing would avail you--and I hope you would avail yourself to chair that hearing--of the opportunity to develop a record to bring to the Senate so Senators would have the benefit of that record to make this important vote. For that reason--perhaps you would like to finish your presentation tonight so it is there in the Record--perhaps you will consider that, and we will not proceed with the amendment further, that you will take it down. Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the adjournment resolution, which is at the desk, and further that the resolution be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I just ask if we could have one variation. At the conclusion of the vote on the amendment of the Senator from Washington, I would be prepared to work out an opportunity for the Senator from Florida to be recognized and lay down an amendment.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I add to that a 5 o'clock vote on amendment No. 392.

Mr. WARNER. We have done that before. It may be somewhat inconvenient, but it is important to keep the momentum of this bill going. We have had superb cooperation from all Senators. I would like to make note that we have only had two quorum calls in 3 days. Mr. President, I now propound a unanimous consent request that the Senator from Washington be permitted to go forward with her amendment at this time, with a 1-hour time agreement, equally divided between the Senator from Washington and the Senator from New Hampshire, and at the conclusion of that hour, there be a motion to table by the Senator from New Hampshire and then a rollcall vote. We will get the yeas and nays later.

Mr. WARNER. I have no objection.

Mr. WARNER. I think we are ready to solve it. Would the Senator have a colloquy with our colleague?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think I can clarify the situation very quickly. The Senator from Virginia has propounded a UC to permit the Senator from Washington to have an hour equally divided, after which time there will be a tabling motion by the Senator from New Hampshire and then a vote. That was before the Chair at the time our colleague from Texas sought recognition for the purpose of trying to reconcile an understanding between himself and the ranking member. Apparently, at this time, we cannot achieve that reconciliation. It is my hope that the two Senators can continue to work and will permit the Senate to go forward with the amendment of the Senator from Washington.

Mr. WARNER

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I cannot accept the basic premise on which the distinguished Senator from Delaware addresses his case; that is, that there was a disposition among good and honest men not to accord fairness, equity, and justice to these two individuals. They were the subject of repeated inquiries. As a matter of fact, the Roberts Commission was headed by a Supreme Court Justice. Throughout the whole judicial history, in the common law of England, which we incorporated in our judicial history, speedy trial is the essence of our justice. The appellate procedure has to thereafter proceed with some expedition. You cannot wait 50-some-plus years to address an issue such as this. What do you say to the congressional committee? Do you dispute the findings of this committee?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, last night the distinguished Senator Roth and I had an extensive debate on this issue, and we are basically covering much of the same ground this morning. I repeat, I just got off the phone with the Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen, his predecessor, Bill Perry. The Dorn report went through this whole case very carefully. I recited the list of some nine tribunals, including the Congress of the United States, that reviewed this matter, and certainly did not reach any conclusion that the action to which my good friend and colleague, the Senator from Delaware, asks the Senate to do today. I associate myself with the remarks of our colleague from Texas. But it is interesting. This is very extensive research performed by our colleague. I took the liberty of taking the book last night and going home to read it, which is a summary of the congressional hearings. What I find interesting is that the Congress absolutely put forward some of the most distinguished Members of the House and the Senate to form the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Alben Barkley, Senator from Kentucky was the chairman; Jere Cooper, Representative from Tennessee, was the Vice Chairman. On the Senate side, just look at the names of the individuals. Based on my own not personal knowledge but study of their careers in the Senate, they certainly were viewed as among the giants of the Senate during that critical period in history of World War II: Walter F. George, Senator from Georgia; Scott Lucas, Senator from Illinois; Owen Brewster, Senator from Maine; Homer Ferguson, Senator from Michigan. They were the elderly statesmen, the leaders of the Senate. In their report, this is what the Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack found. I refer to page 252. It says: ``Specifically, the Hawaiian commands failed'' to do the following. By ``the Hawaiian commands,'' of course, they are referring to the Naval command under Admiral Kimmel and the Army command under General Short: (a) To discharge their responsibilities in the light of the warnings received from Washington, other information possessed by them, and the principle of command by mutual cooperation. The record astonishingly shows that these two senior officers, located on the principal islands of Hawaii, just did not collaborate together and share information and ideas as to how best to plan for the defense of the men and women of the Armed Forces, our interest in the islands at that time, and the critical assets; namely, Naval ships and aircraft that were located at that forward deployed area. (b) To integrate and coordinate the facilities for defense and to alert properly the Army and Navy establishments in Hawaii, particularly in the light of the warnings and intelligence available to them during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941. (c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each of them with the operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security, and to exchange fully all significant intelligence. I am going to repeat that--failure to exchange between the two of them and with their subordinant significant intelligence. (d) To maintain a more effective reconnaissance within the limits of their equipment. (e) To effect a state of readiness throughout the Army and Navy establishments designed to meet all possible attacks. (f) To employ the facilities, materiel, and personnel at their command, which were adequate at least to have greatly minimized the effects of the attack, in repelling the Japanese raiders. (g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence and other information available to them. In fairness, I will read another finding, and that is: The errors made by the Hawaiian commands were errors of judgment and not derelictions of duty. Had there been dereliction of duty, these two men would have been court-martialed. But that was the decision made by the President of the United States, two successive Presidents--Roosevelt and Truman--not to do that. But they found them guilty of errors of judgment. What we are asked to do is to put this body on notice that we are reversing the findings of the distinguished bipartisan panel of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives after taking all of this factual evidence into consideration. Look at the voluminous factual situation. I asked my good friend last night: Are there any new facts on which the Senate could have as a predicate the changing of this decision of the joint congressional committee? And, quite candidly, my colleague from Delaware said no. Just to bring to the attention of the Senate one other part in this report, it states on page 556: The commanding officers in Hawaii had a particular responsibility for the defense of the Pacific Fleet and the Hawaiian coastal frontier. This responsibility they failed to discharge. I repeat, Mr. President, ``This responsibility they failed to discharge.'' The failure of the Washington authorities to perform their responsibility provides extenuating circumstances for the failures of these commanders in the field. This committee took into consideration that there were other failures but there were extenuating circumstances to bring the judgment of this panel to the conclusion that a court-martial was not to be held. But they were to be retired in the grades which they were in at permanent rank. In this record is a request by these two officers to be retired, and the decision was made not to advance them at the time of retirement to the higher grade. That decision was made by individuals who had fresh of mind the facts of this case. For us at this date and time to try to reverse that, in my judgment, would be to say to all of the tribunals that looked at this case--I will recite them again--the Knox investigation of December 1941; the Roberts Commission of January 1941; the Hart investigation of June 1944; Army Pearl Harbor Board, October of 1944; Navy Court of Inquiry, October of 1944; Clark investigation, September of 1944; Hewitt inquiry, July of 1945----

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Virginia be given an additional 5 minutes.

Mr. WARNER. The Clausen investigation, September 12, 1945; and, the joint congressional committee of May of 1945. It is the joint congressional committee record--to now, after these many 50-plus years, go back and reverse the decisions of all of this work done by individuals, as the Senator from Texas pointed out, with the authority to render such judgments would be to say to them: All of you are in error for not having done what the Senator from Delaware requested the Senate do these 50-plus years later. I just think that is a very unwise decision. I think the Senator from Delaware has put an awful lot of hard work into this. I respect him for it. But I simply cannot support the Senator, nor can the current Secretary of Defense, and, indeed, the previous Secretary of Defense, and others who have looked at this set of documents previously. I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will yield, the amendment, as carefully crafted, does not have the word ``legal'' in it. It imposes any ``new commitment.'' Indeed, there are political commitments that give rise to actions from time to time. So I recognize the Senator's focus on ``legal,'' but it does not limit the certification solely to legal. It embraces any new commitment or obligation of the United States.